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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	
Plaintiff.	§	Case No. 3:21-cv-00881-X
vs.	§	(Consolidated with 3:21-cv-00880-X, 3:21-cv-01010-X, 3:21-cv-01378-X, 3:21-cv-01379-X)
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT FUND ADVISORS, L.P. et al.,	§	
Defendants.	§	

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S RESPONSE AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.'s MOTION TO DEEM THE DONDERO ENTITIES VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS AND FOR RELATED RELIEF

Ex.	Description	HMIT Appx. #
1.	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3699] [1]	1-388

[1] **Bankr. Dkt.** refers to the Bankruptcy Docket in Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.).

2.	HMIT's Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3760]	389-434
3.	Transcript of Hearing Held Jun. 8, 2023, Case No. 19-34054-sgj (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 8, 2023)	435-824
4.	HMIT's Second Amended Notice of Appeal [Bankr. 3945]	825-1109
5.	Appellant HMIT's Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record [Bankr. Dkt. 3946]	1110-1123
6.	Appellant HMIT's Second Supplemental Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record [Bankr. Dkt. 3951]	1124-1137
7.	Transmittal and Certification of Record on Appeal [Bankr. Dkt. 3989]	1138-1139
8.	Order Approving Joint Stipulation as to Withdrawal of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Proof of Claim 152 [Bankr. Dkt. 2143]	1140-1148
9.	HMIT's Verified Rule 202 Petition, dated January 20, 2023, Case No. DC-23-01004-J, in the 191st District Court of Dallas County Texas	1149-1192
10.	Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. and Stonehill Capital Management LLC's Notice of Related Case, dated February 16, 2023, Case No. DC-23-01004-J, in the 191st District Court of Dallas County Texas	1193-1195
11.	Transcript of Hearing Held February 22, 2023, Case No. DC-23-01004-J, in the 191st District Court of Dallas County Texas	1196-2163
12.	Order denying HMIT's Verified Rule 202 Petition, dated March 8, 2023, Case No. DC-23-01004-J, in the 191st District Court of Dallas County Texas	2164-2165
13.	Dugaboy Investment Trust's Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust [Bankr. Dkt. 3382]	2166-2201
14.	HMIT's Limited Response in Support of Certain Requested Relief [Bankr. Dkt. 3467].	2202-2212
15.	HCM's Brief Establishing the Need for an Adversary Proceeding to Obtain the Relief Sought in Valuation Motion [Bankr. Dkt. 3639]	2213-2225
16.	Order Denying Motion and Supplemental Motion of Dugaboy Investment Trust Due to Procedural Deficiency: Adversary Proceeding is Required [Bankr. Dkt. 3645]	2226-2332

17.	Dugaboy Investment Trust and HMIT's Motion for Leave to File Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3662]	2333-2647
18.	HCM's Response to Motion for Leave to File Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3692].	2648-2784
19.	Dugaboy Investment Trust and HMIT's Stipulation Withdrawing Movants' Motion for Leave to File Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3775]	2785-2790
20.	Order Granting Stipulation Withdrawing Movants' Motion for Leave to File Proceeding [Bankr. Dkt. 3867].	2791-2793
21.	Complaint to (I) Compel Disclosures About the Assets of the Highland Claimant Trust and (II) Determine (A) Relative Value of those Assets, and (B) Nature of Plaintiffs' Interests in the Claimant Trust, dated May 10, 2023, *The Dugaboy Investment Trust and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Highland Claimant Trust*, Adv. Pro. No. 23-03038-sgj (N.D. Tex.) [Dkt. No. 1].	2794-2822

Dated: December 15, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,
PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: */s/ Sawnie A. McEntire*

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 15, 2023, true and correct copies of this document were electronically served by the Court's ECF system on parties entitled to notice thereof.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
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HMIT Exhibit 1

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	

HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE VERIFIED ADVERARY PROCEEDING

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), Movant, files this Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding ("Motion"), both in its individual capacity and as a derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM" or "Reorganized Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust against Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), Farallon

Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"), James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery") and John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10 (Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, Farallon, Seery and the John Doe Defendant Nos. 11-10 are collectively "Respondents" or "Proposed Defendants").

I. Good Cause for Expedited Relief

1. HMIT seeks leave to file an Adversary Proceeding pursuant to the Court's "gatekeeping" orders, as well as the injunction and exculpation provisions in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Doc. 1943), as modified (the "Plan").[1] A copy of HMIT's proposed Verified Adversary Proceeding ("Adversary Proceeding") is attached as Exhibit 1 to this Motion. This Motion is separately supported by objective evidence derived from historical filings in the bankruptcy proceedings,[2] as well as the declarations of James Dondero, dated May 2022 (Ex. 2), James Dondero, dated February 2023 (Ex. 3), and Sawnie A. McEntire with attached evidence (Ex. 4). [3]

[1] The exculpation provisions were recently modified by a decision of the Fifth Circuit. Such provisions apply to James P. Seery, Jr. only and are limited to his capacity as an Independent Director. *Matter of Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 48 F.4th 419, 438 (5th Cir. 2022).

[2] Unless otherwise referenced, all references to evidence involving documents filed in the Debtor's bankruptcy proceedings (Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.)) are cited by "Doc." reference. HMIT asks the Court to take judicial notice of the documents identified by such entries.

[3] The supporting declarations will be cited as Dondero 2022 Dec. (Ex. 2), Dondero 2023 Dec. (Ex. 3), and McEntire Dec. (Ex. 4).

2. The expedited nature of this Motion is permitted under Fed. R. Bank P. 9006 (c)(1), which authorizes a shortened time for a response and hearing for good cause. For the reasons set forth herein, HMIT has shown good cause and requests that the Court schedule a hearing on this Motion on three (3) days' notice, and that any responses be filed no later than twenty-four hours before the scheduled hearing.[4]

3. HMIT brings this Motion on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust ("Claimant Trust"), as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement (Doc. 3521-5) ("CTA").[5] Upon the Plan's Effective Date, Highland Capital Management, LP, as the original Debtor ("Original Debtor"), transferred its assets, including its causes of action, to the Claimant Trust, including the causes of action set forth in the attached Adversary Proceeding. The attached Adversary Proceeding alleges claims which are substantially more than "colorable" based upon plausible allegations that the Proposed Defendants, acting in concert, perpetrated a fraud,[6] including a fraud upon innocent stakeholders, as well as breaches of fiduciary

[4] Expedited action on this Motion is also warranted to hasten Movants' opportunity to file suit, pursue prompt relevant discovery, and reduce the threat of loss of potentially key evidence. Upon information and belief, Seery has been deleting text messages on his personal iPhone via a rolling, automatic deletion setting.

[5] Solely in the alternative, and in the unlikely event HMIT's proposed causes of actions against Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and/or Jessup are considered to be "Estate Claims" as those terms are used and defined within the CTA and Exhibit A to the Notice of Final Term Sheet [Docket No. 354] in HCM's bankruptcy (and without admitting the same), HMIT alternatively seeks standing to bring this action as a derivative action on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust as appropriate.

[6] Neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to challenge the Court's Orders or the Plan. In addition, neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to redistribute the assets of the Claimant Trust in a manner that would adversely impact innocent creditors. Rather, the

duties and knowing participation in (or aiding and abetting) breaches of fiduciary duty. The Adversary Proceeding also alleges that the Proposed Defendants did so collectively by falsely representing the value of the Debtor's Estate, failing to timely disclose accurate values of the Debtor's Estate, and trading on material non-public information regarding such values. HMIT also alleges that the Proposed Defendants colluded to manipulate the Debtor's Estate—providing Seery the opportunity to plant close business allies into positions of control to approve Seery's compensation demands following the Effective Date.

4. Emergency relief is needed because of a fast-approaching date (April 16, 2023) that one or more of the Proposed Defendants *may* argue, depending upon choice of law, constitutes the expiration of the statute of limitations concerning some of the common law claims available to the Claimant Trust, as well as to HMIT.[7] Although HMIT offered to enter tolling agreements from each of the Proposed Defendants, they either rejected HMIT's requests or have not confirmed their willingness to do so, thereby necessitating the expedited nature of this Motion.[8] Because this Motion is subject to the

proposed Adversary Proceeding seeks to benefit all innocent stakeholders while working within the terms and provisions of the Plan, as well as the Claimant Trust Agreement.

[7] The first insider trade at issue involved the sale and transfer of Claim 23 in the amount of $23 million held by ACMLD Claim, LLC to Muck on April 16, 2021 (Doc. 2215).

[8] HMIT has been diligent in its efforts to investigate the claims described in this Motion, including the filing of a Tex. R. Civ. P. Rule 202 proceeding in January 2023, which was not adjudicated until recently in March 2023. Those proceeding were conducted in the 191st Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas, under Cause DC-23-01004. *See* McEntire Dec. Ex. 4 and the attached Ex. 4-A. Farallon and Stonehill defended those proceedings by aggressively arguing, in significant part, that the discovery issues were better undertaken in this Court.[8] The Rule 202 Petition was recently dismissed (**necessarily without prejudice**)

Court's "gatekeeping" orders and the injunction provisions of the Plan, emergency leave is required.

5. This Motion will come as no surprise to the Proposed Defendants. Farallon and Stonehill were involved in recent pre-suit discovery proceedings under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the same insider trading allegations described in this Motion. Muck and Jessup, special purpose entities created and ostensibly controlled by Farallon and Stonehill, respectively, also were provided notice of these Rule 202 Proceedings in February 2023.[9] Like this Motion, the Rule 202 Proceedings focused on Muck, Jessup, Farallon, and Stonehill and their wrongful purchase of large, allowed claims in the Original Debtor's bankruptcy based upon material non-public information. Seery is also aware of these insider trading allegations because of a prior written demand.

6. In light of the Proposed Defendants' apparent refusal to enter tolling agreements, or their failure to fully affirm their willingness to do so, HMIT is forced to seek emergency relief from this Court to proceed timely with the proposed Adversary Proceeding before the expiration of any *arguable* limitations period.[10]

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on March 8, 2023, ostensibly based on such arguments. However, it is telling that Stonehill and Farallon admitted during the Rule 202 Proceedings to their "affiliation" with Muck and Jessup and that they bought the Claims through these entities.

[9] *See* Dec. of Sawnie McEntire, Ex. 4.

[10] HMIT respectfully requests that this Motion be addressed and decided on an expedited basis that provides HMIT sufficient time to bring the proposed action timely. In the event the Court denies the requested relief, HMIT respectfully requests prompt notice of the Court's ruling to allow HMIT sufficient

II. Summary of Claims

7. HMIT requests leave to commence the proposed Adversary Proceeding, attached as Exhibit 1, seeking redress for breaches of duty owed to HMIT, breaches of duties owed to the Original Debtor's Estate, aiding and abetting breaches of those fiduciary duties, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and fraud. HMIT also alleges several viable remedies, including (i) imposition of a constructive trust; (ii) equitable disallowance of any unpaid balance on the claims at issue;[11] (iii) disgorgement of ill-gotten profits (received by Farallon, Stonehill, Muck and Jessup) to be restituted to the Claimant Trust; (iv) disgorgement of ill-gotten compensation (received by Seery) to be restituted to the Claimant Trust; (v) declaratory judgment relief; (vi) actual damages; and (vii) punitive damages.

III. Standing

8. **HMIT.** Prior to the Plan's Effective Date, HMIT was the largest equity holder in the Original Debtor and held a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HMIT currently holds a Class 10 Claim as a contingent Claimant Trust Interest under the CTA

time to seek, if necessary, appropriate relief in the United States District Court. In order to have a fair opportunity to seek such relief on a timely basis and protect HMIT's rights and the rights of the Reorganized Debtor, HMIT will need to seek such relief on or before Wednesday, April 5, 2023, if this Motion has not been resolved.

[11] In the alternative only, subordination of Muck's and Jessup's General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests and Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to all other interests in the Claimant Trust, including HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest, is necessary and appropriate to remedy Muck's and Jessup's wrongful conduct, and is also consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

(Doc. 3521-5). Upon information and belief, all conditions precedent to HMIT's certification as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary would be readily satisfied but for the Defendants' wrongful actions and conduct described in this Motion and the attached Adversary Proceeding.

9. **Reorganized Debtor.** Although HMIT has standing as a former Class B/C Equity Holder, Class 10 claimant, and now contingent Claimant Trust Interest under the CTA,[12] this Motion separately seeks authorization to prosecute the Adversary Proceeding derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust. All conditions precedent to bringing a derivative action are satisfied.

10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides the procedural steps for "derivative actions," and applies to this proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 7023.1. Applying Rule 7023.1, the Proposed Defendants' wrongful conduct occurred, and the improper trades consummated, in the spring and early summer of 2021, before the Effective Date in August 2021. During this period, HMIT was the 99.5% Class B/C limited partner in the original Debtor. As such, HMIT has individual standing to bring this action because Seery owed fiduciary duties directly to HMIT at that time, and the other Proposed Defendants aided and abetted breaches of those duties at that time.

[12] The last transaction at issue involved Claim 190, the Notice for which was filed on August 9, 2021. (Doc. 2698).

11. The derivative nature of this proceeding is also appropriate because any demand on Seery would be futile.[13] Seery is the Claimant Trustee under the terms of the CTA. Furthermore, any demand on the Oversight Board to prosecute these claims would be equally futile because Muck and Jessup, both of whom are Proposed Defendants, dominate the Oversight Board.[14]

12. The "classic example" of a proper derivative action is when a debtor-in-possession is "unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligations" to prosecute an otherwise colorable claim where a conflict of interest exists. *Cooper*, 405 B.R. at 815 (quoting *Louisiana World*, 858 F.2d at 252). Here, because HMIT's proposed Adversary Proceeding includes claims against Seery, Muck, and Jessup, the conflicts of interest are undeniable. Seery is the Trustee of the Claimant Trust Assets under the CTA, and he also serves as the "Estate Representative."[15] Muck and Jessup, as successors to Acis, the Redeemer Committee and UBS, effectively control the Oversight Board, with the responsibility to "monitor and oversee the administration of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee's performance . . . ."[16]

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[13] Any demand on the Litigation Sub-Trust would be equally futile for the same reasons addressed herein, since the Litigation Trustee serves at the direction of the Oversight Board.

[14] *See* Footnote 8, *infra.* In December 2021, several stakeholders made a demand on the Debtor through James Seery, in his capacity as Trustee to the Claimant Trust, to pursue claims related to these insider trades.

[15] *See* Claimant Trust Agreement (Doc. 3521-5), Sec. 3.11.

[16] *Id.* at Sec. 4.2(a) and (b).

13. Creditors' committees frequently bring suit on behalf of bankruptcy estates. Yet, it is clear that any ***appropriately designated party*** also may bring derivative claims. *In re Reserve Prod., Inc.*, 232 B.R. 899, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (citations omitted); *see In re Enron Corp.*, 319 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). As this Court has held in *In Re Cooper*:

> In Chapter 11 [cases], there is both a textual basis . . . and, frequently, a non-textual, equitable rationale for granting a creditor or creditors committee derivative standing to pursue estate actions (*i.e.*, the equitable rationale coming into play when the debtor-in-possession has a conflict of interest in pursuing an action, such as in the situation of an insider-defendant).

In re Cooper, 405 B.R. 801, 803 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (also noting that "[c]onflicts of interest are, of course, frequently encountered in Chapter 11, where the metaphor of the 'fox guarding the hen house' is often apropos"); *see also In re McConnell*, 122 B.R. 41, 43-44 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) ("[I]ndividual creditors can also act in lieu of the trustee or debtor-in-possession . . . ."). Here, the Proposed Defendants are the "*foxes guarding the hen house*," and their conflicts of interest abound.[17] Proceeding in a derivative capacity is necessary, if not critical.

[17] *See Citicorp Venture Cap., Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims*, 160 F.3d 982, 987 (3d Cir. 1998) (settlement noteholders purchased Debtors' securities with "the benefit of non-public information acquired as a fiduciary" for the "dual purpose of making a profit and influenc[ing] the reorganization in [their] own self-interest."), *see also, Wolf v. Weinstein*, 372 U.S. 633, 642, 83 S.Ct. 969, 10 L.Ed.2d 33 (1963) ("Access to inside information or strategic position in a corporate reorganization renders the temptation to profit by trading in the Debtor's stock particularly pernicious.").

14. The proposed Adversary Proceeding also sets forth claims that readily satisfy the Court's threshold standards requiring "colorable" claims, as well as the requirements for a derivative action. This Motion, which is supported by objective evidence contained in historical filings in the bankruptcy proceedings, also incorporates sworn declarations. At the very least, this additional evidence satisfies the Court's threshold requirements of willful misconduct and fraud set forth in the "gatekeeping" orders, as well as the injunction and exculpation provisions in the Plan.[18] This evidence also supports well-pleaded allegations exempted from the scope of the releases included in the Plan.

15. HMIT is an appropriate party to bring this action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust. If successful, the Adversary Proceeding will likely recover well over $100 million for the Claimant Trust, thereby enabling the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust to pay off any remaining innocent creditors and make significant distributions to HMIT as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary.

16. As of December 31, 2022, the Claimant Trust had distributed 64.2% of the total $397,485,568 par value of all Class 8 and Class 9 unsecured creditor claims. The

[18] HMIT recognizes that it is an "Enjoined Party" under the Plan. The Plan requires a showing, *inter alia*, of bad faith, willful misconduct, or fraud against a "Protected Party." Seery is a "Protected Party" and an "Exculpated Party" in his capacity as an Independent Director. Muck and Jessup *may* be "Protected Parties" as members of the Oversight Committee, but they were not "protected" when they purchased the Claims before the Effective Date. While it is HMIT's position that Farallon and Stonehill do not qualify as "Protected Parties," they are included in this Motion in the interest of judicial economy.

Claims acquired by Muck and Jessup have an allowed par value of $365,000,000. Based on these numbers, the innocent unsecured creditors hold approximately $32 million in allowed claims.[19]

17. As of December 31, 2022, the Claimant Trust has distributed $255,201,228.[20] On a *pro rata* basis, that means that innocent creditors have received approximately $22,373,000 in distributions against the stated value of their allowed claims. That leaves a remaining unpaid balance of approximately $9,627,000.

18. Muck and Jessup already have received approximately $232.8 million on their Claims. Assuming and original investment of approximately $160 million, this represents over $72 million in ill-gotten profits that, if disgorged, would be far more than what is required to fully pay all other innocent creditors - immediately placing HMIT in the status of a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary. The benefits to the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust and innocent stakeholders are undeniable.[21]

19. Seery and the Oversight Board should be estopped from challenging HMIT's status to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Claimant Trust. Seery, Muck and Jessup have committed fraud, acted in bad faith and have unclean hands, and they should not be allowed to undermine the proposed Adversary Proceeding - which seeks

[19] Doc. 3653.

[20] *Id.*

[21] Further, under the present circumstances and time constraints, this Motion should be granted to avoid the prospect of the loss of some of HMIT's and the Claimant Trust's claims and denial of due process.

to rectify significant wrongdoing. To hold otherwise would allow Seery, Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, and Farallon the opportunity to not just "guard the hen house," but to also open the door and take what they want.[22] HMIT seeks a declaratory judgment of its rights, accordingly.

IV. The Proposed Defendants

20. Seery acted in several capacities during relevant times. He served as the Debtor's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO"). He also served as member of the Debtor's Independent Board.[23] He currently serves as Claimant Trustee under the CTA and remains the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor.

21. There is no doubt Seery owed the Original Debtor's Estate, as well as equity, fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. *See In re Xtreme Power Inc.*, 563 B.R. 614, 632-33 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (detailing fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers and directors under Delaware law); *Louisiana World*, 858 F.2d at 245-46 (detailing duties owed by debtors-in-possession).[24]

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[22] "The doctrine of 'unclean hands' provides that "a litigant who engages in reprehensible conduct in relation to the matter in controversy ... forfeits his right to have the court hear his claim, regardless of its merit. [T]he purpose of the clean hands maxim is to protect the court against misuse by one who, because of his conduct, has forfeited his right to have the court consider his claims, regardless of their merit. As such it is not a matter of defense to be applied on behalf of a litigant; rather it is a rule of public policy." *Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc.*, 940 A.2d 43, 80–81 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted for clarity).

[23] Seery is the beneficiary of the Court's "gatekeeping" orders and is an "exculpated" party in his capacity as an Independent Director. He is also a "Protected Party."

[24] The Internal Affairs Doctrine dictates choice of law. Here, the Debtor, Highland Capital Management, was organized under the law of Delaware. As much, Seery's fiduciary duties and claims involving breaches of those duties will be governed by Delaware law.

22. Farallon and Stonehill are capital management companies which manage hedge funds; they are also Seery's close business allies with a long history of business ventures and close affiliation. Although they were strangers to the Original Debtor's bankruptcy on the petition date, and were not original creditors, they became entangled in this bankruptcy at Seery's invitation and encouragement—and then knowingly participated in the wrongful insider trades at issue. By doing so, Seery was able to plant friendly allies onto the Oversight Board to rubber stamp compensation demands. The proposed Adversary Proceeding alleges that Farallon and Stonehill bargained to receive handsome pay days in exchange.

23. Muck and Jessup are special purpose entities, admittedly created by Farallon and Stonehill on the eve of the alleged insider trades, and they were used as vehicles to assume ownership of the purchased claims.[25] The record is clear that Muck and Jessup ***did not exist*** before confirmation of the Plan in February 2021.[26] Now, however, Muck and Jessup serve on the Oversight Board with immense powers under the CTA.[27] When they purchased the claims at issue, Muck and Jessup were ***not*** acting in their official capacities on the Oversight Committee and, therefore, they were not "Protected Persons" under the Plan.

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[25] *See* Ex. 4-B, Rule 202 Transcript at 55:22-25.

[26] *See* McEntire Dec., Ex. 4, Ex. 4-D, Ex. 4-E. Muck was created on March 9, 2021 before the Effective Date. Jessup was created on April 8, 2021, before the Effective Date.

[27] *See* Doc. 3521-5, Sec. 4(a) and 4(b).

24. By trading on the alleged material non-public information, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup became non-statutory "insiders" with duties owed directly to HMIT at a time when HMIT was the largest equity holder.[28] *See S.E.C. v. Cuban*, 620 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The corporate insider is under a duty to 'disclose or abstain'—he must tell the shareholders of his knowledge and intention to trade or abstain from trading altogether."). In this context, there is no credible doubt that Farallon's and Stonehill's dealings with Seery were ***not*** arms-length. Again, Farallon and Stonehill were Seery's past business partners and close allies.[29] By virtue of the insider trades at issue, Farallon and Stonehill acquired control (acting through Muck and Jessup) over the Original Debtor and Reorganized Debtor through Seery's compensation agreement and awards, as well as supervisory powers over the Claimant Trust. This makes Farallon and Stonehill paradigm non-statutory insiders.

25. HMIT also seeks recovery against John Doe Defendant Nos. 1 through 10.[30] It is clear Farallon and Stonehill refuse to disclose the precise details of their legal

[28] Because of their "insider" status, this Court should closely scrutinize the transactions at issue.

[29] Farallon and Stonehill are two capital management firms (similar to HCM) with whom Seery has had substantial business relationships. Also, Seery previously served as legal counsel to Farallon. Seery also has a long-standing relationship with Stonehill. GCM Grosvenor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee (an original member of the Unsecured Creditors Committee in HCM's bankruptcy). Upon information and belief, GCM Grosvenor is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. GCM Grosvenor, through Redeemer, also played a large part in appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors and approved his appointment as HCM's CEO and CRO.

[30] Farallon and Stonehill consummated their trades concealing their actual involvement through Muck and Jessup as shell companies. Farallon's and Stonehill's identities were not discovered until much later after the fact.

relationships with Muck and Jessup. They resisted such discovery in the prior Rule 202 Proceedings in state district court.[31] They also refused to disclose such details in response to a prior inquiry to their counsel.[32] Furthermore, the corporate filings of both Muck and Farallon conspicuously omit the identity of their respective members or managing members.[33] Accordingly, HMIT intends to prosecute claims against John Doe Defendant Nos. 1 -- 10 seeking equitable tolling pending further discovery whether Farallon and Stonehill inserted intermediate corporate layers between themselves and the special purpose entities (Muck and Jessup) they created. *See In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.*, No. 12-36187, 2017 WL 2123867, *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 16, 2017) (lsgur .J.); *see also In re IFS Fin. Corp.* No. 02-39553, 2010 WL 4614293, *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. No. 2, 2010) ("The identity of the party concealing the fraud is immaterial, the critical factor is whether any of the parties involved concealed property of the estate." "In either case, the trustee must demonstrate that despite exercising diligence, he could not have discovered the identity of the [unnamed] defendants prior to the expiration of the limitations period.") *ATP Oil,* 2017 WL 2123867 at *4. That burden is easily satisfied here.

[31] *See* McEntire Dec., Ex. 4.

[32] *See* McEntire Dec., Ex. 4, *see also*, Ex. 4-F.

[33] *See* Ex. 4-D, Ex. 4-E.

V. Background

26. As part of this Court's Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the selections of the Unsecured Creditor's Committee—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Strand Advisors, Inc., ("Strand Advisors"), the Original Debtor's general partner. Following approval of the Governance Order, the Board then appointed Seery as the Original Debtor's CEO and CRO. [34] Following the Effective Date of the Plan, Seery now serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust (the Reorganized Debtor's sole post-reorganization limited partner), and continues to serve as the Reorganized Debtor's CEO. [35]

27. Imbued with his powers as CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained bankruptcy court approval of several settlements prior to the Effective Date, resulting in the following approximate allowed claims (hereinafter "Claims"):[36]

Creditor	**Class 8**	**Class 9**
Redeemer	$137 mm	$0 mm
Acis	$23 mm	$0 mm
HarbourVest	$45 mm	$35 mm
UBS	$65 mm	$60 mm
(Totals)	$270 mm	$95 mm

[34] Doc. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.

[35] *See* Doc. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

[36] Orders Approving Settlements [Doc. 1273, Doc. 1302, Doc. 1788, Doc. 2389].

Each of the settling parties curiously sold their Claims to Farallon or Stonehill (or their affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after they obtained court approval of their settlements. One of these "trades" occurred within just a few weeks before the Effective Date. Farallon and Stonehill coordinated and controlled the purchase of these Claims through Muck and Jessup, and they admitted in open court that Muck and Jessup were created to allow their purchase of the Claims.[37]

28. HMIT alleges that Seery filed (or caused to be filed) deflated, misleading projections regarding the value of the Debtor's Estate,[38] while inducing unsecured creditors to discount and sell their Claims to Farallon and Stonehill. But as reflected in the attached declarations, it is now known that Seery provided material, non-public information to Farallon. The circumstantial evidence is also clear that both Farallon and Stonehill had access to and used this non-public information in connection with their purchase decisions.

29. Farallon and Stonehill are registered investment advisors who have their own fiduciary duties to their investors, and they are acutely aware of what these duties entail. Yet, upon information and belief, they collectively invested over $160 million dollars to purchase the Claims in the absence of any publicly available information that

[37] *See* Ex. 4-B, Rule 202 Transcript at 55:22-25.

[38] The pessimistic projections were issued as part of the Plan Analysis on February 2, 2021. [Doc. 1875-1]. The Debtor projected 0% return on Class 9 claims and only 71.32% return on Class 8 Claims.

could rationally justify such investments. These "trades" become even more suspect because, at the time of confirmation, the Plan provided pessimistic projections advising stakeholders that the Claim holders would never receive full satisfaction:

- From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the valuation of HCM's assets dropped over $200 million from $566 million to $328.3 million.[39]
- HCM's Disclosure Statement projected payment of 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11;[40]
    - This meant that Farallon and Stonehill invested more than $103 million in Claims ***when the publicly available information indicated they would receive $0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par on their Class 8 Claims***.
- In HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report, HCM reported that the amount of Class 8 claims expected to be paid dropped even further from 71% *to 54%*;[41]

30. In the third financial quarter of 2021, just over $6 million of the projected $205 million available to satisfy general unsecured creditors was disbursed.[42] No additional distributions were made to the unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost $250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—**$45 million more than was *ever* projected**.[43]

[39] Doc. 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.

[40] Doc. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, p. 4.

[41] Doc 2949.

[42] Doc 3200.

[43] Doc 3582.

31. According to Highland Capital's Motion for Exit Financing,[44] and a recent motion filed by Dugaboy Investment Trust,[45] there remain ***substantial*** assets to be monetized for the benefit of the Reorganized Debtor's creditors. Thus, upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon, stand to realize significant profits on their wrongful investments. In turn, Stonehill and Farallon will garner (and already have garnered) substantial fees – both base fees and performance fees – as the result of their acquiring and/or managing the Claims. Upon information and belief, HMIT also alleges that Seery has received excessive compensation and bonuses approved by Farallon (Muck) and Stonehill (Jessup) as members of the Oversight Board.

32. As evidenced in the supporting declarations (Exs. 2 and 3):

- Farallon admitted it conducted no due diligence and relied upon Seery in making its multi-million-dollar investment decisions at issue.[46]
- Farallon admitted it was unwilling to sell its stake in these Claims at any price because Seery assured Farallon that the Claims were tremendously valuable.[47]
- Farallon bragged about the value of its investment referencing non-public information regarding Amazon, Inc.'s ("Amazon") interest in acquiring Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. ("MGM").[48]

[44] Doc 2229.

[45] Doc 3382.

[46] *See* Ex. 2, 2022 Dondero Declaration.

[47] *See* Ex. 2, 2022 Dondero Declaration, Ex. 3, 2023 Dondero Declaration.

[48] *See* Ex. 3, 2023 Dondero Declaration.

- Farallon was unwilling to sell its stake in the newly acquired Claims even though publicly available information suggested that Farallon would lose millions of dollars on its investment.[49]

Farallon can offer ***no credible explanation*** to explain its significant investment, and its refusal to sell at any price, ***except*** Farallon's access to material non-public information. In essence, Seery became the guarantor of Farallon's significant investment. Farallon admitted as much in its statements to James Dondero.

33. The same holds true for Stonehill. Given the negative, publicly available information, Stonehill's multi-million-dollar investments make no rational sense unless Stonehill had access to material non-public information.

34. Fed. R. Bank. P. 2015.3 requires debtors to "file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." However, no public reports required by Rule 2015.3 were filed. Seery testified they simply "fell through the cracks." [50]

35. Six days prior to the filing of the motion seeking approval of the HarbourVest Settlement, Seery acquired material non-public information regarding Amazon's interest in acquiring MGM.[51] Upon receipt of this material non-public

[49] *See* Ex. 3, 2023 Dondero Declaration, *see also* Doc. 1875-1.

[50] Doc. 1905, February 3, 2021, Hearing Transcript, 49:5-21.

[51] *See* Adversary No. 20-3190-sgj11, Doc. 150-1.

information, MGM should have been placed on the Original Debtor's "restricted list," but Seery continued to move forward with deals that involved MGM stock and notes.[52] Because the Original Debtor additionally held direct interests in MGM,[53] the value of MGM was of paramount importance to the value of the estate.

36. Armed with this and other insider information, Farallon—through Muck—proceeded to invest in the Claims and, acting through Muck, acceded to a powerful position on the Oversight Board to oversee future distributions to Muck and itself. It is no coincidence Seery invited his business allies into these bankruptcy proceedings with promises of great profits. Seery's allies now oversee his compensation.[54]

37. The Court also should be aware that the Texas States Securities Board ("TSSB") opened an investigation into the subject matter of the insider trades at issue, and this investigation has not been closed. The continuing nature of this investigation

[52] As part of the HarbourVest Settlement, Seery negotiated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF for approximately $22.5 million as part of the transaction. Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF's assets were comprised of debt and equity in MGM. The HCLOF interest was not to be transferred to the Debtor for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to "to an entity to be designated by the Debtor"—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements. Doc. 1625, p. 9, n. 5. Doc. 1625.

[53] *See* Doc. 2229, Motion for Exit Financing.

[54] Amazon closed on its acquisition of MGM in March 2022, but the evidence strongly suggests that agreements for the trades already had been reached - while announcement of the trades occurred strategically after the MGM news became public. Now, as a result of their wrongful conduct, Stonehill and Farallon profited significantly on their investments, and they stand to gain substantially more profits.

underscores HMIT's position that the claims described in the attached Adversary Proceeding are plausible and certainly far more than merely "colorable."

VI. Argument

A. HMIT has asserted Colorable Claims against Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup.

38. Unlike the terms "Enjoined Party," "Protected Party," or "Exculpated Party," the Plan does not define what constitutes a "colorable" claim. Nor does the Bankruptcy Code define the term. However, relevant authorities suggest that a Rule 12(b)(6) standard is an appropriate analogue.

39. The Fifth Circuit has held that a "colorable" claim standard is met if a [movant], such as HMIT, has asserted claims for relief that, on appropriate proof, would allow a recovery. A court need not and should not conduct an evidentiary hearing but must ensure that the claims do not lack any merit whatsoever. *Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 858 F.2d 233, 248 (5th Cir. 1988). Stated differently, the Court need not be satisfied there is an evidentiary basis for the asserted claims but instead should allow the claims if they ***appear*** to have ***some*** merit.

40. Other federal appellate courts have reached similar conclusions. For example, the Eighth Circuit holds that "creditors' claims are colorable if they would survive a motion to dismiss." *In re Racing Services, Inc.*, 540 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2008); *accord In Re Foster*, 516 B.R. 537, 542 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2014), aff'd 602 Fed. Appx. 356 (8th Cir. 2015) (*per curiam*). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar test requiring that the court

look ***only*** to the face of the complaint to determine if claims are colorable. *In re The Gibson Group, Inc.*, 66 F.3d 1436, 1446 (6th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).

41. Although there is a dearth of federal court authorities in Texas, other federal courts have adopted the same standard—*i.e.*, a claim is colorable if it is "plausible" and could survive a motion to dismiss. *See In re America's Hobby Center, Inc.*, 223 B.R. 273, 282 (S.D.N.Y 1998). In addition, in the non-bankruptcy context, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas explained that "[t]he requirement of a 'colorable claim' means only that the plaintiff must have an '*arguable* claim' and not that the plaintiff must be able to succeed on that claim." *Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.*, 207 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (Emphasis added).

42. Thus, in this instance, this Court's gatekeeping inquiry is properly limited to whether HMIT has stated a plausible claim on the face of the proposed pleadings involving "bad faith," "willful misconduct," or "fraud." Because the face of the Adversary Complaint alleges plausible facts, HMIT's Motion is properly granted. Clearly, the attached Adversary Proceeding would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. Furthermore, the supporting declarations and documentary evidence provide additional support, and the circumstantial evidence proves that Farallon and Stonehill, strangers to the bankruptcy on the petition date, would not have leaped into these proceedings without undisclosed assurances of profit.

B. Fraud

43. As set forth in the proposed Adversary Proceeding, HMIT alleges a colorable claim for fraud—both fraud by knowing misrepresentation and fraud by omission of material fact. Here, these allegations of fraud are appropriately governed by Texas law under appropriate choice of law principals.[55]

44. Seery had a duty to not provide material inside information to his business allies. But, he did so. At the latest, Seery became aware of the potential sale of MGM in December 2020 when he received an email from Jim Dondero.[56] Thus, Seery knew at that time that this potential sale would likely yield significant value to the Original Debtor's Estate. Yet, the financial disclosures associated with the Plan's confirmation, which were provided only a month later, presented an entirely different outlook for both Class 8 and Class 9 unsecured creditors.[57] Seery knew at that time that these pessimistic disclosures were misleading, if not inaccurate.

45. There is no credible doubt Seery intended that innocent stakeholders would rely upon the pessimistic projections set forth in the Plan Analysis. Indeed, the singular purpose of the Plan Analysis was to advise stakeholders. As such, HMIT alleges that Seery knowingly made misrepresentations with the intention that innocent stakeholders

[55] However, Delaware law is substantially similar on the elements of fraud. *See Malinals v. Kramer*, No. CIV.A. CPU 6-11002145, 2012 WL 174958, at 2 (Del. Com. PI. Jan. 5, 2012)

[56] *See,* Dondero 2022 Dec., Ex. 2-1.

[57] *See* Doc. 1875-1, Plan Analysis, February 1, 2021.

would rely, and that he failed to disclose material information concerning his entanglements with Farallon and Stonehill, as well as the related negotiations that were chock full of conflicts of interest.

46. On the flip side of this conspiracy coin, Farallon and Stonehill were engaged in negotiations to acquire the Claims at discounted prices; and, they successfully did so. HMIT alleges that their success was based on knowledge that the financial disclosures associated with the Plan Analysis were significantly understated. Otherwise, it would make no financial sense for Farallon and Stonehill to do the deals at issue. Indeed, Farallon admitted that it would not sell the Claims at any price, expressing great confidence in the substantial profits it expected even in the absence of any supporting, publicly available information.[58]

47. All of the Proposed Defendants had a duty of affirmative disclosure under these circumstances. Seery always had this duty. Muck, Jessup, Farallon, and Stonehill assumed this duty when they became non-statutory "insiders." Thus, all of the Proposed Defendants are liable for conspiring to perpetrate a fraud by omission of material facts.

48. HMIT also claims that Seery and the other Proposed Defendants failed to disclose material information concerning Seery's involvement in brokering the Claims in exchange for *quid pro quo* assurances of enhanced compensation. Seery's compensation

[58] Ex. 3, 2023 Dondero Declaration.

should be disgorged or, alternatively, such compensation constitutes a damage recoverable by the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust as assignees (or transferees) of the Original Debtor's causes of action. This compensation was the product of the alleged self-dealing, breaches of fiduciary duty, and fraud.

C. Breaches and Aiding and Abetting Breaches of Fiduciary Duties

49. It is beyond dispute Seery owed fiduciary duties to the Estate. *See Xtreme Power*, 563 B.R. at 632-33 (detailing fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers and directors under Delaware law);[59] *Louisiana World*, 858 F.2d at 245-46 (5th Cir. 1988) (detailing duties owed by debtors-in-possession). Although Seery did not buy the Claims at issue, he stood to profit from these sales because his close business allies would do his bidding after they had acceded to positions of power and control on the Oversight Board. Muck and Jessup were essentially stepping into the shoes of three of the largest unsecured creditors who were already slated to serve on the Oversight Board. Thus, by acquiring their Claims, all of the Proposed Defendants knew that Muck and Jessup would occupy these powerful oversight positions after the Effective Date.

50. Thus, the alleged conspiracy was successfully implemented before the Effective Date. Farallon and Stonehill now occupy control positions through the shell

[59] The *Xtreme* case also notes that "several Delaware courts have recognized that 'directors who are corporate employees lack independence because of their substantial interest in retaining their employment." 563 B.R. at 633-34. Because Muck and Jessup are now in control of Seery's compensation, it follows that Seery is beholden to them, and Seery's disclosure of inside information to Stonehill and Farallon confirms his conflict of interest.

entities (Muck and Jessup) overseeing large compensation packages for Seery. Of course, this control (and the opportunity to control) presented a patent conflict of interest which Seery should have avoided, but instead knowingly created, fostered, and encouraged. HMIT alleges that Seery breached his duty to avoid this conflict or otherwise disclose this conflict and Farallon and Stonehill aided and abetted this breach.

51. The Original Debtor, as an investment adviser registered with the SEC, is also required to make public disclosures on its Form ADV, the uniform registration form for investment advisers required by the SEC. These Form ADV disclosures, which were in effect at the time of the insider trades at issue, explicitly forbade "any access person from trading either personally or on behalf of others . . . on material non-public information or communicating material non-public information to others in violation of the law or duty owed to another party."[60] It now appears these representations were false when made. Seery's alleged conduct also violated, at minimum, the duties Seery owed in his various capacities with the Original Debtor under the Form ADV disclosures.

52. Although initially strangers to the original bankruptcy, by accepting and using inside information, Farallon and Stonehill became "temporary insiders" and thus owed separate duties to the Estate. *See S.E.C. v. Cuban*, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010) ("[E]ven

[60] *See, e.g.*, https://files.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Common/crd_iapd_Brochure.aspx?BRCHR_VRSN_ID=777026.

an individual who does not qualify as a traditional insider may become a 'temporary insider' if by entering 'into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise [they] are given access to information solely for corporate purposes." *In re Washington Mut., Inc.*, 461 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011), *vacated in part*, 08-12229 MFW, 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012) (finding that equity committee stated colorable claim for equitable disallowance against creditors who "became temporary insiders of the Debtors when the Debtors gave them confidential information and allowed them to participate in negotiations with JPMC for the shared goal of reaching a settlement that would form the basis of a consensual plan of reorganization"; vacated in part as a condition of settlement only);[61] *See also, In re Smith*, 415 B.R. 222, 232-33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) ("[a]n insider is an entity or person with 'a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arm's length with the debtor.' 'Thus, the term "insider" is viewed to encompass two classes: (1) per se insiders as listed in the Code and (2) extra-statutory insiders that do not deal at arm's length.'" (citations omitted)). Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup clearly fall into this latter category.

[61] Although the *Washington Mutual* case was subsequently vacated, the Court's intellectual reasoning remains valid because the vacatur was mandated by a mediated settlement, not because the court's logic was flawed or changed, and the court expressly noted that the parties' settlement was conditioned on vacatur. *See In re Washington Mut., Inc.*, No. 08-12229 MFW, 2012 WL 1563880, *8 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012) ("grant[ing] partial vacatur . . . *in furtherance of the settlement embodied in the Plan*," and noting that "absent the requested vacatur, the collapse of the Plan could result in the termination of the Global Settlement Agreement." (emphasis added)).

53. Because Farallon and Stonehill (acting through Muck and Jessup) now hold the majority of the seats on the Oversight Board, they, along with Seery, exercise control of the reorganization proceedings. At no time were Farallon, Stonehill, or Seery's plans disclosed to the other creditors or equity. In fact, the only inference that can be reasonably drawn is that Farallon and Stonehill brazenly sought to conceal their involvement by establishing shell entities—Muck and Jessup—to nominally hold the Claims and create an opaque barrier to any effort to identify the "*Oz behind the curtain*." Such conduct aligns precisely with the inequitable conduct detailed in *Citicorp* and *Adelphia* (discussed below).

54. In sum, the proposed Adversary Proceeding sets forth plausible allegations that Stonehill and Farallon were aware of Seery's fiduciary duties. Indeed, as registered investment advisors, both Farallon and Stonehill were acutely aware of Seery's fiduciary obligations, including, without limitation, the duty to act in the best interests of the Original Debtor's Estate and the duty not to engage in insider trading that would benefit Seery, as an insider, and themselves, as non-statutory insiders. By accepting and then acting on material non-public information, Farallon and Stonehill (as well as Muck and Jessup) aided and abetted breaches of these fiduciary duties. By placing themselves in positions to control Seery's compensation, Farallon and Stonehill (acting through Muck and Jessup) induced, encouraged, aided and abetted Seery's self-dealing.

D. Equitable Disallowance is an Appropriate Remedy

55. HMIT also seeks equitable disallowance. Although the Fifth Circuit in *Matter of Mobile Steel Co.* generally limited the court's equitable powers to subordination rather than disallowance,[62] the Fifth Circuit **did *not* foreclose** the viability of equitable disallowance as a potential remedy. *See* 563 F.2d 692, 699 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1977). Binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent in *Pepper v. Litton* also permits bankruptcy courts to fashion disallowance remedies. 308 U.S. 295, 304-11 (1939). Bankruptcy Code § 510, which supplies the authority for equitable subordination, was "intended to codify case law, such as *Pepper v. Litton . . . and is not intended to limit the court's power in any way…. Nor does [it] preclude a bankruptcy court from completely disallowing a claim in appropriate circumstances*." *In re Adelphia Commun. Corp.*, 365 B.R. 24, 71-72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), *aff'd in part sub nom. Adelphia Recovery Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A.*, 390 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), *adhered to on reconsideration*, 05 CIV. 9050 (LMM), 2008 WL 1959542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008) (emphasis and omissions in original).[63]

56. The Fifth Circuit's decision in *Mobile Steel* also was premised on the notion that disallowance would not add to the quiver of defenses to fight unfairness because

[62] Equitable subordination is an inadequate remedy in this instance.

[63] In *Washington Mutual*, the Court's intellectual reasoning when imposing disallowance is instructive. *See In re Washington Mut., Inc.*, No. 08-12229 MFW, 2012 WL 1563880, *8 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012) ("grant[ing] partial vacatur . . . *in furtherance of the settlement embodied in the Plan*," and noting that "absent the requested vacatur, the collapse of the Plan could result in the termination of the Global Settlement Agreement." (emphasis added)).

creditors "are fully protected by subordination" and "[i]f the misconduct directed against the bankrupt is so extreme that disallowance might appear to be warranted, then *surely* the claim is either invalid or the bankrupt possesses a clear defense against it." *Mobile Steel*, 563 F.2d at 699 n. 10 (emphasis added). Importantly, however, the factual scenarios considered in *Mobile Steel* do not exist here.

57. Here, Muck and Jessup purchased both Class 8 and Class 9 Claims, and they now effectively occupy more than 90% of the entire field of unsecured creditors in these two claimant tiers. Thus, subordination cannot effectively address the current facts where the Original Debtor's CEO and CRO conspired directly with close business allies who acquired the largest unsecured claims to the detriment of other innocent creditors and *former equity*. The reasoning in published cases from other circuits supports this conclusion. *See Adelphia*, 365 B.R. at 71-73; *Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims*, 160 F.3d 982, 991 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1998).

58. The purpose of equitable subordination is to assure that the wrongdoer does not profit from bad conduct. In the typical case, subordination to other creditors will achieve this deterrence. But, it is clear that the Third Circuit's decision in *Citicorp* was structured to use subordination as just one tool in a larger tool box to make sure "at a minimum, the remedy here should deprive – [the fiduciary] of its profit on the purchase of the notes." *Id* at 991. In *Adelphia*, the Southern District of New York also used equitable

subordination as a remedy to address wrongs of non-insiders who aided and abetted breaches a fiduciary duty by the debtor's management. 365 B.R. at 32.

59. But subordination cannot adequately address the wrongful conduct at issue. This is because subordination is typically limited to instances where one creditor is subordinated to other creditors, not equity. Here, for all practical purposes, there are only a few other unsecured creditors with relatively small stakes. Therefore, subordination as a weapon of deterrence is neutered.

60. In sum, by engaging in the alleged wrongful acts, including aiding and abetting Seery's breaches of fiduciary duty, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup should not be rewarded. The Proposed Defendants engaged in alleged conduct which damaged the Original Debtor's estate, including improper agreements to compensate Seery under the terms of the CTA. Equitable disallowance is an appropriate remedy which, when combined with disgorgement of all ill-gotten profits, will deprive the Proposed Defendants of their ill-gotten gains.

E. Disgorgement and Unjust Enrichment

61. The law is clear that disgorgement is an available remedy for breach of fiduciary duty both under Texas Law, see *Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corporation*, 160 S.W. 2d 509 (Tex. 1942), and under Delaware law, see *Metro Storage International, LLC v. Harron*, 275 A.3d 810 (Del. Ch. 2022). Disgorgement is also an appropriate remedy for unjust enrichment under Texas law, *Hunter v. Shell Oil Co.*, 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952),

and under Delaware law, *In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consolidated Shareholder Litigation*, 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007).[64]

62. Likewise, the imposition of a constructive trust is proper for addressing unjust enrichment under both Delaware and Texas law, see *Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana v. Aidinoff*, 900 A.2d 654 (Del. Ch. 2006) and *Hsin-Chi-Su v. Vantage Drilling Company*, 474 S.W. 3d 384 (Tex. App. – 14th Dist. 2015), pet. denied. The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) the defendant must have gained a benefit (2) at the expense of plaintiff, (3) and retention of that benefit must be shown to be unjust. *See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment* §321, cmt. e (2011).

63. Here, the imposition of a constructive trust and disgorgement are clearly appropriate to provide redress for the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and the knowing participation in (or aiding and abetting) those breaches. Furthermore, the imposition of a constructive trust and disgorgement are appropriate to disgorge the improper benefits that all of the Proposed Defendants received by virtue of collusion and insider trading.

64. As set forth in the proposed Adversary Proceeding, Seery gained the opportunity to have his compensation demands rubber stamped. The other Defendants gained the opportunity to purchase valuable claims at a discount knowing that

[64] It is likely that the Internal Affairs Doctrine will dictate that Delaware choice of law governs the breach of fiduciary duty claims.

pessimistic financial projections were false and that the upside investment potential was great. Retention of the benefits they received would be unjust and inequitable.

65. Clearly, the Debtor's Estate was damaged by virtue of the claimed conduct. Seery obtained profits and compensation to the detriment of that estate as well as the estate of the Reorganized Debtor, other innocent creditors and HMIT, as former equity and as a contingent Claimant Trust Beneficiary.

F. Declaratory Relief

66. HMIT also seeks declaratory relief pursuant to Fed. R. Bank P. 7001(9). Specifically, HMIT seeks a declaratory judgment that: (a) there is a ripe controversy concerning HMIT's rights and entitlements under the Claimant Trust Agreement; (b) as a general matter, HMIT has standing to bring an action against a trustee even if its interest is considered "contingent;" (c) HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits of Muck and Jessup, and by extension, Farallon and Stonehill; (d) HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon the equitable disallowance of the Claims held by Muck and Jessup over and above their initial investments; (e) Seery is properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and/or the Claimant Trust because of fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands; (f) Muck and Jessup are properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized

Debtor and the Claimant Trust because of their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands; and (g) all of the Proposed Defendants are estopped from asserting that HMIT does not have standing in its individual capacity due to their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands.

G. HMIT has Direct Standing.

67. The Texas Supreme Court recently held that "a partner or other stakeholder in a business organization has constitutional standing to sue for an alleged loss in the value of its interest in the organization." *Pike v. Texas EMC Mgt., LLC*, 610 S.W.3d 763, 778 (Tex. 2020). In so holding, the Court considered federal law and found that the traditional "incantation that a shareholder may not sue for the corporation's injury" is really a question of capacity, which goes to the merits of a claim, rather than an issue of standing that would impact subject matter jurisdiction. *Id.* at 777 (noting that the 5th Circuit and "[o]ther federal circuits agree that a plaintiff has standing to sue for the lost value of its investment in a corporation"). Because Seery, Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, Farallon's alleged actions devalued HMIT's interest in the Debtor's Estate, including, without limitation, payment of excessive compensation to Seery, HMIT has standing to pursue its common law claims directly. HMIT also has direct standing to seek declaratory relief as set forth in the proposed Adversary Proceeding.

VII. Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust respectfully requests this Court grant HMIT leave authorizing it to file the Adversary Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1, as an Adversary Proceeding in this United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, in its own name and as a derivative action on behalf of the Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., against Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC, Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, James P. Seery, Jr., and John Doe Defendants Nos. 1 – 10, and further grant HMIT all such other and further relief to which HMIT may be justly entitled.

Dated: March 28, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,
PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Beginning on March 24, 2023, and also on March 27, 2023, the undersigned counsel conferred either by telephone or via email with all counsel for all Respondents regarding the relief requested in the foregoing Motion, including John A. Morris on behalf of James P. Seery, and Brent McIlwain on behalf of Muck Holdings LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management, and Farallon Capital Management. Mr. Seery is opposed to this Motion. Based upon all communications with Mr. McIlwain, it is reasonably believed his clients are also opposed and we advised him that this recitation would be placed in the certificate of conference.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 28th day of March 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was served on all counsel of record or, as appropriate, on the Respondents directly.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 1 to Emergency Motion

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. AND THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST	§	**Adversary Proceeding No. _____**
PLAINTIFFS,	§	

v.	§
	§
MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC, JESSUP HOLDINGS, LLC, FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, JAMES P. SEERY, JR., AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS NOS. 1-10	§
	§
DEFENDANTS.	§

VERIFIED ADVERSARY COMPLAINT

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") files this Verified Adversary Complaint in its individual capacity and, as a derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM" or "Reorganized Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (collectively "Plaintiffs"), complaining of Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"), James P. Seery, Jr., ("Seery") and John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10 (Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, Farallon, Seery and the John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10 are collectively "Defendants"), and would show:

I. Introduction

1. HMIT brings this Verified Adversary Complaint ("Complaint") on behalf of itself, individually, and as a derivative action benefitting the Reorganized Debtor and

on behalf of the Highland Claimant Trust ("Claimant Trust"), as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement (Doc. 3521-5) ("CTA").[1] This derivative action is specifically brought pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and B. R. Rule 7023.1. At the time of the transactions at issue, HMIT held a 99.5% limited partnership in Highland Capital Management, LP, the Original Debtor, as described herein. This derivative action is not a collusive effort to confer jurisdiction that the Court would otherwise lack.

2. Upon the Effective Date, the assets of the bankruptcy estate of Highland Capital Management, L.P., as the Original Debtor (the "Debtor's Estate") were transferred to the Highland Claimant Trust under the terms of the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) [Doc. 1943, Exhibit A] (the "Plan") and as defined in the CTA. These assets include all "causes of action" that the Debtor's Estate had before the Effective Date including, without limitation, the causes of action set forth in this Adversary Proceeding. Furthermore, the Claimant Trust is managed by the Claimant Trustee, Seery. Therefore, any demand upon Seery to prosecute the claims set forth in this Complaint would be futile because Seery is a Defendant. Similarly, the Oversight Board exercises supervision over Seery as Claimant

[1] Solely in the alternative, and in the unlikely event HMIT's proposed causes of actions against Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and/or Jessup are considered to be "Estate Claims" as those terms are used and defined within the CTA and Exhibit A to the Notice of Final Term Sheet [Docket No. 354] in HCM's bankruptcy (and without admitting the same), HMIT alternatively seeks standing to bring this action as a derivative action on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust as appropriate. Any demand on the Litigation Sub-Trust would be equally futile for the same reasons addressed in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave (Doc. __).

Trustee, and Muck and Jessup are members of the Oversight Board. Any demand upon Muck and Jessup to prosecute these claims would be equally futile. All conditions precedent to bringing this derivative action have otherwise been satisfied.

3. This action has become necessary because of Defendants' tortious conduct. This tortious conduct occurred before the Effective Date of the Plan, but its effects have caused damage both before and after the Effective Date. Prior to the Effective Date, HMIT owned 99.5% of the limited partnership interest in the Original Debtor and was the beneficiary of fiduciary duties owed by Seery.

4. Seery, the Original Debtor's CEO and former Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO"), wrongfully facilitated and promoted the sale of large unsecured creditor claims to his close business allies and friends, Farallon and Stonehill. He did so by providing material non-public information to them concerning the value of the Original Debtor's Estate that other stakeholders did not know. Farallon and Stonehill, who were otherwise strangers to the bankruptcy proceedings, wrongfully purchased the claims through their special purpose entities, Muck and Jessup, based upon this inside information, and they are now profiting from their misconduct. Seery's dealings with the other Defendants were not arm's length, but instead were covert, undisclosed, and collusive.

5. Motivated by corporate greed, the other Defendants aided and abetted or, alternatively, knowingly participated in Seery's wrongful conduct. They also breached their own duties as "non-statutory insiders." Because of their long-standing, historical

relationships with Seery, and their use of material non-public information, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup assumed positions of control over the affairs of the Debtor's bankruptcy, including compensation awards to Seery. As such, they became non-statutory insiders.

6. HMIT was formerly the largest equity holder in the Debtor, holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HMIT now holds an Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interest and a Contingent Trust Interest under the CTA. Given HMIT's' position as former equity, HMIT's right to recover from the Claimant Trust is junior to the Reorganized Debtor's unsecured creditors, now known as Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. However, the vast majority of the approved unsecured claims superior to HMIT's interest are the claims wrongfully acquired by insider trading and the breaches of duty at issue in this proceeding.

7. By wrongfully soliciting, fostering, and encouraging the wrongful insider trades, Seery violated his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's Estate, specifically his duty of loyalty and his duty to maximize the value of the Estate with corresponding recovery by legitimate creditors and former equity. Seery was motivated out of self-interest to garner personal benefit (to the detriment of the Debtor's Estate) by strategically benefitting his business allies with non-public information. He then successfully "planted" his allies onto the Oversight Board, which, as a consequence does not act as an independent board in the exercise of its responsibilities. Rather, imbued with powers to oversee Seery's

future compensation, the other Defendants are postured to reward Seery financially regarding Defendants' illicit dealings and, upon information and belief, they have done so.

8. By receiving and acting upon material non-public information concerning the financial condition of the Debtor's Estate, Stonehill and Farallon, acting individually and through special purpose shell entities they created and controlled, directly or indirectly, are also liable for aiding and abetting Seery's breaches of fiduciary duties. By acquiring the claims at issue, Muck and Jessup, the shell entities created and controlled by Stonehill and Farallon, also became non-statutory insiders owing duties of disclosure which they also breached.

9. HMIT separately seeks recovery against John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10. Farallon actively concealed the precise legal relationship between Farallon and Muck. Stonehill actively concealed the precise legal relationship between Stonehill and Jessup. What is known, however, is that Farallon and Stonehill created these special purpose shell entities on the eve of the insider trades to acquire ownership of the claims and to otherwise control the affairs of the Oversight Board. Both Farallon and Stonehill rejected inquiries concerning the exact nature of their relationship with these special purpose entities. Accordingly, HMIT seeks equitable tolling of any statute of limitations concerning claims against unknown business entities that Farallon and Stonehill may have created and inserted as intermediate corporate layers in the transactions at issue.

10. HMIT seeks to disgorge all Defendants' ill-gotten profits and equitable disallowance of the remaining unpaid balances on the following allowed claims: Claim Nos. 23, 72, 81, 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 190, and 191 (the "Claims") currently held by Muck and Jessup. Because Defendants received substantial distributions from the Claimant Trust in connection with these Claims, HMIT seeks to disgorge all such distributions above Defendants' initial investment—compelling restitution of such funds to the Claimant Trust for the benefit of innocent creditors and former equity pursuant to the waterfall established under the Plan and the CTA. HMIT also seeks to disgorge Seery's compensation from the date his collusive conduct first occurred. Alternatively, HMIT seeks damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust in an amount equal to all compensation paid to Seery from the onset of his collusive conduct to present.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

11. Pursuant to *Misc. Order No. 33 Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases, U.S. District Court for N.D. Texas* (the "Order of Reference"), this Complaint is commenced in the Bankruptcy Court because it is "related to a case under Title 11." The filing of this Complaint is expressly subject to and without waiver of Plaintiff' rights and ability to seek withdrawal of the reference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), FED. R. BANKR. P. 5011, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-1. Plaintiffs hereby demand a right to a trial by jury of all claims asserted herein and nothing in this Complaint, nor Plaintiffs' compliance with the Order of Reference, shall be deemed a waiver of this right.

12. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties as a "related to" proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and Articles IX.F, and XI. of the Plan.

13. Pursuant to Rule 7008 of the Bankruptcy Rules, Plaintiffs do **not** consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy court.

14. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409, and Articles IX.F, and XI. of the Plan.

III. Parties

15. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust that was the largest equity holder in the Original Debtor, holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HMIT is also the holder of a Contingent Trust Interest in the Claimant Trust, but should be treated as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary due to Defendants' wrongful conduct.

16. Pursuant to the Plan and the CTA, the Claimant Trust holds the assets of the Reorganized Debtor, including the causes of action that accrued to the Original Debtor before the Effective Date. The Claimant Trust is established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulatory Section 301.7701-4(d).

17. Muck is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in California, and may be served with process at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111. Muck has made prior appearances in the Debtor's bankruptcy.

18. Jessup is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in New York, and may be served with process via its registered agent, Vcorp Services, LLC, at 108 W. 13th Street Suite 100, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Jessup has made prior appearances in the Debtor's bankruptcy.

19. Farallon is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in California, and may be served with process at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111. Farallon is a capital management company that manages hedge funds and is a registered investment advisor. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Farallon because Farallon's conduct giving rise to or relating to the claims in this Adversary Proceeding occurred in Texas, thereby satisfying all minimum contacts requirements and due process considerations.

20. Stonehill is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in New York, and may be served with process at 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022. Stonehill is a capital management company managing hedge funds and is a registered investment advisor. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Stonehill because Stonehill's conduct giving rise to or relating to the claims in this Adversary Proceeding occurred in Texas, thereby satisfying all minimum contacts and all due process considerations.

21. Seery is an individual citizen and resident of the State of New York. Mr. Seery may be served with process at 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1805, Dallas, Texas 75201.

22. John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10 are currently unknown individuals or business entities who may be identified in discovery as involved in the wrongful transactions at issue.

IV. Facts

A. *Procedural Background*

23. On October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in Delaware Bankruptcy Court,[2] which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2019.[3]

24. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee's office appointed a four-member Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") consisting of three judgment creditors—the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund ("Redeemer"); Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (collectively "Acis"); and UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS")—and an unpaid vendor, Meta-E Discovery.

25. Following the venue transfer to Texas, on December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed its *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of*

[2] Doc. 3. Unless otherwise referenced, all documents referencing "Doc." refer to the docket maintained in Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.).

[3] Doc. 1.

Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course ("Governance Motion").[4] On January 9, 2020, the Court signed a Governance Order granting the Governance Motion.[5]

26. As part of the Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the selections of the Unsecured Creditors Committee—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Strand, the Original Debtor's general partner. The Board then appointed Seery as the Chief Executive Officer in place of the previous CEO, Mr. James Dondero, as well as the CRO.[6] Seery currently serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust under the terms of the CTA and the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor.[7]

B. *The Targeted Claims*

27. In his capacity as the Original Debtor's CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained court approval for settlements with several large unsecured creditors including Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and another major unsecured creditor, HarbourVest (Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest are collectively the "Settling Parties"), resulting in the following allowed Claims:

Creditor	**Class 8**	**Class 9**
Redeemer	$137 mm	$0 mm

[4] Doc. 281.

[5] Doc. 339.

[6] Doc. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.

[7] *See* Doc. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

Acis	$23 mm	$0 mm
HarbourVest	$45 mm	$35 mm
UBS	$65 mm	$60 mm
(Totals)	$270 mm	$95 mm

As reflected in these settlements, HarbourVest and UBS owned Class 9 claims in addition to Class 8 Claims. Class 9 Claims were subordinated to Class 8 Claims in the distribution waterfall in the Plan.

28. Each of the Settling Parties sold their Claims to Farallon and Stonehill (or affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after receiving court approval of the settlements. One of these "trades" took place within just a few weeks before the Plan's Effective Date.[8] All of these trades occurred when HMIT held its 99.5% equity stake in the Debtor. Notice of these trades was first provided in filings in the records of the Original Debtor's bankruptcy proceedings, as follows: Claim No. 23 (Doc. 2211, 2212, and 2215), Claim Nos. 190 and 191 (Doc. 2697 and 2698), Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153 and 154 (Doc. 2263), Claim No. 81 (Doc. 2262), Claim No. 72 (Doc. 2261).

29. Farallon and Stonehill, both of whom are registered investment advisors that manage hedge funds, have fiduciary duties to their own investors. As such, they are acutely aware of their duties and obligation as fiduciaries. Yet, they both invested many tens of millions of dollars, directly or indirectly, to acquire the Claims in the absence of

[8] Docs. 2697, 2698.

any publicly available information that could provide any economic justification for their investment decisions.

30. Upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon collectively invested an estimated $160 million to acquire the Claims with a face amount of $365 million, and they did so in the absence of any meaningful due diligence. Indeed, Farallon has admitted that it conducted no due diligence but relied on Seery's guarantees.

31. Stonehill and Farallon's investments become even more suspicious because the Plan provided the ***only*** publicly available information, which, at the time, included pessimistic projections that the Claims would ever receive full payment:

a. From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the projected value of HCM's assets dropped over $200 million from $566 million to $364 million.[9]

b. HCM's Disclosure Statement projected payment of 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11.[10]

   - This meant that Farallon and Stonehill invested more than $163 million in Claims when the publicly available information indicated they would receive $0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par on their Class 8 Claims.

c. In HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report, HCM reported that the amount of Class 8 claims expected to be paid dropped even further from 71% to 54%.

[9] Doc. 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.

[10] Doc. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, Ex. A, p. 4.

d. Despite the stark decline in the value of the estate and in the midst of substantial reductions in the percentage of Class 8 Claims expected to be satisfied, Stonehill, through Jessup, and Farallon, through Muck, nevertheless purchased the four largest bankruptcy claims from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively, again, the "Claims") in April and August of 2021 in the combined amount of $163 million.[11]

32. Upon information and belief, Stonehill, through its special purpose entity, Jessup, acquired the Redeemer Committee's claim for $78 million.[12] Upon information and belief, the $23 million Acis claim[13] was sold to Farallon/Muck for $8 million. Upon information and belief, HarbourVest sold its combined $80 million in claims to Farallon/Muck for $27 million. UBS sold its combined $125 million in claims for $50 million to both Stonehill/Jessup and Farallon/Muck. In the instance of UBS, ***the total projected payout was only $35 million***. Indeed, as part of these transactions, both Farallon and Stonehill purchased Class 9 Claims at a time when the Debtor's Estate projected a zero dollar return on all such Claims.

[11] Notices of Transfers [Docs. 2212, 2215, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2297, 2298]. The Acis claim was transferred on April 16, 2021; the Redeemer, Crusader, and HarbourVest claims were transferred on April 30, 2021; and the UBS claims were transferred on August 9, 2021.

[12] July 6, 2021, letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.

[13] Seery/HCM have argued that $10 million of the Acis claim is self-funding.

C. *Material Non-Public Information is Disclosed to Seery's Affiliates at Stonehill and Farallon.*

33. One of the significant assets of the Debtor's Estate was the Debtor's direct and indirect holdings in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM").[14]

34. On December 17, 2020, James Dondero, sent an email to Seery. At that time, Dondero was a member of the MGM board, and the email contained material non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM.[15] Of course, any such sale would significantly enhance the value of the Original Debtor's estate.

35. Upon receipt of this material non-public information, Seery should have halted all transactions involving MGM stock, yet just six days later Seery filed a motion in this Court seeking approval of the Original Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest - resulting in a transfer to the Original Debtor of HarbourVest's interest in a Debtor-advised fund, Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), which held substantial MGM debt and equity.[16] Conspicuously, the HCLOF interest was not transferred to the Original Debtor for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to "to an entity to be designated by the Debtor"—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements.[17]

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[14] *See* Doc. 2229, p. 6.

[15] *See* Adversary Case No. 20-3190-sgj11, Doc. 150-1, p. 1674.

[16] Doc. 1625. Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF's assets were comprised of debt and equity in MGM.

[17] Doc. 1625.

36. Upon information and belief, aware that the Debtor's stake in MGM afforded a new profit center, Seery saw an opportunity to increase his own compensation and enlisted the help of Stonehill and Farallon to extract further value from the Original Debtor's Estate at the expense of other innocent creditors and equity. This *quid pro quo* included, at a minimum, a tacit, if not express, understanding that Seery would be well-compensated.

37. Until 2009, Seery was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Brothers[18] where, on information and belief, he conducted substantial business with Farallon. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Seery continued to work with, and indeed represented Farallon as its legal counsel. Seery ultimately joined a hedge fund, River Birch Capital,[19] which, along with Stonehill, served on the creditors committee in other bankruptcy proceedings. GCM Grovesnor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee[20] and, upon information and belief, is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. Grovesnor, through Redeemer, played a large part in appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors. Seery was beholden to Grovesnor from the outset, and, by extension, Grovesnor's affiliates Stonehill and Farallon.

[18] Seery Resume [Doc. 281-2].

[19] *Id*.

[20] Declaration of John A. Morris [Doc. 1090], Ex. 1, pp. 15.

38. As successful capital management firms, with advisory and fiduciary duties to their own clients, Stonehill and Farallon typically engage in robust due diligence before making significant investments. Yet, in this case, it would have been *impossible* for Stonehill and Farallon to forecast *any* profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments given the negative financial information disclosed by the Original Debtor's Estate. Seery, as the CEO, was aware of and involved in approving these negative financial projections. In doing so, Seery intentionally caused the publication of misleading, false information.

39. Seery shared with Stonehill and Farallon *non-public* information concerning the value of the Original Debtor's Estate which was higher than publicly available information. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that all Defendants knew that the publicly available projections, which accompanied the Plan, were understated, false, and misleading. Otherwise, Farallon, Muck, Stonehill and Jessup would not have made their multi-million-dollar investments. None of the Defendants disclosed their knowledge of the misleading nature of these financial projections when they had a duty to do so. None of the Defendants disclosed the nature of their dealings in acquiring the Claims.

40. By wrongfully exploiting non-public insider information, Stonehill and Farallon—acting through Muck and Jessup—became the largest holders of unsecured claims in the Debtor's Estate with resulting control over the Oversight Board and a front row seat to the reorganization and distribution of Claimant Trust Assets. As such, they

were given control (through Muck and Jessup) to approve discretionary bonuses and success fees for Seery from these assets.

D. ***Distributions***

41. The MGM sale was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for $6.1 billion in cash, plus $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid.[21]

42. By the end of Q3 2021, just over $6 million of the projected $205 million available for general unsecured claimants had been disbursed.[22] No additional distributions were made to general unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost $250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—$45 million more than was *ever* projected.[23] Thus, Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) have already received returns that far eclipse their investment. They also stand to make further significant profits on their investments, including payments on Class 9 Claims.

43. As of December 31, 2022, the Claimant Trust has distributed $255,201,228. On a pro rata basis, that means that innocent creditors have received approximately $22,373,000 in distributions against the stated value of their allowed claims. That leaves a remaining unpaid balance of approximately $9,627,000.

[21] Amazon Q1 2022 10-Q.

[22] Doc. 3200.

[23] Doc. 3582.

44. Muck and Jessup already have received approximately $232.8 million on their Claims. Assuming and original investment of approximately $160 million, this represents over $72 million in ill-gotten profits that, if disgorged, would be far more than what is required to fully pay all other innocent creditors - immediately placing HMIT in the status of a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary.

45. It is clear Seery facilitated the sale of the Claims to Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) at discounted prices and used misleading financial projections to facilitate these trades. This was part of a larger strategy to install Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck), his business allies, onto the Oversight Board where they would oversee lucrative bonuses and other compensation for Seery in exchange for hefty profits they expected to receive.

V. Causes of Action

A. Count I (against Seery): Breach of Fiduciary Duty

46. The allegations in paragraphs 1-45 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

47. As CEO and CRO of a debtor-in-possession, Seery owed fiduciary duties to HMIT, as equity, and to the Debtor's Estate, including, without limitation, the duty of loyalty. Seery also was under a duty to avoid conflicts of interests, but Seery willfully and knowingly engaged in conduct which conflicted with his fiduciary duties—and he did so out of financial self-interest.

48. By fraudulently providing and/or approving negative projections of the Debtor's Estate when he knew otherwise, Seery willfully and knowingly breached his fiduciary duties.

49. By misusing and disclosing confidential, material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon, Seery willfully and knowingly breached his fiduciary duties.

50. By failing to disclose his role in the inside trades at issue, Seery willfully and knowingly breached his fiduciary duties.

51. As a result of his willful misconduct, Seery was unfairly advantaged by receiving additional undisclosed compensation and bonuses from the assets of the Debtor's Estate and from the Claimant Trust Assets—to the detriment of other innocent stakeholders, including HMIT, as former equity and a contingent Claimant Trust Beneficiary.

52. To remedy these breaches, Seery is liable for disgorgement of all compensation he received since his collusion with Farallon and Stonehill first began. Alternatively, Seery should be disgorged of all compensation paid to him under the terms of the CTA since the Effective Date of the Plan in August 2021.

53. Alternatively, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages measured by all ill-gotten compensation which Seery has received since his first collusive conduct began.

B. Count II (against Stonehill, Farallon, Jessup and Muck): Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duty

54. The allegations in paragraphs 1-53 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

55. Seery owed fiduciary duties to HMIT and the Debtor's Estate, and he willfully and knowingly breached these duties. Without limiting the foregoing, Seery owed a duty of loyalty which he willfully and knowingly breached. Seery also owed a duty to not engage in self-interested conduct to the detriment of the Debtor's Estate and innocent stakeholders. Seery also willfully and knowingly breached this duty.

56. Stonehill and Farallon were aware of Seery's fiduciary duties and, by purchasing the Claims and approving bonuses and other compensation for Seery, Stonehill (acting through Jessup) and Farallon (acting through Muck), willfully and knowingly participated in Seery's breaches or, alternatively, willfully aided and abetted such breaches.

57. Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) unfairly received many millions of dollars in profits and fees—and stand to earn even more profits and fees—to the detriment of innocent stakeholders, including HMIT.

58. Stonehill and Farallon are liable for disgorgement of all profits earned from their purchase of the Claims. In addition, they are liable in damages for excessive compensation paid to Seery as part of the covert *quid pro quo* with Seery.

C. Count III (against all Defendants): Fraud by Misrepresentation and Material Nondisclosure

59. The allegations in paragraphs 1-58 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

60. Based on Seery's duties as CEO and CRO of a debtor-in-possession, and the other Defendants' duties as non-statutory insiders, Seery, Stonehill (Jessup), and Farallon (Muck) had a duty to disclose Stonehill and Farallon's plans to purchase the Claims, but they deliberately failed to do so. Seery also had a duty to disclose correct financial projections but, rather, misrepresented such values or failed to correct false and misleading projections. These factual misrepresentations and omissions were material.

61. The withheld financial information was material because it has had an adverse impact on control over the eventual distributions to creditors and former equity, as well as the right to control Seery's compensation. By withholding such information, Seery was able to plant friendly business allies on the Oversight Board to the detriment of innocent stakeholders.

62. Defendants knew that HMIT and other creditors were ignorant of their plans, and HMIT and other stakeholders did not have an equal opportunity to discover their scheme. HMIT and the other innocent stakeholders justifiably relied on misleading information relating to the value of the Original Debtor's Estate.

63. By failing to disclose material information, and by making or aiding and abetting material misrepresentations, Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup intended to induce HMIT to take no affirmative action.

64. HMIT justifiably relied on Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup's nondisclosures and representations, and HMIT was injured as a result and the Debtor's Estate was also injured.

65. As a result of their frauds, all Defendants should be disgorged of all profits and ill-gotten compensation derived from their fraudulent scheme. Seery is also liable for damages measured by excessive compensation he has received since he first engaged in willful misconduct.

D. Count IV (against all Defendants): Conspiracy

66. The allegations in paragraphs 1-65 above are incorporated herein as if incorporated herein verbatim.

67. Defendants conspired with each other to unlawfully breach fiduciary duties to HMIT and the Debtor's Estate, to conceal their fraudulent trades, and to interfere with HMIT's entitlement to the residual of the Claimant Trust Asset.

68. Seery's disclosure of material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon, and Muck and Jessup's purchase of the Claims, are each overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

69. HMIT's interest in the residual of the Claimant Trust Assets has been adversely impacted by this conspiracy. The assets have been depleted by virtue of Seery's compensation awards.

E. Count V (against Muck and Jessup): Equitable Disallowance

70. The allegations in paragraphs 1-69 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

71. By purchasing the Claims based on material non-public information, Stonehill and Farallon, through Jessup and Muck, engaged in inequitable conduct.

72. By earning significant profits on their purchases, Muck and Jessup have been unfairly advantaged to the detriment of the remaining stakeholders, including HMIT.

73. Given this inequitable conduct, equitable disallowance of Muck's and Jessup's Claims to the extent over and above their initial investment is appropriate and consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

74. Pleading in the alternative only, subordination of Muck's and Jessup's General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests and Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to all other interests in the Claimant Trust, including HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest, is necessary and appropriate to remedy Muck's and Jessup's wrongful conduct, and is also consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

***F. Count VI (against all Defendants): Unjust Enrichment and Constructive* Trust**

75. The allegations in paragraphs 1-74 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

76. By acquiring the Claims using material non-public information, Stonehill and Farallon breached a relationship of trust with the Original Debtor's Estate and other innocent stakeholders and were unjustly enriched and gained an undue advantage over other creditors and former equity.

77. Allowing Stonehill, Farallon, Muck and Jessup to retain their ill-gotten benefits at the expense of other innocent stakeholders and HMIT, as former equity, would be unconscionable.

78. Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup should be forced to disgorge all distributions over and above their original investment in the Claims as restitution for their unjust enrichment.

79. The proceeds Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup have received from the Claimant Trust are traceable and identifiable. A constructive trust should be imposed on such proceeds to secure the restitution of these improperly retained benefits.

F. Count VI (Against all Defendants): Declaratory Relief

80. The allegations in paragraphs 1-79 are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

81. HMIT seeks declaratory relief. The Court has jurisdiction to provide declaratory judgment relief when there is an actual controversy that has arisen and exists relating to the rights and duties of the parties.

82. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 provides that "a proceeding to recover property or money," may include declaratory relief. *See*, Fed. R. Bank P. 7001(1), (9).

83. The Claimant Trust Agreement is governed under Delaware law. The Claimant Trust Agreement incorporates and is subject to Delaware trust law. HMIT seeks a declaration, as follows:

a. There is a ripe controversy concerning HMIT's rights and entitlements under the Claimant Trust Agreement;

b. As a general matter, HMIT has standing to bring an action against a trustee even if its interest is considered contingent;

c. HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits of Muck and Jessup, and by extension, Farallon and Stonehill;

d. HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon the equitable disallowance of the Claims held by Muck and Jessup over and above their initial investments. Alternatively, HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested when all of Muck's and Jessup's trust interests are subordinated to the trust interests held by HMIT;

e. Seery is properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and/or the Claimant Trust because of Seery's fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct and unclean hands;

f. Muck and Jessup are properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust because of their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct and unclean hands;

g. All Defendants are estopped from asserting that HMIT does not have standing in its individual capacity due to their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct and unclean hands.

VI. Punitive Damages

84. The allegations in paragraphs 1-74 are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

85. The Defendants' misconduct was intentional, knowing, willful and fraudulent and in total disregard of the rights of others. An award of punitive damages is appropriate and necessary under the facts of this case.

86. All conditions precedent to recovery herein have been satisfied.

VII. Prayer

WHEREFORE, HMIT prays for judgment as follows:

1. Equitable disallowance of the Claims over and above Muck's and Jessup's original investments (or, alternatively, subordination of their Claimant Trust Interests, as addressed herein);

2. Disgorgement of all funds distributed from the Claimant Trust to Muck and/or Jessup over and above their original investments;

3. Disgorgement of compensation paid to Seery in managing or administering the Original and Reorganized Debtor's Estate;

4. Imposition of a constructive trust;

5. Declaratory relief as described herein;

6. An award of actual damages as described herein;

7. An award of exemplary damages as allowed by law;

8. Pre- and post-judgment interest; and,

9. All such other and further relief to which HMIT may be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: /s/

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

Exhibit 2

CAUSE NO. DC-21-09534

IN RE JAMES DONDERO,	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
Petitioner.	§	**95th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

DECLARATION OF JAMES DONDERO

COUNTY OF DALLAS §
§
STATE OF TEXAS §

Mr. James Dondero provides this unsworn declaration under TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE § 132.001.

1. My name is James Dondero. I declare under penalty of perjury that I am over the age of 18 and of sound mind and competent to make this declaration.

2. Earlier this year I retained investigators to look into certain activities involving the respondents in the above-styled case and the related bankruptcy proceedings. Last year, I called Farallon's Michael Lin about purchasing their claims in the bankruptcy. I offered them 30% more than what they paid. I was told by Michael Lin of Farallon that they purchased the interests without doing any due diligence other than what Mr. James Seery—the CEO of Highland—told them, and that he told them that the interests would be worth far more than what Farallon paid. Given the value of those claims that Mr. Seery had testified in court, it made no sense to me that Mr. Lin would think that the claims were worth more than what Mr. Seery testified under oath was the value of the bankruptcy claims.

3. In addition to my role as equity holder in the Crusader Funds, I have an interest in ensuring that the claims purchased by Respondents are not used as a means to deprive the equity holders of their share of the funds. It has become obvious that despite the fact that the bankrupt estate has enough money to pay all claimants 100 cents on the dollar, there is plainly a movement afoot to drain the bankrupt estate and deprive equity of their rights.

4. Accordingly, I commissioned an investigation by counsel who have been in communication with the Office of the United States Trustee. True and correct copies of the reports, which were created in the ordinary course, and their attachments, are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B. A true and correct copy of the letter I received from Alverez and Marsal is attached as Exhibit C hereto.

My name is James Dondero, my birthday is on June 29, 1962. My address is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, Texas 75201. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing testimony is true and correct and is within my personal knowledge.

James Dondero

May 31, 2022

Date

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EDWARD M. HELLER
(1926-2013)

October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee") in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Debtor"). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors' Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee's Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over $550 million in assets and net $110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland's decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net $110 million arbitration award in favor of the "Redeemer Committee."[1] After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor's counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland's best interest.

[1] The "Redeemer Committee" was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the "Crusader Fund" that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[2] It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise . . . ." *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

[2] *See* Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[3] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors' committee to share information it receives with those who "hold claims of the kind represented by the committee" but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors' committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland's structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[4] This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor's counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[5] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

[3] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

[4] *See* Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[5] During a deposition, the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").[6] The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[6] Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at $22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of $40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.[7] Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),[8] nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.[9] That representation is untrue;

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and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating $300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be $0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to $80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

[7] Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

[8] *See* Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

[9] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.[10] If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[11] It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[12] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[13] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims[14]:

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[10] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

[11] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

[12] *See id.* at 22.

[13] *See* Appendix, p. A-25.

[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.[15] In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[16]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0[17]

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a $200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of $556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to $328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021.[18]

[15] A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

[16] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

[17] Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid $50 million for claims worth only $46.4 million. *See* Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between $472-600 million as opposed to $364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

[18] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by $100 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[19]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.[20] Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

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monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

19 *See* Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

20 *See* Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[21] We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

[21] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

> **In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.**

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;

d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement[22];

e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP,	Case No. 19-34054-SGJ 11
Debtor	

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is [redacted] Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It [redacted] flows up from Targa. It includes CCS [redacted] to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes [redacted] from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. [illegible]

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on when it is [illegible] either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant [redacted] assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?

Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?

A. No.

Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?

A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

Q. Excuse me?

A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?

A. There is a semipublic market; yes.

Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?

A. It's available.

Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are not readily available

J. SEERY

markets; correct?

A. No.

Q. Those are operating businesses?

A. Correct.

Q. [redacted] the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for [redacted]

Q. And the adjustment was up or down?

A. When?

Q. [redacted] adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. [redacted] adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the [redacted]

J. SEERY

Q. [redacted] valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of [redacted]

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the [redacted] identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you [redacted] Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, [redacted] had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value [redacted]

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million [redacted]

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. [redacted] settlement, so that leaves roughly [redacted]

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort [redacted]

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in [redacted]

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is [redacted] have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. No Party Deemed Drafter. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. Future Cooperation. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**

SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia

Robert Holmgren

no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

Grosvenor Capital Management

GCM GROSVENOR

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS 32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.
John G. Hutchinson
John J. Lavelle
Martin B. Jackson
Sidley Austin LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019
(212) 839-5300 (tel)
(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!


Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel
More
Message
#OPENTOWORK
Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him) ·
3rd
General Counsel
Winnetka, Illinois, United States ·
Contact info
500+ connections
Message
More
Yale Law School
Open to work
Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel roles
See all details
About
I have over 38 years of experience representing participants in the investment management industry with respect to a wide range of legal and regulatory matters, including SEC, DOL, FINRA, and NFA regulations and examinations. ... see more
Activity
522 followers
Posts Joseph H. created, shared, or commented on in the last 90 days are displayed here.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More | Message

General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr

Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area

Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos

Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois

General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois

Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021.** If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

MUNSCH HARDT
DALLAS / HOUSTON / AUSTIN

Ross Tower
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
munsch.com

Direct Dial 214.855.7587
Direct Fax 214.978.5359
drukavina@munsch.com

November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express
Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[1]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

[1] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).[2] At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[3]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[4]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

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[2] Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

[3] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[4] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[5] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[6]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[7] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[8] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

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[5] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

[6] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

[7] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

[8] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[9] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[10] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

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[9] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[10] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty $750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a "settlement" to obtain Mr. Daugherty's withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor's plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[11]

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately $75 billion under management. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining □2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

[11] *See* "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs.[12]

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[13] Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to $45 million in Class 8 claims and $35 million in Class 9 claims.[14] At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a $31.5 million return.[15]

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least $44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.[16] This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

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[12] Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than $7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the $15 million in legal fees).
[13] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[15] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $28 million.
[16] Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." *See* Ex. B.

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"[17] Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "'actual and necessary cost'" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."[18] It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[19] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[17] *See* Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
[18] *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).
[19] *See* Ex. C.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $600 million,[20] which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[21]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0

[20] *See* Ex. D.
[21] *See* Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16, 2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021).[22]

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of $236 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[23]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than $100 million in claims on those trades.

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[22] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

[23] *See* Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The aggregate $150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[24] In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

[24] *See* Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange.The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[25] When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of $150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."[26] Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

[25] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[26] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[27] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between $472-$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between $150 and $232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least $460 million, including $105 million in cash and a $50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

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[27] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.[28]

- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.[29] The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.[30]

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

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[28] Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.
[29] Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.
[30] Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.[31]

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.[32] Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[33] In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.[34] Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[35] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

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[31] 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
[32] The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.
[33] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.
[34] *Id.* at 26-28.
[35] *See id.* at 22.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a $6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.[36] In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.[37] If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. *See* 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

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[36] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[37] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;

- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay $18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and

- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP,	Case No. 19-34054-SGJ 11
Debtor	

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

REMOTE APPEARANCES:

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Each of the businesses will be a

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on what it's going to happen and what the restrictions either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the value of certain of the assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?

Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?

A. No.

Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?

A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

Q. Excuse me?

A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?

A. There is a semipublic market; yes.

Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?

A. It's available.

Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are not readily available

J. SEERY

markets; correct?

A. No.

Q. Those are operating businesses?

A. Correct.

Q. Who provided the valuation for the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for mark purposes and then we adjust it for plan purposes.

Q. And the adjustment was up or down?

A. When?

Q. For both November and January. You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I believe that for November we adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the top of my head but I believe both of them were adjusted down.

J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. That is the Harbourvest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No. 143717)
Ira D. Kharasch (CA Bar No. 109084)
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-and-

HAYWARD & ASSOCIATES PLLC

/s/ Zachery Z. Annable

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**


SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia


Robert Holmgren


no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

GCM GROSVENOR

Grosvenor Capital Management

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS 32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.
John G. Hutchinson
John J. Lavelle
Martin B. Jackson
Sidley Austin LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019
(212) 839-5300 (tel)
(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!


Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel
More
Message
#OPENTOWORK
Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him) ·
3rd
Yale Law School
General Counsel
Winnetka, Illinois, United States ·
Contact info
500+ connections
Message
More
Open to work
Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel roles
See all details
About
I have over 38 years of experience representing participants in the investment management industry with respect to a wide range of legal and regulatory matters, including SEC, DOL, FINRA, and NFA regulations and examinations. ... see more
Activity
522 followers
Posts Joseph H. created, shared, or commented on in the last 90 days are displayed here.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More | Message

General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr

Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area

Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos

Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois

General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois

Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021.** If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC 2029 Century Park East Suite 2060 Los Angeles, CA 90067

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

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and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

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The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

On investor letterhead, please use the template below to provide Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC and SEI your updated wire information.

Information Needed	Wire Information Input
Investor name (as it reads on monthly statements) Fund(s) Invested Contact Information (Phone No. and Email) Updated Wire Information • Beneficiary Bank • Bank Address • Beneficiary (Account) Name • ABA/Routing # • Account # • SWIFT Code International Wires • Correspondent Bank • ABA/Routing # • SWIFT Code	

Signed By: _____ Date: _____

Exhibit 3

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

DECLARATION OF JAMES DONDERO

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

The undersigned provides this Declaration pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 132.001 and declares as follows:

1. My name is James Dondero. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age. I am of sound mind and body, and I am competent to make this declaration. The facts stated within this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

2. I previously served as the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM"). Jim Seery succeeded me in this capacity following the entry of various orders in the bankruptcy proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 ("HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings").

3. On December 17, 2020, I sent an email to employees at HCM, including the then Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer Jim Seery, containing non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM. I became aware of this information due to my involvement as a member of the board of MGM. My purpose was to alert Mr. Seery and others that MGM stock, which was owned either directly or indirectly by HCM, should be on a restricted list and not be involved in any trades. A true and correct copy of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

4. In late Spring of 2021, I had phone calls with two principals at Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Raj Patel and Michael Linn. During these phone calls, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn informed me that Farallon had a deal in place to purchase the Acis and HarbourVest claims, which I understood to refer to claims that were a part of settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn stated that Farallon agreed to purchase these claims based solely on conversations with Mr. Seery because they had made significant profits when Mr. Seery told them to purchase other claims in the past. They also stated they were particularly optimistic because of the expected sale of MGM.

5. During one of these calls involving Mr. Linn, I asked whether they would sell the claims for 30% more than they had paid. Mr. Linn said no because Mr. Seery said they were worth a lot more. I asked Mr. Linn if he would sell at any price and he said that he was unwilling to do so. I believe these conversations with Farallon were taped by Farallon.

6. My name is James Dondero, my date of birth is June 29, 1962, and my address is 3807 Miramar Ave., Dallas, Texas 75205, United States of America. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NOT.

Executed in Dallas County, State of Texas, on the 15th day of February 2023.

JAMES DONDERO

Exhibit 1

From: Jim Dondero <JDondero@highlandcapital.com>
To: Thomas Surgent <TSurgent@HighlandCapital.com>, Jim Seery <jpseeryjr@gmail.com>, Scott Ellington <SEllington@HighlandCapital.com>, "Joe Sowin" <JSowin@HighlandCapital.com>, Jason Post <JPost@NexpointAdvisors.com>
Cc: "D. Lynn (\"Judge Lynn\")" <michael.lynn@bondsellis.com>, Bryan Assink <bryan.assink@bondsellis.com>
Subject: Trading restriction re MGM - material non public information
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:14:39 -0600
Importance: Normal

Just got off a pre board call, board call at 3:00. Update is as follows: Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in Data Room. Both continue to express material interest.
Probably first quarter event, will update as facts change. Note also any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.

Sent from my iPhone

Exhibit 4

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	

DECLARATION OF SAWNIE A. MCENTIRE

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

The undersigned provides this Declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746 and declares as follows:

1. My name is Sawnie A. McEntire. I am over 21 years of age. I am of sound mind and body and I am competent to make this declaration. Unless otherwise, indicated, the facts stated within this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

2. I am a licensed attorney in good standing with the State Bar of Texas. I am a Director and Shareholder at the firm Parsons McEntire McCleary PLLC. I serve as lead counsel for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") in these proceedings in regard to the motion described in Paragraph 3 below. I also served as lead counsel for HMIT in Rule 202 Proceedings filed in the 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Cause No. DC-23-01004 ("Rule 202 Proceedings").

3. I submit this declaration in support of HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding ("Emergency Motion") to which this Declaration is attached.

4. On January 20, 2023, HMIT filed its Verified Rule 202 Petition in the 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Cause No. DC-23-01004. **A true and correct copy of HMIT's Verified Rule 202 Petition, with accompanying exhibits, is attached to this declaration as Exhibit 4-A.**

5. HMIT served notice of the Rule 202 Petition and hearing on Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"), Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck"), and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") in February 2023. Farallon and Stonehill entered an appearance, responded to the proceedings, and were represented by David Shulte of the law firm of Holland & Knight. Among other things, the Rule 202 Petition sought discovery related to Farallon and Stonehill's due diligence, if any, concerning the sale and transfer of four allowed bankruptcy claims in the above-referenced bankruptcy proceedings from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively the "Claims") in April and August of 2021.[1]

6. On February 22, 2023, HMIT's Verified Rule 202 Petition was heard by the Honorable Gena Slaughter of the 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas. **A true and correct copy of the Hearing Transcript of the Rule 202 Proceedings on February 22, 2023, is attached to this declaration as Exhibit 4-B** ("Transcript'). At this hearing, I argued on behalf of HMIT and Mr. Shulte argued on behalf of Farallon and Stonehill. During this hearing, Farallon and Stonehill admitted they acquired the Claims through their respective "special purpose entities," as reflected in the Transcript. Farallon resisted the requested discovery in the state district court.

7. A true and correct copy of a certified copy of Muck's formation papers in the State of Delaware, showing Muck was created on March 9, 2021, is attached to this Declaration as **Exhibit 4-D**. A true and correct copy of a certified copy of Jessup's formation papers in Delaware, showing Jessup was created on April 8, 2021, is attached to this Declaration as **Exhibit 4-E**. Muck and Jessup's corporate formation documents do not identify their respective members or managing members. *See* Exhibit 4-D and 4-E.

8. On March 8, 2023, the state district court denied and dismissed HMIT's Verified Rule 202 Petition. This ruling was necessarily without prejudice. A true and correct copy of the related Order, dated March 8, 2023, is attached to this declaration as **Exhibit 4-C**.

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[1] *See* Notices of Transfers [Docs. 2211, 2212, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2697, 2698].

9. On March 9, 2023, my law partner, Roger McCleary sent correspondence to Mr. Schulte, as Farallon and Stonehill's counsel, requesting disclosure of the details of their respective legal relationships to Muck and Jessup. Farallon and Stonehill never responded to this inquiry. A true and correct copy of this email correspondence, dated March 9, 2023, is attached to this declaration as **Exhibit 4-F**.

10. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 27, 2023.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NOT.

Executed in Dallas County, State of Texas, on the 27th day of March 2023.

Dawnie A. McEntire

Exhibit 4-A

DC-23-01004

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	191st
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
VERIFIED RULE 202 PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Petitioner, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), files this Verified Petition ("Petition") pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking pre-suit discovery from Respondent Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon") and Respondent Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill") (collectively "Respondents"), to allow HMIT to investigate potential claims against Respondents and other potentially adverse entities, and would respectfully show:

PARTIES

1. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust that was the largest equity holder in Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM"), holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HCM filed chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in 2019 and, as a result of these

proceedings,[1] HMIT held a Class 10 claim which, post-confirmation, was converted to a Contingent Trust Interest in HCM's post-reorganization sole limited partner.

2. Farallon is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in California, which is located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111.

3. Stonehill is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in New York, which is located at 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

4. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, because all or substantially all of the events or omissions giving rise to HMIT's potential common law claims occurred in Dallas County, Texas. In the event HMIT elects to proceed with a lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill, venue of such proceedings will be proper in Dallas County, Texas.

5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.[2] The amount in controversy of any potential claims against Farallon or Stonehill far exceeds this Court's minimum jurisdictional requirements. Without limitation, HMIT specifically seeks to investigate potentially actionable claims for unjust enrichment, imposition of a constructive trust with

[1] These proceedings were initially filed in Delaware but were ultimately transferred to and with venue in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[2] The discovery relief requested in this Petition does not implicate the HCM bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, this Rule 202 Petition is not subject to removal because there is no amount in actual controversy and there is no cause of action currently asserted.

disgorgement, knowing participation in breaches of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with business expectancies.

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Respondents from which discovery is sought because both Farallon and Stonehill are doing business in Texas under Texas law including, without limitation, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §17.042. Consistent with due process, Respondents have established minimum contacts with Texas, and the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Respondents complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. HMIT's potential claims against Respondents arise from and/or relate to Farallon's and Stonehill's contacts in Texas. Respondents also purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law.

SUMMARY

7. HMIT seeks to investigate potential claims relating to the sale and transfer of large, unsecured creditors' claims in HCM's bankruptcy to special purpose entities affiliated with and/or controlled by Farallon and Stonehill (the "Claims"). Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill historically had and benefited from close relationships with James Seery ("Seery"), who was serving as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") at the time of the Claims purchases. Furthermore, still upon information and belief, because Farallon and Stonehill acquired or controlled the acquisition of the Claims under highly questionable

circumstances. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Respondents received material non-public information and were involved in insider trading in connection with the acquisition of the Claims.

8. The pre-suit discovery which HMIT seeks is directly relevant to potential claims, and it is clearly appropriate under Rule 202.1(b). HMIT anticipates the institution of a future lawsuit in which it may be a party due to its status as a stakeholder as former equity in HCM or in its current capacity as a Contingent Trust Interest holder, as well as under applicable statutory and common law principles relating to the rights of trust beneficiaries. In this context, HMIT may seek damages on behalf of itself or, alternatively, in a derivative capacity and without limitation, for damages or disgorgement of monies for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.

9. HMIT currently anticipates a potential lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill as defendants and, as such, Farallon and Stonehill have adverse interests to HMIT in connection with the anticipated lawsuit. The addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: **Farallon Capital Management LLC**, One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111, Telephone: 415-421-2132; **Stonehill Capital Management**, LLC, 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022, 212-739-7474 . Additionally, the following parties also may be parties with adverse interests in any potential lawsuit: **Muck Holdings LLC**, c/o Crowell & Moring LLP, Attn: Paul B. Haskel, 590 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022, 212-530-1823; **Jessup Holdings LLC**, c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan

LLP, Attn: John J. Mandler, 100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390, Orangeburg, NY 10962, 845-6339-7800.

BACKGROUND[3]

A. *Procedural Background*

10. On or about October 16, 2019, HCM filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2019.

11. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee's office appointed a four-member Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") consisting of three judgment creditors—the Redeemer Committee, which is a committee of investors in an HCM-affiliated fund known as the Crusader Fund that obtained an arbitration award against HCM in the hundreds of millions of dollars; Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (collectively "Acis"); and UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS") - and an unpaid vendor, Meta-E Discovery.

12. Following the venue transfer to Texas on December 27, 2019, HCM filed its *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary*

[3] All footnote references to evidence involve documents filed in the HCM bankruptcy proceedings and are cited by "Dkt." reference. HMIT asks the Court to take judicial notice of the documents identified by these docket entries.

Course ("HCM's Governance Motion").[4] On January 9, 2020, the Court signed an order approving HCM's Settlement Motion (the "Governance Order").[5]

13. As part of the Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the UCC's selections—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Strand Advisors, Inc., ("Strand Advisors") HCM's general partner. Following the approval of the Governance Order, the Board then appointed Seery as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") in place of the previous CEO.[6] Seery currently serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust (HCM's sole post-reorganization limited partner) and, upon information and belief, continues to serve as CEO of HCM following the effective date of the HCM bankruptcy reorganization plan ("Plan").[7]

B. Seery's Relationships with Stonehill and Farallon

14. Farallon and Stonehill are two capital management firms (similar to HCM) that, upon information belief, have long-standing relationships with Seery. Upon information and belief, they eventually participated in, directed and/or controlled the acquisition of hundreds of millions of dollars of unsecured Claims in HCM's bankruptcy on behalf of funds which they manage. It appears they did so without any meaningful

[4] Dkt. 281.
[5] Dkt. 339.
[6] Dkt. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.
[7] *See* Dkt. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

due diligence, much less reasonable due diligence, and *ostensibly* based their investment decisions only on Seery's input.

15. Upon information and belief, Seery historically has had a substantial business relationship with Farallon and he previously served as legal counsel to Farallon in other matters. Upon information and belief, Seery also has had a long-standing relationship with Stonehill. GCM Grosvenor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee[8] (an original member of the Unsecured Creditors Committee in HCM's bankruptcy). Upon information and belief, GCM Grosvenor is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. Grosvenor, through Redeemer, also played a large part in appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors and approved his appointment as HCM's CEO and CRO.

C. Claims Trading

16. Imbued with his powers as CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained bankruptcy court approval of settlements with Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and another major creditor, HarbourVest[9] (the "Settlements") (Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest are collectively the "Settling Parties"), resulting in the following allowed claims:[10]

[8] Declaration of John A. Morris [Dkt. 1090], Ex. 1, pp. 15.

[9] "HarbourVest" collectively refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P.

[10] Orders Approving Settlements [Dkt. 1273, Dkt. 1302, Dkt. 1788, Dkt. 2389].

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9
Redeemer	$137 mm	$0 mm
Acis	$23 mm	$0 mm
HarbourVest	$45 mm	$35 mm
UBS	$65 mm	$60 mm

17. Although these Settlements were achieved after years of hard-fought litigation,[11] each of the Settling Parties ***curiously*** sold their claims to Farallon or Stonehill (or affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after they obtained court approval of their Settlements. One of these "trades" occurred within just a few weeks before the Plan's Effective Date.[12] Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill coordinated and controlled the purchase of these Claims through special purpose entities, Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup") (collectively "SPEs").[13] Upon information and belief, both of these SPEs were created on the eve of the Claims purchases for the ostensible purpose of taking and holding title to the Claims.

18. Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill directed and controlled the investment of over $160 million dollars to acquire the Claims in the absence of any publicly available information that could rationally justify this substantial investment. These "trades" are even more surprising because, at the time of the confirmation of HCM's Plan, the Plan provided only pessimistic estimates that these Claims would ever receive full satisfaction:

[11] Order Confirming Plan, pp. 9-11.
[12] Dkt. 2697, 2698.
[13] *See* Notice of Removal [Dkt 2696], ¶ 4.

a. HCM's Disclosure Statement projected payment of 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11;[14]

   i. This meant that Farallon and Stonehill invested more than $163 million in Claims ***when the publicly available information indicated they would receive $0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par on their Class 8 Claims***.

b. In HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report, HCM reported that the amount of Class 8 claims expected to be paid dropped even further from 71% *to 54%* (down approximately $328.3 million);[15]

c. From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the valuation of HCM's assets dropped over $200 million from $566 million to $328.3 million;[16]

d. Despite the stark decline in the valuation of the HCM bankruptcy estate and reduction in percentage of Class 8 Claims expected to be satisfied, Stonehill, through Jessup, and Farallon, through Muck, nevertheless purchased the four largest bankruptcy claims from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively the "Claims") in April and August of 2021[17] in the combined amount of approximately $163 million; and

e. Upon information and belief:

   i. Stonehill, through an SPE, Jessup, acquired the Redeemer Committee's claim for approximately $78 million;[18]

[14] Dkt. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, Exh. A, p. 4.
[15] Dkt. 2949.
[16] Dkt 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.
[17] Notices of Transfers [Dkt. 2211, 2212, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2697, 2698].
[18] July 6, 2021 Letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.

ii. The $23 million Acis claim[19] was sold to Farallon/Muck for approximately $8 million;

iii. HarbourVest sold its combined approximately $80 million in claims to Farallon/Muck for approximately $27 million; and

iv. UBS sold its combined approximately $125 million in claims for approximately $50 million to both Stonehill/Jessup and Farallon/Muck ***at a time when the total projected payout was only approximately $35 million***.

19. In Q3 2021, just over $6 million of the projected $205 million available to satisfy general unsecured claims was disbursed.[20] No additional distributions were made to general unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost $250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—$45 million more than was *ever* projected.[21] According to HCM's Motion for Exit Financing,[22] and a recent motion filed by Dugaboy Investment Trust,[23] there remain ***substantial*** assets to be monetized for the benefit of HCM's creditors. Thus, upon information and belief, the funds managed by Stonehill and Farallon stand to realize significant profits on their Claims purchases. In turn, upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon will garner (or already have garnered) substantial fees – both base fees and performance fees – as the result of their acquiring and/or managing the purchase of the Claims.

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[19] Seery/HCM have argued that $10 million of the Acis claim is self-funding. Dkt. 1271, Transcript of Hearing on Motions to Compromise Controversy with Acis Capital Management [1087] and the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund [1089], p. 197.
[20] Dkt. 3200.
[21] Dkt. 3582.
[22] Dkt. 2229.
[23] Dkt. 3382.

D. ***Material Information is Not Disclosed***

20. Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3 requires debtors to "file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." No public reports required by Rule 2015.3 were filed. Seery testified they simply "fell through the cracks."[24]

21. As part of the HarbourVest Settlement, Seery negotiated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF for approximately $22.5 million as part of the transaction.[25] Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF's assets were comprised of debt and equity in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"). The HCLOF interest was not to be transferred to HCM for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to "to an entity to be designated by the Debtor"—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements.[26]

22. Six days prior to the filing of the motion seeking approval of the HarbourVest Settlement, upon information and belief, it appears that Seery may have acquired material non-public information regarding Amazon's now-consummated interest in acquiring MGM,[27] yet there is no record of Seery's disclosure of such

[24] Dkt. 1905, February 3, 2021 Hearing Transcript, 49:5-21.
[25] Dkt. 1625, p. 9, n. 5.
[26] Dkt. 1625.
[27] Dkt. 150-1.

information to the Court, HCM's creditors, or otherwise. Upon the receipt of this material non-public information, HMIT understands, upon information and belief, that MGM was supposed to be placed on HCM's "restricted list," but Seery nonetheless continued to move forward with deals that involved MGM assets.[28]

23. As HCM additionally held its own direct interest in MGM,[29] the value of MGM was of paramount importance to the value of HCM's bankruptcy estate. HMIT believes, upon information and belief, that Seery conveyed material non-public information regarding MGM to Stonehill and Farallon as inducement to purchase the Claims.

