JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP ROBERT B. KAPLAN (Bar No. 76950) rbk@jmbm.com THOMAS M. GEHER (Bar No. 130588) tgeher@jmbm.com Two Embarcadero Center, 5th Floor San Francisco, California 94111-3813 (415) 398-8080 Telephone: Facsimile: (415) 398-5584 5 Attorneys for UMPQUA BANK 6 7 8 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA ROSA DIVISION 10 11 Case No. 24-10545 In re 12 LEFEVER MATTSON, a California (Jointly Administered) corporation, et al.¹, 13 Chapter 11 14 Debtors. 15 In re Case No. 24-10715 (CN) 16 KS MATTSON PARTNERS, LP, Chapter 11 17 Debtor. RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION OF 18 UMPOUA BANK TO MOTION FOR SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION OF 19 **DEBTORS LEFEVER MATTSON AND** KS MATTSON PARTNERS, LP 20 Date: July 18, 2025 21 Time: 11:00 a.m. Ctrm: 215 22 23 24 25 ¹ The last four digits of LeFever Mattson's tax identification number are 7537. Due to the large 26 number of debtor entities in these Chapter 11 Cases, a complete list of the Debtors and the last four digits of their federal tax identification numbers is not provided herein. A complete list of such information may be obtained on the website of the Debtors' claims and noticing agent at https://veritaglobal.net/LM. The address for service on the Debtors is 6359 Auburn Blvd., Suite B.

ase: 734/5110715 Doc# 182 Filed: 07/01/25 Entered: 07/01 591054525073100000000015

UMPQUA BANK OPPOSITION RE SUBSTANTIVE CONSULIDATION MUTTON

Citrus Heights, CA 95621.

INTRODUCTION

The Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Substantiative Consolidation of Debtor LeFever Mattson and KS Mattson Partners, LP ("Motion") to substantively consolidate the separate bankruptcy estates of (i) LeFever Mattson, a California corporation ("LFM"), and (ii) KS Mattson Partners, LP ("KSMP") (the "Motion") is premature and not supported by any admissible evidence. Thus, the Motion should be denied without prejudice at this time or alternatively, continued to a date well beyond the August 8, 2025 deadline currently set forth the filing of KSMP's Statement of Financial Affairs and Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Significantly, at the hearing held on June 24, 2025 on KS Mattson Partners, LP's Motion for Entry of an Order (I) Extending Time to File Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, Statement of Financial Affairs and List of Equity Security Holders, and (II) Suspending the Governmental Bar Date, this Court also raised the issue about the premature nature of the Motion.

On September 12, 2024, LFM commenced its chapter 11 case. On November 24, 2024, an Involuntary Petition was filed against KSMP. On June 9, 2025, an Order for Relief was entered against KSMP and, as a result, KSMP became a chapter 11 debtor in possession. See, Motion, page 11 of 262, lines 1-9. On June 16 and 24, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered interim and final Orders (KSMP docket nos. 145 and 172), respectively, appointing Robbin L. Itkin as the responsible individual for KSMP. Ms. Itkin remains KSMP's responsible individual.

No Schedules, Statement of Financial Affairs or other required documents setting forth the assets and liabilities of the estate of KSMP have been filed. In the Extension Motion, the Court extended the time for KSMP to file its Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs to August 8, 2025.

Umpqua Bank (the "Bank") is a secured creditor of certain of the jointly administered estates of the "LFM Debtors" and an unsecured creditor of the estates of LFM and KSMP. The Bank made (and filed proofs of claim concerning) separate and distinct secured real estate loans to Debtors RT Golden Hills, LP, River Birch, LP, Sienna Pointe, LLC, Autumn Wood I, LP, Pinewood Condominiums LP, and Vaca Villa Apartments LP. These loans are separately guaranteed by LFM and KSMP. See, Motion, page 30 of 262.

