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17	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
18	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
19	SANTA ROSA DIVISION	
20	In Re:	Lead Case No. 24-10545
21	LEFEVER MATTSON, a California corporation, et al.,	Jointly Administered
22	Debtors.	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO DESIGNATE
23	2 Cottons.	CREDITOR KS MATTSON
		PARTNERS, LP AS A "PERMITTED PARTY" UNDER THE COURT'S
24		12/13/24 ORDER
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At heart, the issue in this Application is whether LeFever Mattson and the Committee may continue to make accusations and seek relief against Creditor KS Mattson Partners, LP ("KSMP") while hiding the evidence upon which they purportedly rely in violation of KSMP's due process and statutory rights. The Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Code say no. For that basic reason, as well as the additional reasons outlined in KSMP's Application (Dkt 1195) and below, KSMP asks the Court to grant its application to be included as a "Permitted Party" under the Court's Order (Dkt. 459) ("Order"), and to direct the Claims Agent, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC dba Verita Global, to provide KSMP with copies of the Proofs of Claim and Proofs of Interest filed in in the above-captioned jointly administered cases.

I. Due Process Requires KSMP to Have Access to the Proofs of Claim.

The United States Constitution's guarantee of due process fully applies to bankruptcy proceedings. *E.g. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Corp.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice ... [which] must be of such nature as <u>reasonably to convey the required information</u> But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.") (emphasis added); *In re Brawders*, 503 F.3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2007) (In bankruptcy proceedings, "due process requires adequate notice and procedures.").

As explained in the Application, an "important role" of proofs of claims is to provide the very notice required by due process. Dkt. 1195 at 4; *see also In re Barker*, 839 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The proof of claim plays the important role of 'alerting the court, trustee, and other creditors, as well as the debtor, to claims against the estate' and the creditor's intention to enforce the claims.") (quoting *In re Daystar of Cal., Inc.*, 122 B.R. 406, 408 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)); *Adair v. Sherman*, 230 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2000) (similar). This notice requirement protects, among other things, KSMP's statutory right to object or otherwise challenge proofs of claim filed by other putative creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) ("any party in interest, including a creditor can object to a proof of claim") (emphasis added).

Against this backdrop of KSMP's constitutional and statutory right to receive adequate notice of the claims of other creditors, how do LeFever Mattson and the Committee respond? By

Filed: 04/17/25 Entered: 04/17/25 16:50:54 Page 2 of

Case: 24-10545 Doc# 1340 51674988.2/069731.0012

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claiming these notice requirements only apply in Chapter 13 cases. Dkt. 1268 at 5 (claiming "Baker is inapposite" because it "arose in a chapter 13 case"). LeFever Mattson and the Committee, however, ignore that Baker was quoting Daystar, which specifically addressed the notice provided by proofs of claim in both Chapters 11 and 7 proceedings. In re Daystar of Cal., Inc., 122 B.R. at 408 ("Claimants did not file timely proof of claims during the Chapter 11 or after conversion to Chapter 7.").

Similarly unavailing is LeFever Mattson and the Committee's attempt to waive away the presumption that proofs of claim are filed publicly. Dkt. 1268 at 5; see 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (A "paper filed in a case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.") (emphasis added). The presumption of access by fellow creditors is further reflected in § 107(c), which limits the Court's ability to override that presumption to protect against identity theft or unlawful injury. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) ("The bankruptcy court, for cause, may protect an individual ... to the extent the court finds that disclosure of such information would create undue risk of identity theft or other unlawful injury to the individual or the individual's property.") (emphasis added). Tellingly, LeFever Mattson and the Committee do not allege that application of the Order to KSMP is justified because of concerns about "risk of identity theft or other unlawful injury to the individual" investor. Instead, LeFever Mattson and the Committee invoke a mistaken and inchoate concern that KSMP might acquire the claims of individuals investors. Dkt. 1268 at 5-6. As explained below, that concern is based on a misstatement of KSMP's counsel's statements. Regardless, they have not identified a risk of the type of injury necessary to invoke § 107(c)(1) against KSMP. Instead, their position appears to be that since they allege Mr. Mattson defrauded some investors, KSMP must be prevented from seeing the evidence upon which this fraud allegation is based.

And, of course, the issue here is also not confidentiality. *Contra* Dkt. 1268 at 5 (claiming that *Baker* "provides no guidance for the situation here, where the Court already has ordered that such Proofs of Claim and Proofs of Interest must be given confidentiality protection.") KSMP has explicitly agreed to be bound by <u>reasonable</u> confidentiality requirements. Dkt. 1195 at 5 ("KSMP and its professionals are ready, willing and able to execute a confidentiality agreement with the

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Debtors and the Committee consistent with the agreement executed by other Permitted Parties to object the Proofs of Claims and Proofs of Interest, as required by the Joint Motion.").