E. ***Seery's Compensation***

24. Upon information and belief, a component of Seery's compensation is a "success fee" that depends on the actual liquidation of HCM's bankruptcy estate assets versus the Plan projections. As current holders of the largest claims against the HCM estate, Muck and Jessup, the SPEs apparently created and controlled by Stonehill and Farallon, were installed as two of the three members of an Oversight Board in charge of monitoring the activities of HCM, as the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust.[30] Thus, along with a single independent restructuring professional, Farallon and

[28] *See* Dkt. 1625, Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, filed December 23, 2020
[29] Motion for Exit Financing.[Dkt.2229]
[30] Dkt. 2801.

Stonehill's affiliates oversee Seery's go-forward compensation, including any "success" fee.[31]

DISCOVERY REQUESTED

25. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Farallon and Stonehill received material non-public information in connection with, and as inducement for, the negotiation and sale of the claims to Farallon and Stonehill or its affiliated SPEs. Discovery is necessary to confirm or deny these allegations and expose potential abuses and unjust enrichment.

26. The requested discovery from Farallon is attached as Exhibit "A", and includes the deposition of one or more of its corporate representatives and the production of documents. The requested discovery from Stonehill is attached as Exhibit "B", and includes the deposition of Stonehill's corporate representative(s) and the production of documents.

27. Pursuant to Rule 202.2(g), the requested discovery will include matters that will allow HMIT to evaluate and determine, among other things:

a. The substance and types of information upon which Stonehill and Farallon relied in making their respective decisions to invest in or acquire the Claims;

b. Whether Farallon and Stonehill conducted due diligence, and the substance of any due diligence when evaluating the Claims;

[31] Claimant Trust Agreement [Dkt. 1656-2].

c. The extent to which Farallon and Stonehill controlled the SPEs, Muck and Jessup, in connection with the acquisition of the Claims;

d. The creation and organizational structure of Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup, as well as the purpose of creating Muck and Jessup as SPEs to hold the Claims;

e. Any internal valuations of Muck or Jessup's net asset value (NAV);

f. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to the Claims;

g. Any documents reflecting expected profits from the purchase of the Claims;

h. All communications between Farallon and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;

i. All communications between Stonehill and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;

j. All documents reflecting the expected payout on the Claims;

k. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and HarbourVest concerning the purchase of the Claims;

l. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and Acis regarding the purchase of the Claims;

m. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and UBS regarding the purchase of the Claims;

n. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and The Redeemer Committee regarding the purchase of the Claims;

o. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill regarding the purchase of the Claims;

p. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill and investors in their respective funds regarding purchase of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

q. All communications between Seery and Stonehill or Farallon regarding Seery's compensation as the Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

r. All documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting any agreements between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding compensation;

s. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Stonehill has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;

t. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Farallon has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;

u. All monies received by and distributed by Muck in connection with the Claims;

v. All monies received by and distributed by Jessup in connection with the Claims;

w. All documents reflecting whether Farallon is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Muck; and

x. All documents reflecting whether Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Jessup.

BENEFIT OUTWEIGHS THE BURDEN

28. The beneficial value of the requested discovery greatly outweighs any conceivable burden that could be placed on the Respondents. The requested information

also should be readily available because the Respondents have been engaged in the bankruptcy proceedings relating to the matters at issue for several years.

29. The important benefit associated with this requested discovery is also clear – it is reasonably calculated to determine whether the Respondents have unjustly garnered tens of millions of dollars of benefit based upon insider information. If this occurred, the monies received as a result of such conduct are properly subject to a constructive trust and disgorged. This would result in substantial funds available for other creditors, including those creditors in Class 10, which includes HMIT as a beneficiary. This significant benefit, in addition to the value of bringing proper light to the activities of Farallon and Stonehill as discussed in this petition, far outweighs any purported burden associated with requiring Respondents to sit for focused depositions concerning the topics and documents identified in Exhibits A and B.

REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORDER

30. After service of this Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on this Petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

31. Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust respectfully requests that the Court issue an order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 authorizing HMIT to take a deposition of designated representatives of Farallon Capital Management, LLC and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. HMIT additionally requests authorization to

issue subpoenas duces tecum compelling the production of documents in connection with the depositions in compliance with Tex. R. Civ. P. 205, and asks that the Court grant HMIT all such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: */s/ Sawnie A. McEntire*

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Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared Mark Patrick, the affiant, whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath, affiant testified as follows:

"My name is Mark Patrick. I am the Administrator of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, and I am authorized and capable of making this verification. I have read Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Verified Rule 202 Petition ("Petition"). The facts as stated in the Petition are true and correct based on my personal knowledge and review of relevant documents in the proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054, in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division ."

Mark Patrick

Sworn to and subscribed before me by Mark Patrick on January 20, 2023.

Notary Public in and for
the State of Texas

DEBORAH COLE
Notary ID #134079165
My Commission Expires
November 23, 2026

3116424.1

EXHIBIT "A"

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

TO: Farallon Capital Management, LLC, by and through its attorney of record _____.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199, 202, and 205, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") will take the deposition on oral examination under oath of Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon") on **_____, 2023 at _____ _.m.** before a notary public or other person authorized to administer a proper oath and will be recorded by stenographic means. The deposition will take place at _____ before a court reporter and videographer and will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition may also be recorded by non-stenographic (videotape) means.

Please take further notice that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b), Farallon is requested to designate one or more person(s) most knowledgeable and prepared to testify on behalf of Farallon concerning the topics identified on Exhibit "1", and to produce the documents described in Exhibit "2", attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January ___, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all known counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sawnie A. McEntire

EXHIBIT "A"
TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

For purposes of the attached Exhibits "1" and "2", the following rules and definitions shall apply.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. The terms "all" and "each" shall be construed as all and each.

2. The terms "all" and "any" shall be construed as all and any.

3. The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed either disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

4. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

DEFINITIONS

The terms used herein shall have the following meanings unless the context requires otherwise:

Acis. The term "Acis" refers to Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC, collectively.

Any and *all*. The terms "any" and "all" should be understood in either the most or the least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. "Any" includes the word "all," and "all" includes the term "any."

Bankruptcy Case. The term "Bankruptcy Case" shall mean the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy of Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Case No. 19-34054 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Claims. The term "Claims" shall mean the claims against Highland's Estate transferred to/acquired by Muck and/or Jessup as evidenced by Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 2215, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2697, 2698.

Communication. The term "communication" means any manner in which the mental processes of one individual are related to another, including without limitation, any verbal utterance, correspondence, **email, text message**, statement, transmission of information by computer or other device, letters, telegrams, telexes, cables, telephone

conversations, and records or notations made in connection therewith, notes, memoranda, sound recordings, electronic data storage devices, and any other reported, recorded or graphic matter or document relating to any exchange of information.

Concerning. The term "concerning" means reflecting, regarding, relating to, referring to, describing, evidencing, or constituting.

Document or documents. The terms "document" or "documents" shall mean anything that may be considered to be a document or tangible thing within the meaning of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, including (without limitation) Electronically Stored Information and the originals and all copies of any correspondence, memoranda, handwritten or other notes, letters, files, records, papers, drafts and prior versions, diaries, calendars, telephone or other message slips, invoices, files, statements, books, ledgers, journals, work sheets, inventories, accounts, calculations, computations, studies, reports, indices, summaries, facsimiles, telegrams, telecopied matter, publications, pamphlets, brochures, periodicals, sound recordings, surveys, statistical compilations, work papers, photographs, videos, videotapes, drawings, charts, graphs, models, contracts, illustrations, tabulations, records (including tape recordings and transcriptions thereof) of meetings, conferences and telephone or other conversations or communications, financial statements, photostats, e-mails, microfilm, microfiche, data sheets, data processing cards, computer tapes or printouts, disks, word processing or computer diskettes, computer software, source and object codes, computer programs and other writings, or recorded, transcribed, punched, taped and other written, printed, recorded, digital, or graphic matters and/or electronic data of any kind however produced or reproduced and maintained, prepared, received, or transmitted, including any reproductions or copies of documents which are not identical duplicates of the original and any reproduction or copies of documents of which the originals are not in your possession, custody or control.

Electronically Stored Information or ESI. The terms *"Electronically Stored Information" or "ESI" shall mean and include all documents, notes, photographs, images, digital, analog or other information stored in an electronic medium. Please produce all Documents/ESI in .TIF format (OCR text, single page). Please also provide a Summation Pro Load File (.dii) respect to all such Documents/ESI*

Estate. The term "Estate" means HCM's bankruptcy estate.

Farallon, *you*, and *your*. The terms "Farallon," "you," and "your" shall mean Farallon Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to, Muck Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees,

representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Farallon is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Farallon's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response.

Grosvenor. The term "Grosvenor" refers to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

HarbourVest. The term "HarbourVest" refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P., collectively.

HCM. The term "HCM" refers to debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Jessup. The term "Jessup" refers to Jessup Holdings, LLC.

MGM. The term "MGM" refers to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

Muck. The term "Muck" shall refer to Muck Holdings, LLC.

NAV. The term "NAV" means net asset value.

Oversight Board. The term "Oversight Board" refers to the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (a/k/a the Oversight Board of the Highland Claimant Trust) as identified in Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2801.

Person. The term "person" is defined as any natural person or any business, legal, or governmental entity or association.

Plan. The term "Plan" refers to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified).

Redeemer. The term "Redeemer" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds.

Seery. The term "Seery" refers to James P. ("Jim") Seery.

Settling Parties. The term "Settling Parties" refers to Redeemer, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS, collectively.

Stonehill. The term "Stonehill" refers to Stonehill Capital Management, LLC.

Strand. The term "Strand" refers to Strand Advisors, Inc.

UBS. The term "UBS" refers to UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively.

EXHIBIT "1"

TOPIC CATEGORIES

The witness(es) designated by Farallon to testify on its behalf is (are) requested to testify concerning the following Topic Categories:

a. The substance, types, and sources of information Farallon considered in making any decision to invest in any of the Claims on behalf of itself, Muck, and/or any fund with which Farallon is connected;

b. Whether Farallon conducted due diligence, and the substance and identification of any due diligence (including associated documents), when evaluating any of the Claims;

c. Any and all communications with James Dondero;

d. The extent to which Farallon was involved in creating and organizing Muck in connection with the acquisition of any of the Claims;

e. The organizational structure of Muck (including identification of all members, managing members), as well as the purpose for creating Muck, including, but not limited to, regarding holding title to any of the Claims;

f. Any internal valuations of Muck's Net Asset Value (NAV), as well as all assets owned by Muck;

g. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to any of the Claims;

h. Any documents reflecting profit forecasts relating to any of the Claims;

i. All communications between Farallon and Seery relating to any of the Claims;

j. All forecasted payout(s) on any of the Claims and all documents including or reflecting the same;

k. All communications between Farallon and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

l. Any negotiations between Farallon and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

m. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill regarding any of the Claims;

n. All communications between Farallon and any investors in any fund managed by Farallon regarding any of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

o. All communications between Seery and Farallon regarding Seery's compensation as Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

p. All agreements and other communications between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding Seery's compensation and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting such agreements and other communications;

q. All base fees and performance fees which Farallon has received or may receive in connection with the Claims and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting the same;

r. All monies received by Muck in connection with any of the Claims and any distributions made by Muck to any members of Muck relating to such Claims;

s. Whether Farallon is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Muck or otherwise holds a direct interest in Muck and all documents reflecting the same;

t. All communications between Farallon and any of the following entities concerning any of the Claims:

    i. UCC;

ii. Highland;

iii. Grosvenor;

iv. Muck;

v. the Oversight Board.

u. The sources of funds used by Muck for the acquisition of any of the Claims;

v. The terms and conditions of any agreements governing the transfers of any of the Claims to Muck;

w. Representations made by Farallon, Muck, Seery, and/or the Settling Parties in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims;

x. Farallon's valuation or evaluation of HCM's Estate;

y. Information learned regarding MGM during the pendency of the negotiations relating to the Claims;

z. The appointment of Muck to the Oversight Board;

aa. Farallon's historical relationships and business dealings with Seery and Grovesnor;

bb. Representations made to the bankruptcy court in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims to Muck.

EXHIBIT "2"

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1. Any and all documents created by, prepared for, or received by Farallon concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;
    d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;
    e. any due diligence undertaken by Farallon or Muck prior to acquiring the Claims;
    f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;
    g. the value of HCM's Estate;
    h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;
    i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;
    j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;
    k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and
    l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.
2. Any and all communications between Farallon, on the one hand, and any of the following individuals or entities: (i) Seery, (ii) the UCC, (iii) the Settling Parties, (iv) Stonehill, (vi) Grosvenor, or, (vii) the Oversight Board, concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;

d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;

e. any due diligence undertaken by Farallon or Muck prior to acquiring the Claims;

f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;

g. the value of HCM's Estate;

h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;

i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;

j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;

k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and

l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.

3. All correspondence and/or other documents by or between Farallon and/or Muck and any investors in any fund regarding the Claims and/or the acquisition or transfer of the Claims.

4. Any and all documents reflecting the sources of funding used by Muck to acquire any of the Claims.

5. Organizational and formation documents relating to Muck including, but not limited to, Muck's certificate of formation, company agreement, bylaws, and the identification of all members and managing members.

6. Company resolutions prepared by or on behalf of Muck approving the acquisition of any of the Claims.

7. Any and all documents reflecting any internal or external audits regarding Muck's NAV.

8. Agreements between Farallon and Muck regarding management, advisory, or other services provided to Muck by Farallon.

9. Any and all documents reviewed by Farallon as part of its evaluation and due diligence regarding any of the Claims.

10. Any documents reflecting any communications with James Dondero;

11. Annual fund audits relating to Muck.

12. Muck's NAV Statements.

13. Documents reflecting the fees or other compensation earned by Farallon in connection with the investment in, acquisition of, transfer of, and/or management of any of the Claims.

3116467

EXHIBIT "B"

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

TO: Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, by and through its attorney of record _____.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199, 202, and 205, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") will take the deposition on oral examination under oath of Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill") on **_____, 2023 at _____ _.m.** before a notary public or other person authorized to administer a proper oath and will be recorded by stenographic means. The deposition will take place at _____ before a court reporter and videographer and will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition may also be recorded by non-stenographic (videotape) means.

Please take further notice that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b), Stonehill is requested to designate one or more person(s) most knowledgeable and prepared to testify on behalf of Stonehill concerning the topics identified on Exhibit "1", and to produce the documents described in Exhibit "2", attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

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smcentire@pmmlaw.com
Ian B. Salzer
State Bar No. 24110325
isalzer@pmmlaw.com
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Dallas, Texas 75201
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Roger L. McCleary
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One Riverway, Suite 1800
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 960-7315
Facsimile: (713) 960-7347

Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January ___, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all known counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sawnie A. McEntire

EXHIBIT "A"
TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

For purposes of the attached Exhibits "1" and "2", the following rules and definitions shall apply.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. The terms "all" and "each" shall be construed as all and each.

2. The terms "all" and "any" shall be construed as all and any.

3. The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed either disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

4. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

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The terms used herein shall have the following meanings unless the context requires otherwise:

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Any and *all*. The terms "any" and "all" should be understood in either the most or the least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. "Any" includes the word "all," and "all" includes the term "any."

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conversations, and records or notations made in connection therewith, notes, memoranda, sound recordings, electronic data storage devices, and any other reported, recorded or graphic matter or document relating to any exchange of information.

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Electronically Stored Information or ESI. The terms *"Electronically Stored Information" or "ESI" shall mean and include all documents, notes, photographs, images, digital, analog or other information stored in an electronic medium. Please produce all Documents/ESI in .TIF format (OCR text, single page). Please also provide a Summation Pro Load File (.dii) respect to all such Documents/ESI*

Estate. The term "Estate" means HCM's bankruptcy estate.

Farallon. The term "Farallon," refers to Farallon Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to, Muck Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors,

assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Farallon is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Farallon's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response.

Grosvenor. The term "Grosvenor" refers to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

HarbourVest. The term "HarbourVest" refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P., collectively.

HCM. The term "HCM" refers to debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Jessup. The term "Jessup" refers to Jessup Holdings, LLC.

MGM. The term "MGM" refers to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

Muck. The term "Muck" shall refer to Muck Holdings, LLC.

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Oversight Board. The term "Oversight Board" refers to the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (a/k/a the Oversight Board of the Highland Claimant Trust) as identified in Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2801.

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Plan. The term "Plan" refers to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified).

Redeemer. The term "Redeemer" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds.

Seery. The term "Seery" refers to James P. ("Jim") Seery.

Settling Parties. The term "Settling Parties" refers to Redeemer, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS, collectively.

Stonehill," "you," and "your." The terms "Stonehill", "you," and "your" shall mean Stonehill Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to Jessup Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees,

representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Stonehill is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Stonehill's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response .

Strand. The term "Strand" refers to Strand Advisors, Inc.

UBS. The term "UBS" refers to UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively.

EXHIBIT "1"

TOPIC CATEGORIES

The witness(es) designated by Stonehill to testify on its behalf is (are) requested to testify concerning the following Topic Categories:

a. The substance, types, and sources of information Stonehill considered in making any decision to invest in any of the Claims on behalf of itself, Jessup, and/or any fund with which Stonehill is connected;

b. Whether Stonehill conducted due diligence, and the substance and identification of any due diligence (including associated documents), when evaluating any of the Claims;

c. Any and all communications with James Dondero;

d. The extent to which Stonehill was involved in creating and organizing Jessup in connection with the acquisition of any of the Claims;

e. The organizational structure of Jessup (including identification of all members, managing members), as well as the purpose for creating Jessup, including, but not limited to, regarding holding title to any of the Claims;

f. Any internal valuations of Jessup's Net Asset Value (NAV), as well as all assets owned by Jessup;

g. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to any of the Claims;

h. Any documents reflecting profit forecasts relating to any of the Claims;

i. All communications between Stonehill and Seery relating to any of the Claims;

j. All forecasted payout(s) on any of the Claims and all documents including or reflecting the same;

k. All communications between Stonehill and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

l. Any negotiations between Stonehill and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

m. All communications between Stonehill and Farallon regarding any of the Claims;

n. All communications between Stonehill and any investors in any fund managed by Stonehill regarding any of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

o. All communications between Seery and Stonehill regarding Seery's compensation as Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

p. All agreements and other communications between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding Seery's compensation and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting such agreements and other communications;

q. All base fees and performance fees which Stonehill has received or may receive in connection with the Claims and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting the same;

r. All monies received by Jessup in connection with any of the Claims and any distributions made by Jessup to any members of Jessup relating to such Claims;

s. Whether Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Jessup or otherwise holds a direct interest in Jessup and all documents reflecting the same;

t. All communications between Stonehill and any of the following entities concerning any of the Claims:

    i. UCC;

ii. Highland;

iii. Grosvenor;

iv. Jessup;

v. the Oversight Board.

u. The sources of funds used by Jessup for the acquisition of any of the Claims;

v. The terms and conditions of any agreements governing the transfers of any of the Claims to Jessup;

w. Representations made by Stonehill, Jessup, Seery, and/or the Settling Parties in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims;

x. Stonehill's valuation or evaluation of HCM's Estate;

y. Information learned regarding MGM during the pendency of the negotiations relating to the Claims;

z. The appointment of Jessup to the Oversight Board;

aa. Stonehill's historical relationships and business dealings with Seery and Grovesnor;

bb. Representations made to the bankruptcy court in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims to Jessup.

EXHIBIT "2"

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1. Any and all documents created by, prepared for, or received by Stonehill concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;
    d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;
    e. any due diligence undertaken by Stonehill or Jessup prior to acquiring the Claims;
    f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;
    g. the value of HCM's Estate;
    h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;
    i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;
    j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;
    k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and
    l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.
2. Any and all communications between Stonehill, on the one hand, and any of the following individuals or entities: (i) Seery, (ii) the UCC, (iii) the Settling Parties, (iv) Farallon, (vi) Grosvenor, or, (vii) the Oversight Board, concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;

d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;

e. any due diligence undertaken by Stonehill or Jessup prior to acquiring the Claims;

f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;

g. the value of HCM's Estate;

h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;

i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;

j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;

k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and

l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.

3. All correspondence and/or other documents by or between Stonehill and/or Jessup and any investors in any fund regarding the Claims and/or the acquisition or transfer of the Claims.

4. Any and all documents reflecting the sources of funding used by Jessup to acquire any of the Claims.

5. Organizational and formation documents relating to Jessup including, but not limited to, Jessup's certificate of formation, company agreement, bylaws, and the identification of all members and managing members.

6. Company resolutions prepared by or on behalf of Jessup approving the acquisition of any of the Claims.

7. Any and all documents reflecting any internal or external audits regarding Jessup's NAV.

8. Agreements between Stonehill and Jessup regarding management, advisory, or other services provided to Jessup by Stonehill.

9. Any and all documents reviewed by Stonehill as part of its evaluation and due diligence regarding any of the Claims.

10. Any documents reflecting any communications with James Dondero;

11. Annual fund audits relating to Jessup.

12. Jessup's NAV Statements.

13. Documents reflecting the fees or other compensation earned by Stonehill in connection with the investment in, acquisition of, transfer of, and/or management of any of the Claims.

3116467

Exhibit 4-B

REPORTER'S RECORD

VOLUME 1 OF 1

COURT OF APPEALS CAUSE NO. 00-00-00000-CV

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004-J

IN RE:	)	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	)	
	)	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	)	
INVESTMENT TRUST,	)	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
	)	
	)	
Petitioner.	)	191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S

RULE 202 PETITION

which was heard on

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

On the 22nd day of February 2023, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Gena Slaughter, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, and the following proceedings were had, to wit:

Proceedings reported by machine shorthand utilizing computer-assisted realtime transcription.

GINA M. UDALL, CSR, RPR
Official Reporter, 191st District Court

APPEARANCES:

MR. SAWNIE A. McENTIRE
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Telephone: (214) 237-4300
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ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
Hunter Mountain
Investment Trust

and

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Email: david.schulte@hklaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS
Farallon Capital
Management, LLC, and
Stonehill Capital
Management LLC

* * *

VOLUME 1 INDEX

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S

RULE 202 PETITION

which was heard on

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS INDEX

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
P-1	Declaration of Mark Patrick	36	42	1
P1-A	Claimant Trust Agreement	36	42	1
P1-B	Division of Corporations - Filing	36	42	1
P1-C	Division of Corporations - Filing	36	42	1
P1-D	Order Approving Debtor's Settlement	36	42	1
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Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
PI-J	Exhibit A Highland Capital Management, L.P. Disclaimer for Financial Projections	36	42	1
PI-K	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	36	42	1
P-2	Declaration of James Dondero	36	42	1
P2-1	Jim Dondero email dated Thursday, December 2020	36	(41)	1

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R-1	Cause No. DC-21-09543 Verified Amended Petition	41	44	1
R-2	Cause No. DC-21-09543 Order	41	44	1
R-3	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-4	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-5	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-6	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-7	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-8	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-9	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-10	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS INDEX continued

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
R-11	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-12	United State Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-12239	41	44	1
R-13	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-14	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-15	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-16	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-17	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Counsel.

We are here in DC-23-01004, In re: Hunter Mountain Investment Trust.

And who is here for the plaintiff?

MR. McENTIRE: For the petitioner, Your Honor, Sawnie McEntire and my partner Roger McCleary.

THE COURT: Okay. And then for Farallon?

MR. SCHULTE: My name is David Schulte and I represent both of the respondents. It's Farallon Capital Management, LLC, and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC.

THE COURT: We are here today on a request for a 202 petition. I know one of the issues is the related suit, but let's just plow into it and we'll go from there.

Okay. Counsel?

MR. McENTIRE: May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McENTIRE: And I've given Mr. Schulte copies of all these materials.

In the interest of time, I have all the key pleadings here, which I will give you a copy of.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. McENTIRE: And this is the evidentiary submission that we submitted about a week ago.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: To the extent you are interested, it is cross-referenced by exhibit number to the references in our petition to the docket in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. Otherwise, I go hunting for stuff.

MR. McENTIRE: This is a PowerPoint.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And, lastly, a proposed order.

THE COURT: Wonderful.

MR. McENTIRE: And Mr. Schulte has copies of it all.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. McENTIRE: All right. Your Honor, we are here for leave of court to conduct discovery under Rule 202 to investigate potential claims.

The issue before the court is not whether we have an actual claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We do not even need to state a cause of action. It is simply the investigation of potential claims.

Mr. Mark Patrick is here with us today. He's behind me. Mr. Patrick is the administrator of Hunter Mountain, which is a Delaware trust.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He is the manager of Rand Advisors, which is also an investment manager of the trust. And, in effect, for all intents and purposes, Mr. Patrick manages the assets of the trust on a daily basis.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: There are potential claims that we're investigating. And I'll go through some of these because I know opposing counsel has raised standing issues.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I think we can address all those standing issues.

Insider trading is in itself a wrong as recognized by courts. And I'll refer you to the opinions. We believe there's a breach of fiduciary duties, and that may take a little explanation.

At the time that Farallon and Stonehill acquired these claims, through their special purpose entities Muck and Jessup, they were outsiders.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: But by acquiring the information in the manner in which we believe they did, they became insiders. And when they became insiders, under relevant authorities they owe fiduciary duties.

And at the time they acquired the claims, my client Hunter Mountain Investment Trust was the 99.5 percent interest holder or stakeholder in Highland Capital.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We also believe a knowing participation of breach of fiduciary duties under another name, aiding and abetting. But Texas recognizes it as knowing participation. Unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and tortious interference.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Farallon and Stonehill are effectively hedge funds. And so is Highland Capital.

They were created. They actually did create Muck and Jessup. Those are the two entities that actually are titled with the claims. They acquired it literally days before the transfers.

So the reason we're focusing our discovery effort on Farallon and Stonehill, we are confident that any meaningful discovery -- emails, letters, correspondence, document drafts, things of that nature -- probably predated the existence of Muck and Jessup.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: That's why we're focusing our discovery effort on Farallon and on Stonehill.

But, needless to say, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck and Jessup, having all participated in this acquisition, they're all insiders for purposes of assuming fiduciary duties.

And as I said, outsiders become insiders under the relevant authority. And one key case is the Washington Mutual case --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: -- which we cited in our materials.

I would also just let you know, this is not something in total isolation. We understand we're not privy to the details. But we understand the Texas State Security Board also has an open investigation that has not been closed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And that's by way of background.

202 allows presuit discovery for a couple of reasons. And I won't belabor the point. One is to investigate potential claims.

There is no issue of notice or service here. There's no issue of personal jurisdiction. Farallon and Stonehill made a general appearance.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: There's no issue concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. They actually concede that the court has jurisdiction on page 8 of their response.

The court's inquiry today is a limited judicial inquiry. There are really two avenues which I'll explain, but, first, I think the salient avenue is does the benefit of the discovery outweigh the burden.

And I think as I will hopefully demonstrate, I think that we clearly do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The merits of a potential claim, the case law is clear, is not before the court.

Much of their brief and their response is devoted to trying to attack the fact that there is no duty or things such as standing.

But the reality of it is we are not required to actually prove up a cause of action to this court although I think I can. In this process, I probably certainly can identify a potential cause of action. That's not our obligation to carry our burden.

There was an issue about timely submission of evidence they raised in a footnote, but I think that was resolved before the court took the bench.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I've handed you a binder with Mr. Mark Patrick's affidavit and Jim Dondero's affidavit.

As I understand it, correct me if I'm wrong, you're not objecting to the submission of that evidence. Is that correct?

MR. SCHULTE: Almost.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, I do object to the two declarations that were submitted I believe five days before the hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: As Your Honor is aware, Rule 202 contemplates 15 days' notice. The petition itself was required to be verified. It was verified and then new substance was added by way of these

declarations five days before the hearing.

And so we would argue that that has the effect of amending or supplementing the petition within that 15-day notice period.

All that said, I don't have any issue with the majority of the documents attached to Mr. Patrick's declaration.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So I do object on the grounds of hearsay and timeliness to the declarations.

On Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's declaration, I object to that document on the grounds of hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay. Which one?

MR. SCHULTE: Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's declaration on the basis of hearsay.

All the other documents are I believe file-stamped copies of the pleadings filed in the bankruptcy, which I don't have any issue with that.

And then the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's declaration is an email that's objected to on the basis of hearsay. And it hasn't been proven up as a business record or any other way that will get past hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So those are the limited objections I have to what's in that filing, Your Honor.

MR. McENTIRE: And I will address those objections. And we're prepared to put Mr. Patrick on the stand, if necessary.

I would point out that the case law is very clear that there's no 15-day rule here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We have asked the court to take judicial notice of all of our evidence in our petition itself.

The 15 days is the amount of time you have to give notice before the hearing --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: -- but the case law is clear that I can put live testimony on, I can put affidavit testimony on.

THE COURT: This is an evidentiary hearing.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

And that includes affidavits. And affidavits are routinely accepted in these types of proceedings and I have the case law I can cite to the court.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, in contrast, I think if this were, for example, an injunction hearing, I don't believe that an affidavit would be

the substitute in an injunction hearing for live testimony.

And so if this is an evidentiary standard, I don't think that these affidavits should come in for the truth of the matter asserted. The witnesses should testify to the facts that they want to prove up.

MR. McENTIRE: I could give the court a cite.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Glassdoor, Inc. versus Andra Group.

THE COURT: What was the name of it?

MR. McENTIRE: Glassdoor, Inc. versus Andra Group. It is 560 S.W.3d 281. It specifically addresses the use and relies upon affidavits in the record for purposes of a Rule 202.

So, with that said, I will address it in more detail in a moment. The evidentiary rule, to be clear, is it has to be supported by evidence. Seven days was the date that I picked because it was well in advance. It's the standard rule that's used for discovery issues. It's seven days before a hearing.

So I picked it. He's had it for seven days. He's never filed any written objections to my evidence. None.

And under the Local Rules I would think he would have objected within three business days. He did not do that, and so I'm a little surprised by the objection.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: All right. We do have copies of all the certified records, but I gave you the agenda on that. And we talked about the two declarations.

So the limited judicial inquiry is the only issue before the district court. It's whether or not to allow the discovery, not the merits of any claim yea or nay.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: There's no need for us to even plead a cause of action, although we did.

Mr. Schulte goes to great length in his response to take issue with our cause of action, suggesting we had none. We do. But we're not even under an obligation to plead it; nevertheless, we did.

This is actually a two-part test. The first part was allowing the petitioner -- in this case, Hunter Mountain -- to take the requested deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice, or the likely benefit outweighs the burden. Both apply here.

These trades took place in April of 2021, three of the four. The fourth I think took place in the summer.

And our goal is to obtain the discovery in a timely manner so we do not have any argument, valid or invalid, that there's a limitations issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And so any further delay, such as transferring this to another court or back to the bankruptcy court, which it does not have jurisdiction, would cause tremendous delay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Hunter Mountain, a little bit of background. It is an investment trust. When it has money, it participates directly in funding the Dallas Foundation --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: -- which is a very I think well-respected and recognized charitable foundation.

Certain individuals and pastors from various churches are actually here because Hunter Mountain indirectly, but ultimately, provides a significant source of funding for their outreach programs and their charitable functions and programs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The empirical evidence in the documents that are before the court, regardless of what's in the affidavits, just screams that there was no due diligence here.

Now, we know in Mr. Dondero's affidavit he had a conversation with representatives of Farallon, which would be admissions against interest. They're admissions basically against interest that they effectively did no due diligence.

Yet we believe, upon information and belief, that they invested over $167 million. There are two sets of claims. There's a Class 8 claim and a Class 9 creditor claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Their expectations at the time that they acquired these claims was that Class 9 would get zero recovery.

So who spends $167 million when their expectation on return of investment is zero? Who spends $167 million even in Class 8 when the expected return is just 71 percent and is actually declining? And I think it's actually admitted in the affidavit that Mr. Dondero provided.

So without being hyperbolic or exaggerating, the data that was available publicly

was extremely pessimistic and doubtful that there would be any recovery.

We have direct information -- admissions, frankly -- that Farallon had access to non-public material, non-public information. And that was the fact that MGM Studios was up for sale.

Mr. Dondero was on the board of directors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He communicated, because of his responsibilities, this information to Mr. Seery.

And Mr. Seery, apparently, would have been restricted. He couldn't use it or distribute it.

THE COURT: Right.

And I don't know a lot about securities law but, yeah, that would be insider information. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes.

And it appears from the affidavit that Mr. Dondero submitted that Farallon was aware of the information before the sale closed, before they closed their acquisitions.

And Mr. Dondero asked the question are you willing to even sell your claims and they said no. Or even 30 percent more and they said no. We're told that they're going to be very valuable.

Well, no one else had this information, so we have a problem here that we have two outsiders who are now insiders. They've acquired potentially very valuable claims with the sale of MGM.

They also acquired information concerning the portfolios of these companies over which Highland Capital managed and had ownership interests, so we're talking about having access to information that any other bidder or suitor would not have.

So this is how they were divided up. $270 million in Class 8. Each of the creditors right here are the unsecured creditors who sold. They were the sellers.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And these are the claims in the Class 9.

So you have $95 million in Class 9 claims that are being acquired when the expectation is that there will be zero return on investment. You have $270 million where the expectation was extremely low and pessimistic.

And here are the documents. And Mr. Schulte has not objected to these. This particular document is Exhibit 1-J to Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: This came out of the plan. So when the bankruptcy plan was confirmed in February 2021, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck and Jessup, the latter two weren't even in existence.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Farallon and Stonehill were complete strangers to the bankruptcy proceedings, yet they come in in the wake of this information and they invest tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars with no apparent due diligence.

The situation gets even worse. And this is Exhibit 1-I to Mr. Patrick's affidavit. And as I understand, Mr. Schulte does not object to these documents. It's declining. And then, suddenly, they're in the money.

And at the end of the third quarter last year, they're already making 255 million bucks. And that's a far cry from the original investment. This is for both Class 8 and Class 9.

So Mr. Patrick states the purpose of this is to seek cancellation. Another word for it in bankruptcy-ese would be disallowance. But the cancellation of these claims and disgorgement.

If these are ill-gotten gains, regardless of the rubric or the monicker that you place on it --

breach of fiduciary duty as insiders, aiding and abetting or knowing participation in fiduciary duties, because a lot of people have fiduciary duties on this stuff. No matter what you call it, disgorgement is a remedy.

Wrongdoers should not be entitled to profit from their wrongdoing.

Mr. Schulte makes a big point that we can't prove damages. Well, first of all, I don't agree with the conclusion.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: But even if he was right, disgorgement is a proxy for damages. And we have an entitlement and a right to explore how much they have actually received, when did they receive it.

The weathervane is tilting in one direction here, Judge.

Clearly, there is a creditor trust agreement. That's a very important document. It spells out rights and obligations. It's part of the plan.

There's a waterfall. And on page 27 of the creditor trust agreement a waterfall is exactly what it suggests. You have one bucket gets full, you go to the next bucket all the way down.

THE COURT: Class 1 or tier 1.

I can't remember the category. I don't do bankruptcy. But, yeah, those get paid, then the next level, then the next level.

So by the time you get down to level 10, which I think is what Hunter Mountain was, theoretically, there wouldn't have been anything left.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

But here, if Class 8 and Class 9 -- and I will say the big elephant in those two classes are Farallon and Stonehill or their special purpose entity bucket Jessup -- they have 95 percent of that category.

And suddenly they're not entitled to keep what they've got, and suddenly there's a disallowance, or suddenly a cancellation regardless of the theory or the cause of action -- and we have several avenues here -- a lot of money is going to flow into the coffers of Hunter Mountain, and a lot of money will flow into the Dallas Foundation, and a lot of money will flow into the coffers of charities.

So there is standing here. Standing requires the existence of a duty. We think we have duties.

And a concrete injury. And if these claims were manipulated, we have a concrete injury and our proxy is disgorgement.

We've been deprived of an opportunity to share in category 10 or as we just described it in the waterfall under the creditor trust agreement.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Their burden is to show that this discovery has no benefit. No. That's my burden to show benefit. But their burden would be to show that it's overly burdensome to them.

And I find that difficult to understand since part of their response is devoted to the fact that, hey, judge in Dallas County, you should turn this over to Judge Jernigan in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Because it's bankruptcy, you know.

MR. McENTIRE: In bankruptcy, that's their invitation.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Well, if they're inviting us to go do the discovery in bankruptcy court, it doesn't seem to be that burdensome because it's going to be the same discovery.

And, by the way, Judge Jernigan actually does not have jurisdiction over these proceedings. The other earlier proceeding, as you know, they attempted to remove it to her court and it was remanded.

Clearly, she does not have jurisdiction.

The problem with bankruptcy involved, in addition, if I wanted to do Rule 2004 discovery like they're suggesting, that's their invitation. They would like you to push us down the road.

Well, we can't afford to push it down the road. Because if they push it down the road, I've got to go file a motion with Judge Jernigan, get leave to issue subpoenas.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: They have 14 days to file a motion to quash, then I have to file another motion. And it's 21 days before their response is even filed. And there's another 14 or 15 days before the reply is filed. We're looking at 60, 70 days. And that's one of the reasons we selected this procedure.

And, by the way, you hear the phrase forum shopping a lot. Well, without engaging in the negative inference that that term suggests, a plaintiff, a petitioner, has the right to select its venue for a variety of reasons.

Our venue is the state district courts of Texas because it has an accelerated procedure. And that's why we're here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: I've identified the potential causes of action. Entities or people that breach fiduciary duties and receive ill-gotten gains a constructive trust may be imposed, disgorgement. Then we do run into bankruptcy concepts.

But it's important to know that some of these are not bankruptcy. Some of these are common law.

I suggest to the court, I don't have to go get Judge Jernigan's permission to sue Farallon or Stonehill for breach of fiduciary duties. I don't have to get her permission to sue for knowing participation.

If I'm actually looking for equitable disallowance, probably, maybe. But I can do the discovery here and then make that decision whether I need to go back to bankruptcy court.

I'm not foolish. I'm not going to run afoul of Judge Jernigan's orders. If I have to go back to Judge Jernigan to get permission, I will do it.

THE COURT: Right. Because only an idiot runs afoul of the bankruptcy court.

MR. McENTIRE: Hopefully, I'm not that.

So I clearly understand what both my ethical and lawyer obligations are. And I'm not going to run afoul of any court orders.

But some of these remedies don't require

an overview by Judge Jernigan or the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: They have a duty not to commit fraud, whether it's commit fraud against us or commit fraud against the estate.

They have a duty not to interfere with the expectancies that we have as a B/C beneficiary. That's a code name for a former Class 10 creditor.

They have a duty not to trade on inside information, and that's the Washington Mutual case.

And I've just already mentioned that because they were outsiders, they're insiders now.

These are their arguments. Our evidence is timely. It's not untimely. It's not speculative. It's not speculative because the events have already taken place. I'm not talking about something hypothetical.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: My remedy flows from that.

So we're not projecting that I might have a claim later on. I have a claim today. If I have a claim today, I have it today. I have it and I want to confirm it by this discovery. Because their wrongdoing has already taken place, it's not hypothetical, it's not futuristic, it's already occurred.

When they say they have no duty to us, they're just wrong. They have duties not to breach fiduciary duties. We have direct standing I believe to bring a claim in that regard.

We have a right to bring direct standing under the Washington Mutual case, which I'll discuss.

And we also have a right to bring a derivative action.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I notice that they made a comment about that in their response. But I can sue individually.

And I can also bring an action in the alternative as a derivative action for the estate. And these are all valid claims for the estate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Transfer. This is not a related case because it's not the litigation.

So if you just go to the very first instance and you look at the Local Rule, it talks about litigation and causes of action.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We don't have a cause of action. We're not asserting one in this petition. So this is not a related case that falls within the

four corners of the Local Rule.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the thing is it's still a related case. Like if you file a 202 and then you file a lawsuit, that would be considered related.

I looked at it and you're right. Technically, it's different parties. I'll just say it's a grey zone at best.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

This is not a lawsuit in terms of causes of action. It might be a related case if Mr. Dondero had come in and filed a lawsuit. That would be a related case. Mr. Dondero is not involved in this process, other than as a fact witness.

These are all the evidentiary issues that perhaps he's raised. Live testimony, affidavit testimony is admissible.

The court considered numerous affidavits filed with the court. And that's as recently as 2017. These are all good cases, good law.

Equitable disallowance. It's kind of a fuzzy image. This is a bankruptcy court case, but this is simply to underscore the fact that in addition to my common law remedies there is a very substantial remedy in bankruptcy court.

It's not one I necessarily have to pursue, but if I wanted to I could. But what it does do is it helps to find some duties.

And here, the court has the right to disallow a claim on equitable grounds in extreme instances, perhaps very rare, where it is necessary as a remedy. And they did it in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: This is simply an analogy to securities fraud and the 10b-5 statute.

Insiders of a corporation are not limited to officers and directors, but may include temporary insiders who have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.

Well, what about the MGM stock? The court finds that the Equity Committee -- so here's the equity -- has stated a colorable claim. We were 99.5 percent equity.

The Equity Committee has stated a colorable claim that the settlement noteholders became temporary insiders because they acquired information that was not of public knowledge in connection with their acquisition.

And allowed them to participate in negotiations with JPMC -- JPMorgan Chase -- for the shared goal of reaching a settlement.

So these were outsiders that suddenly became temporary insiders because of access to inside information.

This is not a new concept. It comes from the United States Supreme Court. Fiduciaries cannot utilize inside information.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And we believe we have enough before the court to support and justify a further investigation that this may have occurred.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Now, not a related case. The Jim Dondero case is actually closed.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I'll be frank with you. In all candor, I never thought this was a possible related case.

THE COURT: I mean, we're talking about the same events, but there are differences, I agree.

MR. McENTIRE: We're talking about one similar event dealing with Farallon. Other events are different.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: So we have different dates.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Different parties on the petitioner's side, different law firms.

The only common party is Farallon. Alvarez & Marsal are not parties to this but Stonehill is. Stonehill was not a party to the prior proceedings.

And the standing is manifest. With no criticism of Mr. Dondero's lawyer, I searched in his argument where he was articulating standing.

And without going further, I will tell you I think our standing is clear. We're in the money.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We are in the money if there's a disgorgement or a disallowance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We have all types of claims, including insider trading and a creation of fiduciary duties.

Our remedies, as far as I can tell, he didn't identify any. We have several. Disgorgement, disallowance, subordination, a variety. And damages.

So we suggest strongly that it is not a related case.

And I must tell you, the reference to say send this to bankruptcy court or defer to the bankruptcy court or send us over to Judge Purdy, with all due respect to opposing counsel, it's really just a delay mechanism.

And what they're seeking to do through their invective, their criticisms, the references to these other courts, is seeking an opportunity to push us down the road and put us in a bad position potentially and a not enviable position in connection with statute of limitations.

Your Honor, we would offer the binder of exhibits that we submitted on February 15, 2022, including the affidavits and all the attached exhibits.

I would ask the court to take judicial notice of all the exhibits that we referred to in our petition, which I think is appropriate since we were specifying with particularity what we were requesting the court to take judicial notice of. And that's the large index, that's the list.

THE COURT: Obviously, I can take judicial notice of any kind of court pleadings, whether they're state or federal.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's clear.

MR. McENTIRE: We would offer both affidavits and all the attachments into evidence at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have exhibit numbers for them?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes. It's Exhibit 1 with attachments. 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F and then Exhibit 1-G, Exhibit 1-H, Exhibit 1-J, Exhibit 1-K.

Everything in the binder, Your Honor. It's Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 with the attachments.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I believe they're all identified. I can put a sticker on them, if you'd like.

THE COURT: Yeah. To admit them, it will need a sticker.

So I'm going to hold off on admitting them for just a minute because I do want to hear his objections and then we can go back to it. So just make sure we do that.

I'm not trying to not admit them, but I do want to let him have his objections.

Okay. Anything else, Counsel?

MR. McENTIRE: That's all I have right now, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?

MR. SCHULTE: Should I start with those exhibits, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Why don't you do that. That's probably the easiest way.

MR. SCHULTE: In light of the authorities that Mr. McEntire shared about the affidavits, I'll withdraw the objections to the affidavits or the declarations.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: I'm taking Mr. McEntire's word that those cases say what he says they say.

THE COURT: I'll tell you because 202 is not a lawsuit, you don't necessarily have a right to cross-examine, et cetera. So, yeah, affidavits are frequently used on 202s.

MR. SCHULTE: And that's fine, Your Honor. I'll take Mr. McEntire's word what those cases say.

But I will maintain the objection to Exhibit H -- it's the declaration of Mr. Patrick -- on the grounds of hearsay. That is not a court record or a file-stamped pleading from federal or state court. It's just a letter. So that's hearsay. And it hasn't been properly authenticated.

The other issue is the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's declaration. That's just an email

from Mr. Dondero, so I object on the grounds of hearsay.

THE COURT: Mr. McEntire, what's your response specifically to Exhibit H as attached to the Patrick declaration and then the attachment to the Dondero declaration?

MR. McENTIRE: Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's affidavit would be hearsay, but there's an exception that it's not controversial.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And there's no indication that there's any challenge of the reliability of the document.

THE COURT: What is the exhibit? I'm trying to pull it up. Sorry.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Exhibit 1-H. It is a letter from Alvarez & Marsal simply indicating what they paid for the claim.

THE COURT: Is it the July 6th, 2021, letter?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've got it.

MR. McENTIRE: And the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, just the state of mind of Farallon.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He has proved it up that it's authentic. It's a true and accurate copy.

And it goes to the state of mind of Farallon and it goes to the state of mind of Mr. Seery as well who are basically individuals who are trading on inside information.

And Mr. Seery would not have known about the MGM sale but for that email. And Farallon and Stonehill would not know about MGM but for Mr. Seery.

THE COURT: Okay. So the response to hearsay is that it goes to state of mind.

MR. McENTIRE: It goes to state of mind.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel. How do you respond to that?

MR. SCHULTE: I'll start with the last one, Your Honor. I think that's the definition of hearsay, is that you're purporting to establish the state of mind of the parties who are not before the court.

It's been emphasized that Mr. Dondero has no relation to HMIT. And none of the recipients of the email are parties to this proceeding.

This purports to establish the state of mind of Mr. Seery, who is not before the court, and the state of mind of Farallon, just based on the say so of

Mr. Dondero in this email. That's hearsay.

And as for the first letter, this is a letter on the letterhead of A&M which, by the way, is one of the parties in the Dondero Rule 202 petition.

And it's not on the letterhead of any of the parties to this case so the letter isn't properly authenticated.

And I'm not aware of the not controversial exception to hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, there is a thing that talks about if you're admitting something that's just not controverted. Right? It's everybody agrees "X" happened. We're just admitting evidence to have that. So what this basically is is just showing the claim of the funds.

And I guess my question is what's the objection. Is there an objection to the substance of it?

MR. SCHULTE: I don't think there's any dispute that Farallon and Stonehill, through their respective special purpose entities, purchased the claims that are at issue here.

And if that's the sole purpose of admitting this letter into evidence, I don't think that's a matter that's genuinely in dispute.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So if that's the only issue as raised by this letter, I don't know that there's a dispute there.

THE COURT: Right. Well, that's the whole thing.

MR. McENTIRE: I think we're almost solving the issue on the fact of how much they paid, $75 million.

THE COURT: Okay. So I will sustain the objection to the email to Mr. Dondero's declaration, Exhibit P 2-1.

I am going to overrule the objection to -- I don't know what the letter is of the attachment.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Exhibit P 1-H to Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Correct. Sorry.

Okay, Counsel. If you'll proceed.

MR. SCHULTE: May I approach the bench, Your Honor? I have a binder of exhibits also.

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. SCHULTE: These have all been marked with exhibit stickers already. There are tabs for each of the exhibits. They're marked R1 through 17, I believe. And "R," of course, stands for Respondents.

THE COURT: I take the shortcut of calling everybody "Plaintiff" and "Defendant" just because I'm so used to using that language in court.

But I do agree. It's Petitioner and Respondent. You're not technically a defendant.

Okay. So, first of all, I'm going to admit Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, with the sole exception of the email to Mr. Dondero's declaration that I sustained.

And then are there objections to the respondent's exhibits?

MR. McENTIRE: Very few.

I object to Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2 as irrelevant.

THE COURT: What's the objection to 1?

MR. McENTIRE: They're offering the order from Judge Purdy.

THE COURT: Okay. I can take judicial notice of that. I mean, it's a court record from Dallas County. So I don't think that that's particularly relevant.

To be bluntly honest, I looked at it last night. Right? Because of the issue that there's a related case, I pulled that file too and looked at everything.

So I can take judicial notice of that. Whether it's relevant or not, I can look at it. And, obviously, if it's not relevant, I'll disregard it.

MR. McENTIRE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: I'll overrule that objection. What's next?

MR. McENTIRE: The only other objections are Exhibit 12 and 13. I just don't know what they are or for what purpose they would be offered.

THE COURT: Okay. So 12 is a notice of appearance and request for service in the bankruptcy court on behalf of Hunter Mountain Trust.

So what's the issue, Counsel?

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, these are notices of appearance filed by Hunter Mountain in the bankruptcy court.

And the purpose of these notices is simply to show -- and maybe this is not genuinely in dispute -- that Hunter Mountain, through its counsel, would have received notice of all the activity that was going on in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: It's the same issue I've got with everything that Plaintiff submitted. It's a bankruptcy pleading. I can take notice of it. If it's irrelevant, I'll disregard it.

So I'll overrule that objection.

And then what's 13?

MR. McENTIRE: The same objection.

THE COURT: I'll overrule it because again, I can take judicial notice of those.

MR. McENTIRE: No other objections, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 17 are so admitted.

MR. SCHULTE: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. SCHULTE: HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- races into this court seeking extensive and burdensome presuit discovery about claims trading that took place in the Highland bankruptcy two years ago.

Mr. McEntire has talked about the harm that would result from delay if a different court were to consider this request for presuit discovery. That is a function of waiting two years after the subject claims transfers to seek relief in this court.

The exact same allegations of claims trading and misconduct by Jim Seery -- those allegations are not on the slides that you looked at. But those allegations are common in Mr. Dondero's Rule 202 petition and this petition.

THE COURT: Right. They're common.

I know you make the allegation that Dondero is related to Hunter Mountain, but I guess I don't have any evidence of that.

Or do you have evidence of that? Because otherwise, while it involves some of the same issues in the sense of the underlying facts, technically Farallon is the common respondent.

But there's a different respondent and there's a different petitioner in that case.

MR. SCHULTE: Yes. That's true, Your Honor. And we've said that on information and belief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: That's our suspicion.

We believe that to be the case, but I don't have evidence of it. I didn't hear a denial of it, but, nevertheless, that is where things stand.

But what's important about the case is even if this court and Judge Purdy determined that the cases are not related, what is important is that the same allegations related to this claims trading and the same allegations of inside information being shared by Mr. Seery, those were front and center in the July 2021 petition filed by Mr. Dondero.

Even if there are other dissimilarities between the cases, those are issues that are common.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And it's important to note that as HMIT has filed this petition, it has glossed over issues of its own standing and the assertion of viable claims that will justify this discovery.

Now, I know that HMIT has cited these cases that say, Your Honor, I don't have to state a really specific claim right now.

But you do have to articulate some ground for relief, some theory, that would justify the expense and the burden that you're trying to put the respondents to in responding to all this discovery.

And this isn't simple discovery. We're talking about deposition topics with I believe 29 topics each and 13 sets of really broad discovery requests with a bunch of subcategories.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We're not talking about some minimal burden here. This is an intrusion into entities that are not parties to a lawsuit, but rather this investigation.

And HMIT has ignored that there is a specific mechanism in the bankruptcy court that's

available to it under federal bankruptcy Rule 2004 and that the substance of HMIT's petition, which is claims trading and bankruptcy, falls squarely within the expertise of Judge Jernigan, the presiding bankruptcy judge.

THE COURT: And I agree. You could do this in federal court. But there's a lot of things that can be done in state court or done in federal court.

They get to choose the method of getting the information, so why should I say, theoretically, yes, this is a good thing, I should do it, but, hey, send it to bankruptcy. Why?

MR. SCHULTE: The bankruptcy judge has actually answered that question directly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: It is true, as HMIT has said, the federal bankruptcy court doesn't have jurisdiction over a Rule 202 proceeding. That's not in dispute.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We tried to remove the last case to federal bankruptcy court and it was a state claim.

But what the bankruptcy judge pointed out

when she remanded the case back to Judge Purdy, who ended up dismissing Dondero's petition, is it pointed out, one, there's this mechanism in bankruptcy where they can do the exact same thing, Rule 2004.

And the bankruptcy judge pointed out that it is in the best position to consider Hunter Mountain's request.

It pointed out when it remanded the case that it had grave misgivings about doing so. It confirmed that it is in the best position to consider this presuit discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. This is part of one of the exhibits?

MR. SCHULTE: Yes, Your Honor. This is in one of the opinions that I included in the binder, a courtesy copy of one of those opinions.

THE COURT: Oh, at the back?

MR. SCHULTE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: It's 2022 Bankruptcy Lexis 5.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it.

And real quick, for the record, it's Dondero versus Alvarez & Marsal. It's 2022 Bankruptcy Lexis 5.

MR. SCHULTE: Right.

And in particular, Your Honor, I'm looking at pages 31 to 32 of that order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: What the judge is pointing out here is it has grave misgivings about remanding the case because it knows a thing or two about the Highland bankruptcy, having presided over the case and all the related litigation for over what's now three years.

And it's familiar with the legal and factual issues. It's familiar with the parties. It's familiar with claims trading in a bankruptcy case, which was the very crux of the Dondero petition. It's also the crux of this petition by Hunter Mountain.

And it observed, the bankruptcy court did, that any case that could be fashioned from the investigation would end up in bankruptcy court anyway because it would be related to the Highland bankruptcy.

So you ask a really good question, Your Honor. Why should I ship it off to the bankruptcy court. The answer is Judge Jernigan is in a position to efficiently and practically deal with this request because she deals with it all the time and she is intimately familiar with the legal and factual issues and with claims trading.

It's not like Hunter Mountain gets poured out if it goes to bankruptcy court. It has a mechanism to seek the exact same discovery from Judge Jernigan who is very familiar with these very particular issues.

Now, Hunter Mountain says, well, bankruptcy court is too time-consuming and cumbersome. It's going to take 60 days to even get this before the bankruptcy court.

Well, we're talking about the fact that they've waited two years to file this proceeding related to these claims transfers that took place in 2021.

So, again, what HMIT is asking this court to do is inefficient and is impractical. This court would need to devote a lot of resources to understand what the proper scope of any discovery should be, whether the claims are cognizable.

And that's just a tall order, Your Honor. The request is more appropriately dealt with by the bankruptcy judge, according to a proper bankruptcy filing.

It's undisputed that while the bankruptcy court doesn't have jurisdiction over a 202 petition, there's no question that it has jurisdiction over a Rule 2004 request for discovery, which is the counterpart for this type of discovery in bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: The real issue, Your Honor, and this is the part that Hunter Mountain is dancing around, is that Hunter Mountain doesn't want to be in front of Judge Jernigan.

Judge Jernigan held Mark Patrick -- that is HMIT's principal who verified this petition. She held him along with Dondero and Dondero's counsel and others in civil contempt and sanctioned them nearly $240,000 for trying to join Seery to a lawsuit in violation of Judge Jernigan's gatekeeping orders.

HMIT is trying to dodge the bankruptcy court and its scrutiny of what HMIT is doing as this petition also targets Seery and the inside information that he purportedly gave to Farallon and Stonehill.

This is forum shopping, plain and simple. And the court should dismiss the petition so that HMIT can seek this discovery in bankruptcy court.

Now, I don't want to spend a lot of time on the related case, but I will emphasize just what I've mentioned, which is while some of the parties may be different, we're still talking about the same claims trading activity that took place in 2021 and the same allegations of insider dealing by Seery.

And Judge Purdy, on remand, dismissed

that petition where some of the same arguments were made about judicial efficiency and that the case should be filed in bankruptcy court.

And it bears noting, by the way, that after Judge Purdy dismissed Dondero's Rule 202 petition, where we had argued that this ought to be in the bankruptcy court, Dondero didn't file in the bankruptcy court, which sort of makes the point that they didn't want to be in front of Judge Jernigan on this either.

Okay. Now let's turn to the merits, Your Honor. While Mr. McEntire has gone to great lengths to say we don't have to state claims, he stated five or six on that PowerPoint presentation of claims that he envisions.

But what made it all really crystal clear is in that notice of supplemental evidence, and that includes the declaration of Mr. Patrick, there in paragraphs 15 and 16 it's made clear what Hunter Mountain really wants.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: What the goal of this discovery is is to invalidate the claims that Farallon and Stonehill's entities purchased.

So let's unpack what it is they purchased.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: These are claims that were not ever held by Hunter Mountain. These are claims that were held by Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest.

THE COURT: Right. They were the Class 8 and 9. Right?

MR. SCHULTE: I believe that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Those claims were always superior to whatever it was that Hunter Mountain held.

So Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest held those claims. The parties in the bankruptcy had the opportunity to file objections to those claims. And they did.

And Seery, on behalf of the debtor, negotiated with Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest and reached settlements that resolved the priority and amounts of those claims.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: And then filed what's referred to -- and I'm sure Your Honor knows this -- as a Rule 9019 motion to approve those settlements in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Actually, I don't. I've never done bankruptcy but I read it. I know the general process and I did read it.

MR. SCHULTE: All right.

THE COURT: Just FYI, I've never done bankruptcy law. They've got their own rules.

MR. SCHULTE: Well, the parties in the bankruptcy had the opportunity to object to those settlements and some did so.

And after evidentiary hearings, the bankruptcy court granted those motions and allowed and approved those claims.

That is really important, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: That's Exhibits 14 through 17 in the binder that I handed you.

And these are the same exhibits that are referenced in Hunter Mountain's petition. And it bears noting that the U.S. District Court affirmed those orders after appeals were taken.

But the bankruptcy court's approval of the very same claims that Hunter Mountain now seeks to investigate and invalidate is entitled to res judicata.

HMIT can't now second-guess the bankruptcy court's orders approving those very same claims. That's the effect of the investigation that Hunter Mountain seeks, the invalidation of claims that are already bankruptcy court approved.

And it bears noting that each of those four orders, Exhibits 14 through 17, provides the following: quote, "The court" -- the bankruptcy court -- "shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this order."

This would include HMIT's stated goal of conducting discovery to try to invalidate these very claims.

This is yet another reason, Your Honor, to answer your question earlier of why this request for discovery should be posed to the bankruptcy court.

Judge Jernigan, I suspect, would have views on whether her own orders authorizing these claims should be overturned.

Okay. So HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- alleges that after the bankruptcy court approved these claims, Seery disclosed inside information to Farallon and to Stonehill to encourage them to buy these claims from the original claimants. Again, UBS, Redeemer, Acis, and HarbourVest.

Farallon, through Muck, which is its special purpose entity, and Stonehill through Jessup, which is Stonehill's special purpose entity, acquired those transferred claims in 2021.

And there's no magic in bankruptcy court to claims transfers. It's a contractual matter between the transferors and the transferees. It's strictly between them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And there's no bankruptcy court approval that's even required.

The transferee, so in this case Muck and Jessup, had simply to file under federal bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) a notice saying these claims were transferred to us. And they did so.

Your Honor, that's Exhibit 6 through 11 in the binder that I handed to you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: The filings evidencing those claims transfers were public. And Hunter Mountain received the claims transfer notices.

And that's the exhibits that we were talking about, Exhibits 12 through 13, where Hunter Mountain's lawyers had appeared in the case before those claims transfer notices were filed.

So not surprisingly, Hunter Mountain did not file any objections to those claims transfers. And that's not surprising because under Rule 3001, the only party that could object to the claims transfers were

the transferors themselves.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: Essentially saying, hold on. We didn't transfer these claims. But of course there's no dispute that the transfers were made.

Here, HMIT was neither the transferor nor the transferee of the claims. It had no interest in these claims. It never did. It didn't before the claims transfers and it didn't after the claims transfers.

The claims originally belonged to Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest, and they were then transferred to Muck and Jessup, which are Farallon's and Stonehill's entities.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: So why does that matter? That matters because these claims were approved by the bankruptcy court. The claims didn't change or become more valuable after they were transferred. The only difference is who is holding the claims.

So Hunter Mountain says, hold on. What we're alleging here is that the claims that Farallon and Stonehill purchased with the benefit of this purported inside information from Mr. Seery, they're secretly worth more than expected.

Those allegations, they're disputed, to be sure. But let's assume they're true. That situation has zero impact on Hunter Mountain.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And that's because this is a matter that's strictly between the parties to the claims transfers. Again, Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest on the one hand and Farallon and Stonehill on the other.

And the way we know this is let's pretend that Muck and Jessup didn't buy these claims, Your Honor, and that the claims instead have remained with UBS, HarbourVest, Acis, and whatever the other one I'm forgetting. The claims wouldn't have been transferred, and they would have remained with those entities.

In that case, the original claimants would have held those claims for longer than they wanted. And if HMIT is right, then the claims would have ended up being worth more than even they expected.

So why does that matter? Well, that matters because if that is all true, Hunter Mountain would be in the exact same place today. Neither better nor worse off, it would be in the exact same place.

Either Farallon and Stonehill's entities are gaining more on these claims than they expected

or UBS, HarbourVest, Acis, and Redeemer, they are realizing more on these claims than they expected.

But Hunter Mountain never stood to be paid on these claims to which it was a stranger. These are claims in which Hunter Mountain never had any interest.

THE COURT: So presuming that Hunter Mountain had expressed interest in buying these claims and there was insider trading, you don't think that would be a tortious interference in a potential contract?

MR. SCHULTE: If there was insider trading of the type that Hunter Mountain alleges in this case, it would have no impact on the rights of Hunter Mountain.

If that's true, maybe there was a fraud on the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court would surely be interested in that. Maybe there was a fraud on the transferors. I mean, maybe UBS, Redeemer, Acis -- why do I always forget the third one? -- and HarbourVest.

THE COURT: Like I said, I had a chart last night of all the names. Obviously, I haven't been involved in this case up until now, and there's a lot of names.

MR. SCHULTE: Yes.

The transferors of the claims might say,

well, wait a minute. I wish I would have known this inside information. I'm the one that was really injured here.

Because if there was really meat on this bone, Your Honor, then the injured parties would be the transferors of the claims: Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest.

Because the crux of HMIT's petition is that those entities, the transferors, were duped into selling their claims for too little when the claims were secretly worth more.

Well, if that's true, you would expect that the transferors would be screaming up and down the hallway, saying we didn't get paid enough.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We are the injured parties here, we are the ones with damages, we want to unwind these claims transfers, or we want to be paid more on these claims transfers.

But the rights of those entities, the transferors, to complain about these allegations doesn't mean that Hunter Mountain can also stand up and say, well, I want to complain too. Because Hunter Mountain never stood to be paid on these claims.

The question is if somebody was duped,

if somebody was injured, if anybody it was the transferors, not Hunter Mountain. The transferors would be the only real parties in interest that would have been injured by what Hunter Mountain alleges.

But it's notable that none of those transferors has filed an objection to these transfers.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: None of them has filed a Rule 202 proceeding. None of them has filed a Rule 2004 proceeding seeking discovery about inside information that Farallon and Stonehill allegedly had. It is Hunter Mountain who is an absolute stranger to these claims trading transactions.

And so HMIT is trying to inject itself into a transaction to which it was never a party and which it never had any interest.

The sellers were entitled to sell those claims to any buyer they wanted to on whatever terms they agreed to.

And if there was some information that they didn't have the benefit of that the buyers did, you would expect the transferors, if anyone at all, to be the ones complaining about it. But that's not what we have here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: All right. Another note that Hunter Mountain glosses over is duty.

So all the claims that were listed on the PowerPoint all require that there must have been some kind of a duty owed by Farallon and Stonehill to Hunter Mountain. But there's no duty owed to a stranger to a claims trading transaction.

Yet again, if anybody were to have a duty owed to it, I guess it would be the transferors of the claims even though that was an arm's length transaction.

But it's not a stranger to the transaction and a stranger that has no interest in the claims that we're talking about here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Nor has Hunter Mountain identified any authority for a private cause of action belonging to Hunter Mountain related to these claims transfers.

Hunter Mountain doesn't have the right to assert claims on behalf of other parties. It only has the right to assert claims on behalf of itself when it has been personally aggrieved.

I heard Mr. McEntire say several times during his presentation that Hunter Mountain had a

99.5 percent equity interest in Highland Capital.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: I think it's important to point out that that equity interest was completely extinguished by the confirmed plan in the bankruptcy case.

As Your Honor pointed out, we have the waterfall, and Classes 1 through 9 have to be paid in full. And you know what Classes 8 and 9 are? General unsecured claims and subordinated claims.

And the only way that Hunter Mountain is ever in the money, as Mr. McEntire was saying, with its Class 10 claim is if Seery, the claimant trustee, certifies that all claims in 1 through 9 are paid in full 100 percent with interest and all indemnity claims are satisfied.

There has been no such certification by Mr. Seery, and there may never be such a certification by Mr. Seery.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So that is real important because the idea that Hunter Mountain stands to somehow gain from this transaction is flawed for the reasons we've already talked about.

But it's also flawed because they have

what is, at best, a contingent interest. It's contingent on things that have not yet occurred. And under the case law, they don't have standing conferred on them in that interest.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So for all those reasons why there is no interest in the claims, no legal damages, no duty owed to it, no private cause of action belonging to it and a hypothetical and contingent interest, HMIT lacks standing to investigate or challenge these claims and claims transfers to which it was not a party and in which it had zero interest.

And for any or all of the reasons we've talked about, Your Honor, their petition should be dismissed. I welcome any questions the court may have.

THE COURT: No. My head is kind of spinning. Like I said, I spent all day yesterday reading stuff. As I said, I will admit I've never practiced bankruptcy law.

I mean, my joking statement is I pretty much know enough to not be in contempt of bankruptcy court. Because I have cases where one of the defendants or one of the parties ends up in bankruptcy court and whether or not I can proceed with my case, et cetera. That's my whole goal is not to be in contempt of court.

MR. SCHULTE: That should be the goal, is to not be in contempt of the bankruptcy court.

MR. McENTIRE: May I have just five or ten minutes?

THE COURT: I don't have another hearing, so we're fine on time.

MR. McENTIRE: All right. In all due deference to Mr. Schulte, the last 15 minutes of his argument misstates the law.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The Washington Mutual case addresses almost 90 percent of what he just talked about. Their equity was entitled to bring an action to basically disallow an interest that was acquired by inside information.

Okay. And so he has not addressed the Washington Mutual case at all.

THE COURT: Well, okay. So my question is let's say that the insider trading didn't happen.

I mean, when I was playing with the numbers last night, it doesn't appear that Hunter Mountain, being Class 10, would have gotten anything anyways even if. Right?

Like I said, I did a lot of reading last night, so I want to make sure I understand.

MR. McENTIRE: Fair enough. I think I can address that.

The bottom line is a wrongdoer should not be entitled to profit from his wrong. That's the fundamental premise behind the restatement on restitution. That's the fundamental purpose of the Washington Mutual case.

You have remedies, including disgorgement, disallowance or subordination.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to be devil's advocate because I'm trying to work through this.

So let's say it did happen and the court ordered disgorgement and invalidated these transfers, then the money would just go to the Class 8 and Class 9. Right? To Acis, UBS, HarbourVest, etc.

MR. McENTIRE: No, they would not. Because those claims have already been traded.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's what I'm saying.

If the court said there was insider trading and to disallow the transfer and ordered disgorgement, theoretically, back to Highland Capital, then the money is there.

Okay. So then it would just go to Acis and UBS. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: The remedy here is to subordinate their claims. HarbourVest, UBS, Acis, and the Redeemer committee have sold their claims. They can intervene if they want and that's up to them. If they want to take the position that they were defrauded, that's up to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Otherwise, the remedy is to disgorge the proceeds and put them back into the coffers of the bankruptcy court in which case Category 8 and 9 would be brimful, overflowing, and flow directly into the coffers in Class 10.

And that's the purpose of 15 and 16 in Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I find it amazing that he refers to Judge Jernigan's orders where he said anything dealing with these claims must come back to me. I have exclusive jurisdiction. I recall that argument.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Well, she could have accepted the removal of Mr. Dondero in that other proceeding. She didn't. She said I don't have jurisdiction over this. I'm sending it back to the state court.

THE COURT: Okay. Because it was filed as a 202. If it had been filed as a Rule 404, then she would have had jurisdiction because you're specifically invoking a state court process. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: I'm invoking exclusively a state court process because of the benefit it provides. That is a strategic choice that this petitioner has elected. It has nothing to do with bankruptcy court, other than bankruptcy court is too slow.

All the invective about the prior contempt order has nothing to do with these proceedings. Mr. Dondero is not involved in these proceedings.

If HarbourVest and UBS want to intervene in some subsequent lawsuit, they have a right to do so. I can't stop them.

But until then, we have stated a cause of action or at least a potential cause of action which is insider trading. That from an outsider makes them an insider that owes fiduciary duties to the equity.

Washington Mutual allowed equity to come in and disallow those claims. And if those claims are disallowed, the Class 10 is going to be overflowing on the waterfall. And that's my client.

A couple of other things. Hunter Mountain

is not a stranger. Hunter Mountain was the big elephant in the room until the effective date of the plan.

We held 99.5 percent of the equity stake and when all of these wrongdoings occurred, Hunter Mountain was still the 99.5 percent equity stakeholder.

It's only after the bankruptcy plan had gone effective, after these claims had already been --

THE COURT: Wait. The insider trading happened after the bankruptcy had been filed but before the bankruptcy was resolved.

So it's during that process. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: You have filing a bankruptcy. You have a bankruptcy plan. You have confirmation of the plan, but it doesn't go effective until six months later.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: After the bankruptcy plan was confirmed and they had dismal estimates of recovery -- 71 percent on Class 8, zero percent on Class 9 -- that's when Farallon and Stonehill purchased the claims.

But they purchased the claims at a time before the bankruptcy wasn't effective. And so the so-called claimant trust agreement had not gone into effect until several months later.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And during this period of time Hunter Mountain was the very, very largest stakeholder.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And so to call it a stranger is just not right and it's not fair because we're anything but a stranger.

They make an argument that Hunter Mountain didn't object to the settlements. Well, so what? I'm not attacking the underlying settlements. I'm attacking the claims transfers.

And then he says, well, why didn't they object to the claims transfers. Well, he finally conceded that the claims transfers are not actually subject to a judicial scrutiny by the bankruptcy court.

This court is uniquely qualified to review these claims transfers as is Judge Jernigan. Insider information is insider information as a rose is a rose is a rose. And any court of law is qualified to determine whether insider information was used.

Judge Jernigan did not say, okay, Farallon, you can buy this claim. There was no judicial process here.

THE COURT: Right. I mean, it's a motion.

We want to do this, just get approval.

MR. McENTIRE: They don't even have to get approval.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: All they have to do is file notice.

THE COURT: Okay. File the notice.

MR. McENTIRE: Judge Jernigan was not involved at all.

We had no reason to object. All we know there's a claims transfer. It's not until later that we discover that inside information was used and that's why we're here.

So we didn't object to the original claims. There was no need to. The original settlements rather. There was no need to. There was no objection to the claims transfers.

There was no mechanism to object, other than what we're doing here today. This is our objection. This is our attempt to object.

Because we believe that they have acquired hundreds of millions of dollars of ill-gotten gain and if that is true, not only will Hunter Mountain be benefited tremendously, but other unsecured creditors. They are very few but they will be also benefited.

Frankly, Judge Jernigan may want that to happen.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: But we're here to get the discovery so I can pull it all together within the next 30 days or 40 days. So I can make decisions before somebody might suggest, hey, well, you should have filed this a little bit earlier.

And so, Judge, that's why we're here, in the interest of time. And that was my decision. That was my strategic decision to bring it here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: He says that Rule 3001 is the exclusive remedy. Only transferors can complain about transferees or vice versa.

THE COURT: You're not necessarily complaining about the actual transfer. It's how the transfer came about.

MR. McENTIRE: That's right.

And to suggest that that is the governing principle that this court should consider is an absolute contradiction to the Washington Mutual case.

Because if fraud is in play, if inside information is in play, then it impacts everyone who is a stakeholder. Everyone.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And we are one of the largest stakeholders in the bankruptcy proceedings, even today. So that's all I have.

I thank you for your attention, Your Honor. Clearly, the benefit here is we get to uncover some things that need to be uncovered. And we'd like to do it so in a timely fashion.

And if we don't have a claim, we don't have a claim. If we have a claim, then we may file it in a state district court.

And if Judge Jernigan and her gate-keeping orders require us to go there, we'll go there. I'm not going to run afoul of any rule she has, but we need to get this underway.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, may I make some rifle-shot responses?

THE COURT: Yeah. That's fine.

MR. SCHULTE: Okay. Mr. McEntire has said that they are one of the largest stakeholders in the Highland bankruptcy based on this 99.5 percent equity. That equity was extinguished in the fifth amended plan.

That's Exhibit 3 that I handed you, Your Honor. That plan was filed in January of 2021

before any of these claims transfers took place. The equity was extinguished by virtue of the plan.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Mr. McEntire was talking about this Washington Mutual case. I read the case.

But what he said repeatedly, and I think it's really important to listen to what Mr. McEntire said about this case, is that that court allowed the equity to come in and talk about these transfers.

Hunter Mountain doesn't have any equity. That equity was extinguished in the plan for reasons I just discussed. So for being the largest stakeholder, according to Mr. McEntire, in the bankruptcy what does Hunter Mountain have to show for that? A Class 10.

As Your Honor pointed out, a Class 10 interest, that is below everybody else. And that's where they've been relegated.

And to answer your question, Your Honor, that you posed to Mr. McEntire that I'm not sure was ever answered, HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- at Class 10 stood to gain nothing when the plan was put together. So the largest stakeholder stood to gain nothing.

I've pointed to the language in the court's order about how the court has exclusive jurisdiction.

And Your Honor nailed the answer to the concern raised by Mr. McEntire, which is the bankruptcy court didn't have jurisdiction over a 202 proceeding. But it unquestionably has authority over the counterpart, 2004 in bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: Finally, I have never argued and if I did say this, I apologize. I have never argued that Hunter Mountain is somehow a stranger to the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Right. They were obviously involved in the bankruptcy, but they're a stranger to these transfers.

MR. SCHULTE: Exactly. They were a stranger to these transactions. They didn't have any interest in these claims.

They don't stand to gain anything if the claims are either rescinded or if the claims are invalidated or the transfers are invalidated. They don't stand to get anything because they never had any interest in these claims.

The claims are the claims and either UBS, Redeemer, Acis, and HarbourVest stood to gain more than expected or Farallon and Stonehill stand to gain more than expected.

And if anybody is really injured here, it's not Hunter Mountain. It's the transferors who were duped into these transfers, according to Hunter Mountain. And they would be the ones that would have damage and have a claim along the lines of what Hunter Mountain is trying to assert on behalf of all stakeholders.

Your Honor, I have a proposed order, as Mr. McEntire does.

May I bring it up?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Okay, Mr. McEntire. Anything else?

MR. McENTIRE: His last few statements are inconsistent with the law, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Because the law clearly, clearly indicates that we are a beneficiary. And that's what the Washington Mutual case stands for.

THE COURT: Okay. Wait. Let me make sure I know which one.

Do you have a cite for that case?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes, ma'am. It's in the PowerPoint.

THE COURT: That's fine. I just wanted to make sure I could find it.

MR. McENTIRE: There's also a Fifth Circuit case that talks about subordination where a Class 8 and Class 9 would actually be subordinated, Your Honor, to our claim.

So that's another approach to this, is subordination.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And that's the In re Mobile Steel case out of the Fifth Circuit. I think there's a cite in our brief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I acknowledge that we're now classified with a different name. We're a B/C limited partner. And we're, in effect, a Class 10 beneficial interest.

But we're there having been a 99.5. And the lion share of any money, 99.5 percent of any money that overflows into bucket No. 10 is ours.

THE COURT: Right.

Okay. I am processing. Obviously, I need to take this into consideration. I haven't had a chance to go through Respondent's exhibits.

I've looked through the plaintiff's exhibits, but now I have much more of a focus of what I'm doing.

So I will try to get you all a ruling by the end of next week. I apologize. I've got a special setting next week that's going to be kind of crazy, but I will do everything I can.

If you all haven't heard from me by next Friday afternoon, call my coordinator Texxa and tell her to bug me.

MR. McENTIRE: Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: You all are excused. Have a great day.

(This completes the Reporter's Record, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Rule 202 Petition, which was heard on Wednesday, February 22, 2023.)

STATE OF TEXAS)

COUNTY OF DALLAS)

I, Gina M. Udall, Official Court Reporter in and for the 191st District Court of Dallas County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is $750.00 and was paid by the attorney for Respondents.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 1st day of March 2023.

/S/ Gina M. Udall
Gina M. Udall, Texas CSR #6807
Certificate Expires: 10-31-2024
Official Reporter, 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas
George Allen Sr. Courts Building
600 Commerce St., 7th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 653-7146

Exhibit 4-C

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Petitioner.	§	191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER

Came on for consideration *Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Verified Rule 202 Petition* ("Petition") filed by petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"). The Court, having considered the Petition, the joint verified response in opposition filed by respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill"), HMIT's reply, the evidence admitted during the hearing conducted on February 22, 2023, the argument of counsel during that hearing, Farallon's and Stonehill's post-hearing brief, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes that HMIT's Petition should be denied and that this case should be dismissed. Therefore,

The Court ORDERS that HMIT's Petition be, and is hereby, DENIED, and that this case be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

THE COURT SO ORDERS.

Signed this 28th day of March, 2023.

HONORABLE GENA SLAUGHTER

Exhibit 4-D

State of Delaware
Secretary of State
Division of Corporations
Delivered 09:24 AM 03/09/2021
FILED 09:24 AM 03/09/2021
SR 20210838989 - File Number 5421257

CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION

OF

Muck Holdings, LLC

FIRST: The name of the limited liability company is:

Muck Holdings, LLC

SECOND: Its registered office in the State of Delaware is to be located at 251 Little Falls Drive, in the City of Wilmington, Delaware, 19808, and its registered agent at such address is CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the individual forming the Company, has executed, signed and acknowledged this Certificate of Formation this 9th day of March, 2021.

By: /s/ Hanchang Sohn
Name: Hanchang Sohn
Title: Authorized Person

Exhibit 4-E

CERTIFICATE OF FORMATION

OF

Jessup Holdings LLC

FIRST: The name of the limited liability company is Jessup Holdings LLC.

SECOND: The address of its registered office in the State of Delaware is 1013 Centre Road, Suite 403-B in the City of Wilmington, Delaware 19805, in the County of New Castle. The name of its registered agent at such address is Vcorp Services, LLC.

THIRD: Members may be admitted in accordance with the terms of the Operating Agreement of the limited liability company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate of Formation on April 08, 2021.

/s/Taylor Lolya
Taylor Lolya, Authorized Person

State of Delaware
Secretary of State
Division of Corporations
Delivered 01:10 PM 04/08/2021
FILED 01:10 PM 04/08/2021
SR 20211222936 - File Number 5822640

Exhibit 4-F

From: Roger L. McCleary
To: Schulte, David C (DAL - X59419)
Cc: Sawnie A. McEntire
Subject: HMIT — court's order/HMIT"s request for information
Date: Thursday, March 9, 2023 3:46:00 PM

David,

Thank you. This ruling denies Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") the investigatory discovery sought from Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon") and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill") under Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. Accordingly, HMIT requests that Farallon and Stonehill advise whether they will *voluntarily* provide some or all of the information and documents requested in HMIT's Rule 202 Petition and, if so, under what terms. Please let us know by Tuesday, March 14th, whether Farallon and Stonehill will consider doing so. If so, we are available to discuss this at your earliest convenience.

In any event, HMIT also requests that Farallon and Stonehill *voluntarily* respond to the following two specific requests, which they can answer in a matter of minutes:

1. A simple description of the legal relationship: a) between Farallon and Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), and b) between Stonehill and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup").
2. Whether: a) Farallon is a co-investor in any fund in which Muck holds an interest related to the Claims at issue in the Rule 202 Petition; b) Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which Jessup holds an interest related to the Claims at issue in the Rule 202 Petition.

We would also appreciate prompt written responses to these two specific requests. To the extent we do not receive written responses to these two requests by close of business on Tuesday, March 14th, this will be taken as Farallon and Stonehill's refusal to provide the requested responses. Similarly, to the extent we do not receive a written confirmation of Farallon and Stonehill's willingness to discuss voluntary production of more of the information and documents requested in HMIT's Rule 202 Petition by then, this will be taken as their refusal to consider doing so.

Please let us know if you or your clients have any questions about this request. Thank you.

Regards, Roger.

Roger L. McCleary
Parsons McEntire McCleary PLLC
One Riverway, Suite 1800
Houston, TX 77056
Tel: (713) 960-7305
Fax: (832) 742-7387
www.pmmlaw.com

are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.

From: Schulte, David C (DAL - X59419) <David.Schulte@hklaw.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 8, 2023 9:08 PM
To: Sawnie A. McEntire <smcentire@pmmlaw.com>; Roger L. McCleary <rmccleary@pmmlaw.com>
Cc: Timothy J. Miller <tmiller@pmmlaw.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] HMIT — court's order

Counsel--attached is a copy of the court's order in this case.

Dave

David C. Schulte | **Holland & Knight**
Partner
Holland & Knight LLP
1722 Routh St., Suite 1500 | Dallas, TX 75201
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	

ORDER GRANTING HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

Upon consideration of the *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding* [Dkt. __] (the "Motion") filed by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), and having considered any responses thereto, the Court finds that: (1) the claims alleged in HMIT's Proposed Adversary Complaint [Dkt. __-1] against James P. Seery ("Seery"), Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Muck Holdings, LLC, and Jessup Holdings, LLC (the "Claims") are colorable; (2) any demand on any other persons or entities to

prosecute the Claims would be futile; (3) HMIT is an appropriate party to bring the Claims on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust; and (4) HMIT's Motion should be granted.

It is therefore **ORDERED THAT:**

1. The Motion is GRANTED.

2. HMIT is granted leave to file its Proposed Adversary Complaint [Dkt. __-1] as an adversary proceeding in this Court.

###END OF ORDER###

Submitted by:
Parsons McEntire McCleary PLLC

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire_____
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Counsel for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

HMIT Exhibit 2

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	

HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S SUPPLEMENT TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE VERIFIED ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), Movant, files this Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding (the "Supplement"), both in its individual capacity and on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM" or "Reorganized Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust

("Claimant Trust") (the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust are collectively the "Highland Parties") against Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"), Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon"), Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill"), James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery") and John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10 (Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, Farallon, Seery and the John Doe Defendants Nos. 11-10 are collectively "Respondents" or "Proposed Defendants").[1]

OVERVIEW

1. This Supplement is not intended to amend or supersede the Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding (Doc. 3699) ("Emergency Motion for Leave"); rather, it is intended as a supplement to address procedural matters and to bring forth additional facts that further confirm the appropriateness of the derivative action.

2. Recent events make clear that (1) Seery, as Trustee, has a conflict of interest which precludes him from bringing the proposed claims; and (2) Seery, as Trustee, has abandoned and actively attempted to avoid a merits-based determination of the proposed claims. These facts are set forth in a revised Adversary Complaint attached to this Supplement as Exhibit 1-A.

[1] All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meaning ascribed to them in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave.

3. The revised Adversary Complaint also re-postures the Highland Parties as nominal defendants to address any procedural issues. Although the Court may authorize HMIT to bring the derivative action on behalf of the Highland Parties as Plaintiffs, their joinder as nominal defendants is also a recognized pleading practice. This recharacterization ***does not change*** the substance of the derivative action, which remains for the benefit of the Highland Parties.

4. Additional factual allegations are set forth in the revised Adversary Complaint. These additional allegations do not alter the substantive nature of the proposed causes of actions.

5. This Supplement is timely. The hearing will be scheduled no earlier than May 18, 2023. As such, the Respondents have at least 25 days from the filing of this Supplement before any scheduled hearing.

RECENT EVENTS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE

6. On March 28, 2023, HMIT filed its Emergency Motion for Leave, seeking leave to represent the Highland Parties in a derivative capacity and seeking damages and other relief on behalf of itself, individually, as well as on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust.

7. HMIT also filed its Application for Expedited Hearing on its Emergency Motion for Leave ("Application") seeking a hearing prior to April 16, 2022. In its Application, HMIT presented what it believed was good cause under Rule 9006 of the

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to authorize a shortened time for a response and hearing.

8. On March 30, 2023, the so-called "Highland Parties," which then also included Seery (Doc. 3707), and separately, Muck, Jessup, Farallon, and Stonehill (Doc. 3704), filed their Objections to the Application. One of the arguments advanced in these Objections by counsel for the "Highland Parties" was that the Court should delay a ruling on HMIT's Application so Seery and other parties could develop a potential statute of limitations defense.

9. Regarding the proposed claims, Seery attempted to avoid the claims to protect his own self-interest ***at the expense of*** the Highland Parties and HMIT. Seery unilaterally characterized the Highland Parties as the "Highland Defendants" and claimed they were opposed to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave. To be clear, HMIT seeks to assert its proposed claims ***on behalf of*** the Highland Parties, ***not against*** them.

10. Because recent events clearly establish HMIT's capacity and standing to bring its derivative claims, a revised Adversary Complaint is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1-A**. In addition to new factual allegations, the revised Adversary Complaint also includes allegations regarding fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule because

these recent events make clear that the Proposed Defendants seek to fabricate a limitations argument which otherwise would not exist.

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

11. Seery has known about HMIT's proposed claims for some time, yet, as Claimant Trustee with a duty to protect the Estate, Seery has made no attempt to prosecute these claims, is possessed of a debilitating conflict of interest and, in fact, has urged this Court to weaponize the gatekeeping protocol to make certain he and the other defendants can better take advantage of a purported statute of limitations defense. *See* Motion, n. 14. (Doc. 3707, ¶¶ 6, 17). Seery has opposed the Emergency Motion for Leave to advance his personal self-interest. Aware that "[t]he Plan does not release . . . Causes of Action arising from willful misconduct, criminal misconduct, actual fraud, or gross negligence," Seery is clearly seeking other means by which to insulate himself.

12. Seery's recent conduct confirms he is disqualified to bring the Proposed Claims due to his manifest conflict of interest. His recent actions are to the detriment of the Highland Parties and HMIT, making it all the more necessary for the Court to grant HMIT leave to bring the proposed claims. *See Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 858 F.2d 233, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1988) (granting leave to creditors' committee to bring breach of fiduciary duty claim against bankruptcy estate's officers and directors for mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate due to debtor-in-possession's incapacity to do so due to apparent conflict of interest).

13. In *Louisiana World Expedition*, the Fifth Circuit explained: "In light of our analysis, we find that the debtor-in-possession's refusal to pursue LWE's cause of action against its officers and directors for negligent management was indeed unjustified. The Committee outlined a colorable claim which, if pursued successfully, could have greatly increased the value of the estate. While the debtor-in-possession's refusal was understandable given the grave conflict of interest implications, we cannot ignore the fact that the creditors' interests in seeing the property of the estate collected were not protected. Where the interests of an estate and its creditors are impaired by the refusal of a trustee or a debtor-in-possession to initiate adversary proceedings to recover property of the estate, we must consider that refusal unjustified." *Id*. at 252.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust respectfully requests this Court:

1. grant HMIT leave authorizing it to file the Adversary Complaint, attached as Exhibit 1-A, as an Adversary Proceeding in this United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, in its own name and as a derivative action on behalf of the Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust, against Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC, Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, James P. Seery, Jr., and John Doe Defendants Nos. 1 – 10 (and against Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust as nominal defendants to the extent necessary); and

2. further grant HMIT all such other and further relief to which HMIT may be justly entitled.

Dated: April 23, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: */s/ Sawnie A. McEntire*

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

On April 21, 2023, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's counsel conferred by telephone, via email, or both with counsel for all Respondents regarding the relief requested in this filing, including John A. Morris, who purports to be representing and acting on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust, Josh Levy and Lindsay Robin on behalf of James P. Seery, and David Schulte on behalf of Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Mr. Morris indicated it can be assumed his clients are opposed until he reviews this filed instrument. Mr. Levy and Mr. Schulte indicated that their respective clients are neither opposed nor agreed until their counsel has reviewed the contents of this filing.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 23rd day of April 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was served on all counsel of record or, as appropriate, on the Respondents directly.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

Exhibit 1-A to Emergency Motion

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., AND THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST	§	**Adversary Proceeding No. _____**
PLAINTIFFS,	§	

v.	§
	§
MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC, JESSUP HOLDINGS LLC, FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC, JAMES P. SEERY, JR., JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS NOS. 1-10,	§
	§
DEFENDANTS	§
	§
and	§
	§
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., AND THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§
	§
NOMINAL DEFENDANTS.	§

VERIFIED ADVERSARY COMPLAINT

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") files this Verified Adversary Complaint ("Complaint") in its individual capacity and as a derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM" or "Reorganized Debtor"), and the Highland Claimant Trust ("Claimant Trust") (the Claimant Trust and Reorganized Debtor are collectively referred to as "Nominal Defendants"), (collectively the Nominal Defendants and HMIT, in its various capacities, are referred to as "Plaintiffs") complaining of Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"), Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon"), Stonehill

Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill"), James P. Seery, Jr., ("Seery"), and John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10 (Muck, Jessup, Stonehill, Farallon, Seery, and the John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10 are collectively "Defendants"), and would show:

I. Introduction

A. *Preliminary Statement*

1. HMIT brings this Verified Adversary Complaint ("Complaint") on behalf of itself, individually, and as a derivative action benefitting and on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust, as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement (Doc. 3521-5) ("CTA").[1] This action has become necessary because of the wrongful conduct of the Defendants, involving self-dealing, breaches of fiduciary duties, and aiding and abetting those breaches of duty.

2. This lawsuit focuses on a scheme involving Seery and his close business associates and allies. Seery held command of the Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., in a complex bankruptcy. The Debtor's business involved hundreds of millions of dollars in assets that were held by the Debtor's Estate in a variety of entities, managed funds, and other investments. It was not and still is not a narrowly focused business with

[1] Solely in the alternative, and in the unlikely event HMIT's proposed causes of actions against Seery, Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and/or Jessup are considered to be "Estate Claims" as those terms are used and defined within the CTA and Exhibit A to the Notice of Final Term Sheet [Docket No. 354] in HCM's bankruptcy (and without admitting the same), HMIT alternatively seeks standing to bring this action as a derivative action on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust as appropriate. Any demand on the Litigation Sub-Trust would be equally futile for the same reasons addressed in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave (Doc. 3699).

the type of uncomplicated, transparent assets that almost any potential claim purchaser could meaningfully evaluate. Seery effectively enjoyed despotic control over how these assets were managed, sold, or monetized, and many of his activities were never subject to judicial scrutiny or accountability. Indeed, Seery failed to cause the Debtor to make the financial disclosures required in such proceedings.

3. Thus, acting within a cloak of secrecy, Seery provided close business acquaintances, the other Defendants ("Defendant Purchasers"), with material non-public information concerning the value of assets which they then used to purchase the largest approved unsecured claims. The Defendant Purchasers paid well over a hundred million dollars to buy these claims without the kind of independent due diligence that would be reasonably expected, if not required, because of their own fiduciary duties to their investors. It made no sense for the Defendant Purchasers to invest millions of dollars for assets that – per the publicly available information – did not offer a sufficient potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk. The counter-intuitive nature of the purchases at issue compels the conclusion that the Defendant Purchasers acted on inside information and Seery's secret assurances of great profits. Indeed, based upon publicly available information, their investment was projected to yield a small return with virtually no margin for error. But as they must have anticipated, they have already recovered the purchase price ***and*** returns far greater than what was publicly projected,

with the expectation of significant more profits if not deterred. These facts fit classic insider trading activity.

4. As part of the scheme, the Defendant Purchasers obtained a position to approve Seery's ongoing compensation - to Seery's benefit and also to the detriment of the Claimant Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, and HMIT. Initially, Seery's compensation package was composed of a flat monthly pay. Now, however, it is also performance based. This allows the Defendant Purchasers to satisfy the *quid pro quo* at the heart of the scheme. Seery would help the Defendant Purchasers make large profits and they would help enrich Seery with big pay days.

5. To further advance their scheme, the Defendants have participated in the pursuit of contrived litigation against HMIT and others, through litigation sponsored by the Litigation Sub Trust. Upon information and belief, Seery also directed or authorized legal counsel for the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust (who, tellingly, also represented Seery) to oppose HMIT's efforts to obtain leave to file this adversary proceeding. These obstructive tactics are self-serving, with the apparent goals of attempting to: (a) exhaust financial resources in an effort to delay recognition of the vesting of HMIT's interests under the terms of the CTA; (b) reduce the value of HMIT's interests under the CTA; and (c) deprive HMIT of claims relating to breaches of fiduciary duty stemming from the scheme. The Defendants and Litigation Sub Trust have used millions of dollars of assets to finance these obstructive tactics. Every dollar misapplied

by Defendants to further this scheme is damaging to HMIT, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust.

6. This derivative action is brought pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and B. R. Rule 7023.1. At the time of the transactions at issue, HMIT held a 99.5% limited partnership in Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Original Debtor. This derivative action is not a collusive effort to confer jurisdiction that the Court would otherwise lack.

7. This action also is brought subject to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) (Doc. 1943, Exhibit A) (the "Plan") Article IX.F. Consistent with such provisions, this action is ***not*** brought ***against*** the nominal party Reorganized Debtor or the nominal party Claimant Trust, but as a derivative action on their behalf and for their benefit.[2] Additionally, HMIT is a person or party aggrieved by the conduct of the Defendants and, therefore, HMIT has constitutional standing to bring this action.

B. ***The Claimant Trust, the Derivative Action, the Futility of Further Demand, Abandonment of Claims, and Conflict of Interest***

8. Upon the Effective Date, the assets of the bankruptcy estate of Highland Capital Management, L.P., as the Original Debtor (the "Debtor's Estate"), were transferred to the Highland Claimant Trust under the terms of the Plan, and as defined

[2] To the extent the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are considered necessary parties for the purposes of this derivative action, they have been included as nominal defendants.

in the CTA. These assets include all "causes of action" that the Debtor's Estate had before the Effective Date including, without limitation, the causes of action set forth in this Adversary Proceeding. Furthermore, the Claimant Trust is also managed by the Claimant Trustee, Seery, who has self-servingly and falsely characterized the claims as allegedly meritless (Doc. 3707).

9. Seery, as Claimant Trustee, breached his fiduciary duties and abandoned the current claims in this Adversary Complaint by objecting to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File this Adversary Complaint (Doc. 3699) and Application for Emergency Hearing (Doc. 3700). Seery is attempting to weaponize the gatekeeping protocols in the Plan to arm himself and others with potential defense arguments to avoid a merits-based determination of the claims against Seery and the other Defendants. In other words, Seery is attempting to protect his own self-interest ***at the expense of*** the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and HMIT. Therefore, any demand upon Seery to prosecute the claims in this Complaint would be futile because Seery is a Defendant.

10. Similarly, the Oversight Board exercises supervision over Seery as Claimant Trustee, and Muck and Jessup are controlling members of the Oversight Board. Any demand upon Muck and Jessup to prosecute these claims would be equally futile because they also filed objections to the expedited prosecution of these or similar claims (falsely characterizing the claims as an alleged waste of judicial resources) (Doc. 3704). Upon

information and belief, Muck and Jessup are also controlled by Farallon and Stonehill, further evidencing the futility of any such demand on Muck and Jessup.

11. All conditions precedent to bringing this derivative action have otherwise been satisfied or waived, and the Defendants are estopped from asserting otherwise. HMIT is an appropriate party to bring this action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust.

C. ***Nature of the Action***

12. The insider trading scheme was implemented after confirmation of the Plan, but before the Effective Date. Prior to the Effective Date, HMIT owned 99.5% of the limited partnership interest in the Debtor and was the beneficiary of fiduciary duties owed by Seery.

13. Seery, the Original Debtor's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and former Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO"), wrongfully facilitated and promoted the insider trades by providing material non-public information to Defendant Purchasers concerning the value of assets in the Debtor's Estate. Farallon and Stonehill, who were otherwise strangers to the bankruptcy proceedings, wrongfully purchased the claims through their special purpose entities, Muck and Jessup, based upon this inside information. Seery's dealings with the Defendant Purchasers were not arm's-length, but instead were covert, undisclosed, and collusive.

14. Motivated by corporate greed, the Defendant Purchasers aided and abetted or, alternatively, knowingly participated in Seery's wrongful conduct. They also breached their own duties as "non-statutory insiders." Because of their long-standing, historical relationships with Seery, and their use of material non-public information, the Defendant Purchasers obtained effective control over various affairs of the Debtor's bankruptcy, including compensation awards to Seery. As such, they became non-statutory insiders.

15. HMIT was formerly the largest equity holder in the Debtor, holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. As part of the scheme, Seery is attempting to delay recognition of HMIT's vesting of its interests under the CTA. As an allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interest and Contingent Trust Interest holder, HMIT's right to recover from the Claimant Trust would be junior to the Reorganized Debtor's unsecured creditors, now known as Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. However, the vast majority of the approved unsecured claims superior to HMIT's interest are those claims wrongfully acquired by the insider trading and the breaches of duty at issue in this proceeding.

16. By wrongfully soliciting, fostering, and encouraging the wrongful insider trades at issue, Seery violated his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's Estate and to HMIT, including specifically his duty of loyalty and his duty to avoid self-dealing. But Seery was motivated out of self-interest to garner personal benefit by strategically "planting" his allies onto the Oversight Board which, as a consequence, does not act as an independent

board in the exercise of its responsibilities. Rather, imbued with powers to effectively control Seery's compensation, the Defendant Purchasers are postured to reward Seery for their illicit dealings and, upon information and belief, they have done so.

17. By receiving and acting upon material non-public information concerning the financial condition of the Debtor's Estate, Stonehill and Farallon, acting individually and through special purpose shell entities they created and controlled, directly or indirectly, are also liable for aiding and abetting Seery's breaches of fiduciary duties. By acquiring the claims at issue, Muck and Jessup, the shell entities created and controlled by Stonehill and Farallon, also became non-statutory insiders, and also aided and abetted Seery's breaches of fiduciary duties.

18. Because of their willful, inequitable misconduct and bad faith, Plaintiffs ask the Court to require the Defendant Purchasers to disgorge their ill-gotten profits and equitably disallow the remaining unpaid balances on the following allowed claims: Claim Nos. 23, 72, 81, 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 190, and 191 (the "Claims") currently held by Muck and Jessup. Because the Defendant Purchasers received substantial distributions from the Claimant Trust in connection with these Claims, HMIT seeks to disgorge from Defendant Purchasers all such distributions above the Defendant Purchasers' initial investment—compelling restitution of such funds to the Claimant Trust for the benefit of other creditors and former equity pursuant to the waterfall established under the Plan and the CTA. Plaintiffs also ask the Court to require Seery to

disgorge all compensation from the date his collusive conduct first occurred. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust in an amount equal to all compensation paid to Seery from the onset of his collusive conduct to present.

19. By this Complaint, Plaintiffs do not seek to challenge the Plan or the Order confirming the Plan.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

20. Pursuant to *Misc. Order No. 33 Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases, U.S. District Court for N.D. Texas* (the "Order of Reference"), this Complaint is commenced in the Bankruptcy Court because it is "related to a case under Title 11." The filing of this Complaint is expressly subject to and without waiver of Plaintiffs' rights and ability to seek withdrawal of the reference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), FED. R. BANKR. P. 5011, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 5011-1. Plaintiffs hereby demand a right to a trial by jury of all claims asserted herein and nothing in this Complaint, nor Plaintiffs' compliance with the Order of Reference, shall be deemed a waiver of this right. To the extent necessary, Plaintiffs seek to withdraw the reference at this time.

21. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties as a "related to" proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and Articles IX.F., and XI. of the Plan.

22. Pursuant to Rule 7008 of the Bankruptcy Rules, Plaintiffs do **not** consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy court.

23. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409, and Articles IX.F., and XI. of the Plan.

III. Parties

24. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust that was the largest equity holder in the Original Debtor, holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HMIT is also the holder of a Contingent Trust Interest in the Claimant Trust, but HMIT should be treated as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary due to Defendants' wrongful conduct and considering the current value of the Claimant Trust Assets before and after the relief requested herein. Due to Seery's abandonment of the claims asserted herein, and his patent conflict of interest, HMIT has constitutional standing and capacity to bring these claims both individually and derivatively.

25. The Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware and may be served at its principal place of business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201. The Reorganized Debtor is a nominal defendant only, and a primary beneficiary of this lawsuit.

26. Pursuant to the Plan and the CTA, the Claimant Trust holds the assets of the Reorganized Debtor, including the causes of action that accrued to the Debtor's Estate before the Effective Date. The Claimant Trust is established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulatory Section 301.7701-4(d). The

Claimant Trust may be served at its Principal Office where the Claimant Trust is maintained: 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201. The Claimant Trust is a nominal defendant only, and a primary beneficiary of this lawsuit.

27. Muck is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in California, and may be served with process at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111. Muck has made prior appearances in the Debtor's bankruptcy.

28. Jessup is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in New York, and may be served with process via its registered agent, Vcorp Services, LLC, at 108 W. 13th Street Suite 100, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Jessup has made prior appearances in the Debtor's bankruptcy.

29. Farallon is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in California, and may be served with process at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111. Farallon is a capital management company that manages hedge funds and is a registered investment advisor. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Farallon because Farallon's conduct giving rise to or relating to the claims in this Adversary Proceeding occurred in Texas, thereby satisfying all minimum contacts requirements and due process considerations.

30. Stonehill is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal office in New York, and may be served with process at 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022. Stonehill is a capital management company managing hedge funds and is a

registered investment advisor. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Stonehill because Stonehill's conduct giving rise to or relating to the claims in this Adversary Proceeding occurred in Texas, thereby satisfying all minimum contacts and all due process considerations.

31. Seery is an individual citizen and resident of the State of New York. Mr. Seery may be served with process at 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1805, Dallas, Texas 75201.

32. HMIT separately seeks recovery against John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10. Farallon has actively concealed the precise legal relationship between itself and Muck. Stonehill also actively concealed the precise legal relationship between itself and Jessup. What is known, however, is that Farallon and Stonehill created these special purpose shell entities, on the eve of the insider trades to acquire ownership of the Claims and to otherwise control the affairs of the Oversight Board. Both Farallon and Stonehill rejected inquiries concerning the exact nature of their relationship with these special purpose entities. Accordingly, HMIT seeks equitable tolling of any statute of limitations concerning claims against unknown business entities or individuals that Farallon and Stonehill may have created and inserted as intermediate corporate layers in the transactions at issue. John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10 are currently unknown individuals or business entities who may be identified in discovery as involved in the wrongful transactions at issue.

IV. Facts

A. *Procedural Background*

33. On October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in Delaware Bankruptcy Court,[3] which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2019.[4]

34. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee's office appointed a four-member Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") consisting of three judgment creditors—the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund ("Redeemer"); Acis Capital Management, L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (collectively "Acis"); and UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS")—and an unpaid vendor, Meta-E Discovery.

35. Following the venue transfer to Texas on December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed its *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the*

[3] Doc. 3. Unless otherwise referenced, all documents referencing "Doc." refer to the docket maintained in Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.).

[4] Doc. 1.

Ordinary Course ("Governance Motion").[5] On January 9, 2020, the Court signed a Governance Order granting the Governance Motion.[6]

36. As part of the Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the selections of the Unsecured Creditors Committee—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Strand, the Original Debtor's general partner. The Board then appointed Seery as the Chief Executive Officer in place of the previous CEO, Mr. James Dondero, as well as the CRO.[7] Seery currently serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust under the terms of the CTA and as CEO of the Reorganized Debtor.[8]

B. *The Targeted Claims*

37. In his capacity as the Original Debtor's CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained court approval for settlements with several large unsecured creditors including Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and another major unsecured creditor, HarbourVest (Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest are collectively the "Settling Parties"), resulting in the following allowed Claims:

Creditor	**Class 8**	**Class 9**
Redeemer	$137 mm	$0 mm
Acis	$23 mm	$0 mm
HarbourVest	$45 mm	$35 mm

[5] Doc. 281.