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Due to, among other things, the complete lack of information with respect to the financial affairs, assets, and liabilities of KSMP, no party can make an intelligent decision on whether the requested substantive consolidation is beneficial or harmful to them, individually, or the separate creditor groups of LFM and KSMP. Thus, the Motion is premature. Further, the Motion makes many statements and offers various opinions to attempt to support the requested substantive consolidation, but there is absolutely no admissible evidence to support the Motion. The declaration of Mr. Golden (LFM docket no. 1586), one of the LFM Creditors' Committees' many lawyers working on this matter, lacks foundation. Mr. Golden has absolutely no personal knowledge concerning the multitude of hearsay documents attached to the Motion or the contents or creation of such documents, and the documents attached to the Motion and referred to in Mr. Golden's declaration are hearsay, not properly authenticated and are inadmissible. As the Motion lacks admissible evidence, it must be denied without prejudice at this time.

SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION OF LFM AND KSMP SHOULD BE DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

A. General Principles Concerning Substantive Consolidation.

Substantive consolidation "is an extreme and unusual remedy." *Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy)*, 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002).

"Proponents of substantive consolidation have the burden of showing one or the other rationale for consolidation." *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 212 (3rd Cir. 2005).

"Substantive consolidation 'is no mere instrument of procedural convenience ... but a measure vitally affecting substantive rights,' (citation omitted) to 'be used sparingly' (citation omitted)." *In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2nd Cir. 1988). (See also, *In re Bonham*, 229 F.3d 750, 767 (9th Cir. 2000)("resort to consolidation ... should not be Pavlovian, (citation omitted), but as almost every other court has noted, should be used 'sparingly' (citation omitted).")

"Indeed, because substantive consolidation is extreme ... and imprecise, this 'rough justice' remedy should be rare and, in any event, one of last resort after considering and rejecting other remedies (for example, the possibility of more precise remedies conferred by the Bankruptcy

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Code[, such as the avoidance and recovery of (i) fraudulent conveyances under Bankruptcy Code §§ 548 and 544])." *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3rd Cir. 2005).

"Other remedies, such as the doctrines of alter ego and fraudulent conveyance, may be available, and appropriate under the circumstances, and the bankruptcy court should duly make such considerations. Substantive consolidation should not be used as 'a 'free pass' to spare [d]ebtors or any other group from proving challenges, like fraudulent transfer claims, that are liberally brandished to scare yet are hard to show.'... if the objectors to substantive consolidation were as vulnerable to the fraudulent transfer challenges as alleged, 'then the game should be played to the finish in that arena.' (citation omitted.)" *In the Matter of AMCO Insurance*, 444 F.3d 690, 696, fn 5 (5th Cir. 2006). See also, *Owens Corning* at 211.

"Substantive consolidation should be used only after it has been determined that all creditors will benefit because untangling [of affairs] is either impossible or so costly as to consume the assets [of the entities]. Otherwise, for example, a series of fraudulent conveyances might be viewed as resulting in a 'commingling' that justified substantive consolidation. ...

Commingling, therefore, can justify substantive consolidation only where 'the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [is] so substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the creditors.' (citation omitted.)" *Augie/Restivo* at 519.

Based upon the foregoing principles and the lack of admissible evidence supporting the Motion, the Motion should be denied without prejudice at this time.

B. The Motion is Premature and Should Be Denied.

The Motion was filed a mere (i) eleven (11) days after KSMP became a debtor in this Court and (ii) four (4) days after Ms. Itkin was initially appointed as the interim responsible individual for KSMP. As a result of the foregoing, at this time, KSMP has not filed its Schedules, Statement of Financial Affairs and other required documents to disclose to all creditors and interested parties KSMP's assets, liabilities and financial affairs. Further, KSMP just recently obtained, by Order of this Court, an extension to and through August 8, 2025, to file such documents. See, Order, KSMP docket no. 173. The Creditors' Committee for the LFM Debtors appears to be taking advantage of this lack of information to obtain substantive consolidation

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before any meaningful analysis can take place to determine whether LFM and KSMP are so "hopelessly entangled" that the "time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble [LFM and KSMP] is so substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the creditors' or where no accurate identification and allocation of assets is possible." *Bonham* at 766.