The Court need not speculate about the prejudice that would arise by denying the application. LeFever Mattson and the Committee have repeatedly sought relief from this Court against KSMP on the basis of what they claim the proofs of claim disclose. Indeed, they do so in the same brief in which they contend that KSMP should not receive these proofs of claim. Specifically, LeFever Mattson and the Committee rely on a declaration of Brad Sharpe in which he makes representations about what "[c]laims filed thus far in the LeFever Mattson Chapter 11 Cases reveal[.]" Dkt. 1268-1 ¶ 4. While it may be convenient for the LeFever Mattson and the Committee to make representations about what evidence "reveals" while denying KSMP a full and fair opportunity to respond by denying it access to that evidence, due process does not allow it.

Contrary to LeFever Mattson and the Committee's accusation, KSMP's Application does not challenge the Order. Dkt. 1268 at 6-7. Instead, through the Application, KSMP seek standing under the Order as a Permitted Party, which it is authorized to pursue. Dkt. 1195. In doing so, KSMP did, correctly, note that neither the Joint Motion nor the Order explained the impact of withholding proofs of claim from other creditors would have on those creditors statutory and due process rights. Dkt. 1195 at 4 ("But neither the Order nor the Joint Motion provide any basis to depart from the 'important role' that a proof of claim has in alerting other creditors of the claims against the estate in this proceeding."). LeFever Mattson and the Committee misconstrue that sentence as asserting that there was no basis to enter the Order. That is not what that sentence says. While the Order may properly provide certain protections for creditors, it cannot be used in the way the LeFever Mattson and the Committee attempt to use it: to deny notice to other creditors in a way to deprive them of access to evidence and the ability to pursue statutory rights.

II. LeFever Mattson and the Committee Misstate Their Own Exhibits.

LeFever Mattson and the Committee claim that the Court should deprive KSMP of proper notice and the ability to defend itself and pursue its statutory rights because, they allege, KSMP is seeking the information for other purposes. Dkt. 1268 at 5-6. The problem with this position is it relies on a misstatement of what the exhibits actually say. In responding to inquiries from investors,

counsel has explained that:

Thank you for your inquiry regarding your investments. Your patience is greatly appreciated. ...

[W]e have publicly expressed our approach and willingness to find a <u>complete and satisfactory resolution for investors</u>. We have outlined steps we are taking to achieve this goal. Mr. Mattson <u>is interested</u> in finding pathways to acquire investor interests or otherwise liquidate entity assets to disburse proceeds to those investors. This includes offering his own resources, when possible, to do so. <u>We have also agreed to facilitate and participate in mediation for a structured process to allow for resolution of investor concerns."</u>

Dkt. 1268-1 Ex. B (emphasis added). Tellingly, LeFever Mattson and the Committee (in an effort to gin-up controversy) fail to alert the Court that this communication was sent in response to inquiries from investors. And it does not "announce a parallel claims resolution process whereby the Mattson Debtors would liquidate assets to compensate certain of their victims," (Dkt. 1268 at 3), but rather explains that KSMP and Mr. Mattson have been tirelessly seeking to work with LeFever Mattson and the Committee to establish a plan that would actually benefit all investors by liquidating entity assets to compensate investors and resolve investor claims. In Mr. Mattson and KSMP's view, attempting to use the significant assets of all entities to quickly come up with a global solution is preferable to wasting money and time on needless disputes.

Thus, KSMP does not seek access to proofs of claim "as a litigation tactic as well as fodder for [its] proposed extrajudicial [sic], selective [sic] asset distribution" (nor has it admitted to such a purpose). Dkt. 1268 at 5. Of course, such concerns are easily addressed by a confidentiality agreement that limits use of information derived from proofs of claim. But since that does not seemingly achieve LeFever Mattson and the Committee's goal of hamstringing KSMP's defense or forcing KSMP into bankruptcy on LeFever Mattson and the Committee's terms, it is rejected out of hand.