[6] Doc. 339.

[7] Doc. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.

[8] *See* Doc. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

UBS	$65 mm	$60 mm
(Totals)	$270 mm	$95 mm

As reflected in these settlements, HarbourVest and UBS owned Class 9 claims in addition to Class 8 claims. Class 9 claims were subordinated to Class 8 claims in the distribution waterfall in the Plan.

38. Each of the Settling Parties sold their Claims to Farallon and Stonehill (or affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after receiving court approval of the settlements. One of these "trades" took place within just a few weeks before the Plan's Effective Date.[9] All of these trades occurred when HMIT held its 99.5% equity stake in the Debtor. Notice of these trades was first provided in filings in the records of the Original Debtor's bankruptcy proceedings, as follows: Claim No. 23 (Doc. 2211, 2212, and 2215), Claim Nos. 190 and 191 (Doc. 2697 and 2698), Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153 and 154 (Doc. 2263), Claim No. 81 (Doc. 2262), Claim No. 72 (Doc. 2261).

39. Farallon and Stonehill, both of whom are registered investment advisors that manage hedge funds, are acutely aware that they owe fiduciary duties to their investors. Yet, they both invested many tens of millions of dollars, directly or indirectly, to acquire the Claims in the absence of any publicly available information that could provide any economic justification for their investment decisions.

[9] Docs. 2697, 2698.

40. Upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon collectively invested an estimated amount exceeding $160 million to acquire the Claims with a face amount of $365 million, but a far lower publicly projected value at the time, and they did so in the absence of any meaningful due diligence. Indeed, Farallon has admitted that it conducted no due diligence but relied on Seery's profit guarantees.

41. The Defendant Purchasers' investments become even more suspicious because the Debtor, through Seery, provided the ***only*** publicly available information which, at the time, included pessimistic projections that certain of the Claims would receive partial payment, while the subordinated class of Claims would receive no distribution:

a. From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the projected value of HCM's assets dropped over $200 million from $566 million to $364 million.[10]

b. HCM's Disclosure Statement publicly projected payment of only 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11.[11]

    - This meant that the Defendant Purchasers invested more than an estimated $160 million in the Claims when the publicly available information indicated they would receive $0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par value on their Class 8 Claims. At best, the Defendant Purchasers would receive a marginal return that could not justify the risk.

[10] Doc. 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.

[11] Doc. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, Ex. A, p. 4.

c. Despite the stark decline in the value of the Debtor's Estate and in the midst of substantial reductions in the percentage of Class 8 Claims expected to be satisfied, Stonehill, through Jessup, and Farallon, through Muck, nevertheless purchased the four largest bankruptcy claims from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively, again, the "Claims") in April and August of 2021 in the combined estimated amount of at least $163 million.[12]

42. Upon information and belief, Stonehill, through its special purpose entity, Jessup, acquired the Redeemer Committee's claim for $78 million.[13] Upon information and belief, the $23 million Acis claim[14] was sold to Farallon/Muck for $8 million. Upon information and belief, HarbourVest sold its combined $80 million in claims to Farallon/Muck for $27 million. UBS sold its combined $125 million in claims for $50 million to both Stonehill/Jessup and Farallon/Muck. In the instance of UBS, ***the total projected payout was only $35 million***. Indeed, as part of these transactions, both Farallon and Stonehill purchased Class 9 Claims at a time when the Debtor's Estate projected a zero dollar return on all such Claims.

43. Furthermore, although the publicly available projections suggested only a small margin of error on any profit potential for its significant investment, Farallon, upon information and belief, indicated it would refuse to sell its stake in the Claims for a 40%

[12] Notices of Transfers [Docs. 2212, 2215, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2297, 2298]. The Acis claim was transferred on April 16, 2021; the Redeemer, Crusader, and HarbourVest claims were transferred on April 30, 2021; and the UBS claims were transferred on August 9, 2021.

[13] July 6, 2021, letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.

[14] Seery/HCM have argued that $10 million of the Acis claim is self-funding.

premium or more above its investment—claiming that its stake was far more valuable based upon Seery's assurances. This is a striking admission that Farallon had and used material non-public inside information.

C. *Material Non-Public Information is Disclosed to Seery's Affiliates at Stonehill and Farallon*

44. One of many significant assets of the Debtor's Estate was the Debtor's direct and indirect holdings in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM").[15]

45. On December 17, 2020, James Dondero sent an email to Seery. At that time, Dondero was a member of the MGM board, and the email contained material non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM.[16] Of course, any such sale would significantly enhance the value of the Debtor's Estate.

46. Upon receipt of this material non-public information, Seery should have halted all transactions involving MGM stock, yet just six days later Seery filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court seeking approval of the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest - resulting in a transfer to the Debtor's Estate of HarbourVest's interest in a Debtor-advised fund, Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), which held substantial MGM debt and equity.[17] Conspicuously, the HCLOF interest was not transferred to the Debtor's Estate for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to "to an entity to be

[15] *See* Doc. 2229, p. 6.

[16] *See* Adversary Case No. 20-3190-sgj11, Doc. 150-1, p. 1674.

[17] Doc. 1625. Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF's assets were comprised of debt and equity in MGM.

designated by the Debtor"—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements.[18]

47. Upon information and belief, aware that the Debtor's stake in MGM afforded a new profit center, Seery saw this and the value of other assets as an opportunity to increase his own compensation. He then enlisted the help of Stonehill and Farallon to extract further value from the Debtor's Estate. This *quid pro quo* included, at a minimum, an understanding that Seery would be well-compensated for the scheme once the Defendant Purchasers, acting through Muck and Jessup, obtained control of the Oversight Board following the Effective Date.

48. Until 2009, Seery was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Brothers[19] where, upon information and belief, he conducted substantial business with Farallon. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Seery continued to work with, and indeed represented Farallon as its legal counsel. Seery ultimately joined a hedge fund, River Birch Capital,[20] which, along with Stonehill, served on the creditors committee in other bankruptcy proceedings. GCM Grovesnor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee[21] and, upon information and belief, is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. Grovesnor, through Redeemer, played a large part in

[18] Doc. 1625.

[19] Seery Resume [Doc. 281-2].

[20] *Id*.

[21] Declaration of John A. Morris [Doc. 1090], Ex. 1, pp. 15.

appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors. Seery was beholden to Grovesnor from the outset, and, by extension, Grovesnor's affiliates Stonehill and Farallon.

49. As successful capital management firms, with advisory and fiduciary duties to their own clients, Stonehill and Farallon typically engage in robust due diligence before making significant investments. Yet, in this case, it would have been *impossible* for Stonehill and Farallon (in the absence of inside information) to forecast *any* significant profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments given the publicly available, negative financial information.

50. Seery shared with Stonehill and Farallon material *non-public* information concerning certain assets of the Debtor's Estate. Otherwise, it makes no sense that the Defendant Purchasers would have made their multi-million-dollar investments under these circumstances.

51. Fed. R. Bank. P. 2015.3(a) requires "periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or debtor . . . in which the estate holds a substantial of controlling interest." The purpose of Rule 2015.3 is "to assist parties in interest taking steps to ensure that the debtor's interest in any entity . . . is used for payment of allowed claims against the debtor." Pub. L. 109-8 § 419(b) (2005). However, these reports were not provided, thereby giving the Defendant Purchasers the added benefit of being insiders having access to information that was not made publicly available to other stakeholders.

52. When questioned at the confirmation hearing regarding the failure to file these reports, Seery explained that he "did not get it done and it fell through the cracks" (Doc. 1905 at 49:18-21). Yet even now—two years later—complete reports identifying the asset values and profitability of each non-publicly traded entity (in which the Reorganized Debtor has or held interests) have not been disclosed. Upon information and belief, this includes several entities including, but not limited to: Highland Select Equity Fund; Highland Select Entity Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P.; Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.; Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.; Highland Capital Management Korea Limited; Cornerstone Healthcare; Trussway Industries, LLC; Trussway Holdings, LLC; OmniMax International; Targa; CCS Medical; JHT Holdings; and other entities.[22] Upon information and belief, the Reorganized Debtors' interest in some of these entities has been sold,[23] but the sales prices have not been fully disclosed (except as reported by certain purchasers in public SEC filings).

53. Rather than providing the required reports, only generic information was provided (by way of examples, as "private security," "private portfolio company," and "private equity fund") with a total reported value of $224,267,777.21.[24] Entities were sold

[22] *See* Doc. 2229, pp. 6-7; January 29, 2021, Deposition of James P. Seery, Jr., 28:7-29:25.

[23] *See, e.g.*, https://trussway.com/2022/09/01/trussway-joins-builders-firstsource/ (sale of Trussway); https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scionhealth-completes-acquisition-of-cornerstone-healthcare-group-301728275.html (sale of Cornerstone; unsurprisingly, Sidley Austin served as counsel for the purchaser); https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/svpglobal-completes-acquisition-of-omnimax-international-301151365.html (sale of OmniMax).

[24] Doc. 247 at p. 12.

without Court approval and without any 2015.3 report filings. In sum, upon information and belief, the Debtor had and the Reorganized Debtor has significant assets in a variety of funds and investments that were not publicly disclosed.

54. By wrongfully exploiting such material non-public insider information, Stonehill and Farallon—acting through Muck and Jessup—became the largest holders of unsecured claims in the Debtor's Estate with resulting control over the Oversight Board and a front row seat to the reorganization and distribution of Claimant Trust Assets. As such, they were given control (through Muck and Jessup) to approve discretionary bonuses and success fees for Seery from these assets.

D. ***Distributions***

55. The MGM sale was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for $6.1 billion in cash, plus $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid.[25]

56. HCM and its wholly owned subsidiary, HCMLP Investments, own 50.612% of HCLOF, which, as of December 31, 2021, had a total net asset value of $76.1 million, a substantial amount of which has been monetized.[26] Upon information and belief, HCM's interest in HCLOF was worth at least $38 million.

[25] Amazon Q1 2022 10-Q.

[26] Doc. 3584-1, pp. 2, 9, 13, 21.

57. On or about September 1, 2022, upon information and belief, Trussway was sold to Builder's First Source for $274.8 million, net of cash.[27] Prior to the sale, upon information and belief, Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. ("HSEF") owned "approximately 90%" of Trussway, and HCM owned 100% of HSEF.[28] Upon information and belief, HCM should have netted at least $247.8 million from the sale of Trussway.

58. According to HCM's most recent Form ADV, filed on March 31, 2023, HCM currently owns at least $127.5 million in Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners Master, LP, Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., and Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund (collectively, the "Private Funds"), in addition to interests in HCM's client-CLOs and other non-regulatory assets.

59. Accordingly, and upon information and belief, and based solely on the Reorganized Debtor's interests in Trussway, HCLOF, and the Private Funds, the Reorganized Debtor has over **$413.3 million** in estimated liquid or monetizable assets—which alone exceeds the $397.5 million in general unsecured claims, and indeed *all* allowed claims[29]—notwithstanding the value realized from the Reorganized Debtor's

[27] BLDR Q3 2022 10-Q.

[28] Doc. 2229, n. 8.

[29] Doc. 3757, p. 7.

interests in MGM, Trussway, Cornerstone, and other substantial assets that may remain to be monetized.[30]

60. By the end of Q3 2021, just over $6 million of the projected $205 million available for general unsecured claimants had been disbursed.[31] No additional distributions were made to general unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost $250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—$45 million more than was *ever* projected.[32] Thus, Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) already have received returns that far eclipse their estimated investments. They also stand to make further significant profits on their investments, including distributions on their Class 9 Claims.

61. As of March 31, 2023, the Claimant Trust has distributed $270,205,592.[33] On a *pro rata* basis, this means that other creditors (excluding Muck and Jessup) have received an estimated $24,332,361.07 in distributions against the stated value of their allowed claims.[34] That leaves an estimated unpaid balance of only $2,456,596.93.

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[30] See Doc 3662, p. 4 (projecting assets worth at least $663.72 million as of June 1, 2022); *see also* supra, n. 22-23.

[31] Doc. 3200.

[32] Doc. 3582.

[33] Doc. 3757, p. 7.

[34] Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck)'s Claims collectively represent an estimated 91% of all Class 8 claims. The other creditors therefore represent an estimated 9%. Upon information and belief, Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) hold 100% of the Class 9 claims.

V. Causes of Action

A. *Count I (against Seery): Breach of Fiduciary Duties*

62. The allegations in paragraphs 1-61 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

63. As CEO and CRO of a debtor-in-possession, Seery owed fiduciary duties to HMIT, as equity, and to the Debtor's Estate, including, without limitation, the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interests, but Seery willfully and knowingly engaged in conduct which conflicted with his fiduciary duties—and he did so out of financial self-interest.

64. By disclosing material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon in an effort to gain personal financial benefit, Seery willfully and knowingly breached his fiduciary duties. By failing to disclose the inside trades at issue, including his role in those inside trades, Seery willfully and knowingly breached his fiduciary duties.

65. As a result of his willful misconduct, Seery was unfairly advantaged by receiving assurances of additional undisclosed compensation and bonuses from the assets of the Debtor's Estate and from the Claimant Trust Assets—to the detriment of other stakeholders, including HMIT.

66. Seery's misconduct constituted fraud, willful misconduct, and bad faith.

67. Plaintiffs sue for all actual damages caused by Seery's misconduct. Seery should also be held liable for disgorgement of all compensation he received since his

collusion with the Defendant Purchasers first began. Alternatively, Seery should be disgorged of all compensation paid to him under the terms of the CTA since the Effective Date of the Plan in August 2021.

68. Alternatively, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages measured by all ill-gotten compensation which Seery has received since his first collusive conduct began.

B. ***Count II (against all Defendant Purchasers and the John Doe Defendants): Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duties***

69. The allegations in paragraphs 1-68 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

70. Seery owed fiduciary duties to HMIT and the Debtor's Estate, and he willfully and knowingly breached these duties. Without limiting the foregoing, Seery owed a duty of loyalty which he willfully and knowingly breached. Seery also owed a duty to not engage in self-interested conduct to the detriment of the Debtor's Estate and innocent stakeholders. Seery willfully and knowingly breached this duty.

71. The Defendant Purchasers were aware of Seery's fiduciary duties and, by purchasing the Claims and approving bonuses and other compensation for Seery, Stonehill (acting through Jessup) and Farallon (acting through Muck), willfully and knowingly participated in Seery's breaches or, alternatively, willfully aided and abetted such breaches.

72. Stonehill (Jessup) and Farallon (Muck) unfairly received many millions of dollars in profits and fees—and stand to earn even more profits and fees.

73. The Defendant Purchasers' misconduct constitutes bad faith, fraud, and willful misconduct.

74. Plaintiffs sue for all actual damages caused by the Defendant Purchasers' wrongful conduct. The Defendant Purchasers are also liable for disgorgement of all profits Defendant Purchasers earned from their participation in the purchase of the Claims. Plaintiffs also seek damages against the Defendant Purchasers for excessive compensation paid to Seery as part of the covert *quid pro quo* with Seery.

C. *Count III (against all Defendants): Conspiracy*

75. The allegations in paragraphs 1-74 above are incorporated herein as if incorporated herein verbatim.

76. Defendants conspired with each other to unlawfully breach fiduciary duties to HMIT and the Debtor's Estate, and to conceal their wrongful trades.

77. Seery's disclosure of material non-public information to the Defendant Purchasers and Seery's receipt of additional compensation as a *quid pro quo* for the insider-claims trading are overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

78. HMIT's interest in the residual of the Claimant Trust Assets has been adversely impacted by this conspiracy. The assets have been depleted by virtue of Seery's compensation awards.

79. All Defendants' misconduct constitutes bad faith, fraud, and willful misconduct.

80. Plaintiffs sue for all actual damages caused by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. All Defendants should be disgorged of their ill-gotten profits and gains.

81. Plaintiffs sue all Defendants for damages associated with Seery's compensation awards pursuant to the scheme.

D. ***Count IV (against Muck and Jessup): Equitable Disallowance***

82. The allegations in paragraphs 1-81 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

83. By purchasing the Claims based on material non-public information, Stonehill and Farallon, through Jessup and Muck, engaged in inequitable conduct.

84. By earning significant profits on their purchases, Muck and Jessup have been unfairly advantaged.

85. Muck and Jessup's misconduct constitutes bad faith, fraud, and willful misconduct.

86. Given this willful, inequitable, and bad faith conduct, equitable disallowance of Muck's and Jessup's Claims to the extent over and above their initial investment is appropriate and consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

87. Pleading in the alternative only, subordination of Muck's and Jessup's General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests and Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to all other interests in the Claimant Trust, including HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest, is

necessary and appropriate to remedy Muck's and Jessup's wrongful, willful, and bad faith conduct, and is also consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

E. ***Count V (against all Defendants): Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust***

88. The allegations in paragraphs 1-87 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

89. By acquiring the Claims using material non-public information, Stonehill and Farallon were unjustly enriched and gained an undue advantage over other creditors and former equity.

90. All Defendants' misconduct constitutes bad faith, fraud, and willful misconduct.

91. Allowing Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup to retain their ill-gotten benefits would be unconscionable.

92. Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup should be forced to disgorge all distributions over and above their original investment in the Claims as restitution for their unjust enrichment.

93. The proceeds Stonehill, Farallon, Muck, and Jessup have received from the Claimant Trust are traceable and identifiable. A constructive trust should be imposed on such proceeds to secure the restitution of these improperly retained benefits.

94. Seery was also unjustly enriched by his participation in this scheme and he should be required to disgorge or restitute all compensation he has received from the

outset of his collusive activities. Alternatively, he should be required to disgorge and restitute all compensation received since the Effective Date. A constructive trust should be imposed on all such funds to secure the restitution of these improperly obtained benefits.

F. ***Count VI (Against all Defendants): Declaratory Relief***

95. The allegations in paragraphs 1-94 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

96. HMIT seeks declaratory relief. The Court has jurisdiction to provide declaratory judgment relief when there is an actual controversy that has arisen and exists relating to the rights and duties of the parties.

97. Bankruptcy Rule 7001 provides that "a proceeding to recover property or money," may include declaratory relief. *See*, Fed. R. Bank P. 7001(1), (9).

98. The CTA is governed under Delaware law. The CTA incorporates and is subject to Delaware trust law.

99. HMIT seeks a declaration, as follows:

a. There is a ripe controversy concerning HMIT's rights and entitlements under the Claimant Trust Agreement;

b. HMIT has standing to bring an action even if its interest is considered contingent and because it is an aggrieved party and enjoys constitutional standing;

c. HMIT has capacity and standing to bring these claims derivatively because Seery, as Trustee, has abandoned the claims;

d. HMIT has capacity and standing to bring these claims derivatively because Seery, as Trustee, and Muck and Jessup have a conflict of interest;

e. HMIT is an appropriate party to bring the derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust;

f. Alternatively, HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested now;

g. HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon disgorgement by Muck and Jessup, and by extension, Farallon and Stonehill, of their ill-gotten profits;

h. HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested upon the equitable disallowance of the Claims held by Muck and Jessup over and above their initial investments. Alternatively, HMIT's status as a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is fully vested when all of Muck's and Jessup's trust interests are subordinated to the trust interests held by HMIT;

i. Seery is properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and/or the Claimant Trust because of Seery's conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands;

j. Muck and Jessup are properly estopped from asserting that HMIT is not an appropriate party to bring this derivative action on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust because of their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands; and

k. All Defendants are estopped from asserting that HMIT does not have standing in its individual capacity due to their fraudulent conduct, bad faith, willful misconduct, and unclean hands.

VI. Punitive Damages

100. The allegations in paragraphs 1-99 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

101. The Defendants' misconduct was intentional, knowing, willful, in bad faith, fraudulent, and in total disregard of the rights of others. An award of punitive damages as allowed by law is appropriate and necessary under the facts of this case.

VII. Conditions Precedent

102. All conditions precedent to recovery herein have been satisfied or have been waived.

VIII. Fraudulent Concealment and Equitable Tolling

103. The allegations in paragraphs 1-102 above are incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

104. The illicit conduct of Defendants as described herein was concealed from Plaintiffs, who did not know, and could not reasonably discover, either that conduct of Defendants or the injury that would result. Specifically, as described herein, Defendants conspired to trade on material nonpublic information in breach of duties to the Original Debtors and Debtor's Estate. Defendants used deception to conceal the causes of action alleged herein and continue to refuse formal and informal discovery requests of facts, information, and documents related to the Plaintiffs' claims. HMIT reasonably relied on

Defendants' deceptive representations, and otherwise exercised all diligence in this matter, yet the causes of action were inherently undiscoverable.

105. Defendants continued to engage in the illicit practices described herein, and consequently, Plaintiffs were continually injured by Defendants' illicit conduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs submit that each instance that one or more of the Defendants engaged in the conduct complained of in this action constitutes part of a continuing violation and operates to toll the statutes of limitation applicable to all causes of action in this matter.

106. Defendants' conduct was and is, by its nature, self-concealing. In addition, Defendants, through a series of affirmative acts and omissions, suppressed the dissemination of truthful information regarding their illicit conduct, and have actively foreclosed Plaintiffs from learning of their illicit, unfair, self-dealing, disloyal, and/or deceptive acts.

107. To the extent that one or more of the Defendants asserts a defense of statute of limitations or other time-based defense, they are estopped from doing so and Plaintiffs affirmatively pleads fraudulent concealment should toll or otherwise prevent application of any alleged statute of limitation defense. Plaintiffs further affirmatively plead equitable estoppel.

108. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiffs' claims on behalf of itself and on behalf of the Highland Parties are timely under any applicable statute of limitations, pursuant

to the discovery rule, pursuant to the equitable tolling doctrine, pursuant to fraudulent concealment, and/or pursuant to any other applicable tolling doctrine.

IX. Jury Demand

109. Plaintiffs hereby demand a right to a trial by jury of all claims asserted herein involving triable issues of fact.

X. Prayer

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against each of the Defendants as follows:

1. That all Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein;

2. Finding that HMIT has capacity and standing to bring these claims individually and derivatively because Seery, as trustee, has abandoned the claims and has a conflict of interest;

3. Finding that HMIT has capacity and standing to bring these claims individually and derivatively because Muck and Jessup have a conflict of interest;

4. Awarding equitable disallowance of the Claims over and above Muck's and Jessup's original investments (or, alternatively, subordination of their Claimant Trust Interests, as addressed herein);

5. Awarding disgorgement of all funds distributed from the Claimant Trust to the Defendant Purchasers and any John Doe Defendants over and above their original investments;

6. Awarding disgorgement of all compensation paid to Seery from the date of his first collusive activities, or alternatively, from the Effective Date;

7. Imposition of a constructive trust as to all ill-gotten profits received by the Defendant Purchasers and any John Doe Defendants;

8. Awarding declaratory relief as described herein;

9. Awarding actual damages as described herein;

10. Awarding exemplary damages as described herein;

11. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law; and

12. Awarding all such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: /s/

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

HMIT Exhibit 3

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	)	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11**
	)	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	)	Dallas, Texas
	)	June 8, 2023
	)	9:30 a.m. Docket
Reorganized Debtor.	)	
	)	HMIT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
	)	FILE VERIFIED ADVERSARY
	)	PROCEEDING (3699)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STACEY G.C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

APPEARANCES:

For the Reorganized Debtor:	John A. Morris Gregory V. Demo Hayley R. Winograd PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES, LLP 780 Third Avenue, 34th Floor New York, NY 10017-2024 (212) 561-7700
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

DALLAS, TEXAS - JUNE 8, 2023 - 9:42 A.M.

THE CLERK: All rise. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, is now in session, The Honorable Stacey Jernigan presiding.

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. All right. We are here this morning for a setting in Highland. This is on a motion of Hunter Mountain for leave to file an adversary proceeding. I will start out by getting appearances from lawyers in the courtroom.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor. Sawnie McEntire along with my partner Roger McCleary and Tim Miller on behalf of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Ltd.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. John Morris, Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, for the Reorganized Highland, for the Highland Claimant Trust. I'm joined by Mr. Pomerantz, Mr. Demo, and Ms. Winograd.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. STANCIL: Good morning, Your Honor. Mark Stancil from Willkie Farr & Gallagher for Mr. Seery. I'm joined by my colleague Josh Levy.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. MCILWAIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Brent McIlwain from Holland & Knight here for Muck Holding, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC, Farallon Capital Management, LLC, and

Stonehill Capital Management, LLC.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Is that all of our lawyer appearances? I know we have observers on the WebEx, but I assume you are just observers. We scheduled this to be a live hearing for participants.

All right. Well, we had some ground rules for how this would go forward today. We, of course, have had two -- I call them hearings on what kind of hearing we're going to have. We've had two status conferences. And so our ground rules were set. Three hours of total presentation time for each the Movant and the aggregate Respondents. We also had an order regarding what discovery would or would not be allowed.

And to my surprise, there were a flurry of pleadings. We're a few minutes late getting out here because we were trying to digest what was filed late yesterday and into the night.

So I understand we have a controversy about a couple of expert witnesses who were listed on Monday on the Movants' exhibit and witness list. And I've seen a motion to exclude the expert witnesses' testimony. And I think we need to address that right off the bat. I don't want to take too much time on this, because, again, we're going to finish today, and I won't let this housekeeping matter eat into our three hours, but I want to get going. So I'll hear from Movant, Mr. McEntire.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, may --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. STANCIL: We moved to exclude, so I would propose that my colleague, Mr. Levy, address this motion very briefly if --

THE COURT: Well, I guess --

MR. STANCIL: Or I will do as --

THE COURT: -- that actually makes sense.

MR. STANCIL: Okay.

THE COURT: I was thinking Mr. McEntire teed up the issue, but I suppose you did with the motion to exclude. So, Counsel?

MR. LEVY: Thank you, Your Honor. Josh Levy on behalf of Mr. Seery.

So, we think our papers largely speak for themselves, but two additional points we'd like to raise. In the response filed by Hunter Mountain this morning, and this is Docket Entry 3828, in Paragraph 11, they argue that this is a bench hearing on colorability, not a trial where junk science is a concern. But junk science is precisely what they're trying to introduce here. They have raised two expert witnesses, one who purports to be an expert in compensation but has no experience whatsoever in evaluating compensation, and they provide no methodology for their conclusion.

For example, they claim to have identified red flags.

They never explain what those red flags are, why they are red flags, or how they determined they were red flags. This is junk science, precisely what the Federal Rules are designed to exclude.

But that shouldn't detract from the broader procedural point that this is the first time we're hearing about expert witnesses, at 10:00 p.m. three days before the hearing. This is a trial by ambush. This motion was filed in March, we've been litigating this motion for over two months now, and this is the first time we're hearing about any expert witnesses.

As Your Honor noted, we've had multiple conferences. We've had rules setting the ground rules for this hearing. We've had orders setting the scope of discovery. But now Hunter Mountain is trying to pull a bait-and-switch. After never mentioning any experts, after obtaining orders limiting the scope of discovery, they then wait until right before the hearing to disclose their experts, ensuring that these experts are insulated from any kind of discovery and can ambush us at the hearing.

I'm happy to answer any other questions, but we believe they should be excluded and the accompanying exhibits should also be excluded.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And the accompanying exhibits, I don't review exhibits before a trial or a hearing because I don't know what's going to be objected

to and admitted. So do you want to point out, were there expert reports in the proposed exhibits?

MR. LEVY: These were charts and analyses prepared by their experts, not actual expert reports.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: In their witness and exhibit list, Hunter Mountain included several paragraphs that I guess serves as what would be their expert reports. And then it would be Exhibits 39 through 52, which consist of CVs, materials reviewed, and then what they term "data charts" prepared by their experts.

THE COURT: 39 through 52? Oh, I'm looking at the wrong exhibit notebook. Oh.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Okay. Here we go. All right. No questions at this time.

Mr. McEntire?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor. May I proceed?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. MCENTIRE: Again, my presentation and response is subject to our objection concerning that any evidence is being admitted for any purpose, other than what we believe is the proper standard of review. So my response and our offer of these experts is subject to that objection.

With that said, Mr. Levy's argument he just presented to

the Court presupposes that my client has a duty under 9014 to provide a report, which we do not; to provide detailed disclosures, which we do not, because 9014 is specifically exempted from the scope of Rule 26. What we did, we didn't have to do. What we did, and I made the decision to provide them some disclosure and identification of who they were, their backgrounds, and --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop you.

MR. MCENTIRE: Certainly.

THE COURT: "What we did, we didn't have to do." The Local Rules, first of all, do require an exhibit and witness list. And --

MR. MCENTIRE: We've provided that.

THE COURT: I know. I know. But you -- I thought I heard you --

MR. MCENTIRE: No, no.

THE COURT: -- saying you didn't have to do that. You do have to do that.

MR. MCENTIRE: No, no, no.

THE COURT: But I guess what you're saying is --

MR. MCENTIRE: What we provided was more than what the Local Rules require.

THE COURT: How so?

MR. MCENTIRE: We provided CVs. We provided their backgrounds. We disclosed in the actual witness description

who they were and the key components of their opinions. And we refer to their data charts. That is not something that the Local Rule requires.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me back up. We have our Local Rules, but then we had our two status conferences --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- on what the format of the hearing --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- would be.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: And, of course, there was extensive discussion, evidence or no evidence? What did the legal standard, colorability, require?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: And I came out in the end and said, if people want to put on witnesses, they're entitled to put on witnesses. I think there may be a mixture of a fact question and law question on colorability. So, and then I set a three-hour time limit and I said, if someone wants to depose Mr. Seery and Mr. Dondero, they can, but no more discovery other than that. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: I understand.

THE COURT: Why then did you not say, well, wait, Judge, if it's going to be evidence, we're just letting you know, in full disclosure, we might call a couple of experts,

and this may impact your decision on what kind of discovery can happen. And this may impact your decision on whether three hours each side is enough.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, Your Honor, in fairness, I don't think we had made a final decision to actually designate any experts. And at the time, the focus was on other witnesses. But there was no exclusion, there was no limitation at all on my right to bring an expert. And the Rules are very clear. And the Court's --

THE COURT: But I specifically limited discovery, and it was on your motion. It was on your motion we set the hearing on --

MR. MCENTIRE: Actually, --

THE COURT: You know, did you need a continuance, because if we were going to have evidence, maybe you needed a continuance. And then there was a discovery issue raised.

MR. MCENTIRE: To be clear, Your Honor, I'm looking at your orders.

THE COURT: Got them in front of me.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your order of May 26, 2023. You said, You can put on your witnesses and the Court is going to rule. You made no limitations as to who the witnesses would be. Your order did not limit the scope of witnesses to simply Mr. Seery or Mr. Dondero. In fact, any suggestion that you did limit the witnesses is contrary --

THE COURT: Now, which order are you looking at?

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm looking at the May 26, 2023 order, Page 51, Lines 3 through 14.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: You also stated --

THE COURT: I have -- have I entered three orders on this? I've got a May 10th order. I've got a May 22nd order.

MR. MCENTIRE: And I would also point out, Your Honor, --

THE COURT: Could you answer my question? I want to look at what you're looking at.

MR. MCENTIRE: Certainly.

THE COURT: Here we -- this is the one. Okay. Aha. Okay. May 26.

MR. MCENTIRE: Page 51, Lines 3 through 14.

THE COURT: I've entered three orders on what kind of hearing we're going to have. Okay. So you're looking where?

MR. MCENTIRE: Page 51, Lines 3 through 14. "You can put on your witnesses."

THE COURT: Page 51?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Oh. You're looking at a transcript, not the order.

MR. MCENTIRE: That's right. I apologize.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah, I'm looking at the transcript from the hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm looking at my order.

MR. MCENTIRE: And the order, the order also specifies no limitation at all in connection with the -- the --

THE COURT: But my order was based on what was discussed that day.

MR. MCENTIRE: And what was --

THE COURT: If you had said, hmm, Judge, if you're going to allow evidence, we may call a couple of experts, then there would have been a whole discussion about that and did I need to limit the discovery, as I did. And there would have been a whole discussion of, well, three hours, three hours each side, is that going to be enough if we have experts?

MR. MCENTIRE: The discovery ruling that you made was on my motion, and at the time I was not seeking to take any expert depositions. And you denied my request to take ample discovery. You limited my right to take only one deposition, without documents.

The issue of taking expert discovery was not even on the table. However, you made it very --

THE COURT: Well, that's my point precisely. The whole purpose of the hearing was, what kind of hearing are we going to have on June 8th?

MR. MCENTIRE: I understand. And our position --

THE COURT: We had already had one status conference on argument only versus evidence. And I allowed you all to file some briefing, which you did. And then I issued an order after the briefing, saying, I think I should allow evidence on the colorability question. I'm not forcing anyone to put on evidence, but if you want to put on evidence, you can.

And then you filed your motions and we had the next status conference on what kind of hearing we're going to have. And there was more argument: We don't think the evidence is appropriate, but if evidence is appropriate, we want you to continue the hearing to allow all kinds of discovery. I don't know what. And it was right before Memorial Day, and I hated the fact that a bunch of subpoenas were going to go out and ruin people's holidays. But there was no discussion then of, okay, but just so you know, since you have made the ruling that evidence can come in, we're going to have a couple of experts.

MR. MCENTIRE: As I've already mentioned, Your Honor, we had not made a decision to call experts at that time. We made a decision to call the experts shortly before we filed our designations.

The point here is this. The Rules do not require me to provide any more disclosure than I have. I have gone over and above the Local Rules.

If the Court believes that it would have allowed more time for this hearing, I would advise the Court that opposing counsel vehemently opposed any type of postponement or continuance. The discovery that I was requesting was discovery from fact witnesses. Experts were not at issue at that time. Experts are --

THE COURT: Because --

MR. MCENTIRE: -- at issue now.

THE COURT: -- nobody knew that experts might be called.

MR. MCENTIRE: I have a right to call experts, Your --

THE COURT: It changes the whole complexion.

MR. MCENTIRE: But I have a right to call experts, under the Rules. I have a right, a fundamental due process -- let me -- may I finish, Your Honor? A fundamental due process right to call experts. Their attempt to charge some type of *Daubert* challenge is nothing but a shotgun blast on the wall, having no meaning at all. At a minimum, I have a right to put the witnesses on the stand and we'll have a *Daubert* hearing.

If they want more time, they need to ask for it. They didn't ask for it. Their solution is to strike my experts, which is improper. It would be improper for this Court to strike my experts when they have been properly tendered under the Local Rules. They have not cited an alternative remedy.

If they want the alternative remedy, they need to ask the Court.

THE COURT: My next question is: How do you propose to get this all done in only three hours?

MR. MCENTIRE: We intend to move quickly.

THE COURT: But, see, now they, I'm guessing, prepared their case assuming there weren't going to be experts. And they, if they're good lawyers, which I know you all are, they have their script of the kind of things they were going to ask the witnesses.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, did they have a --

THE COURT: And now they've got to carve out time for two last-minute experts?

MR. MCENTIRE: They had an option. And one of the options was they could have called me up on Tuesday and asked for their depositions and I probably would have agreed.

THE COURT: I already said no depositions except Seery and Dondero.

MR. MCENTIRE: Then they could have come and filed a different kind of motion with the Court.

Their only remedy that they're seeking is a draconian one. There are other options that are more consistent with the implementation of due process here, Your Honor, not striking my experts, which were properly identified under the Local Rules.

If the Court is going to strike my experts, note our objection. We are tendering our experts. We will put -- like to put a proffer on for the Fifth Circuit or for the appellate process. But if the Court is going to strike our experts, then it needs to do so. We object because we have done everything correctly.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's another problem. I have not had time to process their motion to exclude. Beyond the procedural issues, they are saying junk science, that there's inadequate expertise on the part of I guess at least one of them regarding executive compensation. I haven't had -- they filed their motion to exclude at 4:00-something yesterday. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: I understand.

THE COURT: Now, yeah, I could have stayed up all night. I stayed up pretty late anyway, by the way. But --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, --

THE COURT: -- I haven't even had the time to process and intelligently rule on their motion --

MR. MCENTIRE: I appreciate that, and I'll respect --

THE COURT: -- as far as the --

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll respect the Court's statement.

THE COURT: -- junk science argument.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll respect the Court's statement. Their process and the procedure they've adopted is improper,

because if you're going to have a *Daubert* hearing, that's a live hearing. Or they're going to have to have evidence to support their challenge. This is simply a conclusory shotgun blast on the wall, Your Honor.

If you even want to consider a *Daubert* challenge, the proper procedure is to put the witnesses on the stand and have an opportunity to have a proffer of evidence and a cross-examination. That's the proper procedure. Throwing something and innuendo and rhetoric and conclusions is not a proper *Daubert* motion at all. The Court could deny their *Daubert* motion just on those grounds.

THE COURT: I'm not going to rule on a motion that I've barely had a chance to read, not to mention your response that was filed at 8:00-something this morning.

MR. MORRIS: It was.

MR. MCENTIRE: It was. Well, then the option is you need to continue the proceeding to allow the experts to take the stand.

THE COURT: Well, I know you have thought on that, but here is something I'm contemplating doing. We'll go forward with the hearing in the manner my order said we would go forward with it. My, I guess, Order #3 of my three orders. And at the end of the evidence, you can argue in closing, each of you, why we should keep the evidence open to come back another day on only the experts. But time matters. If you've

all already used your three hours on each side, then are we going to come back for five minutes on each of them? I mean, I don't know.

And then, of course, I would have to, if I ruled in that way, I believe I would have to give them a chance to depose these people.

MR. MCENTIRE: I think that would be reasonable.

THE COURT: Okay. But you think you can get all of your evidence in, other than your experts, and your opening statement, if any, your closing argument, if any, in three hours?

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll do my best.

THE COURT: Well, if you -- it's not a matter of -- I'm just saying this may all be an academic argument, because I'm not increasing this to more than three hours each. We've fully vetted that.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, what the Court is then doing by virtue of your ruling is that you're making me actually present my evidence in a shortened form today, two hours, two and a half hours, not knowing how -- whether or not you are actually going to allow experts.

So, without the certainty, I will have to abbreviate my entire presentation, giving them the advantage of putting more evidence on than I, in an effort to anticipate a positive ruling, which you're not prepared to provide yet. And so I'm

actually being penalized.

THE COURT: Counsel, we had two status conferences on what kind of hearing we were going to have.

MR. MCENTIRE: I understand.

THE COURT: Now, the fact that you had not decided your strategy for this hearing, that's not my fault. Again, we had two hearings on what kind of hearing we were going to have today. We could have fully vetted this. I could have heard about the experts, I could have decided if we were going to continue the hearing past June 8th, could have decided if we were going to allow more depositions.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: I could have fully studied the merits of the motion to exclude and decided if this is junk science or not.

MR. MCENTIRE: I would request a ruling at this time, Your Honor, on the experts. If you are not inclined to provide a ruling to me on the experts at this time, I would effectively be penalized on my time limits. I will have to set aside enough time to put the experts on, not knowing, not knowing whether you're going to give me the opportunity to do so until the end of the day. And that would be -- that would be punishment.

THE COURT: Isn't this going to be just preparing your case you would have -- I mean, going forward with your

case the way you would have?

MR. MCENTIRE: No, I don't -- really don't think so. I think there's --

THE COURT: I mean, --

MR. MCENTIRE: There's a difference.

THE COURT: -- you did not prepare your witnesses and your possible cross-examination with the expectation of I'll get my two experts in?

MR. MCENTIRE: My -- of course. But the point is, then I'm going to have to set aside a half an hour or maybe even longer from my other witness preparations, not knowing whether you'll even give me that time.

THE COURT: Isn't the other side going to have to do the very same thing?

MR. MCENTIRE: No.

THE COURT: Why not? They don't know how I'm going to rule. I don't know how I'm going to rule. I have not studied the motion to exclude the way I should.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. Well, Your Honor, we request a ruling now. But if the Court is not inclined to do so, please note our objection.

THE COURT: All right. I'll give the Movants the last word. And I say "Movants" plural. I'm trying to remember where I saw a joinder and when I did not. Did I see a joinder? I can't remember.

MR. MORRIS: Can we just have a moment, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. MCILWAIN: Your Honor, my clients did file a joinder, but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCILWAIN: -- I'm going to let them handle this.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. LEVY: Thank you, Your Honor. Two brief points we'd like to make. The first is on the Rules. So, Hunter Mountain is focused on Rule 26(a) regarding reports. However, Rule 26(b) applies to contested matters under Rule 9014. And as we explain in Paragraph -- we explain in our brief, that -- or, in Paragraph 19 of our brief, that under Rule 26(b) we're entitled to depose the experts.

And so we agree with Your Honor's suggestion that if there's going to be any sort of experts, then we need the opportunity to depose them. This is Rule 26(b)(4)(A), which expressly does apply to contested matters under Bankruptcy Rule 9014(b).

The second point is we agree with the approach Your Honor has proposed. We think, for today, both sides can put on their full cases without expert witnesses. Both sides can have the full three hours, which should address Hunter

Mountain's concern. And if Your Honor decides at the conclusion of the hearing that expert testimony would be helpful, then we could take the opportunity to depose their experts and then come back for an additional half-hour for each side to address any expert testimony that Your Honor believes would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. Is your proposal that you each today would be limited to two and a half/two and a half? Or three/three, and then another hour, 30 minutes/30 minutes, if I --

MR. LEVY: Three/three.

THE COURT: -- decide to allow any experts?

MR. LEVY: Yeah. Three. Three and three for each side, the hearing contemplated by Your Honor's orders, today. And if Your Honor decides that expert testimony would be helpful, we could come back for an hour, for half an hour on each side, regarding experts.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McEntire, what about that?

Oh, I'm sorry, did you --

MR. STANCIL: Oh, I'm sorry. Just one additional point, Your Honor. We would ask that Your Honor's ruling on the ultimate admissibility of this be limited to what they've actually put in front of us. The day for the hearing is today, so I think I'd like -- I'd suspect Your Honor would

like to avoid another raft of submissions. So we would just ask that they live or die with what they've said in the way of methodology, disclosures, and the like.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McEntire, this seems like the best of all worlds, maybe.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, it may be the best of the worlds in which we're operating.

My first position is that the experts are admissible, period. And the Rules do not require anything more than what we've already done. In fact, we've done more than we were supposed to.

THE COURT: What is your argument about 26(b)(4), which --

MR. MCCLEARY: If they want to take a deposition, they could have called me up and asked for it.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, I was --

THE COURT: Wait a second. They were under a court order. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: They could have -- they could have sought --

THE COURT: They were under my order. Okay? They would have been violating my order if they had done it.

MR. STANCIL: I was also, Your Honor, I was in a --

THE COURT: Not to mention that it was --

MR. STANCIL: I was in an airplane from 9:00 a.m.

Tuesday until 9:00 p.m. Tuesday.

THE COURT: I'm surprised a lot of you got here, with the Martian atmosphere that I saw pictures of.

Yes. That's not realistic, to think that you disclose an expert on Monday for a Thursday hearing and they can call you up and --

MR. MCENTIRE: The other --

THE COURT: -- quickly put together a deposition. So, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure. The other option, --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- of course, Your Honor, as I mentioned before, and I'm not going to repeat myself, is they -- there's other forms of relief they could seek. But under the circumstances, and in light of your apparent leaning on the issue, then this is the best under the circumstances that they've suggested. We'd like an hour each.

I would also point out that -- well, anyway, that's it, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So we are going to go forward as planned, three hours/three hours. No experts today. In making your closings -- well, this is kind of awkward. I'm trying to think if we really have closing arguments, when you don't know if it's -- it doesn't seem to make sense. Like, I guess we could have closing arguments if you want, subject to

supplementing your closing arguments if we come back a second day with the experts. Okay?

And I'm not making a ruling today on the motion to exclude. I'm going to hear what I hear. And maybe what we'll do is I'll give you a placeholder hearing if we're going to come back on the experts. Then I'll go back and read the motion, the response, and make my ruling on are we coming back for another day of experts. Okay? Got it?

And with regard to the comment about not adding to, I think that's a fair point. You can't add new exhibits that the expert might talk about or that you might want me to consider between now and whenever the tentative day two is.

MR. MCENTIRE: Understand. We agree with that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, there is one -- one exhibit that has a small typo transcription of a number on it. So we would like to substitute for that. It's a minor detail. But I'll provide opposing counsel with that. But it's very minor.

THE COURT: You have it today, I presume?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, we have it.

THE COURT: Okay. So as long as you hand it to them today.

MR. STANCIL: No objection, Your Honor. We do -- I think someone is back at the office working on a short reply

on our motion, which I assume we could file in support of -- I mean, we filed our motion. They filed an opposition. I assume we would be entitled under the Rules to file a short reply on the actual exclusion issue.

THE COURT: That is fair, but let's talk about timing. You said someone is back at the office working on it. Could you get it on file by Monday?

MR. STANCIL: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay. Then that'll be allowed if it's filed by the end of the day Monday.

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, I'm providing a copy of Exhibit 43 to opposing counsel, which is the substitute exhibit.

And obviously, we'd like to have an opportunity to respond to what their filing is on Monday.

THE COURT: No. I mean, motion, response, reply. That's all our Rules permit. Okay? Motion, response, reply. Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, with that, do the parties want to make opening statements? If so, Mr. McEntire, you go first.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor. We have a PowerPoint I would like to utilize, if I could.

THE COURT: You may.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, before we get to that, the Plaintiff has objected to virtually every single exhibit that we have. Should we deal with the evidence first, because I don't want to refer to documents or evidence in my opening that they're objecting to. They've literally objected to every single exhibit except one, although I think they're withdrawing certain of those objections.

I don't -- I don't know if the Court has had an opportunity to see the objection that was filed to the exhibits.

THE COURT: That was what was filed like at 11:00 last night or so?

MR. MORRIS: That's right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: And so at 2:00, 3:00, 4:00, 5:00 o'clock this morning, I actually typed out a response that I'd like to hand up to the Court. But we've got to resolve the evidentiary issues before we get to this.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, --

MR. MORRIS: And I don't know what their position is going to be --

THE COURT: -- as a housekeeping matter, let's do that first. And let's start with the Movants' exhibits. Do we have any stipulations on admissibility of Movants' exhibits?

MR. MORRIS: So, if I understand correctly, Your Honor, you'd like to know if we object to any of their exhibits first?

THE COURT: Yes. And --

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- we'll hold --

MR. MORRIS: Because we have very limited objections.

THE COURT: Yes. We're going to keep on hold for now your exhibits to the expert-related, --

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- your objections to the expert-related ones.

MR. MORRIS: Right. I think -- I think --

THE COURT: So let's not talk about, for this moment, --

MR. MORRIS: 39 --

THE COURT: -- 39 through 52.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: But as for 1 through 38 or 53 through 80, do the Respondents have objections?

MR. LEVY: Yes, Your Honor. We have very limited objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: So, the three to which we object in their entirety are Exhibits 24, 25, and 76, all of which we object

to on relevance grounds.

Exhibits 24 and 25 are email correspondence between counsel in an unrelated state court matter where Mr. Seery is responding to a third-party subpoena regarding the preservation of his text messages on his iPhone. This has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not the Movants have stated a colorable claim for breach of fiduciary duties.

What this appears to be is related to an entirely separate motion raised by Dugaboy regarding the preservation of Mr. Seery's iPhone. So we object to Exhibits 24 and 25 because they have simply nothing to do with the issues in this hearing.

We also object to Exhibit 76, which is a filing from two years ago in a different bankruptcy matter, from *Acis*, regarding an injunction in place in that -- in that plan about issues that -- that occurred before the bankruptcy was in place. So this is just an entirely different case from issues that arose many, many years ago that, again, has nothing to do with this case.

THE COURT: This was whether the *Acis* plan injunction barred some lawsuit?

MR. LEVY: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Is that all?

MR. LEVY: We also have limited objections to certain exhibits that we think are admissible for the -- for the fact

they're said, but not the truth of the matter asserted.

For example, Exhibits 1 and 2 are complaints filed in those actions. We have no objection to those coming in, but not for the truth of the matter asserted. These are advocacy pieces and pleadings. They're not actually substantive evidence.

And we would have similar -- similar objections to Exhibits 4, 6, 11, --

THE COURT: Wait. 4 is James Dondero Handwritten Notes, May 2021.

MR. LEVY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: So, we have no objection to that coming into evidence.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. LEVY: But there are -- those are hearsay. They're not admissible standing by themselves for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: And Exhibit 6 are news articles. Similarly, they're hearsay, but we have no objection to them coming in. They're admissible for the fact that they're published, but not the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: Exhibit 11, which is a motion filed by the

Debtor. Similarly, it's for -- we have no objection to anything on the docket coming in, but anything that's an advocacy piece, like a motion as opposed to an order, we think is not admissible for the truth of the matter asserted.

And that would be a similar objection, then, for Exhibit 58, which is a complaint.

Exhibits 59, 60, and 61 are -- are letters by counsel for Mr. Dondero to the U.S. Trustee's Office. We similarly have no objection to that coming in, but not for the truth of the matter asserted.

And Exhibits 62 and 63, Exhibit 62 is an attorney declaration attaching, similarly, documents that are -- that are advocacy pieces.

And Exhibit 63 appears to be an asset chart prepared by counsel. So it would be a similar objection.

And Exhibit 66 also is a declaration attaching documents.

No objections to those coming in, but not for the truth of the matter asserted.

Exhibits 72, 73, and 74 are all -- well, 72 are press articles. 73 and 74 are briefs. We don't object to that coming in, but we object to it being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.

And similarly, Exhibit 80 is a pleading in an SDNY bankruptcy. We have no objection to that coming in, but not for the truth of the matter asserted.

And finally, Exhibits 81, 82, 83 don't specify particular documents. They appear to largely be reservations of rights. And so we would likewise reserve our right to object once we see any specific documents --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: -- admitted under these exhibits.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. --

MR. LEVY: And I understand my colleague has an objection to Exhibit 5.

MR. MORRIS: Exhibit 5, which is the subject, I believe, of an unopposed sealing motion. That document has to do with purported restrictions on certain securities. Since it's subject to a sealing motion, I don't want to say too much more than that, other than that -- we don't think it should be admitted, because you can just see from the information on the document that it was created after the termination of a shared services agreement.

However, I'm hopeful that we can resolve the issue by simply stipulating that in December 2020 MGM was on a restricted list. What that means, what the consequences of it, the rest of it can be the subject of discussion. But if they're trying to get that document in for that particular fact, we would stipulate to it in order to resolve that dispute.

THE COURT: All right. Well, that's lots to respond

to, Mr. McCleary. Why don't we start with the outright objections: 24, 25. It's apparently text messages related to Mr. Seery's iPhone. I know we've got another motion pending out there that's not set today regarding Mr. Seery's iPhone.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor. Well, as the Court is aware, we've attempted to get discovery from Mr. Seery in relation to the allegations in this lawsuit. And by the way, all of our exhibits that we're tendering are subject to our objections that this should not be an evidentiary hearing. I just want to make that clear.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. Thank you. So, we're not waiving that.

The Exhibits 24 and 25 are relevant to the fact that he's -- he's not preserving information that is relevant to the claims in this lawsuit. And that also is something that is a factor in the colorability of our claims in this case.

THE COURT: How?

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, there is an effort, we believe, underway to not have information available for us to discover. And it reflects that they have been involved in providing -- we think supports -- providing material nonpublic information to other people that would be in his phone. And we want him to preserve it. And we think the fact that he is not is evidence that supports the colorability of our claims.

THE COURT: So, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, this --

THE COURT: No. No. I'm processing that. You're wanting the Court to receive into evidence a text that may say something like, I delete messages periodically on my phone, to support your claim that you have a colorable claim that some sort of improper insider disclosure of information and insider trading is going on? He said he had an automatic delete feature on his phone; therefore, he -- that must be evidence of a colorable claim for insider trading. That's the argument?

MR. MCENTIRE: May I add to it, supplement, Your Honor? Mr. Seery, in his deposition, indicated that he did receive a text message that he had recently reviewed from Stonehill in February of 2021. To the extent, however, that is inconsistent with the fact that he has an automatic delete button, suggesting to me that certain text messages have been selectively saved and some other messages have been not selectively saved.

THE COURT: We don't have that motion set today.

MR. MCENTIRE: This is not -- that has nothing to do with the motion. It has to do with the fact that what is being presented to the Court in response, the Respondents' argument, is a selected window, a selected picture, that is -- distorts the reality of what we think has been destroyed

evidence.

Mr. Seery can't save one message that may be helpful to them and not save others that may not be. And it is inconsistent with the notion that this automatic delete button was already in effect, so why does he have one favorable message? That's why it's relevant.

THE COURT: Maybe he stopped using the automatic delete after --

MR. MCENTIRE: No, he didn't at this time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's the relevance.

THE COURT: So, --

MR. MCCLEARY: And he should never have used it, Your Honor, given his role and responsibilities.

THE COURT: We don't have that motion set today. What is the content of these emails? February 16th, March 10th, 2023? What is the content, for me to really zero in --

MR. LEVY: I have --

THE COURT: -- on relevance or not.

MR. LEVY: -- copies of the emails, if that would be helpful --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVY: -- to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, you know, now I'm seeing them, so I

don't know what the big deal is if --

MR. LEVY: As Your Honor can see, these are emails between counsel regarding preservation, which has nothing to do with whether there are colorable claims for fiduciary duties.

I'll add that -- and to show that this has nothing to do with this case and it is an attempt to generate a fishing expedition for documents in an entirely unrelated motion, we had a meet-and-confer where we represented to the counsel bringing that motion that we have been able to recover the text messages from the iCloud.

And so this is really just a sideshow. It has nothing to do with the issues of the colorability of claims for breach of fiduciary duties. It should not be introduced into evidence in this hearing.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection, but this is without prejudice to you re-urging admission of these messages at the hearing on the motion regarding Mr. Seery's phone. Okay? Now, --

MR. MCCLEARY: That's as to 24 and 25, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Correct. And let's go now to the other one, the Exhibit 76, the *Acis*-related document, the relevance of that. Statement of Interested Party in Response to Motion of NexPoint to Confirm Discharge or Plan Injunction Does Not Bar Suit, or Alternatively, for Relief from All Applicable

Injunctions.

What is the relevance for today's matter?

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, this is background of pleadings and just background information generally to support the allegations made in the case and the background.

THE COURT: What do you mean, background?

MR. MCCLEARY: Kind of the history relative to the claims trading and relative to the claims of the use of insider information.

THE COURT: Okay. Be more specific, because I certainly have a background education on *Acis* litigation.

(Pause.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Yeah. Your Honor, this is a data point that is referred to in one of our experts' data charts, I believe, so --

THE COURT: All right. So let's just carry that to --

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm just going to mark it as carried along with 39 through 62, related to the experts.

(HMIT's Exhibits 39 through 62 and Exhibit 76 carried.)

THE COURT: Okay. What about all of these objections that we don't object *per se* but we want it clear that the documents are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted because there's hearsay?

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, I'll let Mr. McCleary address all of those.

I want to point out one exception, and that is Exhibit #4, which are handwritten notes from Mr. Jim Dondero. Those are not -- they are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted because it's an admission of a party opponent in these proceedings, and that's Farallon. They reflect significant statements and admissions by Farallon, which are not hearsay. It's an exception to the hearsay rule. And they're being offered for more -- they are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, because -- and it's admissible in that format.

THE COURT: But are you referring to hearsay within hearsay? Because there would be, I guess -- I guess the handwritten notes of Mr. Dondero are his hearsay, and then you're saying there's --

MR. MCENTIRE: So, this is reflecting statements made to Mr. Dondero that are admissions of a party opponent.

MR. LEVY: None of that has been established. These are not notes from anybody at Farallon or Stonehill which could potentially be a party admission. These are notes by Mr. Dondero about what was purportedly said by somebody else, and there's no evidence that these were kept in the regular course of business.

This is hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. And this

could be established in testimony, but it can't be admitted -- the document can't be admitted to speak on behalf of a third person who's not here.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, I agree, we'd need to lay a foundation. But that's not the purpose of this discussion right now. I am simply advising the Court that once I lay a foundation, it comes in for all purposes. It comes in as an admission of a party opponent.

MR. LEVY: It is not an admission of a party opponent. It is not notes or statements by any actual defendant. These are notes by Mr. Dondero being introduced for his own benefit. It is not a party admission.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to carry that one. If one of the witnesses that's on the witness stand -- well, presumably Mr. Dondero will be called -- we can get context at that time and decide if it's appropriate to let it in and let you cross-examine him on them if that's going to come in. All right? So we'll carry this one.

Anything else, though, unique, or can we consider as a batch all these other objections to -- most of them being pleadings, not all of them but a lot of them -- that the Respondents just want it clear that they're not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted? Your response?

MR. MCCLEARY: They're, again, largely data points relied on by experts in the course of coming up with their

opinions and just setting the background and history of the claims trading.

THE COURT: Well, then which ones are data points? Because I just need to carry those, right? If they're not being offered for any other reason.

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, I would have to -- we would have to refer to the charts of the experts, Your Honor, to determine that on all of them.

MR. MCENTIRE: In order to facilitate this, may I make a suggestion, Your Honor? We'll agree that if we're going to offer anything that he's identified other than for the purposes indicated, we will advise the Court. Otherwise, we'll accept the limitations imposed. And as we go through, if we offer an exhibit that is more than the truth -- if we are offering it for the truth of the matter asserted, we will advise the Court, and then we could take it up then. I'm just trying to get the ball rolling.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's still going to be a time-consuming thing, maybe. But, okay. Just, when we start the clock here -- very shortly, I hope -- I want people clear that when you make objections, that counts against your three hours. Okay? All right?

MR. LEVY: Okay. Understood, Your Honor.

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, we have certainly made objection to some of their exhibits.

THE COURT: All right. Well, shall we turn to those now?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, they objected to every single exhibit except one, so let's be clear.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: If they're withdrawing them, that's fine.

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: But let's be clear.

MR. MCCLEARY: -- we are not withdrawing our general objection to all the evidence, of course. Just --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just say for the record right now, I understand and you are preserving for all purposes your ability to argue on appeal that it was error for the Court to consider any evidence. Okay? You have not waived that argument by --

MR. MCCLEARY: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- now --

MR. MCCLEARY: Thank you. We can have --

THE COURT: -- agreeing to the admission of anybody's exhibit or offering your own exhibits.

MR. MCCLEARY: And we could have a running objection on that basis, on relevance to all the witnesses and the evidence that they offer on that basis. I would request that.

THE COURT: Well, okay, let me be clear. Relevance. Your argument is that no evidence is relevant because the Court doesn't need to consider any evidence --

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- on the colorability issue. You've got a running objection. It's not destroyed for appeal purposes. Okay?

MR. MCCLEARY: Thank you, Your Honor. Then, subject to that, in terms --

MR. MORRIS: I'm sorry to interrupt, but --

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure.

MR. MORRIS: -- would it be helpful if I gave the Court my list so she can see --

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure.

MR. MORRIS: -- what the --

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may. I'm not sure, if everything has been objected to, I'm not sure how --

MR. MORRIS: Because I've tried -- I've tried to organize it in a way that would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Pause.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. Your --

THE COURT: I'm ready.

MR. MCCLEARY: -- Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MCCLEARY: So, we are withdrawing our objections, other than the general objections to relevance based on the evidentiary nature of the proceeding, to Exhibits 1 and 2.

With respect to 3, this is a verified petition to take deposition for suit and seek documents filed on July 22, 2021. We object on the grounds of relevance and hearsay to that. Is that --

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: I don't -- I don't understand this one.

THE COURT: This --

MR. MCCLEARY: Is that, I'm sorry, is that your #11?

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

MR. MCCLEARY: All right. We withdraw our objection to #3, subject to our general objection.

On Exhibit 4, we object to relevance and hearsay on a verified amended petition to take deposition before suit and seek documents.

THE COURT: Okay. This is my time to hear your argument. And we're going to be here --

MR. MORRIS: Can I -- can I do this here? It's going to be much quicker.

THE COURT: What do you mean? Do what here?

MR. MORRIS: So, if you just follow the chart that I

gave the Court, --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: -- Section A is a list of exhibits that they've objected to. Those exhibits are in the right-hand column.

At the same time, they are offering the exact same exhibits into evidence on their exhibit list. I don't understand how they can offer their exhibits and object to ours.

MR. MCCLEARY: Counsel. I'm sorry. We've already told them that, subject to our general objection, we'll withdraw the objections to those exhibits.

MR. MORRIS: Right. So can we agree that all objections to Section A are withdrawn?

MR. MCCLEARY: Subject to the general objection, yes.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So, --

MR. MORRIS: That's going to be much quicker.

THE COURT: -- 11, 34, 2, 46, 42, 38, 41, 39, 40, and various attachments to Highland Exhibits 5 are withdrawn. So, admitted by stipulation.

(Debtors' Exhibits 2, 11, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46 are received into evidence. Certain attachments to Debtors' Exhibit 5 are received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: And to make this easy, Your Honor, at

some point I hope later today, but perhaps tomorrow, we'll slap a caption on this, we'll file it on the docket, so that, you know, an appellate court, if necessary, can follow along. But I think that we've just stipulated that all of the exhibits identified in Section A of this document are -- the objections have been withdrawn.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: Subject to the general objections.

MR. MORRIS: Right. That gets us -- I'm going to jump to Section C, because I think the same is true. Section C identifies all exhibits that each party has taken from the docket. And you can see from Footnote 4, the Court can take judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, we've just had the discussion about whether or not any of them would be limited for purposes of the truth of the matter asserted, but all of the exhibits identified in Section C I think the Court can take judicial notice of because they're on a docket.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. MORRIS: And so I would respectfully request that they withdraw their objections to anything in Section C.

THE COURT: Response, Mr. McCleary?

MR. MCCLEARY: I understand the Court can take judicial notice of those, Your Honor, but they do contain irrelevant and hearsay information also.

MR. MORRIS: The hearsay, I think that we just had

the discussion. I mean, if there's something that he wants to really point out at this point that I can respond to. But we would agree that advocacy pieces shouldn't be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Court orders, on the other hand, are law of the case.

THE COURT: So, I mean, it's the very same situation we just addressed with your own exhibits. You have a lot of court filings. And they didn't have a problem with it, as long as everyone knew advocacy was not being accepted for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, --

THE COURT: Isn't this the same thing?

MR. MCCLEARY: -- they're not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted. That's one thing. And certainly the Court can take judicial notice. We do object to the extent they're offering Exhibits 6 through 10 for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. MORRIS: Well, let me check those.

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MCCLEARY: I'm sorry. 6, 7, uh -- (pause).

THE COURT: Those are orders of --

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- courts.

MR. MORRIS: Yeah. They're orders of the Court.

MR. MCCLEARY: The orders are not relevant, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Explain.

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, they have not demonstrated that the orders that they seek to introduce are relevant. They have orders regarding, for example, the contempt proceedings that are irrelevant to these proceedings. And prejudicial under 403.

THE COURT: All right. Shall I take a five- or ten-minute break? Let me -- I think I've been very generous by not starting the clock yet on the three hours/three hours.

MR. MCCLEARY: Appreciate that.

THE COURT: But here's how we do things in bankruptcy court. And I don't mean to talk down to anyone. I don't know, you may appear in bankruptcy court every day of your life. But we expect counsel to get together ahead of time and stipulate to the admissibility of as many exhibits as you can. If there's a preservation of rights here and there, fine. But we --

MR. MCCLEARY: Maybe if we take --

THE COURT: You know, --

MR. MCCLEARY: We can try to --

THE COURT: -- helping everyone to understand, --

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure.

THE COURT: -- we have thousands of cases in our court.

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure.

THE COURT: And this is just something we have to do to give all parties their day in court when they need time. And so --

MR. MCCLEARY: If you'd like us to take ten minutes and try to narrow this, we certainly --

THE COURT: Okay. With everybody understanding you should have taken the ten minutes before we got here. But, again, when I say three hours, --

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- that's what I meant. Okay?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we'll take a ten-minute break.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess ensued from 10:42 a.m. until 10:54 a.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. Have we reached agreements on some of these exhibits?

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, we have agreed on the ones that we can agree on, and we announced that to the Court with respect to the Paragraph A items that the Court's already ruled on.

I would like to point out to the Court that we just got their objections handed to us right before the hearing. We filed ours last night. So we didn't --

THE COURT: At 11:00-something, right?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor, but we did --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, okay. So I guess your point is you want to make sure I'm annoyed with everyone, not just selective of you.

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, --

THE COURT: I mean, exhibit lists were filed Monday. So I don't know why on Tuesday people were not on the phone saying, you know, or Wednesday morning at the latest.

MR. MCCLEARY: Sure. And we haven't had much of an opportunity, in fairness, to consider their objections and respond because we just received them right at the time of the hearing, just before the hearing started.

Your Honor, we would urge our objections to Exhibit #4. We've objected to this petition to take deposition before suit and seek documents on the basis of relevance and hearsay. They have a number of pleadings in other matters that have nothing to do with, frankly, the colorability standard in this case. And this is an example.

THE COURT: Okay. This is the time for me to hear specific objections and what the basis is, and not just --

MR. MORRIS: Can we go back --

THE COURT: -- a category.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yeah.

MR. MORRIS: Can we go back to my way? Because it's

just going to be much faster. It really will be. Right? We -- Category 1, A and C, we dealt with. Category B, --

THE COURT: Well, we dealt with A.

MR. MORRIS: Right. And --

THE COURT: All of those are withdrawn, and they are admitted by stipulation.

MR. MORRIS: Right.

MR. MCCLEARY: Subject to --

THE COURT: Category C, --

MR. MCCLEARY: -- the general objections.

THE COURT: -- I'm not sure we're to closure on.

MR. MORRIS: Um, --

THE COURT: Are we to closure on C? Are you stipulating?

MR. MCCLEARY: No. We are not stipulating on C.

MR. MORRIS: Let's do them one at a time.

MR. MCCLEARY: I have not had an opportunity to -- to --

MR. MORRIS: Let's do them one at a time.

MR. MCCLEARY: Have not had an opportunity to look at each and every one of these, Your Honor. Because we did just get these.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: But generally --

THE COURT: If we have not wrapped this up in 15

minutes, we're just going to start, and you can object the old-fashioned way. But I'm telling all lawyers here, objections count against your time. Okay?

MR. MORRIS: And I'd move for the admission of all of our exhibits right now, then.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: So let him -- let -- put him on the clock and let's go.

THE COURT: Okay. So, 15 minutes. Let start going through everything except Category A.

MR. MORRIS: Number 4?

MR. MCCLEARY: Number 4, Your Honor, we object on the basis of relevance and hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. My response to that, Your Honor, and this will be my response -- this is in Section B of my outline --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: Okay? They object to Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 9. These are Mr. Dondero's prior sworn statements. You just heard his lawyer stand here and tell the Court that somehow his handwritten notes should be admissible as an admission. You know what he did? He testified four different times under oath. That's Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 9. Sworn statements.

They come into evidence not as hearsay but under Federal

Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1). It's beyond -- the notion that they can prove a colorable claim and that it's not relevant that he's got diametrically different -- he's got four different statements, now five with his notes, he's got five different statements. Doesn't that go to the colorability of these claims?

We believe it does. That's the basis for the introduction of these documents into evidence.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McCleary, your response?

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, it's a verified amended petition, Your Honor, in another matter, to -- before suit to seek documents. Has nothing to do with the merits of this case and our motion for leave. So we object on the grounds of relevance and hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, since they're prior sworn statements of Mr. Dondero, --

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, then they might -- if they want to use it later to impeach, they can try to do that, but they have to lay the foundation.

THE COURT: What about 801(d)(1)?

MR. MCCLEARY: Again, relevance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I overrule. Those are --

MR. MCCLEARY: And Mr. --

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Those are going to be admitted.

MR. MCCLEARY: By the way, on hearsay, Mr. Dondero is not Hunter Mountain. So when he argues that these are admissions, they're not admissions by Hunter Mountain.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, the only piece of evidence, literally the only piece of evidence they have are the words out of Mr. Dondero's mouth. There is no evidence, there will be no evidence of a *quid*, a *pro*, or a *quo*. There will be no evidence other than what Mr. Dondero testifies to --

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: -- about what he was told. There will be no evidence that there was a meaningful relationship between Mr. Seery and Ms. -- and Farallon and Stonehill. There will be no evidence, none, that Farallon and Stonehill rubber-stamped Mr. Seery's compensation package. Nothing. The only thing we have are going to be the words out of Mr. Dondero's mouth and these notes that just showed up. And these statements --

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I mean, it just feels like --

MR. MORRIS: It's --

THE COURT: -- if notes get in, then sworn statements of Mr. Dondero should get in. Right?

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, he's making arguments, closing arguments, opening arguments, trying to run out the

clock. We objected to relevance, and we stand on our objection.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: And on hearsay.

THE COURT: I'll admit 3, 4, 5, and 9.

(Debtors' Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 9 are received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Section E.

MR. MCCLEARY: I'm sorry. So our objections are overruled?

THE COURT: They are overruled.

MR. MCCLEARY: On 3, 4, 5?

THE COURT: And 9.

MR. MORRIS: Section E of my outline.

MR. MCCLEARY: What about 6?

THE COURT: That's not --

MR. MORRIS: Well, --

THE COURT: Well, I don't --

MR. MORRIS: -- it would -- it would --

THE COURT: Let's go back to C. I'm not clear if we're to closure on Section C.

MR. MORRIS: I'll let Counsel go through --

THE COURT: And 6 is within Section C.

MR. MORRIS: I'll let Counsel go through each one, one at a time.

MR. MCCLEARY: No. That's all right. If you want to go through, you have them lumped in. Yeah, I think it'd probably be quickest if, frankly, we just go down the list, Your Honor. Frankly.

THE COURT: Well, you've got ten minutes left.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. We object to #6, memorandum and opinion order granting Dondero's motion to remand, on the basis of relevance and hearsay.

THE COURT: Overruled. I can take judicial notice under 201 of that. So 6 is admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 6 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: We object to Exhibits 7 and 8 on the grounds of relevance. 7 on relevance and hearsay, and 8 on relevance.

MR. MORRIS: I'll take 7 first, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: It's an order dismissing Mr. Dondero's 202 petition. That 202 petition sought discovery on the basis of the exact same so-called insider trading claims that Hunter Mountain is asserting today.

I think it's not only relevant, it's almost dispositive that a Texas state court heard the exact same -- or, actually, not the exact same, because Mr. Dondero changed his story so many times -- but heard a version, I think Versions 1, 2, and 3, of this insider trading and would not even give them

discovery.

So when the Court considers whether or not there's a colorable claim here, I think it ought to think about what a Texas state court decided on not whether or not they have colorable claims, whether or not they're even entitled to discovery. I think it's very relevant. Move for its admission right now.

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, it's ironic, because at that hearing counsel for the Respondents was arguing that it ought to be this Court that considers what discovery is appropriate.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, obviously, you can argue about that, but, again, I think I can take judicial notice of this. Right?

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, we argue that it's not relevant, Your Honor, and it is the --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: 7 is not relevant and is hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Number 8, --

THE COURT: Objection is overruled.

MR. MCCLEARY: Overruled?

THE COURT: And so 7 is admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 7 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: 8 is our verified petition. And we

object on the grounds of relevance.

MR. MORRIS: You know, Your Honor, if I really had the time and the patience to do this, I think I'd find this document attached to Mr. McEntire's affidavit that's on their exhibit list.

But to speed this up just a little bit, how could their 202 petition that sought discovery on the basis of the very same insider trading allegation not be relevant? It's a judicial order. You can take notice of it. And it's incredibly relevant that a second Texas state court heard the same allegations that they're presenting to you as colorable and said no, you're not getting discovery.

MR. MCCLEARY: We don't know why they made that order, Your Honor. They could have simply accepted the opposition's arguments that this Court had jurisdiction and should consider what discovery ought to be done.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. MCCLEARY: It's not relevant to our --

THE COURT: I admit 8.

MR. MORRIS: Next?

MR. MCCLEARY: Overruled?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Debtors' Exhibit 8 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: The declaration of James Dondero. I think we withdrew the Dondero --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MCCLEARY: -- declarations. If it --

THE COURT: It's --

MR. MCCLEARY: Numbered -- I'm sorry, #9.

THE COURT: 9. I've already checked it as admitted.

MR. MCCLEARY: If you want to -- if you want to offer #9, they can offer it.

THE COURT: It's admitted. I've already --

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.

THE COURT: -- said.

MR. MCCLEARY: Number 10. It's an order denying our second Rule 202 petition. And we object to it on relevance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Same objection. It's overruled. It's admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 10 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Number 12, 13, and -- 12 and 13 are correspondence regarding resignation letters. We object on grounds of relevance.

THE COURT: Wait. Did we skip 11 for a reason?

MR. MCCLEARY: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Did we skip 11 for a reason?

MR. MCCLEARY: We only have it --

THE COURT: Oh, wait. It's already admitted by stipulation.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yeah, and we have --

MR. MORRIS: That's the one --

MR. MCCLEARY: We have our general objection.

MR. MORRIS: That's the one exhibit that they didn't object to.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: We only had our general objection with respect to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you.

MR. MCCLEARY: On 12 --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MCCLEARY: -- and 13, those are correspondence regarding resignations. We object on the grounds of relevance.

MR. MORRIS: So, the relevance of that, Your Honor, is to show that when Mr. Dondero sent this email to Mr. Seery in December 2020, he had absolutely no relationship to Highland, had absolutely no duty to Highland, had absolutely no reason to send this email to Highland. He wasn't in control of Highland. He wasn't --

If they'll stipulate to this, that's fine. He wasn't in control. He had no authority to do anything. He couldn't effectuate trades. He wasn't there. And that's what these documents are intended to prove.

THE COURT: Okay. Why are we -- this is --

MR. MCCLEARY: Because there are --
THE COURT: Some of this stuff, I mean, --
MR. MCCLEARY: There are other agreements.
THE COURT: -- is no big deal. Right?
MR. MCCLEARY: Sub-advisory agreements, other agreements that he had under which he had a responsibility to make the communications regarding material nonpublic information that he made. So this is simply irrelevant, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I overrule. I mean, again, I don't --
MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.
(Debtors' Exhibits 12 and 13 are received into evidence.)
MR. MCCLEARY: Number 14, --
THE COURT: You're both giving me just a lot of background that I already have, but of course a Court of Appeals --
MR. MORRIS: That's why we --
THE COURT: -- isn't going to have it.
MR. MORRIS: Yep.
MR. MCCLEARY: Well, #14, Exhibit 14, we object on the grounds of relevance and hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay. Wait a minute. We skipped 13 because -- why? Oh, wait, that was, I'm sorry, 12 and 13 --
MR. MORRIS: Yes.
THE COURT: -- where I've overruled the objection and

admitted.

Okay. Go ahead.

MR. MCCLEARY: 14, we object on the grounds of relevance and hearsay, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: I'm just going to make this real quick, Your Honor. Here's the thing. This Court knows it. It's actually facts that cannot be disputed because they're subject of court orders.

As the Court will recall, beginning in late November 2020 continuing through late December 2020, Mr. Dondero was engaged in a continuous pattern of interference with Highland's business and trading. It was the subject of the TRO, which is why the TRO is relevant.

Your Honor will recall that at the end of November Mr. Dondero attempted to stop Mr. Seery from trading in Avaya stock. On December 3rd is when he sent this threatening email, text message, to Mr. Dondero [sic]. It caused us to get the TRO.

Your Honor will recall on December 16, 2020, that's when we had the hearing on Mr. Dondero's motion to try to stop Mr. Seery from trading in the CLOs that the Court dismissed as frivolous and granted the directed verdict of Highland.

So, that's December 16. He sends this email about MGM on December 17th. And what happens on December 18th? More interference with Highland's business. It's a matter of --

beyond dispute. It's law of the case at this point because that's the subject of the contempt order. And the Court found that, after -- after hours, on December 18th, Hunter Covitz told Mr. Dondero that Mr. Seery was again trying to trade in Avaya stock, and within a day or two Mr. Dondero was again interfering it, and that's what led to the second -- to the first contempt order.

So all of these documents are relevant to show motive and what was happening. This email was not sent for any legitimate purpose. The evidence is just overwhelming. And it's not -- it's not like, oh, that's an argument we're making. Between the TRO and the contempt order, it's law of the case. He was interfering with Highland's business nonstop for thirty days, including the day before he sent this email and the day after he sent the email.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, this is a lawsuit or an effort to file a lawsuit on behalf of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, not James Dondero. And as much as Counsel wants to make this about Jim Dondero and attack him, this is a different case. So this exhibit has nothing to do with the claims in this lawsuit. It's not relevant. And hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: The only evidence is Mr. Dondero. It's -- could not be more relevant.

THE COURT: Okay. I overrule. I'm admitting this.

And so we're --

MR. MCCLEARY: Uh, --

THE COURT: It's 14. It's -- how far?

MR. MCCLEARY: 14. Exhibit 15 is where we are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Debtors' Exhibit 14 is received into evidence.)

THE COURT: 15.

MR. MORRIS: Oh, that's -- that's the contempt order. And so these contain the judicial findings that are now beyond dispute that Mr. Dondero was engaged in interfering with Highland's business after the TRO was entered on December 10th.

THE COURT: Okay. Again, my own orders, --

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, it's not --

THE COURT: -- I can take judicial notice of --

MR. MCCLEARY: It's --

THE COURT: -- under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

MR. MCCLEARY: It's --

THE COURT: 201.

MR. MCCLEARY: We simply object as not relevant. We object based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Any possible relevance is outweighed by the prejudice. And we object on the grounds of hearsay, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Prejudice? Prejudice? They're orders I

issued. I'm going to be prejudiced by my own orders?

MR. MCCLEARY: Uh, well, --

THE COURT: I don't --

MR. MCCLEARY: -- Hunter Mountain will be.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll overrule.

(Debtors' Exhibit 15 is received into evidence.)

THE COURT: I'll tell you what. We're out of our -- well, we've get probably 30 seconds left. Anything that we can maybe knock out to not have eat into your three hours? Both of you?

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, we filed written objections to all of these exhibits. We urge those objections. 16.

THE COURT: I know, but this is your chance to argue why your objections have merit. I can -- we can just --

MR. MCCLEARY: Because, well, obviously, we're talking about pleadings and filings in other matters. The evidence that they're trying to use to impugn Jim Dondero, which has nothing to do with the merits of HMIT's claims and allegations of insider trades.

THE COURT: Okay. A lot of this is articles. Articles, articles, articles about MGM.

MR. MCCLEARY: On the articles, Your Honor, subject to our general objection, we'll withdraw the objections to the articles if they'll agree to the articles that we've offered.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, we didn't lodge an objection to their articles.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: And just so, if anybody is keeping track at home, this is Item B on the list that I created earlier this morning.

THE COURT: Okay. So, 25 through 30 are articles. Those are admitted by stipulation. Nothing is about the truth of the matter asserted. They're just articles that were out there for --

MR. MORRIS: Right. I would just --

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes.

THE COURT: -- the world.

MR. MORRIS: Just so we're clear, it's Exhibits 25, 6 -- 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.

THE COURT: Right.

(Debtors' Exhibits 25 through 30 are received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: And so, yes, those are all articles. They have their articles. Exhibit 72.

THE COURT: Oh, and 34 is another one. So that's admitted as well.

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

(Debtors' Exhibit 34 is received into evidence.)

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we're out of time, so as for the others, they can offer them the old-fashioned way if they want to, you can object the old-fashioned way, and it eats into both of your three hours.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear opening statements.

And by the way, before we wrap up today, I'm going to say out loud everything I've admitted so we're all crystal clear on what's in the record. This has been a bit chaotic.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. Understood.

THE COURT: So, Caroline is going to be the keeper of our time over here. And if the judge ever interrupts you, she's going to stop the timer. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: I hope I won't any more, but you may proceed.

MR. MCENTIRE: No, I appreciate it. Thank you. Can you see it, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I can, yes. Thanks.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can opposing counsel see it?

MR. MORRIS: Yes, sir.

MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

THE COURT: And I'm just going to ask everyone who has a PowerPoint today, can I get a hard copy --

MR. MCENTIRE: Certainly.

THE COURT: -- before we close?

MR. MCENTIRE: Certainly.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST

MR. MCENTIRE: May it please the Court, Your Honor, at this time I'll be providing the opening statement on behalf of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust. It is a Delaware trust. Mark Patrick, who's in the courtroom, is the Administrator. He will be one of the witnesses that you'll hear today.

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust is the former 99.5 percent equity holder, currently classified as a Class 10 contingent beneficiary under the Claimant Trust Agreement. It is active in supporting various entities that in turn support charities throughout North Texas.

Your Honor, this is not an ordinary claims-trading case. I know the Court made those references in one of the hearings, and I wanted to more clearly respond. This has different indicia. An ordinary claims-trading case is normally outside the purview of the bankruptcy court. What makes this different is that we're involving, we believe and allege, breaches of fiduciary duty of the Debtor-in-Possession's CEO and the Trustee.

It involves also aiding and abetting by the entities that actually acquired the claims. And that falls into the

category of willful misconduct.

It also involves injury to the Reorganized Debtor and to the Claimant Trust. Ordinarily, a claims trade would not involve injury to the estate or the reorganized debtor. Here, we have alleged that it has. And the injury takes the form of unearned excessive fees that Mr. Seery has garnered as a result of his relationship and arrangements, as we have alleged, with the Claims Purchasers.

During the course of my presentation today, I'll be referring to the Claims Purchasers as the collective of Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup.

I would like to briefly discuss some of the issues that have already been presented to the Court, just to make sure that this record is clear.

Can you please continue?

We don't believe the *Barton* Doctrine is applicable. I believe that precedent is very clear that the *Barton* Doctrine deals with proceedings in other courts, and the various standards and requirements of *Barton* do not apply if in fact we're coming to the Court and filing the proceeding in the court where the Trustee was actually appointed.

And so I think that the law is clear. And this is Judge Houser here in the Northern District of Texas in the case *In re Provider Meds*. And she makes very clear that the standard for granting leave to sue here is actually less stringent than

a 12(b)(6) plausibility standard. So if there is any issue as to what standard this Court should be applying to the -- to this process, we believe it's a 12(b)(6) standard, confined to the four corners of the document.

If the Court wishes to consult the documents that are referred to in the four corners of the petition or complaint, it may do so.

But the standard here is even more flexible than a standard plausibility. Our evidence, though, achieves the standard of plausibility as well.

The *In re Deepwater Horizon* case is another important case. That's a Fifth Circuit case. A plaintiff's claim is colorable if it can allege standing and the elements necessary to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Defining a colorable claim as one with some possible validity. I don't have to prove my case today. I didn't have to prove my case in the prior hearings. I have to prove sufficient allegations, not evidence, but sufficient allegations to show that it has some possible basis of validity.

Possible basis of validity. We're not here talking about likelihoods. We're not here talking about *prima facie* evidence. We're not here talking about probabilities. We're talking about something less than plausibility. But, again, we achieve plausibility.

A colorable claim is defined as one which is plausible or

not without merit. These are various cases from around the country. The colorable claim requirement is met if a committee has asserted claims for relief that, on appropriate proof, would allow recovery. On appropriate proof. We're not required to put on that proof today, Your Honor.

Courts have determined that a court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing, but must ensure that the claims do not lack any merit whatsoever. We submit that our claims have substantial merit and deserve the opportunity to initiate our proceedings, have an opportunity to conduct discovery. And if they want to file a 12(b)(6) motion before this judge, before you, they can do so. If they want to file a motion for summary judgment, they can do so. But at this juncture, they cannot, and at this juncture this Court should not consider evidence in making its determination.

Standing under Delaware law. The Funds have collectively really hit the standing issue hard. I think it's easily resolved. First of all, it's clear that a beneficial owner has standing to bring a derivative action. Under Delaware law, a beneficial owner has a right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the -- against the trustee.

So the issue is, am I a beneficial owner? As a contingent beneficiary in Class 10, and that's the Court's inquiry here, do I qualify as a beneficial owner? And I think that Delaware law is clear that, by not limiting it to only vested

interests, by not limiting it only to immediate beneficiaries, they are not -- they are not extending the scope of the statute to contingent beneficiaries. And this is consistent with the laws around the country, because even Texas recognizes that an unvested contingent beneficiary has a property right to protect.

Even Mr. Seery admitted in his deposition that a unvested contingent interest is in the nature of a property right. If you have a property right, that property right can be abused. If you have a property right, that property right, whether it's inchoate or not, it can be abused, it can be misappropriated, and you could become aggrieved. And that is the constitutional standard for standing: Is Hunter Mountain Investment Trust aggrieved? And the answer is yes.

Contingent beneficiaries from around the country, in addition to Mr. Seery's admission that we have a property interest, contingent beneficiary has standing. This is the *Smith v. Clearwater* case on Slide 11. Very clearly, they say that even if it's subject to a future event. Their argument is that Mr. Seery has not certified Hunter Mountain as in the money. We believe we are in the money. That's a different issue. We believe he should certify, in the discharge of his duties. That's a different issue.

But even assuming his case -- his argument for a moment, their argument is that since he's not done that act, which we

also challenge and criticize that he's not done that act, that we can't qualify to bring this case. Well, that's not what the law is, that even an unvested interest, a contingent interest, has a right.

Slide 12. This is the State of Illinois. Despite the fact that interest is contingent and may not vest in possession, you still have a right to protect what you have. And you have standing to bring a cause of action.

The Claimant Trust Agreement, by the way, suggests that we have no vested interest, and they'll likely argue that point. But the point there is the law says that's irrelevant. If it's an inchoate interest, if it's potentially vested in the future, that's what imbues you with standing.

And in any event, the Claimant Trust Agreement is subject to Delaware trust law, and they can't get around that. They can say whatever they want to say in the agreement to try to block us from participation, but it's still subject to Delaware trust law, and Delaware trust law does not draw a distinction between vested or unvested.

The State of Missouri: There is no dispute in this case that the future -- that future beneficiaries have standing to bring an accounting action, whether they're vested or contingent. The *Bucksbaum* case. Article III standing exists, constitutional standing, including discretionary beneficiaries, have long been permitted to bring suits to

redress trustees' breaches of trust. This applies not only to our standing as an individual plaintiff, which we've brought, but also in our standing -- in our capacity seeking to bring a derivative action to benefit the Claimant Trust of the Reorganized Debtor. Both are permitted under this law under these cases.

An interest -- in the *Mayfield* case, an interest is any interest, whether legal or equitable or both, vested, contingent, defeasible, or indefeasible. So the unilateral self-serving wording of the Claimant Trust does not abrogate our right to bring the claim.

I'd like to talk briefly about fiduciary duties. We know that Mr. Seery has fiduciary duties to the estate when he was the CEO prior to the effective date. We allege that he breached those fiduciary duties, and that gives us standing to bring the claim that we have brought for breaching fiduciary duties, causing damages that are accruing post-effective date.

In the *Xtreme Power* case, again, the directors can either appear on both sides of the transaction or expect to derive any personal financial benefit. We are alleging that Mr. Seery engaged in self-dealing. We allege that he engaged in self-dealing by arriving at an understanding where he could put business allies -- whether you call them friends, business allies, close acquaintances -- on the committee, the Oversight Board that would ultimately oversee his compensation, which,

in the context of this case, makes no sense and it is excessive.

Muck is a specially -- special-purpose entity of Farallon. Farallon acquired the claims, created Muck to do the job. Muck is now on the Oversight Board.

Jessup. Jessup is a special-purpose entity, a shell created by Stonehill. Stonehill bought the claims, funneled the money through Jessup. Jessup is now on the Oversight Board. Jessup and Muck -- and by the way, the principals in Farallon are actually the representatives from Muck on the Oversight Board. So there's no suggestion that there's really a distinct corporate relationship here.

Michael Linn, who is a principal at Farallon. You'll hear his name today, throughout today. He actually is a representative of the Oversight Board, dealing with Mr. Seery and negotiating Mr. -- I put negotiation in quotes -- negotiating Mr. Seery's compensation.

I'd like to talk very briefly about background. We took Mr. Seery's deposition. I was unaware of this. I now know it. Perhaps the Court was already aware of it. This is Mr. Seery's first job as a CEO of any debtor. This is the first time Mr. Seery has ever been a chief restructuring officer. This is the first time Mr. Seery has ever been the CEO of a reorganized debtor. This is the first time that he's served as a trustee post-effective date. However, his compensation

is excessive and not market-driven, and there's a reason for that. We believe and we allege that it's a *quid pro quo* because of prior relationships with Farallon and Stonehill.

Farallon and Stonehill are hedge funds, Your Honor. They created their special-purpose entities on the eve of this transaction simply to take the title to the claims, but the money is going upstream.

Seery has a relationship with Farallon. Do we know the full extent of that relationship? No. We have been deprived of discovery. We attempted to get the discovery in the state court 202 process. We were denied for reasons not articulated in the court's order.

We attempted to get the discovery here that the Court refused under the last hearing about these relationships.

So what we do have begins to put the pieces of the puzzle together. And sufficient is more than plausible. It is more than colorable.

We know that Mr. Seery went on a meet-and-greet trip to Farallon's offices in 2017. Didn't have to. He was trying to cultivate a business relationship. Farallon was important to him.

We know that in 2019 he was no longer with Guggenheim Securities. He goes out to Farallon's offices for another meet-and-greet and he specifically meets with the two principals who are reflected in Mr. Dondero's notes, Raj Patel

and Michael Linn.

We know that in June 2020 Farallon emailed Seery. This is after Mr. Seery becomes the CEO. He says, "Congratulations. We're monitoring what you're doing."

Seery's relationship with Stonehill. These are all -- this is all before what we believe to be the events that are at issue in this case. We believe that -- represented Stonehill in the *Blockbuster* bankruptcy proceeding. There was an objection to a document. Mr. Seery was involved in the *Blockbuster* proceedings. Stonehill was one of his many clients on the committee that he represented.

We know that Stonehill is actively involved in one of Mr. Seery's charities in New York. We know that he sent text messages to Mr. Seery in February of 2021, wanting to know how to get involved in this bankruptcy.

Farallon and Stonehill were strangers to this bankruptcy. They weren't creditors. They were encouraged and they came into this process.

Farallon and Stonehill have not denied any of our allegations. They are not putting any evidence on today. We allege that these relationships was based and founded upon a *quid pro quo*. I'll scratch your back; you scratch mine. You give me some information; I want to evaluate these claims. And, by the way, we're going to be on the Oversight Board, or you're going to put us on the Oversight Board, or by default

we'll be on the Oversight Board, and we'll work out your compensation agreement.

Mr. Seery also has an established relationship with Stonehill.

I like to have a timeline of certain events. This is not all of the relevant events, but this can give you a quick picture. We know that Mr. Dondero sent an email to Mr. Seery in December of 2020 relating to MGM. It is undisputed that Mr. -- that Farallon emailed Seery, Mr. Seery, in January of 2021 if there was a path to get information regarding the claims for sales. Mr. Seery says he never responded to it, but we know that this entity, Farallon, got deeply involved in buying these claims shortly after this email.

We have the Claimant Trust Agreement suddenly being amended to not have a base fee, but now we're going to incorporate a success participation fee. As part of a plan, we're not criticizing that, but suddenly the vehicle for post-effective date bonuses is being created.

The Debtors' analysis comes out in association with the plan confirmation. It projects a 71.32 percent recovery for Class 8 and Class 9, and those are the principal classes we're talking about. 95 percent -- 98 percent of all of the claims here are in Class 8 and Class 9, until you get to us, Class 10.

71.32 percent of Class 8 means that Farallon and Stonehill

will get less than about a six percent internal rate return on their $163 million investment, which they have never denied. That is not a hedge fund investment goal. Investment -- hedge funds like these companies, they go for 38, 40, 50 percent of returns. Who would ever invest $163 million on a distressed asset that's not collateralized with only an expectation of an internal rate of turn of six percent? But that's going to be the evidence before the Court. That does not make any financial, rational wisdom at all.

The plan is confirmed. It's undisputed that Stonehill contacts Seery after the plan is confirmed to want to know how to get involved. They have phone calls after this text message. Muck is created on March 9. We know from Mr. Seery's deposition that Farallon told Seery that six days later they bought the claims. All the claims, by the way, when I say bought the claims, it's everything except UBS. To our knowledge. They may have negotiated the paperwork back then, but the claims transfers did not occur until the summer. All the other claims involved, the claims transfers were filed with this Court in mid-April and at the end of April.

Tim Cournoyer removes MGM from the restricted list. Tim Cournoyer is an employee of Highland. Well, it tells us that MGM was on the restricted list and there should be no discussion about MGM, but there was. There was discussions about MGM, and Mr. Dondero is going to testify to that.

And we also know that the HarbourVest settlement was consummated during this period of time. If it had been on the restricted list, as it was, that transaction should never have occurred. But it did occur. This Court ordered it. It approved it. And I'm not challenging -- we're not challenging that settlement. It is done. That is done. What we are challenging is the fact that Mr. Seery is actively involved in using inside material nonpublic information.

Jessup Holdings is created shortly thereafter, on April 8th. We have claims settling on April 30th. The Acis claim is transferred to Muck -- that's Farallon -- on April 16. The Redeemer and Crusader are all transferred on April 30th.

Stonehill and Farallon never deny that they did no due -- that they failed to do due diligence. We allege that there was no due diligence. And that relies in significant part upon Mr. Dondero. But now, because we have Mr. Seery's deposition, it also relies upon Mr. Seery's admissions in deposition, because he says he never opened up a data room, he doesn't know what due diligence they did. Farallon says the only due diligence they did is they talked to Jim Seery. And how do you invest $163 million, or $10 million or $50 million, whatever the part is, with an internal rate of return six percent, only on the advice of Mr. Seery, who's never been a trustee or a CEO before, unless there's something going on?

Your Honor, public announcement of MGM on May 26th. On

May 28th, two days later, Mr. Dondero calls Farallon. It took Mr. Dondero or his group a few days, a week or so, to even understand who -- that Farallon was involved, because the registrations for Muck and Jessup did not disclose their principals, did not even disclose addresses. They were shell -- they were companies that came in in the last minute to buy these claims incognito, frankly.

They found out that Farallon was involved. They had a call initially with Raj Patel, who is the principal of Farallon. He has three conversations total: One with Mr. Patel and two with Michael Linn. Michael Linn was the one responsible for these claim purchases. Patel admitted that Farallon relied exclusively on Seery and did no due diligence. Linn rejected the premium to sell. The evidence you'll hear today, that Mr. Linn rejected a premium up to 40 percent to sell the claims. He actually said he would not sell at all because he was told by Mr. Seery that the claims were too valuable.

That is evidence of insider trading. Specifically, they said they were very optimistic about MGM and they were unwilling to sell because Seery said too valuable.

We have -- these are the purchases. This is where the Class 9 claims fall. And keep in mind -- Tim, go back -- that $95 million of this upside potential is being told, at least to the publicly available information, that you're never going

to get there. Yet 95 -- $95 million is allocated to this category. So Class 8 is $275 million. Class 9 is 29 -- $95 million.

Next.

So we have the evidence that you'll hear today. Farallon admitted the timing. No due diligence, never denied by the Claim Purchasers. Based upon material nonpublic information. That's our allegation. Purchased over $160 million. This is never denied by the Claims Purchasers. They purchased claims when the return on investment was highly doubtful. Maximum expected annual rate of return, assuming publicly-available information, was approximately six percent, and that is totally atypical of what a hedge fund would seek.

Insider information. We're not talking about just MGM. The Respondents want to narrow the Court's inquiry. This is much larger than MGM. MGM is a part of it, it's a big part of it, but it's not the only part of it. It's other assets. Portfolio companies. Other invested assets. There's a lot of money out there, and it was never disclosed during the ordinary course of the bankruptcy, for reasons that the Court already knows, in terms of asset values. How does someone come in and purchase distressed assets, claims, without any understanding of what assets are backing those claims, when there's no publicly-available information there to do it and there's no evidence, no indication, no statement that actually

due diligence was done?

That right there, without anything else, makes our claims plausible. You don't have to prove insider trading by direct evidence. Nobody's going to admit that they did something wrong. You prove it circumstantially, and we've cited cases and we'll give you cases to that effect.

Next.

We have material nonpublic information. It is very clear that Mr. Dondero on December 17th sent this email, not just to Mr. Seery but to several other individuals, including lawyers. It states that he'd just gotten off a board call. A pre-board call. The update, he provides the update. Active diligencing. It's probably a first-quarter event. We can scour all of the other media documents that are in evidence, both from us and them, and you're not going to find any indication anywhere that a board member has said, guys, gals, it's going to be a probable first-quarter event. That's material nonpublic information.

THE COURT: By the way, you all objected to this exhibit.

MR. MCENTIRE: No, this is my exhibit.

THE COURT: We spent --

MR. MCENTIRE: I did not. They objected to this.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, we didn't object to it, and that is the one exhibit that they did not object to.

THE COURT: Oh, it is?

MR. MORRIS: Nobody objected to this exhibit.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm not going to object to this exhibit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It's a different version.

MR. MCENTIRE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: Okay. It was a different email around that same time frame.

MR. MCENTIRE: So just --

THE COURT: Apologies. We stopped the clock.

MR. MCENTIRE: This -- my next exhibit is simply a demonstrative, but I just want the Court to understand that MGM is no small matter here and Mr. Seery did testify in deposition that it probably made up $450 million. He was pretty close.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I object to this demonstrative. There is no evidence in the record. It's not cited to anything. We're not just going to start putting up stuff on the screen that we like.

MR. MCENTIRE: Excuse me. I'm not offering this document into evidence.

MR. MORRIS: I don't care. The Court shouldn't be seeing a demonstrative exhibit that contains matters that are never going to be in the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: I disagree. I can put the data in the record.

May I proceed?

MR. MORRIS: But you didn't.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not considering the truth of this until and unless I get evidence of this.

MR. MCENTIRE: Fair enough. But the point is this, Mr. Seery has conceded in deposition that between the institutional funds and the CLOs, there's a lot of MGM securities and stock. We're talking a lot of money. We're not talking about just Highland Capital's investment.

You can skip the next slide. Skip.

So, rumors versus material nonpublic information. They can talk all day long, and if they want to use their time doing this, they can. There's a difference between rumor and actual material nonpublic information. Rumor from undocumented sources, lack of clarity, lack of timing. There is no -- there's no debate that a lot of people knew that maybe MGM might be for sale. Maybe they wouldn't. Sometimes it falls apart, you know. But the point is a board member is telling someone that there's a probable event in the first quarter of 2021. That is definite, specific, and it comes from the highest authority. That is -- if that's not material and public information, I don't know what could be.

Classic indications of insider trading. You have to have

a tipper with access to MNPI. Here, we know that Mr. Seery, if he's the tipper, we allege he's the tipper -- and these are words of art out of case law, by the way -- he has access to information about MGM. He has access about asset values, projected values. He has a relationship. We believe he has a very strong relationship. It's more than just social acquaintances. He's giving congratulatory emails. He's getting solicitations. He's solicited. Benefits received. We know what the benefits are. They get the opportunity to invest money with huge upside.

There was a point mentioned some time ago that, well, only -- only the sellers really have the grievance. Well, Your Honor, we have a right to start our lawsuit and do some discovery, because, frankly, a lot of sellers have big-boy agreements. They say, you don't sue me if I have MNPI. I don't sue you if you have MNPI. We have mutual releases. Let's go by our way. Everybody's happy. We're not going to come back and see each other ever again.

That's one of the things we're being deprived of here. But otherwise, what we have here is a colorable plan. We've asked for the communications with the sellers. We can't get it. We have here an email.

Next.

We have here an email. This actually -- you'll hear Mr. Dondero say this actually reflects three communications. Raj

Patel, Farallon, bought it because of Seery. Mr. Dondero contacted Mr. Patel and says, Raj Patel bought it because of Seery. 50 to 70 percent's not compelling. Class 8. 50 percent, 70 percent. Give you a 30 percent to 40 percent premium. Not compelling. I ain't going to sell. Ask what would be compelling. Nothing. No offer. Bought in February/ March. We now know the time frame. We know that Stonehill is communicating with them and we know that Farallon has been just communicating with Mr. Seery. Bought assets with claims. It's not just the MGM. It's not just the portfolio companies and other assets. It's also the claims.

Well, what are the claims? It's the claims against Mr. Dondero. Well, how would they know about all this if there's no due diligence and there's no evidence of any due diligence before you? 130 percent of costs, not compelling, no counter. Mr. Dondero's angry. Discovery is coming.

Atypical behaviors are also circumstantial evidence of insider trading. We have strange behaviors here, Judge. We have a vast majority of the claim value is acquired by only two entities post-confirmation. Most significant claims are only owned by two entities who were strangers to the whole process.

The removal of -- and Mr. Morris offered to stipulate. The sudden removal of MGM from the compliance list in April of 2021 -- by the way, the removal doesn't cleanse the MNPI. If

you have material nonpublic information because you received it from Mr. Dondero, the fact that Mr. Dondero's no longer employed by Highland Capital or no longer directly or formally affiliated doesn't cleanse the MNPI.

We have no due diligence, regardless of the significant nine-digit numbers, and we have no rational explanation of why this kind of money would be invested when they're projecting an actual loss, if -- a modest return at best for Class 8 and a loss for Class 9.

Insider trading can be proved by circumstantial evidence, Your Honor. No fraudster, no person who's done wrong is going to admit to it, so you look for the classic -- you look for the classic elements. And that's what we had here. And we have alleged all of this in our pleadings. Not in extraneous evidence. Within the four corners of our pleadings. And that's why we have a plausible claim.

You know, I believe it's Rule 8, Rule 9 of the Federal -- you have to require specificity in a fraud claim. Well, this is not a fraud claim. This is a different claim. But we have provided specificity that passes the smell test of colorability. We have provided specificity that would satisfy even more stringent requirements under 12(b)(6).

The plan analysis. This is a, I think, a document admitted by everyone. Mr. Seery has testified that this projection of 71.32 percent for Class 8 came out in February

of 2021 and never changed, all the way up to the effective date.

So this is what the public believed. This is what the public knew. And if this was all that Farallon and if is all that Stonehill had access to, that means that they were going to lose their entire investment on Class 9. They bought UBS at a loss to begin with. And on the other three investments, they were going to get a very, very modest, minor return, six percent over three years, or even less. That is not what hedge funds do.

Seery's excessive post-effective date compensation. We have obtained no discovery from Farallon or Stonehill in this regard, but we know that he had no prior experience. We know that the award that was given him was not market-based, even though the self-serving documents that have been produced and that are attached to their exhibit list suggests a robust negotiation. Well, they were robust without any kind of reality check in the real world about whether it was market-supported. None. Mr. Seery has admitted to that.

It was not lowered. He's making $1.8 million a year right now, with most -- a lot of the assets already sold, the reorganization done. All they're doing now is monetizing assets. He's getting $1.8 million. He's got 11 people working for him. And then he has a bonus, a bonus that is -- increases significantly with his ability to recover for Muck,

Jessup, Farallon, and Stonehill.

And in the absence of -- if we were really dealing with uncertainty and risk, then that may be another issue, but here we're dealing with entities that already know that they're going to get a payday and they already have. They've already made about a $170 million return -- 170 percent return, excuse me -- over and above the original investment, when they were projected to actually lose money.

Just so you know, we have over $534 million of cash that has been basically monetized, and out of that, $203 million in total expenses -- $277 million to Class 8 and -- and -- 1 through 7, and Class 8 distributors. Excuse me, creditors. Even if you take -- if you take out the alleged obligations of Mr. Dondero on the promissory note cases, that still leaves over $100 million available, which puts us in the money. Puts us in the money. And the fact that you have $203 million of expenses in a case of this nature is part of our claim, is that we have delay actions. We have a situation where Mr. Seery is continuing to receive $1.8 million a year on a slow pace to monetize, paying other professionals, when this could have been over a long time ago. That's part of our allegations. It's not part of any valuation motion. It's actually in our allegations.

I'm going to reserve the rest. I think that's my opening statement, Your Honor. I'm going to reserve the rest for my

closing. And let me see. Yes, that's right. And thank you for your time.

THE COURT: All right. Caroline, how much time was that?

THE CLERK: Thirty-four minutes and 27 seconds.

THE COURT: Thirty-four minutes and 37 seconds. Okay.

THE CLERK: Twenty-seven.

THE COURT: Oh, 27. Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thirty-four minutes?

MR. MCCLEARY: Thirty-four minutes.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I do have hard copies of my short slide presentation.

THE COURT: All right. You may approach.

And Mr. McEntire, are you going to give me your PowerPoint later, hard copies later?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor. I found one typo and I'd like to fix one typo and then we'll give it to you.

THE COURT: Okay.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTORS

MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. John Morris, Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, for Highland Capital Management and the Claimant Trust.