At the hearing on the Extension Motion, a transcript of which is attached to this Response and Opposition of the Bank as Exhibit A, the Court stated as follows:

The Court: It's unlikely I'm going to rule on this motion at the hearing date. How do you file a motion for substantive consolidation . . . when the schedules haven't been filed yet. Mr. Taylor? Transcript, p. 8, lines 11-14.

At this time, due to the lack of any adequate information concerning the assets and liabilities of KSMP, it is simply impossible for this Court, or any creditor or interested party, to make any determination if "all creditors will benefit because untangling [of affairs] is either impossible or so costly as to consume the assets [of the entities]." *Augie/Restivo* at 519. There is no way that any creditor or party in interest can determine whether or not they will be a "winner" or a "loser" as a result of the proposed consolidation. The Bank, due to the lack of information, has no way to determine whether or not the requested consolidation will prejudice its potential recovery on the separate guaranties of LFM and KSMP, if necessary. On this ground alone, the Motion should be denied.

Additionally, notwithstanding the assertion by the LFM Creditors' Committee that the affairs of LFM and KSMP are "so entangled" that the egg cannot be unscrambled, the Motion goes into great detail concerning KSMP's affairs and bank transfers and explains many of the transactions between LFM and KSMP. The detailed allegations set forth in the Motion (which are not supported by any declarations or admissible evidence) suggests that the affairs of LFM and KSMP are not "hopeless entangled." In this day and age, it is standard operating procedure for affiliated entities to (i) have overlapping ownership and control, (ii) share facilities and employees, (iii) have transactions between affiliated entities and (iv) have parent entities, such as LFM and KSMP, provide guaranties for loan transactions involving subsidiaries or affiliated entities managed by the parent entities. Thus, these alleged (and unsupported) facts do not, and should

not, be a basis for the substantive consolidation of LFM and KSMP.

Third, many of the alleged transactions and "facts" used as support for the requested consolidation appear to be potential fraudulent conveyances or other types of transactions that may be avoidable. Substantive consolidation is not a substitute for avoidance actions.

Other remedies, such as the doctrines of alter ego and fraudulent conveyance, may be available, and appropriate under the circumstances, and the bankruptcy court should duly make such considerations. Substantive consolidation should not be used as 'a 'free pass' to spare [d]ebtors or any other group from proving challenges, like fraudulent transfer claims, that are liberally brandished to scare yet are hard to show.'... if the objectors to substantive consolidation were as vulnerable to the fraudulent transfer challenges as alleged, 'then the game should be played to the finish in that arena.' (citation omitted.)

In the Matter of AMCO Insurance, 444 F.3d 690, 696, fn 5 (5th Cir. 2006). See also, Owens Corning at 211.

Finally, in an attempt to convince the parties to not oppose this Motion and convince the Court to grant the Motion, the Creditors' Committee states that the cost to "untangle" or "disentangle" the affairs of LFM and KSMP "will cost more than \$20 million." See, Motion, page 8 of 262, lines 11-14 and page 33 of 262, line 22 through page 34 of 262, line 2. Yet, there is zero evidence on this issue; no declaration of any one has been filed making this statement or explaining the basis for this statement. The only "evidence" (which is inadmissible) supporting the Motion are hearsay documents and other documents and alleged agreements which are not authenticated (and cannot be authenticated by a lawyer for the Creditors' Committee). There is no admissible evidence to support the Motion and, at the final evidentiary hearing, the Bank, as it does here, will object to the offered "evidence" being admitted.

C. The Creditors' Committee Has Not Met Its Burden of Proof.

"Proponents of substantive consolidation have the burden of showing one or the other rationale for consolidation." *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 212 (3rd Cir. 2005). Here, the Creditors' Committee has not met its burden because it has not produced any admissible evidence to support the drastic remedy of substantive consolidation.²

² At the final evidentiary hearing on the Motion, the Bank will, if necessary, raise all appropriate objections to the Creditors' Committee's alleged evidence.

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The only declaration filed in support of the requested consolidation is the declaration of Steven W. Golden (LFM docket no. 1568) ("Golden Decl."), one of the many attorneys representing the LFM Debtors' Creditors' Committee. The Golden Decl. does not contain any substantive testimony. The Golden Decl., based on Mr. Golden's alleged personal knowledge, seeks to introduce documents of third parties that are hearsay, documents that pre-date this bankruptcy case, and documents filed with certain courts, including this Bankruptcy Court.