III. KSMP's Notice to the Investors Is Reasonable Under the Circumstances.

Lefever Mattson and the Committee claim that KSMP has not provided sufficient notice to the "entire universe" of investors in accordance with the Bar Date Order to become a Permitted Party: KSMP "need[s] to provide notice to the entire universe of Investors—more than 600 individuals and entities asserting approximately 1,700 investments—by April 23, 2025. KSMP

Filed: 04/17/25 Entered: 04/17/25 16:50:54 Page 5 of

Case: 24-10545 Doc# 1340 51674988.2/069731.0012

admittedly does not have the contact information necessary to do so, or it would not have needed to file the Application." Dkt. 1268 at 7-8 (emphasis added). Thus, LeFever Mattson and the Committee oppose the Application on the grounds that it fails to give notice to people who could only be identified for notification after the Application has been approved—rendering it redundant. This scenario exemplifies a Catch-22.

The "validity of any method of notice turns on its <u>reasonableness in the circumstances</u>: Where conditions do not make it practical to give notice reasonably certain to inform those affected, the [United States Supreme] Court held that the form chosen must not be substantially less likely to bring home notice than any other substitute feasible and customary in the circumstances." *In re Jewelart, Inc.*, 71 B.R. 968, 972 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (emphasis added). KSMP provided notice to the Debtor, the Official Committee of Creditors and all parties listed for notice on the claims agent's website including the claims agent itself.

The notice that KSMP provided to parties in interest was what was the most reasonable under the circumstances, as KSMP provided more than sufficient notice to all the parties that it has information for. The application and the notice were not just mailed to the parties included on the notice list but were additionally included on the claims agent website. All parties in this "entire universe" have filed a proof of claim or proof of interest in this case, consequently they are familiar with the claims agent website as that is where they had to file those claims. If there is any party that has not received notice directly through the mail, they have received notice through the claims agent website. Notice to the claim's agent, which is the party with initial and unrestricted access to the claims filed in the case should be sufficient notice to all the creditors and investors that have been restricted from public access. KSMP's notice was the most reasonable under the circumstances and the notice provided is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than the customary form of notice because the information is provided on the claims agent's website and all parties in the "entire universe" of this case are familiar with that website.

For these reasons and the reasons set forth in the Application, the Court should grant KSMP's application to be included as a "Permitted Party" under the Court's Order (Dkt. 459)

¹ Any person can go to the claims agent website and view any filing in this case for free.

1	("Order"), and to direct the Claims Agent, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC dba Verita Global,
2	to provide KSMP with copies of the Proofs of Claim and Proofs of Interest filed in in the above-
3	captioned procedurally consolidated case.
4	
5	Dated: April 17, 2025 FENNEMORE LLP
6	
7	By:/s/ James P. Hill Micheline Nadeau Fairbank
8	Mark Bostick
9	Thiele R. Dunaway James P. Hill John M. Mallach
10	John M. McHugh Attorneys for KS Mattson Partners, LP and Kenneth W. Mattson
11	LP and Kenneth W. Mattson
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Filed: 04/17/25 Entered: 04/17/25 16:50:54 Page 7 of Case: 24-10545 Doc# 1340 51674988.2/069731.0012

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
$\begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{bmatrix}$	I, Linda Gubba-Reiner, declare:	
3 4	I am a citizen of the United States and am employed in the County of Alameda. I am over	
5	the age of 18 years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 600 B	
6	Street, Suite 1700, San Diego, California, 92101.	
7	On the date set forth below I caused to be served the following document(s):	
8	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO DESIGNATE CREDITOR KS	
9	MATTSON PARTNERS, LP AS A "PERMITTED PARTY" UNDER THE COURT	
10	12/13/24 ORDER	
11	on each party listed below in the following manner:	
12	on each party listed below in the following mainler.	
13	BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: by placing said document(s) in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, in a United States mail box at Oakland, California, addressed as set forth	
14	below.	
15	BY PERSONAL SERVICE: by causing to be delivered by reputable messenger service said document(s) addressed as set forth below.	
16	BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: by transmitting via email said document(s) to the email	
17	address set forth below.	
18	(ECF): Pursuant to controlling General Orders and LBR, the foregoing document(s) will	
document(s). On the date set forth below, I chec	be served by the court via Notice of Electronic Filing ("NEF") and hyperlink to the document(s). On the date set forth below, I checked the CM/ECF docket for this	
20 21	bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding and determined that the following persons are on the list of parties to receive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below:	
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Case: 24-10545 Doc# 1340 Filed: 04/17/25 Entered: 04/17/25 16:50:54 Page 9 of 10

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22	
22	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
23	Executed on April 17, 2025, at San Diego, California.
24	Executed on ripin 17, 2023, at San Biego, Camorina.
25	/s/ Linda Gubba-Reiner
26	Linda Gubba-Reiner
	Zinda Good Romer
27	
28	

Case: 24-10545 Doc# 1340 Filed: 04/17/25 Entered: 04/17/25 16:50:54 Page 10 of 10