I want to be fairly brief because I really want to focus on the evidence. I look forward to Your Honor hearing from

Mr. Seery so that he could clear up a lot of the misleading statements that were just made.

The Court is here today on a gatekeeper function, and we're delighted that the gatekeeper exists. We're delighted that the Court will have an opportunity, after considering evidence, to determine whether or not these claims are actually colorable.

There's -- there were a lot of conclusory statements I just heard. There were a lot of assumptions that were made. There were a lot of misleading statements that were made. At the end of the day, what the Court is going to be asked to do is to decide whether, in light of the evidence, do these claims stand up on their own? And they do not.

And let me begin by saying that I made a mistake a couple of weeks ago. If we can go to Slide 1. I told Your Honor that you were the sixth body to consider these insider trading claims. Based on Hunter Mountain's exhibit list, there is actually one more, and I'll get to that in a moment. So you're actually -- this is the seventh attempt to peddle these claims to one body or another.

The first was Mr. Dondero's 202 petition.

Everything I have here, Your Honor, is footnoted to evidence. Okay?

So, Footnote 1, you can look in the paragraphs of Mr. Dondero's petition, his amended petition, his declaration,

where he makes the same allegations. Again, I misspeak. Not the same allegations. Different versions of the allegations that are being presented today concerning insider trading.

He did it three times. The Texas state court said no discovery. In October of 2021, Douglas Draper wrote an extensive letter to the U.S. Trustee, setting forth the same allegations. You can find them at our Exhibit 5. It's attachment Exhibit A, Pages 6 through 11. Compare them to the allegations that are being made by Hunter Mountain today. The U.S. Trustee's Office took no action.

Mr. Rukavina followed up with the same thing to the same body in November of 2021. You can see where his allegations of insider trading are made and *quid pro quo* and all the rest of it. Again, they took no action.

The one that I don't have on this chart because I didn't -- I made the chart last week and then was unavailable. Mr. Rukavina sent a second letter. And you can find that at Plaintiffs' Exhibit 61. And in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 61, you'll see that Mr. Rukavina sent yet another letter to the U.S. Trustee's Office on May 11, 2022.

And these are all really important, right? The U.S. Trustee's Office has oversight responsibility for matters including claims trading. That's their job. They took three different swings at this. And these are pages of allegations. 6 to 11. 9 to 13. We think it's very important that the

Court look at what was told to the U.S. Trustee's Office. And you're going to hear Mr. Seery testify that Highland has never heard from the U.S. Trustee's Office concerning any of these allegations or any of the other allegations that are set forth in Mr. Rukavina and Mr. Draper's letter. Never. Declined to even initiate an investigation.

Hunter Mountain filed its own 202 petition. It boggles my mind that they try to create distance with Mr. Dondero, because the whole petition, like this whole complaint, is based on Mr. Dondero. He submitted a declaration alleging the same insider trading case, and a second Texas state court said I'm not even giving you discovery. We know that's the result.

But the best is the Texas State Securities Board. I think we're going to hear testimony that Mr. Dondero or somebody under his control is the one who filed the complaint with the Texas State Securities Board. Who would be the better body to assess whether or not there's insider trading than a securities board? I can't imagine there's a better body. They did an investigation. Mr. Dondero could have told them anything he wanted. I'm sure he did. And they wrote in their motion in Paragraph 37 one of the reasons they have colorable claims is the investigation is ongoing.

Much to their dismay, I'm sure, two days before our opposition was due, the Texas State Securities Board said, we've looked at the complaint, we've done our investigation,

and we're not taking any action. You can find that, Your Honor, Footnoted 5 at Exhibit 33.

You are now the seventh body who's being asked -- and you're being asked to do substantially more than any of the other prior bodies were. The Texas state courts were being asked, just let them have discovery. They said no. The U.S. Trustee's Office, charged with the responsibility of looking at claims trading, said, I'm not going to investigate. I know what you've told me. No. The Texas State Securities Board. Insider trading, insider trading. I'm not doing an investigation. I'm not doing anything. And now they want to come here and engage in, you know, in expensive, long litigation over the same claims nobody else would touch.

Can we go to the next slide?

Mr. Dondero's email. Good golly. "Amazon and Apple are in the data room." There's a hundred articles out there that they're putting into evidence that say that. "Both continue to express material interest." There's a hundred articles out there that say that. "Probably a first-quarter event. Will update as facts change."

There will not be any evidence that he ever updated anybody, because that wasn't the purpose of this, as Your Honor will recall. He had an axe to grind.

And I direct your -- I don't direct the Court to do anything -- I ask the Court to take a look at our opposition

to the motion, in Paragraphs 23 to 25, where we cite to extensive evidence, all of which is now part of the record, showing just what was happening, from the moment he got fired on October 10th until the end of the year, with the interference, with the interference, with the threats, with the TRO. It was nonstop.

Was this email sent in good faith by somebody who owed no duty to anybody? Or was it really just another attempt -- and this is why the gatekeeper is so important, because I think that's exactly what this Court is supposed to do: Is this a good-faith claim? Is this a claim that's made in good faith? It can't be. And you know why? You know what's -- you know what's -- I'll just say it now. I won't even save it for cross.

Remember the HarbourVest settlement that they're making so much, you know, about? Mr. Dondero is the tipper. According to him, he gave Mr. Seery inside information. According to him, Mr. Seery abused it by engaging in the HarbourVest transaction. But Mr. Dondero filed an extensive objection to the HarbourVest settlement and never said a word about this, because that wasn't on his mind at the time. The email was sent in order to interfere. And when that failed, he's trying to play gotcha now. It's ridiculous.

He owed no duty to Highland. It would have been a breach of his own duty to MGM to share that information at that

period of time.

The shared services agreement. They don't help him. Mr. Dondero has nothing to do with that. Highland is providing services. He's not providing services to Highland. Highland was providing. We had already given notice of termination. We had already had our plan and disclosure -- we had already had our disclosure statement approved. We were weeks away from confirmation. Please.

And the *Wall Street Journal* article on December 21st at Exhibit 27, that's not your garden-variety *Wall Street Journal* article, because it specifically says that investment bankers were engaged to start a formal process. The investment bankers are identified by name. Something has changed. Anybody could see that.

Yes, there were rumors for a long time. Nobody had ever said there was a formal process. Nobody had ever said investment bankers had ever been hired. Nobody had ever identified those investment bankers. Right? I mean, just the world changed.

If you can go to the next slide.

You know, before I get to the next slide in too much detail, *quid pro quo*. We look at it as *quid*. Did he -- is there any evidence that he actually gave anybody material nonpublic inside information? The answer is going to be no. The *quo* is the relationship. And I'm not going to spend too

much time on that now. But wait until you hear Mr. Seery testify as to the actual facts about his relationship. Because some of what we just heard is mind-boggling, that little -- that little page from the *Blockbuster* case, like, 14 years ago, where Farallon was one of a group of people who Jim Seery never met. Like, the stretch, what they're trying to do is beyond the pale. But I'm delighted to have Mr. Seery sit in the box and answer all the questions they want to ask him about his relationship with Farallon and Stonehill.

But getting to the point, the *quid pro quo*. The *quo* is they fixed his compensation? Are you kidding me? They rubber-stamped his compensation? Highland and Mr. Seery and the board are alleged to have negotiated? There's nothing alleged. There are facts. There is evidence. It is beyond dispute. If you look, just for example, right, they take issue with his salary? The salary was fixed by this Court in 2020. Without objection. He's getting the exact same salary that he ever got.

You'll hear that it's a full-time job. Your Honor knows better than anybody in this courtroom, other than me, perhaps, the litigation burden that's been placed on this man. He has no other income. He doesn't do anything else. This is a full-time job. It's the exact same job that he had when Your Honor approved his compensation package three years ago, without a raise. They didn't give him a nickel more. Not one

nickel. It's outrageous.

The balance of his compensation, of which he has not yet received a nickel, is exactly what this Court would want somebody in Mr. Seery's position to do. It aligns his interests with his constituency. Not with Stonehill. Not with Farallon. With all creditors. The greater the recovery, the greater the bonus. Outrageous, right? Remarkable, isn't it? Only in their world.

If Your Honor can go back to Mr. Rukavina's letter, because this is where it all -- that's where it all starts from. Like, excessive compensation. Mr. Rukavina, I don't know how he did this, why he did it, what it was based on. He actually told the U.S. Trustee's Office that they thought Mr. Seery made $50 million. It's in the letter. $50 million, they told the U.S. Trustee's Office he made. It's footnoted, so you can go find it. It's right there, at Page 14. Quote, Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

$8.8 million is what he's making. They think that's excessive? What do they think he should make? Three? Five? We're not going to hear that. But that's what this case is about. You just heard counsel in his opening statement. He literally said the only thing at issue is his compensation. And that has to be the case, because if there was -- if there was no claims trading, UBS and HarbourVest and Acis, right, the Redeemer Committee, they would all still be holding these

claims today.

When Stonehill and Farallon acquired the claims, they were all allowed. There was no debate about what the claims were. If they held the claims today, they would be worth the exact same amount of money, only a different person would be benefitting from it.

So the case actually is only about Mr. Seery's compensation. And they've moved the goalposts, as often happens in this courtroom, from rubber-stamping -- I'll give you what you want. When I hear rubber-stamp, I hear, you make a demand and I'll give it to you. And now they realize, when they see the negotiation -- because it's in evidence, it's just the documents, you can see the board minutes -- what do we, doctor the board minutes and they should get discovery because we doctored the board minutes? The board minutes show a four-month negotiation with an Independent Board member fully involved. It's mind-boggling. It's actually -- well, I'll just leave it at that.

Next slide. Last slide. Let me finish up. Three of the four sellers were former Committee members. Mr. Dondero agreed that Committee members would have access to special nonpublic inside information as part of the protocols, as part of the corporate governance settlement. He agreed to that. These are the people who got abused? These are the people who didn't know what was happening? Committee members and

HarbourVest, probably one of the biggest and most sophisticated funds in the world, didn't know what was happening? They got abused? Stonehill and Farallon took advantage of them?

If you read their pleadings closely, they actually allege, and I don't -- I don't know if there'll ever be any evidence of this -- but they actually allege that -- I forget which -- oh, somebody is an investor in Stonehill and Farallon, and so the theory is one of the sellers is an investor in Farallon. So not only did they abuse, they abused one of their own investors. Like, this is not a colorable claim. This is ridiculous.

None of the claims sellers are here. Sophisticated people who -- who -- right? Mr. Dondero could pick up the phone and say, hey, guys, you got ripped off. You sold your claims when you shouldn't have. They had an unfair advantage.

Nobody's here. Where is anybody complaining? They're not going to because they cut a deal that they thought was good for them at the time. In hindsight, maybe they have regrets. Right? We all have regrets sometimes in hindsight. But that doesn't create a claim.

We've heard so much about what hedge funds would get and how much and is this rational? The fact of the matter is, at the time Mr. Dondero had his phone call on May 28th, UBS had not been purchased, although MGM had already been announced.

So when they talk about MGM, maybe it's the fact -- and this is in evidence -- maybe it's the fact that, two days before, the MGM-Amazon deal actually was publicly announced. It actually was. So maybe when they say, hey, yeah, we like MGM, because, you know, that just -- that just got announced. Maybe that happened.

But at the end of the day, the claims that they bought, if you just look at the claims that were purchased at the time he had the conversation, all Mr. Seery had to do was meet projections and they were going to get $33 million in two years. A 30 percent return in two years. I don't know. That doesn't -- that doesn't sound crazy to me. Doesn't sound crazy to me. It certainly doesn't create a colorable claim, just because they think that Farallon or Stonehill -- there's not going to be any evidence of Farallon or Stonehill's risk profile. There's not going to be any evidence of Farallon or Stonehill's, you know, expected returns. There's not going to be any evidence at all about what due diligence they did or didn't do, other than what comes out of Mr. Dondero's mouth, as usual.

Mr. Dondero -- and let's look at what's going to come out of Mr. Dondero's mouth. He has multiple sworn statements. I'm going to take his notes and they're going to become mine. I'll put him on notice right now. Because those notes bear no relationship to the evolution of his sworn statements over

time.

The first time he mentions MGM in a sworn statement is two years after the fact in Version #5. That's a colorable claim? You want -- you want to oversee a litigation, or maybe it gets removed to the district court, maybe I get lucky to be in front of a jury, and I'll have Mr. Dondero explain how it took him five tries before he could write down the letters MGM. Not a colorable claim. No evidence against Stonehill whatsoever. Zero. Zero. Never spoke to them. There's no colorable claim here, Your Honor.

I'm going to turn the podium over to Mr. Stancil to talk about the law.

THE COURT: Okay.

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

MR. STANCIL: Thank you, Your Honor. Mark Stancil, counsel for Mr. Seery. But I'm going to just very briefly address a few legal points. And I actually mean briefly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: I'll come back to a good bit of this in closing as time permits.

I heard Mr. McEntire say *Barton* doesn't apply. I would encourage him to start with what the gatekeeping order actually says. Here it is. This is in -- it's in the plan. Your Honor has confirmed it. The question we have in terms of what standard applies is, what does this order mean? Well, we

think that's going to be clear. It's not what they think the word "colorable" would mean in other contexts. It's not what they think they should have to satisfy now that they have a theory. It's, what does this mean?

And we'll get into some of the additional evidence from Your Honor's order at the time, later in closing.

Next slide, please.

But let me just start to say I'm awfully surprised to hear him say that he doesn't believe *Barton* applies, because the order says that it does. This is Paragraph 80 of the confirmation order. It says that the Court has statutory authority to approve the gatekeeper provision under these sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The gatekeeper provision is also within the spirit of the Supreme Court's *Barton* Doctrine. The gatekeeper provision is also consistent with the notion of a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious litigants that has been approved by the Fifth Circuit in such cases as *Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures*.

So I think it is impossible, and respectfully, Your Honor, it's law of the case. This is what the order is based on. The day for objecting to what's in the confirmation order is long gone.

So let me come back, then -- first slide, please -- and I'll just very briefly give you a little legal framework for what we're going to be arguing to you later in closing.

So, *Barton* does require a *prima facie* showing. That is *Vistacare* and plenty of other cases. That is more than a 12(b)(6) standard, Your Honor. Numerous courts agree. And in fact, as you'll hear us discuss later, Judge Houser's opinion is not to the contrary, because she said explicitly, I'm not applying *Barton*. So anything that they're relying on for what *Barton* requires from that opinion is *dicta*. But we can show you case after case after case, and we will, to show that *Barton* requires evidentiary hearings.

Here's a point, this third bullet here is something I have not heard a single word in all of the briefing and ink that has been spilled and in as long as we've been here this morning, is what is a gatekeeping order doing if all it does is reproduce a 12(b)(6) standard? That's what they say. In fact, they're actually saying it's even lower. Now I think I heard them say it's even lower than a 12(b)(6) standard.

That makes no sense whatsoever. We've just shown you that this gatekeeping order was imposed consistent with *Barton* and vexatious litigant principles. Later I will walk Your Honor through factual findings that you made detailing the vexatious litigation, detailing the abuses. The notion that the gate is the same gate that every other litigant who hasn't demonstrated that record of bad faith is absurd, and it serves no purpose.

And as Mr. Morris described, Hunter Mountain woefully,

woefully violates any *prima facie* showing. And we'll get into a little bit more exactly how that works.

We are going to ask this Court, in addition to ruling that *Barton* applies and that they've failed it, we're going to ask this Court, respectfully, to please consider ruling on multiple independent grounds as well. We know there's a penchant for appeals and appeals upon appeals. So we will argue to Your Honor, although we will largely spare you another rehash of our briefs, but we will explain to Your Honor why they do lack standing to bring this claim as a matter of Delaware law. And there was a lot of fuzzing up about constitutional standing and Delaware law. Not necessary.

If -- we will be happy to rely on our pleadings here, but on Page 27 of the Claimant Trust Agreement, that's what defines their rights under Delaware law, and they were talking about how beneficial owners under Delaware law have standing. Well, are they beneficial owners? They are not. Equity holders -- this is in Paragraph C, Page 27 of the Claimant Trust Agreement -- Equity holders will only be deemed beneficiaries under this agreement upon the filing of a payment certification with the bankruptcy court, at which time the contingent trust interests will vest and be deemed equity trust interests.

They are not beneficial owners of squat. That has not

happened.

And last, Your Honor, we will -- and I will organize this for Your Honor in closing as well -- we would ask you to rule on a straight-up 12(b)(6) standard as an alternative, because we know what's coming on appeal and we think their complaint collapses under its own weight. You heard Mr. Morris detailing their own math shows significant returns. You'll also hear us describe how they have nothing but mere conclusions and naked assertions upon information and belief but unsupported.

Iqbal and *Twombly* would still apply under their 12(b)(6) standard, especially, and perhaps even more with a heightened standard under Rule 9(b), because they're essentially alleging some version of fraud, it sounds like.

They're never going to get there, Your Honor. All we would ask is for a full record to take inevitably, unfortunately, to the Court of Appeals.

And I think Mr. -- I'm not sure which of my colleagues will be speaking briefly for Holland & Knight, but I'll just turn it over to them.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McIlwain?

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIM PURCHASERS

MR. MCILWAIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be even briefer. Brent McIlwain here for the Claim Purchasers.

Your Honor, Mr. McEntire stated to this Court that my

clients have never denied any of this. In fact, in his reply, he says, The Claim Purchasers do not deny that they invested over $163 million. We do not deny that we did not due diligence, we do not deny that we refused to sell our claims at any price, and we do not deny that we invested the claims at what is, at best, a low ROI.

We had no duty to answer to HMIT or Mr. McEntire. We had no duty when we bought these claims to -- we had no duties to any creditor. We had -- it was a bilateral agreement with a third party. And frankly, Your Honor, it's not Mr. Dondero's or HMIT's business what due diligence we did and what information that we obtained.

But I will tell you right now, Your Honor, we were very careful in our pleadings to not bring issues of fact, because this -- HMIT has been chasing my clients, obviously, based on the notes that were presented in the initial PowerPoint, it was a -- it's retribution. It's retribution for not agreeing to sell the claims to Mr. Dondero when he offered to purchase at a 40 percent premium.

And Your Honor, when I look at that note, it's interesting, because I hadn't seen the note, obviously, until it showed up on the exhibit list. When you look at that note, I think it's -- I think it's very interesting. To the extent it was contemporaneous, I don't know. But what it shows, it shows that if you're a hammer, everything's a nail. And Mr.

Dondero is a vexatious litigator. And what did he write down? Discovery to follow.

But my question is this. Who was trying to trade on inside information? Mr. Dondero was offering a 40 percent premium, allegedly, on the cost. What information did he have? Certainly, he had inside information.

My client owed no duty to Mr. Dondero. My client owed no duty to anybody in this estate at the time of these claims purchase.

And Your Honor, we talk a lot about -- or, it's been talked a lot of insider trading. These are claims trades. I think the Court honed in on this from the very get-go. The Court does not have a role in claims trades. There's a 3001 notice that's filed post-claims trade, but there's no requirement that there's Court approval.

And these aren't securities. It's not as if we're trading claims and it could benefit or hurt you based on some equity position that you're going to obtain. We obtained claims that had been settled, they were litigated heavily, and the most that we can obtain is the amount of the claim. And that is, as Mr. Morris stated, all that changed was the name of the claimant. That's all. Because the claims didn't increase in value based on the trade.

Your Honor, our pleadings, I think, speak for themselves in terms of you really -- you really don't have to consider

evidence, from our perspective, to determine that this proposed complaint has no merit and is not plausible and presents no colorable claims.

The gatekeeper provision, and we're going to talk a lot about that today, obviously, right, requires that Mr. Dondero establish a *prima facie* case that the claims have some plausibility. If you can simply write down allegations, file a motion for leave and attach those allegations and say, Your Honor, you have to take all these as true, the gatekeeper has no meaning. There's no point in having a gatekeeper provision.

And in summary, Your Honor, what -- and I think Mr. Morris honed in on this specifically -- this really comes down to compensation. Right? Because this -- the allegation is that my clients purchased claims, presumably at a discount, right, based on some inside information, which we obviously deny, but we don't have to put that at issue today. For what purpose? For what purpose? So we got inside information from Mr. Seery so that we could then scratch his back on compensation on the back-end?

Your Honor, there is no reason that my clients need to be involved in this litigation. If HMIT thinks that this -- that they have a claim against Mr. Seery for excessive compensation, they can -- they could have brought such a gatekeeper motion, or a motion for leave under the gatekeeper

provision, without including my clients. Why did they include my clients? They included my clients because my clients did not sell to Mr. Dondero when he called, unsolicited, to try to get information. It's retribution. And that's what a vexatious litigator does, and that's why the gatekeeper provision is in place.

I'll reserve the rest for closing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Caroline, what was the collective time of the Respondents?

THE CLERK: Twenty-eight minutes and 37 seconds.

THE COURT: Twenty-eight minutes, 37 seconds.

All right. Well, let's talk about should we take a lunch break now? I'm thinking we should, because any witness is going to be, I'm sure, more than an hour. So can you all get by with 30 minutes, or do you need 45 minutes? I'll go with the majority vote on this.

(Counsel confer.)

MR. MCENTIRE: 1:00 o'clock. 45 minutes.

MR. MORRIS: 40 minutes, whatever. 1:00 o'clock?

THE COURT: We'll come back at 1:00 o'clock.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A luncheon recess ensued from 12:19 p.m. until 1:05 p.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. We're going back on the record in the Highland matter, the Hunter Mountain motion for leave to file lawsuit.

I'll just let you know that at 1:30 we're going to take probably what will be a five-minute break, maybe ten minutes at the most, because I have a 1:30 motion to lift stay docket. Just looking at the pleadings, I really think maybe one is going to be resolved and it won't be more than five or ten minutes. So whoever is on witness stand can either just stay there, because I think we won't be finished, or you can take a bathroom break or whatever. All right? So, it's video, the 1:30 docket.

All right. So, Mr. McEntire, are you ready to call your first witness?

MR. MCENTIRE: I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: May I proceed?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. MCENTIRE: At this time, Hunter Mountain calls Mr. James Dondero.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dondero, welcome. If you could find your way to the witness box, I will swear you in once you're there. It looks like you've got lots of notebooks there. Please raise your right hand.

(The witness is sworn.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may be seated.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm not familiar with your procedure. Should I approach the -- here to --

THE COURT: If you would, unless you're having --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- any kind of --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's fine. I'm not.

THE COURT: -- knee issues or, you know, sometimes people want to stay seated for that reason.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, again, my tender of Mr. Dondero as a witness is subject to our running objection on the evidentiary format.

THE COURT: Understood.

JAMES DAVID DONDERO, HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S WITNESS, SWORN

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, would you state your full name for the record, please?

A James David Dondero.

Q With whom are you currently -- what company are you currently affiliated with?

A Founder and president of NexPoint.

Q All right. And I think the Court is well aware, but would

you just briefly describe your prior affiliation with -- was it Highland Capital?

A Yes.

Q What was that affiliation?

A President and founder for 30 years, and then to facilitate an expeditious resolution of the estate I handed the reins to three Independent Board members and I became a portfolio manager until October of -- I was an unpaid portfolio manager until October of '20.

Q Thank you, sir. Do you have any current official position with Hunter Mountain Investment Trust?

A No.

Q Can you describe for us, sir, any actual or control you attempt to exercise on the business affairs of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust?

A None.

Q Are you -- do you have any official legal relationship with Hunter Mountain Investment Trust where you can attempt to exercise either direct or indirect control over Hunter Mountain Investment Trust?

A I do not.

Q Did you participate -- personally participate in the decision of whether or not to file the proceedings that are currently pending before Judge Jernigan?

A I did not.

Q As the former CEO of Highland Capital, are you familiar with the types of assets that Highland Capital owned? On the petition date?
A Yes.
Q And have you been monitoring these proceedings and the disclosures in these proceedings since the petition date?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Can you describe generally for me the types of assets on the petition date that Highland Capital owned? The types of assets? Describe the types of assets -- companies, stocks, securities, whatever, whatever you -- however you would describe it.
A There were some securities, but it was primarily investments in private equity companies and interests in funds.
Q Okay. I've heard the term portfolio company. What is a portfolio company?
A A portfolio company would be a private equity company that we controlled a majority of the equity and appointed and held accountable the management teams.
Q Would there be separate management, separate boards, for those portfolio companies?
A Yes.
Q All right. How many portfolio companies were there on the petition date, if you're aware? If you recall?

A Half a dozen, of different sizes.
Q Can you identify the names, if you recall?
A Yes.
Q What are those names?
A Trussway, Cornerstone, some small -- Carey International, CFA, SSP Holdings. Yeah, to a lesser extent, OmniCare.
Q All right.
A Or, um, --
Q In addition to the portfolio --
A Sorry.
Q -- of companies in which Highland Capital would own interests, did Highland also have interests in various funds?
A Yes. I said OmniCare. I meant OmniMax, I think was the name.
Q What type of funds?
A I'm sorry. The funds were usually funds that we were invested in or seeded or managed. So they're things like Multistrat, Restoration, a Korea fund, PetroCap.
Q Are these managed funds by Highland Capital? Or were they?
A Yes. Pretty much, with the exception of PetroCap. We were a minority -- a minority -- a large -- a large minority investor with a sub-advisor.
Q Did Highland Capital Management on the petition date own an interest, a direct security interest in MGM?

A Yes. And I -- yes.
Q Did the various portfolio companies that you've identified, did one or more of those portfolio companies also own MGM stock?
A Yes.
Q Did the various funds that you've identified, did one or more of those funds also own MGM stock?
A Yes. Between -- yes. Between the CLOs, the funds, Highland directly, it was about $500 million that eventually got taken out for about a billion dollars.
Q Okay. $500 million is what you said?
A Approximately. Depending on what mark, what time frame. But ultimately they got taken out for about a billion dollars.
Q Okay. And as a consequence of these investments, significant investment -- first of all, how would you describe that magnitude of investments? Is that a significant investment from the perspective of MGM?
A Yes.
Q As a consequence, what role, if any, did you play in terms of MGM's governance? Were you -- did you become a member of the board of directors?
A Yes. I was a board member for approximately ten years, and myself and the president of Anchorage, between our two entities, we had a majority of the equity in MGM.
Q Okay. If there was a third party, not familiar with the

management of Highland Capital, who had been monitoring these bankruptcy proceedings as you have, was there any way that a third-party stranger to this bankruptcy proceeding could, from your perspective, actually appreciate or identify the -- all the details of the investments that Highland Capital had?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question. It calls for speculation. He's not here as an expert today. He shouldn't be allowed to testify what a third party would or wouldn't have thought or known.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, I'll --

THE COURT: I'll overrule.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero?

A The disclosures in the Highland bankruptcy were scant. I think there was six or eight line items listed, the descriptions of which were limited. But it didn't include -- it didn't include a broad listing of all the funds, and it didn't include subsidiaries or any net value or any offsetting liabilities or risks of any of the underlying companies or investments, either.

MR. MCENTIRE: Would you put up Exhibit 3, please?

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, we're going to -- do you have a screen in front of you as well?

A Yes.

Q We're going to put up Exhibit 3, and I'm going to ask you some questions about it. First of all, would you identify Exhibit 3?
A It didn't come up on my screen yet.
Q Still not up there?
A Yes. Now it is.
Q Can you identify Exhibit 3, please?
(Discussion.)
Q There we go. Mr. Dondero, would you identify Exhibit 3, please?
A This was an email I sent to Compliance and relevant people to put -- to put MGM on the restricted list.
Q It indicates it was on December 17, 2020. Did you personally author this email?
A Yes.
Q You sent it to multiple individuals, including Mr. Surgent. Was Mr. Surgent an attorney at Highland Capital at the time?
A He was head of compliance for both organizations.
Q Scott Ellington? Is he an attorney? Was he an attorney at the time?
A He's the general counsel of Highland.
Q You also sent it to someone at NexPoint Advisors, Jason Post. Who is Mr. Post?
A Mr. Post was head of compliance at NexPoint Advisors and a

subordinate of Thomas Surgent's.
Q Jim Seery. Mr. Seery, of course. You also addressed it to Mr. Seery?
A Yes.
Q It says, Trading Restrictions Re: MGM Material Nonpublic Information. What did you mean by the term "material nonpublic information"?
A Material nonpublic information is when you have material nonpublic information that the public does not have, and it essentially makes you an insider and restricts you from trading.
Q All right. It says, Just got off a pre-board call.
First of all, you generated this in the ordinary course of your business, did you not?
A Um, --
Q This email.
A Yes.
Q Okay.
A Yes.
Q And --
A Any restricted list. Restricted list items happen all the time in the normal course of business.
Q And you've maintained a copy of this email as well, have you not?
A I'm sure we have one. I don't have it personally.

Q Fair enough. But you're -- you have -- you have access and custody over emails, correct?
A Not any of my Highland emails.
Q But those were left. Right?
A Yes. Yes.
MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I mean, he's leading the witness at this point, so I'm just --
MR. MCENTIRE: That's fine.
MR. MORRIS: I'm just --
THE COURT: Okay. Sustained.
MR. MORRIS: -- going to be sensitive to it.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Mr. -- this is a true and accurate copy of the email that you sent, is it not?
A It appears to be.
MR. MCENTIRE: At this time, I would offer Exhibit 3 into evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm looking through what we admitted earlier. Did we not --
MR. MCENTIRE: This already may be in evidence.
THE COURT: Yes. I'm --
MR. MCENTIRE: I don't --
THE COURT: Was there any objection?
MR. MORRIS: There wasn't. I mean, --

THE COURT: I think there was an objection that I overruled.

MR. MORRIS: No. There wasn't. I mean, unfortunately, we've gotten the short end of the stick here, because all of their documents are in evidence, and I got caught short because I'm going to have to do it the old-fashioned way. But yes, this is in evidence.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. Fair enough.

MR. MORRIS: Because -- actually got through all of their documents.

MR. MCENTIRE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q So, Mr. --

THE COURT: So it's in evidence.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q -- Dondero, going back to Exhibit 3, it says, Just got off a pre-board call.

Is that the MGM board, a pre-board call?

A Yes.

Q What is a pre-board call?

A It's a pre-board call that usually sets the agenda. And, again, myself and the Anchorage guys, we would move in locksteps, in a coordinated fashion, generally, in terms of agenda and company policy.

Q It says, Update is as follows. Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in the data room.

What was your understanding of -- of -- what was your intent in conveying that information to the recipients?

A The intent was really in the last sentence, or second-to-last sentence, that the transaction was likely to close. Amazon had come back. We had turned Amazon away earlier in the year at $120 a share, and they said they wouldn't be willing to pay more. And --

THE COURT: Is there an objection?

MR. MORRIS: There is an objection. None of this was shared with Mr. Seery, all of this background that we're -- that we're doing. He -- I would request that we stick with the -- only the information that was given to Mr. Seery, like -- like he's talking about his intent. Like, who cares at this point?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: This is what Mr. Seery got.

THE COURT: Okay. What is your response to that?

MR. MCENTIRE: I have a response to -- well, they've -- they've questioned his intent in sending this in his opening statement.

MR. MORRIS: Ah.

MR. MCENTIRE: And I'm trying to make it clear what his intent was.

MR. MORRIS: So, you know what, Your Honor? *Quid pro quo*. Now we're going to do a real *quid pro quo*. He can ask him about his intent, and then he can't object to all of the other documents and exhibits that I say prove that this was here only to interfere with Mr. Seery's trading activity. I'll do that *quid pro quo*.

MR. MCENTIRE: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may. Objection is overruled.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, what was your intent in communicating --

A Okay.

Q -- that probably a first-quarter event? What was your understanding?

A After 30 years of compliance education: Taint one, taint all. We were all sitting together. I -- the trading desk was right outside my desk. All the employees of Highland that would eventually move to NexPoint, all the ones that would eventually move to Skyview, all the ones that eventually moved to Jim Seery, were all within 30 feet of my desk.

Q What do you mean by "Taint one, taint all"?

A That's a compliance concept that, as a professional, you have a responsibility, when you are in possession of material nonpublic information, to put something on the restricted list so that it's not traded. Okay? And you can't -- one person can't sit in their cube and say they know something and not

tell anybody else, such that the rest of the organization trades. That's not the way compliance works.

Q It says also no -- also, any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.

What was the meaning of that or the intent of that?

A There was a stringent shareholder agreement, particularly among the board members, that no shares could be bought or sold without approval of the company.

Q The company here being MGM?

A MGM, yes.

Q What is a restricted list?

A A restricted list is when you believe as an investment professional that you have material nonpublic information, you notify Compliance, and then Compliance notifies the entire organization and prevents any trading in that security.

Q You mentioned the doctrine taint one, taint all. If an individual or -- if an individual within a company setting is found to have traded on material nonpublic information, what is the potential consequence or sanction?

MR. MORRIS: Objection, Your Honor. This is like a legal conclusion. He's not a law enforcement officer. He's not a securities officer. What are we doing?

MR. MCENTIRE: I can rephrase.

THE COURT: Okay. He's going to rephrase.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Based upon your years -- based upon your years of experience as a board member of MGM, based upon your years of experience as a CEO of Highland Capital and an executive that trades in securities and has sold securities, what is your understanding, from a non-legal perspective, of what the risks are associated with trading on material nonpublic information?
A You could be -- you would be fired from the organization if you did. You could be banned from the securities industry. The industry can shut down the -- or, the SEC can shut down the advisor or they can fine the advisor.
Q Do you know what a compliance log is?
A Yes.
Q Should MGM have been placed on a compliance log at NexPoint?
A Throughout the organization -- throughout the organization, it should -- it should and it was on all -- at all organizations, yes.
Q Should it have been placed on a -- on a compliance log to Highland Capital, from your perspective?
A Yes.
Q Can you give us any explanation of why, to your knowledge, why MGM would be taken off the restricted list in April of 2021 at Highland Capital?
A When an investment professional puts something on the restricted list, in order for it to come off the restricted

list, the material nonpublic information has to be public. So there has to be a cleansing that occurs by the company.

Q To the extent that you were no longer affiliated with Highland Capital in the early portion, the first quarter of 2021, does that somehow cleanse the material nonpublic information that you identified?

A It does not.

Q Why not?

A Because the -- it -- the company hasn't -- the company didn't come out and make public the information that we knew from a private perspective that the transaction was about to go through.

Q You sat here during opening statements when Mr. Morris referred to the various news coverage and media coverage concerning MGM and the fact that people had expressed interest in buying in the past?

A Yes. And at the board level, we had entertained numerous ones. There were rumors that had no basis in fact, and there were negotiations we had with people that were never in the news. But none of them got to this degree of certainty where it was going to close within a couple months.

Q From your perspective as an investment professional, with the years of experience that you described for the Court, what is the difference between receiving an email from a board member such as yourself and rumors or suggestions of possible

sale in the media?
A I knew with certainty from the board level that Amazon had hit our price, agreed to hit our price, and it was going to close in the next couple months.
Q That's not rumor or innuendo; that's hard information from a member of the MGM board?
A Correct.
MR. MCENTIRE: All right. You can take that down, please, Tim.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q I want to talk a little bit about due diligence. When you were the chief executive officer of Highland Capital, --
A Yes.
Q -- can you tell us whether Highland Capital ever involved itself in the acquisition of distressed assets?
A Yes. We did a fair amount of investing in distressed assets.
Q What is a distressed asset?
A It's something that trades at a discount, where the certainty and the timing of realizations or contractual obligations is uncertain.
Q Is a -- well, let me back up. Has Highland -- did Highland Capital ever invest in unsecured claims in connection with bankruptcy proceedings?
A Yes.

Q And in terms of the -- on the spectrum of risk, where does an unsecured creditor claim in a bankruptcy proceeding kind of rank in terms of the uncertainties or risk, from your perspective?

A It's high risk. It's a -- yeah, it would be highly-distressed, generally.

Q Explain to us -- I know the Court is very familiar with claims trading. Explain to us from your perspective as an investment -- a seasoned investment expert or executive what those risks are. What types of risk are associated with such an investment?

A You have to evaluate the assets tied to the claim specifically. Or if it's an unsecured in general, the assets in general in the estate.

You have to handicap the realization that a distressed seller might not get full value for something. You have to handicap the likelihood around that. And then you have to handicap the timing, and then you have to handicap the expenses and the other obligations of the estate, and then handicap risk items that aren't known or that are difficult if not impossible to underwrite, like unknown litigation or last-minute litigation or claims or something.

Q And all these handicapping, this handicapping process, how does that impact the price or the investment that you're willing to make? Generally?

A Generally, you put a much higher discount rate. You know, like if you would do debt at 10 percent and a normal public equity at a 15 percent return, you would do distressed or private equity investing at a 20, 25 percent return expectation to offset the risk and the unknowns.

Q In order to handicap an investment in an unsecured creditor's claim appropriately to reach an informed decision, what type of data would you need to have access to?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question. He's not here as an expert. He's here as a fact witness. He should -- he should limit himself to that instead of talking about what investors should be doing.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, he's here as the former CEO of Highland Capital. He has experience, firsthand knowledge experience, and he also has expertise because of his education, his career, and training.

And again, there's no limitation here under the Rules about what type of information I can elicit from him in this proceeding. This is, whether you call it expert testimony, I call it personal knowledge, but it has some expert aspects to it, but I think that's fair and appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, I think you can ask what kind of data would you rely on, would Highland Capital or entities he's been in charge of rely on, --

MR. MCENTIRE: I understand.

THE COURT: -- but not what would people rely on. So I sustain the objection partially.

MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, I'll rephrase the question. When you were the chief executive officer of Highland Capital before Mr. Seery took the reins, and you, your company, Highland Capital, was investing in an unsecured creditor's claims, what due diligence, what type of information would you expect your team to explore and investigate?

A Sure. Distressed investment in a trade claim would be among our thickest folders, it would be among our most diligenced items, because you have those three buckets, the value of the assets, again, and the ability and timing of monetization of those as a not strong -- as a weak seller, and then you would have the litigation or claims against those, and then you would have to also have a third section of analysis for the litigation risk of the estate overall.

Q What type of legal analysis or legal due diligence would you have required as the CEO of Highland Capital?

A At Highland, we would have had third-party law firms, in addition to our own legal staff, in addition to our own business professionals, reviewing all the analysis and the assumptions.

Q With regard to a financial analysis, what types of financial due diligence would you have required?
A It would have been a detailed -- a detailed analysis of all the cash flows on the particular underlying investments, and an evaluation and valuation of what those companies or investments were worth.
Q Why is it important to look at the underlying value of the asset?
A Because that -- those are what will be monetized in order to give you a return on the claims or securities that you buy in a distressed situation.

MR. MCENTIRE: Tim, would you please put up Exhibit 4?

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I don't mean to be monitoring your time, but we're at the 1:30 --

THE COURT: I was just checking the clock here. Let's do take a break. So, --

MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, can we have an instruction to the witness not to --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MORRIS: -- look at his phone and not to confer with anybody? Because we had that incident once before.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't --

THE WITNESS: I don't have my phone.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: My phone's at the front desk.

THE COURT: So, no discussions with your lawyers or -- I guess he doesn't have his phone -- during this break.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, I really think this will take five minutes, so don't go far.

(Off the record, 1:33 p.m. to 1:47 p.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. We will go back on the record, then, in the Highland matter.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm just going to grab him right now.

THE COURT: Okay. We are, for the record, waiting on Mr. Dondero to take his place again on the witness stand.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Dondero. We're ready for you to resume your testimony.

All right. Mr. McEntire, you may proceed.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION, RESUMED

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, when we left off, I was just putting up what I requested as Exhibit 4.

MR. MCENTIRE: And Tim, if you can put that back up, please.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, can you identify Exhibit #4, please?
A Yes. These are notes I took contemporaneous with three conversations with guys at Farallon.
Q I didn't quite hear you. Did you say contemporaneous?
A Yes.
Q So, you say with three conversations. Who were the conversations with?
A One was with Raj Patel that was fairly short, and he deflected me to Mike Linn, who was the portfolio manager in charge and had done the transactions.
Q Which transactions?
A The buying of the claim, the Highland claims.
Q All right. And what was your purpose in making these notes?
A We'd been trying nonstop to settle the case for two-plus years. We'd been counseled that it was a Kabuki dance that would just, you know, all settle at the end, and it never quite happened that way. And when we heard the claims traded, we realized there were new parties to potentially negotiate to resolve the case.

The ownership was initially hidden, but we were able to find out pretty quickly that Farallon was Muck. So I reached out the Farallon guys.
Q All right. And were you ever able at that time to determine who was affiliated with Jessup, the other special-

purpose entity?
A We -- initially, we thought Farallon was all of the entities. We didn't find out about Stonehill -- it was more difficult and they had taken more efforts to hide the ownership in Stonehill. We didn't find out for two more months.
Q So your first conversation was with Mr. Patel?
A Yes.
Q And did you call him?
A Yes.
Q Your first entry, there's a 28 on the left-hand side. What does that 28 refer to, if you recall?
A That was the date, I believe.
Q Do you believe it was May 28th?
A Yes.
Q What makes you believe that?
A That's what it says.
Q Okay. Raj Patel --
THE COURT: Is there a way you can show the words that are cut off?
MR. MCENTIRE: On this particular one, I can't, Your Honor. We tried, but we can't. No.
THE COURT: If I look in the notebook, can I see it?
MR. MCENTIRE: I don't think so. I think this is -- what you see is exactly what's in the notebook. It's the same

document. This is how -- how we -- this is how we have it.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Mr. Patel. Who is Mr. Patel?
A He's Mike Linn's boss. He's head of -- I believe head of credit at Farallon.
Q Okay. And Farallon is based where, if you know?
A San Francisco.
Q And what kind of company is Farallon, if you know?
A They -- they look a lot like Highland. Well, they do real estate. They do hedge funds. They do -- they don't do as many 40 Act or retail funds, but they're -- they're an investor.
Q Mr. Patel. What did he tell you during this phone call?
A That he bought it because Seery told him to buy it and they had made money with Seery before.
Q All right. And how long did the call last?
A Not long.
Q Okay. You said he referred you to Mr. -- who was the person?
A To Mike Linn.
Q Who is Mike Linn?
A Mike Linn is a portfolio manager that works for Mr. Patel.
Q And did you call Mr. Linn?
A Yes.
Q All right. The notes here, do these reflect several

conversations?
A The first one reflects a conversation with Raj Patel, and then the rest of it reflects two conversations with Mike Linn.
Q All right. Where does the first conversation with Mike Linn start and where does it end?
A It ends -- it begins at the 50, 70 cents. We knew that they had -- that the claims had traded around 50 cents. And I said we'd be willing to pay 70 cents. We'd like to prevent the $5 million-a-month burn. We'd like to buy your claims.
Q Why 70 cents? What was -- what was that all about?
A I was trying to give them a compelling premium that was still less than I had offered the UCC three months earlier.
Q And so you have: Not compelling, Class 8. What does that mean?
A He said that was -- he just said 70 cents wasn't compelling.
Q There's a reference to: Asked what would be compelling. Was that a question you asked him?
A Yes.
Q And what was his response?
A He said he had no offer. And he -- we had heard he paid 50 cents and I offered him 70 cents and then -- but he was clear to me that he wouldn't tell me what he paid. And so the next time I called him I -- I -- instead of just making it cents on the dollar, I said I'd pay 130 percent of whatever he

did pay. You don't have to tell me what you paid, but I'll pay you 30 percent more than you paid, you know, a couple months ago. And -- or we thought they notified the Court when they just bought it, but they had actually negotiated buying it back in February. January or February. So --

Q Who told you that they bought it in February or March time frame?

A He did.

Q Okay. Was this during the first or the second phone --

MR. MORRIS: I apologize for interrupting. Who's the "he"?

MR. MCENTIRE: Mike Linn.

THE WITNESS: Mike Linn.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you so much.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll make sure the record --

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mike Linn --

A Yes.

Q -- told you that Farallon had bought their interest in the claims back in the February or March time frame?

A Yes.

Q All right. Bought assets with claims. What does that refer to?

A He said it wasn't compelling because he said Seery told him it would be worth a lot more. He -- he confirmed what Raj

said, that -- I said, do you realize the estate is spending $5 million a month on legal fees? That, you know, you should want to sell this thing. And he said Seery told him it was worth a lot more and there were claims and litigation beyond the asset value.

Q You offered him 40 to 50 percent premium. What is that?

A That's what the 70 cents on the 50 cents represents. And then I changed the dialogue to I'll pay you 130 percent of whatever your cost was. And he said, not compelling. And then I, both -- both calls, I pressed him, what price would he offer at? And he said he had no offer, he wasn't willing to sell.

Q The 130 percent of cost, not compelling, was that in the second or the third call with Mr. Linn?

A It was at my third and final call with Farallon. My second call with Mike Linn was the 130 percent of cost.

Q And he said not compelling? You put it in quotation marks?

A Yep.

Q And then you said, no counter. What does that mean?

A He wouldn't -- he wouldn't give an offer, he wouldn't give a price at which he would sell.

Q What did Mike Linn tell you, in effect, with regard to his due diligence that Farallon had undertaken?

A When I -- when I told him about the risks and the

litigation and the burn, he said he wasn't following the case, he wasn't aware of it, he was depending on Jim Seery.

Q What, if anything, did Michael Linn tell you about MGM?

A That was more the initial Raj Patel call, where he said we bought it because he was very optimistic regarding MGM.

Q Okay. Did you have any understanding when he first got his optimism about MGM?

A No. He just said that's why they had bought it initially, they were very optimistic about MGM.

Q That's why they had bought it initially?

A Yes.

Q And they had bought it initially in the February-March time frame?

A Yes.

Q And that -- would you -- does that predate the public disclosure of the MGM sale to Amazon?

A Yes.

Q Substantially by a couple of months?

A Yes.

Q I'd like to turn your attention now to a different topic.

MR. MCENTIRE: And Tim, if you could pull up Exhibit 8, please.

I believe this document is already in evidence, Your Honor.

THE COURT: 8 is?

MR. MCENTIRE: Oh, by the way, I offer Exhibit 4 into evidence.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Let me ask you a couple quick questions.

THE COURT: Is there an objection?

MR. MORRIS: Nope.

THE COURT: Okay. 4 is admitted.

(Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Exhibit 4 is received into evidence.)

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Exhibit 8.

MR. MORRIS: I apologize, Your Honor. Just one caveat. It's not for the truth of the matter asserted; it's for what his impressions were at the time.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: This is what he wrote down. I don't --

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm offering it for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. And I object to that extent. This --

MR. MCENTIRE: Let me --

MR. MORRIS: Can I *voir dire*? Can I *voir dire*? May I do --

MR. MCENTIRE: May I finish my statement that I was --

THE COURT: Let him finish, and then --

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- you can.

MR. MCENTIRE: I am offering it for the truth of the matter asserted because these are documents that were prepared contemporaneously, it's an exception to the hearsay rule and reflects admissions of a -- of an adverse party. Admissions that are adverse to their interests. Declarations of interest adverse to their interest and admissions of an adverse party contemporaneously recorded. And so that's why I'm offering it.

MR. MORRIS: For all purposes?

THE COURT: Okay. Let me have you point me to the exact hearsay exception. I understand this hearsay exception you're arguing for the hearsay within the hearsay, the party opponent exception. But it's technically hearsay of Mr. Dondero, even though he's here on the stand.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, I could lay a foundation, then.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, --

THE COURT: Well, no. I'm asking for what your --

MR. MCENTIRE: It's --

THE COURT: -- rule reference is.

MR. MCENTIRE: I don't have the Rules with me right this second. It's 803(1) --

(Discussion.)

MR. MCENTIRE: All right. Well, it's -- it's admissible under several categories. It's not hearsay because it's an admission of a party opponent. It's also an admission under 803(1), present sense impression. It's also admissible --

THE COURT: So you say it's Mr. Dondero's statement describing or explaining an event --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- or admission made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes. It's also a record of a regularly-conducted activity, which is 803(6). And I think it's also not technically hearsay because it's also an admission of a party. So, this --

THE COURT: Well, that's the hearsay within the hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: But I'm -- I'm --

MR. MORRIS: That can't possibly be right. I can't go back to my hotel right now and write down that he told me that he did a bad thing and come in here tomorrow and say he admitted he did a bad thing because it's in my notes.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: That's can't possibly be the law.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: That's not the law.

MR. MCENTIRE: There are two hearsay issues here. One is whether this is a business record or otherwise qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule, and then there's an internal hearsay issue of whether or not what Mr. Patel and Mr. --

THE COURT: You haven't established the business record exception. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm prepared to lay the foundation right this second. At this moment.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, is this a document that was generated by you in the ordinary course of your business?

A Yes.

Q Did you have personal knowledge when you recorded this document?

A Yes.

Q You personally recorded this document, correct?

A Yes.

Q And you have had custody of this document. Correct?

A Yes.

Q And this is --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's a -- that's a business record,

Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Where's the document now? How come it's -- how come it's cut off?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have the document today? How come we're looking at a document that's cut off?

A I'm sure we have it somewhere. I don't have it.

MR. MORRIS: So, number one, Your Honor, we don't have the actual document. We have a partial document.

Number two, let's talk about it for a second.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q You say that you do this in the ordinary course of business. What's the purpose of taking these notes?

A When I'm starting negotiation with somebody new on something complicated and I don't know what their concerns or rationale is going to be, I take little notes like this.

Q And is it -- is it the purpose of it to capture the important things that are going on in the conversation?

A So I know next time how to address it differently, you know.

Q That's not my question. My question is, is the purpose of taking notes so that you have a written record of the important points that you discussed?
A Yes, so I know how to address it the next time.
Q Okay. And among the important points that you never put down on these notes was the letters MGM. Is that correct?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And you never put down here that Michael Linn told you he wasn't following the case, correct?
A No, I did not.
Q Okay.
A But it was --
Q And --
A Yeah. But I --
Q That --

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, if this is --

MR. MCENTIRE: (faintly) This is *voir dire* of the witness for a business record exception.

MR. MORRIS: No, because --

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Mr. Patel wouldn't tell you how much he paid and that's why you didn't write it down, right?
A Mr. Patel told me he bought it because of Seery. My

conversation was very short with him. That was one of the few things he said. Linn said he wouldn't sell it because he didn't find it compelling.

Q Okay.

A And Linn was the one who wouldn't tell me --

Q Okay.

A -- the price.

Q But -- but even though you took these notes to write down things that you thought were important, you didn't write down MGM. Correct?

A Yes.

Q And you didn't write down that anybody was very optimistic about MGM. Correct?

A No, I did not.

Q And you didn't write down that Mr. Linn told you he wasn't following the case. Correct?

A Well, he said the same thing Patel said about he bought it because of Seery. He did confirm that. I didn't see any reason to write that again.

Q You didn't -- you never wrote it down. Not once. Not -- there's nothing about again, right. You never wrote down that --

A No, I did write --

Q -- anybody ever told you they weren't following the case. Correct?

A Correct.
Q Okay.
A But I wrote down that he bought it because of Seery.
Q Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, no objection. It can go in.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.

THE COURT: Wait. Did you just say no objections?

MR. MORRIS: Except -- except for the hearsay on hearsay. It can't possibly be an admission. It's his -- it's his notes. This is what he wrote. It can come in for that purpose. It's -- it's a -- that's what he's testified to, and I can't object to that. But it can't possibly come in as an admission against Farallon.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, I disagree.

MR. MORRIS: That's the point.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, I disagree. This is otherwise admissible, and it can come. I think that's really, Your Honor, that's really the weight it's going to be given. It comes in. He's not making an objection to its admissibility. And if he wants to argue the weight of the document, that's a different issue.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: You may.

MR. STANCIL: The second layer of hearsay goes to whether this is a statement by Farallon. It is a statement by

Mr. Dondero of what he heard, what he says he heard Farallon say. 801(d) refers to, when they're talking about an opposing party statement, made by the party, not made by a listener who says he heard the party. This is classic hearsay within hearsay. It's not admissible for that purpose.

THE COURT: Okay. I sustain the objection, and -- but I'm still struggling to understand what the Respondents have agreed to. Because --

MR. MORRIS: That -- that this is what he claims to have written down. I mean, right? So, so --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: -- a present sense impression.

THE COURT: So, it is admitted as Mr. Dondero's present sense impression, but it's not admitted as to the truth of anything that Claims Purchasers may have said.

MR. MORRIS: And -- and the --

THE COURT: That's what you're saying?

MR. MORRIS: Yes. And the most important thing is that he's testified that the purpose of the notes was to capture the things that were important that he was told. And we've established what he wasn't told.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. I believe the document is in evidence, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Exhibit 4 is in evidence. But, again, there's no admission in here as to what Claims Purchasers

testified as to.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, they haven't testified yet because --

THE COURT: This is what he --

THE DEFENDANT: I understand. I understand.

THE COURT: -- he says he remembers.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. So, --

THE COURT: It's sort of an --

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, just so we're clear for our record, this is not admitted for the truth of what Farallon is purported to have said.

MR. MCENTIRE: Correct.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. MCENTIRE: This --

MR. STANCIL: Thank you.

MR. MCENTIRE: This is offered for the truth of what Mr. -- Mr. Dondero recalls them saying.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: In part.

THE COURT: I think -- I think we're on the same page now. I think. I think.

(Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Exhibit 4 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCENTIRE: All right. May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you please put up Exhibit 8, please? And I believe this document has been put into evidence --

THE COURT: It is.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, this document is a -- part of a -- the Court's docket. It was filed on February 1, 2021, if you could go to the top upper banner. It's Debtors' Notice of Filing of Plan Supplement of the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, as Modified.

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q I'll direct your attention, --

MR. MCENTIRE: If you could go to Page 4, please, for me, Tim.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Page 4 has a schedule, a plan analysis and a liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q All right. For Class 8, what does it identify that is being projected for distributions to the general unsecured claims for Class 8?

A 71.3 percent.

Q What percentage is being identified that will be

distributed to Class 9?

A 9, no distribution.

Q No distribution? All right. Mr. Dondero, in Paragraph -- I'm going to give you a piece of paper.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you just give me a piece of paper real quick?

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q I'm handing you a piece of paper and I'm --

A Okay. Thank you.

Q Mr. Dondero, in our complaint in this case, the proposed complaint in this case, we allege that Class 8 had a total of $270 million, the claims that were purchased by Farallon and Stonehill had a face value in Class 8 of $270 million. Would you write that number down?

And assuming that this was public information that was available in February of 2021 at 71.32 percent, --

MR. MORRIS: Objection, Your Honor. That's an assumption not in evidence. He hasn't laid a foundation for what was available in February in 2021.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, according to --

THE COURT: Wait. Are you going to respond, or are you just going to --

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll rephrase the question.

THE COURT: -- rephrase? Okay.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q According to the document that is identified as Exhibit #8 that says that 71.32 percent is the anticipated projected payout on Class 8 claims, what is 71.32 percent of the face value of the claims that were purchased?

A About $192 million.

Q $192 million? And assuming for a moment that, as alleged by Hunter Mountain in this case, that $163 million was actually used to purchase the Class 8 claims, what is the difference?

A About $30 million.

Q A little less than that, isn't it? Or is the number --

A Yeah. $28 million or whatever.

Q $28 million? And based upon your years of experience in running Highland Capital, being involved in the purchase of unsecured claims, being involved in investigating and acquiring distressed assets, that return over a two-year period, is that the kind of return that a hedge fund would typically -- you would expect to receive?

MR. MORRIS: I just want to make sure that -- because the question changed a little bit in the middle. If he wants to ask him if he would have made the investment, that's fine. But he should not be permitted to testify as to what any other investor, including the ones who purchased these claims, would have done. Every -- there's different risk profiles. He can

testify to whatever he wants about himself.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Go ahead. Based upon your experience at Highland Capital, would Highland Capital have ever acquired those claims based upon that kind of return over two years? For a distressed asset such as this?

A No.

Q Why not?

A It's below a debt level return that you could get on high-rated assets with certainty. It's --

Q What do you mean by it's below -- below a debt return that you could get on collateralized assets? What do you mean by that?

A I think in this case the debt that the Debtor put in place paid 12, 13 percent and was triple secured or whatever. So no one would buy the residual claims for an 8 percent compounded, whatever that $28 million works out to.

MR. MORRIS: I move to strike, Your Honor. He shouldn't be talking about or testifying to what other people might do.

THE WITNESS: Well, we --

THE COURT: This is --

THE WITNESS: We would never have done that.

THE COURT: This is --

MR. MCENTIRE: He would not have.

THE COURT: -- Highland, not nobody. Okay.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, and what is it about the fact that these claims are not collateralized that impacts the decision-makers, from your perspective?

A You have all the risk that the $205 million of expenses this estate has currently paid grows to $300 or $400 million. You know, you have the risk that other litigation regarding Seery violating the Advisers Act --

MR. MORRIS: I move to strike, Your Honor.

THE WITNESS: -- results in --

THE COURT: Sustained.

THE WITNESS: -- expenses.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Just respond to my question, sir. What does the fact about not being collateralized, how does that impact the decision-maker's --

A Well, I was trying to answer it. You just have all kinds of residual risk of bad acts that have happened at the estate or expenses increasing or whatever.

MR. MORRIS: I move to strike the phrase "bad acts," Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q What did you mean by that? What did you mean by "bad acts"?
A We've highlighted it in a lot of complaints. There's been several violations of the Advisers Act.
MR. MORRIS: Move to strike, Your Honor. It's a legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Mr. Dondero, are you familiar with an entity known as NHF?
A Yes.
Q What is NHF?
A A NexPoint hedge fund. It was a closed-in fund that we manage still to this day at NexPoint. The name has changed to NXDT.
Q Was NHF publicly traded?
A It -- yeah, it's a publicly-traded equity. It's a closed-in fund, technically, but it's a publicly-traded security.
Q What -- what is your affiliation with NHF?
A I'm the portfolio manager.
Q And, again, what are your responsibilities as the portfolio manager?
A To optimize the portfolio and hopefully exceed investor expectations.
Q Have you become aware that Stonehill was purchasing MGM stock in the first quarter of 2021? And NHF?

A Yes. We believe -- we're able to demonstrate from Bloomberg records, on the Bloomberg terminal, they show up as holders and purchasers in the -- in the first few months of 2021.

Q What magnitude?

A I think it was one of their top equity positions. It was about six million bucks.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you put up the chart? This is for demonstrative purposes only.

I'm not offering this chart into evidence, Your Honor. It's simply a demonstration. Or a demonstrative.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, there's no such thing.

MR. MCENTIRE: There is.

MR. MORRIS: A demonstrative has to be based on evidence. A demonstrative is supposed to summarize evidence. You don't put up a demonstrative until --

THE COURT: All right. What's your response to that?

MR. MCENTIRE: That I'm about to walk through some points where he can establish as a point of evidence, and then we can talk about it. Demonstratives, demonstratives are used all the time, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: It's to --

THE COURT: Well, they summarize evidence.

MR. MORRIS: It's to summarize evidence.

THE COURT: Yes. So, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, this is --

THE COURT: -- you can elicit the evidence, and then if this chart seems to summarize whatever he testifies as to, then --

MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

THE COURT: -- then I think maybe you can put it up.

MR. MCENTIRE: Mr. -- you can take it down, Tim.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero, do you have an understanding of how much total distributions have been paid to date in the Highland bankruptcy?

A I believe the Class 8 -- the 1 through 7 was only about $10 million. I believe Class 8 got $260 or $270 million so far.

Q All right. And do you have an understanding of what the total amount of expenses are?

A Total expenses paid to date was $203 million. $205 million.

Q So the -- the -- there's a rough approximation between the professional expenses and the actual all proofs of claim; is that correct?

A There is, yeah, a ratio, and -- yes.

Q The total cash flow, if you add those two together, what are they? What are they approximately?

A $470 million.

Q $470 million? And do you understand that the -- that the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust would have more than sufficient assets to reach Class 10 where Hunter Mountain is currently located, even setting aside the claims against you?
A Correct. There's $57 million of cash on the balance sheet, net of a couple million today, I guess. And then there's $100 million of other assets.

MR. MCENTIRE: Reserve the rest of my questions. Reserve the rest of my questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Pass the witness.

MR. MCENTIRE: Could I have my time estimate?

THE COURT: Yes. Caroline?

THE CLERK: (faintly) As of right now, we are at 81 minutes, so --

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: That was 81 minutes total?

THE CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Good afternoon, Mr. Dondero.
A Good to see you.
Q My pleasure. Do you know an attorney named Ronak

(phonetic) Patel?
A Is that Rakhee that they call --
Q Could be. Do you know an attorney named Rakhee Patel?
A There was a Rakhee Patel, I believe, early in the *Acis* case.
Q Let me try --
A I'm not -- I've never met her.
Q Let me try this differently.
A Okay.
Q Did you ever meet with the Texas State Securities Board?
A No.
Q Did anybody acting on your behalf ever file a complaint with the Texas State Securities Board?
A No.
Q Do you know if anybody's filed a complaint with the Texas State Securities Board? About Highland?
A I believe you covered it earlier. Mark Patrick.
Q Mark Patrick what?
A I guess he did, or Hunter Mountain did, or the DAF did. I don't -- I don't know.
Q Did you ever speak with Mark Patrick about a TSSB investigation of Highland?
A No.
Q Okay. Why do you think Mark Patrick knows about the TSSB investigation of Highland?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection to form. Calls for speculation. He's just established that he's never --

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- talked to Mark Patrick.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Sustained.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Have you ever seen the draft Hunter Mountain complaint in this case?

A No.

Q Okay. I think you testified a moment ago that Amazon had hit MGM's price by December 17th. Do I have that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Then how come you didn't say that in your email to Mr. Seery?

A Your best practices and typical practices, when you put it on the restricted list, is to just give as little information as possible so that the inside information isn't promulgated specifically throughout the organization and leaked --

Q So, --

A -- throughout the organization.

Q So, even though your intent was to convey information to Mr. Seery, you didn't actually tell him the truth, right? You didn't tell him that Amazon had actually hit the stock price.

Right?
A I wouldn't characterize it that way.
Q Okay. In fact, all you told him was that they were interested. Isn't that right?
A I wasn't telling him anything. I was telling Compliance, as an investment professional, that it needed to be on the restricted list because we were in possession of material nonpublic information regarding a merger that was going to go through shortly. Or in the next few months.
Q Is it your testimony that, as of December 17th, Amazon had made an offer that was acceptable to MGM?
A Yeah, we were going into -- that's what the board meeting was. We were going into exclusive negotiations to culminate the merger with them.
Q Okay. I think you have a binder there of our exhibits. If you can go to #11.
A Which one?
MR. MORRIS: May I approach?
THE WITNESS: Sure.
(Pause.)
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q That's your email, sir, right?
A Yes.
Q Okay. It doesn't say anything about Amazon hitting the price, right?

A It doesn't need to.
Q In fact, it still mentions Apple, doesn't it? Why did you feel the need to mention Apple if Amazon had already hit the price?
A The only way you generally get something done at attractive levels in business is if two people are interested.
Q But why weren't you -- why were you creating a story for the Compliance Department when the whole idea was to be transparent so they would understand what was happening? Why would you create a story that differed from the facts?
A It didn't differ from the facts, and it's not a story. It's a, we have material nonpublic information. Please put this on the restricted list. And --
Q But that -- but you said Amazon and Apple are actively diligencing and they're in the data room. Do you see that?
A That's true.
Q So, even though -- you know what, I'll move on. But this -- this doesn't say what you testified to earlier, that Apple hit the -- that Amazon hit the price. Right? Can we just agree on that?
A Well, agree that it doesn't have to and it's not supposed to.
MR. MORRIS: I move to strike. I just want --
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. MORRIS:

Q -- you to -- I want you to just work with me here. You did not tell the Compliance Department that Apple -- that Amazon had hit the strike price. Right? Isn't that correct? That's not what this email says?

A The -- you can pull up a hundred of these type emails. They're not specific.

MR. MORRIS: I'm going to move to strike and I'm just going to ask you, --

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q -- because you testified to one thing, and I just want to make clear that you told the Compliance Department something different. Can we just agree on that?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, Your Honor, may I respond to his motions to strike? I think he's becoming argumentative.

THE COURT: Could you speak into the mic, --

MR. MCENTIRE: I can.

THE COURT: -- please.

THE COURT: He's becoming argumentative. And I think it's very clear that, if he asks a question, the witness has a right to respond. I think his answers are totally responsive. And I don't think anything should be struck.

THE COURT: Okay. Your question was you didn't put in there anything about it hit the strike price --

MR. MORRIS: He didn't --

THE COURT: -- or whatever?

MR. MORRIS: He didn't -- he didn't tell the Compliance Department what he just testified to. In fact, he told the Compliance Department something very different. That's all I'm asking.

THE COURT: And I think that's just a yes or no.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Yes or no? You told the Compliance Department something different than what was actually happening?

A That's not true.

Q Oh.

A Exactly what was here, what was happening. I didn't give more detail, which is more hearsay.

Q Okay. If somebody was filing -- following the Highland bankruptcy, they would have known that MGM was very important, right?

A You'd have to show me where. I don't -- I don't see it in any of the bankruptcy --

Q You don't think that that's true?

A I didn't see it in any of the public filings.

Q Do you remember we were here two years ago on this very day, June 8, 2021, for the second contempt hearing? You sat in that very witness box during the second contempt hearing? Remember that? That was two years ago.

A I remember sitting in the box. What are you asking?
Q And do you remember that that was just a few days after MGM had announced its deal with Amazon?
A I -- I don't remember -- I -- was that the day the judge was hopeful that would lead to a resolution of the case?
Q Exactly. So, --
A Okay.
Q -- Judge Jernigan certainly knew that MGM was important. Right?
A Yes.
Q And she's a bankruptcy judge, right?
A Yes.
Q And she was overseeing the bankruptcy case, right? Correct?
A Yes.
Q And the very first thing when she walked in the door two years ago on this day was, oh my goodness, MGM, they have a deal, maybe we can finally get to a settlement. Right?
A And I wish she had pushed on that.
Q Do you --
A And I remember you guys dismissing it.
Q Do you think she had material nonpublic inside information?
A No, I don't think so.
Q She probably learned it in the bankruptcy case, right?

A Yeah.
Q Okay. Do you believe Mr. Seery sold any MGM securities between the day you sent your email and the day the Amazon deal was announced on May 26th?
A I don't know.
Q Do you -- so you have no knowledge? Let's do this a different way. You have no basis to say that Mr. Seery sold any MGM securities between the moment you sent this email on December 17th and the day the Amazon deal was announced on May 26th. Correct?
A I'm sorry. Just to clarify, you're saying sold, not bought, right? You're not asking me if --
Q I'll do either way.
A Okay.
Q Fair point.
A Sure.
Q Very fair point.
A Okay.
Q Do you believe that Mr. Seery engaged in any transactions of MGM securities between those two relevant data points?
A Yes.
Q Okay. What do you think he did?
A The HarbourVest transaction.
Q Okay. So, you learned about the HarbourVest transaction when?

A When it was filed.
Q And that was on December 23rd. Do you remember that?
A Yes.
Q It was just less than a week after you sent your email, right?
A Yes.
Q And do you remember that you filed an objection to the HarbourVest settlement?
A Yes.
Q And you're the one who gave Mr. Seery this material nonpublic inside information, right?
A Yes.
Q Did you object to the HarbourVest settlement on the basis that Mr. Seery was engaging in insider trading?
A Not then, I don't think. I believe --
Q You didn't, right? Even though it was happening at the exact same moment, the very -- within a week of you giving him this information. He's announcing that he's doing this settlement and you don't say a word. Isn't that right?
A Because I delegated the responsibility to Compliance by notifying them of material nonpublic information, and Compliance should hold the organization accountable. Compliance is separate and discrete from management. Compliance reports to the SEC.
Q You filed a 15-page objection to the settlement, didn't

you?
A I don't -- I don't know.
Q Did you tell Judge Jernigan that Mr. Seery was doing bad?
A Not then. I think a month later, two months later.
Q Even though you knew what was happening, you didn't say anything, right?
A I -- I'm not responsible for all the filings. I --
Q Even though it's under your name?
A Correct.
Q How about -- how about CLO Holdco? Did CLO Holdco file an objection to the HarbourVest settlement?
A I -- I don't know which entities did, but it -- whatever entities that were in control that could did, eventually, when they found out, you know, and -- but did -- did they, within a week or contemporaneously? No. It was right around the holidays. A lot of people weren't paying attention. You guys were trying to rush the HarbourVest thing through.
Q Sir, CLO Holdco filed an objection, claiming that it was entitled to purchase the HarbourVest interests in HCLOF because it had a right of first refusal, right? Isn't that right?
A Okay. I -- what ultimately governs the --
Q Isn't that right?
A I don't -- okay.
Q It's really just yes or no.

A I don't know.
Q If you don't remember, that's fine.
A I don't remember, yeah.
MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, would he please give the witness an opportunity to answer? He's interrupted three times in less than five seconds. Give the witness an opportunity to respond.
MR. MORRIS: This is real easy stuff.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MORRIS: I'm trying to cross him here.
MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, with all due respect, he's making it very difficult because he's being very aggressive --
MR. MORRIS: Nah.
MR. MCENTIRE: -- and he's interrupting the witness.
MR. MORRIS: I would never.
THE COURT: Okay. I don't feel the need to do that right now, but I will -- I will consider your request.
THE WITNESS: Can I give a complete answer to his last question, or one that I'd like to be my answer on the record?
THE COURT: Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: The governing responsibility as a registered investment advisor is you're not allowed to buy back from investors fund interests or investments unless you offer it to everybody else, in writing, in that fund first.

That's the Investment Advisers Act as I understand it, and that is what was improper in the HarbourVest transaction. I mean, besides the fact that the pricing was wrong, they misled HarbourVest. And I know HarbourVest hasn't complained, but just because your investors don't complain doesn't mean you can rip them off.

MR. MORRIS: I'd really move to strike the entirety of the answer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Granted.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Mr. Dondero, HC --

A I'm not going to -- I'm not answering any more questions unless I can answer that question with that answer, --

Q Mr. Dondero, do you --

A -- because I believe it's responsive.

Q Do you remember that CLO Holdco withdrew their objection?

A I --

Q To the HarbourVest settlement?

A I don't remember.

Q Do you remember that's really when Grant Scott left the scene?

A I don't --

Q He thought it was inappropriate for them to withdraw, right?

A I don't remember all the details. I know they made some

mistakes, and there's a tolling agreement against Kane's (phonetic) firm for making mistakes, and, you know, whatever. But I -- I don't remember all the details.

Q And a couple of months later, you conspired with Mr. Patrick to try to sue Mr. Seery in order to try to get that very same interest in HCLOF, right?

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, I have to object. There's no foundation and it's also highly argumentative and I move to object. That's a -- that's a question asked in bad faith.

THE WITNESS: I deny any conspiring.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q In April, Mr. Patrick filed a lawsuit on behalf of CLO Holdco a couple of weeks after getting appointed as the head of CLO Holdco and the DAF about the HarbourVest settlement. Isn't that right?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And you worked with him on that, right?

A I -- I did not work with him on that. I was very just tangentially aware.

Q Okay.

MR. MORRIS: I'm just going to refer the Court -- I'm going to move for the admission into evidence of the second contempt order.

THE COURT: Exhibit what?

MR. MORRIS: Just one moment, Your Honor.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: You know what, I don't know that I have it on the list. I'm just going to ask the Court to take judicial notice. We had a hearing two years ago to this day, and the Court found in the order that it entered at the conclusion of that hearing that Mr. Patrick had abdicated his responsibility to Mr. Seery. It's one of the reasons why Mr. Seery wasn't held in contempt of Court. And I'd like -- I'd like Counsel to address it now.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah, I'll -- you said Seery, didn't you?

MR. MORRIS: Oh, sorry. I said Seery. I meant Dondero.

MR. MCENTIRE: (faintly) Also, I believe it's entirely irrelevant. Judicial -- taking judicial --

THE COURT: Would you speak in the microphone, please?

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm sorry. Taking judicial notice of something that is utterly irrelevant is not necessary, not appropriate. What this Court did two years ago roughly to the day -- and I assume he's correct -- has no bearing on anything before the Court today. Nothing. This has zero connection, nexus, under any analysis, any fair scrutiny, dealing with the

colorability of the claim that Hunter Mountain, who was not involved in those proceedings, is trying to advance here. And it would be -- it would be improper for this Court to even take it under judicial notice.

THE COURT: Okay. Response?

MR. MORRIS: Can I respond?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. So, Your Honor, I'm going to move for the introduction into evidence of Exhibit 45. It is the Charitable DAF complaint that was filed in the federal district court on April 12, 2021, under the direction of Mark Patrick, who today stands here as the representative of Hunter Mountain.

This was the complaint, if Your Honor will recall, that they tried to amend and we had a hearing here about the circumstances, because that amendment was going to name Mr. Seery personally, in violation of the gatekeeper order. Right?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: And so it is all tied together. If you go to Paragraph 77 of this exhibit, it says, HCLOF holds equity in MGM Studio. This is the exact same transaction, right? So, so Mr. Dondero says, I gave Mr. Seery inside information, he violated all of these things in the HarbourVest transaction, even though he didn't say a word

then, and here, while it's still on the restricted list, before the Amazon deal is announced, they're actually in court saying that they should be entitled to acquire that same asset that Mr. Seery supposedly acquired improperly. He wants it for himself.

I mean, are you kidding me? It's not relevant?

THE COURT: I overrule the relevance objection. It's admitted.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you. And 45 is admitted, Your Honor?

THE COURT: 45 is admitted.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

(Debtors' Exhibit 45 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCENTIRE: Just, Your Honor, I was identifying my objection in connection with his original request that you take something under --

THE COURT: Would you speak in the microphone? Again, we --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes. My original objection was addressing his request of you, Your Honor, to take something under judicial notice. I want to make sure my objection is also lodged with regard to Exhibit 45, which I understand you've overruled.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.

THE COURT: It is so noted.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: You've objected and I've admitted it.

MR. MORRIS: And I think I've said this already, but the reason that we're requesting the Court take judicial notice of its order on the second contempt proceeding is because it shows that Mr. Dondero and Mr. Patrick worked together, in violation of the gatekeeper, to try to suit Mr. Seery to obtain the interest in HCLOF that he is sitting here today saying somehow that Mr. Seery wrongfully acquired, even though he didn't say a word at the time.

THE COURT: Okay. So now we're talking about not Exhibit 45 --

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: -- but the order that was entered --

MR. MORRIS: Correct.

THE COURT: -- regarding the filing of Exhibit 45?

MR. MORRIS: Exactly.

THE COURT: Someone is going to need to give me a docket entry number before we're done here.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: I can and will take judicial notice of that, but I need to have it --

MR. MCENTIRE: So I assume, for the record, my objection is overruled?

THE COURT: Your objection is overruled.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

MR. MORRIS: All right.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q You mentioned something about, I think, was it NXDT or NHF?

A Yes.

Q And just let me see if I can do it this way. Right? So there used to be a fund known as the NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund, right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And in 2020 that was a closed-in fund. Correct?

A Yes.

Q And it traded under the ticker symbol NHF, correct?

A Yes.

Q And then late in 2021 the name of the fund was changed to NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust, correct?

A Yes.

Q And the ticker symbol changed from NHF to NXDT, correct?

A Yes.

Q And then it became a REIT the following year, right?

A Yes.

Q And I'm just going to refer to these letters as the Fund; is that fair?

A That's fine.

Q For purposes of these questions. And you were the Fund's portfolio manager, the president, the principal executive officer, correct?
A Yes.
Q And another entity that you controlled, NexPoint Advisors, provided advisory services to the Fund, correct?
A Yes.
Q And you controlled NexPoint Advisors at all times, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And the Fund was publicly traded, right?
A Yes.
Q And the Fund owned shares of MGM at the end of 19 -- at the end of 2020, correct?
A Yes.
Q In fact, as of December 2020, MGM was one of the Fund's ten largest holdings, with -- valued at over $25 million. Isn't that right?
A Yes.
Q And by the end of 2021, MGM was the Fund's fifth largest holding, with assets -- with a value of over $40 million. Correct?
A Yes.
Q And the Fund also held MGM common stock indirectly; isn't that right?

A Yes.
Q In fact, when the Amazon deal closed at the -- in March of 2022, the Fund issued a press release disclosing that it stood to receive over $125 million on the MGM shares that it held directly and indirectly. Correct?
A We issued several press releases. I don't remember --
Q Okay. Do you remember that, that as a result of the MGM sale, the Fund was expected to receive approximately $126 million?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
A Roughly.
Q All right. In October 2020, just a few weeks before you sent your email, the Fund announced the commencement of a tender offer to acquire outstanding shares at a certain price. Correct?
A Yeah, I believe so.
Q And you authorized that, right?
A Yes.
Q And when a fund acquires shares and then retires them, the shareholders who did not tender consequently own a larger percentage of the fund than they did before the tender, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And the tender was completed in January, in the

first week of January 2001 [sic], correct?
A I don't remember when it was complete.
Q It started at the end of October 2020, and it ended sometime in January '21. Is that fair?
A Okay. I don't remember. Okay.
Q Do you want me to refresh your recollection?
A I'm just saying I don't remember.
Q Yeah, okay.
A I'm not dis...
Q Okay.
A -- denying it. I just don't remember the exact dates.
(Discussion.)
MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, can I mark for identification purposes Plaintiffs' Exhibit -- I'm just going to call it 100, to see if it refreshes the witness's recollection?
THE COURT: You may mark it.
MR. MORRIS: Okay.
THE COURT: We'll see where it goes from there.
(Debtors' Exhibit 100 is marked for identification.)
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q So, I've put --
MR. MCENTIRE: Hold it. Your Honor, I think we're now marking exhibits that we haven't put on an exhibit list.
MR. MORRIS: I'm trying to refresh his recollection.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.
MR. MORRIS: Yeah.
MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MORRIS: Okay? I haven't offered it in -- I haven't offered it --
THE COURT: I've not admitted -- I don't know what it is. I haven't admitted it yet. I'm waiting.
MR. MORRIS: I haven't offered it into evidence. He said he doesn't remember, --
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MORRIS: -- I've got an SEC document here, and I'm going to try and refresh his recollection.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q You're familiar with these forms, right?
A Generally.
Q In fact, in fact, you sign them in your capacity as the fund portfolio manager, right? Your signature is put on it, anyway?
A Generally.
Q Yeah. And do you see that this is the Form N-CSR that was filed with the SEC at the end of 2001 [sic] on behalf of NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust?
A Yes.

Q Okay. So if you just turn to Page 16. And the numbers are kind of at the bottom in the middle of the page. You'll see the notes to the consolidated financial statements.
A Yes.
Q Okay. And Note 1 discusses the organization. Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q And at the bottom of the left-hand column, it says, On January 8, 2021, the company announced the final result of its exchange offer pursuant to which the company purchased the company's outstanding -- the company's common shares in exchange for certain consideration.
Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q That's a reference to the tender offer that you authorized at the end of October, correct?
A Yes.
Q And then at the bottom it says, The company share -- company -- excuse me. I strike that. It says, quote, The common shares at a price of $12 per common share, for an aggregate purchase price of approximately $125 -- $105 million. Upon retirement of the repurchased shares, the net asset value was $152 million, or $17.41 million.
Do you see that?
A Yes.

Q Does that refresh your recollection that the tender offer was completed at the beginning of January?
A Yes.
Q And that's with all of the MGM stock that the Fund still owned at that time, right?
A Yeah. We -- we didn't -- we didn't violate --
Q You didn't --
A We didn't -- we didn't violate like Seery did. We didn't sell any shares or buy shares.
Q Okay.
MR. MORRIS: I'm going to move to strike that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So granted.
MR. MCENTIRE: Well, Your Honor, I've actually got a response to his motion to strike. This entire inquiry is irrelevant.
MR. MORRIS: Not --
MR. MCENTIRE: This has no relevance at all in connection with the allegations that we're making in this case.
THE COURT: Your response?
MR. MORRIS: My response, Your Honor, if you ask me -- let me just get a few more questions. He personally owned shares in the Fund. The Fund owned shares in MGM. And notwithstanding the restricted material, this is the insider,

and he is benefiting from himself through the Fund's repurchase of these shares in the tender offer, and he went and he had substantial holdings. I'll get to that in a minute.

So he is actually doing something worse than what Mr. Seery -- what he accuses Mr. Seery of, because he's buying shares for his own personal benefit. Right? He's the insider. Right? And the Fund owns the shares directly. There's never going to be an allegation that HCLOF ever owned any MGM stock. Never.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to allow this. Obviously, on redirect, you can further question on this --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

THE COURT: -- to --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, his suggestions and his accusations are purely argumentative.

THE COURT: Would you please speak in the microphone? We --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, he's standing in the way, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MCENTIRE: It's irrelevant.

THE COURT: There are two. There's room for both of you.

Continue. Go ahead.

MR. MCENTIRE: It's entirely irrelevant, and it's argumentative.

THE COURT: Okay. Overruled. You can continue.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q You did own an awful lot of the Fund's shares, didn't you?

A I owned some.

Q You owned some? You owned millions, right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And as a result of the tender, you owned a greater interest of the Fund, right?

A Yes.

Q And therefore you owned a greater number -- a greater portion of the MGM stock, the $125 million of MGM stock that was owned directly and indirectly by the Fund, correct?

A You do know insiders weren't permitted to participate in the tender, which would have kept my percentage the same.

Q Sir, you benefitted -- you didn't stop the tender, right? You didn't say, now I know what's going to happen, I should stop it? You benefitted from the tender. Can we just agree on that?

A I did everything I was supposed to do, notifying Compliance. If they thought it was material, they would have -- it was in their hands once I notified Compliance of the material --

Q Okay.

A -- nonpublic information.
Q I appreciate that. I just want --
A It wasn't my responsibility to do Compliance's job to call you or call --
Q Okay.
A -- the SEC or call anybody else.
Q But you will agree that, even though you had material nonpublic inside information, you didn't take any steps to stop the tender, correct?
A The tender was for a relatively small amount of the stock. But I did -- I would -- it would not be my responsibility to change or adjust the tender --
Q Okay.
A -- or what was happening.
Q Okay. And then the last question is, you benefitted from the tender because the Fund repurchased shares, which increased your percentage ownership of the Fund, and therefore your percentage ownership of the MGM shares that were held directly and indirectly. Is that fair?
A Marginally, I guess. Yes.
Q Okay. From the -- from the millions of shares, you would describe it as marginal? Okay.
Let me move on. You've testified now that you spoke with representatives of Farallon in the late spring, I guess beginning on May 28th. Right?

A Yes.
Q And that was two days after the MGM deal was publicly announced, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And had you ever communicated with Mr. Patel before that phone call?
A I don't believe so.
Q And then you spoke with Mr. Linn shortly after?
A Yes.
Q Had you ever spoken with Mr. Linn before that phone call with Mr. Linn?
A I don't believe so.
Q So these phone calls were the very first time that you ever spoke to either one of these gentlemen. Is that right?
A That I can remember.
Q Okay.
A If I ran into them at --
Q Uh-huh.
A -- a conference a decade ago, I don't know, but --
Q And they told you that they bought the shares in the February-March time frame, right?
A Yes.
Q And you have no reason to dispute that, correct?
A Correct.
Q Okay. And you didn't know how much they had paid for the

claims as a result of these conversations, correct?
A They did not admit a price.
Q Okay. And it's your testimony that there wasn't sufficient information in the public for them to buy -- this is your view -- that there wasn't sufficient information in the public to justify their purchases. Is that your view?
A Correct.
Q And even though you didn't think there was sufficient information in the public, you were prepared to pay 30 percent more than they did, right?
A Yes.
Q And is that because you were 30 percent more irrational than them or because you had material nonpublic inside information?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Argumentative, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Even at a 30 percent premium, it was less than I offered the UCC several months earlier, number one.

Number two, I was still under the illusion there was a desire to resolve the place, not burn it down. You know, there was -- all the original members were happy to sell at $150 million. It was a $500 or $600 million estate. There should be $400 or $500 million of residual value. It shouldn't all be going out the door to lawyers and others.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q You were willing to pay 30 percent more for an unknown purchase price, 30 percent more of an unknown purchase price, at a moment that you didn't believe there was sufficient information to buy the claims, correct?

A You have a couple misstatements in there. The Grosvenor piece was public. The Grosvenor piece traded at $67 million. So we knew that piece trade at around 50 cents. We knew from people in the marketplace the other pieces were trading right around that level.

So I wasn't just offering 30 percent on any willy-nilly number, 130 percent of any willy-nilly number. I knew they had paid around 50, 60 cents. And so I was offering 30 percent more than that. Thirty percent more than $150 million, call it $200 million. I had offered $230 or $240 million to resolve the whole estate before the plan went effective, and I got no response from the original UCC members.

Q So why didn't you just try to settle the case with them? Why did you try to buy the claim? Why, if you had these new people, and your good intentions were to finally get to a settlement of the case, why didn't you say, hey, guys, how do we resolve the case? Why did you want to buy the claims at a 30 percent premium over what they paid with no knowledge and no diligence, according to you? Can you explain that to Judge

Jernigan?
A Because Seery told them to hold on, don't worry, they were going to make $270 million.
Q That doesn't answer my question. Why didn't you try -- you had new owners. Why didn't you try to settle with them?
A When someone owns an asset, buying their asset is settling with them. What claim does Farallon have against us? At that point, they had no claims against us.
Q It doesn't settle the case, does it?
A But if we owned all the claims, it would settle the case. Just like if Seery had objected to the claims trading that they were supposed to give written notice to the Court, he had enough cash on the balance sheet to buy and retire all the claims.
Q All right. Let's go back, I apologize, to that Exhibit 11. No, it's not Exhibit 11. I think it's their Exhibit 4, your notes.
MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, may I have -- just have one moment?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. MORRIS: Can you tell me how long I've been going? That's really my question.
THE CLERK: So, on cross, --
MR. MORRIS: Yeah.
THE CLERK: -- you've been going for 32 minutes.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. Trying to speed this up.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q All right. So, do we have your handwritten notes, which are Exhibit 4, in this binder? Oh.

THE COURT: Do you want to put it up again on the screen?

MR. MORRIS: Ms. Canty, if you're listening and you can do that, that would be great. If not, --

(Discussion.)

MS. CANTY: One second, John.

MR. MORRIS: All right. He -- he's got it.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Okay. So, I just -- I just want to make -- you know, follow up on a few questions I asked you earlier on *voir dire*. So, these are your notes, right, and you said you write down the important stuff. Correct?

A I write down, yeah, the stuff I thought I would need for the next call.

Q Okay. And, you know, again, just so we have it all in one spot, it doesn't say anything about MGM. Correct?

A It does not.

Q It doesn't say anything about a *quid pro quo*, correct?

A *Quid pro*? Uh, no, it does not.

Q It doesn't say anything at all about Mr. Seery's

compensation, correct?
A It does not.
Q It doesn't say anything about the sharing of material nonpublic inside information, correct?
A When I told them discovery was coming, that was my response to I knew they had traded on material nonpublic information.
Q Okay. That -- you told them that?
A Yes.
Q Is that what you're saying now?
A Yes.
Q Oh, so that's what you told them? They didn't tell you that; that's what you told them?
A Yes.
Q And that's why you wanted discovery, right?
A I thought it would be a lot easier to get discovery on a situation like this than it has been for the last two years, yes.
Q Okay. Um, --
A In fact, I told them that it would be coming in the next few weeks. And this has been a couple years.
Q And that's exactly what you did, right?
A Well, we've been trying for two years to get --
Q Right.
A -- discovery in this.

Q Okay. So you filed your Texas 202, right?
A I don't know who filed what.
Q That was the one by Mr. Sbaiti that was filed under your name? Do you remember that?
A Generally.
Q Okay. Let's take a quick look at that document. It's #3 in our binder.
A Binder #3?
(Discussion.)
MR. MORRIS: Okay. I think #3 is in evidence, Your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Number 3 is in evidence.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MORRIS: Okay.
THE COURT: It is.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q And if you can turn to the last page, Mr. Dondero. Page 8.
A Yes.
Q Okay. And that's your signature, right?
A Yes.
Q And you verified that this document was true and correct within the best of your personal knowledge, correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you read it before you signed it?

A Probably.
Q You don't recall doing that?
A Not at this moment.
Q And you may not have. Is that fair?
A No, I probably did. Do you have a question?
Q I'm just wondering if you signed it or not.
A I did sign it.
Q Okay. Good. So, can you go to Paragraph 21? Well, let's start at Paragraph 20. It says that Mr. Seery, quote, has an age-old connection to Farallon, and upon information and belief, advised Farallon to purchase the claims.
Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q And then the next paragraph you refer to the telephone call that you had with Michael Linn, right?
A Yes.
Q It doesn't refer to any phone call with Mr. Patel, correct?
A It does not.
Q And the only reason that you swore under oath you were told that Farallon purchased the claims was because of Farallon's, quote, prior dealings with Mr. Seery. Correct? In Paragraph 21, it says, Relying entirely on Mr. Seery's advice solely because of their prior dealings?
A Yes.

Q Okay. You didn't -- you didn't swear under oath at that time that you were told that they bought the claims because of MGM. Right?
A If you're asking if this is -- it seems like it's not complete, if that's what you're asking me.
Q I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you what -- I'm asking you to confirm that you swore under oath to the Texas state court, just weeks after you had these conversations, about what you were told concerning Farallon's purchase of the claims.

I'm focused on Paragraph 21. The only reason that you gave, that you told the Texas state court under oath, was that Farallon told you they bought their claims because of their prior dealings with Seery. Right?
A Yeah. And that's true. And that's consistent with what I've said.
Q Okay. You didn't say anything about MGM, correct?
A Correct.
Q You didn't say anything about a *quid pro quo*, correct?
A Correct.
Q You didn't say anything about Mr. Seery's compensation. Correct?
A I did not.
Q You didn't say anything about the sharing of material nonpublic inside information, correct?

A Different document, different purposes.
Q Well, but that's now two documents. You have your notes and you had this document, neither one of which say any of those things. Fair?
A Different documents, different purposes. I don't know if that's --
Q Is it fair that neither one of those documents say any of those things?
A It's fair that they don't all match.
Q Okay. Okay. Well, that's a fair statement. Let's go to the next one. Do you remember the next year you filed an amended petition?
A What tab?
Q That's -- I appreciate that. It's Tab 4. Do you see at the last page you've again signed a verification?
A Yep.
Q And do you see this one's filed with the Texas state court on May 2, 2022?
A Yes.
Q And you swore under oath that this statement was complete, true, and accurate to the best of your knowledge, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Can you go to Page 5, please?
A Yes.
Q Directing your attention to Paragraph 23, do you see where

you say now that Farallon was relying, quote, on Mr. Seery's say-so because they had made so much money in the past when Mr. Seery told them to purchase claims.

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Again, you don't say anything about MGM, correct?

A Correct.

Q Again, you don't say anything about material nonpublic inside information, correct?

A Well, on 24 it does. Right? Mr. Seery had inside information on the price and value of claims. So, you've got to look at all of the bullet points.

Q But that's not the paragraph where you're talking -- that's -- it says, in other words. That's not the paragraph where you're describing your conversation with Farallon. That's your interpretation of it, correct, just as you just said?

A (no immediate response)

Q You told -- I'm sorry. I should let you finish the answer. That's your interpretation of it, correct?

A Well, I'm reading all the bullets in aggregate, and it's -- it's a picture of material information shared by Seery, not just MGM or one particular investment, but on all the other assets that aren't detailed in any of the public filings, also.

Q The only -- the only point I want to make, I think we can agree on this --
A Okay.
Q -- is that you believed that Mr. Seery gave them material nonpublic inside information. Farallon never told you that. Isn't that true? That's why you wanted discovery?
A They said they relied on him and did no diligence of their own. They were very express -- explicit about that.
Q Okay. Can you answer my question now?
A Which -- I thought -- that does, --
Q You concluded --
A -- yes.
Q -- that Mr. Seery gave them material nonpublic inside information. They never told you that. Fair?
A They said they relied on -- solely on Seery, didn't buy it for any other reason, and they did no due diligence of their own.
Q Okay. Let's go to the next one. Now, the no-due-diligence part, that's not in any version we've seen, right? That's something that you just --
A No, no, --
Q -- that you're just testifying to now? That's not in your notes, it's not in Version 1, and it's not in this version, correct?
A Well, let's go back to the Linn one, because when I was

going back and forth and he wouldn't give a price, he kept saying, Seery told us it's worth a lot more. And I kept saying, you've got to look at the burn, you've got to look at the professionals. And --

Q Okay.

A -- that's --

Q Shortly after this, you filed yet another declaration, right?

A Yes.

Q Uh-huh. Can you turn to #5? And this is another version of your recollection of what you were told, correct? In Paragraph 2?

A These are all -- I don't know why you're saying they're different. They're all the same. They're just slightly different verbiage. What's the major difference between any of them?

Q I'll ask, I'll ask you the question. The question is, you had never written in any of the prior versions that they didn't do any due diligence; isn't that right? You never -- you never talked about their due diligence in any prior version, correct?

A It's all -- it's all the same version. I don't -- some versions --

Q Can you answer my question?

A I don't know. I don't know --

Q Which --
A -- which ones included which -- I don't --
Q We've just looked at them. Do you want to look at them again?
A I just looked at one page in the other one and it was five pages. I just looked at the one page and I found two or three things --
Q Your notes --
A -- it didn't include, but --

MR. MORRIS: You know what. I don't want to argue. They say what they say, Your Honor, and I would ask the Court to look carefully at our objection to the motion because we lay all of this out.

Your Honor can -- here's the point, because I do want to finish up right now. There are five different versions of this conversation. They're laid out in the brief. And the question that you have to ask yourself, Your Honor, is, if you allow this case to go forward, how do they make a colorable claim when the story keeps changing?

And I'll just leave it at that, because, you know, the last version says MGM for the first time. Like, it comes out of nowhere. This -- his notes don't say it, he hasn't testified that that's what he was told, but somehow that's in his sworn statement.

So I'm just going to rest on the papers, because this is

-- I don't want to be argumentative.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, I'll object to the argument of counsel. He's just doing another opening statement here, and it's inappropriate and not proper.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree. This is Q and A.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: So, --

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Do you know -- do you have any knowledge or information as to how Mr. Seery's compensation was established?

A Uh, --

Q Withdrawn. I'm talking now not in his capacity as an independent director or the CEO of the Debtor. I'm only talking about in his capacity as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee. Do you have any personal knowledge as to how his compensation was established?

A The knowledge I have is that the Claimant Trust gives full latitude to change it at almost any time they want. Add more to it, add more than that we've seen, double it in the future if reserves are reversed. It can do anything it wants. And I guess we've seen some redacted partial statements of his compensation, but that's all I know.

Q Okay. You have no knowledge about how Mr. Seery's compensation package was determined, correct?

A I was not involved.
Q Okay. You've never -- I'll just leave it at that.
MR. MORRIS: I have nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Pass the witness. I'm sorry, I guess I should ask, do any of the other responding parties have examination?
MR. STANCIL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No? Okay. Redirect?
MR. MCENTIRE: Just very briefly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you, Your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Mr. Dondero, you remember the questions about Judge Jernigan walking into the courtroom on June 8 two years ago saying, MGM is sold, maybe we can settle this case? Do you recall those questions?
A Yes.
Q And do you remember Mr. Morris's dramatic suggestion that, well, how did Judge Jernigan know, or to that effect?
A Yes.
Q Well, that had already been announced, had it not, publicly?
A Yes.
Q Several weeks before?

A Yes.
Q I'd like to direct your attention -- do you still have Exhibit 4 that he handed you? Do you have Exhibit 4 there?
A Uh, --
Q His exhibit?
A Is that the notes?
Q No, it's -- Exhibit 4 is the verified amended petition to take deposition before suit -- take -- in the state court. To -- deposition.
A You've got to give me more of a clue. I'm sorry. There's like six binders.
MR. MCENTIRE: Mr. Morris, can you show us where the exhibit --
MR. MORRIS: Sure. Which one is it?
MR. MCENTIRE: It's Exhibit 4. I'm going to talk to him about Exhibit 4 (inaudible) that you've have used with this witness.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q I assume -- Mr. Dondero, were you assuming from the tone and the substantive content of his questions that Mr. Morris is suggesting that your notes are not reliable?
A He was trying to make it seem like the versions were different. They were all 90 percent the same. Different -- it seemed like different emphasis for different purposes. And then you have to remember we learned more about Farallon and

Stonehill over time. Like, in the beginning, when I had -- when I -- we didn't even know Stonehill was involved when I --

Q Sure.

A -- first talked to -- when --

Q Well, he made the big suggestion about you never talked about due diligence before. Turn to Exhibit 4, Paragraph 23, which he did not address with you. Can you turn to Paragraph 23 of Exhibit 4? Mr. Morris omitted to refer you to this particular paragraph.

A 23? Go ahead.

Q Would you read it into the record?

A (reading) On a telephone call between Petitioner and Michael Linn, a representative of Farallon, Michael Linn informed the Petitioner Farallon had purchased the claim sight-unseen and with no due diligence, a hundred percent relying on Mr. Seery's say-so, because they had made so much in the past with Mr. -- when Mr. Seery had (overspoken).

Q Now, since you've an opportunity to see other paragraphs and other -- that he was otherwise not selecting, you did refer to the -- to what Mr. Linn had told you about in May of 2021?

A Yes. I've been very consistent. Listen, I believe Farallon tapes all their conversations. So, eventually, as this goes further, I purposefully --

Q Well, let's --

MR. MORRIS: I move to strike, Your Honor.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q He also did not direct your attention or the Court's attention to Paragraph 27 of Exhibit 4, selecting -- presumably strategically selecting not to refer to that paragraph. Do you see Paragraph 27?

A Yes.

Q Could you read that into the record, please?

A (reading) However, Mr. Seery is privy to material nonpublic information, inside information of many of the securities that Highland deals in, as well as the funds that Mr. Seery manages through Highland. One of these assets was a publicly-traded security that Highland was an insider of, and therefore should not have traded, whether directly or indirectly, given its possession of insider information.

Q Isn't that paragraph just basically addressing MGM?

A Yeah, that's the only major position we had that that would apply to.

Q So the suggestion that you're just making this MGM stuff up is not true. It's consistent with what you've (inaudible) in other courts as well, correct?

A Yes. I believe it's disingenuous to say that there's different versions of my story.

Q Well, let's continue with Mr. Morris's strategy. Go to Exhibit 3, please. Mr. Morris suggested that there's no reference at all in any of these prior pleadings about Mr. Seery's excess conversation. Do you recall that series of questions?

A Yes. Or his statements, yes.

Q Yes. And he did not direct your --

MR. MORRIS: I move to strike. I asked him if he had any knowledge of the man's compensation package. That's what I asked him.

MR. MCENTIRE: No, sir. Your Honor, that's not what he asked him. That was one of the questions he asked. The other question was, there's nothing in here about compensation. That's what I'd like to address now.

MR. MORRIS: Oh, go right ahead.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Directing your attention --

THE COURT: You can ask. I'd have to go back and check the record whether you had that second question you mentioned. I remember questions about does he have knowledge of Seery's compensation. I just can't remember if he asked, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: -- were there references to it in the --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, --

THE COURT: -- prior pleadings.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- for the record, we'll make it clear that there is a reference.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q If I could direct your attention to Paragraph 23, Exhibit -- as to --

MR. MORRIS: What exhibit is it?

MR. MCENTIRE: It's Exhibit 3.

MR. MORRIS: Hold on one second.

MS. MUSGRAVE: Your exhibit.

THE COURT: Highland's Exhibit 3.

MR. MORRIS: Give me a moment.

THE COURT: Page what?

MR. MCENTIRE: It's Paragraph 22 on Page 5.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. My Exhibit 3?

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Could you read for me, please, Mr. --

MR. MORRIS: Hold on one second. It's my Exhibit 3 or your exhibit?

MR. MCENTIRE: It's your exhibit. This is Hunter Mountain's binder.

MR. MORRIS: Ah, I apologize.

MR. MCENTIRE: You were just using it.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. All right. Go ahead. What

paragraph were you?
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q I'd direct your attention, Mr. Dondero, to Paragraph 22.
MR. MORRIS: Yeah.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Would you read -- would you read Paragraph 22 into the record, please?
A (reading) Mr. Seery had much to gain by brokering a sale of the claim suggested to Muck, mainly his knowledge that Farallon as a friendly investor would allow him to remain as Highland's CEO with virtually unfettered discretion to administer Highland. In addition, Mr. Seery's written compensation package incentivized him to continue the bankruptcy for as long as possible.
Q There was also a series of questions to you about a transaction involving NexPoint -- NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust. Do you recall those questions?
A Yeah. Let's talk about that.
Q All right. Tell me what the transaction was.
A I'm sorry. The tender that he was asking about or --
Q Yes, the tender.
A There was -- investors wanted some shares retired, and we didn't have enough cash on the balance sheets. So we tendered in the form of giving them Preferred, which was like equity but a better dividend or a more secured dividend, and 20

percent cash. And then insiders weren't allowed to participate. But the whole tender was only for eight or ten percent of the nominal amount outstanding. And again, you've got a package of securities, so you didn't get any -- you didn't cash. And although it reduced the share count, it also increased the Preferred or the claims against the company. So it was marginally accretive, I guess.

Q All right.

A But, again, as far as inside information is concerned, Compliance is a separate party organization that reports up to the SEC. Has a dotted line to me. Reports to the SEC. They make sure everything we do is compliant.

Q Mr. Dondero, --

A Yeah. Can --

Q -- you didn't participate in the transaction, did you?

A No. Insiders weren't allowed to participate in the transaction.

MR. MCENTIRE: Reserve the rest of my questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any recross?

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q The reference to the compensation that we just looked at, that was your own personal view, not something that anybody from Farallon ever told you, correct? You can go back and

look.
A Yeah, that --
Q I mean, it's not a trick question.
A Yeah, that was my pleading.
Q Okay. And that was your own speculation, if you will? It had nothing to do with anything Farallon ever told you, correct?
A I never discussed Seery's compensation with Farallon.
Q Okay. Thank you, sir, very much. Just one last question. The price of the tender --
A Yes.
Q -- was based in part on the value of the MGM stock, correct?
A The tender was based on market price --
Q And --
A -- of where the closed-in fund was trading. It was trading at a discount. And the discount to NAV, the NAV included MGM accurately marked at whatever time.
Q I appreciate that.
MR. MORRIS: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dondero, that concludes your testimony.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: You are excused from the witness box.
(The witness steps down.)

THE COURT: We probably should take a break, right?

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Caroline, do you want to give them the aggregate time used?

THE CLERK: Yes. The Defendants used 91 minutes right now. And the Respondents together, 86 minutes.

THE COURT: Okay. I thought it was going to be higher than that.

(Laughter.)

MR. MCENTIRE: That's what it feels like.

MR. MORRIS: You were wishing.

THE COURT: I was wishing. Okay. A ten-minute break.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess ensued from 3:17 p.m. until 3:28 p.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. We're back on the record in the Highland matter. Mr. McEntire, you may call your next witness.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, Hunter Mountain would call Mr. Seery adversely.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, we're waiting for Mr. Morris for just 60 more seconds. I think he's on his way back to the courtroom.

THE COURT: Okay. I just noticed.

Did I hear you say you're going to call him virtually?

MR. MCENTIRE: Adversely.

THE COURT: Oh, adversely? Okay. I'm so used to hearing the word "virtually" the past few years.

Oh, and there he is. Okay.

MR. SEERY: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Seery, welcome.

MR. SEERY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Please raise your right hand.

(The witness is sworn.)

THE WITNESS: I do.

THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.

JAMES P. SEERY, JR., HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S ADVERSE WITNESS, SWORN

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Seery, would you please state your full name for the record?

A James P. Seery, Jr.

Q And you and I met for the first time I believe it was last Friday in your deposition; is that correct?

A You were by video.

Q I mean, --

A We didn't actually meet.

Q Correct. You are currently the CEO of the Reorganized

Debtor?
A That's correct.
Q Prior to your appointment as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor, you've never served as a CEO of a reorganized debtor in the past, have you?
A I have not.
Q You previously served as the chief executive officer of Highland Capital as a Debtor-In-Possession. Is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And that was the first time you'd ever served in a position such as that; is that correct?
A As the CEO of a debtor, yes.
Q Right. You also now currently serve as a Trustee for the Highland Claimant Trust, which was put into effect after the effective date of the plan, correct?
A Yes, I'm the Claimant Trustee.
Q All right. That's the first time --
THE COURT: Mr. McEntire, we usually require standing at the podium. I mean, do you need --
MR. MCENTIRE: That's fine. I'm totally fine.
THE COURT: Okay. That's --
MR. MCENTIRE: I forgot.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q That was -- and your capacity as the Trustee for the

Claimant Trust, that's a first experience as well, correct?
A As the Claimant Trustee, yes.
Q All right. And in these various capacities as a CEO of the Reorganized Debtor, do you consider yourself to be subject to the Investment Advisers Act?
A No, I don't I'm subject to the Investment Advisers Act. I think Highland in certain capacities could be.
Q All right. But do you have any duties that -- that you are required to fulfill under the Investment Advisers Act accordingly?
A Do I?
Q Yes.
A I believe Highland does. I don't know that I have any personal duties.
Q All right, sir. Let me now talk a little bit about your duties that you did have at Highland. You agree that when you were at Highland you had fiduciary duties that you owed to the estate?
A Yes.
Q What were those duties?
A To generally treat the estate on an honest and fair matter.
Q Avoid conflicts of interest?
A Yes.
Q Not self-deal?