Not one of the documents attached to the Golden Decl. are admissible. First, all of the documents attached to the Golden Decl. are hearsay. Second, how can Mr. Golden authenticate any of the documents attached to his declaration; he has no personal knowledge concerning the creation of the documents, the execution of the documents or the relevant facts to cause such documents to be "business records." Mr. Golden's employment as one of the many lawyers representing the LFM Debtors' Creditors' Committee does give him special powers to authenticate any records. Third, while some of the offered documents are documents filed with a court (see, Exhibits B, C, and L), that does not make them admissible for the truth of the matters set forth therein. While the Bankruptcy Court may take judicial notice of these documents, judicial notice only allows the Bankruptcy Court to take judicial notice of the existence of the documents and what it says, but not the truth of what is said in the judicially noticed document. See, In re Blumer, 95 B.R. 143, 146 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1988) ("It is well established that a court may take judicial notice of its own records. (Citations omitted.) But this does not mean that a court can take judicial notice of the truth of all documents found within a court's records. That a fact sought 🎨 be noticed is found in a court's records is not talismanic; the fact still must be of a type described in Fed.R.Evid. 201."); M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Construction Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491, (9th Cir. 1983)("a court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in another cause so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a contention in a cause then before it."); and In re Scarpinito, 196 B.R. 257, 267 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("While a bankruptcy judge may take judicial notice of a bankruptcy court's records, see Fed.R.Evid. 201(c), made applicable hereto by Fed.R.Bankr.P 9017 (citations omitted), we may not infer the truth of facts contained in documents, unfettered by rules of

evidence or logic, simply because such documents were filed with the court.") Simply put, no admissible evidence supports the substantive consolidation of LFM and 2 KSMP. The Creditors' Committee has failed to carry its burden of proof. The Motion should be 3 denied without prejudice as premature at this time. 5 **CONCLUSION** Based upon the foregoing, Umpqua Bank respectfully requests that the Motion be denied 6 without prejudice at this time. 7 . 8 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP DATED: July 2, 2025. ROBEFRT B. KAPLAN 10 THOMAS M. GEHER 11 12 /s/ Robert B. Kaplan ROBERT B. KAPLAN 13 Attorneys for Umpqua Bank 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

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UMPQUA BANK OPPOSITION RE SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION MOTION

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EXHIBIT A

Case: 24-10715 Doc# 182-1 Filed: 07/01/25 9 Entered: 07/01/25 15:24:37 (Reg) 10:24-10545 UMPQUA BANK OPPOSITION 12 UBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION MOTION

1 2 APPEARANCES: (All parties appearing via Zoom) 3 Proposed counsel to KS ERIN N. BRADY, ESQ. Hogan Lovells US LLP Mattson Partners, LP: 1999 Avenue of the Stars 4 Suite 1400 Los Angeles, CA 90067 5 6 For KS Mattson Partners, MICHELINE NADEAU FAIRBANK, ESQ. LP and Kenneth Mattson: Fennemore Wendel 7800 Rancharrah Parkway 7 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 788-22008 DAVID A. TAYLOR, ESQ. 9 For LeFever Mattson, a California Corporation and Keller Benvenutti Kim LLP its affiliated debtors: 425 Market Street 10 26th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 11 (415)496-672312 ROBERT B. KAPLAN, ESQ. For Umpqua Bank: Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell 13 LLP Two Embarcadero Center 14 5th Floor 15 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415)398-8080 16 For Socotra Capital, Inc.: CAROLINE R. SISCHO, ESQ. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & 17 Hampton LLP 333 South Hope Street 18 43rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 19 (213)620-178020 For Office of the United PHILLIP SHINE, ESQ. States trustee: U.S. Department of Justice 21 450 Golden Gate Avenue 5th Floor 22 Suite #05-0153 San Francisco, CA 9410 23 (415) 705-3333 24

