OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 1 2 TIFFANY L. CARROLL Acting United States Trustee 3 **CURTIS CHING** 3931 Assistant United States Trustee 4 **NEIL VERBRUGGE 7478** 5 Trial Attorney 300 Ala Moana Boulevard, Room 4108 6 Honolulu, Hawaii 96850 Telephone: (808) 522-8155 7 Email: ustpregion15.hi.ecf@usdoj.gov 8 Email: Neil.Verbrugge@usdoj.gov 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS **BANKRUPTCY DIVISION** 11 Case No. 1:24-bk-00002 In re 12 (Chapter 11) IMPERIAL PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL 13 (CNMI), LLC, 14 Debtor and Final Hearing: 15 Date: June 21, 2024 Debtor-in-Possession. Time: 8:30 a.m. (ChST) 16 Chief Judge: Hon. Ramona V. Manglona 17 [Related Docket Entries: #12, 19, 30, 31, 47, 18 53, 84, 86, 87, 111, and 112] 19 UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT 20 REGARDING DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING DEBTOR TO **OBTAIN POSTPETITION INDEBTEDNESS** 21 22 The United States Trustee, by and through her attorney, hereby submits this Second 23 Supplemental Statement ("Second Supp. Statement") regarding the Debtor's Motion for Order 24 Authorizing Debtor to Obtain Postpetition Secured Indebtedness ("DIP Financing Motion"). 25 The United States Trustee has authority and standing to make this statement since its 26 responsibilities include, among other things, supervising "the administration of cases ... under 27 1

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1. On April 23, 2024, Debtor filed a Motion for Order Authorizing Debtor to Obtain Postpetition Secured Indebtedness ("Motion for DIP Financing"), Dkt. #12. Debtor's Motion for DIP Financing seeks authority to incur secured debtor-in-possession financing ("DIP Financing") from lender Loi Lam SIT ("DIP Lender") through a post-petition loan up to \$7,000,000 secured by a junior lien and superpriority claim against the estate.

- 2. On an interim basis, Debtor sought up to \$400,000 secured by a junior lien and superpriority claim against the estate upon the entry of an interim order approving the DIP Facility.
- 3. On April 24, 2024, the United States Trustee filed a Statement regarding Debtor's First Day Motions including, inter alia, objections to Lender's request for interim approval of at \$400,000 loan to Debtor secured by a junior lien and superpriority claim against the estate pertaining to Debtor's Motion for DIP Financing, Dkt. #19.
- 4. On May 10, 2024, the Debtor filed a Reply, Dkt. #47, in which Lender made a substantial concession by abandoning his request for a junior lien and superpriority claim against the estate.
- 5. On May 30, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on interim approval of Debtor's Motion for DIP Financing.
- 6. On June 11, 2024 the Court entered an Interim Order granting in part, on an interim basis on the terms set forth therein, the Debtor's Motion for DIP Financing up to \$400,000 in post-petition financing as an administrative expense claim, Dkt. #112 (the "Interim Order").

7. Paragraph 3 of the Interim Order provides: "Lender shall transfer the Carve Out amount of \$100,000.00 of the Initial Advance to the Client Trust Account of Choi & Ito, Debtor's general bankruptcy counsel."

II. UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S COMMENTS REGARDING DEBTOR'S COUNSEL HOLDING "CARVE-OUT" PROFESSIONAL FEE FUNDS IN CLIENT TRUST FUND ACCOUNT AND NOT IN DEBTOR'S DIP ACCOUNT

Pursuant to the Interim Order, the Lender's interim loan to Debtor in the amount of \$400,000 was approved, on an interim basis, as an administrative expense claim (subject to certain carve-outs, to share ratably with all other administrative expense claims) for actual post-petition advances made by the Lender to the Debtor for authorized budget expenses. From the loan proceeds, the Lender's administrative expense claim is subject to carve outs for quarterly fees, chapter 7 trustee compensation (in the event of liquidation), and up to \$100,000 in professional fees. Although the professional's fees are "carved-out" from the Lender's administrative expense claim, such professional fees are not carved-out from other post-petition administrative expense claims and may only be paid upon Court approval (and, in the event the estate is administratively insolvent, are subject to disgorgement to share ratably with any other unpaid non-Lender post-petition administrative expense claims).