A Yes.
Q Do you agree with me that you would have a duty not to trade on material inside -- material nonpublic information?
A Generally, I would have a duty to not trade on material nonpublic information, yes.
Q Can you think of an exception?
A There may be. I just don't think of any one off the top of my head.
Q So, today, you would agree, for purposes of these proceedings, that you would have an obligation as the CEO of the Debtor-In-Possession not to participate in a transaction involving material nonpublic information? Agreed?
A It would depend. So, for example, if I was trading with someone else who had material nonpublic information, that might be a permissible transaction.
Q The HarbourVest transaction, you were involved in negotiating the HarbourVest settlement?
A Yes, I was.
Q Did that involve any component related to MGM stock?
A No, it did not.
Q There was no involvement at all concerning the transfer of MGM stock to any entity as a result of that transaction?
A None whatsoever.
Q Okay. And does HCLOF not have a participation at this time in MGM stock?

A We call it H-C-L-O-F.
Q Yes.
A It does not own MGM stock, and as I far as I know, never owned MGM stock.
Q Okay. You agree you received an email from Mr. Dondero in December of 2020. We've had it here before. You've seen it in the courtroom, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Did you ever send -- forward that email to anyone else?
A I'm sorry. Could you repeat that?
Q Did you forward that email on to anyone else?
A I believe I did, yes.
Q To whom?
A I certainly discussed it with counsel. I believe I forwarded it to counsel, both the Pachulski firm and the WilmerHale firm. Thomas Surgent had gotten it. He was on the email. And I also forwarded it, I believe -- certainly, discussed it -- with the other independent directors.
Q Okay. I'm not going to talk about your conversations with other lawyers in-house, okay, or your outside counsel. Did you take any steps yourself personally to make sure that MGM stock was placed on a restricted list at Highland Capital after you received that email?
A No. MGM was already on the restricted list at Highland

Capital.
Q Okay. And is that because of Mr. Dondero's position on the board of MGM?
A It -- I believe that's the reason. It was on before I got to Highland.
Q Okay. And you agree, do you not, sir, that the email that you received from Mr. Dondero also contained material nonpublic information?
A I don't think so, no.
MR. MCENTIRE: Would you put up Exhibit -- our Exhibit 4, please?
MR. MORRIS: 4?
MR. MCENTIRE: 4.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Did H-C-L-O-F -- I'll refer to it as HCLOF, you refer to it as H-C-L-O-F -- did that -- did HCLOF own any funds that owned MGM stock?
A HCLOF had interest in certain Highland-managed CLOs that did own some.
Q As a result of the Highland settlement -- excuse me, the HarbourVest settlement, was there any impact on who owned some of those CLO funds?
A No.
Q Okay. How was the CLOs, the funds, handled, if at all, in the -- in the HarbourVest settlement?

A They didn't have any impact whatsoever on the HarbourVest settlement.
Q Looking at Exhibit 4 for a moment, please, did the interests, did the interests in -- HarbourVest's interests in any of those CLOs transfer?
A No, they did not.
Q Okay. And did HCLOF acquire any interest in any of those CLO's as a consequence of the HarbourVest settlement?
A No, it did not.
Q Looking at Exhibit 4. Excuse me, Exhibit 3 is what I meant to say. Exhibit 3.
THE COURT: Hunter Mountain Exhibit 3?
MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor. Excuse me.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q This is the email that we were just referring to that you received, correct?
A Yes.
Q And you don't think -- you knew that Mr. Dondero was on the board of directors of MGM?
A Yes.
Q And he -- as a member of the board of directors, when you received this, you see where he indicated that it was probably a first-quarter event? Do you see that?

A I see what it says, yes.
Q Okay. And you did not think that that was material nonpublic information?
A No, I did not.
Q When he indicated that Amazon and Apple were actively diligencing -- are diligencing in the data room, both continue to express material interest, coming from a member of the board of directors of MGM, you did not think that was material nonpublic information?
A I did not, no.
Q You know the difference between a newspaper article or a media article that discusses rumors of a possible sale and the difference between that and a member of the board of directors saying that a sale is going to occur? You understand the difference between the two?
A Between the two things you just outlined?
Q Yes.
A Yes. One you said a sale is going to occur, and the other you said a media report. But it would depend on what's in the media report. Some media reports are pure speculation. Others have a lot of detail, and they clearly came from an inside source, and that's why the market moves on them.
Q Okay. So what you're suggesting to me, that there was some indication in the media press before you received this email suggesting that there was actually going to be a sale in

the first quarter of 2021?
A I don't know if it had a first-quarter event in it, but certainly it was clear from the media reports and the actual quotes from Kevin Ulrich of Anchorage, who was the chairman at MGM, that a transaction had to take place very quickly. And in fact, the transaction did not take place in the first quarter.
Q Okay. So you -- when you received this particular email, you did not think that it was requiring any additional protection at -- in any way? Is that what you're suggesting to this Court?
A That the email required additional protection?
Q That you didn't take additional steps to make sure that it was maintained on the restricted list.
A It was already on the restricted list, so there was no change.
Q Was it --
A I --
MR. MORRIS: Hold on. Let him finish.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
A I was suspicious when I got the email, but I didn't think I had to do anything else than the steps I told you I just took.
Q Yeah, I'm not asking whether you were suspicious or not. My question's a little bit different. You understand that MGM

was taken off your restricted list in April of 2021?
A I understand that that's what you've recently shown me. I wasn't aware of that fact or I didn't have a recollection of that fact, but certainly April of 2021 would be beyond the first quarter. Mr. Dondero was not an employee, an affiliate, subject to a contractual relationship. He had no duty to Highland and Highland had no duty to him. And in fact, it was quite antagonistic by that time. So it would be appropriate to take MGM off the restricted list at the end of that time.
Q Well, hopefully you won't take this as argumentative, but I object as nonresponsive. That really wasn't my question. Okay? My question --
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q -- is a little bit different. As far as you were concerned, MGM was on the restricted list and stayed on the restricted list all the way until the public announcement in May of 2021?
A That's not true.
Q When did you first become aware it was taken off the restricted list?
A I didn't -- I wasn't aware that it had come off the restricted list. I would have assumed it would have been off the restricted list once Mr. Dondero had been severed from Highland.

Q I see. Now, Mr. Dondero has relayed a conversation that he had with Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn, suggesting that they were particularly optimistic about MGM based upon what you told them.

A I --

Q Let me finish. If that occurred, are you suggesting that that is a lie?

A Two things. One is I don't think he actually testified to that. I think he said he had a conversation with Mr. Patel. Then he had a different conversation with Mr. Linn, and a subsequent conversation with Mr. Linn. So the way he laid it out were multiple conversations.

Q Agreed.

A I don't -- I don't know which one you're talking about.

Q Mr. Dondero testified that Mr. Patel was particularly optimistic about the investment because of what he had learned from Mr. -- from you about MGM.

MR. MORRIS: I dispute that characterization. Why can't he just ask the question?

MR. MCENTIRE: That is my question. If that --

THE COURT: What is the question? I'm not sure I hear the question.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm getting lost because I'm getting interrupted. I'll try to rephrase it again.

MR. MORRIS: It's my first objection.

MR. MCENTIRE: And I --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm just going to rephrase, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just rephrase your question.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Dondero has testified that Farallon advised him in May of 2021 that they were optimistic about MGM based upon what you told them. Assuming that to be the case, do you deny that happened?

A I do deny that happened. Because I can't -- I don't know what Farallon told him, but I never told Farallon anything. And a conversation on May 28th, after the May 26th announcement that MGM was going through, might make people optimistic that it could go through, but there was a very difficult FTC process that MGM would have to go through.

Q And I'm referring to that. If Farallon stated that they were optimistic about MGM based upon what you had told them, --

A That would not be true.

Q -- that would be false?

A That would not be true.

Q And is Mr. Dondero says that's what Farallon told them, that would also be false?

A That's correct.
Q So we have your statement, we have what may be Farallon's statement, and we have what Mr. Dondero believes may have been Farallon's statement, and you're saying the latter two are just not true?
A I didn't have a conversation with Farallon about MGM that -- that I recall --
Q Well, you're on the witness stand.
A -- virtually at any time.
Q You're on the witness stand.
A Oh, I'm aware of where I am sitting.
Q Yeah. Good. We've got that cleared up. Now, are you suggesting that -- that you may not specifically recall this conversation?
A No, I am not saying that at all. After May 26th, when the MGM announcement was made and it was public, I may have had conversations with a number of people about MGM.
Q Well, let's make sure the record is clear. Did you call Farallon on May 26th and say, hey, did you know that MGM just sold?
A No, I don't recall any such conversation, and I wouldn't have had to, since it was in the paper.
Q I'm not talking about what's in the paper. I'm talking about conversations between you and Farallon.
A Yeah. I don't recall having a conversation with Farallon

on May 26th.
Q How about May 27th?
A Not that I recall, no.
Q How about May 28th?
A Not that I recall off the top of my head.
Q And we understand that that's the day that Mr. Dondero actually had his conversation that he's reported, at least, with Farallon. Do you recall that?
A That's what he claims, yes.
Q You were with a company called River -- you're a lawyer, correct?
A I am. I'm in retired status.
Q Okay. I wish I was.
A It's simply retiring your license and not having to take the CLE.
Q Understood. Now, you were with a company called River Birch?
A Yes.
Q And from River Birch, you went to Guggenheim Securities?
A That's correct.
Q At Guggenheim Securities, did you go to Farallon and meet with Mr. Patel in their offices in San Francisco?
A I believe we did, yes.
Q You call it a meet-and-greet?
A I do, yes.

Q That was in 2017?
A 2017, 2018. I'm not exactly sure when it was.
Q And one of the purposes of meet-and-greet is to solicit business or to see if a business opportunity -- see if it exists?
A That's not correct, no.
Q What is a meet-and-greet for, then?
A It's to meet the people at the fund and to greet the people at the fund. Introduce them to other people in your firm.
Q Just because it's going to be fun, or does it have a business angle to it?
A Oh, it hopefully will be fun, yes, but it's done in order to build a relationship over time. You're not in there soliciting business. If you do that, you won't do very well.
Q Okay. Fair enough. So you're there trying to develop a relationship with Farallon?
A Guggenheim was, yes.
Q And you were part of it?
A That's correct.
Q And what was your job at Guggenheim?
A I was co-head of credit.
Q Is that a fairly significant position at Guggenheim?
A Not really, no.
Q It's not significant at all?

A No.
Q All right.
A Which is why --
Q Well, you left --
A Which is why they don't have that business.
Q Okay. So is that why you left Guggenheim?
A It -- I did, yeah. It wasn't a good fit for either Guggenheim or for me, because it really wasn't something --
Q When did you --
A -- that they were set up to do.
Q -- leave Guggenheim?
A In 2019.
Q And then you went back to Farallon to meet with them again, did you not?
A I met with Farallon while I was in San Francisco with my wife.
Q Okay. Did you call ahead to arrange the meeting, or was it just a --
A I --
Q -- a blind call?
A I did call ahead, yes.
Q A cold call, I guess, is the word -- the phrase that they use. Okay. So -- and was that a meet-and-greet?
A That was again, yes.
Q Again, what were you trying to do? Develop a relationship

with Farallon?
A I was trying to catch up with them after having met them previously. And that was just Raj Patel. And this one I also met Michael Linn.
Q Okay. What kind of business were you in when you met with them the second time?
A I wasn't doing anything.
Q What were you hoping to do?
A I was hoping to get back into the investing side of the business, from running a credit-type lending business at Guggenheim, which is what they tried to do and it didn't work out. And I wanted to get back to what I was doing more at River Birch, but I was looking at other opportunities, whatever came along.
Q Well, what were the different options that you were looking at?
A I was looking at potentially getting back into investing, joining potentially a restructuring firm, any options like that. I was not looking to become a lawyer again.
Q And why would meeting and greeting with Farallon fit in within that scenario, the strategic scenarios that you've just discussed?
A They're a giant hedge fund.
Q A giant hedge fund?
A Yes.

Q And so it would be good to have a relationship with a giant hedge fund, wouldn't it?
A And to know what their thinking of the markets, where the opportunity set might be, who they are dealing with and interacting with. Those are -- those are valuable things to know over time.
Q And --
A And you need to maintain those relationships in order to be --
Q Sure.
A -- part of any business.
Q Sure. These meet-and-greets can actually evolve and provide relationship benefits, correct?
A I don't -- I'm not sure what you mean by relationship benefits.
Q Sloppy words for -- on my part. They can evolve into something that is a meaningful relationship?
A They could over time, yes.
Q And we know that after you became the CEO of Highland Capital that you received a call from, was it Farallon, to congratulate you on your appointment?
A It was an email.
Q And that was in the summer of 2020, shortly after your meet-and-greet out in San Francisco?
A Your calendar's a bit off, but it was in June of 2020, so

that would have been more than shortly after, but yes.
Q Okay. And who contacted you to congratulate you on your appointment?
A This was my appointment as an independent director. I had not yet been appointed as CEO or CRO. This was in June of 2020, and it was Michael Linn.
Q Michael Linn? Was it a telephone call?
A I think 30 seconds ago I said it was an email.
Q Fair enough. Do you still have that email?
A I do, yes.
Q Okay. He contacted you again, "he" being Michael Linn, he contacted you again in January of 2021, did he not?
A That's correct, yes.
Q He wanted to see if he could get involved somehow in the Highland bankruptcy?
A Well, he congratulated -- he didn't congratulate -- he wished me a happy new year, and he basically said it looks like you're -- again, he's following the case -- it looks like you're doing good work. Is there any way for us to get involved? We're interested in claims or buying assets.
Q Okay. And Stonehill. Now, you know the founder of Stonehill, do you not?
A No, I don't know him. I've met him several times.
Q Doesn't he come by and stop in and talk with you when you're in Stonehill's offices? And that's happened recently?

A Your use of the plural is incorrect, and you know that from the deposition. I was in Stonehill's office one time, and I was in a meeting with Mr. Stern. We ended up having a board meeting from Stonehill's office with the other participants on video, and Mr. Motulsky came in and said hello.
Q All right. And who's Mr. Motulsky?
A He's the founder of Stonehill.
Q I see. And did you know Mr. Motulsky before that?
A I'd interacted with Mr. Motulsky over the years at -- mostly at industry-type functions.
Q Okay. Now, Stonehill is also a hedge fund?
A Yes.
Q Are they different than Farallon in that regard, or similar?
A I don't know as much about what their business is. They certainly do a direct lending component, so I know that they -- they will do some direct lending, which I don't think is something Farallon really does. Farallon is much bigger, as I understand it, but I don't really know the size of Stonehill.
Q Okay.
A I know they're not a $50 billion fund like Farallon.
Q And do you know Mr. Stern at Farallon?
A I now know him, yes, because he was -- he's really the representative on the -- no, he's not the representative on

the board, but he is the one who manages the Stonehill and Jessup positions for Stonehill.

Q Well, we know that after you were CEO of Highland, you also got a text message, correct, a text message from someone at Stonehill, correct?

A Mr. Stern sent me a text message reintroducing himself -- I don't know if it was re- or just introducing -- and sent me his email and asked me to contact him about the case. This was at the end of February/beginning of March 2021, after the confirmation order.

Q Okay. After the -- after the confirmation order?

A Yes.

Q I believe the confirmation order -- I may be wrong -- I thought it was like the 21st, 22nd, somewhere in there. Does that sound right to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So, shortly after confirmation, then, Farallon calls you to congratulate you and wants to see how they can get involved?

A No. There was no congratulations there. Shortly after the confirmation order, which I believe was at least a week to ten days after confirmation, I got the communication from Mr. Stern to try to connect about the case.

Q All right.

A He's at Stonehill, not Farallon.

Q Correct. Now, --
A You said Farallon.
Q I misspoke, then. Thank you for correcting me. Let's talk about -- you live in New York?
A I do.
Q You're involved with a charity called Team Rubicon?
A Yes.
Q And Team Rubicon is a -- is that a veterans-type charity?
A Yeah. It's a veteran-led organization, and what it does is connects veterans to disasters. And mostly in the U.S., but also all over. So if there's a flood, if there's a hurricane, if there's an earthquake, veterans who have been trained in -- by the military in ready response and really being able to handle themselves when things are bad are deployed to help the communities that are hit. So I think that Team Rubicon likes to think, you know, on your worst day they're your best friend.
Q So you're -- are you on the board?
A No, I'm not.
Q You're on the Host Committee?
A I was on the Host Committee last year, and I'll be on the Host Committee this year.
Q Okay. And you have charity events?
A We have a charity event, yes.
Q Okay. And the purpose of the charity event is to raise a

bunch of money?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. Have you been successful in the past?
A I do my best. Team Rubicon is a big organization. It's done very well raising money. It doesn't have an endowment. The founder's theory was that if people give us money, we're supposed to spend it on helping other people. And so each year it has to raise more money.
Q And Stonehill has been -- has contributed to your charity?
A I believe Stonehill, one or two years, and I should know this, and I didn't look it up after our deposition, gave $10,000.
Q Okay. Maybe once, maybe twice?
A Maybe twice.
Q Okay.
A I hope more.
Q Okay. And they also attend your -- your actual charity events, do they not?
A No.
Q All right. They just give money?
A That's right. And the Mike Stern who's on the board of Team Rubicon is not the Mike Stern who is at Stonehill. It's an older gentleman who's in Texas who just happens to give a lot of money to --
Q All right.

A -- Team Rubicon.
Q You also represented Blockbuster. Take that back. Were you the lawyer or the attorney representing the Creditors Committee, the UCC, in the *Blockbuster* bankruptcy?
A No, I was not.
Q Tell me what your capacity was.
A I represented a group of bondholders, secured bondholders. So I represented the group.
Q And was Stonehill a member of that group?
A Not that I recall, but your pleadings seem to indicate that they were. So if they were, they were a small participant. The largest participant was Carl Icahn, who owned about 30 percent of it. Then the others who were big were DK, Davidson Kempner, Monarch, Owl Creek. Those were the big players.
Q Well, --
A When Carl Icahn is in your group, you remember that.
Q Yeah, well, Carl Icahn is not here. We're talking about Stonehill right now.
A And I said I don't remember them actually being a part of it. If they were, --
Q Okay. Well, let me -- let me give you what I'm going to mark as Exhibit 80. That's your name at the top, right?
(Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Exhibit 80 is marked for identification.)

A That's correct, yes.
Q You were at the time with Sidley & Austin?
A That's correct, yes.
Q This is *In re Blockbuster*.
MR. MCENTIRE: Scroll down, please.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q And steering group of senior -- involves -- well, let's count them. Let's see. One, two, three, four, five. Five entities comprising the backstop lenders. Is that correct?
A I think that's the steering group. So, in order to represent the group, you need to try to assemble a large-enough group that it's material to the company. And then the company, if you're -- particularly if you're over 50 percent, will pay the fees of the group. And you don't represent any individual member of the group. I've never represented Carl Icahn. I represent the group. And if folks want to stay in the group, they can stay. If they want to trade out of the group, they do. And the company will generally continue to pay the fees, and you represent the group so long as you have a controlling interest in the -- whatever the issue is.
Q Well, that's interesting, because now what you're telling me is that this group right here, this is kind of like the executive committee of the group.
A No, it's called the steering group, and it doesn't necessarily --

Q That's fine.
A Well, it's not an executive committee. It doesn't necessarily include just the largest. Some large holders won't be on it. The largest holders here by a long shot were Icahn, who --
Q I'm not talking about --
A -- unloaded, as I say, over 30 percent. Monarch, Owl Creek, and I just don't recall Stonehill being a part of it.
Q I'm not really interested in Carl Icahn. I just want to establish this is a steering group in which you were the lead counsel and Blockbuster was on it. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Excuse me. Not Blockbuster.
A I'm sorry.
Q Stonehill.
A No, it's the Blockbuster case in 2010, and Stonehill was apparently on it, but I just don't have a recollection of their involvement.
Q All right. So when Mr. -- who sent you the text message in February of 2021 from Stonehill?
A Michael Stern.
Q And had you actually met him before?
A I think I had, but we didn't know each --
Q All right.
A You know, we certainly didn't know each other, we'd never

worked on anything together, but I --

Q Do you have all your text messages from that period of time, that first quarter of 2021?

A I believe I do, yes.

Q They're saved?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When did the automatic delete button on your cell phone start?

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, objection. We've covered this this morning. I believe this is a motion coming down the pike, and I thought we had -- thought we had had tabled this preservation issue.

MR. MCENTIRE: This has a direct bearing on his communications with Farallon and Stonehill in this period of time, Your Honor. We have one text message that he's identified, and I have a right to examine whether there are others. Or if not, why not.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, he's --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's a legitimate -- I'm not finished. That's a legitimate area of inquiry in this examination.

MR. STANCIL: He's testified he has them all. Your Honor did not order document discovery. I think that's it for purposes of today's hearing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I sustain the objection.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q After this text message that you received from Stonehill in February 2021, did you have any follow-up?
A Well, his text message, I don't recall what it said other than I was -- I do recall that he gave me his email address, because I didn't have it. And we just didn't know each other well enough. But we definitely had follow -up. He wanted to talk to me, and at some point we talked.
Q And when did you talk?
A I'm sorry?
Q When did you talk?
A When? I -- it was at the, initially, end of February, beginning of March. So it would have been somewhere in that -- in that time period.
Q End of February, beginning of March? And we also know that you next talked to Farallon, according to your testimony, and they advised you they had already purchased all their claims as of March 15, correct?
A On March 15th, they sent me an email that said they had purchased an interest in claims, and --
Q So -- go ahead.
A I'm not finished. And then at some point after that, we arranged a quick discussion, because that was a curious --
Q I want to assure you I will always let you finish.
A Thank you very much.

Q Unlike others. So, with that said, Mr. Seery, can you identify -- let me back up. Was there a data room set up at Highland Capital for claims investors to come in and look at data?
A No, there was not.
Q Are you aware, sitting here today, that Farallon did any due diligence in connection with its investment in the claims it purchased that are at issue in this proceeding?
A I have indication that they did some, yes. I don't know how much they did.
Q What is the indication?
A In the email in June of 2020, Mr. Linn said that he and his associate were following the case, thought it was -- that's the one that congratulated me on being an independent director, and that they were paying attention to the case. And it -- I don't recall the exact other items in there, but it was clear that they were following the Highland matter. And then in the email in January 2021, he also indicated that they'd been following the case further, and said, Looks like you have things well in hand, or something to that effect. So --
Q Do you have that email, too? Have you saved that email?
A They're all saved, yeah.
Q Okay. So let's talk about that. But you had no data room that would allow them to come in and actually investigate the

underlying assets. Is that correct?
A Not in respect of anybody trying to buy claims. We did have a data room with respect to financing.
Q Please listen to my question. I'll get to it. Data room for claims investors. There was no data room set up on or before March 15 to allow Farallon to come in and investigate its investment in this claim?
A That's correct.
Q There was no data room set up prior to March 15 to allow Stonehill to come in and investigate its investment in the claims it purchased. Is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q Can you identify any due diligence, sitting here today -- let me back up. You heard Mr. Dondero's testimony about portfolio companies, correct?
A Yes.
Q Portfolio companies are companies in which Highland Capital has an interest that actually have separate and distinct management. Is that correct?
A Generally. And it -- I disagree with some of his testimony, but generally that's correct, yes.
Q Well, okay. Let's just take on the part that you agree with. With regard to those portfolio companies, was there anything that was disclosed in the Highland publicly-available financials that would allowed a detailed analysis of

Highland's investments in each of those portfolio companies?
A I don't know. Certainly, in the four or five sets of projections that were filed, there were financial projections. I'm not sure exactly what was included in each one or in the disclosure statement.
Q Fair enough. Well, I'll represent to you I don't think there's detailed information on each individual portfolio company.
MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, he's not here to testify. I move to strike.
MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q In that regard, Mr. Seery, can you identify what Farallon did to investigate the underlying asset value of any of these portfolio companies?
A I don't have any knowledge as to what Farallon did before it bought claims.
Q Can you identify what due diligence Stonehill did to investigate the underlying asset value in any of these portfolio companies?
A I don't -- I mean, in connection with claims purchasing, I have no idea what Stonehill did.
Q Now, I understand that you solicited -- perhaps I don't recall correctly. Did you solicit both Farallon and Stonehill

to participate in a bid to provide exit financing?
A I don't think that's fair. I solicited Farallon because I knew they already owned claims. Stonehill reached out to me, and that was one of the things they were interested in doing, if there was financing needs.
Q Okay.
A And at the time they reached out, which was right after confirmation -- right after confirmation and the confirmation order, we didn't know what our needs would be. We didn't really, at the early stage, think we needed exit financing. When we looked at some of the difficulty we were going to have -- for example, collecting notes and realizing on assets -- we realized that we were going to need some exit financing in order to have enough money to support the enterprise to monetize the assets.
Q And I think you used the -- I think the phrase you used, you are the straw man or a straw man bid? Is that what you called it the other day?
A We did. You set up a very typical competitive process to do exit financing.
Q And what was the --
A And what -- well, I --
Q -- suggest --
A I was going to get to your straw man. And one of the things you do is you assess what the market's going to look

like, what you think the market looks like, what you think a financing would be good for the enterprise, the flexibility you need, how you'd structure it. And then you put that out to prospective lenders and say, Here's our straw man. This is what we'd like you to consider in terms of financing. And then they do their work and come back. And they can either say, that looks great, or we have a totally different idea of what the financing might be, or some other combination of those things.

Q Mr. Seery, thank you for that answer, but I need to ask you to do me a favor. I'm on the clock, and so I'd just like to get my questions out, if you'd try to respond. Okay?

A Uh-huh.

Q Because your answers, as long as they may be, are impacting me a little bit.

So let me ask this question. In the straw man proposal that you put out for bid, what was the suggested interest rate?

A You know, you asked me that the other day, and I think I was slightly off. So it -- and I -- but I did tell you that it depended. There was -- I don't recall what the rate was, but it starts -- if everybody wants to put out money -- and I apologize for the length of the answer -- they look and they say, well, what if I get paid back in six months? Nobody wants to do that. So, duration makes a difference. So

there's an interest rate. There's upfront fees. There's often exit fees. And sometimes there's other amounts. So, our -- my recollection is that our straw man was somewhere in the low teens on the high end, and then closer to high single-digits on the low end. Something in that range.

Q And Farallon indicated to you they were not interested, correct?

A No, not exactly. What Farallon said was they didn't -- they signed an NDA because we invited them in. We invited in six folks. Five signed NDAs. Two of the -- I invited in Farallon. I invited in Stonehill. Well, Stonehill called me. I invited in Contrarian because they had bought claims. And then two lenders that I knew. And Farallon did the work and came back and said, this isn't really what we do. And the other guys, you're telling me, which I was, that other people are more competitive. And so it's not really what we do, we don't think the returns are good enough, but if you need us, because now they're already invested in the claims, call us.

Q Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: And again, I'll object as nonresponsive. Your Honor, that was a very long answer talking about a lot of other entities. My only question was what the interest rate was.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, we oppose the motion to strike. I think it's --

MR. MCENTIRE: No, I didn't strike it. I said -- my objection was nonresponsive. I will now follow it up with a motion to strike his answer.

THE COURT: Overruled. Okay.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Seery, you just told us that the interest rate was in the high single digits to in the 12 and 13 percent range.

A No, I was giving you the all-in return for the lender. That's a very different --

Q All-in return?

A -- thing for the -- than an interest rate.

Q That's even better.

A And it depended on the time.

Q Fair enough.

Q So if -- the shorter the duration, the higher the effective return, because he's not getting the return for as long a period of time. If I have $100 million and I get 10 percent, I get just $10 million. But if I have that out for $3 million, I've earned $30 million. So maybe that gets squeezed in the longer it's out.

Q And Farallon said that the interest rate or the return rate was not what they were looking for?

A They indicated two things. I believe I've said this several times. One is they said, this isn't really what we do, a $50-ish million dollar loan to do an exit. But we're in

the case. If you need us, call us. Included in that was, it doesn't look attractive enough to us because you're telling me other guys are more competitive.

Q Okay. And do you know what kind of rate of return they were going to get on the investment of the -- on the claims at a 71 percent projected return rate?

A If we only hit the plan, Farallon's two purchases, based on the numbers you get -- you gave, over a two-year period, would be 38.9 percent.

Q Okay, but we're going to talk about that in a second. Okay. How much -- how much did Farallon actually invest?

A I'd have to look back at your numbers. They're in your pleading. I don't know what they actually paid. I just have it from your pleading.

Q Okay. And do you have paperwork that -- can you (inaudible) calculation here?

A I have a calculator that, when I looked at your numbers, I ran that, and I --

Q I see. All right.

A I'm able to remember certain things.

Q So, so if it's projected that the internal rate of return is only six percent, do you disagree with that?

A A hundred percent disagree. There's -- that's virtually impossible.

Q Okay.

A And that's, by the way, for hitting the plan.
Q I'm sorry?
A That's for hitting the 70 -- the 71-and-change percent.
Q I want to ask you a question about that. The 71-percent-and-change --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- that came out of the plan for Class 8, --
A Yes.
Q -- that was for Class 8, correct?
A Correct.
Q There was zero expected return to Class 9, correct?
A That's correct. They would only get upside, and I think it says in the projections, based upon our view at the time, litigation that could ensue, and that was part of the plan.
Q And as I understand it, that 71-and-some-change --
A Uh-huh.
Q -- projected return rate never changed from the date of confirmation all the way up to the effective date. Am I correct?
A The -- we didn't change the projections that we'd filed with the plan because the plan was confirmed. We didn't need to change the projections that were filed with the plan.
Q The NDAs, as you understand it, can you tell me specifically when the NDAs were signed?
A I know it's the first week of April to the second week of

April. Blue Torch may have signed -- who actually ended up doing the financing -- they may have signed it a week or so before. They'd been around offering financing a number of times in the past.

Q Fair enough. But we know that you understood as of March 15th that Farallon had already made their investments? I mean, claims?

A That's what they told me in that email, yes.

Q Okay. When did Stonehill sign the NDA?

A In and around the same time.

Q But you don't know when Stonehill actually purchased their claims?

A I don't know exactly when. I know generally that by the end of April, early May, they were -- they were the holder of the Redeemer claim. And --

(Interruption.)

A -- I can't remember whether it was from them or whether it was from --

Q Did you ever communicate with Stonehill during the time that they were doing their due diligence on the exit financing?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did they come to your offices?

A I don't know if we were back yet. I think we were back, but I don't recall them coming to our offices. I think it was

all virtual. It's early '21, so there would have been vaccines. It would have been very -- very -- I don't recall them coming to the offices at that time.

Q But just to be clear, you don't know, you can't give the Court a date when Stonehill actually completed their investments in either Redeemer or HarbourVest?

A No, I don't. I don't know. Did -- just --

Q That was my question.

A When you say Redeemer or HarbourVest, they never bought HarbourVest.

Q It was just Redeemer?

A Correct.

Q All right. You understand that Muck is an entity, a special-purpose entity created by Farallon?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q And you understand Jessup is a special-purpose entity created by Stonehill?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Muck and Jessup are both on the Oversight Committee?

A They are. They -- those entities are the --

Q Is it the Oversight Committee or the Oversight Board?

A Same thing.

Q Fair enough.

A I'll consider them the same.

Q And there's a third member, too, correct?

A That's correct.
Q Okay.
A Independent member.
Q Okay. So you have a three-person board; is that right?
A That's correct.
Q And one of their jobs is to make decisions concerning your compensation?
A The structure of the Claimant Trust Agreement provides that I'm to negotiate with the -- either the Committee or the Oversight Board. And the compensation in the Claimant Trust Agreement is a base salary of $150,000, which is -- a month, which is the same as the one in the case, plus severance, plus a success fee. And it's very specific that that will be negotiated by the -- either the Committee or then the Oversight Board.
Q And Michael Linn, who Mr. Dondero has referred to, he's actually on the Oversight Board, is he not?
A He's the Muck representative on the Oversight Board.
Q All right.
A Yes.
Q If I understand it correctly, you are currently receiving, as the Trustee, $150,000 a month. Is that correct?
A That's incorrect.
Q What are you receiving?
A I receive $150,000 a month as the Trustee and the CEO of

Highland Capital.

Q Well, --

A So I have --

Q -- fair enough.

A I have both roles. The Trustee, for example, doesn't manage the team, they actually work for Highland Capital, and I'm the CEO of Highland Capital.

Q There was some suggestion that the $150,000 was something that the Court had passed upon prior to the effective date or part of the plan. This is a separate negotiated item that you -- that you allegedly negotiated that was awarded to you post-effective date, correct?

A That's false.

Q Okay. So the $150,000 had a discount that was supposed to drop down to $75,000 after a period of time. That never happened, did it?

A The -- you seem to be mixing concepts. But the $150,000 a month was set by the plan and the -- and the Claimant Trust Agreement as the "base salary." That wasn't going to move. When we -- it never was supposed to move.

When I began negotiating with the Oversight Board for the success fee, they pushed back and said, we would like that to step down. So in our -- I did not say, oh, that's a great idea. We ended up negotiating, and they included a provision that we would renegotiate depending on the level of work.

That's one of the provisions.
Q Okay. But renegotiate down to $75,000 after a period of time, but that never happened?
A Initially, I believe it was supposed to step down to $75,000 automatic, subject to renegotiation that it go back up, not a structure that I particularly liked. And since then, we've negotiated on that point.
Q So you currently are making $150,000 a month?
A That's correct.
Q How often do you come to Dallas?
A Usually I'm here at least once a month. Usually it's between two and four days.
Q Okay. And you have a staff here in Dallas at Highland Capital, correct?
A Yes.
Q How many people?
A Eleven.
Q Eleven people?
A Uh-huh.
Q Working full-time?
A Yes.
Q And you're still making $1.8 million a year?
A Yes.
Q You also have a bonus structure, correct?
A That's correct.

Q And that's performance-based?

A That's correct.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you pull up the agreement please? Okay.

(Pause.)

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q All right. Do you see --

MR. MCENTIRE: We're having technical difficulty here.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q All right. Can you identify this document?

MR. MCENTIRE: What exhibit number is this?

MR. MILLER: 28.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Exhibit 28.

MR. MCENTIRE: I believe this is already in evidence.

THE COURT: Hunter Mountain Exhibit 28?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q This is the memorandum of agreement. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q On the third line, it says -- and your name is identified here. You're the Claimant Trustee, correct?

A Claimant Trustee/CEO.

Q Engaged in robust, arm's length, and good-faith negotiations regarding the incentive compensation program.

As part of this robust, arm's length, and good-faith negotiation, did you personally conduct any independent search in the marketplace?

A I did -- what do you mean by search in the marketplace?

Q Well, did you try to do a market study? I asked that question in your deposition.

A I didn't know if you were asking a different question.

Q Same question.

A You mean market study on compensation?

Q Yes.

A No, I did not.

Q Are you aware of whether or not any member of the Oversight Board or Oversight Committee did a market study?

A On compensation?

Q On compensation.

A I'm not aware that they did one, no.

Q So this robust, arm's length, and good-faith negotiation, as far as you know, is divorced from any market study database or -- or methods. Is that correct?

A I don't believe that's correct, no.

Q I see. So did -- was any third-party consultant hired?

A Not by me or Highland or the Trust, no.

Q All right.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you scroll down a little bit, please?

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q You signed this agreement, correct?

A Yes.

Q And we have Michael Linn signing on behalf of Muck, who also is with Farallon, correct?

A That's correct.

MR. MCENTIRE: Scroll down.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q And by the way, this is a heavily-redacted document. The redactions deal with what?

A The redactions deal with the portion that would go to the team as opposed to going to me.

Q Are we talking about the 11-member team?

A Correct.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can you scroll down? Stop. Go back.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q So we have the assumed allowed claim amounts under Section D. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Class 9, $98 million and some change. Class 8, $295 million and some change. Then we go into the incentive payment tiers. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q What's the purpose of the tiers?
A The purpose of the tiers was to set additional compensation so that, the more recovery, the higher the compensation. So, below Tier 1, there was really effectively no bonus, is my recollection. And then in each tier there would be a percentage.

So the first tier is $10 million. There would be a percentage of that $10 million that could be allocated for bonus. Then in the next tier it would be $56 million. A portion of that would be allocated for bonus. And it's weighted more heavily to the higher-recovery tiers, meaning it incentivizes both me and the team to try to reach deeper into Class 8 and Class 9 and get higher recoveries.

Q Okay. So the idea is, the more difficult it is to get the recoveries, the higher percentage you should get, because if you're successful then you should be rewarded accordingly? Is that kind of how it works?
A I'm not sure if difficult is the term, but it's a combination of both expertise, difficulty, and time.

MR. MCENTIRE: All right. Can you scroll down, please? Next page.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q And here are your actual tier participations. They go -- you said basically nothing Tier 1, up through 6 percent. So Tier 1 is the 71 percent, right?

A It's .72 percent, and it's of the -- that's the first piece. You have to get to Tier 1. So if we had not -- I believe it's structured is if we don't get to Tier 1, for example, we don't hit the plan, right around the plan number of 71-and-change cents, then there wouldn't -- there wouldn't be upside.

So it was very much structured in a way that you had to perform. And then the better the performance, the bigger the percentages of the tier.

Q So, in theory, Mr. Seery, by the time you get down to Tier 4 and Tier 5, it's a little bit less certain that you're ever going to get there. Is that right?

A Well, out of the gate, going deeper was uncertain. It's a question of being able to execute well on the assets and being able to control the costs and being able to make distributions. It wasn't based on what we just got for the assets. It's actually based on actual distributions --

Q I understand that.

A -- to Class 8 and 9 claimants.

Q I understand that. And the idea is, is that it take a lot more effort -- the theory was it might take a lot more effort to get all the way to the bottom of Tier 5 to pay all the Class 9 claims, right?

A And maybe a little luck.

Q Yeah. And Class 10 is not even factored into this, is it?

A No, it is not.
Q And so you didn't consider Class 10. You stopped at Tier 5?
A That's correct.
Q So your entitlement to a 6 percent return, or a 6 percent bonus on the recoveries, you say it's there to incentivize you. You didn't expect that to actually happen, did you, when you signed this? Is that your testimony?
MR. STANCIL: I object to the form of the question. It mischaracterizes the agreement.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q You didn't expect it to happen, did you, sir?
THE WITNESS: Well, the six --
THE COURT: Wait. I'm sorry. Could you rephrase the question?
MR. MCENTIRE: Sure.
BY MR. MCENTIRE:
Q Are you telling the judge that you really didn't expect that to happen and that's why you were entitled to a higher percentage?
A No. We didn't expect to reach Class 9 and go deep into Class 9, but we certainly held out the possibility that we could. And it's not six percent. It's six percent of the increment. These are cumulative. So you get .72 of Tier 1. You get 1.17 of Tier 2. And you can add those, and you earn

them when you've actually made the distribution, but you don't get paid until you get all your distribution or we're relatively done or there's a renegotiation. Because the Committee wanted to make sure that I didn't say, hey, I hit Tier 3, time to go, I got a better job.

Q So, Mr. Seery, if Farallon told Mr. Dondero that they wouldn't sell basically at any price because you said it was too valuable, and they rejected a 40 or 50 percent premium, if they said that, is that -- is that a lie?

A That I -- rephrase that, please. I don't -- didn't quite understand your question.

Q Yeah. You've heard the testimony that Farallon, Michael Linn, told Mr. Dondero that they were not going to sell their claim at any amount because you had told them it was too valuable. Is that a lie?

A I think that's -- yeah, I don't think that's true.

Q Okay. And obviously, if they're not going to be willing to sell at any amount, they must be pretty certain they're going to hit Tier 5. Would that just be a lie?

A That -- that conversation was before this negotiation. That -- there's no -- they could not have had any expectation, either when they had that conversation in May or when we had this discussion that I was going to hit Tier 5 and I hadn't hit Tier 5. And the idea that they wouldn't sell at any price is complete utter nonsense, because they're capped on what

they can get.
Q So if -- sure. Okay. So, but if Farallon told --
A But that's what you said.
Q If Farallon told Mr. Dondero that they wouldn't even sell at 130 percent of the purchase price because you told them it would be too valuable, is that a lie?
A I never told them it would be too valuable. I don't -- I don't know any of the other parts that you're saying, the 130 percent of an unknown number, some guess number that Mr. Dondero had. I never told them it would be too valuable. That would be their own assessment of where we were at the end of May 2021.
Q If they said that you told them not to sell, that it was too valuable, is that a lie?
A That's untrue, yes.
Q If they told him -- if they told him that he told you -- that you told them it was too valuable because of MGM, is that a lie?
A Yes.
Q How many shares of stock did Highland Capital own?
MR. MCENTIRE: Well, one second. What is my time? How much time do I have?
THE CLERK: Right now you're at --
MR. MCENTIRE: So I'm almost two and a half hours in?
THE CLERK: Just about. A little under.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q I'm going to have to speed up here, Mr. Seery.

THE COURT: A little under two and a half, you said.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Seery, I want to make sure. Highland Capital owns interests in the CLOs. What is the CLOs' stake in the MGM stock, or what was it?

A Highland Capital does not own any interest in any of the CLOs it manages. It has a fee stream, and it can have certain deferred fees that it can get, but it didn't own any interest in any of the CLOs that it managed.

Q Fair enough. How about the portfolio companies?

A Did Highland Capital own interests in the portfolio companies?

Q Yes.

A Some of the ones Mr. Dondero listed, but they weren't portfolio companies. So he said OmniMax, but we didn't have any management of OmniMax. We just had debt that converted to equity, but we didn't control the -- the thing. That was during the case, the company.

Q Did Multistrat have an interest in MGM?

A Multistrat owned MGM, yes.

Q Okay. And did your company, Highland Capital -- your company -- Highland Capital have an interest in Multistrat?

A Highland Capital owns 57 percent of Multistrat, yes.

Q And did Highland Capital have an interest in any other portfolio companies that have an interest in -- had a stake in MGM?

A RCP. Restoration Capital Partners.

Q And do you recall what the value of that was?

A It shifted over time. I don't -- I don't know what time you're talking about.

Q And isn't it true that 90 percent of all the securities that Highland Capital owned at the time that the sale went public was roughly 90 percent of all of Highland Capital's securities?

MR. STANCIL: Objection, Your Honor. I don't know what that question is asking.

THE COURT: I don't understand it, either.

Could you rephrase?

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll try to.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q At the time that the announcement was made about Amazon buying MGM in May of 2021, what percentage of all the securities did MGM comprise of the securities that were owned by Highland Capital?

A Of the securities that were directly owned by Highland Capital, it may have been -- I'm thinking of public or semi-public securities, the 150,000 or 170,000 that we had that were subject to the Frontier lien. Might have been almost all

of the securities that we owned. It wasn't -- it was a good position, but it wasn't a huge driver for the directly-owned shares. There was more value in the Multistrat and the RCP.

Q What percent of shares of all --

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I'm having trouble hearing the end of Mr. Seery's answers. So I know it's not his --

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. If you could make sure you speak into the mic.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I'm sorry.

MR. STANCIL: I'm having trouble with Mr. McEntire talking over the end of Mr. Seery's answers.

THE COURT: Ah.

MR. STANCIL: I'm having trouble following.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: I apologize.

THE COURT: Okay. Could you --

MR. MCENTIRE: I didn't know I was doing that.

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MCENTIRE: I'll try to do better.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Mr. Seery, of all the stock that Highland Capital owned in May of 2021, what percentage of that was (inaudible) stock?

A Hopefully this is clear. Highland Capital did not own a

lot of stock. Highland Capital did have a direct ownership interest in MGM, so that might have been the vast majority of the stock that Highland Capital owned. It did own interest in other entities, like its investment in RCP or its investment in Multistrat. But of the stock that it owned directly, that was probably it, and that's the one that was liened up to Frontier.

Q Mr. Seery, did Highland Capital own approximately 170,000 shares of MGM stock in May of 2021?

A Yes. You -- I'm sorry. You asked me what percentage, and I think I said roughly that amount of stock liened up to Frontier, and that that might have been almost all of the stock we owned.

Q Does Highland Capital own a direct interest in HCLOF?

A In HC --

Q HCLOF?

A HCLOF? Yes. Highland Capital owns a small direct interest, and a large indirect interest which we got through the settlement with HarbourVest.

Q And the entity in which you acquired the indirect interest, what's the name of that entity?

A I don't recall. It's a -- it's a single-shell special-purpose entity that we own all of it and it has no other assets.

Q And just to make sure that the record is clear, you deny

under oath that HCLOF has any interest -- or had any interest in MGM stock?

A HCLOF has never owned MGM stock and still doesn't own MGM stock. It's never owned it.

Q Um, --

A At least -- at least, as long as I've been in this case.

MR. MCENTIRE: One second, Your Honor, please.

(Pause.)

MR. MCENTIRE: I'm going to have to pass the witness because of time sensitivities, Your Honor, so I'll pass the witness at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Cross?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Mr. Seery?

A Yes, sir.

Q You just covered a lot of what we would have covered, so I want to be really, really quick here. Okay? We're not covering old ground. Let's just start with the HarbourVest settlement. Do you recall that Mr. Dondero sent the email to you on December 17th?

A Yes.

Q Okay. When did you reach the agreement with HarbourVest on the settlement?

A December 10th.

Q Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, I'd like to move into evidence Exhibit 31. Actually, let me lay a foundation first.

Can you give the witness --

MR. MCENTIRE: Is this a new exhibit?

MR. MORRIS: No. It's Exhibit 31.

MR. MCENTIRE: Can I see it, Tim, please?

MR. MORRIS: It's in your box.

MR. MCENTIRE: Give me a minute.

MR. MORRIS: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Okay. We're about to focus on Highland Exhibit what?

MR. MORRIS: 31.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Do you have it, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I do.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Do you have it, Mr. Seery?

A I do, yes.

MR. MORRIS: Do you have it, sir?

MR. MCENTIRE: I do. Thank you.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can you just tell the Court what this is?

A This is an email chain. It starts from me to the other

independent directors, copying counsel, to outline the terms of the HarbourVest settlement that I had just made the offer to HarbourVest to settle on these terms on December 8th. And this was the product of a number of negotiations that had taken place over the prior weeks, and this was the final offer that I was making to them to settle.

Q Directing your attention to the bottom of the first page, the first email dated December 8, 2020 at 6:46 p.m., can you just read the first sentence out loud.

A I lost -- you lost me.

Q That begins, "As discussed yesterday."

A Oh. "As discussed yesterday, after consultation with John Morris" -- that would be you -- "regarding litigation risks, this evening I made an offer" -- it says "and," but it should have said "an" -- "offer to HarbourVest to settle their claims. The following are the proposed terms."

Q Okay. Just stop right there. And you were -- this is the report that you gave to the independent directors?

A The other independent directors.

Q Right.

A I was also one.

Q Right. And did Mr. Dubel respond?

A He did, yes.

Q And can you just describe briefly what your understanding was of his response?

A Dubel responds a couple hours after I sent the original email: "Jim, this basically looks like a $10 million -- net $10 million payment to HV." That's HarbourVest. "Is that correct? Does the 72-cent recovery include the $22-1/2 million that we get from the transfer of HCLOF interests? Remind me again, post-effective date, who is managing HCLOF?"

So I think my understanding was Mr. Dubel was querying me on some of the terms that I had set forth here, including that the value of the claim in our estimation was going to be about $9.9 million, meaning they would have a $45 million senior claim, a $35 million junior claim, and we thought, based on the values we had then, it was going to pay out about $9.9 million.

Q Okay. And was this offer accepted?

A Yes, it was.

Q When was it accepted?

A I think I just said. On -- on December 10th.

Q Okay. And did the terms that you described for the other independent directors on December 8th, did they change in any way at all from that reflected in this email until the time we got to the 9019 hearing?

A Not at all, no.

Q Okay. I see that you mention in here that you -- it says, quote, "The interests have a marked value of $22-1/2 million, according to Hunter Covitz." Do you see that?

A That's correct, yes.
Q Who's Hunter Covitz?
A Hunter Covitz was a Highland employee. He ran the structured products business. So he was responsible for making sure that the CLO we managed, which was AC7, was compliant and was -- with the indentures. He also was responsible for monitoring the -- what we call the 1.0 CLOs, even though they weren't really CLOs, they were more like closed-in funds. And he also kept track of the Acis -- CLOs that HCLOF had an interest in that were managed by Acis.
Q Okay. And do you recall how he conveyed to you the NAV?
A Well, I talked to him numerous times, so this wasn't our -- I didn't just call him up at the end and say, what's the NAV? I had had discussions with him while I was negotiating with HarbourVest. And at some point, he or someone -- he told me the amount, and at some point he gave me a NAV statement that actually showed the NAV of HCLOF, which at 11/30 was roughly $45 million.
Q Okay. Can you turn to Exhibit 31-A, the next document in the binder?
A Mine's completely blacked out.
THE COURT: I'm sorry, what number?
MR. MORRIS: 31-A.
THE COURT: Oh.
MR. MORRIS: And the first two pages are redacted

just because they're not relevant and they're business information.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q But can you turn to the last page, sir?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell the judge what this is?

A So this is a net asset value statement from HCLOF. That's Highland CLO Funding, Limited. That's the Guernsey entity that -- that held these interests. And this is a net asset amount, and it shows what the net -- what the net asset value is as of this time on a carryforward basis of $45.191 million.

Q Okay. And where did you get this document?

A I believe I got it from Covitz. It's generated by an entity called Elysium, which is the fund administrator for HCLOF, and I believe they're out of Guernsey.

Q And did you rely on this document in setting the proposal to HarbourVest?

A Well, both the conversations with Covitz and the document. And frankly, HarbourVest got the same documents because they were -- they held a membership interest in HCLOF. So he -- Michael Pugatch knew what the NAV was.

Q And would Mr. Dondero or entities controlled by him who also have interests in HCLOF, is it your understanding that they would have also had this document available?

A All members would --

MR. MCENTIRE: Excuse me. Excuse me. I object to that question, the question being "and the entities controlled by Mr. Dondero." There's no foundation for this witness to answer a question like that.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Who else owned --

THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q -- an interest in HCLOF?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: It would have been DAF.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q The DAF?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Let's just ask this question. Is it your understanding that these NAV valuation reports were made to all holders of interests in HCLOF?

A Yes. And that would include the DAF. And I did leave off that there were three former Highland employees long gone, or at least not around at this point, who also owned very small interests, and they would have gotten those statements as well.

Q And does HCLOF also produce audited financial statements?

A It does, yes.

Q Can you go to Exhibit 60, please?

A Six zero?
Q Yes, sir. A couple of questions here. Is this a document that Highland would have received in the ordinary course of business?
A Yes, it is.
Q Okay. And what is the NAV depicted on this page as of the end of the year 2020?
A Well, you have to look through it, because this document is actually dated 4/21/21, --
Q Okay.
A -- which you can see on Page 10 where it's signed. And that shows a net asset value of $50.4 million as of 12/31/21. 12/20. I'm sorry. And -- but it wasn't prepared until -- the audits aren't done and we don't get this document until after the directors sign off in April.
Q Okay.

MR. MORRIS: And Your Honor, I move for the admission into evidence of these three HarbourVest-related documents, 30, 31-A, and 60.

MR. MCENTIRE: No objection.

THE COURT: They're admitted.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

(Debtors' Exhibits 30, 31-A, and 60 are received into evidence.)

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Okay. Let me move on. We've seen Mr. Dondero's email today. You've seen that before, correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay. What was your reaction when you got it?
A I was highly suspicious.
Q Why is that?
A Well, not to replow too much old ground, but this came after he threatened me. He threatened me in writing. I'd never been threatened in my career. I've never heard of anyone else in this business who's been threatened in their career. So anything I would get from him, I was going to be highly suspicious.

It also followed the imposition of a TRO for interfering with the business. He knew what was in the TRO and he knew what it applied to, and it restricted him from communicating with me or any of the other independent directors without Pachulski being on it.

Furthermore, Pachulski had advised Mr. Dondero's counsel that not only could they not communicate with us, if they wanted to communicate they had to prescreen the topics.

And how do we know that? Because Dondero filed a motion to modify the TRO. And that was all before this email.

In addition, that followed the termination of the shared service arrangements, the approval of the disclosure statement, and the demand to collect on the demand notes that

Mr. Dondero and his entities were liable for.

So at that point, he'd been interfering with the business, he had threatened me, he was subject to a TRO, and I got this email and I was highly suspicious.

Q Did you ever share this email with anybody at Farallon?

A No.

Q Did you ever share this email with anybody at Stonehill?

A No. And just to be clear, not just the email, the contents. Never discussed it with them.

Q That was going to be my next question. Did you ever share any information about MGM with anybody?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.

MR. MORRIS: I'm asking the question.

MR. MCENTIRE: No, you're leading.

MR. MORRIS: This is the whole --

MR. MCENTIRE: You're leading the witness.

THE COURT: Overruled. Finish the question.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Did you ever share any information concerning with MGM with anybody at Stonehill before you learned that they had purchased claims?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: No. No, I did not.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Did you ever share any information with anybody at Farallon concerning MGM before you learned that they purchased their claims?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.

THE WITNESS: No, I did not.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

(Pause.)

THE WITNESS: You know, you just asked me something about Stonehill.

THE COURT: No.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Yeah. No question.

A I wanted to clarify one.

Q What did you want to clarify, sir?

A Certainly didn't share anything about this email, any of the contents of it. I don't know if I ever -- I don't know exactly when Stonehill bought their claims, and they were subject to the NDA to do the financing process. So I know when Farallon told me they had bought their claims and I know we never had any discussions at all before they acquired their claims, and I don't know when Stonehill got those -- their claims, so I don't know when -- what was in the data room or what -- what might have been discussed about MGM while they

were under an NDA.
Q Okay.
A But certainly nothing -- I never shared the contents of this email, the substance of this email, the email at all. That's what I wanted to clarify.
Q What data room are you talking about, sir?
A This was the data room related to the exit financing where we sought exit financing and ultimately got exit financing from Blue Torch Capital.
Q And who put together the data room?
A DSI, which was our financial consultants, and our finance team.
Q And why did you -- did you delegate responsibility for creating the data room to DSI and the members of your team you just identified?
A Yeah, of course.
Q How come?
A I don't really know how to put together a data room.
Q Did you -- did you direct them to put anything in the data room?
A Not specifically. We had a deck that we -- that certainly I worked on and commented on, which would have been a general overview of the -- of the post-reorganized Highland and the -- and the -- and the Claimant Trust. So I certainly commented on that. But the specific information in the data room, I

don't -- I never looked at it. I don't know what it is.
Q How many -- how many entities who were participating in the exit facility process wound up making bids or offers?
A There were five that signed NDAs. Three provided substantive proposals. One was verbal. That was Bardin Hill, who'd been contacting me throughout the case, and they do this kind of financing, and they submitted a competitive bid. Stonehill in writing, and then amended, a more aggressive one, in writing. And Blue Torch probably three, and the most aggressive.
Q And did you give the -- did you give the opportunity to your age-old friends at Stonehill?
A They're not my age-old friends. And no, they lost. They were second, they were close, it was a good real proposal, but they didn't win.
Q So, --
A Blue Torch won.
Q So is it fair to say that you -- did you pick the best proposal that you thought provided the best value for the company that you were managing?
MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, again, for the last ten minutes, we've had nothing but leading questions. And it just is --
MR. MORRIS: Fine. Happy to --
THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase.

BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Why did you pick Stone -- why did you pick Blue -- Blue-?
A Blue Torch.
Q Blue Torch, over the other bids?
A It was the best bid. So, structurally, it was the least expensive, although they were extremely close. I had a lot of confidence in Blue Torch because this type of financing is what they do. And while you can never have a hundred percent confidence that if somebody goes through the -- this is an LOI, right, so this is a letter of intent. When they go further, they may -- they may not complete it. But I had a high degree of confidence that they would get there, because, again, that's what they do. And they were the -- they were just the better bid.
Q Okay. Do you recall that in Mr. Dondero's notes he wrote down that he was told that Farallon had purchased their claims in February or March?
A I saw that on what he claimed, yes.
Q And is that consistent with what you were told by Farallon in March?
A They told me they acquired the claims -- they had acquired the claims on March 15th, by email. I don't know if they acquired them in February or March. Or even January. I know they said they had them on March 15.
Q Did you ever speak with Farallon about anything having to

do with the purchase of their claims?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Not -- not before they sent me that email.

MR. MORRIS: I apologize. Withdrawn.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Before -- before learning of their purchase, had you had any discussions with them about potential claim purchases?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: No.

MR. MCENTIRE: Leading.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: No, I didn't.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Okay. Before you learned that Stonehill had purchased claims in the Highland bankruptcy, had you ever had any conversation with them about the potential purchase of claims?

MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.

THE WITNESS: No, I don't -- I don't --

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I don't -- I don't believe so, no.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Do you have any knowledge at all as to how the sellers went about selling their claims?
A I have some knowledge now, post-effective date, that I believe I have some understanding, but not a great one.
Q Did you ever communicate with any of the sellers about the potential sale of their claims prior to the time their claims were sold?
MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I did have a conversation with Eric Felton who was the Redeemer representative on the Creditors' Committee. And it came out of one of the emails I got. I think it indicated that --
MR. MCENTIRE: Objection, hearsay, Your Honor. I mean, hearsay, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MCENTIRE: It's hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay. He's about to say something that's hearsay is the objection. Any response?
MR. MORRIS: I'm not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted. I'm offering it for Mr. Seery's state of mind and the extent of his communications. How about that?
MR. MCENTIRE: I don't see how you could offer it for anything other than for the truth of the matter asserted. It's coming from a third party, so I object to hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. You know what? We --
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Other than the one conversation --
THE COURT: Are you withdrawing the question or do I need --
MR. MORRIS: Yeah. This is just --
THE COURT: Okay. You're withdrawing the question.
MR. MORRIS: I'll withdraw the question.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Other than the one conversation with Mr. Felton, did you ever have a conversation with any seller prior to the time you learned that Farallon or Stonehill --
MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q -- purchased the claims?
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Did you play any role in facilitating or recommending to Farallon or Muck that it purchase claims?
MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: No. None whatsoever.
BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Did you play any role in facilitating or recommending that Stonehill or Jessup purchase claims?
A No.
MR. MCENTIRE: Objection. Leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q All right. Let's just finish up with compensation. Can you go to Exhibit 41, please? Can you just identify that document for the Court?
A This is the -- it's a memorandum agreement that sits on top of an outline. It is the December 2 incentive compensation agreed terms for Highland Capital --
Q Okay.
A -- and the Trust.
Q And when was this signed?
A It would have been -- the date is December 6th.
Q And --
A 2021. I'm sorry.
Q Okay. And when did you and the Committee members begin discussing your compensation package?
A Shortly after the effective date, which was August 11, 2021.
Q And were there any negotiations during that intervening three- or four-month period?

A Considerable negotiations during that period, yes.
Q Can you go to the last page of Exhibit 41? Can you describe that for the Court? I know it's hard to read, but --
A I --
Q -- the numbers don't matter so much as the infor... you know, just, can you just describe --
A Yeah.
Q -- what's being conveyed?
A So it's very hard to read, but it says -- because it's small -- Seery Proposal 1, Oversight Counter 1, Seery Proposal 2, Oversight Counter 2, and then it continues down. My recollection is that we had four or five rounds of back-and-forth that were meaningful. But it -- but it even took a detour in the middle, because it started with my proposal, which was pretty robust, and their response to me that they didn't like the structure or the amount, and so then we started talking about that. And then they -- after we were kind of hitting numbers and structure at the same time, they came back to me and said, stop, we've got to agree on the structure before we agree on the amounts.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, I'm going to object as it's hearsay and move to strike. This is -- he's not talking about the document. He's talking about something outside of the four corners of the document. I object to hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: Hearsay? There's no statement.

THE COURT: There was --

MR. MORRIS: It's a description of what happened.

MR. MCENTIRE: But he's actually referring to statements in his substantive comments.

THE COURT: Overruled. Okay.

MR. MORRIS: I move for the admission into evidence of Exhibit 41.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. MCENTIRE: That's the memorandum agreement, Mr. Morris? Is that it?

MR. MORRIS: Yes, sir.

MR. MCENTIRE: No objection.

THE COURT: Admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 41 is received into evidence.)

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can we go backwards to Exhibit 39, please? Can you describe for the Court what that is?

A This is a redacted copy of minutes of the board meeting on August 21 -- 26, 2021.

Q And there's a lot of stuff redacted there. Do you have an understanding as to why there is redactions?

A It would have nothing to do with these issues that we're discussing or the alleged *quid pro quo*.

Q Okay. Can you just read out loud the last portion that's unredacted on the second page, beginning with "Mr. Seery

reviewed"?
A It actually says, "Mr. Seery also presented the board with an overview of his incentive compensation program proposal, which would include not only Mr. Seery but the current HCMLP team. The terms and structure of the proposal had been previewed with the board in prior operating models presented by Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery reviewed the proposal and stated his view that the proposal was market-based and was designed to align incentive between himself and the HCMLP team on the one hand and the Claimant Trust beneficiaries on the other. The board asked questions regarding the proposal and determined that it would consider the proposal and revert to Mr. Seery with a counterproposal."
Q All right. When you were -- when you were shown one of these documents before, you were asked to identify Mr. Linn, but you weren't asked about the others. Do you see Richard Katz there?
A Yes.
Q Who's that?
A He's the independent member.
Q Did he play any role in the negotiation of your compensation package?
A Yes. He was actively involved.
Q Okay. And how about Mr. Provost? Who's he?
A He is the Jessup person. Jessup is the board member.

He's their representative on the board.

Q Okay.

MR. MORRIS: And I move for admission into evidence of Exhibit 39.

MR. MCENTIRE: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 39 is received into evidence.)

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Let's go to Exhibit 40, please. Can you just describe for the Court what that is?

A This is a subsequent board meeting minutes, August 30, 2021.

Q And can you just read into the record -- why are there redactions?

A Again, they would -- if there are redactions, it would have nothing to do with the issues that are being brought up in this motion.

Q And can you just read into the record the paragraph beginning, "Mr. Katz"?

A "Mr. Katz began the meeting by walking the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery through the Oversight Board's counterproposal to the HCMLP incentive compensation proposal, including the review of the spreadsheet and summary of the counterproposal. Discussion was joined by Mr. Linn and Mr. Stern. Mr. Seery asked numerous questions and received detailed responses from

the Oversight Board. Mr. Seery and the Oversight Board agreed to continue the discussion and negotiations regarding the proposed incentive compensation plan for the Claimant Trustee and the -- and the HCMLP."

Q So they didn't accept your original proposal that you made in the earlier document?

A They did not.

Q Okay. And did negotiations continue?

A They did, yes.

MR. MORRIS: Before we go on, I move for admission into evidence Exhibit 40.

THE COURT: Any --

MR. MCENTIRE: No objection.

THE COURT: It's admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 40 is received into evidence.)

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can you go to Exhibit 59, please? Can you describe for the Court what this is?

A This is an email string between me and the Oversight Board regarding the compensation proposal.

Q Okay. And directing your attention to the bottom, I guess, of the second page, there is an email from Mr. Katz dated October 26. Do you see that?

A At the bottom of the second -- oh, yes, yes.

Q Okay. Can you just read the sentence at the bottom of the

page beginning "We propose"?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, Your Honor, I would, first of all, object to him just reading from the document until it's been put into evidence.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, say again?

MR. MCENTIRE: I would object to Exhibit --

THE COURT: We can't pick things up on the record when you don't speak in a mic.

MR. MCENTIRE: I object to him simply reading from the document before the document is offered into evidence.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Accepted into evidence.

MR. MORRIS: Sure. I'd move it into evidence.

MR. MCENTIRE: I object as hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: This is a present sense recollection -- recorded. It's a clear business record. It's a negotiation that's happening over time. Mr. Seery is here to answer any questions about authenticity.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, it's an email string involving communications with third parties. That's hearsay in and of itself. And it's not been established that this is a business record. And Mr. Morris's statements to that effect, frankly, don't carry his burden. There's internal hearsay contained throughout the document, Your Honor, even if it is a business record.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, just to be clear, let me respond.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: Exceptions to hearsay rule. 803(1) present sense impression; (2) -- (3) existing mental impression, state of mind about motive, (5) recorded recollection, (6) records of regularly-conducted activity, or Federal Rule of Evidence 807, residual exception for trustworthy and probative evidence. I'll take any of them.

MR. MCENTIRE: None of them apply.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Overruled.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: I admit it. 59's admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 59 is received into evidence.)

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can you just read that last sentence at the bottom of that page?

A This is from Rich Katz to me.

Q Uh-huh.

A (reading) We propose doing this in two stages. First, we'd like to come to agreement on structural, underscored, elements of the ICP.

ICP means incentive compensation program or plan.

Only after we'd done that, when the board had greater

understanding of what plan they were pricing, would we haggle out the specific numbers, underscore, tier attachment points, and percentage participation in each tier.

Q Okay. And going to the right-hand part of that, do you see where it says, Salary J.S. Only?

A Yes.

Q Can you just, you know, generally describe for the Court what the debate is or the negotiation that's happening on that particular point?

A Well, this was brought up earlier. The salary was $150,000 a month. That was the same salary that I'd had during the case that was approved by the Court. It had been approved by the Committee, approved by the other independent members. That was continuing. It was also contained as an actual base salary in the plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement, and they were never amended.

The Committee came back to me and said, we'd like that to step down. And they'd like it to step down on a definitive specific schedule, because they had a view that that would incentivize me to work faster to make distributions before the stepdown and that I wouldn't linger in the role. And the yellow --

Q Can you just read the yellow out loud?

A That's --

Q Read the whole thing.

A That's my response.
Q Read the whole thing.
A (reading) Based on the required expertise, volume, and personal risk of the work today, I do not think that any formulaic reduction in base comp is appropriate. With the complexity and amount of issues that I have to manage on a daily basis, I currently do not have capacity to take on significant outside work. Of course, things can change. If they do, I am open to discussing reduction in the base. I have no interest in sitting around doing nothing, having no risk, and collecting the full base compensation. We can include prefatory language and an agreement to revisit our terms, but I do not see an avenue to set parameters to lock in an agreement for the future at this time.
And then there's another paragraph on severance.
Q You can stop there.
MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: All right. Pass the witness.
MR. MCENTIRE: Do you have any questions?
A VOICE: No.
MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. How much time do I have, please?
THE CLERK: So, the limit is at two hours and 32 minutes.
MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q Just a couple questions very quickly, Mr. Seery. Highland Capital Management paid HarbourVest cash as part of the settlement, correct?

A That's incorrect.

Q There was no cash component at all?

A There was not.

Q And in connection with the HarbourVest settlement, HarbourVest transferred an interest in HCLOF to Highland Capital or an entity affiliated with Highland Capital; is that not correct?

A That's correct.

Q And that -- that entity -- and HCLOF, and HCLOF had an interest in various CLOs, correct?

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I object. This is beyond the scope of my cross, or redirect, however you prefer.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, you spent a lot of time on HarbourVest. I'm just trying to clear it up.

MR. MORRIS: I didn't say the word CLO. I did not say the word CLO.

THE COURT: Overruled. He can go there.

If you'd please move the mic towards your voice.

BY MR. MCENTIRE:

Q And HCLOF had an interest in various CLOs, correct?

A I believe it had an interest in five CLOs. Oh, that's not true. It had an interest in five of the 1.0 CLOs. It also owned one hundred -- basically, somewhere between 87 and a hundred percent of Acis 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, which is about a billion dollars of CLOs to 10 (inaudible) leveraged vehicles, and they owned basically all the equity, so that was the driver of the value.

Q And various entities that were -- I mean, some of these various CLOs had an interest in MGM stock, correct?

A The 1. -- the Highland 1.0s did. The value drivers I just described -- Acis 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 -- had no interest in MGM.

Q But one of them did have an interest in MGM?

A That's not correct.

Q What did you just say?

A 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 did not have any interest in MGM.

Q Were there any CLOs that had an interest in MGM?

A Some of the 1.0 CLOs did, --

Q I see.

A -- yes.

MR. MCENTIRE: Pass the witness.

MR. MORRIS: No further questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Seery, I want to ask you one thing.

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

EXAMINATION BY THE COURT

THE COURT: We dance around it a lot. The Highland

ownership of MGM stock. If think -- if you could confirm I've heard this correct -- you said Highland itself owned 170,000 shares that were subject to a Frontier Bank lien?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe that's the right amount. So, Highland directly owned about 170,000 shares. Those were liened up to Frontier. They were -- they were never transferred. Highland never sold any MGM stock.

THE COURT: Okay. So Frontier still holds it or what?

THE WITNESS: No. In fact, post-effective -- I believe it was post-effective date, and with cash generated, we -- we paid off the Frontier loan, --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS: -- released that lien, and then we held those shares in MGM until the merger was consummated.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So we tendered our shares into the -- into the merger and got the merger consideration, which was cash.

THE COURT: Okay. And so there was that. But other than that, you said Highland owned 50 percent of Multistrat, which owned some MGM stock?

THE WITNESS: Multistrat had a -- I don't recall the amount, but a material amount of MGM stock. That also -- so, Highland owned 57 percent of Multistrat. Is also the manager

of Multistrat.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS: Multistrat did not sell any MGM stock. It also tendered them into the merger as well.

THE COURT: Okay. And then you said Highland owned some percentage of Restoration --

THE WITNESS: Restorations Capital Partners.

THE COURT: -- Capital Partners, which owned some MGM stock?

THE WITNESS: Similarly, Highland is the manager of what we call RCP. RCP owned a material amount of MGM stock. RCP did not sell any MGM stock. However, in 2019, you'll recall that Mr. Dondero sold $125 million of stock postpetition out of RCP. It was MGM stock. He sold it back to MGM. We had a -- we had a hearing on it, because subsequently the Independent Board learned about it, the Committee learned about it, they had not -- it had not been disclosed, but there was a -- what we thought was a binding agreement with MGM, and MGM indicated that they were going to hold us to it, and so we had a hearing about approving that transaction. The Committee was not happy.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm fuzzy on when that was. You said?

THE WITNESS: That would have been in early 2020, probably April-ish timeframe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor?

THE WITNESS: The transaction was in November, I believe.

MR. MORRIS: If it's helpful, Your Honor, you can find it at Docket 487.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: I think that's the objection from the Committee where the issue was -- comes up at least at one time.

THE COURT: Okay. And then I think this is the last category I heard, that HCM and its specially-created sub owned just over 50 percent of HCLOF, and it in turn owns interest in a lot of CLOs, and a few of those, what you call the 1.0 CLOs, did own some MGM stock?

THE WITNESS: That's correct. So if you look on the audited financials that we had introduced into evidence, you'll see actually every asset that HCLOF owns. There's no MGM in there. It does own interest. There were minority interests in five or six of the 1.0 CLOs. Grayson, Greenbrier, Gleneagles, Brentwood, Liberty, and one other. And it had interest in those, but it never owned any MGM stock and it never traded any MGM stock. It didn't own any.

THE COURT: All right. Did I cover the universe of what MGM stock was owned by Highland or something Highland had

an interest in?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. So, the ones that HCLOF had an interest in that I just listed, those -- Jasper was the other one. I apologize. The -- they owned -- they owned MGM stock among their other -- they had a lot of other assets. The other CLOs, the 1.0 CLOs that Highland had, every one of them owned MGM stock. None of them sold or bought any stock. Those all tendered into the merger as well. Highland did not own any interest in any of those entities.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS: It just managed them.

THE COURT: Okay. And this is my last question. Someone brought up or it came up today that exactly two years ago today -- I didn't remember we were on an anniversary of that -- but was when we had a hearing, and I think it was a contempt hearing, but I had, I guess, read in the media, like many other human beings, an article about the MGM-Amazon transaction, and I had said I had hope in my heart and brain that this could be an impetus or a triggering event for maybe a settlement. And that was kind of quickly pooh-poohed, if you will.

Remind me why I was quickly persuaded, oh well, I guess that's not going to happen. I just can't remember what I heard that day.

THE WITNESS: Well, it was widely known that

Highland, meaning not the 171,000 --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS: -- but the entities that Highland or related entities, including DAF, the other Dondero entities, controlled a lot of Highland stock, as even Mr. Dondero said between Anchorage --

THE COURT: You mean MGM?

THE WITNESS: MGM, I'm sorry. Between -- there were only five major holders. There was the two we just mentioned and Davidson Kempner and Monarch and Owl Creek, and just a few other big holders.

And so Your Honor would have learned it from the case, but you also would have learned it from the paper, that any time a holder is mentioned, it's first Anchorage, because they owned the biggest piece, and Kevin Ulrich, who was the chairman of Anchorage, was also the chairman of MGM. And then Highland was always mentioned.

The reason that it didn't have some great amount of capital that went on to Highland, although there was money from RCP and there was money from MGM, is Highland doesn't own the stock that's -- or interests in the 1.0 CLOs that owned all of it. We just manage it.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE WITNESS: And that goes to various other entities, including, in large part, to Dondero entities. So

there wasn't a big windfall to Highland from that.

The possibility of some upside from HCLOF, because it owned small interests in those five, there was some value in that, but a lot of it got tied up in the litigation that other entities, Dondero entities, are bringing against U.S. Bank and Acis, which has tied up everything in that -- those distributions.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. You are excused from the stand.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. STANCIL: I owe you a docket number, Your Honor. You said don't let us leave before we give you a docket number for that second contempt order. We promised to come back. It was #2660.

THE COURT: Okay. Got it.

MR. STANCIL: Which -- did we move that into evidence?

MR. MORRIS: No. We asked the Court to take judicial notice.

THE COURT: I will take judicial notice of 2660, --

MR. STANCIL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- I already said. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're excused.

(The witness steps down.)

THE COURT: All right. Are you going to have any other evidence, Mr. McEntire?

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, as I respond to your question, I think we have 30 -- approximately 30 minutes left.

THE CLERK: Twenty-six, yes.

MR. MCENTIRE: Twenty-six. We do have another witness. We also have a closing final argument. And we also have an opportunity -- we want to reserve an opportunity for our experts that is still under advisement.

So my first action would be to ask for an extension of time, or we would like to add to our time limit. Instead of just three hours, we'd like to increase the time so we can accomplish all these things.

I mean, if the Court is unwilling to give us additional time, then I will be forced not to call another witness. I will move to a very short final argument. I need to preserve some time for my experts, should you allow them to testify.

THE COURT: Well, --

MR. MORRIS: May I respond?

THE COURT: -- you don't have to preserve time. I'm either going to allow you to put on your experts, and we said 30 minutes/30 minutes, --

MR. MORRIS: That was what I was going to say, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: There's no prejudice here. Nobody's being harmed. There's no appellate issue. I thought we were really clear. Everybody gets their three hours today. We will file our reply brief on Monday. The Court will determine both whether it needs to hear expert testimony and whether or not our motion should be sustained. If the Court denies the motion, we'll take a couple of depositions and each side will get whatever period of time the Court orders.

But, you know, the attempts to create an appellate record are just -- you know, that's not -- there's no issue here. He can -- he's got 26 minutes. He can put on his witness, he can make his closing in the 26 minutes that they've always had.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we have --

MR. MCENTIRE: May I caucus? May I caucus very quickly, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay. Uh-huh. And while you're caucusing, we have our game plan on the experts. We know how that's going to happen. And I'm not extending the three hours.

MR. MORRIS: (sotto voce) We have 62 minutes?

(Pause.)

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, accordingly, I'll just -- we'll move into a final argument at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. So you rest?

MR. MCENTIRE: I rest.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MORRIS: We call Mark Patrick.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Patrick, you've been called to the witness stand.

MR. MORRIS: I just need to find my examination notes. Just give me one moment, please.

THE COURT: All right. Please raise your right hand. Could you remain standing, please.

(The witness is sworn.)

THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.

MARK PATRICK, DEBTORS' WITNESS, SWORN

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Hi, Mr. Patrick.

A Hello.

Q Did you ever meet with anybody at the Texas State Securities Board?

A No.

Q Do you know if -- do you know anybody who ever met with anybody at the Texas State Securities Board concerning Highland?

A Yes.

Q And who met with the Texas State Securities Board concerning Highland?

A Ronnie (phonetic) Patel.

Q And is that a lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Do you know who retained Mr. -- that lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Who retained that lawyer?
A The DAF, the Charitable DAF Fund. Or one of its entities.
Q Okay. And is it your understanding that the DAF Fund or one of its charitable entities filed a complaint with the Texas State Securities Board?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Thank you very much. Does Hunter Mountain owe any money to Mr. Dondero?
A No.
Q Is there a promissory note that's outstanding that Mr. Dondero has pursuant to which Hunter Mountain owes him $60-plus million?
A No.
Q Who created Hunter Mountain?
A Well, I don't recall specifically. I just recall the facts that, when Hunter Mountain was created, Thomas Surgent, the chief compliance officer of Highland Capital Management, who was representing the Dugaboy Investment Trust as well as Highland Capital legally with respect to that transaction, requested to Rand that the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust be created for purposes of Highland filing its ADV with the SEC.

It was my understanding that when the ADV would be filed, sort of the ownership change would -- chain would stop at Hunter Mountain.

Q Okay. Dugaboy is Mr. Dondero's family trust, correct?

A No. But I'll help you along. Just please use the full name of the trust.

Q If I refer to the Trust, will you know that that's -- is that for the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, or do you want me to use trust --

A There's no entity called Dugaboy. Just Dugaboy. There's not.

Q Okay.

A It's a shorthand. I'm --

Q Okay. I'll refer to Dugaboy then, okay?

A What are we referring to?

Q The trust known as Dugaboy.

A Okay. Fair enough. Go ahead.

Q Okay. Did Dugaboy contribute a portion of its ownership interest in Highland to the Highland -- to the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust?

A Contribute? No.

Q Did it transfer?

A Yes.

Q And did it receive in exchange a promissory note from Hunter Mountain?

A Yes, it did.
Q Okay. And Mr. Dondero is the lifetime beneficiary of Dugaboy, correct?
A Yes and no. It's a placeholder -- a placeholder provision that's never been used.
MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, pardon me. Pardon me. Objection, relevance, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Relevance?
MR. MORRIS: This is -- we've been told so many times that Mr. Dondero has no interest in this case, he has nothing to do with Hunter Mountain. He's the lifetime beneficiary of Dugaboy. And if I --
THE WITNESS: That provision has never been invoked. He's received no money through that provision.
THE COURT: Okay. Just wait. We're resolving --
MR. MORRIS: Right.
THE COURT: -- an objection at the moment.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Can we turn to Exhibit 51?
THE COURT: I'm still working on the objection.
MR. MORRIS: I'm going to try and lay a foundation. Okay?
THE COURT: Okay. So he's withdrawing the question.
MR. MCCLEARY: He's withdrawing the question? Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. MORRIS:
Q You have a binder in front of you, sir. Can you go to Exhibit 51?
THE COURT: And this is Highland's Exhibit 51?
MR. MORRIS: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q And is that a promissory note that was made --
A Yes, it is.
Q -- that was made by Hunter Mountain in favor of Dugaboy back in 2015?
MR. MCCLEARY: Objection, relevance, Your Honor.
MR. MORRIS: I'm trying to connect Mr. Dondero to Hunter Mountain.
THE COURT: Okay. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's a secured promissory note with the amount of approximately $62.6 million signed by Beacon Mountain, LLC, --
MR. MORRIS: Uh-huh.
THE WITNESS: -- as administrator for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust.
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Okay. And as the -- what's your role with Hunter Mountain today?
A And it's in favor, just to answer your question, it's in

favor of the Dugaboy Investment Trust. That's where I was just being a little stickler --

Q I appreciate that.

A -- previously. Sorry.

Q I do.

A Okay. What is your question?

Q What's your role with Hunter Mountain today?

A I am the administrator.

Q When did you become the administrator?

A On or about August of 2022.

Q Okay. How did you become the administrator?

A Through the acquisition of Rand Advisors.

Q And does Hunter Mountain have any employees?

A No.

Q Does it have any operations?

A No.

Q Does it generate any revenue?

A Not -- not currently.

Q Okay. Did it generate any revenue in 2022?

A No.

Q Does it own any assets?

A Yes.

Q What does it own?

A It has -- it's my understanding it has a contingent beneficiary interest in the Claimants Trust.

Q And that's the only asset it has, right?
A Correct.
Q So that if it -- if that interest has no value, then Hunter Mountain has no ability to pay the Dugaboy note. Fair?
A (sotto voce) If that interest has no value?
That is correct.
Q Okay.
MR. MORRIS: I move Exhibit 51 into evidence.
MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, relevance. Objection.
THE COURT: Your response?
MR. MORRIS: Mr. Dondero desperately needs Hunter Mountain to win in this lawsuit because otherwise his family trust will get nothing on this $63 million note.
THE COURT: Okay. Overrule the objection. It's admitted.
(Debtors' Exhibit 51 is received into evidence.)
BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Neither you or any representative of Hunter Mountain has ever spoken with any representative of Farallon, correct?
A Correct.
Q Neither you nor any representative of Hunter Mountain has ever spoken with anybody at Stonehill, correct?
A Correct.
Q You have -- neither you nor Hunter Mountain have any personal knowledge about a *quid pro quo*, correct?

A (sotto voce) Nor Hunter Mountain have any personal knowledge about a *quid pro quo*.

Correct.

Q Neither you nor anybody at Hunter Mountain have any personal knowledge about how Mr. Seery's compensation package was determined, correct?

A Correct.

Q Neither you nor anybody at Hunter Mountain had any knowledge about the terms of Mr. Seery's compensation package until the Highland parties voluntarily disclosed that in opposition to the Hunter Mountain motion, correct?

A No. I --

MR. STANCIL: Objection, relevance, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: No. I seem to -- I seem to have an awareness that the performance fee was amended at a certain time post-confirmation, or, you know, around the confirmation time period. And so that's with respect to the compensation. I -- just myself.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can you tell Judge Jernigan everything you know or everything you knew before receiving Highland's opposition to this motion about Mr. Seery's compensation as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor at the Claimant Trustee?

MR. MCCLEARY: Objection, Your Honor. That's

overboard and an unclear question.

THE COURT: Overruled. He's gone through some specific things now. I guess he's just trying to encompass anything we haven't covered.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I had a -- I personally had a general understanding that Mr. Seery's compensation changed after the claims trading to put in a performance-based-type measure. But I do recall that it was always very -- it was unclear exactly the terms.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Okay. Did you learn anything else?

A Such as?

Q Just, did you ever learn anything else about Mr. Seery's compensation package that you haven't testified to yet?

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, objection. Vague.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: No.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Okay. Neither you nor Hunter Mountain has any personal knowledge whatsoever about any due diligence that Stonehill did in connection with the purchase of claims, correct?

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, he's getting into allegations in the complaint which involve attorney work product, so we object on the basis of invading the attorney work product.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can you restate the question again?

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Yes, sir. Neither you nor Hunter Mountain have any personal knowledge as to what due diligence Stonehill did before purchasing its claims in this case, correct?

MR. MCCLEARY: Objection. Attorney work product. Invasion of that. Could I --

THE COURT: I just ruled.

MR. MCCLEARY: I understand.

THE COURT: I just --

MR. MCCLEARY: Could I have a running objection to this line of questioning on that basis, Your Honor, invasion of attorney work product?

THE COURT: Why don't you explain why it's attorney work product. I'm missing --

MR. MCCLEARY: Because they might -- he would have knowledge from the efforts and investigation through attorneys in the case. I assume he's not asking -- you can't separate that, potentially. So he's getting into attorney work product.

MR. MORRIS: I'm asking for facts.

THE COURT: He's asking for facts. I overrule.

BY MR. MORRIS:

Q Can you answer the question, sir?

A Yeah. I'm not aware -- I'm not personally aware of how much work Farallon did, or Stonehill.
Q You have no knowledge whatsoever about the diligence Stonehill did before purchasing its claims, correct?
A Well, I would generalize now is that they did nothing.
Q And that's on the basis of Mr. Dondero's testimony, correct?
A I would just call it on a basis of our general inquiry, which would be including, in part, Mr. Dondero's testimony.
Q What else are you relying upon for your conclusion that you just described other than Mr. Dondero's? What other facts?
A Yeah, we -- yeah, we have not uncovered any facts that indicated that they did conduct any due diligence of any sort.
Q Okay. And are you -- do you have any personal knowledge as to what Farallon did in connection with its due diligence prior to buying its claim?
A Yeah. We have not been able to find any facts that would suggest that Farallon conducted any due diligence of any kind.
Q Okay.

MR. MORRIS: One second, Your Honor.

(Pause.)

BY MR. MORRIS:
Q Who's paying Hunter Mountain's legal fees?
A Hunter Mountain is paying -- is legally obligated and

paying its own legal fees.

Q If it generates no income and its only assets is the interest in Highland, where is it getting the funds to pay legal fees?

MR. MCCLEARY: Objection, Your Honor. This is irrelevant and invades the attorney-client privilege.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, I'm happy to read a Fifth Circuit case that says the identity of a third-party payer of attorneys' fees is not privileged. I would refer them to *In re Grand Jury Subpoena*, 913 F.2d 1118, a 1990 Fifth Circuit case. I can read from Judge Jones' opinion, but you tell me how much you want to hear on this.

THE COURT: Okay. I overrule your objection. He can answer.

THE WITNESS: There is a settlement agreement by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust as well as the Dugaboy Investment Trust that provides for the payment of attorney fees.

MR. MORRIS: No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Cross?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor, briefly.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MCCLEARY:

Q Mr. Patrick, how would you describe Mr. Dondero's relationship with Hunter Mountain Investment Trust today?

A None.
Q You were asked some -- let me ask you about litigation, and litigation involving the sub-trust. Has Hunter Mountain been involved in litigation with Mr. Kirschner?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And what is your understanding of Mr. Kirschner's role?
MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, while I would love for them to continue --
MR. MCCLEARY: He's the --
MR. MORRIS: -- to use their time, I object that it's beyond the scope of my examination. They passed on the witness. They rested their case. He should be limited to the scope of my inquiry.
THE COURT: Okay. How does this tie to direct?
MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, it -- just very generally. This is --
THE COURT: Okay. I need to know how it ties to the direct.
MR. MCCLEARY: This doesn't tie directly to the direct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then it's beyond the scope, you acknowledge?
MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Sustained, then.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.

BY MR. MCCLEARY:

Q Mr. Patrick, has Hunter Mountain Investment filed any litigation as a plaintiff other than its efforts to be a plaintiff in this lawsuit and its action as a petitioner in the Rule 201 matter earlier this year in Dallas state court?

A The 202.

Q 202, yes.

A No, it has not.

Q All right. And then it's -- has it been a party, then, to any other litigation other than the efforts to file this action, the Rule 202 action, and has it been a defendant in any lawsuits?

A To my understanding, no.

Q Is it involved as a defendant in the Kirschner litigation?

A Yes.

Q Mr. Kirschner is suing Hunter Mountain; is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. So, is Hunter Mountain a vexatious litigant?

MR. MORRIS: Objection, Your Honor. This is now really beyond the scope. We're not doing -- this is -- we're not doing it. I'm not letting -- because there's a vexatious litigant motion pending now in the district court right now before Judge Starr. This has nothing to do with anything I asked.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCCLEARY: They're trying to draw --

THE COURT: You've already asked him is it a party in any other litigation besides the 202 and this attempted one, so where are we going with this?

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, they're just trying to draw Mr. Dondero into this and -- this vexatious litigant argument, and we're just developing the fact that obviously Hunter Mountain has only filed -- attempting to file this action and a Rule 202 proceeding. So they're not involved in a lot of litigation and they're not a vexatious litigant.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I'll sustain that and we can just move on.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. Then I'll pass the witness. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Any redirect?

MR. MORRIS: No, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You are excused, Mr. Patrick.

(The witness steps down.)

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. MORRIS: Just a time check for both sides and let's get to closings.

THE COURT: Okay. Caroline?

THE CLERK: Movant has 23 minutes left and the Respondents have 47.

THE COURT: 23 and 47. Any other evidence from the Respondents?

MR. MORRIS: That is a fair question.

(Discussion.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, I just want to confirm that all the exhibits that they did not object to have been admitted into evidence.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me --

MR. MCCLEARY: We do offer them.

MR. MORRIS: Oh.

THE COURT: Hang on.

MR. MORRIS: Did I get Exhibit 45, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Just a moment. I'm doing two things at once here. 45 is in.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. On HMIT's exhibits, okay, first, as we all know, 29 through 52 are carried until -- if we have another hearing with the experts.

(HMIT's Exhibits 29 through 52 carried.)

THE COURT: I'm showing we have -- and speak up if anyone questions this -- I show that we have Hunter Mountain Exhibits 3 and 4, and then 7 through 10, 12 through 23, and 26 through 38, and 53 through 57, 64, 65, and then 67 through seventy --

(HMIT's Exhibits 3, 4, 7-10, 12-23, 26-38, 53-57, 64, 65,

67-70 are received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, I apologize. From 36 -- 26 to 32 are in?

THE COURT: I believe that was part of the stipulation, Mr. Morris, right?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes.

MR. MORRIS: I think that's right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: We really didn't object to very many.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MCCLEARY: That would be 25, too. That would include 25?

MR. STANCIL: No. Objection. 25 is not --

THE COURT: It's not admitted.

MR. STANCIL: It's not in evidence.

THE COURT: 25 and 24 were not admitted.

MR. MORRIS: Correct. Those are my emails.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

MR. MCCLEARY: 25 is an article.

THE COURT: Your 25 was John Morris Email Re: Text Messages dated March 10, 2023.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. I can't remember where I left off. I think I left off -- I'll just repeat after the expert exhibits that are carried. I've admitted 53 through 57. I

have admitted 64, 65, 67 through 71.

(HMIT's Exhibit 71 is received into evidence.)

Now, I'm not sure if I ended up admitting 72. That was the articles. I can't remember if you stipulated on that finally.

MR. MORRIS: I said they --

MR. MCCLEARY: They had no objection.

MR. MORRIS: -- they come in --

THE COURT: Not for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. MORRIS: -- self -- exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Self-authenticating.

THE COURT: So 72 is in.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay.

(HMIT's Exhibit 72 is received into evidence.)

THE COURT: Then we had some pleadings. I think 73, 74, 75 are in, but again, not for the truth of the matter asserted in any advocacy on 73 and 74. And then 77, 78, 79 are in. And that's it.

(HMIT's Exhibits 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, and 79 are received into evidence.)

MS. DEITSCH-PEREZ: Your Honor, I didn't make an appearance, but I was taking notes (inaudible).

MR. MCCLEARY: Your Honor, I believe 80 should be in.

MR. MORRIS: No objection to 80. It's on our -- it's

part of our Exhibit 5.

THE COURT: Okay. 80 is in. Admitted.

(HMIT's exhibit 80 is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Yeah. That's really Section A of that thing that I gave you this morning.

THE COURT: If Ms. Deitsch-Perez wants to consult with the Hunter Mountain lawyers, she can. I don't know --

MR. MORRIS: Can I go through quickly mine, Your Honor? Because we actually never had the opportunity to put our exhibits in.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's make sure we're to --

MR. MORRIS: Okay. I'm sorry. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: -- closure on the Hunter Mountain exhibits.

MR. MORRIS: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Anything I said that you disagree with? I don't think --

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Okay. Let's hurry up. What is the controversy?

A VOICE: Roger? The Court's addressing you.

MR. MCCLEARY: Oh. Excuse me, Your Honor. So, just a little unclear of whether you have Exhibits 21 through 25 admitted.

THE COURT: I have 21, 22, and 23. Not 24. Not 25.

Okay. Anything else?

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. Then we do offer 24 and 25.

THE COURT: You offered them. I did not admit them.

MR. MCCLEARY: Okay. 76. I believe -- was that -- you're carrying?

MS. DEITSCH-PEREZ: Carried.

MR. MCCLEARY: You're carrying that?

THE COURT: Okay. I carried that and --

MR. MCCLEARY: It's part of the expert issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, part of the expert. So it's carried.

(HMIT's Exhibit 76 is carried.)

(Pause.)

MR. MCCLEARY: I understand you've admitted 53 through 83, although some of them have now not been approved.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we need to clarify. 58 through 63, you think you offered them and I admitted them, but not for the truth? I remember that being discussed for 58 through 63. Are you actually offering them?

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes. 58 through 63.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Morris, you ultimately agreed that yes, but not for the truth of the matter asserted?

MR. MORRIS: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So they are admitted. Okay.

(HMIT's Exhibits 58 through 63 are received into evidence.)

THE COURT: And then there was an objection to the Mark Patrick declaration for the same thing, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. MORRIS: Exactly.

THE COURT: But you agree as long as it's --

MR. MORRIS: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So what that means is, to recap, 53 through 75 are admitted, although some of those are only -- they're not for the truth of the matter asserted. And then 77 through 80 are admitted. Okay?

MR. MCCLEARY: And 76? We offered 76.

THE COURT: That's -- we carried it. We carried it. It relates to the expert.

MR. MCCLEARY: Carried it.

(Pause.)

MR. MCCLEARY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now let's straighten out Highland's exhibits. So, I'm showing 1 through 16 have been admitted, and then 25 through 31-A?

MR. MORRIS: 25 through 31-A?

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Yes. 25 through 31-A.

MR. MORRIS: Okay.

THE COURT: And then 34. And then 39, 40, 41, and

then 45. 51, 59, and 60.

MR. MORRIS: Okay. So I'm going to do my best not to burden the Court. I'm trying to focus. We move for the admission into evidence of Exhibit 32, which is Mr. Dondero's objection to the HarbourVest settlement. And the reason that we're offering it is because he made no mention of any concern at all that the settlement implicated material nonpublic inside information.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection?

MR. MCCLEARY: 32?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor. Relevance and hearsay.

THE COURT: Overruled. And I can take judicial notice of it in any event.

(Debtors' Exhibit 32 is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: We move for the admission into evidence of Exhibit 33, which is the recent letter from the Texas State Securities Board declining to take any action after conducting an investigation of the Dugaboy complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. Any objection?

MR. MCCLEARY: We object on the grounds of relevance, 403, hearsay, and authenticity, Your Honor.

And I also, I think it's important that the decision by a regulatory body has no bearing on this cause of action or the

colorability of this claim, and the Texas State Securities Board will tell you that. This is completely and utterly irrelevant to your inquiry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I overrule the relevance objection. Certainly, it goes to colorability. It's some evidence. It's some evidence. A regulatory body did not choose to go forward --

MR. MCCLEARY: But that could be for --

THE COURT: -- on the complaint.

MR. MCCLEARY: That could be for reasons entirely unrelated.

THE COURT: True, true. It's some evidence.

MR. MORRIS: That's speculation.

MR. MCCLEARY: Not for this.

THE COURT: But what is the authenticity objection?

MR. MCCLEARY: Well, there's no demonstration. I don't believe they sponsored that with anyone.

THE COURT: Pardon? Say again?

MR. MCCLEARY: They didn't sponsor that with anyone.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, I actually -- if they really put me to it, because I was reading the Rules of Evidence in the wee hours of the morning, I am certain that there's an exception for government documents and government statements and government decisions.

MR. STANCIL: Your Honor, as to its authenticity, I

could produce a witness from Highland who said they got it, if that's really what we're doing. That it's the letter, they got it from the TSSB, if we're really doing authenticity.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, it's hearsay and there is no authenticity issue and it's irrelevant. I understand --

MR. STANCIL: What is the authenticity issue, Mr. McEntire?

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand the authenticity issue. You think this is a --

MR. STANCIL: Do you think it's a real letter or a fake letter?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, first of all, I'm going to address the Court and not you, okay?

Your Honor, --

THE COURT: Well, address by speaking in a --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just saving the court reporter from grief, okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: It is hearsay, and it is hearsay that is calculated to be misrepresented or mischaracterized because it's utter speculation as to the basis for their decision. And if it's -- utter speculation is the basis of your decision, it has no reason to come in. There's no --

THE COURT: What you're telling me, it goes to the

weight of the evidence. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: Okay. You're not telling me it's inadmissible hearsay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, it is inadmissible hearsay.

MR. MORRIS: Can I just, for one second?

THE COURT: Please.

MR. MORRIS: Paragraph 34 of their motion, Your Honor. Quote, "The Court also should be aware that the Texas State Securities Board opened an investigation into the subject matter of the insider tradings at issue, and this investigation has not been closed. The continuing nature of this investigation underscores HMIT's position that the claims described in the attached adversary proceeding are plausible and certainly far more than merely colorable."

They used the investigation to try to convince you that their claims are colorable, and now we have a letter saying there's nothing.

THE COURT: Okay. You want to explain that to me?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, we put no evidence in, in this proceeding --

THE COURT: You put what?

MR. MCENTIRE: We have put no evidence in, in this proceeding, --

THE COURT: You filed a pleading under Rule 11

suggesting this was highly relevant, right?

MR. MCENTIRE: We filed a motion. Yes, we did.

THE COURT: Under Rule 11.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes. Of course we did.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Of course we did.

THE COURT: Suggesting this Texas State Securities Board complaint and investigation was highly relevant.

MR. MCENTIRE: The fact that it had opened an investigation and was conducting an investigation is irrelevant. Its decision to stop the investigation without further elaboration or clarification, this is why it calls for utter speculation.

MR. MORRIS: Your --

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have the hearsay exception that applies? I'm looking at my evidence rules right now for the government record or public record. Is it 803(8) that we need to have addressed here?

MR. STANCIL: 803(8), Your Honor.

A VOICE: Yeah, public records.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: Public record. Sets out --

THE COURT: Public records, 803(8), hearsay exception. Moreover, you pled allegations suggesting this investigation was really relevant. So I overrule your

objection, and so that means 33 is admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 33 is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I continue. Exhibit 36 --

MR. MCENTIRE: Which one was that?

MR. MORRIS: That was 33.

So now we're up to 36, Your Honor. I'm going to skip some of these.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: But this is just the Court's order approving Mr. Seery's original --

THE COURT: I'm waiting for any objection for the record. Do we have an objection, Mr. McCleary?

MR. MCCLEARY: 36, relevance, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: The relevance is that this Court approved without objection Mr. Seery's compensation package in an amount that included a base salary of $150,000, which the Claimant Purchasers and the independent director saw fit to continue.

THE COURT: Objection overruled. It's admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 36 is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: I think 38 may be on their list. Yeah, 38 is in as their 26, right? So that should be admitted.

THE COURT: Admitted.

(Debtors' Exhibit 38 is received into evidence.)

MR. MCCLEARY: If it's on our list, we agree.
THE COURT: Okay. It's admitted.
MR. MORRIS: That's it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you all need a five-minute break before we do closing arguments?
MR. MORRIS: I'd be grateful.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MCCLEARY: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Will do.
THE CLERK: All rise
(A recess ensued from 5:49 p.m. to 5:57 p.m.)
THE CLERK: All rise.
THE COURT: All right. Please be seated.
We're back on the record in the Highland matter. Closing arguments. Just for everyone's benefit, time -- you said 47 minutes and 23 minutes back several minutes ago, and then we had all the housekeeping stuff. So I'm not sure if that's where we are right now or if --
MR. MCENTIRE: I'm waiting for my monitor guy to be here.
THE COURT: Okay. Okay.
So Caroline, is it still 47 and 23?
THE CLERK: Yes.
THE COURT: That's when we started the housekeeping stuff.

MR. MCENTIRE: So 27 minutes?

THE COURT: Twenty-three.

THE CLERK: Twenty-three.

MR. MCENTIRE: Twenty-three? Can I get a five-minute warning, please? Would you pull up the PowerPoint? And let's go to Slide 39.

May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST

MR. MCENTIRE: So, before I go to the PowerPoint, I'd like to kind of give a high-altitude overview of the situation as I see it from the evidence perspective. We don't believe this should have been an evidentiary hearing. Evidence has been allowed.

We had a situation where, if you believe Mr. Dondero's testimony as contrasted with Mr. Seery's testimony, you have a credibility issue. So the Court is now conducting an inquiry presumably on the basis in part on the credibility of witnesses. And if you engage -- and if you want to indulge that type of inquiry, the credibility of witnesses, without allowing the Plaintiff in this case or the Movant in this case to conduct some level of meaningful discovery, I would suggest we have been deprived of due process, because without documents to test Mr. Seery's statements, we are being deprived of something that's basically very fundamental in our

judicial process.

And therefore, it underscores our argument and our rationale why this shouldn't be an evidentiary hearing, because I don't believe the Court can consider credibility issues.

We have, on the one hand, unequivocal notes from Mr. Dondero prepared contemporaneously that would suggest that someone admitted to him and stated to him that they did in fact obtain material nonpublic information. Mr. Seery says that didn't happen. I specifically said, is that a lie? Yes, it's not true. Well, that's a real problem, because that's not the criteria that this Court should use for determining whether we have a colorable claim. A colorable claim is whether there is some possibility. It's something less, even less stringent than a 12(b)(6) standard, plausibility. We have that.

If you look at our pleadings, we have set forth all of the facts we need, all the elements we need to establish a trade on material inside information, nonpublic information. We have evidence -- we have allegations that there was no due diligence. And Farallon's lawyer stood up here -- well, I'm not going to really address that today. But if there was any day to address it, it was today. We have no evidence to suggest they did do due diligence. Even Mr. Seery said, I don't know what due diligence they did. We have evidence to

suggest that the only due diligence they did was to talk to Mr. Seery, who has told -- who told them that this is very valuable, don't -- this is a really good -- a good investment here, it's a lot better than the 71 percent that's on our disclosures.

And Judge, that evidence supports the colorability of the claim. And if you go down the pathway of saying, well, I'm not sure about Mr. Dondero because he had been held in contempt two years ago, that's a real problem. That's a problem for this Court. And I'm going to suggest that's why this should have been a four-corners deliberation. Even Farallon and Stonehill suggest this should be a four-corners deliberation.

We have evidence now of no due diligence. We have evidence before you that suggests that they did learn about MGM before the announcement date. We have evidence that Mr. Seery did trade on -- did -- was aware and received information of material nonpublic information. And for him, a CEO of his reputed stature, to sit here and say that was not material and that was nonpublic defies common sense. It defies reasonableness. That goes to credibility.

Mr. Dondero's notes speak volumes. The trades themselves speak volumes. Mr. Dondero established that the interest -- return of interest here is to be less than one -- it's in the one digits, and hedge funds trade in the 30, 40, 50 percent

range. Well, if that's the case, we have Farallon walking away from a return on the exit financing of 13 percent, and that wasn't good enough for him. How could six percent be good enough for him? There's something missing here. There's something not right.

And we're entitled to get our lawsuit on file and do some discovery. And if they want to do a 12(b)(6), they do a 12(b)(6). If they want to do a Rule 56 after discovery, they could do a Rule 56, all in this Court. But to address this threshold issue now based upon this, what happened here today, is a fundamental denial of due process.

I'd like to go to my pleadings.

Can you go to Slide 39, please?

First of all, let there be no doubt -- 39. Slide 39. 38. 38, please.

We can plead on information and belief. We have a right to plead on information and belief. And the Fifth Circuit -- that is an acknowledged procedural practice in the Fifth Circuit. And if some of our allegations are based upon information and belief, so be it. The test here is not at this stage. The test here is whether I have sufficient factual allegations, whether on information and belief or otherwise, to satisfy at most a plausibility standard. That's it.

And if they want to challenge us at a later date, they

can. Rule 56. 12(b)(6). Or standing. But we have standing. We have standing. We have standing under Delaware law. We're a contingent beneficial interest that has standing under Delaware law and all other law. All -- even Texas agrees that a contingent interest has standing, an inchoate interest as Mr. Seery described. A property interest. You have property interest, you have standing.

THE COURT: Let me ask you.

And Caroline, turn the clock off when the Court interrupts.

Just so you know, I mean, my analysis here is standing first. Does your client have standing? Because we all know that's a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry and I have to explore that first. And then I've said many times the legal standard question for colorability. That's kind of the second place I go --

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure.