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          OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2025, 11:05 AM
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          (Call to order of the Court.)
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              THE CLERK: Line item number 2, Your Honor, KS Mattson
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     Partners, LP.
              And I'll bring in the appearances, Your Honor.
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              MS. BRADY: Good morning, Your Honor. Can you hear
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     me?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MS. BRADY: Good morning, Your Honor. It's Erin
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     Brady, from Hogan Lovells, proposed counsel to KSMP. And
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     Robbin Itkin, the responsible individual, is also on the line
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     this morning.
              And we've got two matters up today.
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              THE COURT:
                          Well, hang on. Hang on. Hang on.
              MS. BRADY:
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                          Yep.
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              THE COURT: We've got a full complement of attorneys
     who want to make their appearance.
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              MS. BRADY:
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                          Yes.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. Mr. Taylor?
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              MR. TAYLOR: Yes. Your Honor, good morning. David
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     Taylor, from Keller Benvenutti Kim, for LeFever Mattson and its
     affiliated debtors.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Kaplan?
              MS. FAIRBANK: Good morning, Your Honor. Micheline
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1 Fairbank --

THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Fairbank. I apologize. Go ahead.

MS. FAIRBANK: That's okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

Micheline Fairbank, outgoing attorney for K.S. Matson Partners.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to make an appearance today?

MR. KAPLAN: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Robert Kaplan for Umpqua Bank.

MS. WILSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Brooke Wilson, from Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, for the committee of the LeFever Mattson debtors.

MS. SISCHO: Good morning, Your Honor. Caroline Sischo for secured creditor, Socotra capital.

MR. SHINE: Good morning, Your Honor. Phillip Shine, appearing on behalf of the United States Trustee.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning to you all. There's a few -- as Ms. Brady mentioned, there's a few matters on calendar. Let's first deal with the continued hearing in the debtor's motion for authority to designate Ms. Itkin as the responsible individual. I did see Ms. Itkin's supplemental declaration. I didn't see any opposition by the U.S. Trustee.

Mr. Shine, any opposition to her appointment?

MR. SHINE: Your Honor, we have resolved opposition through the proposed order.

THE COURT: Okay. So the application to appoint her as the responsible individual is granted. And Mr. Shine, again, just upload -- Ms. Brady or Mr. Shine, upload the order and I'll take a look at it and sign it hopefully.

Okay. We also have the debtor's motion to extend the time to file schedules -- I mean, the bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs, list of equity security holders. Let's first deal with that.

Well, the creditors' matrix was timely filed, correct, Ms. Brady?

MS. BRADY: Yes, it was.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. BRADY: Although I fully anticipate it will be amended as we continue to find additional --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BRADY: -- information and creditors.

THE COURT: You read my mind. Okay. How much time do you need to file the schedules and statement of financial affairs?

MS. BRADY: Your Honor, we're asking for sixty days, which puts us -- sixty days after the order for relief, which puts us at August 8th. And we're asking for that simply because we're literally reconstructing the books and records, and it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to file schedules that are completely incomplete only to spend the time and money to

amend them. So we were hoping to get a reasonable amount of time that would give us an opportunity to do it --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BRADY: -- hopefully right.

THE COURT: Okay. How is that going to -- and again, there may not be an answer for this today, but I've got this looming motion for substantive consolidation. And how is that request -- and I'm not saying there's a reason -- this isn't a reason to deny it. I'm going to grant the debtor more time.

Just the question I have is --

MS. BRADY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- what impact does that -- and again, I think I'm hearing the motion for substantive consolidation before August 8th, or at least the initial hearing. How is that going to affect a motion for substantive consolidation, which leads me to the next question, which is who gets served -- creditors of KS Mattson Partners, L.P. get served with the motion for substantive consolidation, even though it's been filed already, correct?

MS. BRADY: That is correct. My understanding, if I -- and counsel for the LeFever Mattson committee can correct me if I'm wrong. My understanding was that we provided them a copy of our creditor matrix, and they filed -- they served it upon the creditors on our matrix as well as their creditor group.

THE COURT: Right.