Paragraph 3 of the Interim Order provides: "Lender shall transfer the Carve Out amount of \$100,000.00 of the Initial Advance to the Client Trust Account of Choi & Ito, Debtor's general bankruptcy counsel." The United States Trustee respectfully submits that Paragraph 3 should be deleted from any future interim order or final DIP Financing order.

Allowing Debtor's counsel to hold \$100,000 in budgeted amounts for professional funds in its client trust account, instead of being held in debtor-in-possession bank account ("DIP bank account") arguably elevates Debtor's counsel to a secured creditor to the extent it is in possession

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of this cash and its fees are earned. To avoid any confusion or ambiguity over the status of these funds, the United States Trustee submits these funds should be held in a DIP bank account to ensure the funds are unmistakably designated as "property of the estate" subject to all creditors' rights. The United States Trustee is not opposed to Debtor establishing a separately labeled DIP bank account to hold these funds so long as Debtor's counsel's rights to the funds are limited to the "carve-out" from the Lender's administrative expense claim (and, in the event of administrative insolvency subject to pro-rata distribution to all equal priority administrative expense claims).

Before Paragraph 3 is incorporated into any future interim order or final order, the parties in interest in this case should have an opportunity to be heard. Paragraph 3 was neither discussed in the Amended Term Sheet and nor briefed prior to entry of the Interim Order. Paragraph 3 is a de facto post-petition retainer for the benefit of Debtor's counsel. Although post-petition retainers are not *per se* impermissible, Debtor and Debtor's counsel should seek advance authorization, upon notice and hearing,¹ for authorization to take a post-petition retainer and should establish by motion the appropriateness of a post-petition retainer.²

¹ In determining whether an atypical fee procedure is appropriate, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit considers the following factors:

[&]quot;[A] fee retainer procedure ... may be authorized [where]: 1. The case is an unusually large one in which an exceptionally large amount of fees accrue each month; 2. The court is convinced that waiting an extended period for payment would place an undue hardship on counsel; 3. The court is satisfied that counsel can respond to any reassessment in one or more of the ways listed above; and 4. The fee retainer procedure is, itself, the subject of a noticed hearing prior to any payment thereunder."

In re Knudsen Corp., 84 B.R. 668, 672–673 (BAP 9th Cir. 1988).

² The following factors are relevant to considering the appropriateness of a post-petition retainer in Chapter 11:

Alternatively, if Debtor's counsel is allowed to retain funds in its client trust account, the Court should make clear that such funds are property of the estate until the Court approves and awards any fee application made by Debtor's counsel, and that no attorney lien or other priority attaches to such funds except for the "carve-out" from the Lender's administrative expense claims, and that if fees are not approved any funds in excess of the approved compensation must be turned over to the estate.

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the forgoing reasons, the United States Trustee requests any future interim order or final DIP Financing order delete paragraph 3 of the Interim Order or otherwise adequately address the United States Trustee's comments raised above.

DATE: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 14, 2024.

Tiffany L. Carroll Acting United States Trustee

By /s/ Neil Verbrugge

In determining whether a post-petition retainer in Chapter 11 is justified, the Court must consider several recognized factors, plus special factors which include, but are not necessarily limited to: (1) the retainer's economic impact on the debtor's ongoing business operation; (2) the retainer's economic impact on the ability of the debtor to reorganize; (3) the amount and reasonableness of the retainer; (4) the reputation of debtor's counsel; and (5) the ability of debtor's counsel to disgorge such payments at the conclusion of the case should this Court determine that the fees paid to counsel are not justified.

In re Jefferson Bus. Ctr. Assocs., 135 B.R. 676, 680 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).