THE COURT: -- if I find there's standing. But can you tell me, have there been appellate decisions that are relevant today on standing? Contrary to what people may expect, I don't follow every appellate decision from every appeal in the Highland case. Okay? I wait until I get a mandate --

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure.

THE COURT: -- to where I have to act on something.

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure.

THE COURT: So I feel like I've learned at some point that some either district judge or Fifth Circuit said some party didn't have standing. And I don't know if it was Hunter Mountain or some other trust.

MR. MCENTIRE: Not --

THE COURT: And is there anything they said that, if it wasn't Hunter Mountain, could be relevant here?

MR. MCENTIRE: I hope somebody kicks me if I'm wrong, what I'm about to say. I'm not aware of any such issue --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- dealing with Hunter Mountain Investment Trust. I am not.

THE COURT: But any other party that might somehow bear on this case?

MR. MORRIS: I apologize, Your Honor, I was distracted. For which issue?

THE COURT: Standing. Because I was saying my first thing I've got to tackle in ruling on this is standing of Hunter Mountain. And I seem to remember learning that either the district court on an appeal or the Fifth Circuit on some appeal from Highland --

MR. MORRIS: Correct.

THE COURT: -- said some party didn't have standing.

MR. MORRIS: Correct.

THE COURT: And I don't know if it was --

MR. MORRIS: Dugaboy on the 2015.3, for sure, was a Fifth Circuit standing decision.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: I think there was a district court order that preceded that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: That was the subject of the appeal.

THE COURT: The Dugaboy --

MR. MORRIS: 2015.3.

THE COURT: -- motion to require those --

MR. MORRIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- 2015.3 statements. Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: So what we have here -- we can go back on the clock if you'd like.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. MCENTIRE: How much time do I have?

THE CLERK: You have just under 16 minutes.

MR. MCENTIRE: Sixteen? Okay. Give me a two-minute warning. Sorry.

Your Honor, what we have here --

THE COURT: I don't think the U.S. Supreme Court justices will give you a two-minute warning, but maybe I'm wrong.

MR. MCENTIRE: Would you give me a two-minute

warning, please?

THE COURT: And I'm sure not a Supreme Court justice.

MR. MCENTIRE: What we have here is we have a 99.5 percent equity interest that has now been relegated to a category of contingent interest, which we don't believe we should be, and that's part of our declaratory judgment relief we're asking for, which we have standing to do that at a minimum because we want to be treated like a Class 9.

If they want to treat us like a Class 10, I have an argument for that, and it's more than colorable. It's persuasive. It's -- it is a winning argument. And that is we do have standing in our individual capacity, and we have given you a whole bunch of cases in our PowerPoint, or we will give you a whole bunch of cases in our PowerPoint and in our briefing to support that.

We also have given you Delaware case law that says we have standing under Delaware trust law to bring a derivative action against the Trustee. We have done everything appropriate here.

We have the -- a demand upon Seery obviously would be futile to prosecute the claim. A demand upon the Oversight Board would be futile to make a demand on Muck and Jessup, because they're Defendants and they're SPEs of Farallon and Stonehill. And a demand upon Mr. Kirschner would be futile. They suggest that there's an assignment of some sort, but that

would be a modification -- of the claims over to the Litigation Trust, but that would be a modification of the plan.

There's been no assignment of this claim, or these claims, to the Litigation Trust Trustee. But even if there had been, we pled that in the alternative as well. And it would be futile to make a demand on Mr. Kirschner because he's suing Hunter Mountain.

So we are an appropriate party. The only, then, issue becomes whether or not we have standing under Delaware law to bring a derivative action. And we have briefed that and we -- and that's included in our PowerPoint. The answer is yes.

I'd like to go briefly to Page -- next slide.

In our factual section, we set forth why this investment would defy any kind of rational economic sense in the absence of material nonpublic information as a factual allegation supported by data, supported by dates, supported by time.

Based upon that, we also have allegations that are framed around the admissions that Mr. Michael Linn provided. We have allegations that he turned down a 30 or 40 percent premium in our petition. We have allegations that they admitted that they did no due diligence. We have allegations that they admitted that they got material -- basically information about MGM.

And again, it's not all about MGM. It's about the values

of all the portfolio companies. They want to make it about MGM. If they do, we win. But it's much broader than that.

And we have standing to bring this claim because if we're right Mr. Seery will have to return excess compensation and the Claims Purchasers will have to disgorge. And that's going to help not just Hunter Mountain. That's going to help other creditors who haven't been paid yet.

So this is not exclusively -- Hunter Mountain would substantially benefit. I'm not suggesting otherwise. But it also benefits innocent stakeholders other than Hunter Mountain. And that's why we are an appropriate party. We don't have a conflict of interest to bring this. Everybody on their side of the table does. There's no one else who could bring this.

Your Honor, it's very clear when the trades took place. We give dates and times. It's very clear that -- next slide, 40. It's very clear that their investment was over $160 million. If it isn't, I don't see any denials. All we got today was a lame statement from the lawyer saying we're not here today to deny this.

MR. MORRIS: I'm offended.

THE COURT: He's offended by being called lame.

MR. MCENTIRE: Not you lame personally.

MR. MORRIS: Oh, thanks for the clarification.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: A lame statement by you. In fact, it wasn't even you, so --

In any event, Your Honor, --

MR. MORRIS: I've been called worse.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- the point being is that there was no -- there's not -- never been an attempt to deny the factual allegations in our pleadings dealing with Farallon and Stonehill. None at all.

And so -- not that that's ultimately relevant, because that's an evidentiary issue outside of the four corners of our pleading, but it does -- it just stands out and screams. It screams. And it screams volumes.

So right, now based upon our pleadings -- we even plead in Paragraph 42, Paragraph 42, exactly what they invested. This is what you have before you. No one has disputed it. It's in the four corners of our pleading. We've got dates, times, amounts. We have admissions to Mr. -- well, we have admissions from Michael Linn, Paragraph 47. We have -- we do plead upon information and belief the *quid pro quo* on compensation. And frankly, the evidence here today is that the compensation is excessive. And the experts will further confirm that it is excessive. $1.8 million with a bonus program in place to pay him another $8, $9, $10 million, when in fact the risks don't exist and there's no uncertainty and therefore the percentages make no sense. That's --

THE COURT: What do you mean, the risks don't exist and there is no uncertainty?

MR. MCENTIRE: If Mr. Seery is telling Farallon and Stonehill don't sell, this could be really valuable, it's inconsistent with the notion that the schedule and the performance -- performance schedule in the compensation agreement is rationally justified. Because if it's really certain or it's likely you're going to make a lot of money, there's no reason to give him six percent to incentivize him because it's already a done deal.

And the whole point here is that I scratch your back, you scratch mine. They make a lot of money on their deal and he gets a lot of money on the backside post-effective date. Post-effective date.

Next slide, 49.

It would have been impossible, based upon the publicly-available information in Paragraph 49, impossible for Stonehill and Farallon, in the absence of inside information, to forecast any significant profit when they made their investments. It's not possible. Because given the amount of the Claim 8 and Claim 9 claims -- they actually invested in Claim 9 with a zero return. It's projected to be a negative result. On Claim 8, even if you allocate their entire purchase price to Claim 8, they're going to get something less than a 10 percent return paid out over a couple years. Nobody

invests that kind of money in an unsecured creditor asset that hasn't been collateralized. There's something wrong here.

And we have a right to have our day in court to show that. We have our right to take a true deposition of Mr. Seery with documents. We have a right to take Farallon and Stonehill's deposition with documents. And we have tried to get information and we have been turned down at every turn. We have a right to have our day in court, Your Honor.

We have allegations of excessive compensation. I know Mr. Morris suggested the other day that we didn't have any such allegations. They're here. The whole idea here is that Mr. Seery would really profit on the backside. And, you know, he actually testified, I believe -- I won't do that because that's outside the four corners of our pleading. But the -- there is a *quid pro quo*. We allege there's a *quid pro quo* upon information and belief. And we also allege willfully and knowingly, we allege conduct that falls clearly within the exceptions.

None of this -- none of these claims were released. Mr. Seery's not an exculpated party in the context of how we -- proposing to sue him here. None of the protected parties, to the extent that Muck and Jessup claim to be protected parties, they're not protected here, because all of the claims we're making are on the basis of willful misconduct and bad faith, which are the standards that they used and incorporated in the

plan and in the gatekeeper provisions.

How much time do I have?

THE CLERK: Right now you have --

MR. MCENTIRE: Thirty seconds?

THE CLERK: -- seven minutes left.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. Next slide, please.

Mr. Seery has admitted that he has a duty to avoid self-dealing. We allege that he did self-deal. There is clearly a relationship. We have a right to explore the depths of that relationship. Well, already we know there is a relationship. We have investments in charities, contributions to charities, meet-and-greets, congratulatory emails. It's not as if Farallon and Stonehill are strangers, or Mr. Seery's a stranger to them. It's not like that at all. They contacted him to get involved.

And by placing -- by acquiring these claims -- and by the way, this is the most significant trading activity in your bankruptcy, in this bankruptcy proceeding. Post-confirmation. Post-confirmation. By acquiring these claims, they were guaranteed to be put onto the Oversight Board. By acquiring these claims, they were guaranteed to be put in a position -- into a position where they would adjust, monitor, compensate Mr. Seery. That's the terms of the Claimant Trust. Those are the terms.

And it's interesting, because one of the amendments that's

in evidence to the plan, I think it's either the third or the fourth amendment, that came out of nowhere right before confirmation, they changed the structure of the Claimant Trust to go off a standard base pay and added in a bonus structure at the last minute. That's evidence.

Mr. Seery has acknowledged, we have alleged he had duties to avoid self-dealing, to always look out for the best interests of the estate, to avoid conflicts of interest. Well, here, to the extent that there is a *quid pro quo*, he is self-dealing and he has injured the Reorganized Debtor and he's injured the Claimant Trust, because that's just less money.

And we also allege, Your Honor, it's also an allegation that --

THE COURT: And let me ask, the sole injury here is compensation was more than it would have been if not for the sale of the claims to Farallon and Stonehill --

MR. MCENTIRE: That's one of the injuries.

THE COURT: -- and therefore less money at the end of the day for creditors and ultimately Hunter Mountain?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes. And we also allege that, as part of this arrangement, conspiracy, as we allege conspiracy, we have seen over $200 million flow out of the coffers of this estate in the form of --

THE COURT: What do you mean, as a result of the

alleged conspiracy? What do you mean?

MR. MCENTIRE: A delay, a postponement, making long-term payouts, keeping the litigation alive. They actually suggested to Mr. Linn, don't settle these claims, don't sell out, because this is asset-backed, and we also have claims. And so --

THE COURT: Wait, what? Say again?

MR. MCENTIRE: One of the things that Mr. Linn told Mr. Dondero, according to Mr. Dondero's notes, is we have -- this is very valuable, we're buying assets and we're buying into claims, the litigation claims that are being asserted in this bankruptcy proceeding.

THE COURT: Yes. Got it.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah. And so the whole idea here is, is that people are funneling money in and taking money out of the coffers of this estate to fuel future litigation in order to have a bigger payday at the end for Class 8 and Class 9. That's exactly what those notes suggest.

THE COURT: I don't understand the correlation. What correlation are you making? Because of the claims being purchased, what?

MR. MCENTIRE: The claims being purchased allow Muck and Jessup to be in a position to award compensation. We've talked about that.

THE COURT: I got that.

MR. MCENTIRE: That's one type of injury. The other injury is, and we have alleged it, is the fact that these claims become very valuable not only because they're asset-backed but because also the litigation claims that Mr. Kirschner is prosecuting.

THE COURT: But how does the purchase of the claims impact that? They were allowed claims at certain amounts before, and after the purchase they're still allowed claims.

MR. MCENTIRE: Mr. Seery is telling them that, basically, this is our plan, this is what we're doing, this is --

THE COURT: That was the plan of reorganization that was confirmed by the Court. I don't get how something changed. I'm trying to get to what are the injuries that your client has suffered. And I get the compensation argument you're making, but I don't get the rest of it.

MR. MCENTIRE: If Mr. Dondero had been in a position, or one of his entities had been in a position, or even Hunter Mountain, and I'm not sure why Hunter Mountain -- be in a position to have acquired the claims, then we would -- this bankruptcy wouldn't even be in existence anymore. It'd be over. All creditors would be paid. It would be done. Be over. And that is an allegation we have made --

THE COURT: How do I know that?

MR. MCENTIRE: Because all the creditors would have

been paid off.

THE COURT: How do I know, if he would have purchased the claims, that's what would have happened?

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, that's what he testified to today here. I don't want to get off on a rabbit trail.

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand the injury, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure. I understand.

THE COURT: -- because that's part of my analysis here.

MR. MCENTIRE: The focus, the focus is on the compensation. And once they aid and abet, once they aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duties, they are subject to disgorgement, and disgorgement of all of their ill-gotten gains. And the ill-gotten gains are now well over -- approaching over $100,000 million.

THE COURT: How do you get to that number?

MR. MCENTIRE: Easily. We know how much they purchased, which has never been denied. We know how much has been distributed to Class 8. And we know what percentage of Class 8 they own. They own about 95 percent of all Class 8 claims. So if $270,000 million has been distributed to Class 8, they got 90 percent of that, 95 percent of it has already gone to them, Farallon and Stonehill.

THE COURT: But it would have gone to the sellers of the claims as well. I'm trying to make the connection.

MR. MCENTIRE: That's not the injury. The injury is what -- that is a consequence of their conduct. The injury is the compensation. All right? That's a distinct injury. They are subject to disgorgement as a consequence because they have done wrong, and the law should not tolerate -- should not tolerate and allow wrongdoers to get away. And that's where the unjust enrichment and disgorge --

THE COURT: And what are your best cases for that, that they would have to disgorge --

MR. MCENTIRE: We have cited --

THE COURT: -- the Purchasers would have to disgorge --

MR. MCENTIRE: We have cited cases in our brief.

THE COURT: I'm asking you now to --

MR. MCENTIRE: I don't have them in front of me right this second. But an aider and abettor --

THE COURT: The *CVC* case, is that your best case?

MR. MCENTIRE: I don't have the cases in front of me. I can say this, that the case law is robust, and I can supply you --

THE COURT: It is not robust. That's why I'm asking you to zero in. I read your *CVC* case from the Third Circuit, and I'm wondering, is that your strongest case?

MR. MCENTIRE: No. I think we -- I think we have a lot of strong cases. I'm not sure that it is the strongest.

THE COURT: Tell me which ones, so I --

MR. MCENTIRE: Ma'am, I just said I don't have it in front of me. If you'll look --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, this is closing argument where you present law in support of your position.

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, actually, I'm arguing facts right now. But Your Honor, what I want to tell you is if you'd like me to submit a letter brief on that, I will.

THE COURT: No.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. Then I won't. It's in my brief. All of our authorities are in the brief.

In conclusion, --

THE COURT: Okay. So that was the *CVC* case from the Third Circuit which dealt with an insider who purchased claims, statutory insider, a board member, a 28-percent equity owner, who purchased claims during the case to be in a position to file a competing plan and didn't disclose to the board or file a 3001(e) notice. Okay. There was -- claims shouldn't be allowed at more than what the purchaser paid for it.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm asking you, is that your best case? Because you also cited *Adelphia*, which seemed kind of factually off the mark. And so I really --

MR. MCENTIRE: I -- I'm sorry, --

THE COURT: I need to know, because I've made clear from the beginning, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes.

THE COURT: -- I'm struggling with how is there a cause of action related to claims trading.

MR. MCENTIRE: (chuckles)

THE COURT: I don't know why you're giggling. This is --

MR. MCENTIRE: No, I'm not. But --

THE COURT: -- serious stuff. Okay?

MR. MCENTIRE: Agreed. Agreed.

THE COURT: A bankruptcy estate is being charged ka-ching, ka-ching -- not bankruptcy estate -- the post-confirmation trust. Ka-ching, ka-ching, ka-ching. So this is serious stuff.

MR. MCENTIRE: Agreed.

THE COURT: I need to, you know, colorable claim.

MR. MCENTIRE: Agreed.

THE COURT: Colorable claim.

MR. MCENTIRE: Agreed.

THE COURT: Even if plausibility is the standard, which I've expressed my doubt about that, how do you have a plausible claim? What is your best case?

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. This --

THE COURT: Just to recap what I'm focused on,

purchaser and seller, okay? I can see where breach of contract, maybe some sort of torts between those two. Okay. I can see where the U.S. Trustee, the SEC, I don't know, the Texas State Securities Board, they might get concerned about allegations of insider trading and there might be a regulatory action. But the estate? Again, the post-confirmation trust --

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and a contingent beneficiary. I'm trying to understand what is the best legal authority that might support a colorable claim. And we talked about the *CVC* case and *Adelphia*. I'm trying to figure out what are other cases you think I should really hone in on to understand this.

MR. MCENTIRE: All right. At the very beginning this morning, during my opening statement, I had said this is not your typical claims-handling case, because I recall from our last conference you asked that question a couple of times. This is not your typical claims-handling case. And it's not a typical claims-handling case because we have a fiduciary that we claim breached his duties that were owed to the estate. And he self-dealt. And he -- this has nothing to do with the plan. This has something to do with what Mr. Seery did outside the corners of the plan. Perhaps he used the plan expediently. He self-dealt.

That's why this is not just between a seller and a buyer

of a claim. That's number one.

We have been denied an opportunity to discover the communications between the sellers and the buyers, and my guess is we have big boy agreements that prevent the sellers from ever coming back at anybody for fraud. My expectation, that's the case. We should have a right to go explore that. So that's why they're not here.

THE COURT: Why? I mean, what would that tell you? What would that tell you?

MR. MCENTIRE: That --

THE COURT: If there's a big boy agreement, if there's not, what --

MR. MCENTIRE: It would tell us --

THE COURT: -- consequence would that have for this --

MR. MCENTIRE: It would tell us --

THE COURT: -- proposed lawsuit?

MR. MCENTIRE: It would answer Mr. Morris's question that he's raised several times, this is the seller's issue, this is not -- this is not the Hunter Mountain's issue. It is Hunter Mountain's issue. Hunter Mountain as an equity interest-holder should be in a position to be certified as a Class 9 beneficiary now pursuant to our declaratory judgment action. That's number one.

Number two. As a contingent beneficiary, it is entitled

to protect its interests and bring suits if it sees that something has happened that is incorrect and is a tort involving the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust. That is the nature and the essence of our claim.

And as a consequence, the aiders and abettors should not be allowed to walk away unharmed. They should be required to disgorge their ill-gotten profits. And that calculation is easily done, as I've just demonstrated.

Your Honor, that's all I have. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MCENTIRE: And we talked -- we'd need an opportunity to argue on the issue of experts, because -- whether you're just going to take it under advisement, I'm not sure how you're going to handle that.

THE COURT: I'm going to read the pleadings and then I'm going to let you all know are we coming back for another day.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Who is making the closing argument -- do we have three closing arguments?

MR. STANCIL: Yes.

MR. MCILWAIN: We're going to do it in reverse order.

MR. MORRIS: Reverse order in.

THE COURT: Okay. Reverse order of --

MR. STANCIL: Keep it interesting.

MR. MORRIS: I think I was last on the opening.

THE COURT: -- importance?

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: No. Just kidding. Just kidding.

MR. MORRIS: We're assuming you remember what the original order was.

MR. STANCIL: Yeah, right, right.

MR. MORRIS: It was so many hours ago.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, so many hours ago.

MR. MCILWAIN: I think I was referred to earlier as the lame lawyer.

THE COURT: Oh, you were. I think --

MR. MCILWAIN: So I'll start. I think --

THE COURT: I think you --

MR. MCILWAIN: Or maybe it was the lame argument, whatever. Whatever.

THE COURT: I think you were the lame one.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIM PURCHASERS

MR. MCILWAIN: Your Honor, Brent McIlwain here for the Claim Purchasers.

Let me start, I guess, by saying I understand now why Hunter Mountain did not want to put on evidence, because the evidence that they put on, frankly, made their case much worse.

As we argued or we stated in the opening statement, our

position is that you can look within the four corners of this document and determine that there is no plausible or colorable claim. What the evidence showed is that Mr. Dondero allegedly had a call with one -- with Farallon, not with Stonehill, with Farallon, Farallon wouldn't tell him what they paid, Farallon did not accept an offer of 130 or 140 percent of whatever they paid for the claim, and he thinks they did no due diligence, right? He had nothing in his notes about MGM. So he can say that he thought that they were positive because of MGM, but it's certainly not -- I don't think the Court should take that evidence with any credibility.

But interestingly, what Mr. Dondero says is, well, how do you know how much they paid for these claims? He goes, well, there was a market for the claims, right? They were all trading at 50 or 60 cents. But yet no one would ever buy these claims without any due diligence because the projections in the plan indicate that they wouldn't -- they wouldn't get a return.

Well, if there's a market for the claims and he's willing to pay 30 or 40 percent more than whatever someone purchased, certainly there is a market for the claims. And he is the only one, frankly, that had inside information. That's why he was willing to maybe pay more.

Or, alternatively, the case that you were describing before, Mr. Dondero maybe wanted to buy the claims so he could

control the case, right, so he could dismiss any litigation that was pending against himself so he could avoid the ire of the estate that is aimed at him.

It also -- the Court's inquiry as to what the injury is I think is precisely on point. The only injury offered at this point really is that somehow my client's agreed-to higher compensation that is reasonable or appropriate in return for some inside information on claims that were allegedly trading at 50 or 60 cents in any instance. And what the evidence showed is that, one, Mr. Dondero never had any information about that, about the compensation that Seery is receiving when this complaint was filed, when this motion for leave was filed.

And so if you judge the complaint within the four corners, there is no -- there is no *quid pro quo*, right? Because he says, well, there's obviously something up here because they wouldn't have bought these claims without due diligence, and they must have agreed to higher compensation, and that's why it all happened. And if we throw all this out here, then we'll get to do the discovery that we wanted to do.

Importantly, if you look at his notes, right, the first thing that's written down is discovery to follow, because that's how he operates. That's how a serial litigator operates. Discovery to follow so that I can pay you back for not selling your claim to me. Right? So I can't control the

world, so I can't control this case, you're going to pay. And we're all paying. Every one of us here. Right? There's 15 lawyers in the courtroom and probably 10 on the phone, right? We're all paying.

And so when Mr. McEntire says I'm not getting my day in court, we've had an entire day in court. We've had three hearings to decide what this hearing is going to be. And he's gotten more than his day in court for, frankly, what is word salad. This complaint doesn't pass any test, whether it's 12(b)(6) or under the *Barton* Doctrine. It's simply allegations that are thrown out there, and they're saying, so that we can do more discovery to determine if we actually have allegations. Because they want to continue to harass people, they want to continue to be a thorn in everyone's side, so that perhaps they can avoid further litigation against Mr. Dondero or they can convince somebody to settle with Mr. Dondero.

It doesn't make any sense, Your Honor, and this is exactly why there is a gatekeeper provision, right. That's why the Court imposed this.

And you ask yourself, why would someone sell these claims? Obviously, the sellers of the claims have not shown up. Whether they're big boy, it doesn't matter, because the Court and this estate had nothing to do with those sales. But they haven't shown back up. I can -- I can venture a guess why, if

I was involved with Mr. Dondero, I would sell my claim, right? Because I wouldn't have to be here. And that's exactly why the Court should not authorize this complaint to be filed and the gatekeeper provision of the order should prevent it. And frankly, this should be shut down and we should not have to have continued litigation over experts, or anything else, for that matter. And frankly, we should just be able to go on and let Mr. Seery do his job.

Because I think the evidence was pretty clear that his compensation is reasonable and it was in line, frankly, with what he was making before. And candidly -- and maybe it's because Mr. McEntire is not involved in bankruptcy cases, but this is similar compensation that I see in numerous cases, and it's tiered to incentivize Mr. Seery to do his job, and he's doing his job.

So, with that, Your Honor, I'll cede the rest of the time to the other parties.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

MR. STANCIL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to focus -- and I'm going to put my little clock up so Mr. Morris doesn't, you know, give me the hook here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: But first --

THE COURT: Next time we're all here, maybe I'll have

one of those red, what do you call them, the buzzer.

MR. STANCIL: Oh, the big light?

THE COURT: The red light.

MR. STANCIL: We used to joke that the judge I clerked for wished he had a trapdoor and he could just pull the lever when it was done.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Laughter.)

MR. STANCIL: Maybe I shouldn't have put that in your head.

THE COURT: Who was that? Are we going to say who that was?

MR. STANCIL: So Your Honor, I'm going to try to set the legal framework. I'm going to ask you -- and I think we have our -- we have the deck. It's the little -- if we could put that up and start on Slide 2.

I'd like to address what standard applies, and then I'd like to spend a few minutes asking Your Honor again not only to rule on multiple alternative grounds, but also I'd like to walk through what if you did this on a pure 12(b)(6), because it's going to collapse.

So, well, we'll just jump in. I said at the beginning that we know that the question here is not what does the word colorable mean in isolation. We wouldn't do that in any context. We would always look and see what the operative

language here is in the Court's confirmation order. So the question is, what did the Court mean, it must represent a colorable claim?

So we mentioned before Paragraph 80 of the confirmation order. That cites *Barton*. It cites the vexatious litigant cases. I've not heard one word from Mr. McEntire answering how it can be that we're here on a sub-12(b)(6) standard he now says when the Court articulated this legal authority and this legal basis in the confirmation order. If he believed that, the time to make that argument was on the confirmation appeal, and that's over.

But let me then say, how did we get, how did the Court get to Paragraph 80? Well, that came after a series of factual findings in the confirmation order -- in fact, actually, Josh, do you have the hard copy of this?

MR. LEVY: Yeah.

MR. STANCIL: If I could hand that to the Court.

May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: You may. Thanks.

MR. STANCIL: And I don't propose to go through every slide, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: But if you could turn to Slide #5. This is Paragraph 77 of the Court's confirmation order. Factual support for gatekeeper provision.

MR. MCENTIRE: Excuse me. May I have a copy? I can't see it.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. LEVY: Oh, yeah, sure, sure.

MR. STANCIL: And can we get a copy of yours as well, --

MR. MCENTIRE: Sure.

MR. STANCIL: -- while we're at it? Thanks.

The facts supporting the need for the gatekeeper provision are as follows. I will not read them all, but if you scroll about eight lines down, it says, During the last several months, Mr. Dondero and the Dondero-related entities have harassed the Debtor, which has resulted in further substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for the Debtor. And then there are six separate enumerated examples of that.

Paragraph 78 on the next slide. Findings regarding Dondero postpetition litigation. The Bankruptcy Court finds that the Dondero postpetition litigation was a result of Mr. Dondero failing to obtain creditor support for his plan proposal and consistent with his comments, as set forth in Mr. Seery's credible testimony, that if Mr. Dondero's plan proposal was not accepted he would, quote, burn down the place.

Next slide. This is Paragraph 79. Necessity of the

gatekeeper provision. If you would just skim to the bottom of that first column, it says, Approval of the gatekeeper provision will prevent baseless litigation designed merely to harass the post-confirmation entities charged with monetizing the Debtors' assets for the benefit of its economic constituents, will avoid abuse of the court system and preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants.

And then came Paragraph 80, which we've just discussed. With respect, Your Honor, the question is, what is the meaning of Paragraph 80? And in context, following those paragraphs regarding vexatious litigation and abuse of litigation, it is simply implausible to suggest that colorability is a sub-12(b)(6) standard.

And that is Mr. McEntire's contention today, that the gatekeeping order is actually lower than the threshold that every other litigant faces. Everyone else has to file a claim, pass a 12(b)(6), and on they go to get to discovery. Mr. McEntire believes that the gatekeeping order imposes less than that on him, and then he's treated just like everybody else. It makes no sense whatsoever.

So I'll skip Slides 8 and 9, Your Honor, but that's where the Fifth Circuit described the gatekeeping orders, affirmed them in relevant part, citing *Barton*. There is no mystery here.

If you could flip, Your Honor, to Slide 10 very briefly. We've talked about this case a little bit in one of our status hearings, *In re Vistacare Group*. This is the leading case that describes what it is that one does under a *Barton* analysis, and it says that the trustee must make a -- pardon me -- a party seeking leave to sue a trustee must make a *prima facie* case against the trustee, showing that its claim is not without foundation. A *prima facie* case is more than a 12(b)(6).

And I would direct Your Honor to the language in the third bullet. It involves a greater degree of flexibility than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the bankruptcy court, which, given its familiarity with the underlying facts and the parties, is uniquely situated to determine whether a claim against the trustee has merit. Boy howdy, are we -- I'm sorry. My kids are going to tease me for that.

But this -- no case has ever proved the wisdom of that statement, Your Honor. We are here, and the Court is all too familiar with the facts and the parties of this case. And we're not here on an adversary proceeding. We're here on a contested matter. And Your Honor has the authority on any contested matter to take evidence, and a broad, broad discretion as to what evidence is appropriate to meet that standard.

So we have laid out briefly in Slide 11 what -- why we

believe that -- or how we believe that the *prima facie* showing would work. And in short -- and maybe this will help us going forward -- we believe that if they make -- if a party seeking relief under the gatekeeping order says things, we have the right to rebut them, like in a burden-shifting or a burden of production -- pardon me -- analysis. So you can say that the sun rises in the west, but we can bring in evidence to say it doesn't, it rises in the east. And that's the plausibility threshold.

And here, and if Your Honor would flip to the next slide, I'm not sure it's entirely fair to say, even after they have purported to withdraw their evidence, that they've really done so. And we disagreed with Mr. McEntire, and advised him of such leading up to this hearing, that we do not agree that his redactions fully excise all of the evidentiary assertions from his motion.

And I'll just pick one example here on Slide 12. On the left is Paragraph 32 of the motion for leave prior to the purported withdrawal. On the right is Paragraph 32 after the withdrawal. Your Honor will see all they've withdrawn are the citations. It's verbatim. It's the same allegations. And they have argued various facts and put them in evidence. So even if it were true, and it's not, but even if it were true that all you get here is a 12(b)(6) ruling in the ordinary case if you put no evidence in dispute, they forfeited that

right by putting these facts and evidence in dispute in their motion.

The fact that they have withdrawn evidentiary support for their evidentiary assertions does not relieve them of the reality that they have made all sorts of factual arguments in their motion for leave, and as a contested matter we have the right to address it.

I'm proposing, Your Honor, unless you have questions on the cases on 13, 14, those are the cases where we have described the hearings that have been held under *Vistacare* and *Foster*, and I know more about the down-in-the-weeds of *Foster* than I ever cared to, but I don't want to repeat what's in our briefs.

If Your Honor is willing to flip to Page 15, this is an argument I've alluded to briefly, but boy, we don't hear -- we have not heard a single thing as to what function the gatekeeper serves, particularly in context of Your Honor's factual findings in the confirmation order, if all it means is 12(b)(6) or lower. It just, it's an unanswerable point that they just persist in ignoring.

But I'd like to address very briefly that third bullet, because at various times and in their brief they have cited, Hunter Mountain has cited, down here we call it *Louisiana World*, I think in the Second Circuit we call it *STN*, but this UCC derivative standing. There are, in fact, two elements one

has to pass for that, and that's a different context. The first is colorability as it's used in that context, and that is often a 12(b)(6) standard in that context. But still to have standing, to bring that claim on behalf of the estate, you have to show a cost-benefit analysis. As we've heard today, we've probably spent more in legal fees today, or over the last three months, than the purportedly excessive compensation to Mr. Seery. And so I would respectfully submit, if we were here on a *Louisiana World* or *STN* hearing, this would be an open-and-shut case just as well.

So if I could, Your Honor, if you are willing to jump ahead to Slide 17, I'd like to ask you -- and I do want to address the standing jurisdictional question a little bit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANCIL: Not to get into the weeds of standing, because I think we have briefed that out the wazoo in our papers, and I read this morning -- I think it was this morning -- from the Claimant Trust Agreement, which says they're not a beneficial interest.

But my understanding is that Article III standing, whether there is a theoretical injury in any way, that is -- that goes to Your Honor's subject matter jurisdiction under Article III, but that is not true of statutory standing under Delaware law or prudential standing. Those are -- those go to basically whether they state a claim.

So, Your Honor, I believe, can -- and I've confessed to my colleague that the only way I remember this is I screwed it up really, really badly when I was clerking years ago -- but I believe Your Honor can, and in this case should, rule on the standing ground in the alternative. Not on the Article III. Article III is binary. They either have it or they don't. But on the statutory standing, you can say -- I think you can hold that they do not have standing under Delaware law to pursue the claim, but even if they do have standing, and then reach the remainder.

And we know we're headed for appeal. We've heard -- pretty much two-thirds of the time this morning has been laying the groundwork for an appeal. And we would only like -- we would like to make sure that we give the Fifth Circuit a fulsome record.

So I would like to ask Your Honor to flip to Page 19. And this is really the end of, I think, what we need to do. So, Your Honor, what if we were here just on 12(b)(6)? So we've got a *quid*, we've got a *pro*, we've got a *quo*. They fail at each turn. Let me spend most of my time on the *quid*. I'll let the documents of which the Court can take judicial notice speak for themselves. I will let the bare-bones nature of the assertion -- and it's okay to put in a complaint something on information and belief, but you still have to pass *Iqbal* and *Twombly*. I can't say upon information and belief that I was

denied a starting position on the Knicks, right? I would like to believe that's the case, but it still has to be a plausible allegation.

Let's look at this chart. And this chart is taken right out of our brief. These are their numbers. This is at the bottom. And I want to -- I would like to take head-on this proposition that this is not a rational investment on their numbers.

So let's take the Stonehill purchase of Redeemer. They paid $78 million to earn a projected profit, according to the November 30 disclosure statement, of $19.71 million. By my arithmetic, that is a return of 25.27 percent. Even by Mr. Dondero's lights, that's a pretty good return.

I'm going to come back to why that's not the end of the return, but let's look at the Farallon purchase of Acis. Spent $8 million. Projected profit, $8.4 million. I'll take 105 percent return any day.

Let's look at the Farallon purchase of HarbourVest. Purchase price, $27 million. Projected profit, $5.09 million. That is -- oh, I can't read my own writing anymore -- I think that is 18.85 percent. I would again gladly take that every day of the week, whether it's a distressed asset or otherwise.

But let me make one really important point that Mr. Dondero obfuscated, Mr. McEntire does not acknowledge, and it is just a fact. These are projected profits if all Mr. Seery

does is hit the plan. November 30, 2021. If he does no better than what he thought these assets were worth then, this is the expected return. So for those trades that we've talked about, that's a slam dunk even on that.

But let's look about -- we'll talk about upside. Because, as Your Honor knows from doing bankruptcy cases, upside, it's all about upside for people who are purchasing claims. So it isn't just that their returns were capped at these already-ample percentages. If Class 8, for example, of Redeemer paid out in full, they would be making not -- oh, gosh, I'm not sure I should do this on the fly -- but they'd be recovering $137 million on the Class 8 claim, not the $97.71 million. So there's another $40 million of upside.

Even if it's a low-probability event, that's a -- hedge funds do that all day every day.

Same here with Acis. Paid $8 million, expected $16.4 million, but they could get up to $23 million.

Now, we've heard so much about how Class 9 was worthless, worthless, worthless. No, it's not. There's always the potential for upside. Paid $27 million. Could recover $45 million just on Class 8. Could recover another $35 million on Class 9. They could recover $80 million on a $27 million purchase. Now, the probability of that is complicated, but it's not zero. We know that it's not zero. All we've heard from them today is that Mr. Seery is -- could pay off 8 and 9

in full. So I don't think that is even remotely plausible.

Let's talk briefly about UBS. They like to talk about UBS for the projected profit of $3.61 million in loss. But that was -- that's in August, and that claim trades.

So a couple of things that happened between the November 30 disclosure statement setting that projected value and the purchase of the UBS claim in August. Number one is we are nine, ten months past the worst of COVID. And Your Honor could take judicial notice of massive market movements just if you do nothing.

We don't need to get to that, because we talked all morning about MGM. May 26th, it's announced publicly. May 26, 2021.

So the notion that a purchaser of a UBS claim in the summer of 2021, after this MGM transaction is announced, would think, you know what, I think these claims are only worth what they were worth back in November, is not plausible.

And so this is why the comparisons to the debt, the exit financing, well, 12 percent. That's a 12 percent capped return. We're talking here about returns of 25 percent, 105 percent, 18.85 percent, just based on projections at the -- sort of in the darkest days post-COVID.

So it's not plausible. If a court were looking at this just under the 12(b)(6) standard, we would be -- we'd be dismissing this claim as well. And we really -- respectfully,

Your Honor, we need that ruling. We think we need that ruling so that whatever the -- whatever they may say the standard is in the Fifth Circuit, we only have to go one time. And we really believe that we're entitled to that.

I'll let Your Honor -- I will just stand on the deck and our briefs on the *pro* and the *quo*. But meet-and-greets, these are just conclusory allegations in the complaint. He says they worked -- that he worked for them 10 or 15 years ago, which some of that's not even true, but even if it were all true, if I were beholden to every client I've met at a schmooze fest or everybody I worked for in a group 20 years ago or 15 years ago, you know, I would be incapable of operating without a conflict of interest. And it's just not plausible. This is something that needs to go.

Unless the Court has questions, I will cede the remainder of our time to Mr. Morris.

THE COURT: No questions. Thank you.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE REORGANIZED DEBTOR

MR. MORRIS: Thank you so much, Your Honor, for your patience. It's been a very long day. I am very grateful that we're going to finish today.

As I said at the beginning, I believe this exercise, as difficult as it may have been, is so important and so vital, preserving this estate and what's left of it.

The gatekeeper exists for very important reasons. Your

Honor made those findings in her order that has been upheld on appeal. And we're here to make sure that frivolous litigation is not commenced against my clients, or, frankly, against Stonehill and Farallon, given their capacity as Claimant Oversight Board members.

Hunter Mountain confuses argument with facts. There's no facts here to support anything, and that's what the gatekeeper is about. The gatekeeper is making sure that there's a good-faith basis to pursue claims. And as Mr. Stancil points out, it is certainly acceptable to state things upon information and belief. But the point of the gatekeeper is if somebody says -- not somebody says -- somebody offers proof that those beliefs are wrong, you no longer have a plausible claim. And that's why we thought it was so important to go through this exercise today. Because the facts show that their beliefs are simply wrong, and the entire complaint is based on their beliefs.

There is zero evidence concerning the compensation other than their belief that the compensation is excessive. The case is over. Like, you could stop there. I'm going to go through a bunch of things that -- you could stop there.

I want to actually begin backwards, though, in time, with the HarbourVest settlement. Right? After two years of litigation and re-litigation and re-litigation of the HarbourVest settlement, the claims of insider trading, finally

the Court has before it admissible indisputable evidence that Mr. Seery negotiated the terms of the HarbourVest settlement before he ever got this notorious email from Mr. Dondero. That should be a finding of fact in Your Honor's order and it should never be -- nobody should ever make that allegation again. It's over. You have the documents. You have the email from Mr. Seery to the board, here are the terms, and those are the terms Your Honor approved.

And there's more. Because this is so important for us, because we're tired of being accused of wrongdoing. We're tired of being falsely accused of wrongdoing.

$22-1/2 million. That's the valuation Mr. Seery put on it. You can see that he's doing it to his Independent Board colleagues, copying his lawyers. He's telling them where he got it, from Hunter Covitz. The evidence is now in the record. It came from a regularly-published NAV report from November 30th. It was seven days old. It can never be disputed again that $22.5 million was a fair value, not based on some subjective view of Mr. Seery but based on the person who gave him the report that everybody relies upon that Mr. Dondero got.

And it was ratified yet again in the audited financial statements that came out, and it shows for the period ending -- this is Exhibit 60, I believe -- for the period ending December 31, 2020, $50 million. Okay, so it went up a few

million dollars in December.

This is their case? This is the case? Your Honor I know is still working on the motion to dismiss. That's Mark Patrick, right? That's the complaint that he brought. That's what this is about. I don't mean to confuse the issue, but it's time to put this stuff to rest, because it's wrong. Mr. Dondero has lost and he's got to get over it at some point.

But here's the best piece of evidence about this whole shenanigans about MGM being inside information. Mr. Dondero filed a 15-page objection to the HarbourVest settlement and didn't say a word about it. How is that possible? Six days before the settlement, he sends this email. Two weeks later, in January, he files a 15-page objection and doesn't mention anything about insider trading, MGM, or any wrongdoing by Mr. Seery. In fact, he argues the exact opposite, that Mr. Seery cut a bad deal. How is that possible? This is a plausible claim?

It gets better, or worse, depending on your point of view. CLO Holdco filed an objection and they said they're entitled to buy the asset. This is Mr. Dondero's, you know, operating arm of the DAF. They lost -- they actually had an honorable person who concluded, I don't really have that right. But these are the claims that Mr. Patrick is asserting, and he asserted them on April -- in April, before the MGM deal was announced. Right? And Your Honor found, and that's why it

was so important for the Court to take judicial notice of the second contempt order, because Mr. Dondero was intimately involved in bringing those claims and in bringing those claims against -- or trying to bring those claims against Mr. Seery, in violating of the gatekeeper. This is all tied together.

I have to tell you, I don't know why we're not doing Rule 11. Forget about colorable claims. This is a fraud on the Court. It really is. And I don't know when it's going to stop. I'd love to move on with my life, to be honest with you.

The tender offer. He's out there doing a tender offer benefitting as the fund that he manages acquires more shares and his interest goes up and the value goes up with all these MGM holdings. Really? And he's going to accuse Mr. Seery of wrongdoing?

There was one point of Mr. Dondero's testimony that made my heart skip a beat. It's when he referred to the need to get discovery. And why did it skip a beat? Because he actually had a moment of candor where he admitted that the notion that Mr. Seery gave them material nonpublic inside information was his thought. It's not anything that Farallon ever told him. And then it spins and it spins and it spins, and finally when he gets to the fifth version of his sworn statement MGM suddenly appears. It's not right. Colorable claims? Fraudulent claims.

What's the undisputed evidence right now? I'll take Mr. Dondero at his word that Mr. Patel told him that Farallon bought the claims in February or March. How did they reconcile that with the undisputed testimony that Mr. Seery thereafter invited Farallon to participate in the exit financing? And they signed an NDA in early April. Why would you sign an NDA if you already got inside information? Who would do that? What would be the purpose of that?

How do you reconcile the fact that, according to Mr. Dondero, the claims were already in Farallon's pocket when they signed an NDA to get information for an exit facility. Is that plausible?

We've heard Mr. McEntire say a bunch of times it's much broader than MGM. Not only not a scintilla of evidence, but no substantive allegation. Again, confusing argument with facts. Because he had -- yes, Mr. Seery had access to inside information relative to Highland. He's the CEO. But where is the evidence that he shared anything with anybody? There is nothing.

Mr. Dondero admitted in his motion -- in a moment of candor, he said that's what he concluded based on the fact that Mr. Patel supposedly told him, I bought because Seery told me to. He made the inference. No evidence. Nothing.

They're bringing this case for the benefit of innocent parties? These people have told you time and again that

assets exceed liabilities. What innocent parties? Where are they and how come they're not -- let's get to that point, too. Because they're saying, oh, Mr. Seery is, like, just not declaring the end of this. Seriously? How much do they think Mr. Seery should reserve for indemnification claims as we do trials like this with a mountain of lawyers billing $800, $1,500 an hour? Seriously? Mr. Seery is somehow acting in bad faith by not declaring the end of this case? How much is he supposed to reserve? They keep skipping over that. We'll talk about that in the mediation motion. We'll talk about that in the Hunter Mountain motion in July. Who's prosecuting that? Mr. Dondero's lawyer. I know there's a really big separation between Hunter Mountain and Mr. Dondero, but Stinson is prosecuting that claim on behalf of Hunter Mountain when they're seeking information.

And they complain about the legal fees? We've put our pens down. Kirschner put his pens down. We put down the claim objection. What we're doing is defense at this point.

We're awaiting the ruling on the notes litigation, and we will very much prosecute the vexatious litigant motion if Judge Starr grants the pending motion to exceed the page limit that's been out there for months. I'm not sure what's happening there. We'll do that for sure. But otherwise, we're just playing defense.

We're here today because they've made a motion, a motion

that lacks any good-faith basis whatsoever. And that's why today was so important, so the Court could hear the witnesses. They could -- the Court -- I mean, think about it. Texas State Securities Board. The audacity of saying that somehow a letter from the Texas State Securities Board saying they're taking no action after conducting an investigation of Dugaboy's claim of insider trading is irrelevant? Like, what?

I've told you before, all we do is play Whack-A-Mole. Whack-A-Mole. They make an argument, we prove it's frivolous, so they just make a new argument. Their pleading says their claims are colorable because there's an open investigation. Now there's no investigation and they say that's irrelevant. How can they say that with a straight face? I couldn't.

I want to talk about Mr. Seery. I want to finish with my Mr. Seery. I may not use all my time. We can go home early.

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: It's past early.

MR. MORRIS: But this guy has worked doggedly, Your Honor, and I will defend him until the end of time. He's a man who has so far exceeded expectations. And they're saying he's not -- he's overpaid? The guy is overpaid? When he's into Class 9? When he's being pursued with these frivolous claims? Every day he's being attacked. How much do they think he should be paid? I would have loved to -- I hope -- no, I don't hope. I don't think there's any reason to hear

expert testimony. I think Your Honor should exercise -- the Court should exercise its discretion and say there's no need, the Court doesn't need to hear expert testimony.

But if we do, I'll be delighted to hear their expert's view on what Mr. Seery -- if it's not $8.8 million for all these years, what should it be, after he takes an estate from 71 percent on the 8s to, according to them, assets exceed liabilities, 9s are paid in full?

You know what? If they put their pens down, maybe there would be a conversation. But as long as we keep doing this ridiculous, baseless, frivolous litigation, Mr. Seery is going to conserve resources, because he's got to pay people like me to defend him and to defend the estate. This is a preview of what we'll talk about at the mediation motion. He's doing a great job. He's devoting his life to it. He has no other income. He's got no other job. It's wrong.

The claims are not only not colorable, they are frivolous. I ask the Court to stop this in its tracks right now.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Is there any time for the Movant to have the last word, which we usually give the Movant the last word.

THE CLERK: The Movant, I think, has a little under -- maybe about a minute left.

THE COURT: Anything you want to say in a minute?

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, just I'll take 30 seconds. How is that?

THE COURT: Okay.

REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN

MR. MCENTIRE: I just want to direct your attention to our reply brief, specific paragraphs that address your question about authorities. We do cite several cases on Page 41, 40 and 41, dealing with the issue of unjust enrichment. That's it.

Thank you, Your Honor, very much.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Unjust enrichment?

MR. MCENTIRE: Disgorgement.

THE COURT: Okay. But I was really, you know, claims trading in the bankruptcy context, just your best --

MR. MCENTIRE: Well, I think the cases that you identified were our best cases. The --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- *Adelphia* and the other cases.

THE COURT: All right. Well, --

MR. MCENTIRE: There are other cases, Your Honor, in different contexts. There's also the *Washington Mutual* case dealing with equitable disallowance. There's also the *Mobile Steel* case, a Fifth Circuit --

THE COURT: *Mobile Steel*? Oh, my goodness. Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Okay. All right.

THE COURT: 1968? Or no. That doesn't mean it isn't still quoted often, but --

MR. MCENTIRE: Those would also be relevant.

THE COURT: Equitable subordination --

MR. MCENTIRE: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: -- when there's bad acts.

MR. MCENTIRE: And Footnote #10 in the *Mobile Steel* case. That is relevant, too. Just, --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So I gave a deadline of Monday, right, --

MR. STANCIL: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to reply to the response to the motion in limine?

MR. STANCIL: Yes, Your Honor. Do you want time before you leave for the day? I mean, it's not going to be that long, so 4:00 o'clock Monday? Does that work for you?

THE COURT: I don't care. I probably won't start looking at it until the next day.

MR. STANCIL: But I will -- I'll just reserve and so I don't have my associates --

THE COURT: Yes. I think these days midnight, 11:59 p.m., is what lawyers tend to want.

MR. STANCIL: Oh, not this lawyer.

THE COURT: Oh, well, okay. Okay. So I'll just have to look at this, and probably by Friday of next week I will reach out through Traci and let you know what my decision is on whether we're going to have another day of just 30 minutes, 30 minutes of experts.

MR. MCENTIRE: Your Honor, another housekeeping matter. You'd wanted a copy of our PowerPoint, --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MCENTIRE: -- which I'm pleased to give you. We found a typo that we can correct electronically on the version I showed.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MCENTIRE: I likely will send that to you and I can copy opposing counsel. Is that --

THE COURT: Okay. Send it to Traci Ellison, my courtroom deputy.

MR. MCENTIRE: All right.

THE COURT: And she'll --

MR. MCENTIRE: We'll do that first thing in the morning.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCENTIRE: So you'll have a copy --

MR. STANCIL: Can we get the hard copy that -- from today, though?

MR. MCENTIRE: No, that had a typo on it. I really

don't want to share it. We fixed it.

THE COURT: What? I'm sorry, what?

MR. MORRIS: That's fine.

MR. STANCIL: Never mind.

THE COURT: Do I not need to know?

MR. STANCIL: Let's all go home.

THE COURT: Okay. And then my last question is -- and there was a mention of the CLO Holdco lawsuit, where there's a pending motion to dismiss. There's an opinion I'm writing well underway. I just keep getting sidetracked by other things. Imagine that. So I know that people are wanting to get an answer to that. So, trust me, it's going to get done here pretty soon.

You mentioned Brantley Starr. I mean, it is not my role to pick up the phone and call him and say hey, --

MR. MCENTIRE: No, I wasn't suggesting that.

THE COURT: -- District Judge, get busy on that.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah.

THE COURT: But I'll at least tell you, I know the man seems to have more jury trials than any judge I've seen in this building, so I suspect he's working late hours trying to get things done.

MR. MCENTIRE: Yeah.

THE COURT: What do we have upcoming? We have what you called the mediation motion. When is that set?

MR. MORRIS: June 26.

THE COURT: June 26th. Be here before we know it.

MR. MORRIS: Yeah. And just to keep the Court informed, the Movant's reply was due today. We gave them a week extension. They asked earlier today. I saw in my email we gave them. So I think you should expect the reply on the 15th. The hearing is the 26th, and that's not in person.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm very interested to dive into those pleadings. I knew the motion was coming because one of the lawyers said at a prior hearing it would be coming. So I haven't read any of those pleadings, but, well, I'm just very interested to hear how this plays out. I mean, I've said it before.

MR. MORRIS: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: We had global mediation in summer of 2020. We had two very fine mediators. We had a heck of a lot settled, to my amazement. But we're now way down the road and whole lot of money has been eaten up fighting lots of stuff. I mean, it would have to be pens down. There's an enormous amount out there that would have to be part of it, and I just don't know if everyone is fully appreciating that. I hope they are. Anyone listening. We're really, really far down the road now, and there's just how many appeals? Someone at one time told me there were 26. I bet it's more than that by now.

MR. MORRIS: I think that's right. I think we argued on Monday, what is it, the sixth of nine appeals in the Fifth Circuit. And we've got, you know, a cert petition that we're waiting to hear from on the Supreme Court. And yeah, there's still a couple dozen matters in the district court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Not one of them, not one of them we're prosecuting, with the exception of waiting on the Court to rule on the Report and Recommendation on the notes litigation and vexatious litigant. We are not the plaintiff, movant, in anything.

THE COURT: We've got adversaries. The Reports and Recommendations. That's just made everything go a lot slower. But all right. So we have that. And anything else coming up?

MR. MORRIS: I think on July 11th maybe there is a hearing scheduled on Hunter Mountain. If you recall, Hunter Mountain had that valuation motion last year that you denied on the grounds that they didn't have a legal right to valuation information. They made a motion earlier this year for leave to file an adversary proceeding to assert an equitable claim and some other declaratory relief, is my recollection.

While we filed an opposition, we didn't oppose the relief requested, so that motion got resolved. They have filed an adversary proceeding. And I think, if I remember correctly,

our response to the complaint, maybe that's what due. Oh, the 11th is a status conference. It could be a status conference, maybe to set a scheduling order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: But that's it. I think that's the only thing on the calendar.

THE COURT: That's a lot.

MR. MCENTIRE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else? Okay.

MR. STANCIL: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Proceedings concluded at 7:18 p.m.)

--oOo--

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Kathy Rehling **06/12/2023**

Kathy Rehling, CETD-444 Date
Certified Electronic Court Transcriber

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HMIT'S Exhibits, cont'd.

Debtors' Exhibits

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Debtors' Exhibits, cont'd.

HMIT Exhibit 4

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001-8002, Appellant/Movant Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), both in its individual capacity and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust,[1] appeals to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, from this Court's August 25, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders": Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding (Docs. 3903-3904) (attached to this notice as Exhibits 1 and 2) (the "Final Order"), and all associated interlocutory orders or decisions that merged into or preceded the Final Order, including but not limited to the following:

- March 31, 2023 Order Denying Application for Expedited Hearing (Doc. 3713) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 3);
- May 11, 2023 Order Fixing Briefing Schedule and Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding as Supplemented (Doc. 3781) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 4);

[1] And, in all capacities and alternative derivative capacities asserted in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, and 3816] ("Emergency Motion"), and the supplement to the Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 3760] and the draft Complaint attached to the same [Dkt. No. 3760-1].

- May 22, 2023 Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding (Doc. 3787) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 5) and (Doc. 3790) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 5a);

- May 26, 2023 Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery Or, Alternatively, For Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing (Doc. 3800) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 6);

- Evidentiary and other oral rulings, including but not limited to rulings that did not admit evidence and exhibits offered by HMIT, or admitted the same for only limited purposes, and rulings associated with expert testimony, made at the June 8, 2023 Hearing;

- June 16, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence (Doc. 3853) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 7); and

- July 5, 2023 Order Striking HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) and Limiting Briefing (Doc. 3869), including the appended email ruling (attached to this notice as Exhibit 8).

HMIT also appeals the October 4, 2023 Order Denying Motion of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Seeking Relief Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 (Doc. 3936) (attached to this notice as Exhibit 9).

The names of all other parties to the orders and decisions appealed from and their respective counsel are as follows:

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Dated: October 19, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via ECF notification on October 19, 2023, on all parties receiving electronic notification.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

3133169.1

Exhibit 1

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed August 25, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	
	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER PURSUANT TO PLAN "GATEKEEPER PROVISION" AND PRE-CONFIRMATION "GATEKEEPER ORDERS": DENYING HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE VERIFIED ADVERSARY PROCEEDING[1]
[BANKR. DKT. NOS. 3699, 3760, 3815, and 3816]

I. INTRODUCTION

BEFORE THIS COURT is yet another post-confirmation dispute relating to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Reorganized Debtor").

[1] On August 2, 2023, this court signed an Order [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3897] that was agreed to among various parties, after the filing of a Motion to Stay and Compel Mediation [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3752] filed by James D. Dondero and related entities. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of that order, certain pending matters in the bankruptcy court are stayed pending mediation. The parties did not agree to stay the matter addressed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

It is now more than two and half years since the confirmation of Highland's Plan[2]—the Plan having been confirmed on February 22, 2021.[3] The Plan was never stayed; it went effective on August 11, 2021 ("Effective Date"), and it was affirmed almost in its entirety by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit"), in late summer 2022, including an approval of the so-called Gatekeeper Provision[4] therein. The Gatekeeper Provision—and how and whether it should now be exercised or interpreted to allow a certain lawsuit to be filed—is at the heart of the current *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3760, 3815, 3816] (collectively, the "Motion for Leave") filed by a movant known as Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT").

A. Who is the Movant, HMIT?

Who is HMIT? It is undisputed that it is a former equity owner of Highland. It held 99.5% of Highland's Class B/C limited partnership interests and was classified in a Class 10 under the confirmed Plan, which class treatment provided it with a contingent interest in the Highland Claimant Trust ("Claimant Trust") created under the Plan, and as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement. This means that HMIT could receive consideration under the Plan if all claims against Highland are ultimately paid in full, with interest. As later further discussed, it is undisputed that

[2] Capitalized terms not defined in this introduction shall have the meaning ascribed to them below.

[3] The court entered its *Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief* ("Confirmation Order")[Bankr. Dkt. No. 1943].

[4] In an initial opinion dated August 19, 2022, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Confirmation Order in large part, "revers[ing] only insofar as the plan exculpates certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strik[ing] those few parties from the plan's exculpation, and affirm[ing] on all remaining grounds." *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, No. 21-10449, 2022 WL 3571094, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2022). On September 7, 2022, following a petition for limited panel rehearing filed by certain appellants on September 2, 2022, "for the limited purpose of clarifying and confirming one part of its August 19, 2022 opinion," the Fifth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and replaced it with its opinion reported at *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, 48 F.4th 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2022). The substituted opinion differed from the original opinion only by the replacement of one sentence from section "IV(E)(2) – *Injunction and Gatekeeper Provisions*" of the original opinion: "The injunction and gatekeeper provisions are, on the other hand, perfectly lawful." was replaced with "We now turn to the Plan's injunction and gatekeeper provisions." In all other respects, the Fifth Circuit panel's original ruling remained unchanged. Petitions for writs of certiorari regarding the Confirmation Order have been pending at the United States Supreme Court since January 2023.

HMIT's only asset is its contingent interest in the Claimant Trust. It has no employees or revenue. HMIT's representative has testified that HMIT is liable on more than $62 million of indebtedness owed to The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), a family trust of which James Dondero ("Dondero"), the co-founder and former chief executive officer ("CEO") of Highland, and his family members are beneficiaries, and that Dugaboy also is paying HMIT's legal fees. HMIT vehemently disputes the suggestion that it is controlled by Dondero.

B. What Does the Movant HMIT Seek Leave to File?

HMIT seeks leave to file an adversary proceeding ("Proposed Complaint")[5] in the bankruptcy court to bring claims on behalf of itself and, derivatively, on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust for alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the Reorganized Debtor's CEO and Claimant Trustee, James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery") and conspiracy against: (1) Seery; and (2) purchasers of $365 million face amount of ***allowed*** unsecured claims in this case, who purchased their claims post-confirmation but prior to the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan ("Claims Purchasers,"[6] and with Seery, the "Proposed Defendants"). To be clear (and as later further explained), the claims acquired by the Claims Purchasers were acquired by them after extensive litigation, mediation, and settlements were approved by the bankruptcy court and after the original claims-holders had voted on the Plan and after Plan confirmation. As later explained,

[5] In its original Motion for Leave filed at Bankruptcy Docket No. 3699 on March 28, 2023, HMIT sought leave to file the proposed complaint ("Initial Proposed Complaint") attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion for Leave. Nearly a month later, on April 23, 2023, HMIT filed a *Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Supplement") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3760], a revised proposed complaint as Exhibit 1-A, and stating that "[t]he Supplement is not intended to supersede the [Motion for Leave]; rather, it is intended as a supplement to address procedural matters and to bring forth additional facts that further confirm the appropriateness of the derivative action." Supplement, ¶ 1 and Exhibit 1-A. It is this revised proposed complaint to which this court will refer, when it uses the defined term "Proposed Complaint," even though HMIT filed redacted versions of its Motion for Leave on June 5, 2023 at Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 3815 and 3816 that attached the Initial Proposed Complaint as Exhibit 1.

[6] The Claims Purchasers identified in the Proposed Complaint are Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), which is a special purpose entity created by Farallon to purchase allowed unsecured claims against Highland; Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), which is a special purpose entity created by Stonehill to purchase allowed unsecured claims against Highland.

the Claims Purchasers filed notices of their purchases as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), and no objections were filed thereto. In any event, various damages or remedies are sought against the Proposed Defendants revolving around the Claims Purchasers' claims purchasing activities.

C. Why Does HMIT Need to Seek Leave?

As alluded to above, HMIT filed its Motion for Leave to comply with the provision in the Plan known as a "gatekeeper" provision ("Gatekeeper Provision") and with this court's prior gatekeeper orders entered in January and July 2020, which all require that, before a party may commence or pursue claims relating to the bankruptcy case against certain protected parties, it must first obtain (1) a finding from the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims ("Proposed Claims") are "colorable"; and (2) specific authorization by the bankruptcy court to pursue the Proposed Claims.[7] The Gatekeeper Provision was not included in the Plan *sans raison*. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit recognized in affirming confirmation of the Plan, the Gatekeeper Provision (along with the other "protection provisions" in the Plan) had been included in the Plan to address the "continued litigiousness" of Mr. James Dondero ("Dondero"), Highland's co-founder and former chief executive officer ("CEO"), that began prepetition and escalated following the post-petition "nasty breakup" between Highland and Dondero, by "screen[ing] and prevent[ing] bad-faith litigation against Highland Capital, its successors, and other bankruptcy participants that could disrupt the Plan's effectiveness."[8]

[7] To be clear, the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan was not the first or even second injunction of its type issued in this bankruptcy case. The Gatekeeper Orders were entered by the bankruptcy court pre-confirmation: (a) in January 2020, just a few months into the case, as part of this court's order approving a corporate governance settlement between Highland and its unsecured creditors committee, in which Dondero, Highland's co-founder and former CEO, was removed from any management role at Highland and three independent directors ("Independent Directors") were appointed in lieu of a chapter 11 trustee being appointed ("January 2020 Order"); and (b) in July 2020, in this court's order authorizing the employment of Seery (one of the three Independent Directors) as the Debtor's new Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative ("July 2020 Order," together with the January 2020 Order, the "Gatekeeper Orders").

[8] *See Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 427, 435.

D. Some Further Context Regarding Post-Confirmation Litigation Generally.

Since confirmation of the Plan, hundreds of millions of dollars have been paid out to creditors under the Plan, and there are numerous adversary proceedings and contested matters still pending, at various stages of litigation, in the bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Fifth Circuit, almost exclusively involving Dondero and entities that he owns or controls. To be sure, the post-confirmation litigation in this case does not consist of the usual adversaries and contested matters one typically sees by and against a reorganized debtor and/or litigation trustee, such as preference or other avoidance actions and litigation over objections to claims that are still pending after confirmation of a plan. Indeed, the claims of the largest creditors in this case (with claims asserted in the aggregate of more than one billion dollars) were successfully mediated and incorporated into the Plan—a plan which was ultimately accepted by the votes of an overwhelming majority of Highland's non-insider creditors. Dondero and entities under his control were the only parties who appealed the Confirmation Order, and Dondero and entities under his control have been the appellants in virtually every appeal that has been filed regarding this bankruptcy case. Petitions for writs of mandamus (which have been denied) have been filed in the district court and in the Fifth Circuit by some of these same entities, including one by HMIT, when this court denied setting an ***emergency*** hearing on the instant Motion for Leave (HMIT had sought a setting on three-days' notice).

A recent list of active matters involving Dondero and/or entities and/or individuals affiliated or associated with him, filed in the bankruptcy case by Highland and the Claimant Trust, reveals that there were at least 30 pending and "Active Dondero-Related Litigation" matters as of July 14, 2023: six (6) proceedings in this court; six (6) active appeals or actions are pending in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas; seven (7) appeals in the Fifth Circuit; two (2)

petitions for writs of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court; and nine (9) other proceedings or actions with or affecting the Highland Parties ("Highland," the "Claimant Trust," and "Seery") in various other state, federal, and foreign jurisdictions.[9]

The above-described context is included because the Proposed Defendants assert that the Motion for Leave is just a continuation of Dondero's unrelenting barrage of meritless and harassing litigation, making good on his oft-mentioned alleged threat to "burn down the place" after not achieving the results he wanted in the Highland bankruptcy case. Indeed, the Motion for Leave was filed after two years of unsuccessful attempts by, first, Dondero personally, and then HMIT to obtain pre-suit discovery from the Proposed Defendants (i.e., the Claims Purchasers) through two different Texas state court proceedings, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 ("Rule 202"). In each of these Rule 202 proceedings, Dondero and HMIT espoused the same Seery/Claims

[9] *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 3880 (filed on July 14, 2023, providing a list of "Active Dondero-Related Litigation" and noting that the list is "a summary of active pending actions only and does not include actions that were resolved by final orders, including actions finally resolved after appeals to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas and/or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit."). Just since the filing by the Highland Parties of the list, ***three*** of the appeals pending in the Fifth Circuit have been decided against the Dondero-related appellants, two of which upheld the district court's dismissal of appeals by Dondero-related entities of bankruptcy court orders based on the lack of bankruptcy appellate standing on behalf of the appellant. On July 19, 2023, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by NexPoint Advisors, L.P. ("NexPoint") of bankruptcy court orders approving professional compensation on the basis that NexPoint did not meet the bankruptcy appellate standing test of being a "person aggrieved" by the entry of the orders. *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, L.L.P. (In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.)*, 74 F.4th 361 (5th Cir. 2023). On July 31, 2023, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy—the Dondero family trust that, like the movant here in this Motion for Leave, was the holder of a limited partnership interest in Highland, and, as such, now has a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust—which had appealed a bankruptcy court order approving a Rule 9019 settlement on the same basis: Dugaboy did not meet the bankruptcy appellate standing test of being a "person aggrieved" by the entry of the settlement order. *The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, No. 22-10960, 2023 WL 4861770 (5th Cir. July 31, 2023). The July 31, 2023 ruling followed the Fifth Circuit's ruling on February 21, 2023, affirming the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy of yet another bankruptcy court order for lack of bankruptcy appellate standing. *The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, No. 22-10831, 2023 WL 2263022 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023). These rulings by the Fifth Circuit are discussed in greater detail below. The third ruling by the Fifth Circuit since July 14, 2023, was issued by the Fifth Circuit in a per curium opinion not designated for publication on July 26, 2023, this one affirming the district court's affirmance of yet another Rule 9019 settlement order of the bankruptcy court that was appealed by Dugaboy, agreeing with the district court that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to approve a settlement among the Debtor, an entity affiliated with the Debtor but not a debtor itself, and UBS (the Debtor's largest prepetition creditor and the seller of its claims to the Claims Purchasers, which is one of the claims trading transactions HMIT complains about in the Proposed Complaint). *See The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.*, No. 22-10983, 2023 WL 4842320 (5th Cir. July 26, 2023).

Purchasers conspiracy theory espoused in the Motion for Leave—that Seery must have provided one or more of the Claims Purchasers with material nonpublic information to induce them to want to purchase large, allowed, unsecured claims at a discount; a *quid pro quo* is suggested, such that the Claims Purchasers were allegedly told they would make a hefty profit on the claims they purchased and, in return, they would gladly "rubber stamp" Seery's "excessive compensation" as the Claimant Trustee of the Claimant Trust. In sum, HMIT alleges this constituted wrongful "insider trading" of the bankruptcy claims. In addition, certain lawyers for Dondero and Dugaboy sent letters reporting this alleged conspiracy and "insider trading" to the Texas State Securities Board ("TSSB") and the Executive Office of the United States Trustee ("EOUST").

It is against this background and in this context that the court must analyze, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function under the confirmed Plan and its prior Gatekeeping Orders, whether HMIT should be allowed to pursue the Proposed Claims (i.e., whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims as contemplated under the Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan). The court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Leave on June 8, 2023 ("June 8 Hearing"), during which the court admitted exhibits and heard testimony from three witnesses both in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Leave. Having considered the Motion for Leave, the response of the Proposed Defendants thereto, HMIT's reply to the response, and the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, the court denies HMIT's request for leave to pursue its Proposed Claims. The court's reasoning is set forth below.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Highland's Bankruptcy Case, Dondero's Removal as CEO, and the Plan

Highland was co-founded in Dallas in 1993 by Dondero and Mark Okada ("Okada"). It operated as a global investment adviser that provided investment management and advisory services and managed billions of dollars of assets, both directly and indirectly through numerous

affiliates. Highland's equity interest holders included HMIT (99.5%), Dugaboy (0.1866%), Okada, personally and through trusts (0.0627%), and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), which was wholly owned by Dondero and was the only general partner of Highland (0.25%). On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), Highland, with Dondero in control[10] and acting as its CEO, president, and portfolio manager, and facing a myriad of massive, business litigation claims – many of which had finally become or were about to be liquidated (after a decade or more of contentious litigation in multiple fora all over the world—filed for relief under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The bankruptcy case was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division in December 2019. The official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") (and later, the United States Trustee) expressed a desire for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee due to concerns over and distrust of Dondero, his numerous conflicts of interest, and his history of alleged mismanagement (and perhaps worse).

After many weeks under the specter of a possible appointment of a trustee, Highland and the Committee engaged in substantial and lengthy negotiations, resulting in a corporate governance settlement approved by this court on January 9, 2020.[11] As a result of this settlement, Dondero relinquished control of Highland and resigned his positions as officer or director of Highland and its general partner, Strand,[12] and three independent directors ("Independent Directors") were

[10] Mark Okada resigned from his role with Highland prior to the Petition Date.

[11] This order is hereinafter referred to as the "January 2020 Order" and was entered by the court on January 9, 2020 [Bankr. Dkt. No. 339] pursuant to the *Motion of the Debtor to Approve Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding the Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operation in the Ordinary Course* [Bankr. Dkt. No. 281].

[12] Dondero agreed to this settlement pursuant to a stipulation he executed and that was filed in connection with Highland's motion to approve the settlement. *See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement With the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in Ordinary Course* [Bankr. Dkt. No. 338].

chosen to lead Highland through its chapter 11 case: Seery, John S. Dubel, and retired bankruptcy judge Russell Nelms. Given the Debtor's perceived culture of constant litigation while Dondero was at the helm, it was purportedly not easy to get such highly qualified persons to serve as independent board members. At the hearing on the corporate governance settlement motion, the court heard credible testimony that none of the Independent Directors would have taken on the role without (1) an adequate directors and officers' ("D&O") insurance policy protecting them; (2) indemnification from Strand that would be guaranteed by the Debtor; (3) exculpation from mere negligence claims; and (4) a gatekeeper provision prohibiting the commencement of litigation against the Independent Directors without the bankruptcy court's prior authority. The gatekeeper provision approved by the court in its January 9 Order states,[13]

> No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director of Strand without the Court (i) first determining after notice that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence against Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors and (ii) specifically authorizing such entity to bring such claim. The Court will have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim for which approval of the Court to commence or pursue has been granted.

Dondero agreed to remain with Highland as an unpaid portfolio manager following his resignation and did so "subject at all times to the supervision, direction and authority of the Independent Directors" and to his agreement to "resign immediately" "[i]n the event the Independent Directors determine for any reason that the Debtor shall no longer retain Dondero as an employee"[14] and to "not cause any Related Entity to terminate any agreements with the Debtor."[15] The court later

[13] January 2020 Order, 3-4, ¶ 10.

[14] January 2020 Order, 3, ¶ 8.

[15] *Id.* at ¶ 9.

entered, on July 16, 2020, an order approving the appointment of Seery as Highland's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative,[16] which included essentially the same "gatekeeper" language with respect to the pursuit of claims against Seery acting in these roles. The gatekeeper provision in the July 2020 Order was essentially the same as the gatekeeper provision in the January 2020 Order:

> No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against Seery relating in any way to his role as the chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer of the Debtor without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining after notice that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence against Seery, and (ii) specifically authorizing such entity to bring such claim. The Bankruptcy Court shall have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim for which approval of the Court to commence or pursue has been granted.

July 2020 Order, 3, ¶5. Neither the January 2020 Order nor the July 2020 Order were appealed.

Throughout the summer of 2020, Dondero informally proposed several reorganization plans, none of which were embraced by the Committee or the Independent Directors. When Dondero's plans failed to gain support, he and entities under his control engaged in substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for Highland.[17] As the Fifth Circuit described the situation, after Dondero's plans failed "he and other creditors began to frustrate the proceedings by objecting to settlements, appealing orders, seeking writs of mandamus, interfering with Highland Capital's management, threatening employees, and canceling trades between Highland Capital and its clients."[18] On October 9, 2020, Dondero resigned from all positions with the Debtor and its

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[16] *See* the July 16, 2020 order approving the retention by Highland of Seery as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative, *nunc pro tunc*, to March 15, 2020 ("July 2020 Order") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 854].

[17] According to Seery's credible testimony during the hearing on confirmation of the Plan that had been negotiated between the Committee and the Independent Directors, Dondero had threatened to "burn the place down" if his proposed plan was not accepted. *See* Transcript of Confirmation Hearing dated February 3, 2021 at 105:10-20. Bankr. Dkt. No. #1894.

[18] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 426 (citing *Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Dondero (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, Ch. 11 Case No. 19-34054-SGJ11, Adv. No. 20-03190-SGJ11, 2021 WL 2326350, at *1, *26 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.

affiliates in response to a demand by the Independent Directors made after Dondero's purported threats and disruptions to the Debtor's operations.[19]

The Independent Directors and the Committee had negotiated their own plan of reorganization which culminated in the filing by Highland of its *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)* (the "Plan") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 1808] on January 22, 2021.[20] Highland had negotiated settlements with most of its major creditors following mediation and had amended its initially proposed plan to address the objections of most of its creditors, leaving only the objections of Dondero and entities under his control (the "Dondero Parties") at the time of the confirmation hearing,[21] which was held over two days in early February 2021. The Plan is essentially an "asset monetization" plan pursuant to which the Committee was dissolved, and four new entities were created: the Reorganized Debtor; a new general partner for the Reorganized Debtor called HCMLP GP, LLC; the Claimant Trust (administered by Seery, its trustee); and a Litigation Sub-Trust (administered by its trustee, Marc Kirschner). Highland's various servicing agreements were vested in the Reorganized Debtor, which continues to manage collateralized loan obligation vehicles ("CLOs") and various other investments postconfirmation. The Claimant Trust owns the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, HCMLP GP LLC, and the Litigation Sub-Trust and is charged with winding down the Reorganized Debtor over a three-year period by monetizing its assets and making

June 7, 2021) where this court "h[eld] Dondero in civil contempt, sanctioning him $100,000, and comparing this case to a 'nasty divorce.'").

[19] *See* Highland Ex. 13. The court shall refer to exhibits offered and admitted at the June 8 Hearing on the Motion for Leave by the Highland Parties as "Highland Ex. ___" and to exhibits offered and admitted by HMIT as "HMIT Ex. ___."

[20] The *Disclosure Statement for the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* was filed on November 24, 2020 ("Disclosure Statement") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 1473].

[21] The only other objection remaining was the objection of the United States Trustee to the Plan's exculpation, injunction, and release provisions.

distributions to Class 8 and Class 9 creditors as Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust is overseen by a Claimant Trust Oversight Board ("CTOB"), and pursuant to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement ("CTA"),[22] the CTOB approved Seery's compensation package as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee. Following their acquisition of their unsecured claims, representatives of Claims Purchasers Muck and Jessup became members of the CTOB.[23] Seery's compensation included the same base salary that he was receiving as CEO and CRO of Highland, plus an added incentive bonus tiered to recoveries and distributions to the creditors under the Plan. The Plan provides for the cancellation of the limited partnership interests in Highland held by HMIT, Dugaboy, and Okada and his family trusts in exchange for each holder's pro rata share of a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust ("Contingent Claimant Trust Interest"), as holders of allowed interests in Class 10 (holders of Class B/C limited partnership interests) or Class 11 (holders of Class A limited partnership interests) under the Plan.

B. Dondero Communicates Alleged Material Non-Public Information ("MNPI") to Seery, and Seery Allegedly Provides the MNPI to the Claims Purchasers in Furtherance of an Alleged Fraudulent Scheme to Have the Claims Purchasers "Rubber Stamp" His Compensation as Claimant Trustee Post-Confirmation

1. The December 17, 2020 MGM Email

Between Dondero's forced resignation from Highland in October 2020 and the confirmation hearing in February 2021, Dondero engaged in what appeared to be attempts to thwart, impede, and otherwise interfere with the Plan being proposed by the Independent Directors and the Committee. In the midst of this, on December 17, 2020, Dondero sent Seery[24] an email

[22] Highland Ex. 38

[23] The CTOB had three members: a representative of Muck (Michael Linn), a representative of Jessup (Christopher Provost), and an independent member (Richard Katz). *See* Joint Opposition ¶ 79.

[24] Dondero sent the email to others as well but did not copy counsel for the Independent Directors (including Seery) in violation of the terms of an existing temporary restraining order that enjoined Dondero from, among other things, "communicating . . . with any Board member" (including Seery) without including Debtor's counsel. Morris Dec. Ex. 23 ¶ 2(a). Citations to "Morris Dec. Ex. _" are to the exhibits attached to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support*

(the "MGM Email") that featured prominently in HMIT's Motion for Leave. According to HMIT and Dondero, the MGM Email contained material nonpublic information ("MNPI") regarding the possibility of an imminent acquisition of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"), likely by either Amazon or Apple.[25] At the time Dondero sent the MGM Email, Dondero sat on the board of directors of MGM, and the Debtor owned MGM stock directly. The Debtor also managed and partially owned a couple of other entities that owned MGM stock and managed various CLOs that owned some MGM stock as well. HMIT alleges now that Seery later misused and wrongfully disclosed to the Claims Purchasers this purported MNPI as part of a *quid pro quo* scheme, whereby the Claims Purchasers agreed to approve excessive compensation for Seery in the future (in exchange for him providing this allegedly "insider" information that inspired them to purchase unsecured claims with an alleged expectation of future large profits).[26] A timeline of events (in late 2020) in the weeks leading up to Dondero's MGM Email to Seery, following Dondero's departure from Highland, helps to put the email in full context:

- October 16: Dondero and his affiliates attempt to impede the Debtor's trading activities by demanding—with no legal basis—that Seery cease selling certain assets;[27]

- November 24: Bankruptcy Court enters an Order approving the Debtor's Disclosure Statement, scheduling the confirmation hearing on the Debtor's Plan for January 13, 2021, and granting related relief;[28]

- November 24–27: Dondero personally interferes with the Debtor's

of Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, Bankr. Dkt. No. 3784.

[25] *See* Proposed Complaint ¶ 45.

[26] *See id.* ¶ 3 ("Thus, acting within a cloak of secrecy, Seery provided close business acquaintances, the [Claims Purchasers], with material non-public information concerning the value of assets which they then used to purchase the largest approved unsecured claims."); ¶ 4 ("As part of the scheme, the [Claims Purchasers] obtained a position to approve Seery's ongoing compensation – to Seery's benefit and also to the detriment of the Claimant Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, and HMIT.").

[27] *See* Highland Ex. 14, Dondero-Related Entities' October 16, 2020 Letter; Highland Ex. 15, *Memorandum Opinion and Order Holding Dondero in Contempt for Violation of TRO*, 13-15.

[28] *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 1476.

implementation of certain securities trades ordered by Seery;[29]

- November 30: The Debtor provides written notice of termination of certain shared services agreements it had with Dondero's two non-debtor affiliates, NexPoint Advisors, L.P. ("NexPoint") and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. ("HCMFA"; together with NexPoint, the "Advisors");[30]

- December 3: The Debtor makes written demands to Dondero and certain affiliates for payment of all amounts due under certain promissory notes they owed to the Debtor, that had an aggregate face amount of more than $60 million—this was part of creating liquidity for the Debtor's Plan;[31]

- December 3: Dondero responds with what appeared to be a threat of some sort to Seery in a text message: "***Be careful what you do -- last warning***;"[32]

- December 10: Dondero's interference and apparent threat cause the Debtor to seek and obtain a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Dondero;[33]

- December 16: This court denies as "frivolous" a motion filed by certain affiliates of Dondero, in which they sought "temporary restrictions" on certain asset sales;[34] and

- December 17: Dondero sends the unsolicited MGM Email[35] to Seery, which violates the TRO entered just a week earlier.[36]

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[29] *See* Highland Ex. 15, 30-36.

[30] Morris Decl. Ex. 17; *see also* Transcript of June 8, 2023 Hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave ("June 8 Hearing Transcript"), 273:23-24.

[31] Morris Decl. Exs. 18-21; *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:23-274:1.

[32] Morris Decl. Ex. 22 (emphasis added); *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:1-12 (where Seery testified about receiving the threat from Dondero: "A: [T]his came after he threatened me. He threatened me in writing. I'd never been threatened in my career. I've never heard of anyone else in this business who's been threatened in their career. So anything I would get from him, I was going to be highly suspicious.").

[33] *See* Morris Decl. Ex. 23, *Order Granting Debtor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Against James Dondero* entered December 10, 2020 [Adv. Pro. No. 20-3190 Dkt. No. 10].

[34] *See* Morris Decl. Ex. 24, Transcript of December 16, 2020 Hearing, 63:5-64:15.

[35] Highland Ex. 11.

[36] Seery testified at the June 8 Hearing that Dondero knowingly violated the TRO when he sent the MGM Email:

> [The MGM Email] . . . followed the imposition of a TRO for interfering with the business. He knew what was in the TRO and he knew what it applied to, and it restricted him from communicating with me or any of the other independent directors without Pachulski [Debtor's counsel] being on it. Furthermore, Pachulski had advised Dondero's counsel that not only could they not communicate with us, if they wanted to communicate they had to prescreen the topics. And how do we know that? Because Dondero filed a motion to modify the TRO. And that was all before this email.

June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:13-22.

The MGM Email had the subject line "Trading Restriction re MGM – material non public information" and stated:

> Just got off a pre board call, board call at 3:00. Update is as follows: Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in Data Room. Both continue to express material interest. Probably first quarter event, will update as facts change. Note also any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.[37]

Seery credibly testified at the June 8 Hearing that he was "highly suspicious" when he received the MGM Email. This was because, among other reasons, Dondero sent it ***after***: (i) unsuccessful efforts to impede the Debtor's trading activities (followed by the TRO); (ii) the "be careful what you do" text to Seery by Dondero: (iii) Highland's termination of its shared service arrangements with Dondero's various affiliated entities; (iv) the bankruptcy court's approval of the disclosure statement; and (v) Highland's demand to collect on the demand notes for which Dondero and his entities were liable.[38] Highland's Chapter 11 case was fast approaching the finish line. Moreover, MGM was already on the restricted list at Highland Capital, and had been for a long time, and Dondero would know this.[39] Still further, as of December 17, 2020 (the date Dondero sent the unsolicited MGM Email to Seery), Dondero no longer owed a duty of any kind to the Debtor or any entity controlled by the Debtor, having surrendered in January 2020 direct and indirect control of the Debtor to the Independent Board as part of the corporate governance settlement[40] and having resigned from all roles at the Debtor and affiliates in October 2020. Still further, Dondero—to the extent he was sharing with Seery MNPI that he obtained as a member of the board of directors of MGM—would have been violating his own fiduciary duties to MGM.

[37] Highland Ex. 11.

[38] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:1-274:4.

[39] June 8 Hearing, 215:21-216:9.

[40] *See* Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 339, 354-1 (Term Sheet)).

In any event, in a declaration filed by Dondero in support of HMIT's Rule 202 petition in Texas state court for pre-suit discovery,[41] he indicated that his goal in sending the MGM E-mail was to impede the Debtor and Seery from engaging in any transactions involving MGM:

> On December 17, 2020, I sent an email to employees at HCM, including the then Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer Jim Seery, containing non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM. I became aware of this information due to my involvement as a member of the board of MGM. ***My purpose was to alert Seery and others that MGM stock, which was owned either directly or indirectly by HCM, should be on a restricted list and not be involved in any trades***.

It is noteworthy that ***Dondero's labeling of the MGM Email (in the subject line) as a communication containing "material non public information" did not make it so***. In fact, it appears from the credible evidence presented at the June 8, 2023 hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave that the MGM Email did not disclose information to Seery that was not already made available to the public at the time it was sent. Seery testified that he did not think the MGM Email contained MNPI and that he did not personally "take any steps . . . to make sure that MGM stock was placed on a restricted list at Highland Capital after [he] received [the MGM Email]" because—as earlier noted—"MGM was already on the restricted list at Highland Capital . . . before I got to Highland."[42] Indeed, MGM was ultimately purchased by Amazon after a sale process that had been quite publicly discussed in media reports for several months[43] and that was officially

[41] Highland Ex. 9 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).

[42] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 215:21-216:9. Seery elaborated upon further questioning from HMIT's counsel that he did not think the indications in the MGM Email (that came from a member of the board of directors of MGM) that "it was probably a first-quarter event" and that "Amazon and Apple were actively diligencing – are diligencing in the data room, both continue to express material interest" were not MNPI. *Id.*, 217:23-218:10. He testified that "it was clear [before he received the MGM Email] from the media reports and the actual quotes from Kevin Ulrich of Anchorage, who was the chairman at MGM, that a transaction would have to take place very quickly. And, in fact, the transaction did not take place in the first quarter." *Id.*, 219:3-7.

[43] *See* Highland Ex. 25 ("MGM has held preliminary talks with Apple, Netflix and other larger media companies . . . . MGM, in particular, seems like a logical candidate to sell this year. Its owners include Anchorage Capital, Highland Capital and Solus Alternative Asset Management, hedge funds that acquired the company out of bankruptcy in 2010.") (article dated 1/26/20); Highland Ex. 26 (describing prospects of an MGM sale, noting that, among its largest

announced to the public in late May 2021 (just a few weeks after the Claims Purchasers purchased some of their claims, but a few months ***before*** certain of their claims—the UBS claims—were purchased).[44] For example, as early as January 2020, Apple and Amazon were identified as being among a new group of "Big 6" global media companies, and MGM was identified as being a leading media acquisition target. Indeed, according to at least one media report on January 26, 2020, "MGM, in particular, seems like a logical candidate to sell this year" having already held "preliminary talks with Apple, Netflix and other larger media companies."[45] In October 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported that MGM's largest shareholder, Anchorage Capital Group ("Anchorage"), was facing mounting pressure to sell the company. Anchorage was led by Kevin Ulrich, who also served as Chairman of MGM's Board. The article reported that "[i]n recent months, Mr. Ulrich has said he is working toward a deal," and he specifically named Amazon and Apple as being among four possible buyers.[46] Thus, no one following the MGM story would have been surprised to learn in December 2020 that Apple and Amazon were conducting due diligence and had expressed "material interest" in acquiring MGM. Dondero testified during the June 8 Hearing that, at the time he sent the MGM Email, he "knew with certainty from the board level that Amazon had hit our price, and it was going to close in the next couple of months,"[47] that "as of December 17th, Amazon had made an offer that was acceptable to MGM, [and that] that's what the board meeting was. We were going into exclusive negotiations to culminate the merger with

shareholders, was "Highland Capital Management, LP") (article October 11, 2020). *See also* Highland Exs. 27-30 & 34 (various other articles regarding possible sale/suitors of MGM, dated in years 2020 and 2021, and ultimately announcing sale to Amazon on May 26, 2021, for $8.4 billion).

[44] The MGM-Amazon deal was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for approximately $6.1 billion, net of cash acquired, plus approximately $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid.

[45] Highland Ex. 25.

[46] Highland Ex. 26.

[47] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 127:2-4.

them."[48] Notwithstanding this testimony, Dondero eventually admitted (after a lengthy and torturous cross examination) that he did not actually communicate this supposed "inside" information to Seery in the MGM Email. He did not "say anything about Amazon hitting the price." He did not say anything about the MGM board going into exclusive negotiations with Amazon "to culminate the merger with them." Rather, he communicated information that Seery and any member of the public who cared to look could have gleaned from publicly available information as of December 17, 2020, regarding a much-written-about potential MGM transaction that involved interest from numerous companies, including, specifically, Amazon and Apple. When questioned why "[he felt] the need to mention Apple [in the MGM Email] if Amazon had already hit the price," Dondero simply answered, "The only way you generally get something done at attractive levels in business is if two people are interested," suggesting that he specifically ***did not*** communicate the purported inside information he obtained as a MGM board member—that Amazon had met MGM's strike price and that the MGM board was moving forward with exclusive negotiations with Amazon—because he wanted it to appear that there was still a competitive process going on that included both Amazon and Apple.[49]

Even if the MGM Email contained MNPI on the day it was sent (four months prior to the first of the Claim Purchases that occurred in April 2021), the information was fully and publicly disclosed to the market in the days and weeks that followed. For example, on December 21, 2020, just four days later, a Wall Street Journal article titled *MGM Holdings, Studio Behind 'James Bond,' Explores a Sale*, reported that MGM had "tapped investment banks Morgan Stanley and LionTree LLC and begun a formal sale process," and had "a market value of around $5.5 billion, based on privately traded shares and including debt." The Wall Street Journal Article reiterated

[48] *Id.*, 161:10-14.

[49] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 162:2-6.

that (i) Anchorage "has come under pressure in recent years from weak performance and defecting clients, and its illiquid investment in MGM has become a larger percentage of its hedge fund as it shrinks," and (ii) "Mr. Ulrich has told clients in recent months he was working toward a deal for the studio and has spoken of big technology companies as logical buyers."[50] (*Id*. Ex. 27.) The Wall Street Journal's reporting was picked up and expanded upon in other publications soon after. For example:

- On December 23, 2020, Business Matters published an article specifically identifying Amazon as a potential suitor for MGM. The article, titled *The world is net enough! Amazon joins other streaming services in £4bn bidding war for Bond films as MGM considers selling back catalogue*, cited the Wall Street Journal article and further reported that MGM "hopes to spark a battle that could interest streaming services such as Amazon Prime";[51]

- On December 24, 2020, an article in iDropNews specifically identified Apple as entering the fray. In an article titled *Could Apple be Ready to Gobble Up MGM Studios Entirely?*, the author observed that "it's now become apparent that MGM is actually up on the auction block," noting that the Wall Street Journal was "reporting that the studio has begun a formal sale process" and that Apple—with a long history of exploratory interest in MGM—would be a likely bidder;[52] and

- On January 15, 2021, Bulwark published an article entitled *MGM is For Sale (Again)* that identified attributes of MGM likely to appeal to potential purchasers and handicapped the odds of seven likely buyers—with Apple and Amazon named as two of three potential buyers most likely to close on an acquisition.[53]

Finally, Highland and entities it controlled did not sell their MGM stock while the MGM-Amazon deal was under discussion and/or not made public but, instead, they tendered their MGM holdings in connection with, and as part of, the ultimate MGM-Amazon transaction after it closed in March 2022.

[50] Highland Ex. 27.

[51] Highland Ex. 28.

[52] Highland Ex. 29.

[53] Highland Ex. 30.

2. No Evidence to Support HMIT/Dondero's Assumptions that Seery Shared Alleged MNPI in the MGM Email with Claims Purchasers

One of HMIT's allegations in the Proposed Complaint it seeks leave to file—which is central to HMIT's and Dondero's conspiracy theory—is that Seery shared the alleged MNPI from the MGM Email with the Claims Purchasers (or at least Farallon—the owner/affiliate of Muck, one of the Claims Purchasers) and that the Claims Purchasers only acquired the purchased claims ("Purchased Claims") based on, and because, of their receipt of the MNPI from Seery. HMIT essentially admits in the original version of its Motion for Leave that it has no direct evidence that Seery communicated the alleged MNPI to any of the Claims Purchasers. Rather, its allegation is based on inferences it wants the court to make based on "circumstantial" evidence and on the Dondero Declarations that were attached to the Motion for Leave, which described communications Dondero purportedly had with one or two representatives of Farallon in the "late spring" of 2021 concerning Farallon's recent acquisition of certain claims in the Highland bankruptcy case.[54] Based on these communications, HMIT and Dondero only assume Seery must have provided the MNPI about MGM to Farallon, which must have caused both Farallon and the other Claims Purchaser, Stonehill, to acquire the Purchased Claims.[55]

At the June 8 Hearing, HMIT offered Dondero's testimony that he had three telephone conversations with two representatives of Farallon, Mike Linn ("Linn") and Raj Patel ("Patel"),

[54] Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699) ¶ 1 and Ex. 3; *see also* Highland Ex. 9, *Declaration of James Dondero* (with Exhibit 1) dated February 15, 2023.

[55] Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699) ¶ 28. HMIT subsequently filed the final version of the Motion for Leave that was revised to withdraw the Dondero Declarations and delete all references therein to the Dondero Declarations (but, notably, leaving in the allegations that were based on the Dondero Declaration(s)). This was done after the court ruled that it would allow the Proposed Defendants to examine Dondero regarding his Declarations. HMIT contended at that point that the court should consider the Motion for Leave on a no-evidence Rule 12(b)(6) type basis (but could not explain why it had attached the Dondero Declarations as evidence that "supported" the Motion for Leave, if it believed no evidence should be considered). *See* Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3816) ¶ 28; *see also infra* pages 45 to 47 regarding the "sideshow" litigation that occurred prior to the June 8 Hearing over whether the hearing on the Motion for Leave would be an evidentiary hearing.

who allegedly told him that they purchased the claims without conducting any due diligence and based solely on Seery's assurances that the claims were valuable. These conversations allegedly took place on May 28, 2021—two days after the MGM-Amazon deal was officially announced to the public (on May 26, 2021). Dondero also testified that a photocopy of handwritten notes ("Dondero Notes")[56] (which were partially cut off) were notes he took contemporaneously with these short telephone conversations he initiated (one with Patel and two follow-up conversations with Linn).[57] He testified that his purpose in taking these notes and in initiating the phone calls was that "[w]e'd been trying nonstop to settle the case for two-plus years. . . . [a]nd when we heard the claims traded, we realized there were new parties to potentially negotiate to resolve the case . . . [s]o I reached out [to] the Farallon guys,"[58] and further, on *voir dire* from the Proposed Defendants' counsel, that the purpose of taking the notes was so that he had "a written record of the important points that [he] discussed . . . so I know how to address it the next time."[59] The handwritten notes[60] stated:

Raj Patel bought it because of Seery	*1*
50-70¢ not compelling	*2*
Class 8	*3*
Asked what would be compelling	*4*
-- No Offer	*5*
Bought in Feb/March timeframe	*6*
Bought assets w/ Claims	*7*
Offered him 40-50% premium	*8*
130% of cost; "Not Compelling"	*9*
No Counter; Told Discovery coming	*10*

[56] HMIT Ex. 4. The handwritten notes were admitted into evidence after *voir dire*, not for the truth of anything Patel or Linn allegedly said to him during the three telephone conversations, but as Dondero's "present sense impression" of the telephone conversations.

[57] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 133:1-136:3.

[58] *See id.*, 133:13-23.

[59] *See id.* (on *voir dire*), 144:1838-145:4.

[60] HMIT Ex. 4. The court has placed in a table and numbered each line for ease of reference. The table does not include the separate apparent partial date from the top left corner that Dondero testified was the date that he made the initial call to Patel: May 28, 2021.

On direct examination, Dondero testified that line 1 is what he wrote contemporaneously with the short call he initiated to Patel of Farallon in which Patel allegedly told Dondero "that he bought it because Seery told him to buy it and they had made money with Seery before"[61] and that Farallon "bought [the claim] because he was very optimistic regarding MGM"[62] before referring him to Linn, a portfolio manager at Farallon. Dondero testified that the rest of the handwritten notes (reflected in lines 2 through 10 of the table) were notes he took contemporaneously with two telephone conversations he had with Linn following his call to Patel, with lines 2-8 referring to Dondero's first call with Linn and lines 9 and 10 referring to his second call with Linn.[63] Dondero testified that the "50-70¢" in line 2 referred to his offer to Linn to pay 70 cents on the dollar to buy Farallon's[64] claims because "[w]e knew that they had – that the claims had traded around 50 cents" and "[w]e wanted to prevent the $5 million-a-month burn" (referring to attorney's fees in the Highland case) and that "not compelling Class 8" in lines 2-3 referred to Linn's response to him that the offer was not compelling.[65] Dondero testified that lines 4-5 referred to him asking Linn what amount would be compelling and to Linn's response that "he had no offer."[66] Dondero testified that lines 6-8 referred to Linn telling Dondero that Farallon bought the claims in the February, March timeframe and that Dondero told Linn that, given that the estate was spending $5 million a month on legal fees, Farallon should want to sell its claims and Linn's alleged response that "Seery told him it was worth a lot more."[67] Lastly, Dondero testified on direct examination

[61] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 134:7-10, 135:13-22.

[62] *Id.*, 139:3-11.

[63] *Id.*, 136:4-138:16.

[64] As noted above, Farallon did not acquire any of the Purchased Claims; rather, Farallon created a special purpose entity, Muck, to acquire the claims.

[65] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 136:4-16.

[66] *Id.*, 136:17-23.

[67] *Id.*, 137:6-138:7.

that the last two lines referred to a second telephone conversation he had with Linn in which Dondero offered 130 percent of cost for the claims and that Linn told him that the offer was not compelling, and he would not give a price at which he would sell.[68]

On cross-examination, Dondero acknowledged that, though he had testified that the handwritten notes were intended to be a written record of the important points from the telephone conversations he had with Patel and Linn, there was no mention in the notes of: (1) MGM: (2) or that Farallon was very optimistic about MGM; (3) the sharing of MNPI; (4) a *quid pro quo;* or (5) Seery's compensation, and that his last note—"Told Discovery coming"—was a reference to Dondero telling Linn (not Linn telling Dondero) that discovery was coming in response to Dondero's own supposition that Farallon must have traded on MNPI.[69] Cross-examination also revealed that Farallon never told Dondero that Seery gave them MNPI, and that Dondero only ***believed*** Seery ***must have*** given Farallon MNPI, because Farallon (Patel and Linn) had told him that the only reason Farallon bought their claims was because of their prior dealings with Seery, which Dondero took to mean that they had conducted no due diligence on their own prior to acquiring the claims. Dondero also testified that he did not have any personal knowledge as to how Seery's compensation package, as CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trustee, was determined because he was "not involved" in the setting of Seery's compensation pursuant to the Claimant Trust[70] and that he never discussed Seery's compensation with Farallon.[71]

As noted earlier, Dondero attempted to obtain discovery from the Claims Purchasers in a Texas state court pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Texas state

[68] *Id.*, 138:8-22.

[69] *Id.*, 190:14-191:25. Dondero testified that he told Linn that discovery "would be coming in the next few weeks" and noted that "this has been a couple years. . . . [w]e've been trying for two years to get . . . discovery in this."

[70] *Id.*, 200:13-201:1.

[71] *Id.*, 208:23-209:8.

court denied the First Rule 202 petition on June 1, 2022, after having considered the amended petition, the responses, the record, applicable authorities and having conducted a hearing on the petition on June 1, 2022.[72]

3. Dondero Unsuccessfully Seeks Discovery and to Have Various Agencies and Courts Outside of the Bankruptcy Court Acknowledge His Insider Trading Theories

Dondero acknowledged at the June 8 Hearing that the verified petition ("First Rule 202 Petition") he signed and filed on July 22, 2021, in the first Texas Rule 202 proceeding—just weeks after his telephone calls with Linn and Patel—was true and accurate. In it, he swore under oath as to what Linn told him in the telephone call concerning Farallon's purchase of the claims, and the only reason he gave for wanting discovery was that Linn told him Farallon bought the claims "sight unseen—relying entirely on Seery's advice solely because of their prior dealings."[73] Dondero acknowledged, as well, that his sworn statement that he filed in support of an amended verified Rule 202 petition filed in the same Texas Rule 202 proceeding, but nearly ten months later (in May 2022), described the same telephone conversation he had with Linn, and it did not mention MGM at all and did not say that Linn told him that Seery gave him MNPI; rather, the sworn statement stated only that "On a telephone call between Petitioner and Michael Lin[n], a representative of Farallon, Mr. Lin[n] informed Petitioner that Farallon had purchased the claims sight unseen and with no due diligence—100% relying on Seery's say-so because they had made so much money in the past when Seery told them to purchase claims" and that Linn did not tell him that Seery gave them MNPI, but he concluded that Seery gave Farallon MNPI based on what Linn did tell him.[74]

[72] Highland Ex. 7.

[73] *Id.*, 193:8-194:16; Highland Ex. 3, *Verified Petition to Take Deposition before Suit and Seek Documents*, ¶ 21. The first Texas Rule 202 proceeding in which Dondero sought discovery regarding the Farallon acquisition of its claims was brought by Dondero, individually, in the 95th Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas.

[74] *Id.*, 195:11-197:17; Highland Ex. 4, *Amended Verified Petition to Take Deposition before Suit and Seek Documents*, ¶ 23.

Nine days later, Dondero filed a declaration in the same proceeding, in which he described the same call with Linn as follows:[75]

> Last year, I called Farallon's Michael Lin[n] about purchasing their claims in the bankruptcy. I offered them 30% more than what they paid. I was told by Michael Lin[n] of Farallon that they purchased the interests without doing any due diligence other than what Mr. James Seery—the CEO of Highland—told them, and that he told them that the interests would be worth far more than what Farallon paid. Given the value of those claims that Seery had testified in court, it made no sense to me that Mr. Lin[n] would think that the claims were worth more than what Seery testified under oath was the value of the bankruptcy claims.

Dondero further stated in his declaration that "I have an interest in ensuring that the claims purchased by [Farallon] are not used as a means to deprive the equity holders of their share of the funds," and that "[i]t has become obvious that despite the fact that the bankruptcy estate has enough money to pay all claimants 100 cents on the dollar, there is plainly a movement afoot to drain the bankrupt estate and deprive equity of their rights. Accordingly, "I commissioned an investigation by counsel who have been in communication with the Office of the United States Trustee."[76] Dondero attached as Exhibit A to his declaration a letter from Douglas Draper ("Draper"), an attorney with the law firm of Heller, Draper & Horn, L.L.C. in New Orleans, to the office of the General Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, dated October 5, 2021, in which Draper opens the letter by stating that "[t]he purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the [Creditors' Committee] in the bankruptcy of [Highland]," and later noted that he "became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of [Dugaboy], an irrevocable trust of which Dondero is the primary beneficiary."[77] Mr. Draper laid out the same allegations of insider claims trading, breach of

[75] Highland Ex. 5, ¶ 2.
[76] *Id.*, ¶¶ 3-4.
[77] *Id.*, Ex. A, 1-2.

fiduciary duties, and conspiracy that HMIT seeks to bring in the Proposed Complaint.[78] The U.S. Trustee's office took no action. Dondero made a second and third attempt to get the U.S. Trustee's office to conduct an investigation into the same allegations laid out in Draper's letter, this time in "follow-up" letters to the Office of the U.S. Trustee on November 3, 2021, and six months later, on May 11, 2022, through another lawyer, Davor Rukavina ("Rukavina"), in which Rukavina wrote "to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the [Highland] bankruptcy."[79] Again, the U.S. Trustee's office took no action.

On February 15, 2023, Dondero filed yet another sworn statement about his alleged conversation with Linn, this time in support of a Verified Rule 202 Petition ***filed by HMIT*** ("Second Rule 202 Petition"), filed in a different Texas state court (Texas District Court, 191st Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas), following Dondero's unsuccessful attempts throughout 2021 and 2022 to obtain discovery in the First Rule 202 proceeding and based on the same allegations of misconduct by Seery and Farallon.[80] In this new sworn statement, Dondero describes for the first time the "call" he had with Linn as having been "phone calls" with Patel and Linn and ***mentions MGM*** and Farallon's alleged optimism about the ***expected sale of MGM***:[81]

> In late Spring of 2021, I had phone calls with two principals at Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Raj Patel and Michael Linn. During these phone calls, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn informed me that Farallon had a deal in place to purchase the Acis and HarbourVest claims, which I understood to refer to claims that were a part of settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn stated that Farallon agreed to purchase these claims based solely on conversations with Seery because they had made significant profits when Seery told them to purchase other claims in the past. They also stated that they were particularly optimistic because of the expected sale of MGM.

[78] *Id.*, Ex. A, 6-11.

[79] HMIT Ex. 61.

[80] Highland Ex. 9.

[81] *Id.*, ¶ 4.

The Second Rule 202 Petition was also denied by the second Texas state court on March 8, 2023.[82]

HMIT, in an apparent attempt to provide support for its argument that the Proposed Claims are "colorable," stated in its Motion for Leave that "[t]he Court also should be aware that the Texas States [sic] Securities Board ("TSSB") opened an investigation into the subject matter of the insider trades at issue, and this investigation has not been closed. The continuing nature of this investigation underscores HMIT's position that the claims described in the attached Adversary Proceeding are plausible and certainly far more than merely 'colorable.'"[83] But, two days before opposition briefing was due, on May 9, 2023, the TSSB issued a letter ("TSSB Letter") to Highland, informing it that "[t]he staff of the [TSSB] has completed its review of the complaint received by the Staff against [Highland]. The issues raised in the complaint and information provided to our Agency were given full consideration, and a decision was made that no further regulatory action is warranted at this time."[84] HMIT's counsel (frankly, to the astonishment of the court) objected to the admission of the TSSB Letter at the June 8 Hearing "on the grounds of relevance, 403, hearsay, and authenticity . . . [a]nd I also . . . think it's important that the decision by a regulatory body has no bearing on this cause of action or the colorability of this claim, and the Texas State Securities Board will tell you that. This is completely and utterly irrelevant to your inquiry."[85] The court overruled HMIT's objection to the relevance of this exhibit—considering, among other things, that HMIT, in its Motion for Leave, specifically mentioned the allegedly open TSSB "investigation" as relevant evidence the court "should be aware" of in making its determination of whether the Proposed Claims were "colorable."[86]

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[82] Highland Ex. 10.