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MS. BRADY: I think that, to your point, there will probably be new creditors that are uncovered between now and the time -- the 16th of July, for sure. And I'm assuming that they're going to go ahead and serve that as a supplemental service on those creditors. But I'll defer to them as it's their motion.

THE COURT: But it may be a fait accompli if -- again,

I think I've already said I'm not going to rule on it.

MS. BRADY: Right.

THE COURT: It's unlikely I'm going to rule on this at the hearing date. How do you file a motion for substantive consolidation, again, when the schedules haven't been filed yet. Mr. Taylor?

MS. BRADY: I --

THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Brady.

MS. BRADY: Yeah.

THE COURT: I mean, again --

MS. BRADY: Yeah. So I --

THE COURT: Again, I'm just raising questions that I'm going to repeat. Again, it all relates to the debtor's reasonable request for more time to file schedules. So I'm just giving you some advance notice of what my questions are most likely going to be.

MS. BRADY: Your Honor, I think that we also believe

that we can't really evaluate a substantive consolidation motion until we have our arms around what our creditor body looks like and how that would impact our creditor body. So I think Your Honor made the point at our last hearing that the July 16th hearing would be a preliminary hearing. We can obviously talk about it. The committee has been very willing to talk with us about it, very open and communicating.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRADY: And so I do think -- I think, as an initial matter, obviously, we need to understand who the creditors are, what the assets are, all of that, that will go into the statements and schedules. So regardless of whether there's a sub-con or not, this all needs to be figured out.

But I do agree with Your Honor that we need to have a handle on what's in this estate as part of evaluating whether substantive consolidation is appropriate.

THE COURT: Right. Just so I can -- this debtor owns real property -- the property that this debtor owns or has an interest in, does it have full fee title to those properties?

MS. BRADY: For some. There's also tenancy in common on other properties.

THE COURT: But there's -- okay. And some of this -- and I assume that there's secured debt against the property?

MS. BRADY: I believe some, but not all.

THE COURT: Okay. So then I've got a request to

suspend the nongovernmental bar date, claims bar date, A, probably because we don't have a full creditors matrix -- or the creditors' matrix probably isn't complete.

How long of a suspension do you think is appropriate? Because, again, let me just add the other question, which is, again, I've got this motion for substantive consolidation. If it's granted -- and Mr. Taylor, you can chime in if you -- and Ms. Wilson, you can chime in if you want here.

If it's granted, then one of these debtors has not had a meeting of creditors because, again, I've got to -- no one's asked me to continue the MOC date, but someone has to get notice of the MOC date. So I'm being asked to substantively consolidate a debtor that's gone through the meeting of creditors, the IDI, the claims bar date has passed, with a debtor who hasn't gone through a meeting of creditors, hasn't had an IDI, and no claims bar date. So what does that do?

So does that mean I reopen the claims bar date for everyone, Mr. Taylor, should I grant the request?

MR. TAYLOR: So Your Honor, there are a number of questions along those lines that we've discussed internally but don't yet have proposed answers for. I would assume, on the IDI, there would be one that goes to debtors of KSMP -- or creditors of KSMP. And the bar date question is a good one. We're still evaluating that ourselves. Ms. Wilson should speak as well, but that's my take.

MS. WILSON: That's my understanding as well, Your Honor. I'm trying to figure out the logistics of if it, if the estates were substantively consolidated, would there be a supplemental bar date and how that would proceed.

THE COURT: Because then you may be giving people -again, not that there's anything wrong with this, but you're
giving people who blew the first bar date a second bite at the
apple. And I don't know how you distinguish those creditors.
And I don't know how much time should be spent trying to
distinguish those creditors. Okay. So --

MS. BRADY: That's right, Your Honor. I just wanted to add that I think -- I don't -- I can't -- sitting here today, I don't know when the right time is to set that bar date. But I think there's a concern -- or two concerns. One is a lot of the creditors overlap, and whatever we do, we want to --

THE COURT: Well, we don't -- I mean, we --

MS. BRADY: -- not create confusion between the two estates.