[83] Motion for Leave, ¶ 37.

[84] *See* Highland Ex. 33.

[85] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 323:22-324:3.

[86] *Id.*, 324:4-328:2.

C. Claims Purchasers Purchase Claims and File Notices of Transfers of Claims

To be clear about the time line here, it was after confirmation of the Plan but prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, that the Claims Purchasers: (1) purchased several large unsecured claims that had been allowed following, and as part of, Rule 9019 settlements, each of which were approved by the bankruptcy court, after notice and hearing, prior to the confirmation hearing; and (2) filed notices of the transfers of those claims pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The noticing of the claims transfers began on April 16, 2021, with the notice of transfer of the claim held by Acis Capital Management to Muck, and ended on August 9, 2021, with the notices of transfers of the claims held by UBS Securities to Muck and Jessup:

Claimant(s)	**Date Filed/ Claim No.**	**Asserted Amount**	**Claim Settled/Allowed? If so, Amount**	**Date Filed/ Rule 3001 Notice Dkt. No.**
Acis Capital Management LP and Acis Capital Management, GP LLC (together, "Acis")	12/31/2019 Claim No. 23	$23,000,000	Yes[87] $23,000,000	4/16/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2215 (Muck)
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (the "Redeemer Committee")	4/3/2020 Claim No. 72	$190,824,557	Yes[88] $137,696,610	4/30/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2261 (Jessup)
HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, LP, HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF, LP, HarbourVest Partners LP, HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment LP, HV International VIII Secondary LP, HarbourVest Skew Base AIF LP (the "HarbourVest Parties")	4/8/2020 Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154	Unliquidated	Yes[89] $80,000,000 in aggregate ($45,000,000 General Unsecured Claim, and $35,000,000 subordinated claim)	4/30/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2263 (Muck)

[87] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1302. The Debtor's settlement with Acis was approved over the objection of Dondero. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1121.

[88] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1273.

[89] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1788. The Debtor's settlement with the HarbourVest Parties was approved over the objections of Dondero, Bankr. Dkt. No. 1697, and Dugaboy and the Get Good Trust. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1706.

UBS Securities LLC, UBS AG, London Branch (the "UBS Parties")	6/26/2020 Claim Nos. 190, 191	$1,039,957,799.40	Yes[90] $125,000,000 in aggregate ($65,000,000 General	8/9/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2698 (Muck) and Bankr. Dkt. No. 2697 (Jessup)

HMIT insists that it "made no sense" for the Claims Purchasers to buy the Purchased Claims because "the publicly available information [] did not offer a sufficient potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk," and "their investment was projected to yield a small return with virtually no margin for error."[91] Dondero testified that it was ***his*** view that there was insufficient information in the public to justify the claims purchases.[92] But, HMIT's arguments here are contradicted by the information that was publicly available to Farallon and Stonehill at the time of their purchases and by HMIT's own allegations. In advance of Plan confirmation, Highland projected that Class 8 general unsecured creditors would recover 71.32% on their allowed claims. In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT sets forth the amounts the Claims Purchasers purportedly paid for their claims.[93] Taking into account the face amount of the allowed claims, the Claims Purchasers' projected profits (in millions of dollars) were as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Ascribed Value[94]	Purchaser	Purchase Price	Projected Profit
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	$97.71	Stonehill	$78.0	$19.71
Acis	$23.0	$0.0	$16.4	Farallon	$8.0	$8.40

[90] Bankr. Dkt. No. 2389. The Debtor's settlement with the UBS Parties was approved over the objections of Dondero, Dkt. No. 2295, and Dugaboy and the Get Good Trust. Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 2268, 2293.

[91] Proposed Complaint, ¶ 3.

[92] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 187:3-7 ("Q: And it's your testimony that there wasn't sufficient information in the public for them to buy – this is your view – that there wasn't sufficient information in the public to justify their purchases. Is that your view? A: Correct.).

[93] *Id.*, ¶ 42.

[94] "Ascribed Value" is derived by multiplying the Class 8 amount by the projected recovery of 71.32% for that class.

HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	$32.09	Farallon	$27.0	$5.09
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	$46.39	Stonehill & Farallon	$50.0	($3.61)

As HMIT acknowledges, by the time Dondero spoke with Farallon in the "late spring" of 2021, the Claims Purchasers had acquired the allowed claims previously held by Acis, Redeemer, and HarbourVest.[95] Based on an aggregate purchase price of $113 million for these three claims, the Claims Purchasers would have expected to net over $33 million in profits, or nearly 30% on their investment, had Highland met its projections. The Claims Purchasers would make even more money if Highland beat its projections, because they also purchased the Class 9 claims and would therefore capture any upside. In this context, HMIT's and Dondero's assertions that it did not "make any sense" for the Claims Purchasers to purchase their claims when they did does not pass muster—given the publicly available information about potential recoveries under the Plan. Dondero even acknowledged, on cross-examination, that he was prepared to pay ***30 percent more*** than Farallon had paid, even though he did not think there was sufficient public information available to justify Farallon's purchase of the claims.[96] Dondero essentially testified that he wanted to purchase Farallon's claims because he wanted to be in a position of control to force a settlement or resolution of the bankruptcy case, post-confirmation, under terms acceptable to him. He did not want to try to settle by negotiating with Farallon and Stonehill ***as creditors***, but instead he wanted to purchase the claims because "if we owned all the claims, it would settle the case."[97]

[95] *See* Complaint, ¶ 41 n.12. The UBS claims were not acquired until August 2021, long after the alleged "*quid pro quo*" was supposedly agreed upon and the MGM-Amazon deal was announced in the press in late May 2021. *See*, Highland Ex. 34, *Amazon's $8.45 Billion Deal for MGM is Historic But Feels Mundane* (dated May 26, 2021).

[96] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 187:8-11.

[97] *Id.*, 187:12-189:10.

D. Fifth Circuit's Approval of the Gatekeeper Provision in Plan, Recognition of Res Judicata Effect of the Prior Gatekeeper Orders, and the Bankruptcy Court's Order Approving Highland's Motion to Conform Plan

Harkening back to February 22, 2021, after a robust confirmation hearing, this court entered its order confirming the Plan, over the objections of Dondero and Dondero-Related Parties, specifically questioning the good faith of their objections. The court found, after noting "the remoteness of their economic interests" that "[it] has good reason to believe that [the Dondero Parties] are not objecting to protect economic interests they have in the Debtor but to be disruptors. Dondero wants his company back. This is understandable, but it is not a good faith basis to lob objections to the Plan."[94] The Plan became effective on August 11, 2021.

Of relevance to the Motion for Leave, the confirmed Plan included certain exculpations, releases, and injunctions designed to protect the Debtor and other bankruptcy participants from bad-faith litigation. These participants included: Highland's employees (with certain exceptions); Seery as Highland's CEO and CRO; Strand (after the appointment of the Independent Directors); the Independent Directors; the successor entities; the CTOB and its members; the Committee and its members; professionals retained in the case; and all "Related Persons." The injunction provisions contained a Gatekeeper Provision which is similar to the gatekeeper provisions in the prior Gatekeeper Orders in that it provided that the bankruptcy court will act as a "gatekeeper" to screen and prevent bad-faith litigation against the Protected Parties. The Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan states, in pertinent part:[98]

> No Enjoined Party may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Protected Party that arose or arises from or is related to the Chapter 11 Case . . . without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining, after notice and a hearing, that such claim or cause of action represents ***a colorable claim of any kind***, including, but not limited to, negligence, bad faith, criminal misconduct, willful misconduct, fraud, or gross negligence against a Protected Party and (ii) specifically

[98] Plan, 50-51 (emphasis added).

> authorizing such Enjoined Party to bring such claim or cause of action against such Protected Party.

The Plan defines Protected Parties as,

> collectively, (i) the Debtor and its successors and assigns, direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries, and the Managed Funds, (ii) the Employees, (iii) Strand, (iv) the Reorganized Debtor, (v) the Independent Directors, (vi) the Committee, (vii) the members of the Committee (in their official capacities), (viii) the Claimant Trust, (ix) the Claimant Trustee, (x) the Litigation Sub-Trust, (xi) the Litigation Trustee, (xii) the members of the [CTOB] (in their official capacities), (xiii) [HCMLP GP LLC], (xiv) the Professionals retained by the Debtor and the Committee in the Chapter 11 Case, (xv) the CEO/CRO; and (xvi) the Related Persons of each of the parties listed in (iv) through (xv); [but excluding Dondero and Okada and various entities including HMIT and Dugaboy].

The court notes that the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan provides protection to a broader number of persons than the persons protected under the January 2020 Order (addressing the Independent Directors and their agents and advisors) and the July 2020 Order (addressing Seery in his role as CEO and CRO of the Debtor). But, at the same time, it is less restrictive than the gatekeeping provisions under the Gatekeeper Orders, in that the gatekeeping provisions in the prior orders shield the protected parties from any claim that is not both "colorable" ***and*** a claim for "willful misconduct or gross negligence," effectively providing the protected parties under the prior orders with a limited immunity from claims of simple negligence or breach of contract that do not rise to the level of "willful misconduct or gross negligence," whereas the Gatekeeping Provision under the Plan does not act as a release or exculpation of the Protected Parties in any way because it does not prohibit any party from bringing ***any kind of claim*** against a Protected Party, provided the proposed claimant first obtains a finding in the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims are "colorable."[99]

[99] It should be noted that--as discussed further below--there are, separately in the Plan, exculpations as to a smaller universe of persons--*e.g.,* the Debtor, the Committee and its members, and the Independent Directors.

Dondero and some of the entities under his control appealed[100] the Confirmation Order directly to the Fifth Circuit, arguing, among other issues, that the Plan's exculpation, release, and injunction provisions, including the Gatekeeper Provision (collectively, the "Protection Provisions") impermissibly provide certain non-debtor bankruptcy participants with a discharge, purportedly in contravention of the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 524(e)'s statutory bar on non-debtor discharges. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit, "affirm[ed] the confirmation order in large part" and "reverse[d] ***only insofar as the plan exculpates*** certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strik[ing] those few parties ***from the plan's exculpation***, and affirm[ed] on all remaining grounds."[101] The Fifth Circuit specifically found the "injunction and gatekeeping provisions [to be] sound" and found that it was only "the ***exculpation*** of certain non-debtors" that "exceed[ed] the bankruptcy court's authority," agreeing with the bankruptcy court's conclusions that the Protection Provisions were legal, necessary under the circumstances, and in the best interest of all parties" in part, and only disagreeing to the extent that the ***exculpation*** provision improperly extended to certain bankruptcy participants other than Highland, the Committee and its members, and the Independent Directors and "revers[ing] and strik[ing] the few unlawful parts

[100] On appeal, the appellant funds ("Funds"), whom this court found to be "owned and/or controlled" by Dondero despite their purported independence, also asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate this court's factual finding "because it threatens the Funds' compliance with federal law and damages their reputations and values" and because "[a]ccording to the Funds, the characterization is unfair, as *they* are not litigious like Dondero and are completely independent from him." *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, 48 F.4th at 434. Applying the "clear error" standard of review, the Fifth Circuit "le[ft] the bankruptcy court's factual finding undisturbed" because "nothing in this record leaves us with a firm and definite conviction that the bankruptcy court made a mistake in finding that the Funds are 'owned and/or controlled by [Dondero]." *Id.* at 434-35.

[101] *See supra* note 4. The Fifth Circuit replaced its initial opinion with its final opinion a few days after certain appellants had filed a short (four-and-one-half pages) motion for rehearing (the "Motion for Rehearing") on September 2, 2022. The movants had asked the Fifth Circuit to "narrowly amend the [initial] Opinion in order to confirm the Court's holding that the impermissibly exculpated parties are similarly struck from the protections of the injunction and gatekeeper provisions of the plan (in other words, that such parties cannot constitute 'Protected Parties')." In the final Fifth Circuit opinion, same as the initial Fifth Circuit opinion, the Fifth Circuit stated that, with regard to the Confirmation Order, the panel would "reverse only insofar as the plan exculpates certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strike those few parties from the plan's exculpation, and affirm on all remaining grounds." *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 424. No findings, discussion, or rulings regarding the injunction and gatekeeper provisions that were in the initial Fifth Circuit opinion were disturbed.

of the Plan's ***exculpation provision***."[102] The Fifth Circuit then remanded to the Bankruptcy Court "for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion."[103]

In the course of analyzing the Protection Provisions under the Plan, the Fifth Circuit noted that the protection provisions in the January and July 2020 Orders appointing the Independent Directors and Seery as CEO and CRO of Highland were *res judicata* and that "*those* orders have the effect of exculpating the Independent Directors and Seery in his executive capacities" such that "[d]espite removal from the exculpation provision in the confirmation order, the Independent Directors' agents, advisors, and employees, as well as Seery in his official capacities are all exculpated to the extent provided in the January and July 2020 Orders."[104]

The Reorganized Debtor filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to conform the plan to the Fifth Circuit's mandate, proposing that only one change was needed to make the Plan compliant with the Fifth Circuit's ruling: narrow the defined term for "Exculpated Parties" to read as follows:

> "Exculpated Parties" means, collectively, (i) the Debtor, (ii) the Independent Directors, (iii) the Committee, and (iv) members of the Committee (in their official capacities).

The Reorganized Debtor proposed that this one simple revision of this defined term removed the exculpations deemed by the Fifth Circuit to violate section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, and that no other changes would be required to conform the Plan and Confirmation Order to the Fifth Circuit's mandate. Some of the Dondero-related entities objected to the motion to conform, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's ruling required more surgery on the Plan than simply narrowing the defined term "Exculpated Parties." On February 27, 2023, this court entered its order granting

[102] *Id.* at 435.

[103] *Id.* at 440. The Fifth Circuit's docket reflects that it issued its Judgment and mandate on September 12, 2022.

[104] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 438 n.15. The Fifth Circuit stated, "To the extent Appellants seek to roll back the protections in the bankruptcy court's January 2020 and July 2020 orders (which is not clear from their briefing), such a collateral attack is precluded." *Id.*

Highland's motion to conform the Plan, ordering that one change be made to the Plan – revising the definition of "Exculpated Parties" – and no more.[105] The objecting parties' direct appeal of this order has been certified to the Fifth Circuit and is one of the numerous currently active appeals by Dondero-related parties pending in the Fifth Circuit.

E. HMIT's Motion for Leave

HMIT filed its emergency Motion for Leave on March 28, 2023, which, with attachments, as first filed, was 387 pages in length, including an initial proposed complaint ("Initial Proposed Complaint") and two sworn declarations of Dondero that were attached as "objective evidence" in "support[ ]" of the Motion for Leave,[106] and with it, an application for an emergency setting on the hearing on the Motion to Leave. On April 23, 2023, HMIT filed a pleading entitled a "supplement" to its Motion to Leave ("Supplement"),[107] to which it attached a revised proposed verified complaint ("Proposed Complaint")[108] as Exhibit 1-A to the Motion for Leave and stated that "[t]he Supplement is not intended to amend or supersede the [Motion for Leave]; rather, it is intended as a supplement to address procedural matters and to bring forth additional facts that further confirm the appropriateness of the derivative action."[109] The HMIT Motion for Leave was later amended to eliminate the Dondero Declarations and references to the same (but not the underlying allegations that were supposedly supported by the Dondero Declarations).[110]

[105] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3672.

[106] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699.

[107] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3760.

[108] *See supra* note 5.

[109] Supplement ¶ 1.

[110] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3815 and 3816. Both of these filings had the Initial Proposed Complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion for Leave.

As earlier noted, HMIT desires leave to sue the Proposed Defendants regarding ***the post-confirmation, pre-Effective Date purchase of allowed unsecured claims***. The Proposed Defendants would be:

> **Seery,** who was a stranger to Highland until approximately four months following the Petition Date when he was brought in as one of the three Independent Directors, and now serves as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and the Trustee of the Claimant Trust (and also was previously Highland's CRO during the case, then CEO, and, also, an Independent Board Member of Highland's general partner during the Highland case). Seery is best understood as the man who took Dondero's place running Highland—per the request of the Committee.
>
> **Claims Purchasers,** who were strangers to Highland until the end of the bankruptcy case. They are identified as Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), which was a special purpose entity created by Farallon to purchase unsecured claims against Highland; Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), which was a special purpose entity created by Stonehill to purchase unsecured claims against Highland (collectively, the "Claims Purchasers"). The Claims Purchasers purchased $240 million face value of already-allowed unsecured claims post-confirmation and pre-Effective Date in the spring of 2021 and another $125 million face value of already-allowed unsecured claims in August 2021. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) notices—giving notice of same—were filed on the bankruptcy clerk's docket regarding these purchases. The claims had previously been held by the creditors known as the Crusader Redeemer Committee, Acis Capital, HarbourVest, and UBS (three of these four creditors formerly served on the Committee during the Highland bankruptcy case).
>
> **John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10**, which are described to be "currently unknown individuals or business entities who may be identified in discovery as involved in the wrongful transactions at issue."
>
> **Highland,** as a nominal defendant. HMIT added Highland as a nominal defendant in the Revised Proposed Complaint attached to the Supplement.
>
> **Claimant Trust**, as a nominal defendant. HMIT added the Claimant Trust as a nominal defendant in the Revised Proposed Complaint attached to the Supplement.

The proposed plaintiffs would be:

> **HMIT,** which, again, was the largest equity holder in Highland and held a 99.5% limited partnership interest (specifically, Class B/C limited partnership interests). HMIT is the holder of a Class 10 interest under the Plan, pursuant to which HMIT's limited partnership interest in Highland was extinguished as of the Effective Date in exchange for a pro rata share of a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust.

Highland, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor.

Claimant Trust, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT asserts the following six counts: Count I (against Seery) for breach of fiduciary duties; Count II (against the Claims Purchasers and John Doe Defendants) for knowing participation in breach of fiduciary duties; Count III (against all Proposed Defendants) for conspiracy; Count IV (against Muck and Jessup) for equitable disallowance of their claims; Count V (against all Proposed Defendants) for unjust enrichment and constructive trust; and Count VI (against all Proposed Defendants) for declaratory relief.[111] The gist of the Proposed Complaint is as follows. HMIT asserts that something seems amiss regarding the post-confirmation/pre-Effective Date purchase of claims by the Claims Purchasers. Actually, more bluntly, HMIT asserts that "wrongful conduct occurred" and "improper trades" were made.[112] HMIT believes the Claims Purchasers paid around $160 million for the $365 million face amount of claims they purchased. HMIT believes that this amount was too high for any rational claim purchaser (particularly hedge funds who expect high returns) to have paid for the claims—based on Highland's Disclosure Statement and Plan projections regarding the projected distributions under the Plan to holders of allowed unsecured claims. And, of course, Dondero purports to have concluded from the three phone conversations he had with representatives of one of the Claims Purchasers that they did no due diligence before purchasing the claims. Therefore, HMIT surmises, Seery must have given these Claims Purchasers MNPI regarding Highland that convinced them that it was to their economic advantage to purchase the claims. In particular, HMIT surmises Seery must have shared

[111] In the Initial Proposed Complaint, HMIT proposed to bring claims against the various Proposed Defendants in seven counts, including a count for fraud by misrepresentation and material nondisclosure against all Proposed Defendants. In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT abandons its claim for fraud by misrepresentation and material nondisclosure.

[112] Motion for Leave, 7.

MNPI regarding the likely imminent sale of MGM, in which Highland had, directly and indirectly, substantial holdings. As noted earlier, MGM was ultimately purchased by Amazon after a sale process that had been quite publicly discussed in media reports for several months and that was officially announced to the public in late May 2021 (just a few weeks after the Claims Purchasers purchased some of their claims, but a few months ***before*** certain of their claims—the UBS claims—were purchased).[113] In summary, while the Proposed Complaint is lengthy and at times hard to follow, it boils down to allegations that: (a) Seery filed (or caused to be filed) deflated, pessimistic, misleading projections regarding the value of the Debtor's estate in connection with the Plan, (b) then induced very sophisticated unsecured creditors to discount and sell their claims to the likewise very sophisticated Claims Purchasers, (c) which Claims Purchasers are allegedly friendly with Seery, and are now happily approving Seery's allegedly excessive compensation demands post-Effective Date (resulting in less money in the pot to pay off the creditor body in full, and, thus, a diminished likelihood that HMIT will realize any recovery on its contingent Class 10 interest). HMIT argues that Seery should be required to disgorge his compensation. It appears that HMIT also seeks other damages in the form of equitable disallowance of the Claims Purchasers' claims and disgorgement of distributions on account of those claims, the imposition of a constructive trust over all disgorged funds, and declaratory relief.

HMIT claims that, in seeking to file the Proposed Complaint, it is seeking to protect the rights and interests of the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and "innocent stakeholders" who were allegedly injured by Seery's and the Claims Purchasers' alleged conspiratorial and

[113] The MGM-Amazon deal was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for approximately $6.1 billion, net of cash acquired, plus approximately $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid. Credible testimony from Seery at the June 8 Hearing revealed that Highland and entities it controlled tendered their MGM holdings in connection with the Amazon transaction (they did not sell their holdings while the MGM-Amazon deal was under discussion and/or not made public).

fraudulent scheme to line Seery's pockets with excessive compensation for his role as Claimant Trustee. In its Motion for Leave, HMIT states that "[t]he attached Adversary Proceeding alleges claims which are substantially more than 'colorable' based upon plausible allegations that the Proposed Defendants, acting in concert, perpetrated a fraud, including a fraud upon innocent stakeholders, as well as breaches of fiduciary duties and knowing participation in (or aiding or abetting) breaches of fiduciary duty."[114]

F. Is HMIT Really Dondero by Another Name?

The Proposed Defendants argue that HMIT's Motion for Leave is nothing more than a continuation of the harassing and bad-faith litigation by Dondero and his related entities that the Gatekeeper Provisions were intended to prevent and, thus, this is one of multiple reasons that the Motion for Leave should be denied.

To be clear, HMIT asserts that it is controlled by Mark Patrick ("Patrick"), who has been HMIT's administrator since August 2022. Patrick asserts that he is not influenced or controlled by Dondero, in general, and specifically not in its efforts to pursue the Proposed Claims against Seery and the Claims Purchasers. However, the testimony elicited at the June 8 Hearing—the hearing at which HMIT had the burden of showing the court that its Proposed Claims were "colorable" such that it should be allowed to pursue them through the filing of the Proposed Complaint—paints a different picture. Somewhat tellingly, HMIT chose not to call Patrick—allegedly HMIT's only representative and control person—as a witness in support of its Motion for Leave. Rather, Dondero was HMIT's first witness called in support of its motion, and the first

[114] *See* Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3816) ¶ 3. HMIT notes, in a footnote 6, that "Neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to challenge the Court's Orders or the Plan. In addition, neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to redistribute the assets of the Claimant Trust in a manner that would adversely impact innocent creditors. Rather, the proposed Adversary Proceeding seeks to benefit all innocent stakeholders while working within the terms and provisions of the Plan, as well as the Claimant Trust Agreement."

questions on direct from HMIT's counsel were aimed at establishing that Dondero was not behind the filing of the Motion for Leave and the pursuit of the Proposed Claims.[115] Dondero testified that he did not (i) "have any current official position" with HMIT, (ii) "attempt to exercise [control] on the business affairs of [HMIT]," (iii) "have any official legal relationship with [HMIT] where [he] can attempt to exercise either direct or indirect control over [HMIT]," or (iv) "participate in the decision of whether or not to file the proceedings that are currently pending before Judge Jernigan."[116] After HMIT rested, Highland and the Claimant Trust called Patrick as a witness, and he testified that he was the administrator of HMIT, that HMIT does not have any employees, operations, or revenues, and, when asked if HMIT owned any assets, Patrick testified, with not a great deal of certainty, that "it's my understanding it has a contingent beneficiary interest in the Claimants [sic] Trust" and that is the only asset HMIT has.[117] Patrick testified that HMIT did not owe any money to Dondero personally, but acknowledged that in 2015, HMIT had issued a secured promissory note in favor of Dondero's family trust, Dugaboy, in the amount of approximately $62.6 million (the "Dugaboy Note") in exchange for Dugaboy transferring a portion of its limited partner interests in Highland to HMIT; the Dugaboy Note was secured in part by the Highland limited partnership interests purchased from Dugaboy.[118] Patrick admitted that, if HMIT's Class 10 interest has no value, HMIT would have no ability to pay the Dugaboy Note.[119] He further testified that neither he nor any representative of HMIT had ever spoken with any representative of Farallon or Stonehill, that he had no personal knowledge about any *quid pro quo*, the amount of due diligence Farallon or Stonehill conducted prior to buying their claims, or the terms of

[115] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 113:10-25.

[116] *Id.*

[117] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 307:7-308:2.

[118] *Id.*, 303:11-305:1; Highland Ex. 51, HMIT's $62,657,647.27 *Secured Promissory Note* dated December 24, 2015, in favor of Dugaboy.

[119] *Id.*, 308:3-16.

Seery's compensation package (until the terms were disclosed to them in opposition to the Motion for Leave).[120] Patrick admitted that Dugaboy was paying HMIT's attorneys' fees pursuant to a settlement agreement between HMIT and Dugaboy.[121]

On cross-examination by HMIT's counsel, Patrick further testified that HMIT has not filed any litigation, as plaintiff, other than its efforts to be a plaintiff in the Motion for Leave and its action as a petitioner in the Texas Rule 202 proceeding filed earlier in 2023 in the Texas state court.[122] HMIT's counsel argued that the point of this questioning was that "they're just trying to draw Dondero into this and – this vexatious litigant argument, and we're just developing the fact that obviously Hunter Mountain has only filed – attempting to file this action and a Rule 202 proceeding.[123] But, Dondero and HMIT's counsel referred during the June 8 Hearing to the First Rule 202 Petition (where Dondero was the petitioner) and the Second Rule 202 Petition (where HMIT was the petitioner) as "our" Rule 202 petitions, and also to the numerous attempts at getting the discovery (that Dondero had warned Linn was coming) in the collective. For example, in objecting to the admission of Highland's Exhibit 10 – the Texas state court order denying and dismissing the Second Rule 202 Petition – on the basis of relevance, HMIT's counsel referred to the order as "an order denying ***our second"*** Rule 202 Petition.[124] And, Dondero testified that his warning to Linn in May 2021 that "discovery was coming" was "my response to I knew they had traded on material nonpublic information" and that "I thought it would be a lot easier to get

[120] *Id.*, 308:18-312:12. This testimony from Patrick came after HMIT's counsel objection to counsel's line of questioning regarding Patrick's personal knowledge of the facts supporting the allegations in the Proposed Complaint on the basis that he was invading the attorney work product privilege, which was overruled by this court; HMIT's counsel argued (311:4-19) that the line of questioning was an "invasion of attorney work product . . . [b]ecause they might – he would have knowledge from the efforts and investigation through attorneys in the case."

[121] *Id.*, 312:24-313:18.

[122] *Id.*, 315:3-9.

[123] *Id.*, 316:6-11.

[124] *Id.*, 58:11-13. The court overruled HMIT's relevance objection and admitted Highland's Exhibit 10 into evidence. *Id.*, 58:14-15.

discovery on a situation like this than it has been for the last two years" and that "***we've*** been trying for two years to get . . . discovery."[125]

Dondero's use of an entity over which he exerts influence and control to pursue his own agenda in the bankruptcy case is not new. Rather, this has been part of Dondero's *modus operandi* since the "nasty breakup" between Dondero and Highland that culminated with Dondero's ouster in October 2020, whereby Dondero, after not getting his way in the bankruptcy court, continued to lob objections and create obstacles to Highland's implementation of the Plan through entities he owns or controls. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit specifically upheld this court's finding in the Confirmation Order that Dondero owned or controlled the various entities that had objected to confirmation of the Plan and appealed the Confirmation Order, where the Dondero-related appellants made similar protestations that they are not owned or controlled by Dondero and asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate this court's factual finding because, among other reasons, "[a]ccording to the Funds, the characterization is unfair, as *they* are not litigious like Dondero and are completely independent from him."[126] Based on the totality of the evidence in this proceeding, the court finds that, contrary to the protestations of HMIT's counsel and Patrick otherwise, Dondero is the driving force behind HMIT's Motion for Leave and the Proposed Complaint. The Motion for Leave is just one more attempt by Dondero to press his conspiracy theory that he has pressed for over two years now, unsuccessfully, in Texas state court through Rule 202 proceedings, with the Texas State Securities Board, and with the United States Trustee's office.

[125] *Id.*, 191:5-25.

[126] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 434-435.

G. Opposition to Motion for Leave: Arguing No Standing and No "Colorable" Claims

Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery (together, the "Highland Parties") filed a joint opposition ("Joint Opposition") to HMIT's Motion for Leave on May 11, 2023.[127] The Claims Purchasers filed a separate objection ("Claims Purchasers' Objection") to the Motion for Leave on May 11, 2023, as well.[128] In the Joint Opposition, the Highland Parties urge the court to deny HMIT leave to pursue the Proposed Claims because, as a threshold matter, HMIT does not have standing to bring them, directly or derivatively against the Proposed Defendants. They argue, in the alternative, that the Motion for Leave should be denied even if HMIT had standing to pursue the Proposed Claims because none of the Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims as that term is used in the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan (and Gatekeeper Orders).[129]

The Claims Purchasers likewise argue that HMIT lacks standing to complain about claims trading in the bankruptcy which occurred between sophisticated Claims Purchasers and sophisticated sellers ("Claims Sellers"), represented by skilled bankruptcy and transactional counsel. Moreover, they argue HMIT cannot show that it or the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust were injured by the claims trading at issue because the Purchased Claims had already been adjudicated as allowed claims in the bankruptcy case—thus, distributions under the Plan on account of the Purchased Claims remain the same, the only difference being who holds the claims. Moreover, even if HMIT could succeed in equitably subordinating the validly transferred ***allowed*** claims, HMIT would still be in the same position it is today: the holder of a

[127] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3783. Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery also filed on May 11 a *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Morris Declaration") that attached 44 Exhibits in support of the Joint Opposition. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3784.

[128] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3780.

[129] *See* Joint Opposition ¶ 139 ("Because HMIT lacks standing, this Court need not reach the merits of HMIT's proposed Adversary Complaint. As a matter of judicial economy, however, the Highland Parties respectfully request that this Court address the lack of merit as an alternative basis to deny the Motion.").

contingent, speculative Class 10 interest that would only be paid after payment, in full, with interest, of all creditors under the Plan. The Claims Purchasers argue in the alternative that the Proposed Claims are not "colorable."

Finally, the Proposed Defendants argue that the standard of review for assessing whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable" (as such term is used in the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeping Orders) is a standard that is a higher than the "plausibility" standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6). They argue that HMIT should be required to meet a higher bar with respect to colorability that includes making a *prima facie* showing that the Proposed Claims have merit (and/or are not without foundation) which requires HMIT to do more than meet the liberal notice-pleading standards.

H. HMIT's Reply to the Proposed Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Leave

In its reply brief ("Reply"), filed by HMIT on May 18, 2023,[130] it argues that it has constitutional standing as an "aggrieved party" to bring the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself.[131] HMIT also argues that it has standing under Delaware Trust law to bring a derivative action on behalf of the Claimant Trust and that it not only has standing to bring the Proposed Claims derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor under the Plan, but it is the best party to bring the claims.[132] Finally, HMIT maintains that the standard of review that the bankruptcy court should apply in assessing the "colorability" of the Proposed Claims is no greater than the standard of review applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which would require the bankruptcy court to look only to the "four corners" of the Proposed Complaint

[130] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3785.

[131] *See* Reply ¶ 7.

[132] See, Reply ¶ 23 n.5, where HMIT argues "The nature of this injury, in addition to Seery's influence over the Claimant Trust, and the lack of prior action by the Claimant Trust to pursue the claims HMIT seeks to pursue derivatively, among other things, demonstrate that HMIT is not only a proper party to assert its derivative claims – but the best party to do so."

and "not weigh extraneous evidence,"[133] take all allegations as true, and view all allegations and inferences in a light most favorable to HMIT. As discussed in greater length below, HMIT argues that, under this standard, the bankruptcy court should not consider evidence in making its determination as to whether the Proposed Complaint presents "colorable" claims.

I. Litigation within the Litigation: The Pre- June 8 Hearing Skirmishes

Suffice it to say there was significant activity before the Motion for Leave actually was presented at the June 8 hearing. HMIT sought an emergency hearing on its Motion for Leave (wanting a hearing on three days' notice). When the bankruptcy court denied an emergency hearing, HMIT unsuccessfully pursued an interlocutory appeal of the denial of an emergency hearing to the district court. HMIT then petitioned for a writ of mandamus at the Fifth Circuit regarding the emergency hearing denial, which was denied by the Fifth Circuit on April 12, 2023.

Next, there were multiple pleadings and hearings regarding ***what kind of hearing*** the bankruptcy court should or should not hold on the Motion for Leave—particularly focusing on whether or not it would be an evidentiary hearing.[134] The resolution of this issue turned on what standard of review the court should apply in exercising its gatekeeping function and determining the colorability of the Proposed Claims. HMIT (although it had submitted two declarations of Dondero with its original Motion for Leave and approximately 350 pages of total evidentiary support) was adamant that there should be no evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, arguing that the standard for review should be the plausibility standard under Rule 12(b)(6)

[133] *See* Reply ¶ 47.

[134] Highland, joined by Seery and the Claims Purchasers, had filed a motion asking the bankruptcy court to set a briefing schedule on the Motion for Leave and to schedule a status conference, indicating that Highland's proposed timetable for same was opposed by HMIT. HMIT subsequently filed a response unopposed to a briefing schedule and status conference, but, before the status conference, HMIT filed a brief, stating it was opposed to there being any evidence at the ultimate hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave—arguing the bankruptcy court did not need evidence to exercise its gatekeeping function and determine if HMIT has a "colorable" claim. Rather, the court need only engage in a Rule 12(b)(6)-type plausibility analysis.

motions to dismiss such that "the threshold inquiry is very, very low. Evidence is not allowed. . . . [S]imilar to a 12(b)(6) inquiry, [the court] is limited to the four corners of the principal pleading – in this case, the complaint, or now the revised complaint."[135] Counsel for the Proposed Defendants argued that the standard of review for colorability here, in the specific context of the court exercising its gatekeeping function under the Plan, is more akin to the standards applied under the Supreme Court's *Barton Doctrine*[136] pursuant to which that the bankruptcy court must apply a higher standard than the 12(b)(6) standard, including the consideration of evidence at the hearing on the motion for leave; if the standard of review presents no greater hurdle to the movant than the 12(b)(6) standard applied to every plaintiff in every case, then the gatekeeping provisions mean nothing and do nothing to protect the parties from the harassing, bad-faith litigation they were put in place to prevent.[137] On May 22, 2023, after receipt of post-hearing briefing on the issue, the court entered an order stating that "the court has determined that there may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave" and "[t]herefore, the parties will be permitted to present evidence (including witness testimony) at the June 8, 2023 hearing [on the Motion to Leave] if they so choose."

Two days later, HMIT filed an emergency motion for expedited discovery or alternatively for continuance of the June 8, 2023 hearing, seeking expedited depositions of corporate

[135] Transcript of April 24, 2023 Status Conference, Bankr. Dkt. No. 3765 ("April 24 Transcript"), 14:6-11.

[136] The *Barton Doctrine* was established in the 19th century Supreme Court case of *Barton v. Barbour*, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), and states that a party wishing to sue a court-appointed trustee or receiver must first obtain leave of the appointing court by making a *prima facie* case that the claim it wishes to bring is not without foundation.

[137] *See* April 24 Transcript, 36:24-37:4 ("[W]e're exactly today where the Court had predicted in entering [the Confirmation Order], that the costs and distraction of this litigation are substantial. And if all we're doing is replicating a 12(b)(6) hearing on a motion for leave, we're actually not doing anything to reduce, as the Court made clear, the burdens, distractions, of litigation."); 37:5-13 ("The Fifth Circuit likewise cited *Barton* in its order affirming the confirmation order. Specifically, it also explained that the provisions, these gatekeeper provisions requiring advance approval were meant to 'screen and prevent bad-faith litigation.' Well that – if that means only what the Plaintiff[ ] say[s] it does, then it really doesn't do anything at all to screen. There's no gatekeeping because their version of what that means is always policed under 12(b)(6) standards.").

representatives of the Claims Purchasers and of Seery and production of documents pursuant to deposition notices and subpoenas duces tecum that HMIT had attached to the motion. On May 26, 2023, this court held yet another status conference. Following the status conference, the court granted in part and denied in part HMIT's request for expedited discovery by ordering only Seery and Dondero to be made available for depositions prior to the June 8 Hearing. The court reached what seemed like appropriate middle ground by allowing the deposition of Seery and allowing the other parties to depose Dondero (for whom sworn declarations had been submitted), but the court was not going to allow any more discovery (i.e., of the Claims Purchasers) at so late an hour. The court was aware that HMIT and Dondero had been seeking discovery relating to the very claims trades that are the subject of the Revised Proposed Complaint from the Claims Purchasers in Texas state court "Rule 202" proceedings for approximately two years, where their attempts were rebuffed.

Approximately 60 hours before the June 8 Hearing, HMIT filed its Witness and Exhibit List disclosing for the first time two potential expert witnesses (along with biographical information and a disclosure regarding the subject matter of their likely testimony). Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery filed a joint motion to exclude the expert testimony and documents ("Motion to Exclude"), which the court ultimately granted in a separate order.

During the full-day June 8 Hearing on the Motion to Leave, the court admitted over 50 HMIT exhibits and over 30 Highland/Claimant Trust exhibits. The court heard testimony from HMIT's witnesses Dondero and Seery (as an adverse witness) and from the Highland Parties' witness Mark Patrick, the administrator of HMIT since August 2022 (as an adverse witness). The bankruptcy court allowed HMIT to make a running objection to all evidence—as it continued to argue that evidence was not appropriate.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In determining whether HMIT should be granted leave, pursuant to the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan and the court's prior Gatekeeper Orders, to pursue the Proposed Claims, the court must address the issue of whether HMIT would have ***standing*** to bring the Proposed Claims in the first instance. If so, the next question is whether the Proposed Claims are "***colorable***." But prior to getting into the weeds on ***standing*** and "***colorability,***" some general discussion regarding the topic of claims trading in the bankruptcy world seems appropriate, given that HMIT's Proposed Claims are based, in large part, on allegations of ***improper*** claims trading.

A. Claims Trading in the Context of Bankruptcy Cases—Can It Be Tortious or Otherwise Actionable?

As noted, at the crux of HMIT's desired lawsuit is what this court will refer to as "claims trading activity" that occurred shortly after the Plan was confirmed, but before the Plan went effective. HMIT believes that the claims trading activity gave rise to various torts: breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Seery; knowing participation in breach of fiduciary duty by the other Proposed Defendants; and conspiracy by all Defendants. HMIT also believes that the following remedies should be imposed: equitable disallowance of the Purchased Claims; disgorgement of the alleged profits the Claims Purchasers made on their purchases; and disgorgement of all Seery's compensation received since the beginning of his "collusion" with the other Defendants. Without a doubt, the Motion for Leave and Proposed Complaint revolve almost entirely around the claims trading activity.

This begs the question: ***When (or under what circumstances) might claims trading activity during a bankruptcy case give rise to a cause of action that either the bankruptcy estate or an economic stakeholder in the case might have standing to bring?*** Here, the claims trading

wasn't even "during a bankruptcy case" really—it was post-confirmation and pre-effective date, and it happened to be: (a) after mediation of the claims, (b) after Rule 9019 settlement motions, (c) after objections by Dondero and certain of his family trusts were lodged, (d) after evidentiary hearings, and (e) after orders were ultimately entered ***allowing*** the claims (and in most cases, such orders were appealed). The further crux of HMIT's desired lawsuit is that Seery allegedly "wrongfully facilitated and promoted the sale of large unsecured creditor claims to his close business allies and friends" by sharing ***material non-public information*** to them regarding the potential value of the claims (i.e., the potential value of the bankruptcy estate), and this is what made the claims trading activity particularly pernicious. The alleged sharing of MNPI allegedly caused the Claims Purchasers to purchase their claims without doing any due diligence and with knowledge that the claims would be worth much more than the Plan's "pessimistic" projections might have suggested, and also allowed Seery to plant friendly allies into the creditor constituency (and on the post-confirmation CTOB) that would "rubber stamp" his generous compensation. This is all referred to as "not arm's-length" and "collusive." Notably, the MNPI mostly pertained to a likely future acquisition of MGM by Amazon (which transaction, indeed, occurred in 2022, after being publicly announced in Spring of 2021); as noted earlier, Highland owned, directly and indirectly, common stock in MGM. Also notably, there had been rumors and media attention regarding a potential sale of MGM for many months.[138] In summary, to be clear, HMIT's desired lawsuit is laced with a theme of "insider trading"—although this isn't a situation of securities trading *per se* (i.e., the unsecured Purchased Claims were not securities), and, as noted earlier, the Texas State Securities Board has not seen fit to investigate the claims trading activity.

So, preliminarily, is claims trading in bankruptcy sinister *per se*? The answer is no.

[138] *E.g.,* Benjamin Mullin, *MGM Holdings, Studio Behind 'James Bond,' Explores a Sale,* THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2020, 6:38 p.m.).

The activity of investing in distressed debt (which frequently occurs during a bankruptcy case—sometimes referred to as "claims trading") is ubiquitous and, indeed, has been so for a very long time. As noted by one scholar:

> The creation of a market in bankruptcy claims is the single most important development in the bankruptcy world since the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in 1978. [Citations omitted.] Claims trading has revolutionized bankruptcy by making it a much more market-driven process. [Citations omitted.] . . . The development of a robust market for all types of claims against debtors has changed the cast of characters involved in bankruptcies. In addition to long-standing relational creditors, like trade creditors or a single senior secured bank or bank group, bankruptcy cases now involve professional distressed debt investors, whose interests and behavior are often quite different than traditional relational counterparty creditors.

Adam J. Levitin, *Bankruptcy* Markets*: Making Sense of Claims Trading*, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 64, 65 (2010) (hereinafter "*Bankruptcy Markets*").[139]

As a pure policy matter, some practitioners have bemoaned this claims trading phenomenon, suggesting that "distressed debt traders may sacrifice the long-term viability of a debtor for the ability to realize substantial and quick returns on their investments."[140] Others suggest that claims trading in bankruptcy is beneficial, in that it allows creditors of a debtor an early exit from a potentially long bankruptcy case, enabling them to save expense and administrative hassles, realize immediate liquidity on their claims (albeit discounted), and may

[139] *See also* Aaron Hammer & Michael Brandess, *Claims Trading: The Wild West of Chapter 11s*, AM. BANKR. INST. JOURNAL 62 (Jul./Aug. 2010); Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, *Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11,* 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25 (1990) (noting that "the first recorded instance of American fiduciaries trading claims against insolvent debtors predates all federal bankruptcy laws and goes back to 1790" when the original 13 colonies were insolvent, owing tremendous amounts of debt to various parties in connection with the Revolutionary War; early American investors purchased these debts for approximately 25% of their par value, hoping the claims would be paid at face value by the American government).

[140] Harvey R. Miller, *Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth*, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 2016 (2002). *See also* Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, *Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?*, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, *Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?*, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2005).

even permit them to take advantage of a tax loss on their own desired timetable.[141] On the flipside, "[c]aims trading permits an entrance to the bankruptcy process for those investors who want to take the time and effort to monitor the debtor and contribute expertise to the reorganization process."[142]

So, what are the "rules of the road" here? What does the Bankruptcy Code dictate regarding claims trading? The answer is nothing. The Bankruptcy Code itself has no provisions whatsoever regarding claims trading. The only thing resembling any regulation of claims trading during a bankruptcy case is found at Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)—the current version of which went into effect in 1991—and it imposes extremely light regulation—if it could even be called that. This rule requires, in pertinent part (at subsection (2)), that "[i]f a claim other than one based on a publicly traded note, bond, or debenture" is traded during the case after a proof of claim is filed, notice/evidence of that trade must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk by the transferee. The transferor shall then be notified and given 21 days to object. If there is an objection, the bankruptcy court will hold a hearing regarding whether a transfer, in fact, took place. If there is no objection, nothing further needs to happen, and the transferee will be considered substituted for the transferor.

There are several things noteworthy about Rule 3001(e)(2). First, the only party given the opportunity to object is the ***transferor*** of the claim (presumably, in the situation of a dispute regarding whether there was truly an agreement regarding the transfer of the claim). Second, there is no need for a bankruptcy court order approving the transfer (except in the event of an objection

[141] *See Bankruptcy Markets*, at 70. *See also In re Kreisler,* 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Claims trading allows creditors to opt out of the bankruptcy system, trading an uncertain future payment for an immediate one, so long as they can find a purchaser.").

[142] *Bankruptcy Markets* at 70 (citing, among other authorities, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, *Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms*, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 401 (1997) (finding that "vulture investors add value by disciplining managers of distressed firms").

by the alleged transferor). Third, the ***economic consideration paid need not be disclosed to the court or anyone***. Fourth, there is no requirement or definition of timeliness. Finally, it explicitly does not apply with regard to publicly traded debt. This, alone, means that many claims trades are not even reported in a bankruptcy case. But it is not just publicly traded debt that will not be reflected with a Rule 3001(e) filing. For example, bank debt, in modern times, is often syndicated (i.e., fragmented into many beneficial holders of portions of the debt) and only the administrative agent for the syndicate (or the "lead bank") will file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy—thus, as the syndicated interests (participations) change hands, and they frequently do, there typically will not be a Rule 3001(e) notice filed.[143] To be clear here, this syndication-of-bank-debt fact, along with the fact that there are financial products whereby bank debt might be carved up into economic interests separate and apart from legal title to the loan, means there are many situations in which trading of claims during a bankruptcy case is not necessarily transparent or, for that matter, policed by the bankruptcy court. This is the world of modern bankruptcy. Most of the claims trading that gets reported through a Rule 3001(e) notice is the trading of small vendor claims. And this is all regarded as private sale transactions for the most part.[144]

Suffice it to say that there is not a wealth of case law dealing with claims trading in a bankruptcy context. Perhaps this is not surprising, since it is not prohibited and ***is mostly a matter of private contract between buyer and seller***. The case law that does exist seems to arise in situations of perceived bad faith of a purchaser—for example, when there was an attempt to control voting and/or ultimate control of the debtor through the plan process (not always problematic, but

[143] Anne Marrs Huber & Thomas H. Young, *The Trading of Bank Debt in and Out of Chapter 11*, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 1, 3 (2006).

[144] Note that Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) was very different before 1991. Between 1983-1991, the rule required that parties transferring claims inform the court that a transfer of claims was taking place and also disclose the consideration paid for the transferred claims. A hearing would take place prior to the execution of a trade. Judicial involvement was required and resulted in judicial scrutiny of transactions—something that simply does not exist today.

there are outlier cases where this was found to cross a line and result in consequences such as disallowing votes on a plan or even equitable subordination of a claim).[145] Another type of case that has generated case law is where the purchaser of claims occupied a fiduciary status with the debtor.[146] Still another type of case that has generated case law is where there is an attempt to cleanse claims that might have risks because of a seller's malfeasance, by trading the claim to a new claim holder.[147]

The following is a potpourri of the more notable cases that have addressed claims trading in different contexts. Most of them imposed no adverse consequences on claims traders: *In re Kreisler*, 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) (where a corporation named Garlin, that was owned by the individual chapter 7 debtors' sister and close friend, purchased a $900,000 bank claim for $16,500, and there was no disclosure of Garlin's connections to debtors and no Rule 3001(e)(2) notice was filed, the Seventh Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's invocation of the doctrine of equitable subordination to the claim, stating: "Equitable subordination is generally appropriate only if a creditor is guilty of misconduct that causes injury to the interests of other creditors;" the Seventh Circuit further stated that it could "put to one side whether the court's finding of inequitable conduct was correct" because even if there was misconduct, it did not harm the other creditors, who were in the same position whether the original creditor or Garlin happened to own the claim; the Seventh Circuit did note that Garlin's decision to purchase the original bank

[145] *In re Applegate Prop. Ltd.,* 133 B.R. 827, 836 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (designating votes of an affiliate of the debtor that purchased a blocking position to thwart a creditor's plan because it was done in bad faith); *In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.,* 118 B.R. 282, 289–90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (because of bad faith activities, the court designated votes of a claims purchaser who purchased to get a blocking position on a plan). *But see In re First Humanics Corp.,* 124 B.R. 87, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (claims purchased by debtor's former management company to gain standing to file a plan to protect interest of the debtor was in good faith).

[146] *See In re Exec. Office Ctrs., Inc.*, 96 B.R. 642, 649-650 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988) (and numerous old cites therein).

[147] *Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.),* 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), *vacated, Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. (In re Enron Corp.),* 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y 2007); *Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.),* 333 B.R. 205, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

creditor's claim might have disadvantaged the other creditors if it interfered with the trustee's own potential settlement with the original bank creditor (note that the trustee argued that she had been negotiating a deal with bank under which bank might have reduced its claims); however, the trustee presented no evidence that any deal with the bank was imminent or even likely; thus, whether such a deal could have been reached was speculation; equitable subordination was therefore improper."); *Viking Assocs., L.L.C. v. Drewes (In re Olson),* 120 F.3d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1997) (case involved the actions of an entity known as Viking in purchasing all of the unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate of two chapter 7 debtors, Hugo and Jeraldine Olson; Viking was a related entity, owned by the debtors' children, and purchased $525,000 of unsecured claims for $67,000; while the bankruptcy court had discounted the claims down to the purchase amount and subordinated Viking's discounted claims to the claims of the other unsecured creditors, relying on section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Eighth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to do this, and, thus, reversed and remanded; the Eighth Circuit noted that in 1991, Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2) was amended "to restrict the bankruptcy court's power to inspect the terms of" claims transfers. *Id.* at 101 (citing *In re SPM Mfg. Corp.,* 984 F.2d 1305, 1314 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1993)); the text of the rule makes clear that the existence of a "dispute" depends upon an objection by the ***transferor***; where there is no objection by the ***transferor***, there is no longer any role for the court); *Citicorp. Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Papercraft Corp.),* 160 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1998) (large investor who held seat on board of directors of debtor and debtor's parent, and who also had nonpublic information regarding the debtor's value, anonymously purchased 40% of the unsecured claims at a steep discount during the chapter 11 case, and then, having obtained a blocking position for plan voting purposes, proposed a plan to acquire debtor; the claims purchaser's claims were equitably reduced to amount

paid for the claims since investor was a fiduciary who was deemed to have engaged in inequitable conduct); *Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter),* 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ninth Circuit affirmed bankruptcy court's ruling that a secured creditor's purchase of 21 out of 34 unsecured claims in the case was in good faith and it would not be prohibited from voting such claims on the debtor's plan, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 1126(e)); *In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp.,* 145 F.2d 55, 57 & 58 (7th Cir. 1945) (in a case under the old Bankruptcy Act, in which there were more restrictions on claims trading, a debtor and two of its stockholders argued that the claims of purchasers of bonds should be limited to the amounts they paid for them; bankruptcy court special master found, "that, though he did not approve generally the ethics reflected by speculation in such bonds," there was no cause for limitation of the amounts of their claims, pointing out that the persons who had dealt in the bonds were not officials, directors, or stockholders of the corporation and owed no fiduciary duty to the estate or its beneficiaries—rather they were investors or speculators who thought the bonds were selling too cheaply and that they might make a legitimate profit upon them; the district court agreed, as did the Seventh Circuit, noting that "[t]o reduce the participation to the amount paid for securities, in the absence of exceptional circumstances which are not present here, would reduce the value of such bonds to those who have them and want to sell them. This would result in unearned, undeserved profit for the debtor, destroy or impair the sales value of securities by abolishing the profit motive, which inspires purchasers."); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 461 B.R. 200 (Bankr. Del. 2011), *vacated in part*, 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012) (discussion of an equity committee's potential standing to pursue equitable subordination or equitable disallowance of the claims of certain noteholders who had allegedly traded their claims during the chapter 11

case while having material non-public information; while bankruptcy court originally indicating these were viable tools, court later vacated its ruling on this after a settlement was reached).

Suffice it to say that the courts have, more often than not, been unwilling to impose legal consequences, for an actor's involvement with claims trading. At most, in outlier-type situations during a case, courts have taken steps to disallow claims for voting purposes or to subordinate claims to other unsecured creditors for distribution purposes.[148] But the case at bar does not present facts that are typical of any of the situations in reported cases.

For one thing, unlike in the reported cases this court has located, there ***seems to have been complete symmetry of sophistication among the claim sellers and claim purchasers here—and complete symmetry with HMIT for that matter***. All persons involved are highly sophisticated financial institutions, hedge funds, or private equity funds. No one was a "mom-and-pop" type business or vendor that might be vulnerable to chicanery. The claims ranged from being worth $10's of millions of dollars to $100's of millions of dollars in face value. And, of course, the sellers/transferors of the claims have never shown up, subsequent to the claims trading

[148] Note that, while some cases suggest that outright disallowance of an unsecured claim, in the case of "inequitable conduct" might be permitted (not merely equitable subordination to unsecured creditors)—usually citing to *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)—the Fifth Circuit has suggested otherwise. *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.,* 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977) (cleaned up) (noting that "equitable considerations can justify only the subordination of claims, not their disallowance" and also noting that "three conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate[:] (i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct[;] (ii) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant[; and] (iii) Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." In *Mobile Steel*, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy judge exceeded the bounds of his equitable jurisdiction by disallowing a group of claims and also reversed the subordination of certain claims, on the grounds that the bankruptcy court had made clearly erroneous findings regarding alleged inequitable conduct and other necessary facts. *Contrast In re Lothian Oil Inc.,* 650 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2011) (involving the question of whether a bankruptcy court may ***recharacterize*** a claim as equity rather than debt; the court held yes, but it has nothing to do with inequitable conduct *per se*; rather section 502(b)'s language that a claim should be allowed unless it is "unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law...." is the relevant authority; unlike equitable subordination, recharacterization is about looking at the true substance of a transaction not the conduct of a party (if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck—i.e., equity); the court indicated that section 105 is not a basis to recharacterize debt as equity; it's a matter of looking at state law to determine if there is any basis and looking at the nature of the underlying transaction—as either a lending arrangement or equity infusion.

transactions, to complain about anything. Everyone involved here is, essentially, a behemoth and there is literally no sign of innocent creditors getting harmed. Second, the case at bar is unique in that the claims traded here ***had all been allowed after objections, mediation, and Rule 9019 settlements during the bankruptcy case***. Thus, the amounts that would be paid on them were "locked in," so to speak. There was no risk to a hypothetical claims-purchaser of disallowance, offset, or any "claw-back" litigation (or—one might have reasonably assumed—any type of litigation). Third, the terms for distributions on unsecured claims had been established in a confirmed plan (although the claims were purchased before the effective date of the Plan). Thus, there was a degree of certainty regarding return on investment for the Claims Purchasers here that was much higher than if the claims had been purchased early, during, or mid-way through the case.[149] ***This was post-confirmation, pre-effective date claims purchasing.*** Interestingly, all three of these facts might suggest that little due diligence would be undertaken by any hypothetical purchaser. The rules of the road had been set. The court makes this observation because HMIT has suggested there is something highly suspicious about the fact that Farallon allegedly told Dondero that it did no due diligence before purchasing its claims (leading him to conclude that the Claims Purchasers must have purchased their claims based on receiving MNPI from Seery). Not only has there been no colorable evidence suggesting that insider information was shared, but the lack of due diligence in this context does not reasonably seem suspicious. The claims purchases

[149] *See discussion* in BANKRUPTCY MARKETS, at 91:

> Some claims purchasers buy before the bankruptcy petition is filed, some at the beginning of the case, and some towards the end. For example, there are investors who look to purchase at low prices either when a business is failing or early in the bankruptcy and ride through the case until payouts are fairly certain. [Citations omitted.] These investors might be hoping to buy at 30 cents on the dollar and get a payout at 70 cents on the dollar. Perhaps if they waited another six months, the payout would be 74 cents on the dollar, but the additional 4 cents on the dollar for six months might not be a worthwhile return for the time value of the investment. Other investors might not want to assume the risk that exists in the early days of a case when the fate of the debtor is much less certain, but they would gladly purchase at 70 cents on the dollar at the end of the case to get a payout of 74 cents on the dollar six months later.

were almost like passive investments, at this point—there was no risk of a claim objection and there was a confirmed plan, with a lengthy disclosure statement that described not only plan payment terms and projections, but essentially anything that any investor might want to know.

To reiterate, here, HMIT seeks leave to assert the following causes of action:

I. Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Seery)

II. Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Claims Purchasers)

III. Conspiracy (all Proposed Defendants)

IV. Equitable Disallowance (Claims Purchasers)

V. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust (all Proposed Defendants)

VI. Declaratory Judgment (all Proposed Defendants)

The court struggles to fathom how any of these proposed causes of action or remedies can be applied in the context of: (a) post-confirmation claims trading; (b) where the claims have all been litigated and allowed.

In reflecting on the case law and various Bankruptcy Code provisions, the court can fathom the following hypotheticals in which claims trading during a bankruptcy case might be somehow actionable:

> **Hypothetical #1**: The most obvious situation would be if a purchaser of a claim files a Rule 3001(e) Notice, and the seller/transferor then files an objection thereto. There would then be a contested hearing between purchaser and seller regarding the validity of the transfer with the bankruptcy court issuing an appropriate order after the hearing on the objection. ***As noted, there was no objection to the Rule 3001(e) notices here***.
>
> **Hypothetical #2:** Alternatively, there could be a breach of contract suit between purchaser and seller if one thinks the other breached the purchase-sale agreement somehow. Perhaps torts might also be alleged in such litigation. ***As noted, there is no dispute between purchasers and sellers here.***
>
> **Hypothetical #3:** If there is believed to be fraud in connection with a plan, a party in interest might, pursuant to section 1144 of the Bankruptcy Code, move for

revocation of the plan "at any time before 180 days after the date of entry of the order for confirmation" and the court "may revoke such order if and only if such order was procured by fraud." ***As noted, here HMIT has suggested that the "pessimistic" plan projections may have been fraudulent or misrepresentations somehow. The time elapsed long ago to seek revocation of the Plan.***

Hypothetical #4: As discussed above, in rare situations (bad faith), during a Chapter 11 case, before a plan is confirmed, a claims purchaser's claim might not be allowed for voting purposes. *See* Sections 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code ("the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith"). ***Obviously, in this case, this is not applicable—the claims were purchased post-confirmation.***

Hypothetical #5: As discussed above, in rare situations (inequitable conduct), a court might equitably subordinate ***claims*** to ***other claims***. *See* Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. But here**,** HMIT is seeking either: (a) equitable subordination of the ***claims*** of the Claims Purchaser to HMIT's ***Class 10 former equity interest*** (in contravention of the explicit terms of section 510(c)) or, (b) ***equitable disallowance*** of the claims of the Claims Purchasers (in contravention of *Mobile Steel*).

Hypothetical #6: Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(1) and the Fifth Circuit's *Lothian Oil* case may permit "recharacterization" of a claim from debt to equity in certain circumstances, but not in circumstances like the ones in this case. Here, the claims have already been adjudicated and allowed (some after mediation, and all after Rule 9019 settlement orders). The only way to reconsider a claim in a bankruptcy case that has already been allowed is through Bankruptcy Code section 502(j) ("A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. . . according to the equities of the case."). The problem here is that Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides that a motion for "reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate ***entered without a contest*** is not subject to the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c)" (emphasis added). Here there was most definitely "a contest" with regard to all of these purchased claims. ***Thus, it would appear that any effort to have a court reconsider these claims pursuant to section 502(j) is untimely—as it has been well beyond a year since they were allowed.***

Hypothetical #7: If a party believes "insider trading" occurred there are governmental agencies that investigate and police that. ***Here, the purchased claims (which were not based on bonds or certificated equity interests) would not be securities so as to fall under the SEC's purview. Moreover, there was evidence that HMIT or Dondero-Related entities requested that the Texas State Securities Board investigate the claims trading and the board did not find a basis to pursue anyone for wrongdoing***.

Hypothetical #8: The United States Trustee can investigate wrongdoing by a debtor or unsecured creditors committee. While the United States Trustee would naturally have concerns about members of an unsecured creditors committee (or an officer of a debtor-in-possession) adhering to fiduciary duties and not putting their

> own interests above those of the estate, here, there are a couple of points that seem noteworthy. One, the claims trading activity was post-confirmation so—while certain of the claim-sellers may have still been on the unsecured creditors committee, as the effective date of the plan had not yet occurred—the circumstances are very different than if this had all happened during the early, contentious stages of the case. It seems inconceivable that there was somehow a disparity of information that might be troubling—the Plan had been confirmed and it was available for the world to see. The whole notion of "insider information" (just after confirmation here) feels a bit off-point. Bankruptcy practitioners and judges sometimes call bankruptcy a fishbowl or use the "open kimono" metaphor for good reason. It is generally a very open process. And information-sharing on the part of a debtor-in-possession or unsecured creditors committee is intended to be robust. *See, e.g.,* Bankruptcy Code sections 521 and 1102(b)(3). In a way, HMIT here seems to be complaining about this very situation that the Code and Rules have designed.

In summary, claims trading is a highly ***unregulated*** activity in the bankruptcy world. ***HMIT is attempting to pursue causes of action here that, to this court's knowledge, have never been allowed in a context like this***.

B. Back to Standing—Would HMIT Have Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims?

The Proposed Defendants argue that HMIT lacks standing to bring the Proposed Claims, either: (a) derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust, or (b) directly on behalf of itself. Thus, they argue that this is one reason that the Motion for Leave should be denied.

In making their specific standing arguments, the parties analyze things slightly differently:

The Claims Purchasers focus primarily on HMIT's lack of ***constitutional*** standing but also argue that HMIT does not have ***prudential*** standing under Delaware trust law to bring the Proposed Claims either individually or derivatively. Why do they mention Delaware trust law? Because the Claimant Trust is a Delaware statutory trust governed by the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §§ 3801–29.[150]

The Highland Parties' standing arguments focus almost entirely on HMIT's lack of ***prudential*** standing under Delaware trust law to bring the Proposed Claims.

HMIT argues that the Proposed Defendants "play fast and loose with standing arguments" and that HMIT has ***constitutional*** standing as a "party aggrieved"[151] to bring the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself. HMIT also argues that it has standing under Delaware trust law to bring a

[150] *See* Proposed Complaint, ¶ 26.

[151] Proposed Complaint, ¶7.

derivative action on behalf of the Claimant Trust, and that it not only has standing to bring the Proposed Claims derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor under the Plan, but it is the best party to do so.

1. The Different Types of Standing: Constitutional Versus Prudential

The parties are addressing two concepts of standing that can sometimes be confused and misapplied by both attorneys and judges: ***constitutional Article III standing***, which implicates federal court subject matter jurisdiction,[152] and the narrower standing concept of ***prudential standing***, which does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but nevertheless might prevent a party from having capacity to sue, pursuant to limitations set by courts, statutes or other law.

Article III constitutional standing works as follows: a plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent—not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it must be likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.[153] "If the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve."[154] These elements ensure that a plaintiff has "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."[155]

[152] Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over enumerated cases and controversies.

[153] *See Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 140 S.Ct. 1615, 1618 (2020)(citing the Supreme Court's seminal case on the tripartite test for Article III constitutional standing, *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), where the Supreme Court stated that "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains [the] three elements"); *see also Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 338; *Abraugh v. Altimus*, 26 F.4th 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing *id.*).

[154] *Transunion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021)(cleaned up).

[155] *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

Apart from this minimal constitutional mandate, courts and statutes have set other limits on the class of persons who may seek judicial remedies—and this is the concept of prudential standing. In its recent opinion in *Abraugh v. Altimus*,[156] the Fifth Circuit set forth a detailed analysis of the two types of "standing," noting that the term "standing" is often "misused" in our legal system, which has led to confusion for both attorneys and judges.[157] The constitutional standing that is necessary for a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction is broader than prudential standing and is only the first hurdle a party must clear before pursuing a claim in federal court.

The Fifth Circuit explained that ***in addition to*** Article III constitutional standing, "courts have occasionally articulated other 'standing' requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy under certain conditions, ***beyond those imposed by Article III***,"[158] such as the "standing" requirement that might be imposed by a statute or by jurisprudence. The *Abraugh* case was a perfect example of the latter.

Abraugh involved the civil rights statutes that provide, among other things, that "a party must have standing under the state wrongful death or survival statutes to bring [a § 1983 cause of action]" and noted that these statutes impose additional "standing" requirements that are a matter of prudential standing, not constitutional standing.[159] In *Abraugh*, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of a § 1983 civil rights cause of action—noting that the district court had stated that it was dismissing based on a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" because the plaintiff in that action lacked standing.[160] The plaintiff was the mother of a prisoner

[156] 26 F.4th 298.
[157] *Id.* at 303.
[158] *Id.* at 302 (emphasis added).
[159] *Id.* at 302-303.
[160] *Id.* at 301.

who died by suicide while in custody who brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana correctional officers and officials. After finding that the plaintiff/mother lacked standing under Louisiana's wrongful death and survival statutes (because there had been a surviving child and wife of the prisoner who were the proper parties with capacity to sue), the district court held that it was dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the plaintiff/mother may have lacked standing under Louisiana's wrongful death and survival statutes to bring the claim under § 1983, but that type of standing was matter of ***prudential*** standing, and the plaintiff/mother actually ***did*** have ***Article III*** constitutional standing ("a constitutionally cognizable interest in the life of her son").[161] Thus, the district court's error was ***not*** in finding that the plaintiff/mother lacked prudential standing but in improperly conflating the two standing concepts when it held that it had lacked ***subject matter jurisdiction*** to consider any of the plaintiff's/mother's amended complaints.[162] The Fifth Circuit noted specifically that[163]

> prudential standing does not present a jurisdictional question, but "a merits question: who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right?" As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear, "an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). And a violation of this rule is a failure of "prudential" standing. "Not one of our precedents holds that the inquiry is jurisdictional." It goes only to the validity of the cause of action. And "the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction."

Somewhat relevant to this prudential standing discussion is the fact that, in this bankruptcy case, there have been dozens of appeals of bankruptcy court orders by Dondero and Dondero-related entities. In connection therewith, both the district court and the Fifth Circuit, in evaluating the ***appellate standing*** of the appellants, have taken pains to distinguish between the concepts of:

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[161] *Id.*

[162] *Id.* at 301, 303-304. The Fifth Circuit opined that "the district court did not err in describing [the mother's] inability to sue under Louisiana law as a defect of 'standing[, b]ut it is a defect of prudential standing, not Article III standing" thus technically not implicating the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. *Id.* at 303.

[163] *Id.* at 304 (cleaned up).

(a) traditional, constitutional standing, and (b) a type of prudential standing known as the "person aggrieved" test, which is applied in the Fifth Circuit in determining whether a party has ***standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order***—which it describes as a narrower and "more exacting" standard than constitutional standing. As explained in a Fifth Circuit opinion addressing the standing of a Dondero-related entity called NexPoint to appeal bankruptcy court orders allowing professional fees, the "person aggrieved" standard that is typically applied to ascertain bankruptcy ***appellate*** standing originated in a statute in the Bankruptcy Act. The Fifth Circuit continued to apply it after Congress removed the provision when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.[164] Because it is narrower and "more exacting" than the test for Article III constitutional standing, it involves application of prudential standing considerations.[165] The Fifth Circuit describes the "person aggrieved" test for bankruptcy appellant standing as requiring that an appellant show that it was "*directly and adversely affected pecuniarily* by the order of the bankruptcy court," requiring "a higher causal nexus between act and injury than traditional standing . . . that best deals with the unique posture of bankruptcy actions."[166] In affirming the district court's dismissal of NexPoint's appeal of the bankruptcy court's fee orders, due to NexPoint's lack of prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test, the court rejected NexPoint's argument that it had standing to appeal

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[164] *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, L.L.P. (In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.)*, No. 22-10575, 2023 WL 4621466, *2 (5th Cir. July 19, 2023)(citing *In re Coho Energy Inc.*, 395 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2004)(cleaned up)).

[165] *Id.* at *1, **4-6 (where the Fifth Circuit repeatedly throughout its opinion refers to the "person aggrieved" test for standing in bankruptcy actions as a test for "prudential standing."); *see also Dondero v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.*, Civ. Act. No. 3:20-cv-3390-X, 2002 WL 837208 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2022)(where the district court, in addressing Dondero's standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order approving a Rule 9019 settlement (between Highland and Acis Capital Management GP LLC), notes that "[i]t is substantially more difficult to have standing to appeal a bankruptcy court's order than it is to pursue a typical complaint under Article III of the U.S. Constitution" and that "the Fifth Circuit has long recognized that bankruptcy cases' wide-reaching scope calls for a more stringent standing test.").

[166] *See id.* at *3 (cleaned up). The court quotes its 2018 opinion in *Matter of Technicool Sys., Inc. (In re Technicool)*, 896 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2018), which explains why the "person aggrieved" prudential standing standard is applied in bankruptcy actions: "Bankruptcy cases often involve numerous parties with conflicting and overlapping interests. Allowing each and every party to appeal each and every order would clog up the system and bog down the courts. Given the specter of such sclerotic litigation, standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order is, of necessity, *quite limited*." *Id.* (cleaned up).

because "it meets traditional Article III standing requirements [and that the more exacting] prudential standing considerations such as the 'person aggrieved' standard" did not survive the Supreme Court's 2014 *Lexmark*[167] opinion,[168] which addressed standing issues in the context of false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and reminded that courts may not "limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because 'prudence' dictates."[169] The Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's reminder in *Lexmark* did not nullify the "person aggrieved" test for prudential standing in bankruptcy appeals, citing its own decision in *Superior MRI Services Inc. v. Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc.*[170] (rendered a year after *Lexmark* was decided), in which it held that *Lexmark* applied only to the circumstances of that case, "rather than broadly modifying—or undermining—*all* prudential standing concerns, such as the one animating the 'person aggrieved' standard in bankruptcy appeals."[171]

Similarly, in yet another appeal in this bankruptcy case involving three Dondero-related entities as appellants (NexPoint, Dugaboy, and HCMFA)—this one an appeal of a bankruptcy court order authorizing the creation of an indemnity subtrust and entry into an indemnity trust agreement—the district court noted the parties' confusion about the standing issue, as exemplified in the parties' reference to constitutional standing when they were actually arguing that they had prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test: "Although the parties frame this issue as one of constitutional standing . . . they cite case law and present arguments about the prudential

[167] *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118 (2014).

[168] *Id.* at *2.

[169] *See id.* at *4 (cleaned up).

[170] 778 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2015).

[171] *NexPoint*, 2023 WL 4621466 at *4 (cleaned up). The Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that "*Lexmark* does not expressly reach prudential concerns in bankruptcy appeals and brought no change relevant here." *Id.* at *5 (cleaned up).

standing requirement embodied in the 'person aggrieved' test."[172] The district court noted that it had an "independent obligation to consider constitutional standing before reaching its prudential aspects."[173] The district court dismissed the appeal as to Dugaboy and HCMFA for lack of standing but, upon concluding that NexPoint did have standing, dismissed the appeal as to it on the merits. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.[174] Interestingly, the court noted that, while the parties did not contest the district court's determination that NexPoint had standing to pursue the appeal, it "may consider prudential standing issues *sua sponte*."[175] In doing so, the Fifth Circuit recognized the distinction between constitutional standing and the prudential "person aggrieved" test applied to bankruptcy appeals, which "is, of necessity, quite limited" and "an even more exacting standard than traditional constitutional standing," as it requires an appellant to show that it is "directly, adversely, and financially impacted by a bankruptcy order."[176]

In summary, in analyzing whether HMIT would have standing to bring the Proposed Claims, this court must ***first*** determine whether HMIT would have constitutional standing under Article III (which is a subject matter jurisdiction hurdle) and, assuming it does, then ***additionally*** address whether HMIT would also have prudential standing (i.e., capacity to sue) pursuant to any applicable statutes (e.g., Delaware statutes), jurisprudence, or other substantive law that might ***limit*** who may sue. Notwithstanding HMIT's argument that it has standing under the "person

[172] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-1895-D, 2002 WL 270862, *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2022)(cleaned up). The district court dismissed the appeals of two of the appellants, Dugaboy and HCMFA, finding that they lacked both constitutional standing and prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order after finding the third appellant, NexPoint, to have prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test. *Id.* at **1-3 and *4.

[173] *Id.* at *1 n.2.

[174] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, 57 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023).

[175] *Id.* at 501 (cleaned up).

[176] *Id.*

aggrieved" test[177]—which, as discussed above, is a matter of prudential standing—this is applied only in the context of bankruptcy ***appellate*** matters.[178] As noted in its most recent opinion discussing standing in an appeal from the Highland bankruptcy case, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that the "person aggrieved" test is a test for bankruptcy ***appellate*** standing, which is narrower than a party in interest's right to be heard in bankruptcy cases in general.[179] The court rejected an argument that Bankruptcy Code § 1109, which provides that "[a] party in interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter" confers ***appellate*** standing, noting that "one's standing to appear and be heard before the bankruptcy court [is] a concept distinct from standing to appeal the merits of a decision" and that the "person aggrieved" test for bankruptcy appellate standing is narrower than the test for determining one's standing to appear and be heard in a bankruptcy proceeding.[180]

Thus, the court will now analyze whether HMIT would, at a minimum, have constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims.

2. HMIT Would Lack Article III Constitutional Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims.

As noted above, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have made clear that constitutional standing is necessary for a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. It is only the first hurdle a party must clear before pursuing a claim in federal court. HMIT, as plaintiff, would bear the

[177] HMIT insists that it has constitutional standing to bring claims on its individual behalf "as an aggrieved party." *See* Reply, ¶ 7.

[178] HMIT's argument in this matter that it has constitutional standing because it is a "party aggrieved" incorrectly conflates the prudential bankruptcy appellate "person aggrieved" test with the broader test that is applied to constitutional standing. The court is not being critical of this mistake. As noted at *supra* note 149, the Fifth Circuit in *Abraugh* pointed out that courts and attorneys alike have created confusion by misusing the term "standing" when they equate a lack of "standing," in all instances, with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even when the party is found to lack only prudential standing. Thus, HMIT is not alone in its confusion over the two different concepts of standing.

[179] *See NexPoint*, 2023 WL 4621466 at *6.

[180] *Id.* at *6 (cleaned up)("Because Section 1109(b) expands the right to be heard [in a bankruptcy proceeding] to a wider class than those who qualify under the 'person aggrieved' standard, courts considering the issue have concluded that merely being a party in interest is insufficient to confer ***appellate*** standing.")(emphasis added).

burden of establishing: (1) that it suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent—not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it must be likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.[181]

Concrete and Particularized; Actual or Imminent. As the Supreme Court made clear in the *Lujan* case, the injury in fact element requires a showing that the injury was "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."[182] The Supreme Court in the *Spokeo* case expounded on the "concrete and particularized" requirements of the "injury in fact" element. Particularization requires a showing that the injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way," but while particularization is necessary, it alone is "not sufficient," because an injury in fact must also be "concrete."[183] And, concreteness is "quite different from particularization."[184] A "concrete" injury must be "real," and "not abstract," though it does not mean that the injury must be "tangible," as the injury can be intangible and nevertheless be concrete.[185] In addition to the concreteness and particularization requirements, an injury in fact must be "actual or imminent" such that "allegations of injury that is merely conjectural or hypothetical do not suffice to confer standing."[186] "Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is *certainly*

[181] *See supra* note 153.
[182] *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).
[183] *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 339.
[184] *Id.* at 340.
[185] *Id.*
[186] *Little v. KPMG LLP*, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).

impending"; "allegations of *possible* future injury are not sufficient."[187]

Traceability - Causal Connection. As to the second element—that the injury was caused by the defendant—the Supreme Court in *Lujan* further described it as requiring a showing that "the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant."[188] The "fairly traceable" test requires an examination of "the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury."[189]

Redressability. The third element—redressability—requires the court to examine the connection "between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested."[190] "Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court."[191] "[A] court must determine that there is an available remedy which will have a 'substantial probability' of redressing the plaintiff's injury."[192]

The Claims Purchasers argue that HMIT lacks constitutional standing to pursue the claims asserted in the Proposed Complaint because: (i) neither HMIT nor the Bankruptcy Estate was injured by the Claim Purchasers' acquisition of the claims; and (ii) the Proposed Complaint lacks a theory of cognizable damages to the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and/or the beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust.[193]

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[187] *Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)(cleaned up); *see also Abdullah v. Paxton*, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2023)("[Injury] cannot be speculative, conjectural, or hypothetical [and] [a]llegations of only a 'possible' future injury similarly will not suffice.")(cleaned up).

[188] *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (cleaned up).

[189] *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).

[190] *Id.* (noting "it is important to keep the ['fairly traceable' and 'redressability'] inquiries separate if the 'redressability' component is to focus on the requested relief.").

[191] *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).

[192] *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 129 n.20 (1983)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(cleaned up); *see also Ondrusek v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, Civ. Act. No. 3:22-cv-1874-N, 2023 WL 2169908, at *5 ("Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any available remedy would be sufficiently likely to relieve their alleged economic losses. Without a showing of redressability, those harms also cannot support Plaintiff's Article III standing.").

[193] As noted earlier, certain of the Proposed Defendants—the Highland Parties—do not focus on HMIT's lack of constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims against them, but on its lack of prudential standing under

The court agrees with the Claims Purchasers' argument here. What is HMIT's concrete and particularized injury—that is "real" and is not abstract? That is not conjectural or hypothetical? That is actual or imminent?

Recall that, under the Plan, HMIT holds a Class 10 contingent interest in the Claimant Trust that only realizes value if all creditors are paid in full with interest. HMIT alleges the following injury: it has suffered a devaluation of its unvested Contingent Claimant Trust Interest by virtue of the alleged over-compensation of Seery as the Claimant Trustee—Seery's alleged over-compensation depletes the assets in the Claimant Trust available for distribution to creditors under the Plan, such that there is less likely a chance that HMIT ultimately receives any distributions on account of its Class 10 Contingent Claimant Trust Interest.[194] Yet, HMIT testified, through both witnesses Dondero and Patrick, that it had no personal knowledge of what Seery's actual compensation is under the CTA at the time HMIT filed its Motion for Leave. It was clear that HMIT's allegations regarding Seery's "excessive" compensation were based entirely on Dondero's pure speculation. In reality, Seery's base salary is exactly what the bankruptcy court approved during the bankruptcy case by a court order (after negotiations between Seery and the Committee). The CTA now further governs his compensation. The CTA, which was publicly filed ***in advance of*** the Plan confirmation hearing and approved by this court as part of the Plan

applicable law. Because constitutional standing is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the court has an independent duty to determine whether HMIT would have constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims in federal court. The issue cannot be forfeited or waived by a party. *See Abraugh v. Y & H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived. Moreover, courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.")(cleaned up); *Abraugh*, 26 F.4th at 304 ("It is our constitutional duty, of course, to decline subject matter jurisdiction where it does not exist—and that is so whether the parties challenge Article III standing or not.")(cleaned up).

[194] At the June 8 Hearing, HMIT's counsel was unable to identify any other injury HMIT has alleged to have suffered. HMIT's counsel acknowledged that claims trades, in and of themselves, would not "involve injury to the Reorganized Debtor and to the Claimant Trust" and that claims trades are "normally outside the purview of the bankruptcy court" but that "[h]ere, we have alleged . . . . injury [that] takes the form of unearned excessive fees that Mr. Seery has garnered as a result of his relationship and arrangements, as we have alleged, with the Claims Purchasers." June 8 Hearing Transcript, 67:16-68:8. HMIT can only point to Seery's excess compensation as injury.

(which has been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit), specifically provides that Seery's post-Effective Date compensation would include a "Base Salary" (again, same as during the bankruptcy case), a "success fee," and "severance."[195] The CTA discussed the role of the Committee and then the CTOB in setting the success fee and severance and the like. A fully executed copy of the CTA was admitted into evidence at the June 8 Hearing. HMIT is essentially arguing that its injury (i.e., diminished likelihood of realizing value on its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest) stems from a court-sanctioned and creditor-approved process for approving compensation to Seery. Moreover, HMIT has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that, even if Seery received excessive compensation and that compensation is ordered to be returned, HMIT's Contingent Claimant Trust Interest will ever vest. The district court and the Fifth Circuit in various appeals by Dugaboy, another Dondero-related entity that, similar to HMIT, was a holder of a limited partnership interest in Highland whose interests were terminated as of the Effective Date of the Plan in exchange for a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest, have repeatedly rejected Dugaboy's claims to have standing based on the ***speculative nature of its alleged injuries as a contingent beneficiary of the Claimant Trust under the Plan***. For example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy of the bankruptcy court's order authorizing the creation of an indemnity subtrust, wherein Judge Fitzwater found that, in addition to lacking prudential standing under the

[195] The Disclosure Statement that was approved by this court, after notice and a hearing, on November 24, 2020, provided that "The salient terms of each Trustee's employment, including such Trustee's duties and compensation shall be set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement . . . ." The CTA was part of a Plan Supplement (as amended) that was filed in advance of the confirmation hearing and provided:

> Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Claimant Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall receive compensation of $150,000 per month (the "Base Salary"). Within the first forty-five days following the Confirmation Date, the Claimant Trustee, on the one hand, and the Committee, if prior to the Effective Date, or the Oversight Board, if on or after the Effective Date, on the other, will negotiate go-forward compensation for the Claimant Trustee which will include (a) the Base Salary, (b) a success fee, and (c) severance.

See Highland Ex. 38, at § 3.13(a)(i).

"person aggrieved" test to appeal the bankruptcy court's order, Dugaboy lacked constitutional standing "because they have not identified any injury fairly traceable to the Order: ***the injuries identified are speculative at best and nonexistent at worst***."[196] HMIT's allegations of injury are, without a doubt, "merely conjectural or hypothetical" and are only speculative of possible future injury if its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest ever vests."[197] The court finds that HMIT would not meet the "concrete and particularized" or the "actual or imminent" requirements for an "injury in fact," and, thus, would lack constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims.

With regard to the second requirement of constitutional standing—whether HMIT could show "traceability" with respect to the Claims Purchasers and/or Seery (i.e., a "causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury"[198]), as noted above, there is only a speculative injury. Even if there is unlawful conduct asserted (i.e., sharing of MNPI to Claims Purchasers who then, as a *quid pro quo*, rubber stamped excessive compensation for Seery), there is nothing other than a hypothetical theory of an alleged injury (i.e., an allegedly less likelihood of a distribution on a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest).

With respect to the third requirement of constitutional standing—whether HMIT can show "redressability" (i.e., that it is likely, not speculative, that the injury can be redressed by a favorable

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[196] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-1895-D, 2022 WL 270862, *1 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2022), *aff'd* 57 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023)(emphasis added); *see also* Judge Scholer's opinion in *Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-2268-S, 2022 WL 3701720, *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022)(cleaned up), *aff'd per curium*, No. 22-10831, 2023 WL 2263022 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023) (where Dugaboy had argued that "***its pecuniary interest is . . . a potential recovery under the Plan as one of Debtor's former equity holders***" and that "it ha[d] standing as a 'contingent beneficiary' under the Plan, or a beneficiary who will be entitled to payment after all creditors are paid in full," and Judge Scholer stated, "This assertion is premised on the assumption that Dugaboy's 0.1866% pre-bankruptcy limited partnership interest in Debtor—which was extinguished under the Plan—makes it a contingent beneficiary of the creditor trust created under the Plan. . . . [S]uch a 'speculative prospect of harm is far from a direct, adverse, pecuniary hit' as required to confer standing."

[197] *Little v. KPMG LLP*, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).

[198] *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).

decision), there are multiple problems here.[199] The major remedy sought here is the equitable disallowance of the allowed Purchased Claims (and disgorgement and/or constructive trust of amounts paid or owed to the Claim Purchasers on account of their claims). There is no such remedy available here. As noted earlier, there is a similar concept of ***equitable subordination*** of a claim to another claim, or of an interest to another interest, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 510(c). But under the literal terms of section 510(c), ***claims cannot be subordinated to interests***. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted in the *Mobile Steel* case,[200] that ***equitable disallowance*** of a claim (as opposed to equitable subordination of a claims) is not an available remedy. Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(1) and the Fifth Circuit's *Lothian Oil* case might permit "recharacterization" of a claim from debt to equity in certain circumstances—but not based on inequitable conduct but rather on the nature of a financial transaction. In any event, here, the claims have already been adjudicated and allowed (some after mediation, and all after Rule 9019 settlement orders). The only way to reconsider a claim in a bankruptcy case that has already been allowed is through Bankruptcy Code section 502(j) ("A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. . . according to the equities of the case."). As noted earlier, the problem here is that Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides that a motion for "reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate ***entered without a contest*** is not subject to the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c)" (emphasis added). As further noted earlier, here there was most definitely a "contest" with regard to all of these purchased claims. ***Thus, it would appear***

[199] *See supra* notes 182-184 and accompanying text. The court will note that, as discussed *supra* note 141 and pages 71-72, the remedy of equitable subordination (as to the Claims Purchasers) would not redress HMIT's alleged injury (because equitable subordination of claims to interests is not an available remedy in the Fifth Circuit and thus subordination of the Purchased Claims to other claims would not change HMIT's distributions from the Claimant Trust, if any), and because outright disallowance of all or part of the already allowed Purchased Claims is not an available remedy either, HMIT would not be able to meet the "redressability" requirement with respect to the Claims Purchasers.

[200] *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.*, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).

that any effort to have a court reconsider and potentially disallow these claims pursuant to section 502(j) is untimely—as it has been well beyond a year since they were allowed.

3. HMIT Would Also Lack Prudential Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims.

Even if HMIT would have constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims in an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy court, the Proposed Claims would still be barred if HMIT would lack prudential standing to bring them under applicable state or federal law. HMIT argues that it does have prudential standing under both federal bankruptcy law and Delaware law to pursue the Proposed Claims derivatively and also to bring the Proposed Claims in its individual capacity.

With regard to "federal bankruptcy law," HMIT argues that it has standing pursuant to: (a) Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to derivative actions, which "applies to this proceeding pursuant to" Rule 7023.1 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and (b) *Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co. ("LWE")*,[201] the Fifth Circuit's leading case addressing when a creditors committee may be granted standing to bring causes of action on behalf of a bankruptcy estate. But, federal bankruptcy law does not confer standing ***where the plaintiff otherwise lacks standing under applicable state law***. In other words, whether HMIT would have prudential standing to sue under Delaware law is dispositive of the issue, regardless of the forum. Rule 23.1 "speaks only to the adequacy of the . . . pleadings," and "cannot be understood to 'abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,'"[202] including a right (or lack thereof) to bring a derivative action under the substantive law of Delaware. Additionally, HMIT's reliance on *LWE* is misplaced: *LWE* permits creditors, in certain circumstances ***during*** a bankruptcy case, to "file

[201] 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).

[202] *Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).

suit on behalf of a debtor-in-possession or a trustee"[203] and does not apply to a party's right to sue, derivatively, on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor or any entity that is the assignee of the former bankruptcy estate's assets. Upon confirmation of the Plan, the bankruptcy estate of Highland ceased to exist;[204] Highland is no longer a debtor-in-possession but a reorganized debtor, and the Claimant Trust is a new entity created under the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement. Even if *LWE* did apply in this ***post***-confirmation context, it supports the application of Delaware law to the issue of prudential standing and does not supersede state-law requirements for standing. In *LWE*, before addressing the requirements a creditors' committee must meet to sue derivatively on behalf of a bankruptcy estate as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, the Fifth Circuit conducted a lengthy analysis to determine "as a threshold issue" whether the creditors' committee in that case could assert its claims under Louisiana law.[205] The court specifically addressed whether the creditors' committee could pursue a derivative action under Louisiana law and concluded that "there is no bar in Louisiana law to actions brought by or in the name of a corporation against the directors and officers of the corporation which benefit only the creditors of the corporation; indeed, Louisiana law specifically recognizes such actions."[206] So, even under *LWE* (which the court does not think applies in this post-confirmation context), if HMIT would be barred from bringing a derivative action on behalf the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust under state law, the analysis stops there.[207] Thus, the court looks to Delaware law to determine if HMIT would have prudential standing to pursue the derivative claims on behalf the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust.

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[203] *LWE*, 858 F.2d at 247.

[204] *See In re Craig's Stores*, 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2001).

[205] *LWE*, 858 F.2d at 236-45.

[206] *Id.* at 243.

[207] *See In re Dura Automotive Sys., LLC*, No. 19-123728 (Bankr. D. Del. June 10, 2020), Docket No. 1115 at 46 (where the Delaware bankruptcy court denied the creditors' committee standing to sue derivatively on behalf of a Delaware LLC because the committee lacked standing under the Delaware LLC Act, stating, "To determine that the third party

HMIT acknowledges that both the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are organized under Delaware law, and thus the cause of action against Seery alleging breach of fiduciary duties to the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are governed by Delaware law under the "Internal Affairs Doctrine."[208] In addition, because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duties claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting theory of liability as to the Claims Purchasers is also governed by Delaware law.[209] For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that HMIT would lack prudential standing under Delaware law to bring the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint, derivatively, on behalf of either the Claimant Trust or the Reorganized Debtor.

a) First, HMIT Would Lack Prudential Standing Under Delaware Law to Bring Derivative Actions on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

The Claimant Trust is a Delaware statutory trust governed by the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §§ 3801–29,[210] and "to proceed derivatively against a Delaware statutory trust, a plaintiff has the burden of satisfying the continuous ownership requirement" such that "the plaintiff must be a beneficial owner" continuously from "the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains" through "the time of bringing the action."[211] This requirement is "mandatory and exclusive" and only "a beneficial owner" "has standing to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the

may bring the claim under the derivative basis and, thus, step into the shoes of the debtor to pursue them, the Court must look to the law of the debtors' state of incorporation or formation.").

[208] Motion for Leave, ¶ 21 and n.24; *see also* Plan Art. XII.M ("corporate governance matters . . . shall be governed by the laws of the state of organization" of the respective entity); *Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A.*, 34 A.3d 1074, 1081–82 (Del. 2011) ("In American corporation law, the internal affairs doctrine is a dominant and overarching choice of law principle."). The Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are both organized under the laws of Delaware.

[209] *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas).

[210] *See* Proposed Complaint, ¶ 26.

[211] *Hartsel v. Vanguard Grp., Inc.*, 2011 WL 2421003, at *19 n.123 (Del. Ch. June 15, 2011), *aff'd* 38 A.3d 1254 (Del. 2012); 12 Del C. § 3816(b).

Trust."[212] The Highland Parties argue that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust and, therefore, would lack standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust. HMIT argues to the contrary: that it ***is*** currently, and was at all relevant times, a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust under Delaware trust law such that it would have standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust if it were allowed to proceed with the filing of the Proposed Complaint. The disagreement turns on the nature of HMIT's interest under the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement and whether HMIT, as a holder of such interest, would be considered a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust under Delaware trust law.

As noted, pursuant to the Plan, HMIT's former limited partnership interest in Highland was cancelled as of the Effective Date in exchange for its pro rata share of a "Contingent Claimant Trust Interest," as defined under the Plan.[213] HMIT argues that its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest makes it a contingent beneficiary of the Claimant Trust, which makes it a present "beneficial owner" under Delaware trust law.

The Highland Parties argue that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust; rather, the "beneficial owners" of the Claimant Trust are the "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries,"[214] which are defined in the Plan and the CTA as "the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims" (which are in Class 8 under the Plan) and "Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims" (which are in Class 9 under the Plan); [215] HMIT, a holder of a Class 10 interest under the Plan, is neither.

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[212] *In re Nat'l Coll. Student Loan Tr. Litig.*, 251 A.3d 116, 191 (Del. Ch. 2020) (citing *CML V, LLC v. Bax*, 28 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2011)). HMIT acknowledges this requirement in its Reply: "Delaware statutory trust law provides that a plaintiff in a derivative action on behalf of a trust must be a beneficial owner at the time of the action and at the time of the transaction." Reply, ¶ 19 (citing 12 Del C. § 3816).

[213] *See* Plan Art. III.H.10 and Art. I.B.44.

[214] Section 2.8 of the CTA provides, "The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be the sole beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust . . . ." HMIT Ex. 26, § 2.8.

[215] *See* Plan Art. I.B.44 ("'*Claimant Trust Beneficiaries*' means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the

HMIT, as the holder of a "Contingent Claimant Trust Interest," has only an ***unvested*** contingent interest in the Claimant Trust and, as such, is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust for standing purposes under Delaware trust law. HMIT argues that it "should be treated as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary due to [the Proposed Defendants'] wrongful conduct and considering the current value of the Claimant Trust Assets before and after the relief requested herein."[216] The court disagrees.

HMIT's status as a "beneficiary" of the Claimant Trust is defined by the CTA itself, pure and simple. The CTA specifically provides that "Contingent Trust Interests" "shall not have any rights under this Agreement" and will not "be deemed 'Beneficiaries' under this Agreement," "unless and until" they vest in accordance with the Plan and the CTA. It is undisputed that HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest has not vested under the terms of the Plan and the CTA, and the court does not have the power to equitably deem HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest to be vested based on HMIT's unsupported allegation of wrongdoing on the part of Seery, the Claimant Trustee. Thus, the court finds that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust and, therefore, lacks prudential standing under Delaware law to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust.[217]

Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full, post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests."); CTA § 1.1(h). *See also*, CTA, 1 at n.2 ("For the avoidance of doubt, and as set forth in the Plan, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests will be Claimant Trust Beneficiaries only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan."). HMIT Ex. 26.

[216] Proposed Complaint ¶ 24.

[217] *See Nat'l Coll.*, 251 A.3d at 190–92 (dismissing creditors' derivative claims because they were not "beneficial owners of the Trusts"); *Hartsel*, 2011 WL 2421003, at *19 n.123 (dismissing derivative claims by investors that "no longer own shares" because "those investors no longer have standing to pursue a derivative claim").

b) HMIT Would Likewise Lack Prudential Standing Under Delaware Law to Bring Derivative Actions on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor.

HMIT acknowledges that the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., is a Delaware limited liability partnership governed by the Delaware Limited Partnership Act, 6 Del. C. § 17-101, *et seq.*[218] To bring "a derivative action" on behalf of a limited partnership, "the plaintiff must be a partner or an assignee of a partnership interest" continuously from "the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains" through "the time of bringing the action."[219]

HMIT is not a partner, general or limited, of the Reorganized Debtor limited partnership. HMIT ***was*** a limited partner in the original debtor (specifically, a holder of Class B/C Limited Partnership interests in Highland), but that limited partnership interest was extinguished on August 11, 2021 (the Effective Date of the Plan) per the terms of the Plan, and HMIT does not own any partnership interest in the newly created Reorganized Debtor limited partnership.[220] Because HMIT would not hold a partnership interest in the Reorganized Debtor at "the time of bringing the action," it "lacks derivative standing" to bring claims "on the partnership's behalf."[221] HMIT likewise cannot satisfy "the continuous ownership requirement"; when HMIT's limited partnership interest in the original Debtor was cancelled on the Plan's Effective Date, HMIT "los[t] standing to continue a derivative suit" on behalf of the Debtor.[222] Finally, to the extent HMIT

[218] Proposed Complaint ¶ 25.

[219] 6 Del. C. § 17-1002; *see Tow v. Amegy Bank, N.A.*, 976 F. Supp. 2d 889, 904 (S.D. Tex. 2013) ("The [Delaware] partnership act facially bars any party other than a limited partner from suing derivatively. . . . Delaware courts historically have interpreted the provisions as giving the partners exclusive rights to sue for breach of another party's fiduciary duties to them.") (quoting *CML V, LLC v. Bax*, 6 A.3d 238, 245 (Del. Ch. 2010), *aff'd* 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011)); *El Paso Pipeline GP Co. v. Brinckerhoff*, 152 A.3d 1248, 1265 n.87 (Del. 2016) ("The statutory foundation for the continuous ownership requirement in the corporate realm is echoed in the limited partnership context.") (citing 6 Del. C. § 17-211(h)).

[220] *See* Plan Art. IV.A.

[221] *Tow*, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (dismissing derivative claims by creditor on behalf of partnership for lack of standing).

[222] *El Paso*, 152 A.3d at 1265 (cleaned up) (dismissing derivative action for lack of standing where plaintiff's partnership interest was extinguished by a merger transaction); *see also Schmermerhorn v. CenturyTel, Inc. (In re*

seeks to bring a "double derivative" action on behalf of the Claimant Trust based on claims purportedly held by its wholly owned subsidiary, the Reorganized Debtor, HMIT lacks standing. A "double derivative" action is a suit "brought by a shareholder of a parent corporation to enforce a claim belonging to a subsidiary that is either wholly owned or majority controlled."[223] And, under Delaware law, "parent level standing is required to enforce a subsidiary's claim derivatively."[224] Because HMIT would lack derivative standing to bring claims on behalf of the parent Claimant Trust,[225] it also would lack standing to bring a double derivative action.

c) Finally, HMIT Would Also Lack Prudential Standing under Applicable Law to Bring the Proposed Claims As ***Direct*** Claims.

HMIT argues that it has "direct" standing to pursue the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself, individually.[226] But just because HMIT asserts that some or even all of the Proposed Claims are direct, not derivative claims, does not make it so: "a claim is not 'direct' simply because it is pleaded that way."[227] Rather, in determining whether claims are direct or derivative, a court must "look at the substance of the Petition, and the nature of the wrongs alleged therein, rather than the Plaintiffs' characterization."[228] And, under Delaware law, "whether a claim is solely derivative or

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SkyPort Global Commcn's, Inc.), 2011 WL 111427, at *25–26 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2011) (holding that pre-petition shareholders "lack standing to bring a derivative claim" under Delaware law because they "had their equity interests in the company extinguished pursuant to the merger under the Plan"); *In re WorldCom, Inc.*, 351 B.R. 130, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he cancellation of WorldCom shares under the Plan … prevents the required continuation of shareholder status through the litigation.") (cleaned up).

[223] *Lambrecht v. O'Neal*, 3 A.3d 277, 282 (Del. 2010).

[224] *Sagarra*, 34 A.3d at 1079–81 (capitalization omitted) (citing *Lambrecht*, 3 A.3d at 282).

[225] *See supra* pp. 80-82.

[226] *See e.g.*, Motion for Leave ¶ 10 ("HMIT has individual standing to bring this action because Seery owed fiduciary duties directly to HMIT at that time . . . ."); *id.* ¶ 67 (arguing that "HMIT has [d]irect [s]tanding"); Proposed Complaint ¶ 24 ("HMIT has constitutional standing and capacity to bring these claims both individually and derivatively.").

[227] *Schmermerhorn*, 2011 WL 111427, at *26 (quoting *Gatz v. Ponsoldt*, 2004 WL 3029868 at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2004)).

[228] *See id.* (citing *Armstrong v. Capshaw, Goss & Bowers LLP*, 404 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2005)); *see also Moore v. Simon Enters., Inc.*, 919 F.Supp. 1007, 1009 (N.D. Tex. 1995)("The determination of whether a claim is a derivative claim or a direct claim is made by reference to the nature of the wrongs alleged in the complaint, and is not limited by a [party's] characterization or stated intention.")(cleaned up).

may continue as a dual-natured claim 'must turn ***solely*** on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?'"[229] "In addition, to prove that a claim is direct, a plaintiff 'must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.'"[230] Similarly, in the bankruptcy context, whether a creditor can assert a claim directly or whether the claim belongs to the estate turns on the nature of the injury for which relief is sought: "[i]f the harm to the creditor comes about only because of harm to the debtor, then its injury is derivative, and the claim is property of the estate," such that "only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to pursue the claim for the estate . . . ."[231] "To pursue a claim on its own behalf, a creditor must show this direct injury is not dependent on injury to the estate."[232]

As a reminder, HMIT argues that the injury it has suffered is a devaluation of its interests in the Claimant Trust by virtue of alleged over-compensation of Seery as the Claimant Trustee. HMIT was unable, when pressed during closing arguments, to identify any other injury. It essentially admitted that the claims trades, in and of themselves, would not have harmed the Claimant Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, or individual stakeholders, including HMIT, ***since the Claims Purchasers acquired already allowed unsecured claims, such that the distributions on those claims pursuant to the Plan would be unchanged in the hands of new holders of the claims***.

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[229] *El Paso*, 152 A.3d at 1260 (quoting *Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.*, 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004)) (emphasis in original).

[230] *Id.* (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1033); *see also Schmermerhorn*, 2011 WL 111427, at *24 (same).

[231] *Meridian Cap. CIS Fund v. Burton (In re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C.)*, 912 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).

[232] *Id.*; *see also Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Tr.)*, 25 F.3d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994)("If a cause of action alleges only indirect harm to a creditor (i.e., an injury which derives from harm to the debtor), and the debtor could have raised a claim for its direct injury under the applicable law, then the cause of action belongs to the estate.")(citations omitted).

Thus, by its own concessions, any alleged harm to HMIT (through devaluation of assets in the Claimant Trust) "comes about only because of harm to the debtor," so the alleged "injury is derivative."[233] The court concludes that all of the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint allege derivative claims only, and that none would be direct claims against the Proposed Defendants. Thus, HMIT would lack prudential standing to bring any of the Proposed Claims in the Proposed Complaint, so its Motion for Leave should be denied.

d) Some Final Points Regarding Standing.

In this standing discussion, one should not lose sight of the fact that there are both procedural safeguards in place, as well as certain independent individuals in place with fiduciary duties that might act in the event of any shenanigans regarding Claimant Trust activities. Under section 4.1 of the CTA (approved as part of the Plan process), the CTOB, which includes an independent disinterested member in addition to representatives of the Claims Purchasers,[234] oversees the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties, approves his compensation, and may remove him for cause. Moreover, there is a separate "Litigation Trustee" in this case who was brought in, post-confirmation, as an independent fiduciary to pursue claims and causes of action. These independent persons are checks and balances in the post-confirmation wind down of Highland. This is what creditors voted on in connection with the Plan. Seery and the Claims Purchasers are not in sole control of anything. The CTA, as well as Delaware law, very clearly set forth who can bring an action in the event of some colorable claim. This is the reality of prudential

[233] *Meridian*, 912 F.3d at 293–94 ("The creditors' injury (reduced bankruptcy recovery) derived from injury to the debtor (the loss of estate assets), so only the estate could sue the third parties."); *see also El Paso,* 152 A.3d at 1260–61 & n.60 (holding that claim "claims of corporate overpayment are normally treated as causing harm solely to the corporation and, thus, are regarded as derivative") (collecting cases); *Gerber v EPE Holdings, LLC*, 2013 WL 209658, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013) (holding that claims were derivative because plaintiff had "not identified any independent harm suffered by the limited partners"; "the partnership suffered all the harm at issue—it paid too much").

[234] *See supra* note 23 and accompanying text.

standing. Just as in the *Abraugh* case, where Louisiana law dictated that a mother could not bring a wrongful death case when the deceased prisoner had a surviving wife and child, Delaware law and the CTA dictate here that a contingent beneficiary cannot bring the Proposed Claims here. This is separate and apart from whether the claims are colorable.

C. Are the Proposed Claims "Colorable"?

1. What is the Proper Standard of Review for a "Colorability" Determination?

Although the court has determined that HMIT would ***not*** have standing (constitutional or prudential) to bring the Proposed Claims, this court will nevertheless evaluate whether the claims—assuming HMIT somehow has standing—might be "colorable." This, in turn, requires the court to assess what the legal standard is to determine if a claim is "colorable." As a reminder, the Plan's Gatekeeper Provision and this court's prior Gatekeeper Orders entered in January and July 2020 each required that, before a party may commence or pursue claims relating to the bankruptcy case against certain protected parties, it must first obtain a finding from the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims are "colorable." The Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders did not specifically define "colorable" or what type of legal standard should apply.