THE COURT: Again, I -- we don't know if that's true or not. We have no idea. We have no idea if Mr. Mattson solicited -- or the creditors -- sorry -- if the creditors in KS Mattson Partners overlap at all. I mean, at least I don't. I mean, you folks probably have a much better -- obviously have a much better or should have a much better idea than I do. But

I don't know. I mean, maybe he kept these two businesses, from that perspective, distinct. Who knows?

MS. BRADY: Your Honor, I can say that we, as the KSMP debtor, don't know. I think that there may have been some information, in some of the proofs-of-interest that were filed, that might glean some light on that. But I haven't seen those yet, so I do not know the answer to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRADY: And so I think that just kind of plays into, before we go out with the bar date, I think, at the KSMP level, we want to understand what the lay of the land is, what the claims that have already been asserted in the other case look like, because I understand there were some parties who asserted claims against both debtors. And then also just I don't want to -- I think there's a tension between setting a bar date and having people do a bar date for KSMP. And if there is a substantive consolidation, how does that look like?

So I think the marching orders for us, along with the other parties in this situation, is to figure out the most efficient and least confusing way to communicate with the investors and creditors so that we get it right.

THE COURT: I agree. Okay. So let me -- so the request to extend the deadline for filing schedules and statement of financial affairs to August 8th is granted.

The bar date, again, I'll -- I'm going to continue

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this motion. And we'll pick a date. And I may continue it to
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     the -- again, July -- when's the hearing on the motion for
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     substantive -- July 9th?
              THE CLERK: July 18th.
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              THE COURT: July 18th. Excuse me.
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              THE CLERK:
                          Yes.
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              THE COURT: I'll continue that to July 18th. But the
     clerk's office has asked me what should be done with regard to
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     the meeting of creditors notice.
              Mr. Shine, any comments? Because, again --
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              MR. SHINE: Your Honor, I --
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              THE COURT: Go ahead. I'm sorry.
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              MR. SHINE: Your Honor, I don't have a date selected
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           I think we're working on that.
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              THE COURT: No, that's not my question. Can we set a
            I mean, again, I have -- the Court has to issue a notice
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     of a meeting of creditors date. That's what we do. But you
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     haven't picked a date. Again, the clerk's office has asked me
     essentially to ask you what do you want to do about this, about
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     the MOC, just hold it in abeyance until you contact them and
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     say set it for this date?
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              MR. SHINE: Your Honor, I'll ensure that we reach out
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     to the clerk's office.
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              THE COURT: Okay. And it probably has to be in
     conjunction -- yeah, please do. And I'll tell them to tell me
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or to remind me what the result of that is, or B, if they haven't heard from you.

And you may need to do that in consultation with Ms. Brady, Mr. Taylor, and Ms. Wilson's office because, again, the notice goes out to the creditors' matrix, and that's incomplete. Again, a lot of moving parts here. I just want to make sure that everyone -- that people are working in sync.

Okay. So the August 8th deadline for schedules and statement of financial affairs, I'm continuing the request to suspend the nongovernmental claims bar date to July 18th. And we will see how things proceed.

Let's call the LeFever Mattson matter now.

THE CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. Line item number 3, LeFever Mattson, a California Corporation.

THE COURT: Are the same parties appearing here? Then we can just --

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. BRADY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I see that Mr. Kaplan may have dropped off. But other than that, it looks as if the same parties are appearing. And the record should reflect that.

Okay. This is the motion -- continued hearing on KSMP's motion to designate it as a permitted party under the claims order. I think we were waiting to have Ms. Itkin, the "interim" word removed from her title, which it has now been.

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So is this still a live matter?
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MS. BRADY: Your Honor, I think we've submitted an order. Either we have or will be submitting an order that would name us the permitted -- we have agreements with the parties.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRADY: So I think that we're resolved.

THE COURT: I believe Mr. Wynne did submit an order.

I didn't sign it because we hadn't had this hearing yet.

MS. BRADY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRADY: So my understanding is that we're all resolved on this, and counsel will correct me if I'm wrong.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me.

MR. TAYLOR: Agreed.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, the LeFever Mattson -- again, I look at the docket every time it's on just to see what's coming up. And again, I know that I've got a motion for substantive consolidation. I've got fee applications. And I've got this motion for inter-debtor borrowing.

And just so that people are prepared, Mr. Taylor,
Keller Benvenutti is going to have to demonstrate to me,
obviously, that that is in the best interest of the estate.
And part of that process for me is what are these funds going
to be used for and how they're going to get repaid. Because

I'm looking -- again, I do look at the docket when I have a hearing. And there have been numerous sales, but the net proceeds of those sales are barely enough to pay the monthly administrative expense of this case.

So someone is going to have to explain to me, at that hearing, where these funds are going to be -- how these funds are going to be consumed, how they're going to get repaid, and whether, all of this work that's going to be done and funded by these funds, what it's all going to lead to. And by that I mean, if this work isn't going to lead to some tangible return to creditors, and perhaps equity, then I need to know this now, because we're now a couple million dollars into this case. I need to know where this case is going.

Finding an answer to where all of this money went to is a laudable goal, but an unsatisfactory one if it's not going to result in a dividend. And we're spending money so quickly, at such a pace, that all of the sales proceeds -- and again, I haven't seen any of the largest sales; I think they've all been under five million -- it's being fully consumed by administrative expenses. So I'm not quite sure what this is all going to lead to. And again, this isn't a product by your design but by the factors that led us to this place.

And finally --

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Finally, I've raised this before, and I'm

going to raise it again. Again, I'm just giving you fair warning that these are questions that I'm going to need answers to. Putting aside the substance of the motion, the borrowing motion -- and again, all I've done is just look at it. I just note these are questions that I have that I'd like answers to. And again, I'm going to raise it again, which is I don't know how Keller Benvenutti can be on both sides of these transactions. I don't know how. But again, if it's appropriate, then someone needs to tell me -- someone needs to show me some case law saying it's appropriate, because this has been an ongoing concern that I've had, and I think we need to address it.

Mr. Taylor, you were about to say something? And again, I'm just -- I have in no way, shape, or form concluded, obviously, what the answers to these questions are. I'm just telling you I have questions.

MR. TAYLOR: Fully understood. And frankly, it's very helpful for us to hear this in advance of the hearing. I'm not going to try to answer all of them now, just a couple of --

THE COURT: And I'm not expecting answers again, because --

MR. TAYLOR: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- I'm just telling you these are questions I'm going to have. That's all.

MR. TAYLOR: Yeah. So just briefly on the financial

aspect of the cases that you mentioned, we're quite focused on that ourselves. There is a budget that's attached to the motion. I think that's going to be spruced up and updated in time for the hearing. And I think we'll show that we've plotted out when we expect property sales to happen, how much we expect the net proceeds to be, and how we're going to pay for things. And sharing more of that for you, I think, will be helpful. And there's also the committee's substantive consolidation motion, which only goes to KSMP and the LeFever Mattson --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. TAYLOR: -- may be a preview, though, of a broader substantive consolidation that I think we think may be helpful on some of these fronts.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. TAYLOR: So --

THE COURT: No, I understand, but okay, this is a question of where's the cart and where's the horse here, for example, on your firm's fee application. Again, you're on both sides of every transaction that's been part of this case. And again, someone's going to have to explain to me how that fact affects your firm's ability to seek fees, again, because there is no motion for substantive consolidation in front of all these cases. Again, I'm just --

MR. TAYLOR: Understood.

MR. TAYLOR: And Mr. Kelly has not, unfortunately,

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responded to our three emails, over the last month, asking him
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     to file it there. So there will be -- in addition to a
 2
     substantive response in our opposition on Friday, there will be
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     a motion to strike.
 4
               THE COURT: No, I understand, and --
 5
 6
               MR. TAYLOR: Okay.
 7
               THE COURT: -- I'll deal with that when I see it.
     Okay.
 8
 9
              MR. TAYLOR: I just wanted to give you a heads up.
     That's it.
10
11
               THE COURT:
                           I appreciate it. Okay. So I'll sign that
     order, Ms. Brady, that Mr. Wynne submitted. And that should
12
     take care of that.
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14
              Okay. Thank you all.
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              MS. BRADY: Thank you, Your Honor.
          (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 11:28 AM)
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