HMIT argues that the standard for review to be applied by this court is the same as a simple "plausibility" standard used in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In other words, the court should simply assess whether the allegations of the Proposed Complaint, taken as true and with all inferences drawn in favor of the movant, state a ***plausible*** claim for relief (i.e., colorable equals plausible), and that this standard does not allow for the weighing of evidence by the court.[235] The Proposed Defendants, however, argue that the test for colorability should be more

[235] Reply, ¶ 5 ("[T]he determination of 'colorability' does not allow the 'weighing' of evidence. At most, a Rule 12(b)(6) 'plausibility' standard applies.").

akin to the test applied under the *Barton* doctrine,[236] under which a plaintiff must make a *prima facie* case that a proposed claim against a bankruptcy trustee is "not without foundation." In this regard, they argue that the court can and should consider evidence outside of the four corners of the complaint—especially since HMIT attached to its Motion for Leave, as "evidence" to support it, two declarations of Dondero (as part of a 350-page attachment) and only attempted to withdraw those declarations after the Highland Parties urged that they be permitted to cross-examine Dondero on them.

This court ultimately determined that the "colorability" standard was somewhat of a mixed question of fact and law and, therefore, the parties could put on evidence at the June 8 Hearing if they so-chose. The court would not require it. It was up to the parties. But, in any event, the Proposed Defendants should have an opportunity to cross-examine Dondero on the statements made in his declarations since the declarations had been filed on the docket and the court had reviewed them at this point. HMIT attempted to withdraw the declarations and any reference to them in the Motion for Leave, by filing redacted versions of the Motion for Leave,[237] less than 72 hours before the June 8 Hearing; however, the redacted versions did not redact any allegations in the Motion for Leave that were purportedly supported by the Dondero declarations. Also, HMIT called Dondero as a direct witness, in addition to calling Seery as an adverse witness at the June 8 Hearing, albeit subject to its running objection to the evidentiary format of the hearing.[238] HMIT also filed a witness and exhibit list attaching 80 exhibits and over 2850 pages of evidence and

[236] *Barton v. Barbour,* 104 U.S. 126 (1881).

[237] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3815 and 3816.

[238] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 7:20-24, 112:11-13.

moved for the admission of those exhibits at the June 8 Hearing (again, subject to its running objection to the evidentiary format of the hearing).[239]

In determining what appropriate legal standard applies here in the "colorability" analysis, the context in which the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan was approved seems very relevant. In determining that the Gatekeeper Provision was legal, necessary, and in the best interest of all of the parties, this court set forth in the Confirmation Order a lengthy discussion of the factual support for it, and made specific findings relating to Dondero's post-petition litigation and the need for inclusion of the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan.[240] This court observed that "prior to the commencement of the Debtor's bankruptcy case, and while under the direction of Dondero, the Debtor had been involved in a myriad of litigation, some of which had gone on for years and, in some cases, over a decade" and that "[d]uring the last several months, Dondero and the Dondero Related Entities have harassed the Debtor, which has resulted in further substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for the Debtor."[241] This court further found that: (1) Dondero's post-petition litigation "was a result of Dondero failing to obtain creditor support for his plan proposal and consistent with his comments, as set forth in Seery's credible testimony, that if Dondero's plan proposal was not accepted, he would 'burn down the place,'"[242] (2) without the Gatekeeper Provision in place, "Dondero and his related entities will likely commence litigation against the Protected Parties after the Effective Date" and that "the threat of continued litigation by Dondero and his related entities after the Effective Date will impede efforts by the Claimant Trust to monetize assets for the benefit of creditors and result in lower distributions to creditors because of

[239] *See Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with Its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement* ("HMIT W&E List")[Bankr. Dkt. No. 3818] and n.1 thereto; *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 33:7-10.

[240] *See* Confirmation Order ¶¶ 76-79.

[241] *Id.* ¶ 77.

[242] *Id.* ¶ 78. *See supra* note 12.

costs and distraction such litigation or the threats of such litigation would cause,"[243] and, (3) "unless the [court] approves the Gatekeeper Provision, the Claimant Trustee and the Claimant Trust Oversight Board will not be able to obtain D&O insurance,[244] the absence of which will present unacceptable risks to parties currently willing to serve in such roles." Thus, as set forth in the Confirmation Order, the Gatekeeper Provision (and the Gatekeeper Orders as well, which were approved based on the same concerns regarding the threat of continued litigation by Dondero and his related entities) required Dondero and related entities to make a threshold showing of colorability, noting that the:

> Gatekeeper Provision is also within the spirit of the Supreme Court's "Barton Doctrine." *Barton v. Barbour*, 104 U.S. 126 (1881). The Gatekeeper Provision is also consistent with the notion of a prefiling injunction to deter vexatious litigants, that has been approved by the Fifth Circuit in such cases as *Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC,* 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008), and *In re Carroll,* 850 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2017)."[245]

The Fifth Circuit, in approving the Gatekeeper Provision on appeal, noted that that the Plan injunction and Gatekeeper Provision "screen and prevent bad-faith litigation against Highland Capital, its successors, and other bankruptcy participants that could disrupt the Plan's effectiveness."[246]

Again, the court believes it is appropriate to consider the context in which—and the purpose for which—the Gatekeeper Orders and Gatekeeper Provision were entered in assessing

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[243] *Id.*

[244] Asd noted at ⁋ 79 of the Confirmation Order, the bankruptcy court heard testimony from Mark Tauber, a Vice President with AON Financial Services, the Debtor's insurance broker ("AON"), regarding his efforts to obtain D&O insurance for the post-confirmation parties implementing the Plan. Mr. Tauber credibly testified that of all the insurance carriers that AON approached to provide D&O insurance coverage after the Effective Date, the only one willing to do so ***without an exclusion for claims asserted by Mr. Dondero and his affiliates*** required that the Confirmation Order approve the Gatekeeper Provision.

[245] *Id.* ¶ 80.

[246] *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.* (*In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*), 48 F.4th 419, 435 (5th Cir. 2022).

how "colorability" should work here. It seems that applying HMIT's proposed Rule 12(b)(6) "plausibility" standard would impose no hurdle at all to litigants and would render the threshold for bringing claims under the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders entirely duplicative of the motion to dismiss standard that every litigant already faces.

The authorities cited by HMIT in support of its argument for applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard are inapposite. HMIT has cited no authority that addresses the appropriate standard for assessing the "colorability" of claims in the context of a plan gatekeeper provision—specifically, one implemented in response to a demonstrated need to screen and prevent continued bad-faith, harassing litigation against a chapter 11 debtor that would impede the debtor's implementation of a plan, which is what we have here. HMIT relies on a bevy of cases that include benefits coverage disputes under ERISA, Medicare coverage disputes, and constitutional challenges[247]—none of which implicate the *Barton* doctrine and vexatious-litigant concerns that were referenced by the court in the Plan as justifications for the gatekeeping provisions at issue here.

In affirming the Plan's Gatekeeper Provision, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Courts have long recognized bankruptcy courts can perform a gatekeeping function" and noted, by way of example, that "[u]nder the '*Barton* doctrine,' the bankruptcy court may require a party to 'obtain leave of

[247] *See Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.*, 207 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (assessing whether an employee has "a colorable claim to vested benefits" such that the employee may be considered a "participant" under ERISA); *Abraham v. Exxon Corp.*, 85 F.3d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); *Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp.*, 74 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); *Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc. v. BP Expl. & Prods. (In re Deepwater Horizon)*, 732 F.3d 326, 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that claims administrator incorrectly interpreted class settlement agreement by permitting "claimants [with] no colorable legal claim" to receive awards); *Richardson v. United States*, 468 U.S. 317, 326 n.6 (1984) (discussing whether criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim was "colorable" such that it could be appealed before final judgments); *Trippodo v. SP Plus Corp.*, 2021 WL 2446204, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2021) (assessing whether plaintiff stated a "colorable claim" against proposed additional defendants in determining whether plaintiff could amend complaint); *Reyes v. Vanmatre*, 2021 WL 5905557, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2021) (same); *Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar*, 886 F.3d 496, 504 n.15 (5th Cir. 2018) (assessing whether plaintiff raised a "colorable claim" to warrant the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over a Medicare coverage dispute); *Am. Med. Hospice Care, LLC v. Azar*, 2020 WL 9814144, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2020) (same); *Harry v. Colvin*, 2013 WL 12174300, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2013) (considering whether plaintiff asserted a "colorable constitutional claim" such that the court could exercise jurisdiction); *Sabhari v. Mukasey*, 522 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); *Stanley v. Gonzales*, 476 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).

the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in district court when the action is against the trustee or other bankruptcy-court-appointed officer, for acts done in the actor's official capacity."[248] As noted above, the Fifth Circuit found that the Gatekeeper Provision, which "requires that, before any lawsuit is filed, the plaintiff must seek the bankruptcy court's approval of the claim as 'colorable'"—*i.e.*, to "screen and prevent bad-faith litigation,"—is "sound."[249]

On balance, the court views jurisprudence applying the *Barton* doctrine and vexatious litigant injunctions—while not specifically addressing the "colorability" standard under gatekeeping provisions in a plan[250]—as more informative on how to approach "colorability" than any of the other authorities presented by the parties. One example is *In re VistaCare Group, LLC*.[251]

In *VistaCare*, the Third Circuit noted that, under the *Barton* doctrine, "[a] party seeking leave of court to sue a trustee must make a prima facie case against the trustee, showing that its claim is not without foundation," and emphasized that the "not without foundation" standard, while similar to the standard courts apply in evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, "involves a greater degree of flexibility" than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because "the bankruptcy court, which given its familiarity with the underlying facts and the parties, is uniquely situated to determine whether a claim against the trustee has merit," and "is also uniquely situated to determine the potential effect of a judgment against the trustee on the debtor's estate."[252] To satisfy the "*prima facie* case standard," "the movant must do more than meet the liberal notice-pleading

[248] *Id.* at 438 (cleaned up).

[249] *Id.* at 435.

[250] The court acknowledges that the *Barton* doctrine itself would not be directly applicable here because HMIT is proposing to bring the Proposed Complaint in the bankruptcy court – the "appointing" court of Seery.

[251] 678 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2012).

[252] *Id.* at 232-233 (cleaned up).

requirements of Rule 8."[253] "[I]f the [bankruptcy] court relied on mere notice-pleading standards rather than evaluating the merits of the allegations, the leave requirement would become meaningless."[254] This court agrees with the notion, that "[t]o apply a less stringent standard would eviscerate the protections" of the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders.[255] The court notes, as well, that courts in the *Barton* doctrine context regularly hold evidentiary hearings on motions for leave to determine if the proposed complaint meets the necessary threshold for pursuing litigation. The Third Circuit in *VistaCare* noted that "[w]hether to hold a hearing [on a motion for leave to bring suit against a trustee] is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court,"[256] and that "the decision whether to grant leave may involve a 'balancing of the interests of all parties involved,'" which will ordinarily require an evidentiary hearing.[257] The Third Circuit applied "the deferential abuse of discretion standard" in considering whether the bankruptcy court's granting of leave should be affirmed on appeal.[258]

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[253] *In re World Mktg. Chi., LLC*, 584 B.R. 737, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018) (cleaned up; collecting cases).

[254] *Leighton Holdings, Ltd. v. Belofsky (In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P.)*, 2000 WL 1761020, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000).

[255] *World*, 584 B.R. at 743 (quoting *Leighton*, 2000 WL 1761020, at *2).

[256] *VistaCare*, 678 F.3d at 232 n.12.

[257] *Id.* at 233 (quoting *In re Kashani*, 190 B.R. 875, 886–87 (9th Cir. BAP 1995)). The Third Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court's holding of an evidentiary hearing on the motion for leave was appropriate (though not required in every case)). *Id.* at 232 n.12.

[258] *Id.* at 224 ("We review a bankruptcy court's decision to grant a motion for leave to sue a trustee under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.") (citing *In re Linton*, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1998); *In re Beck Indus., Inc.*, 725 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1984)). Courts of appeal routinely apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard to a bankruptcy court's decision regarding whether leave should be granted to sue a trustee. Although the Fifth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, all nine Circuits that have considered this issue have also adopted an abuse-of-discretion standard. *See In re Bednar*, 2021 WL 1625399, at *3 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2021) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court's decision to decline leave to sue the Trustee under the *Barton* doctrine is reviewed for abuse of discretion . . . .") (citing *VistaCare*); *SEC v. N. Am. Clearing, Inc.*, 656 F. App'x 969, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Although we have never determined the standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a *Barton* motion, other Circuits that have considered the issue review a lower court's ruling on a *Barton* motion for an abuse of discretion.") (citing *VistaCare*); *In re Lupo*, 2014 WL 4653064, at *3 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Sept. 17, 2014) ("Appellate courts review a bankruptcy court's decision to deny a motion for leave to sue under the abuse of discretion standard.") (citing *VistaCare*); *Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (In re McKenzie)*, 716 F.3d 404, 422 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that abuse-of-discretion standard applies to *Barton* doctrine); *Alexander v. Hedback*, 718 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to *Barton* doctrine).

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a bankruptcy court's conducting of an evidentiary hearing, in the context of applying a *Barton* doctrine analysis as to a proposed lawsuit against a trustee, without any concern that the inquiry was somehow improper.[259]

Similarly, courts in the vexatious litigant context, where there was an injunction requiring a movant to seek leave to pursue claims, have required movants to "show that the claims sought to be asserted have sufficient merit," including that "the proposed filing is both procedural and legally sound," and "that the claims are not brought for any improper purpose, such as harassment."[260] "For a prefiling injunction to have the intended impact, it must not merely require a reviewing official to apply an already existing level of review," such as the "plausibility" standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.[261] Rather, courts apply "an additional layer of review," and "may appropriately deny leave to file when even part of the pleading fails to satisfy the reviewer that it warrants a federal civil action" or that the "litigant's allegations are unlikely," especially "when prior cases have shown the litigant to be untrustworthy or not credible . . . ."[262]

In summary, the court rejects HMIT's positions: (a) that it need only show, at most, that the allegations in the Proposed Complaint are "plausible" under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for motions to dismiss; and (b) that this court improperly conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Leave (i.e., that consideration of evidence in this context is impermissible). The court notes, again, that HMIT's argument that this court is not permitted to consider evidence in making its "colorability" determination is completely contradictory to HMIT's actions in filing the Motion

[259] *See Howell v. Adler (In re Grodsky)*, 2019 WL 2006020, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2019) (dismissing an action under *Barton* after "a close examination" by the bankruptcy court of the evidence regarding the trustee's actions and finding that "the plaintiffs' allegations are not based in fact"), *aff'd* 799 F. App'x 271 (5th Cir. 2020).

[260] *Silver v. City of San Antonio*, 2020 WL 3803922, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (denying leave to file lawsuit); *see also Silver v. Perez*, 2020 WL 3790489, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (same).

[261] *Silver*, 2020 WL 3803922, at *6.

[262] *Id.*

for Leave, where it attached two Dondero declarations as part of 350 pages of "objective evidence" that "supported" its motion.

The court concludes that the appropriate standard to be applied in making its "colorability" determination in ***this*** bankruptcy case, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function pursuant to the two Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeper Provision in ***this*** Plan, is a broader standard than the "plausibility" standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. It is, rather, a standard that involves ***an additional level of review***—one that places on the proposed plaintiff a burden of making a prima facie case that its proposed claims are ***not without foundation***, are ***not without merit***, and are ***not being pursued for any improper purpose such as harassment***. Additionally, this court may, and should, take into consideration its ***knowledge*** of the ***bankruptcy proceedings*** and ***the parties*** and any additional evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave. For ease of reference, the court will refer to this standard of "colorability" as the "Gatekeeper Colorability Test." The court considers this test as a sort of hybrid of what the *Barton* doctrine contemplates and what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place.

2. HMIT's Proposed Complaint Does Not Present "Colorable" Claims Under this Court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test or Even Under a Rule 12(b)(6) "Plausibility" Standard.

The court finds, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function under the Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeping Provision in the Plan, that the Motion for Leave should be denied as the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint are not "colorable" claims. The court makes this determination after considering evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing, including the testimony of Dondero, Patrick, and Seery, and the numerous exhibits offered by HMIT and the Highland Parties. HMIT's Proposed Claims lack foundation, are without merit, and appear to be motivated by the improper purposes of vexatiousness and harassment. But, even under the less stringent

"plausibility" standard under Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, where all allegations must be accepted as true, HMIT's "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," fail to "[]cross the line from conceivable to plausible."[263]

HMIT makes unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations in its Motion for Leave and Proposed Complaint that the Claims Purchasers purchased the large allowed unsecured claims only because Seery, while he was CEO of Highland prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, provided them with MNPI and assurances that the Purchased Claims were very valuable. This was allegedly in exchange for their agreement to approve, in their future capacities as members of the CTOB, excessive compensation for Seery in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee after the Effective Date of the Plan. This was an alleged *quid pro quo* that HMIT claims establishes Seery's breach of fiduciary duties and the Claims Purchasers' conspiracy to participate in that breach. As discussed below, these allegations are unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations, and they do not support the inferences that HMIT needs the court to make when it analyzes whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable"—or even merely plausible.

a) HMIT's Proposed Breach of Fiduciary Duties Claim Set Forth in Count I of the Proposed Complaint

Based on HMIT's Proposed Complaint and the evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing, the court finds that HMIT has not pleaded facts that would support a "colorable" breach of fiduciary duties claim against Seery, under this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test, nor a plausible claim pursuant to the Rule 12(b) standard. HMIT alleges that Seery breached his fiduciary duties (i) "[b]y disclosing material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon"

[263] *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679–80 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).

before their purchase of certain Highland claims, and (ii) by receiving "compensation paid to him under the terms of the [CTA] since the Effective Date of the Plan in August 2021."[264]

As earlier noted, both the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are organized under Delaware law and, thus, its proposed Count I against Seery for breach of fiduciary duties to these entities is governed by Delaware law under the "Internal Affairs Doctrine."[265] Under Delaware law, "[t]o bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege '(1) that a fiduciary duty existed and (2) that the defendant breached that duty.'"[266] HMIT fails to plausibly or sufficiently allege either element such that its breach of fiduciary duty claims against Seery could survive.

Under Delaware law, officers and directors generally owe fiduciary duties only to the entity and its stakeholders as a whole, not to individual shareholders.[267] Because Seery did not owe any "duty" to HMIT directly and individually, the Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties to HMIT. HMIT's "legal conclusion[]" that Seery "owed fiduciary duties to HMIT, as equity, and to the Debtor's Estate"[268] "do[es] not suffice" to plausibly allege the existence of any actionable fiduciary relationship.[269] And as discussed earlier in the standing section, HMIT does not have standing to assert a breach of fiduciary claim derivatively on behalf

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[264] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 64–67.

[265] Motion for Leave, ¶ 21 and n.24; *see also* Plan Art. XII.M ("corporate governance matters . . . shall be governed by the laws of the state of organization" of the respective entity); *Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A.*, 34 A.3d 1074, 1081–82 (Del. 2011) ("In American corporation law, the internal affairs doctrine is a dominant and overarching choice of law principle."). The Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are both organized under the laws of Delaware.

[266] *Brooks v. United Dev. Funding III, L.P.*, 2020 WL 6132230, at *30 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2020) (quoting *Joseph C. Bamford & Young Min Ban v. Penfold, L.P.*, 2020 WL 967942, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2020)).

[267] *See Gilbert v El Paso Co.*, 1988 WL 124325, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988) ("[D]irectors' fiduciary duty runs to the corporation and to the entire body of shareholders generally, as opposed to specific shareholders or shareholder subgroups.") *aff'd,* 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); *Klaassen v Allegro Dev. Corp.*, 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2013) (same).

[268] Proposed Complaint ¶ 63.

[269] *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555).

of the Claimant Trust or Reorganized Debtor. But even if HMIT had sufficiently alleged the existence of a fiduciary duty by Seery to HMIT—or to the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust that HMIT would have standing to assert—Seery's alleged communications with Farallon would not have breached those duties.

HMIT alleges that Seery ""disclose[d] material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon," and they "acted on inside information and Seery's secret assurances of great profits."[270] But the Proposed Complaint does not make any factual allegations regarding HMIT's "conclusory allegations," and its "legal conclusions" are "purely speculative, devoid of factual support," and therefore "stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief"[271] (and certainly stop short of being "colorable"). HMIT never alleges when any of these purported communications occurred, what material non-public information Seery provided, and what "assurances of great profits" he made to Farallon or to Stonehill. At the June 8 Hearing, Dondero could only clarify that he believed the MGM Email to have been MNPI and that he ***believed*** that Seery ***must have*** communicated that MNPI to Farallon at some point between December 17, 2020 (the date the MGM Email was sent) and May 28, 2021 (the day that Dondero alleges to have had three telephone calls with representatives of Farallon, Messrs. Patel and Linn, regarding Farallon's purchase of the bankruptcy claims). Dondero alleges that, during these phone calls, Patel and Linn gave Dondero no reason for their purchase of the claims that "made [any] sense." Dondero and Patrick also both testified that neither of them had any personal knowledge: (a) of a *quid pro quo* arrangement between Seery and the Claims Purchasers, (b) of Seery having actually communicated any information from the MGM Email to Farallon, or (c) whether Seery's post-Effective Date compensation had or had not been negotiated in an arms' length transaction. Dondero only

[270] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 3, 64; *see also id.* ¶¶ 13–14, 40, 47, 50.

[271] *Reed v. Linehan (In re Soporex, Inc.)*, 463 B.R. 344, 367, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (cleaned up).

speculates regarding these things, because it "made no sense" to him that the Claims Purchasers would have acquired the bankruptcy claims without having received the MNPI. But HMIT admits in the Proposed Complaint that Farallon and Stonehill purchased the Highland claims at discounts of 43% to 65% to their allowed amounts. Thus, they would receive at least an 18% return based on publicly available estimates in Highland's court-approved Disclosure Statement.[272] The evidence established that, if the acquisition of the UBS claims is excluded—recall that the UBS claims were not purchased until August 2021, which was after the May 28, 2021 phones calls that Dondero made to Farallon personnel—the Claims Purchasers would have expected to net over $33 million in profits, or nearly a 30% return on their investment, had Highland met its projections (this is based on the aggregate purchase price of $113 million for the non-UBS claims purchased in the Spring 2021).

To be clear, the only purported MNPI identified in HMIT's Proposed Complaint was the MGM Email Dondero sent to Seery containing "information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM." But, the evidence showed that this information was widely reported in the financial press at the time. Thus, it could not have constituted MNPI as a matter of law.[273] Moreover, the evidence showed that Dondero ***did not*** communicate in the MGM Email the actual inside information that he claimed to have obtained as a board member of MGM–which was that Amazon had met MGM's "strike price" and that the MGM board was going into exclusive negotiations with Amazon to culminate the merger with them (and, thus, Apple was no longer considered a potential purchaser). Dondero admitted that he included Apple in the MGM Email for the purpose of making it look like there was a competitive process still ongoing. In other

[272] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 3, 37, 42.

[273] *See, e.g.*, *SEC v. Cuban*, 2013 WL 791405, at *10–11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that information is not "material, nonpublic information" and "'becomes public when disclosed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public'") (quoting *SEC v. Mayhew*, 121 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1997)).

words, the MGM Email, at the very least, did not include MNPI and, at worst, was deceptive regarding the status of the negotiations between MGM and potential purchasers.

As to HMIT's allegations that Seery's post-Effective Date compensation is "excessive" and that the negotiations between Seery and the CTOB "were not arm's-length,"[274] the evidence at the June 8 Hearing reflected that the allegations are completely speculative, without any foundation whatsoever, and lack merit. And they are also simply not plausible. HMIT fails to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty.[275]

b) HMIT's Proposed Claims Set Forth in Counts II (Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciaries) and III (Conspiracy)

HMIT seeks to hold the Claims Purchasers secondarily liable for Seery's alleged breach of fiduciaries duties on an aiding and abetting theory in Count II of the Proposed Complaint[276] and, along with Seery, on a civil conspiracy theory of liability in Count III of the Proposed Complaint.[277] Because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duties claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties claim against the Claims Purchasers (Count II) is also governed by Delaware law.[278] HMIT's conspiracy cause of action against the Claims

[274] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 4, 13, 54, 74.

[275] *See Pfeffer v. Redstone*, 965 A.2d 676, 690 (Del. 2009) (dismissing claim for breach of duty of loyalty against a director where "conclusory allegations" failed to give rise to inference that director failed to perform fiduciary duties); *McMillan v. Intercargo Corp.*, 768 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2000) (dismissing claim for breach of fiduciary duty where "[a]though the complaint makes the conclusory allegation that the defendants breached their duty of disclosure in a 'bad faith and knowing manner,' no facts pled in the complaint buttress that accusation.").

[276] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 69-74.

[277] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 75-81.

[278] *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas).

Purchasers and Seery (Count III), on the other hand, does not involve a matter of "internal affairs" or of corporate governance, so it is governed by Texas law under the Plan.[279]

As an initial matter, because HMIT does not present either a "colorable"—or even plausible claim—that Seery breached his fiduciary duties, it cannot show that it has alleged a "colorable" or plausible claim for secondary liability for the same alleged wrongdoing.[280] In addition, HMIT's civil conspiracy claim against the Claims Purchasers and Seery is based entirely on Dondero's speculation and unsupported inferences and, thus, HMIT has not "colorably" alleged, or even plausibly alleged, its conspiracy claim. Under Texas law, "civil conspiracy is a theory of vicarious liability and not an independent tort."[281] "[T]he elements of civil conspiracy [are] "(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result."[282] While HMIT alleges that "Defendants conspired with each other to unlawfully breach fiduciary duties,"[283] it is simply a "legal conclusion" and not the kind of allegation that the court must assume to be true even for purposes of determining plausibility under a motion to dismiss.[284]

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[279] *Klinek v. LuxeYard, Inc.*, 596 S.W.3d 437, 450 n.9 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (applying Delaware law to fiduciary duty claim and Texas law to conspiracy theory); (Plan Art. XII.M)(which provides for the application of Texas law to "the rights and obligations arising under this Plan" except for "corporate governance matters.")

[280] *See English v. Narang*, 2019 WL 1300855, at *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019) ("As a matter of law and logic, there cannot be secondary liability for aiding and abetting an alleged harm in the absence of primary liability.") (cleaned up; collecting cases); *Hill v. Keliher*, 2022 WL 213978, at *10 (Tex. App. Jan. 25, 2022) ("[A] defendant's liability for conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort for which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable.") (quoting *Tilton v. Marshall*, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996)). Because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting theory of liability is also governed by Delaware law. *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas). By contrast, "conspiracy is not an internal affair" or a matter of corporate governance, so it is governed by Texas law under the Plan. *Klinek v. LuxeYard, Inc.*, 596 S.W.3d 437, 450 n.9 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (applying Delaware law to fiduciary duty claim and Texas law to conspiracy theory); (Plan Art. XII.M).

[281] *Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC*, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019).

[282] *Id.* at 141 (cleaned up).

[283] Proposed Complaint ¶ 76.

[284] *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing *Twombly*, 555 U.S. at 565–66).

HMIT repeats four times that Seery provided MNPI to Farallon and Stonehill as a "as a *quid pro quo*" for "additional compensation,"[285] each time based upon conclusory allegations based "upon information and belief" and, frankly, pure speculation from Dondero that his imagined "scheme," "covert *quid pro quo,*" and secret "conspiracy" between Seery, on the one hand, and Farallon and Stonehill, on the other,[286] ***must have*** occurred because "[i]t made no sense for the [Claims] Purchasers to invest millions of dollars for assets that – per the publicly available information – did not offer a sufficient potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk" (i.e., "[t]he counter-intuitive nature of the purchases at issue compels the conclusion that the [Claims] Purchasers acted on inside information and Seery's assurance of great profits.")[287] Importantly, HMIT admits that the Claims Purchasers would have turned a profit based on the information available to them at the time of their acquisitions of the Purchased Claims.[288] HMIT's allegations about the level of potential profits were contradicted by their own allegations and other evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing. But Dondero's speculation about what level of projected return would be sufficient to justify the acquisition of the claims by the Claims Purchasers, or any other third-party investor, does not give rise to a plausible inference that they acted improperly.[289] Thus, HMIT cannot meet

[285] Proposed Complaint ¶ 77; *see also id.* ¶¶ 4, 47, 74.

[286] *See id.* ¶ 3 ("Thus, acting within a cloak of secrecy, Seery provided close business acquaintances, the other Defendants with material non-public information concerning the value of assets which they then used to purchase the largest approved unsecured claims.").

[287] *Id.*

[288] *See, e.g.*, *id.* ¶ 3 (alleging that acquiring the claims "did not offer a ***sufficient*** potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk")(emphasis added); ¶ 43 ("Furthermore, although the publicly available projections suggested only a small margin of error on any profit potential for its significant investment . . . ."); ¶ 49 ("Yet, in this case, it would have been *impossible* for Stonehill and Farallon (in the absence of inside information) to forecast *any* ***significant*** profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments given the publicly available, negative financial information.") (third emphasis added).

[289] In fact, the court did not allow Mr. Dondero to testify regarding what kind of information a hypothetical investor in bankruptcy claims would require or what level of potential profits would justify the purchase of bankruptcy claims by investors in the bankruptcy claims trading market because he was testifying as a fact witness, not an expert. Thus, the court only allowed Dondero to testify as to what data ***he*** (or entities he controls or controlled) would rely on, what ***his*** risk tolerance would have been, and what level of potential profits ***he*** would have required to purchase an allowed unsecured bankruptcy claim in a post-confirmation situation. June 8 Hearing Transcript, 129:6-130:4.

its burden, under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test, of making a prima facie showing that its allegations do not lack foundation or merit. Nor can it meet a plausibility standard.

In addition, contrary to the Proposed Complaint's statement that it would have been "***impossible*** for Stonehill and Farallon (in the absence of insider information) to forecast ***any*** significant profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments," the evidence showed there were already reports in the financial press that MGM was engaging with Amazon, Apple, and others in selling its media portfolio, and thus the prospect of an MGM transaction increasing the value of, and return on, the Purchased Claims, "at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments" was publicly available information.[290] HMIT's suggestion that the Claims Purchasers were in possession of inside information not publicly available when they acquired the Purchased Claims is simply not plausible. Nor is HMIT's allegation that "[u]pon information and belief" Farallon "conducted no due diligence but relied on Seery's profit guarantees" plausible. The allegations regarding Farallon not conducting any due diligence are based, again, entirely on Dondero's speculation and inferences he made from what Patel and Linn (of Farallon) allegedly told him on May 28, 2021; Dondero did not testify that either Patel or Linn ever told him specifically that they had conducted no due diligence. HMIT's allegations in the Proposed Complaint that ***Farallon*** "conducted no due diligence," are based on Dondero's speculation, unsubstantiated, and contradicted by the testimony of Seery, who testified that emails to him from Linn in June 2020 and later in January 2021 indicated to him that Farallon, at least, had been conducting some level of due diligence in that they had been following and paying attention to the

[290] The court notes, as well, that the Claim Purchasers acquired the UBS claims in August 2021—approximately two and a half months ***after*** the announcement of the MGM-Amazon transaction (which was on May 26, 2021)—a fact that HMIT makes no attempt to harmonize with its conspiracy theory that the Claims Purchasers profited from the misuse of MNPI allegedly given to them by Seery.

Highland case.[291] In addition, there are no allegations in the Proposed Complaint regarding whether Stonehill conducted due diligence or not, and Patrick testified that neither he nor HMIT had any personal knowledge of how much due diligence Farallon or Stonehill did prior to acquiring the Purchased Claims.[292] The court finds and concludes that HMIT's allegations of aiding and abetting and conspiracy in Counts II and III of the Proposed Complaint are based on unsubstantiated inferences and speculation, lack internal consistency, and lack consistency with verifiable public facts. Accordingly, HMIT has failed to show that these claims have a foundation and merit and has also failed to show that they are plausible.

c) HMIT's Proposed Claims Set Forth in Counts IV (Equitable Disallowance), V (Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust), and VI (Declaratory Relief) of the Proposed Complaint

i. Count IV (Equitable Disallowance).

In Count IV of its Proposed Complaint, HMIT seeks "equitable disallowance" of the claims acquired by Farallon's and Stonehill's special purpose entities Muck and Jessup, "to the extent over and above their initial investment," and, in the alternative, equitable subordination of their claims to all claims and interests, including HMIT's unvested Class 10 Contingent Claimant Trust Interest, "given [their] willful, inequitable, bad faith conduct" of allegedly "purchasing the Claims based on material non-public information" and being "unfairly advantaged" in "earning significant profits on their purchases."[293] As noted above, these remedies are not available to HMIT.[294]

First, HMIT's request to equitably subordinate the Purchased Claims to all claims and interests is not permitted because Bankruptcy Code § 510(c), by its terms, permits equitable

[291] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 239:6-21.
[292] *See id.*, 310:19-312:2.
[293] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 83-87.
[294] *See infra* pages 74-75.

subordination of a ***claim to other claims*** or an ***interest to other interests*** but does not permit equitable subordination of a ***claim to interests***.

Second, "equitable" disallowance of claims is not an available remedy in the Fifth Circuit pursuant to the *Mobile Steel* case.[295]

Third, reconsideration of an already-allowed claim in a bankruptcy case can only be accomplished through Bankruptcy Code § 502(j), which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, allows reconsideration of allowance of a claim that was allowed following ***a contest*** (which is certainly the case with respect to the Purchased Claims) based on the "equities of the case." But this is only if the request for reconsideration is made within the one-year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. HMIT's request for disallowance of Muck and Jessup's Purchased Claims (if it could somehow be construed as a request for reconsideration of their claims), is clearly untimely, as it is being made well beyond a year since their allowance by this court following contests and approval of Rule 9019 settlements. Thus, the court finds that HMIT has not alleged a colorable or even plausible claim in Count IV of the Proposed Complaint and, therefore, the Motion for Leave should be denied.

ii. Count V (Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust)

In Count V of the Proposed Complaint, HMIT alleges that, "by acquiring the Claims using [MNPI], Stonehill and Farallon were unjustly enriched and gained an undue advantage over other creditors and former equity" and that "[a]llowing [the Claims Purchasers] to retain their ill-gotten benefits would be unconscionable;" thus, HMIT alleges, the Claims Purchasers "should be forced to disgorge all distributions over and above their original investment in the Claims as restitution for their unjust enrichment" and "a constructive trust should be imposed on such proceeds . . . ."[296]

[295] *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.*, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).

[296] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 89-93.

HMIT alleges further that "Seery was also unjustly enriched by his participation in this scheme and he should be required to disgorge or restitute all compensation he has received from the outset of his collusive activities" and "[a]lternatively he should be required to disgorge and restitute all compensation received since the Effective Date" over which a constructive trust should be imposed.[297] HMIT has not alleged a colorable or even a plausible claim for unjust enrichment or constructive trust in Count V.

Under Texas law,[298] "[u]njust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution of benefits either wrongfully or passively received under circumstances which give rise to an implied or quasi-contractual obligation to repay."[299] Thus, "when a valid, express contract covers the subject matter of the parties' dispute, there can be no recovery under a quasi-contract theory."[300] Here, as noted above, HMIT's only alleged injury is a diminution of the value of its unvested Contingent Claimant Trust Interest by virtue of Seery's allegedly having wrongfully obtained excessive compensation, with the help of the Claims Purchasers. ***Yet Seery's compensation is governed by express agreements*** (i.e., the Plan and the CTA). Thus, HMIT's claim based on unjust enrichment is not an available theory of recovery.

iii. Count VI (Declaratory Relief)

HMIT seeks declaratory relief in Count VI of the Proposed Complaint, essentially, that Dondero's conspiracy theory is correct and that HMIT's would succeed on the merits with respect

[297] *Id.* ¶ 94.

[298] Under the Plan, Texas law governs HMIT's "claim" for unjust enrichment because it is not a "corporate governance matter." (Plan Art. XII.M.) It also governs HMIT's "claim" for constructive trust, which "is merely a remedy used to grant relief on the underlying cause of action." *Sherer v. Sherer*, 393 S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App. 2013).

[299] *Taylor v. Trevino*, 569 F. Supp. 3d 414, 435 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (cleaned up); *see also Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.*, 630 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. App. 2021) (same).

[300] *Taylor*, 569 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (quoting *Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc.*, 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex. 2000)).

to the Proposed Claims if it were permitted leave to bring them in an adversary proceeding.[301] But, a request for declaratory relief is not "an independent cause of action"[302] and "in the absence of any underlying viable claims such relief is unavailable."[303] This court has already found and concluded that HMIT would not have constitutional or prudential standing to bring the underlying causes of action in the Proposed Complaint. This court has also found and concluded that all of the Proposed Claims are without foundation or merit and are not even plausible and are all; being brought for the improper purpose of continuing Dondero's vexatious, harassing, bad-faith litigation. Thus, HMIT would not be entitled to pursue declaratory judgement relief as requested in Count VI of the Proposed Complaint.

d) HMIT Has No Basis to Seek Punitive Damages

HMIT separately alleges that the Claims Purchasers' and Seery's "misconduct was intentional, knowing, willful, in bad faith, fraudulent, and in total disregard of the rights of others," thus entitling HMIT to an award of punitive damages under applicable law. But, HMIT abandoned its proposed fraud claim that was in its Original Proposed Complaint, so its sole claim for primary liability is Seery's alleged breach of his fiduciary duties. And under Delaware law, the "court cannot award punitive damages in [a] fiduciary duty action."[304]

[301] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 96-99.

[302] *See Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. EEOC*, 70 F.4th 914, 932 (5th Cir. 2023).

[303] *Green v. Wells Fargo Home Mtg.*, 2016 WL 3746276, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) (citing *Collin Cty. v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods*, 915 F.2d 167, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1990)); *see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am.*

[304] *Buchwald v. Renco Grp. (In re Magnesium Corp. of Am.)*, 539 B.R. 31, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing *Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc.*, 902 A.2d 1130, 1154 (Del. Ch. 2006)), *aff'd* 682 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2017).

3. HMIT Does Not Present "Colorable" Claims Under this Court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test Because It Seeks to Bring the Proposed Complaint for Improper Purposes of Harassment and Bad-Faith, Vexatiousness.

Under this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test, in addition to showing that its allegations and claims are not without foundation or merit, HMIT must also show that the Proposed Claims are not being brought for any improper purpose. Taking into consideration the court's knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, the court finds that HMIT is acting at the behest of, and under the control or influence of, Dondero in continuing to pursue harassing, bad faith, vexatious litigation to achieve his desired result in these bankruptcy proceedings. So, in addition to failing to show that its Proposed Claims have foundation and merit, HMIT cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose and, thus, cannot meet the requirements under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test; HMIT's Motion for Leave should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court concludes, having taken into consideration both its knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, that HMIT's Motion for Leave should be denied for three independent reasons: (1) HMIT would lack constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims (and, thus, the federal courts would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the Proposed Claims); (2) even if HMIT would have constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims, it would lack prudential standing to bring the Proposed Claims; and (3) even if HMIT would have both constitutional standing and prudential standing to bring the Proposed Claims, it has not met its burden under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test of showing that its Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims—that the Proposed Claims are not without foundation, not without merit, and not being pursued for an improper purpose. Moreover,

even if this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test should be replaced with a Rule 12(b)(6) "plausibility" standard, the Proposed Claims are not plausible.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that HMIT's Motion for Leave be, and hereby is **DENIED**.

###End of Memorandum Opinion and Order###

Exhibit 2

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed August 25, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	
	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER PURSUANT TO PLAN "GATEKEEPER PROVISION" AND PRE-CONFIRMATION "GATEKEEPER ORDERS": DENYING HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE VERIFIED ADVERSARY PROCEEDING[1]
[BANKR. DKT. NOS. 3699, 3760, 3815, and 3816]

I. INTRODUCTION

BEFORE THIS COURT is yet another post-confirmation dispute relating to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Reorganized Debtor").

[1] On August 2, 2023, this court signed an Order [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3897] that was agreed to among various parties, after the filing of a Motion to Stay and Compel Mediation [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3752] filed by James D. Dondero and related entities. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of that order, certain pending matters in the bankruptcy court are stayed pending mediation. The parties did not agree to stay the matter addressed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

It is now more than two and half years since the confirmation of Highland's Plan[2]—the Plan having been confirmed on February 22, 2021.[3] The Plan was never stayed; it went effective on August 11, 2021 ("Effective Date"), and it was affirmed almost in its entirety by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit"), in late summer 2022, including an approval of the so-called Gatekeeper Provision[4] therein. The Gatekeeper Provision—and how and whether it should now be exercised or interpreted to allow a certain lawsuit to be filed—is at the heart of the current *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3760, 3815, 3816] (collectively, the "Motion for Leave") filed by a movant known as Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT").

A. Who is the Movant, HMIT?

Who is HMIT? It is undisputed that it is a former equity owner of Highland. It held 99.5% of Highland's Class B/C limited partnership interests and was classified in a Class 10 under the confirmed Plan, which class treatment provided it with a contingent interest in the Highland Claimant Trust ("Claimant Trust") created under the Plan, and as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement. This means that HMIT could receive consideration under the Plan if all claims against Highland are ultimately paid in full, with interest. As later further discussed, it is undisputed that

[2] Capitalized terms not defined in this introduction shall have the meaning ascribed to them below.

[3] The court entered its *Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief* ("Confirmation Order")[Bankr. Dkt. No. 1943].

[4] In an initial opinion dated August 19, 2022, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Confirmation Order in large part, "revers[ing] only insofar as the plan exculpates certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strik[ing] those few parties from the plan's exculpation, and affirm[ing] on all remaining grounds." *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, No. 21-10449, 2022 WL 3571094, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2022). On September 7, 2022, following a petition for limited panel rehearing filed by certain appellants on September 2, 2022, "for the limited purpose of clarifying and confirming one part of its August 19, 2022 opinion," the Fifth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and replaced it with its opinion reported at *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, 48 F.4th 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2022). The substituted opinion differed from the original opinion only by the replacement of one sentence from section "IV(E)(2) – *Injunction and Gatekeeper Provisions*" of the original opinion: "The injunction and gatekeeper provisions are, on the other hand, perfectly lawful." was replaced with "We now turn to the Plan's injunction and gatekeeper provisions." In all other respects, the Fifth Circuit panel's original ruling remained unchanged. Petitions for writs of certiorari regarding the Confirmation Order have been pending at the United States Supreme Court since January 2023.

HMIT's only asset is its contingent interest in the Claimant Trust. It has no employees or revenue. HMIT's representative has testified that HMIT is liable on more than $62 million of indebtedness owed to The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), a family trust of which James Dondero ("Dondero"), the co-founder and former chief executive officer ("CEO") of Highland, and his family members are beneficiaries, and that Dugaboy also is paying HMIT's legal fees. HMIT vehemently disputes the suggestion that it is controlled by Dondero.

B. What Does the Movant HMIT Seek Leave to File?

HMIT seeks leave to file an adversary proceeding ("Proposed Complaint")[5] in the bankruptcy court to bring claims on behalf of itself and, derivatively, on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust for alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the Reorganized Debtor's CEO and Claimant Trustee, James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery") and conspiracy against: (1) Seery; and (2) purchasers of $365 million face amount of ***allowed*** unsecured claims in this case, who purchased their claims post-confirmation but prior to the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan ("Claims Purchasers,"[6] and with Seery, the "Proposed Defendants"). To be clear (and as later further explained), the claims acquired by the Claims Purchasers were acquired by them after extensive litigation, mediation, and settlements were approved by the bankruptcy court and after the original claims-holders had voted on the Plan and after Plan confirmation. As later explained,

[5] In its original Motion for Leave filed at Bankruptcy Docket No. 3699 on March 28, 2023, HMIT sought leave to file the proposed complaint ("Initial Proposed Complaint") attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion for Leave. Nearly a month later, on April 23, 2023, HMIT filed a *Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Supplement") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 3760], a revised proposed complaint as Exhibit 1-A, and stating that "[t]he Supplement is not intended to supersede the [Motion for Leave]; rather, it is intended as a supplement to address procedural matters and to bring forth additional facts that further confirm the appropriateness of the derivative action." Supplement, ¶ 1 and Exhibit 1-A. It is this revised proposed complaint to which this court will refer, when it uses the defined term "Proposed Complaint," even though HMIT filed redacted versions of its Motion for Leave on June 5, 2023 at Bankruptcy Docket Nos. 3815 and 3816 that attached the Initial Proposed Complaint as Exhibit 1.

[6] The Claims Purchasers identified in the Proposed Complaint are Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), which is a special purpose entity created by Farallon to purchase allowed unsecured claims against Highland; Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), which is a special purpose entity created by Stonehill to purchase allowed unsecured claims against Highland.

the Claims Purchasers filed notices of their purchases as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), and no objections were filed thereto. In any event, various damages or remedies are sought against the Proposed Defendants revolving around the Claims Purchasers' claims purchasing activities.

C. Why Does HMIT Need to Seek Leave?

As alluded to above, HMIT filed its Motion for Leave to comply with the provision in the Plan known as a "gatekeeper" provision ("Gatekeeper Provision") and with this court's prior gatekeeper orders entered in January and July 2020, which all require that, before a party may commence or pursue claims relating to the bankruptcy case against certain protected parties, it must first obtain (1) a finding from the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims ("Proposed Claims") are "colorable"; and (2) specific authorization by the bankruptcy court to pursue the Proposed Claims.[7] The Gatekeeper Provision was not included in the Plan *sans raison*. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit recognized in affirming confirmation of the Plan, the Gatekeeper Provision (along with the other "protection provisions" in the Plan) had been included in the Plan to address the "continued litigiousness" of Mr. James Dondero ("Dondero"), Highland's co-founder and former chief executive officer ("CEO"), that began prepetition and escalated following the post-petition "nasty breakup" between Highland and Dondero, by "screen[ing] and prevent[ing] bad-faith litigation against Highland Capital, its successors, and other bankruptcy participants that could disrupt the Plan's effectiveness."[8]

[7] To be clear, the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan was not the first or even second injunction of its type issued in this bankruptcy case. The Gatekeeper Orders were entered by the bankruptcy court pre-confirmation: (a) in January 2020, just a few months into the case, as part of this court's order approving a corporate governance settlement between Highland and its unsecured creditors committee, in which Dondero, Highland's co-founder and former CEO, was removed from any management role at Highland and three independent directors ("Independent Directors") were appointed in lieu of a chapter 11 trustee being appointed ("January 2020 Order"); and (b) in July 2020, in this court's order authorizing the employment of Seery (one of the three Independent Directors) as the Debtor's new Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative ("July 2020 Order," together with the January 2020 Order, the "Gatekeeper Orders").

[8] *See Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 427, 435.

D. Some Further Context Regarding Post-Confirmation Litigation Generally.

Since confirmation of the Plan, hundreds of millions of dollars have been paid out to creditors under the Plan, and there are numerous adversary proceedings and contested matters still pending, at various stages of litigation, in the bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Fifth Circuit, almost exclusively involving Dondero and entities that he owns or controls. To be sure, the post-confirmation litigation in this case does not consist of the usual adversaries and contested matters one typically sees by and against a reorganized debtor and/or litigation trustee, such as preference or other avoidance actions and litigation over objections to claims that are still pending after confirmation of a plan. Indeed, the claims of the largest creditors in this case (with claims asserted in the aggregate of more than one billion dollars) were successfully mediated and incorporated into the Plan—a plan which was ultimately accepted by the votes of an overwhelming majority of Highland's non-insider creditors. Dondero and entities under his control were the only parties who appealed the Confirmation Order, and Dondero and entities under his control have been the appellants in virtually every appeal that has been filed regarding this bankruptcy case. Petitions for writs of mandamus (which have been denied) have been filed in the district court and in the Fifth Circuit by some of these same entities, including one by HMIT, when this court denied setting an ***emergency*** hearing on the instant Motion for Leave (HMIT had sought a setting on three-days' notice).

A recent list of active matters involving Dondero and/or entities and/or individuals affiliated or associated with him, filed in the bankruptcy case by Highland and the Claimant Trust, reveals that there were at least 30 pending and "Active Dondero-Related Litigation" matters as of July 14, 2023: six (6) proceedings in this court; six (6) active appeals or actions are pending in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas; seven (7) appeals in the Fifth Circuit; two (2)

petitions for writs of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court; and nine (9) other proceedings or actions with or affecting the Highland Parties ("Highland," the "Claimant Trust," and "Seery") in various other state, federal, and foreign jurisdictions.[9]

The above-described context is included because the Proposed Defendants assert that the Motion for Leave is just a continuation of Dondero's unrelenting barrage of meritless and harassing litigation, making good on his oft-mentioned alleged threat to "burn down the place" after not achieving the results he wanted in the Highland bankruptcy case. Indeed, the Motion for Leave was filed after two years of unsuccessful attempts by, first, Dondero personally, and then HMIT to obtain pre-suit discovery from the Proposed Defendants (i.e., the Claims Purchasers) through two different Texas state court proceedings, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 ("Rule 202"). In each of these Rule 202 proceedings, Dondero and HMIT espoused the same Seery/Claims

[9] *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 3880 (filed on July 14, 2023, providing a list of "Active Dondero-Related Litigation" and noting that the list is "a summary of active pending actions only and does not include actions that were resolved by final orders, including actions finally resolved after appeals to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas and/or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit."). Just since the filing by the Highland Parties of the list, ***three*** of the appeals pending in the Fifth Circuit have been decided against the Dondero-related appellants, two of which upheld the district court's dismissal of appeals by Dondero-related entities of bankruptcy court orders based on the lack of bankruptcy appellate standing on behalf of the appellant. On July 19, 2023, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by NexPoint Advisors, L.P. ("NexPoint") of bankruptcy court orders approving professional compensation on the basis that NexPoint did not meet the bankruptcy appellate standing test of being a "person aggrieved" by the entry of the orders. *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, L.L.P. (In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.)*, 74 F.4th 361 (5th Cir. 2023). On July 31, 2023, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy—the Dondero family trust that, like the movant here in this Motion for Leave, was the holder of a limited partnership interest in Highland, and, as such, now has a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust—which had appealed a bankruptcy court order approving a Rule 9019 settlement on the same basis: Dugaboy did not meet the bankruptcy appellate standing test of being a "person aggrieved" by the entry of the settlement order. *The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, No. 22-10960, 2023 WL 4861770 (5th Cir. July 31, 2023). The July 31, 2023 ruling followed the Fifth Circuit's ruling on February 21, 2023, affirming the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy of yet another bankruptcy court order for lack of bankruptcy appellate standing. *The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, No. 22-10831, 2023 WL 2263022 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023). These rulings by the Fifth Circuit are discussed in greater detail below. The third ruling by the Fifth Circuit since July 14, 2023, was issued by the Fifth Circuit in a per curium opinion not designated for publication on July 26, 2023, this one affirming the district court's affirmance of yet another Rule 9019 settlement order of the bankruptcy court that was appealed by Dugaboy, agreeing with the district court that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to approve a settlement among the Debtor, an entity affiliated with the Debtor but not a debtor itself, and UBS (the Debtor's largest prepetition creditor and the seller of its claims to the Claims Purchasers, which is one of the claims trading transactions HMIT complains about in the Proposed Complaint). *See The Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.*, No. 22-10983, 2023 WL 4842320 (5th Cir. July 26, 2023).

Purchasers conspiracy theory espoused in the Motion for Leave—that Seery must have provided one or more of the Claims Purchasers with material nonpublic information to induce them to want to purchase large, allowed, unsecured claims at a discount; a *quid pro quo* is suggested, such that the Claims Purchasers were allegedly told they would make a hefty profit on the claims they purchased and, in return, they would gladly "rubber stamp" Seery's "excessive compensation" as the Claimant Trustee of the Claimant Trust. In sum, HMIT alleges this constituted wrongful "insider trading" of the bankruptcy claims. In addition, certain lawyers for Dondero and Dugaboy sent letters reporting this alleged conspiracy and "insider trading" to the Texas State Securities Board ("TSSB") and the Executive Office of the United States Trustee ("EOUST").

It is against this background and in this context that the court must analyze, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function under the confirmed Plan and its prior Gatekeeping Orders, whether HMIT should be allowed to pursue the Proposed Claims (i.e., whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims as contemplated under the Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan). The court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Leave on June 8, 2023 ("June 8 Hearing"), during which the court admitted exhibits and heard testimony from three witnesses both in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Leave. Having considered the Motion for Leave, the response of the Proposed Defendants thereto, HMIT's reply to the response, and the arguments and evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, the court denies HMIT's request for leave to pursue its Proposed Claims. The court's reasoning is set forth below.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Highland's Bankruptcy Case, Dondero's Removal as CEO, and the Plan

Highland was co-founded in Dallas in 1993 by Dondero and Mark Okada ("Okada"). It operated as a global investment adviser that provided investment management and advisory services and managed billions of dollars of assets, both directly and indirectly through numerous

affiliates. Highland's equity interest holders included HMIT (99.5%), Dugaboy (0.1866%), Okada, personally and through trusts (0.0627%), and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), which was wholly owned by Dondero and was the only general partner of Highland (0.25%). On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), Highland, with Dondero in control[10] and acting as its CEO, president, and portfolio manager, and facing a myriad of massive, business litigation claims – many of which had finally become or were about to be liquidated (after a decade or more of contentious litigation in multiple fora all over the world—filed for relief under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The bankruptcy case was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division in December 2019. The official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") (and later, the United States Trustee) expressed a desire for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee due to concerns over and distrust of Dondero, his numerous conflicts of interest, and his history of alleged mismanagement (and perhaps worse).

After many weeks under the specter of a possible appointment of a trustee, Highland and the Committee engaged in substantial and lengthy negotiations, resulting in a corporate governance settlement approved by this court on January 9, 2020.[11] As a result of this settlement, Dondero relinquished control of Highland and resigned his positions as officer or director of Highland and its general partner, Strand,[12] and three independent directors ("Independent Directors") were

[10] Mark Okada resigned from his role with Highland prior to the Petition Date.

[11] This order is hereinafter referred to as the "January 2020 Order" and was entered by the court on January 9, 2020 [Bankr. Dkt. No. 339] pursuant to the *Motion of the Debtor to Approve Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding the Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operation in the Ordinary Course* [Bankr. Dkt. No. 281].

[12] Dondero agreed to this settlement pursuant to a stipulation he executed and that was filed in connection with Highland's motion to approve the settlement. *See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement With the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in Ordinary Course* [Bankr. Dkt. No. 338].

chosen to lead Highland through its chapter 11 case: Seery, John S. Dubel, and retired bankruptcy judge Russell Nelms. Given the Debtor's perceived culture of constant litigation while Dondero was at the helm, it was purportedly not easy to get such highly qualified persons to serve as independent board members. At the hearing on the corporate governance settlement motion, the court heard credible testimony that none of the Independent Directors would have taken on the role without (1) an adequate directors and officers' ("D&O") insurance policy protecting them; (2) indemnification from Strand that would be guaranteed by the Debtor; (3) exculpation from mere negligence claims; and (4) a gatekeeper provision prohibiting the commencement of litigation against the Independent Directors without the bankruptcy court's prior authority. The gatekeeper provision approved by the court in its January 9 Order states,[13]

> No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director of Strand without the Court (i) first determining after notice that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence against Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors and (ii) specifically authorizing such entity to bring such claim. The Court will have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim for which approval of the Court to commence or pursue has been granted.

Dondero agreed to remain with Highland as an unpaid portfolio manager following his resignation and did so "subject at all times to the supervision, direction and authority of the Independent Directors" and to his agreement to "resign immediately" "[i]n the event the Independent Directors determine for any reason that the Debtor shall no longer retain Dondero as an employee"[14] and to "not cause any Related Entity to terminate any agreements with the Debtor."[15] The court later

[13] January 2020 Order, 3-4, ¶ 10.

[14] January 2020 Order, 3, ¶ 8.

[15] *Id.* at ¶ 9.

entered, on July 16, 2020, an order approving the appointment of Seery as Highland's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative,[16] which included essentially the same "gatekeeper" language with respect to the pursuit of claims against Seery acting in these roles. The gatekeeper provision in the July 2020 Order was essentially the same as the gatekeeper provision in the January 2020 Order:

> No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against Seery relating in any way to his role as the chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer of the Debtor without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining after notice that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence against Seery, and (ii) specifically authorizing such entity to bring such claim. The Bankruptcy Court shall have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate any such claim for which approval of the Court to commence or pursue has been granted.

July 2020 Order, 3, ¶5. Neither the January 2020 Order nor the July 2020 Order were appealed.

Throughout the summer of 2020, Dondero informally proposed several reorganization plans, none of which were embraced by the Committee or the Independent Directors. When Dondero's plans failed to gain support, he and entities under his control engaged in substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for Highland.[17] As the Fifth Circuit described the situation, after Dondero's plans failed "he and other creditors began to frustrate the proceedings by objecting to settlements, appealing orders, seeking writs of mandamus, interfering with Highland Capital's management, threatening employees, and canceling trades between Highland Capital and its clients."[18] On October 9, 2020, Dondero resigned from all positions with the Debtor and its

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[16] *See* the July 16, 2020 order approving the retention by Highland of Seery as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative, *nunc pro tunc*, to March 15, 2020 ("July 2020 Order") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 854].

[17] According to Seery's credible testimony during the hearing on confirmation of the Plan that had been negotiated between the Committee and the Independent Directors, Dondero had threatened to "burn the place down" if his proposed plan was not accepted. *See* Transcript of Confirmation Hearing dated February 3, 2021 at 105:10-20. Bankr. Dkt. No. #1894.

[18] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 426 (citing *Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Dondero (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, Ch. 11 Case No. 19-34054-SGJ11, Adv. No. 20-03190-SGJ11, 2021 WL 2326350, at *1, *26 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.

affiliates in response to a demand by the Independent Directors made after Dondero's purported threats and disruptions to the Debtor's operations.[19]

The Independent Directors and the Committee had negotiated their own plan of reorganization which culminated in the filing by Highland of its *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)* (the "Plan") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 1808] on January 22, 2021.[20] Highland had negotiated settlements with most of its major creditors following mediation and had amended its initially proposed plan to address the objections of most of its creditors, leaving only the objections of Dondero and entities under his control (the "Dondero Parties") at the time of the confirmation hearing,[21] which was held over two days in early February 2021. The Plan is essentially an "asset monetization" plan pursuant to which the Committee was dissolved, and four new entities were created: the Reorganized Debtor; a new general partner for the Reorganized Debtor called HCMLP GP, LLC; the Claimant Trust (administered by Seery, its trustee); and a Litigation Sub-Trust (administered by its trustee, Marc Kirschner). Highland's various servicing agreements were vested in the Reorganized Debtor, which continues to manage collateralized loan obligation vehicles ("CLOs") and various other investments postconfirmation. The Claimant Trust owns the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, HCMLP GP LLC, and the Litigation Sub-Trust and is charged with winding down the Reorganized Debtor over a three-year period by monetizing its assets and making

June 7, 2021) where this court "h[eld] Dondero in civil contempt, sanctioning him $100,000, and comparing this case to a 'nasty divorce.'").

[19] *See* Highland Ex. 13. The court shall refer to exhibits offered and admitted at the June 8 Hearing on the Motion for Leave by the Highland Parties as "Highland Ex. ___" and to exhibits offered and admitted by HMIT as "HMIT Ex. ___."

[20] The *Disclosure Statement for the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* was filed on November 24, 2020 ("Disclosure Statement") [Bankr. Dkt. No. 1473].

[21] The only other objection remaining was the objection of the United States Trustee to the Plan's exculpation, injunction, and release provisions.

distributions to Class 8 and Class 9 creditors as Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust is overseen by a Claimant Trust Oversight Board ("CTOB"), and pursuant to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement ("CTA"),[22] the CTOB approved Seery's compensation package as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee. Following their acquisition of their unsecured claims, representatives of Claims Purchasers Muck and Jessup became members of the CTOB.[23] Seery's compensation included the same base salary that he was receiving as CEO and CRO of Highland, plus an added incentive bonus tiered to recoveries and distributions to the creditors under the Plan. The Plan provides for the cancellation of the limited partnership interests in Highland held by HMIT, Dugaboy, and Okada and his family trusts in exchange for each holder's pro rata share of a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust ("Contingent Claimant Trust Interest"), as holders of allowed interests in Class 10 (holders of Class B/C limited partnership interests) or Class 11 (holders of Class A limited partnership interests) under the Plan.

B. Dondero Communicates Alleged Material Non-Public Information ("MNPI") to Seery, and Seery Allegedly Provides the MNPI to the Claims Purchasers in Furtherance of an Alleged Fraudulent Scheme to Have the Claims Purchasers "Rubber Stamp" His Compensation as Claimant Trustee Post-Confirmation

1. The December 17, 2020 MGM Email

Between Dondero's forced resignation from Highland in October 2020 and the confirmation hearing in February 2021, Dondero engaged in what appeared to be attempts to thwart, impede, and otherwise interfere with the Plan being proposed by the Independent Directors and the Committee. In the midst of this, on December 17, 2020, Dondero sent Seery[24] an email

[22] Highland Ex. 38

[23] The CTOB had three members: a representative of Muck (Michael Linn), a representative of Jessup (Christopher Provost), and an independent member (Richard Katz). *See* Joint Opposition ¶ 79.

[24] Dondero sent the email to others as well but did not copy counsel for the Independent Directors (including Seery) in violation of the terms of an existing temporary restraining order that enjoined Dondero from, among other things, "communicating . . . with any Board member" (including Seery) without including Debtor's counsel. Morris Dec. Ex. 23 ¶ 2(a). Citations to "Morris Dec. Ex. _" are to the exhibits attached to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support*

(the "MGM Email") that featured prominently in HMIT's Motion for Leave. According to HMIT and Dondero, the MGM Email contained material nonpublic information ("MNPI") regarding the possibility of an imminent acquisition of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"), likely by either Amazon or Apple.[25] At the time Dondero sent the MGM Email, Dondero sat on the board of directors of MGM, and the Debtor owned MGM stock directly. The Debtor also managed and partially owned a couple of other entities that owned MGM stock and managed various CLOs that owned some MGM stock as well. HMIT alleges now that Seery later misused and wrongfully disclosed to the Claims Purchasers this purported MNPI as part of a *quid pro quo* scheme, whereby the Claims Purchasers agreed to approve excessive compensation for Seery in the future (in exchange for him providing this allegedly "insider" information that inspired them to purchase unsecured claims with an alleged expectation of future large profits).[26] A timeline of events (in late 2020) in the weeks leading up to Dondero's MGM Email to Seery, following Dondero's departure from Highland, helps to put the email in full context:

- October 16: Dondero and his affiliates attempt to impede the Debtor's trading activities by demanding—with no legal basis—that Seery cease selling certain assets;[27]

- November 24: Bankruptcy Court enters an Order approving the Debtor's Disclosure Statement, scheduling the confirmation hearing on the Debtor's Plan for January 13, 2021, and granting related relief;[28]

- November 24–27: Dondero personally interferes with the Debtor's

of Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, Bankr. Dkt. No. 3784.

[25] *See* Proposed Complaint ¶ 45.

[26] *See id.* ¶ 3 ("Thus, acting within a cloak of secrecy, Seery provided close business acquaintances, the [Claims Purchasers], with material non-public information concerning the value of assets which they then used to purchase the largest approved unsecured claims."); ¶ 4 ("As part of the scheme, the [Claims Purchasers] obtained a position to approve Seery's ongoing compensation – to Seery's benefit and also to the detriment of the Claimant Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, and HMIT.").

[27] *See* Highland Ex. 14, Dondero-Related Entities' October 16, 2020 Letter; Highland Ex. 15, *Memorandum Opinion and Order Holding Dondero in Contempt for Violation of TRO*, 13-15.

[28] *See* Bankr. Dkt. No. 1476.

implementation of certain securities trades ordered by Seery;[29]

- November 30: The Debtor provides written notice of termination of certain shared services agreements it had with Dondero's two non-debtor affiliates, NexPoint Advisors, L.P. ("NexPoint") and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. ("HCMFA"; together with NexPoint, the "Advisors");[30]

- December 3: The Debtor makes written demands to Dondero and certain affiliates for payment of all amounts due under certain promissory notes they owed to the Debtor, that had an aggregate face amount of more than $60 million—this was part of creating liquidity for the Debtor's Plan;[31]

- December 3: Dondero responds with what appeared to be a threat of some sort to Seery in a text message: "***Be careful what you do -- last warning***;"[32]

- December 10: Dondero's interference and apparent threat cause the Debtor to seek and obtain a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Dondero;[33]

- December 16: This court denies as "frivolous" a motion filed by certain affiliates of Dondero, in which they sought "temporary restrictions" on certain asset sales;[34] and

- December 17: Dondero sends the unsolicited MGM Email[35] to Seery, which violates the TRO entered just a week earlier.[36]

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[29] *See* Highland Ex. 15, 30-36.

[30] Morris Decl. Ex. 17; *see also* Transcript of June 8, 2023 Hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave ("June 8 Hearing Transcript"), 273:23-24.

[31] Morris Decl. Exs. 18-21; *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:23-274:1.

[32] Morris Decl. Ex. 22 (emphasis added); *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:1-12 (where Seery testified about receiving the threat from Dondero: "A: [T]his came after he threatened me. He threatened me in writing. I'd never been threatened in my career. I've never heard of anyone else in this business who's been threatened in their career. So anything I would get from him, I was going to be highly suspicious.").

[33] *See* Morris Decl. Ex. 23, *Order Granting Debtor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Against James Dondero* entered December 10, 2020 [Adv. Pro. No. 20-3190 Dkt. No. 10].

[34] *See* Morris Decl. Ex. 24, Transcript of December 16, 2020 Hearing, 63:5-64:15.

[35] Highland Ex. 11.

[36] Seery testified at the June 8 Hearing that Dondero knowingly violated the TRO when he sent the MGM Email:

> [The MGM Email] . . . followed the imposition of a TRO for interfering with the business. He knew what was in the TRO and he knew what it applied to, and it restricted him from communicating with me or any of the other independent directors without Pachulski [Debtor's counsel] being on it. Furthermore, Pachulski had advised Dondero's counsel that not only could they not communicate with us, if they wanted to communicate they had to prescreen the topics. And how do we know that? Because Dondero filed a motion to modify the TRO. And that was all before this email.

June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:13-22.

The MGM Email had the subject line "Trading Restriction re MGM – material non public information" and stated:

> Just got off a pre board call, board call at 3:00. Update is as follows: Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in Data Room. Both continue to express material interest. Probably first quarter event, will update as facts change. Note also any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.[37]

Seery credibly testified at the June 8 Hearing that he was "highly suspicious" when he received the MGM Email. This was because, among other reasons, Dondero sent it ***after***: (i) unsuccessful efforts to impede the Debtor's trading activities (followed by the TRO); (ii) the "be careful what you do" text to Seery by Dondero: (iii) Highland's termination of its shared service arrangements with Dondero's various affiliated entities; (iv) the bankruptcy court's approval of the disclosure statement; and (v) Highland's demand to collect on the demand notes for which Dondero and his entities were liable.[38] Highland's Chapter 11 case was fast approaching the finish line. Moreover, MGM was already on the restricted list at Highland Capital, and had been for a long time, and Dondero would know this.[39] Still further, as of December 17, 2020 (the date Dondero sent the unsolicited MGM Email to Seery), Dondero no longer owed a duty of any kind to the Debtor or any entity controlled by the Debtor, having surrendered in January 2020 direct and indirect control of the Debtor to the Independent Board as part of the corporate governance settlement[40] and having resigned from all roles at the Debtor and affiliates in October 2020. Still further, Dondero—to the extent he was sharing with Seery MNPI that he obtained as a member of the board of directors of MGM—would have been violating his own fiduciary duties to MGM.

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[37] Highland Ex. 11.

[38] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 273:1-274:4.

[39] June 8 Hearing, 215:21-216:9.

[40] *See* Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 339, 354-1 (Term Sheet)).

In any event, in a declaration filed by Dondero in support of HMIT's Rule 202 petition in Texas state court for pre-suit discovery,[41] he indicated that his goal in sending the MGM E-mail was to impede the Debtor and Seery from engaging in any transactions involving MGM:

> On December 17, 2020, I sent an email to employees at HCM, including the then Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer Jim Seery, containing non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM. I became aware of this information due to my involvement as a member of the board of MGM. ***My purpose was to alert Seery and others that MGM stock, which was owned either directly or indirectly by HCM, should be on a restricted list and not be involved in any trades***.

It is noteworthy that ***Dondero's labeling of the MGM Email (in the subject line) as a communication containing "material non public information" did not make it so***. In fact, it appears from the credible evidence presented at the June 8, 2023 hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave that the MGM Email did not disclose information to Seery that was not already made available to the public at the time it was sent. Seery testified that he did not think the MGM Email contained MNPI and that he did not personally "take any steps . . . to make sure that MGM stock was placed on a restricted list at Highland Capital after [he] received [the MGM Email]" because—as earlier noted—"MGM was already on the restricted list at Highland Capital . . . before I got to Highland."[42] Indeed, MGM was ultimately purchased by Amazon after a sale process that had been quite publicly discussed in media reports for several months[43] and that was officially

[41] Highland Ex. 9 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).

[42] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 215:21-216:9. Seery elaborated upon further questioning from HMIT's counsel that he did not think the indications in the MGM Email (that came from a member of the board of directors of MGM) that "it was probably a first-quarter event" and that "Amazon and Apple were actively diligencing – are diligencing in the data room, both continue to express material interest" were not MNPI. *Id.*, 217:23-218:10. He testified that "it was clear [before he received the MGM Email] from the media reports and the actual quotes from Kevin Ulrich of Anchorage, who was the chairman at MGM, that a transaction would have to take place very quickly. And, in fact, the transaction did not take place in the first quarter." *Id.*, 219:3-7.

[43] *See* Highland Ex. 25 ("MGM has held preliminary talks with Apple, Netflix and other larger media companies . . . . MGM, in particular, seems like a logical candidate to sell this year. Its owners include Anchorage Capital, Highland Capital and Solus Alternative Asset Management, hedge funds that acquired the company out of bankruptcy in 2010.") (article dated 1/26/20); Highland Ex. 26 (describing prospects of an MGM sale, noting that, among its largest

announced to the public in late May 2021 (just a few weeks after the Claims Purchasers purchased some of their claims, but a few months ***before*** certain of their claims—the UBS claims—were purchased).[44] For example, as early as January 2020, Apple and Amazon were identified as being among a new group of "Big 6" global media companies, and MGM was identified as being a leading media acquisition target. Indeed, according to at least one media report on January 26, 2020, "MGM, in particular, seems like a logical candidate to sell this year" having already held "preliminary talks with Apple, Netflix and other larger media companies."[45] In October 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported that MGM's largest shareholder, Anchorage Capital Group ("Anchorage"), was facing mounting pressure to sell the company. Anchorage was led by Kevin Ulrich, who also served as Chairman of MGM's Board. The article reported that "[i]n recent months, Mr. Ulrich has said he is working toward a deal," and he specifically named Amazon and Apple as being among four possible buyers.[46] Thus, no one following the MGM story would have been surprised to learn in December 2020 that Apple and Amazon were conducting due diligence and had expressed "material interest" in acquiring MGM. Dondero testified during the June 8 Hearing that, at the time he sent the MGM Email, he "knew with certainty from the board level that Amazon had hit our price, and it was going to close in the next couple of months,"[47] that "as of December 17th, Amazon had made an offer that was acceptable to MGM, [and that] that's what the board meeting was. We were going into exclusive negotiations to culminate the merger with

shareholders, was "Highland Capital Management, LP") (article October 11, 2020). *See also* Highland Exs. 27-30 & 34 (various other articles regarding possible sale/suitors of MGM, dated in years 2020 and 2021, and ultimately announcing sale to Amazon on May 26, 2021, for $8.4 billion).

[44] The MGM-Amazon deal was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for approximately $6.1 billion, net of cash acquired, plus approximately $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid.

[45] Highland Ex. 25.

[46] Highland Ex. 26.

[47] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 127:2-4.

them."[48] Notwithstanding this testimony, Dondero eventually admitted (after a lengthy and torturous cross examination) that he did not actually communicate this supposed "inside" information to Seery in the MGM Email. He did not "say anything about Amazon hitting the price." He did not say anything about the MGM board going into exclusive negotiations with Amazon "to culminate the merger with them." Rather, he communicated information that Seery and any member of the public who cared to look could have gleaned from publicly available information as of December 17, 2020, regarding a much-written-about potential MGM transaction that involved interest from numerous companies, including, specifically, Amazon and Apple. When questioned why "[he felt] the need to mention Apple [in the MGM Email] if Amazon had already hit the price," Dondero simply answered, "The only way you generally get something done at attractive levels in business is if two people are interested," suggesting that he specifically ***did not*** communicate the purported inside information he obtained as a MGM board member—that Amazon had met MGM's strike price and that the MGM board was moving forward with exclusive negotiations with Amazon—because he wanted it to appear that there was still a competitive process going on that included both Amazon and Apple.[49]

Even if the MGM Email contained MNPI on the day it was sent (four months prior to the first of the Claim Purchases that occurred in April 2021), the information was fully and publicly disclosed to the market in the days and weeks that followed. For example, on December 21, 2020, just four days later, a Wall Street Journal article titled *MGM Holdings, Studio Behind 'James Bond,' Explores a Sale*, reported that MGM had "tapped investment banks Morgan Stanley and LionTree LLC and begun a formal sale process," and had "a market value of around $5.5 billion, based on privately traded shares and including debt." The Wall Street Journal Article reiterated

[48] *Id.*, 161:10-14.

[49] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 162:2-6.

that (i) Anchorage "has come under pressure in recent years from weak performance and defecting clients, and its illiquid investment in MGM has become a larger percentage of its hedge fund as it shrinks," and (ii) "Mr. Ulrich has told clients in recent months he was working toward a deal for the studio and has spoken of big technology companies as logical buyers."[50] (*Id*. Ex. 27.) The Wall Street Journal's reporting was picked up and expanded upon in other publications soon after. For example:

- On December 23, 2020, Business Matters published an article specifically identifying Amazon as a potential suitor for MGM. The article, titled *The world is net enough! Amazon joins other streaming services in £4bn bidding war for Bond films as MGM considers selling back catalogue*, cited the Wall Street Journal article and further reported that MGM "hopes to spark a battle that could interest streaming services such as Amazon Prime";[51]

- On December 24, 2020, an article in iDropNews specifically identified Apple as entering the fray. In an article titled *Could Apple be Ready to Gobble Up MGM Studios Entirely?*, the author observed that "it's now become apparent that MGM is actually up on the auction block," noting that the Wall Street Journal was "reporting that the studio has begun a formal sale process" and that Apple—with a long history of exploratory interest in MGM—would be a likely bidder;[52] and

- On January 15, 2021, Bulwark published an article entitled *MGM is For Sale (Again)* that identified attributes of MGM likely to appeal to potential purchasers and handicapped the odds of seven likely buyers—with Apple and Amazon named as two of three potential buyers most likely to close on an acquisition.[53]

Finally, Highland and entities it controlled did not sell their MGM stock while the MGM-Amazon deal was under discussion and/or not made public but, instead, they tendered their MGM holdings in connection with, and as part of, the ultimate MGM-Amazon transaction after it closed in March 2022.

[50] Highland Ex. 27.

[51] Highland Ex. 28.

[52] Highland Ex. 29.

[53] Highland Ex. 30.

2. No Evidence to Support HMIT/Dondero's Assumptions that Seery Shared Alleged MNPI in the MGM Email with Claims Purchasers

One of HMIT's allegations in the Proposed Complaint it seeks leave to file—which is central to HMIT's and Dondero's conspiracy theory—is that Seery shared the alleged MNPI from the MGM Email with the Claims Purchasers (or at least Farallon—the owner/affiliate of Muck, one of the Claims Purchasers) and that the Claims Purchasers only acquired the purchased claims ("Purchased Claims") based on, and because, of their receipt of the MNPI from Seery. HMIT essentially admits in the original version of its Motion for Leave that it has no direct evidence that Seery communicated the alleged MNPI to any of the Claims Purchasers. Rather, its allegation is based on inferences it wants the court to make based on "circumstantial" evidence and on the Dondero Declarations that were attached to the Motion for Leave, which described communications Dondero purportedly had with one or two representatives of Farallon in the "late spring" of 2021 concerning Farallon's recent acquisition of certain claims in the Highland bankruptcy case.[54] Based on these communications, HMIT and Dondero only assume Seery must have provided the MNPI about MGM to Farallon, which must have caused both Farallon and the other Claims Purchaser, Stonehill, to acquire the Purchased Claims.[55]

At the June 8 Hearing, HMIT offered Dondero's testimony that he had three telephone conversations with two representatives of Farallon, Mike Linn ("Linn") and Raj Patel ("Patel"),

[54] Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699) ¶ 1 and Ex. 3; *see also* Highland Ex. 9, *Declaration of James Dondero* (with Exhibit 1) dated February 15, 2023.

[55] Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699) ¶ 28. HMIT subsequently filed the final version of the Motion for Leave that was revised to withdraw the Dondero Declarations and delete all references therein to the Dondero Declarations (but, notably, leaving in the allegations that were based on the Dondero Declaration(s)). This was done after the court ruled that it would allow the Proposed Defendants to examine Dondero regarding his Declarations. HMIT contended at that point that the court should consider the Motion for Leave on a no-evidence Rule 12(b)(6) type basis (but could not explain why it had attached the Dondero Declarations as evidence that "supported" the Motion for Leave, if it believed no evidence should be considered). *See* Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3816) ¶ 28; *see also infra* pages 45 to 47 regarding the "sideshow" litigation that occurred prior to the June 8 Hearing over whether the hearing on the Motion for Leave would be an evidentiary hearing.

who allegedly told him that they purchased the claims without conducting any due diligence and based solely on Seery's assurances that the claims were valuable. These conversations allegedly took place on May 28, 2021—two days after the MGM-Amazon deal was officially announced to the public (on May 26, 2021). Dondero also testified that a photocopy of handwritten notes ("Dondero Notes")[56] (which were partially cut off) were notes he took contemporaneously with these short telephone conversations he initiated (one with Patel and two follow-up conversations with Linn).[57] He testified that his purpose in taking these notes and in initiating the phone calls was that "[w]e'd been trying nonstop to settle the case for two-plus years. . . . [a]nd when we heard the claims traded, we realized there were new parties to potentially negotiate to resolve the case . . . [s]o I reached out [to] the Farallon guys,"[58] and further, on *voir dire* from the Proposed Defendants' counsel, that the purpose of taking the notes was so that he had "a written record of the important points that [he] discussed . . . so I know how to address it the next time."[59] The handwritten notes[60] stated:

Raj Patel bought it because of Seery	*1*
50-70¢ not compelling	*2*
Class 8	*3*
Asked what would be compelling	*4*
-- No Offer	*5*
Bought in Feb/March timeframe	*6*
<u>Bought assets</u> w/ Claims	*7*
Offered him 40-50% premium	*8*
130% of cost; "Not Compelling"	*9*
No Counter; Told Discovery coming	*10*

[56] HMIT Ex. 4. The handwritten notes were admitted into evidence after *voir dire*, not for the truth of anything Patel or Linn allegedly said to him during the three telephone conversations, but as Dondero's "present sense impression" of the telephone conversations.

[57] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 133:1-136:3.

[58] *See id.*, 133:13-23.

[59] *See id.* (on *voir dire*), 144:1838-145:4.

[60] HMIT Ex. 4. The court has placed in a table and numbered each line for ease of reference. The table does not include the separate apparent partial date from the top left corner that Dondero testified was the date that he made the initial call to Patel: May 28, 2021.

On direct examination, Dondero testified that line 1 is what he wrote contemporaneously with the short call he initiated to Patel of Farallon in which Patel allegedly told Dondero "that he bought it because Seery told him to buy it and they had made money with Seery before"[61] and that Farallon "bought [the claim] because he was very optimistic regarding MGM"[62] before referring him to Linn, a portfolio manager at Farallon. Dondero testified that the rest of the handwritten notes (reflected in lines 2 through 10 of the table) were notes he took contemporaneously with two telephone conversations he had with Linn following his call to Patel, with lines 2-8 referring to Dondero's first call with Linn and lines 9 and 10 referring to his second call with Linn.[63] Dondero testified that the "50-70¢" in line 2 referred to his offer to Linn to pay 70 cents on the dollar to buy Farallon's[64] claims because "[w]e knew that they had – that the claims had traded around 50 cents" and "[w]e wanted to prevent the $5 million-a-month burn" (referring to attorney's fees in the Highland case) and that "not compelling Class 8" in lines 2-3 referred to Linn's response to him that the offer was not compelling.[65] Dondero testified that lines 4-5 referred to him asking Linn what amount would be compelling and to Linn's response that "he had no offer."[66] Dondero testified that lines 6-8 referred to Linn telling Dondero that Farallon bought the claims in the February, March timeframe and that Dondero told Linn that, given that the estate was spending $5 million a month on legal fees, Farallon should want to sell its claims and Linn's alleged response that "Seery told him it was worth a lot more."[67] Lastly, Dondero testified on direct examination

[61] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 134:7-10, 135:13-22.

[62] *Id.*, 139:3-11.

[63] *Id.*, 136:4-138:16.

[64] As noted above, Farallon did not acquire any of the Purchased Claims; rather, Farallon created a special purpose entity, Muck, to acquire the claims.

[65] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 136:4-16.

[66] *Id.*, 136:17-23.

[67] *Id.*, 137:6-138:7.

that the last two lines referred to a second telephone conversation he had with Linn in which Dondero offered 130 percent of cost for the claims and that Linn told him that the offer was not compelling, and he would not give a price at which he would sell.[68]

On cross-examination, Dondero acknowledged that, though he had testified that the handwritten notes were intended to be a written record of the important points from the telephone conversations he had with Patel and Linn, there was no mention in the notes of: (1) MGM: (2) or that Farallon was very optimistic about MGM; (3) the sharing of MNPI; (4) a *quid pro quo;* or (5) Seery's compensation, and that his last note—"Told Discovery coming"—was a reference to Dondero telling Linn (not Linn telling Dondero) that discovery was coming in response to Dondero's own supposition that Farallon must have traded on MNPI.[69] Cross-examination also revealed that Farallon never told Dondero that Seery gave them MNPI, and that Dondero only ***believed*** Seery ***must have*** given Farallon MNPI, because Farallon (Patel and Linn) had told him that the only reason Farallon bought their claims was because of their prior dealings with Seery, which Dondero took to mean that they had conducted no due diligence on their own prior to acquiring the claims. Dondero also testified that he did not have any personal knowledge as to how Seery's compensation package, as CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trustee, was determined because he was "not involved" in the setting of Seery's compensation pursuant to the Claimant Trust[70] and that he never discussed Seery's compensation with Farallon.[71]

As noted earlier, Dondero attempted to obtain discovery from the Claims Purchasers in a Texas state court pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Texas state

[68] *Id.*, 138:8-22.

[69] *Id.*, 190:14-191:25. Dondero testified that he told Linn that discovery "would be coming in the next few weeks" and noted that "this has been a couple years. . . . [w]e've been trying for two years to get . . . discovery in this."

[70] *Id.*, 200:13-201:1.

[71] *Id.*, 208:23-209:8.

court denied the First Rule 202 petition on June 1, 2022, after having considered the amended petition, the responses, the record, applicable authorities and having conducted a hearing on the petition on June 1, 2022.[72]

3. Dondero Unsuccessfully Seeks Discovery and to Have Various Agencies and Courts Outside of the Bankruptcy Court Acknowledge His Insider Trading Theories

Dondero acknowledged at the June 8 Hearing that the verified petition ("First Rule 202 Petition") he signed and filed on July 22, 2021, in the first Texas Rule 202 proceeding—just weeks after his telephone calls with Linn and Patel—was true and accurate. In it, he swore under oath as to what Linn told him in the telephone call concerning Farallon's purchase of the claims, and the only reason he gave for wanting discovery was that Linn told him Farallon bought the claims "sight unseen—relying entirely on Seery's advice solely because of their prior dealings."[73] Dondero acknowledged, as well, that his sworn statement that he filed in support of an amended verified Rule 202 petition filed in the same Texas Rule 202 proceeding, but nearly ten months later (in May 2022), described the same telephone conversation he had with Linn, and it did not mention MGM at all and did not say that Linn told him that Seery gave him MNPI; rather, the sworn statement stated only that "On a telephone call between Petitioner and Michael Lin[n], a representative of Farallon, Mr. Lin[n] informed Petitioner that Farallon had purchased the claims sight unseen and with no due diligence—100% relying on Seery's say-so because they had made so much money in the past when Seery told them to purchase claims" and that Linn did not tell him that Seery gave them MNPI, but he concluded that Seery gave Farallon MNPI based on what Linn did tell him.[74]

[72] Highland Ex. 7.

[73] *Id.*, 193:8-194:16; Highland Ex. 3, *Verified Petition to Take Deposition before Suit and Seek Documents*, ¶ 21. The first Texas Rule 202 proceeding in which Dondero sought discovery regarding the Farallon acquisition of its claims was brought by Dondero, individually, in the 95th Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas.

[74] *Id.*, 195:11-197:17; Highland Ex. 4, *Amended Verified Petition to Take Deposition before Suit and Seek Documents*, ¶ 23.

Nine days later, Dondero filed a declaration in the same proceeding, in which he described the same call with Linn as follows:[75]

> Last year, I called Farallon's Michael Lin[n] about purchasing their claims in the bankruptcy. I offered them 30% more than what they paid. I was told by Michael Lin[n] of Farallon that they purchased the interests without doing any due diligence other than what Mr. James Seery—the CEO of Highland—told them, and that he told them that the interests would be worth far more than what Farallon paid. Given the value of those claims that Seery had testified in court, it made no sense to me that Mr. Lin[n] would think that the claims were worth more than what Seery testified under oath was the value of the bankruptcy claims.

Dondero further stated in his declaration that "I have an interest in ensuring that the claims purchased by [Farallon] are not used as a means to deprive the equity holders of their share of the funds," and that "[i]t has become obvious that despite the fact that the bankruptcy estate has enough money to pay all claimants 100 cents on the dollar, there is plainly a movement afoot to drain the bankrupt estate and deprive equity of their rights. Accordingly, "I commissioned an investigation by counsel who have been in communication with the Office of the United States Trustee."[76] Dondero attached as Exhibit A to his declaration a letter from Douglas Draper ("Draper"), an attorney with the law firm of Heller, Draper & Horn, L.L.C. in New Orleans, to the office of the General Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, dated October 5, 2021, in which Draper opens the letter by stating that "[t]he purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the [Creditors' Committee] in the bankruptcy of [Highland]," and later noted that he "became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of [Dugaboy], an irrevocable trust of which Dondero is the primary beneficiary."[77] Mr. Draper laid out the same allegations of insider claims trading, breach of

[75] Highland Ex. 5, ¶ 2.
[76] *Id.*, ¶¶ 3-4.
[77] *Id.*, Ex. A, 1-2.

fiduciary duties, and conspiracy that HMIT seeks to bring in the Proposed Complaint.[78] The U.S. Trustee's office took no action. Dondero made a second and third attempt to get the U.S. Trustee's office to conduct an investigation into the same allegations laid out in Draper's letter, this time in "follow-up" letters to the Office of the U.S. Trustee on November 3, 2021, and six months later, on May 11, 2022, through another lawyer, Davor Rukavina ("Rukavina"), in which Rukavina wrote "to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the [Highland] bankruptcy."[79] Again, the U.S. Trustee's office took no action.

On February 15, 2023, Dondero filed yet another sworn statement about his alleged conversation with Linn, this time in support of a Verified Rule 202 Petition ***filed by HMIT*** ("Second Rule 202 Petition"), filed in a different Texas state court (Texas District Court, 191st Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas), following Dondero's unsuccessful attempts throughout 2021 and 2022 to obtain discovery in the First Rule 202 proceeding and based on the same allegations of misconduct by Seery and Farallon.[80] In this new sworn statement, Dondero describes for the first time the "call" he had with Linn as having been "phone calls" with Patel and Linn and ***mentions MGM*** and Farallon's alleged optimism about the ***expected sale of MGM***:[81]

> In late Spring of 2021, I had phone calls with two principals at Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Raj Patel and Michael Linn. During these phone calls, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn informed me that Farallon had a deal in place to purchase the Acis and HarbourVest claims, which I understood to refer to claims that were a part of settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn stated that Farallon agreed to purchase these claims based solely on conversations with Seery because they had made significant profits when Seery told them to purchase other claims in the past. They also stated that they were particularly optimistic because of the expected sale of MGM.

[78] *Id.*, Ex. A, 6-11.

[79] HMIT Ex. 61.

[80] Highland Ex. 9.

[81] *Id.*, ¶ 4.

The Second Rule 202 Petition was also denied by the second Texas state court on March 8, 2023.[82]

HMIT, in an apparent attempt to provide support for its argument that the Proposed Claims are "colorable," stated in its Motion for Leave that "[t]he Court also should be aware that the Texas States [sic] Securities Board ("TSSB") opened an investigation into the subject matter of the insider trades at issue, and this investigation has not been closed. The continuing nature of this investigation underscores HMIT's position that the claims described in the attached Adversary Proceeding are plausible and certainly far more than merely 'colorable.'"[83] But, two days before opposition briefing was due, on May 9, 2023, the TSSB issued a letter ("TSSB Letter") to Highland, informing it that "[t]he staff of the [TSSB] has completed its review of the complaint received by the Staff against [Highland]. The issues raised in the complaint and information provided to our Agency were given full consideration, and a decision was made that no further regulatory action is warranted at this time."[84] HMIT's counsel (frankly, to the astonishment of the court) objected to the admission of the TSSB Letter at the June 8 Hearing "on the grounds of relevance, 403, hearsay, and authenticity . . . [a]nd I also . . . think it's important that the decision by a regulatory body has no bearing on this cause of action or the colorability of this claim, and the Texas State Securities Board will tell you that. This is completely and utterly irrelevant to your inquiry."[85] The court overruled HMIT's objection to the relevance of this exhibit—considering, among other things, that HMIT, in its Motion for Leave, specifically mentioned the allegedly open TSSB "investigation" as relevant evidence the court "should be aware" of in making its determination of whether the Proposed Claims were "colorable."[86]

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[82] Highland Ex. 10.

[83] Motion for Leave, ¶ 37.

[84] *See* Highland Ex. 33.

[85] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 323:22-324:3.

[86] *Id.*, 324:4-328:2.

C. Claims Purchasers Purchase Claims and File Notices of Transfers of Claims

To be clear about the time line here, it was after confirmation of the Plan but prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, that the Claims Purchasers: (1) purchased several large unsecured claims that had been allowed following, and as part of, Rule 9019 settlements, each of which were approved by the bankruptcy court, after notice and hearing, prior to the confirmation hearing; and (2) filed notices of the transfers of those claims pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The noticing of the claims transfers began on April 16, 2021, with the notice of transfer of the claim held by Acis Capital Management to Muck, and ended on August 9, 2021, with the notices of transfers of the claims held by UBS Securities to Muck and Jessup:

Claimant(s)	Date Filed/ Claim No.	Asserted Amount	Claim Settled/Allowed? If so, Amount	Date Filed/ Rule 3001 Notice Dkt. No.
Acis Capital Management LP and Acis Capital Management, GP LLC (together, "Acis")	12/31/2019 Claim No. 23	$23,000,000	Yes[87] $23,000,000	4/16/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2215 (Muck)
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (the "Redeemer Committee")	4/3/2020 Claim No. 72	$190,824,557	Yes[88] $137,696,610	4/30/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2261 (Jessup)
HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, LP, HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF, LP, HarbourVest Partners LP, HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment LP, HV International VIII Secondary LP, HarbourVest Skew Base AIF LP (the "HarbourVest Parties")	4/8/2020 Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154	Unliquidated	Yes[89] $80,000,000 in aggregate ($45,000,000 General Unsecured Claim, and $35,000,000 subordinated claim)	4/30/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2263 (Muck)

[87] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1302. The Debtor's settlement with Acis was approved over the objection of Dondero. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1121.

[88] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1273.

[89] Bankr. Dkt. No. 1788. The Debtor's settlement with the HarbourVest Parties was approved over the objections of Dondero, Bankr. Dkt. No. 1697, and Dugaboy and the Get Good Trust. Bankr. Dkt. No. 1706.

UBS Securities LLC, UBS AG, London Branch (the "UBS Parties")	6/26/2020 Claim Nos. 190, 191	$1,039,957,799.40	Yes[90] $125,000,000 in aggregate ($65,000,000 General	8/9/2021 Bankr. Dkt. No. 2698 (Muck) and Bankr. Dkt. No. 2697 (Jessup)

HMIT insists that it "made no sense" for the Claims Purchasers to buy the Purchased Claims because "the publicly available information [] did not offer a sufficient potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk," and "their investment was projected to yield a small return with virtually no margin for error."[91] Dondero testified that it was ***his*** view that there was insufficient information in the public to justify the claims purchases.[92] But, HMIT's arguments here are contradicted by the information that was publicly available to Farallon and Stonehill at the time of their purchases and by HMIT's own allegations. In advance of Plan confirmation, Highland projected that Class 8 general unsecured creditors would recover 71.32% on their allowed claims. In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT sets forth the amounts the Claims Purchasers purportedly paid for their claims.[93] Taking into account the face amount of the allowed claims, the Claims Purchasers' projected profits (in millions of dollars) were as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Ascribed Value[94]	Purchaser	Purchase Price	Projected Profit
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	$97.71	Stonehill	$78.0	$19.71
Acis	$23.0	$0.0	$16.4	Farallon	$8.0	$8.40

[90] Bankr. Dkt. No. 2389. The Debtor's settlement with the UBS Parties was approved over the objections of Dondero, Dkt. No. 2295, and Dugaboy and the Get Good Trust. Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 2268, 2293.

[91] Proposed Complaint, ¶ 3.

[92] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 187:3-7 ("Q: And it's your testimony that there wasn't sufficient information in the public for them to buy – this is your view – that there wasn't sufficient information in the public to justify their purchases. Is that your view? A: Correct.).

[93] *Id.*, ¶ 42.

[94] "Ascribed Value" is derived by multiplying the Class 8 amount by the projected recovery of 71.32% for that class.

HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	$32.09	Farallon	$27.0	$5.09
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	$46.39	Stonehill & Farallon	$50.0	($3.61)

As HMIT acknowledges, by the time Dondero spoke with Farallon in the "late spring" of 2021, the Claims Purchasers had acquired the allowed claims previously held by Acis, Redeemer, and HarbourVest.[95] Based on an aggregate purchase price of $113 million for these three claims, the Claims Purchasers would have expected to net over $33 million in profits, or nearly 30% on their investment, had Highland met its projections. The Claims Purchasers would make even more money if Highland beat its projections, because they also purchased the Class 9 claims and would therefore capture any upside. In this context, HMIT's and Dondero's assertions that it did not "make any sense" for the Claims Purchasers to purchase their claims when they did does not pass muster—given the publicly available information about potential recoveries under the Plan. Dondero even acknowledged, on cross-examination, that he was prepared to pay ***30 percent more*** than Farallon had paid, even though he did not think there was sufficient public information available to justify Farallon's purchase of the claims.[96] Dondero essentially testified that he wanted to purchase Farallon's claims because he wanted to be in a position of control to force a settlement or resolution of the bankruptcy case, post-confirmation, under terms acceptable to him. He did not want to try to settle by negotiating with Farallon and Stonehill ***as creditors***, but instead he wanted to purchase the claims because "if we owned all the claims, it would settle the case."[97]

[95] *See* Complaint, ¶ 41 n.12. The UBS claims were not acquired until August 2021, long after the alleged "*quid pro quo*" was supposedly agreed upon and the MGM-Amazon deal was announced in the press in late May 2021. *See*, Highland Ex. 34, *Amazon's $8.45 Billion Deal for MGM is Historic But Feels Mundane* (dated May 26, 2021).

[96] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 187:8-11.

[97] *Id.*, 187:12-189:10.

D. Fifth Circuit's Approval of the Gatekeeper Provision in Plan, Recognition of Res Judicata Effect of the Prior Gatekeeper Orders, and the Bankruptcy Court's Order Approving Highland's Motion to Conform Plan

Harkening back to February 22, 2021, after a robust confirmation hearing, this court entered its order confirming the Plan, over the objections of Dondero and Dondero-Related Parties, specifically questioning the good faith of their objections. The court found, after noting "the remoteness of their economic interests" that "[it] has good reason to believe that [the Dondero Parties] are not objecting to protect economic interests they have in the Debtor but to be disruptors. Dondero wants his company back. This is understandable, but it is not a good faith basis to lob objections to the Plan."[94] The Plan became effective on August 11, 2021.

Of relevance to the Motion for Leave, the confirmed Plan included certain exculpations, releases, and injunctions designed to protect the Debtor and other bankruptcy participants from bad-faith litigation. These participants included: Highland's employees (with certain exceptions); Seery as Highland's CEO and CRO; Strand (after the appointment of the Independent Directors); the Independent Directors; the successor entities; the CTOB and its members; the Committee and its members; professionals retained in the case; and all "Related Persons." The injunction provisions contained a Gatekeeper Provision which is similar to the gatekeeper provisions in the prior Gatekeeper Orders in that it provided that the bankruptcy court will act as a "gatekeeper" to screen and prevent bad-faith litigation against the Protected Parties. The Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan states, in pertinent part:[98]

> No Enjoined Party may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Protected Party that arose or arises from or is related to the Chapter 11 Case . . . without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining, after notice and a hearing, that such claim or cause of action represents ***a colorable claim of any kind***, including, but not limited to, negligence, bad faith, criminal misconduct, willful misconduct, fraud, or gross negligence against a Protected Party and (ii) specifically

[98] Plan, 50-51 (emphasis added).

> authorizing such Enjoined Party to bring such claim or cause of action against such Protected Party.

The Plan defines Protected Parties as,

> collectively, (i) the Debtor and its successors and assigns, direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries, and the Managed Funds, (ii) the Employees, (iii) Strand, (iv) the Reorganized Debtor, (v) the Independent Directors, (vi) the Committee, (vii) the members of the Committee (in their official capacities), (viii) the Claimant Trust, (ix) the Claimant Trustee, (x) the Litigation Sub-Trust, (xi) the Litigation Trustee, (xii) the members of the [CTOB] (in their official capacities), (xiii) [HCMLP GP LLC], (xiv) the Professionals retained by the Debtor and the Committee in the Chapter 11 Case, (xv) the CEO/CRO; and (xvi) the Related Persons of each of the parties listed in (iv) through (xv); [but excluding Dondero and Okada and various entities including HMIT and Dugaboy].

The court notes that the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan provides protection to a broader number of persons than the persons protected under the January 2020 Order (addressing the Independent Directors and their agents and advisors) and the July 2020 Order (addressing Seery in his role as CEO and CRO of the Debtor). But, at the same time, it is less restrictive than the gatekeeping provisions under the Gatekeeper Orders, in that the gatekeeping provisions in the prior orders shield the protected parties from any claim that is not both "colorable" ***and*** a claim for "willful misconduct or gross negligence," effectively providing the protected parties under the prior orders with a limited immunity from claims of simple negligence or breach of contract that do not rise to the level of "willful misconduct or gross negligence," whereas the Gatekeeping Provision under the Plan does not act as a release or exculpation of the Protected Parties in any way because it does not prohibit any party from bringing ***any kind of claim*** against a Protected Party, provided the proposed claimant first obtains a finding in the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims are "colorable."[99]

[99] It should be noted that--as discussed further below--there are, separately in the Plan, exculpations as to a smaller universe of persons--*e.g.,* the Debtor, the Committee and its members, and the Independent Directors.

Dondero and some of the entities under his control appealed[100] the Confirmation Order directly to the Fifth Circuit, arguing, among other issues, that the Plan's exculpation, release, and injunction provisions, including the Gatekeeper Provision (collectively, the "Protection Provisions") impermissibly provide certain non-debtor bankruptcy participants with a discharge, purportedly in contravention of the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 524(e)'s statutory bar on non-debtor discharges. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit, "affirm[ed] the confirmation order in large part" and "reverse[d] ***only insofar as the plan exculpates*** certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strik[ing] those few parties ***from the plan's exculpation***, and affirm[ed] on all remaining grounds."[101] The Fifth Circuit specifically found the "injunction and gatekeeping provisions [to be] sound" and found that it was only "the ***exculpation*** of certain non-debtors" that "exceed[ed] the bankruptcy court's authority," agreeing with the bankruptcy court's conclusions that the Protection Provisions were legal, necessary under the circumstances, and in the best interest of all parties" in part, and only disagreeing to the extent that the ***exculpation*** provision improperly extended to certain bankruptcy participants other than Highland, the Committee and its members, and the Independent Directors and "revers[ing] and strik[ing] the few unlawful parts

[100] On appeal, the appellant funds ("Funds"), whom this court found to be "owned and/or controlled" by Dondero despite their purported independence, also asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate this court's factual finding "because it threatens the Funds' compliance with federal law and damages their reputations and values" and because "[a]ccording to the Funds, the characterization is unfair, as *they* are not litigious like Dondero and are completely independent from him." *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.)*, 48 F.4th at 434. Applying the "clear error" standard of review, the Fifth Circuit "le[ft] the bankruptcy court's factual finding undisturbed" because "nothing in this record leaves us with a firm and definite conviction that the bankruptcy court made a mistake in finding that the Funds are 'owned and/or controlled by [Dondero]." *Id.* at 434-35.

[101] *See supra* note 4. The Fifth Circuit replaced its initial opinion with its final opinion a few days after certain appellants had filed a short (four-and-one-half pages) motion for rehearing (the "Motion for Rehearing") on September 2, 2022. The movants had asked the Fifth Circuit to "narrowly amend the [initial] Opinion in order to confirm the Court's holding that the impermissibly exculpated parties are similarly struck from the protections of the injunction and gatekeeper provisions of the plan (in other words, that such parties cannot constitute 'Protected Parties')." In the final Fifth Circuit opinion, same as the initial Fifth Circuit opinion, the Fifth Circuit stated that, with regard to the Confirmation Order, the panel would "reverse only insofar as the plan exculpates certain non-debtors in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524(e), strike those few parties from the plan's exculpation, and affirm on all remaining grounds." *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 424. No findings, discussion, or rulings regarding the injunction and gatekeeper provisions that were in the initial Fifth Circuit opinion were disturbed.

of the Plan's ***exculpation provision***."[102] The Fifth Circuit then remanded to the Bankruptcy Court "for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion."[103]

In the course of analyzing the Protection Provisions under the Plan, the Fifth Circuit noted that the protection provisions in the January and July 2020 Orders appointing the Independent Directors and Seery as CEO and CRO of Highland were *res judicata* and that "*those* orders have the effect of exculpating the Independent Directors and Seery in his executive capacities" such that "[d]espite removal from the exculpation provision in the confirmation order, the Independent Directors' agents, advisors, and employees, as well as Seery in his official capacities are all exculpated to the extent provided in the January and July 2020 Orders."[104]

The Reorganized Debtor filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to conform the plan to the Fifth Circuit's mandate, proposing that only one change was needed to make the Plan compliant with the Fifth Circuit's ruling: narrow the defined term for "Exculpated Parties" to read as follows:

> "Exculpated Parties" means, collectively, (i) the Debtor, (ii) the Independent Directors, (iii) the Committee, and (iv) members of the Committee (in their official capacities).

The Reorganized Debtor proposed that this one simple revision of this defined term removed the exculpations deemed by the Fifth Circuit to violate section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, and that no other changes would be required to conform the Plan and Confirmation Order to the Fifth Circuit's mandate. Some of the Dondero-related entities objected to the motion to conform, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's ruling required more surgery on the Plan than simply narrowing the defined term "Exculpated Parties." On February 27, 2023, this court entered its order granting

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[102] *Id.* at 435.

[103] *Id.* at 440. The Fifth Circuit's docket reflects that it issued its Judgment and mandate on September 12, 2022.

[104] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 438 n.15. The Fifth Circuit stated, "To the extent Appellants seek to roll back the protections in the bankruptcy court's January 2020 and July 2020 orders (which is not clear from their briefing), such a collateral attack is precluded." *Id.*

Highland's motion to conform the Plan, ordering that one change be made to the Plan – revising the definition of "Exculpated Parties" – and no more.[105] The objecting parties' direct appeal of this order has been certified to the Fifth Circuit and is one of the numerous currently active appeals by Dondero-related parties pending in the Fifth Circuit.

E. HMIT's Motion for Leave

HMIT filed its emergency Motion for Leave on March 28, 2023, which, with attachments, as first filed, was 387 pages in length, including an initial proposed complaint ("Initial Proposed Complaint") and two sworn declarations of Dondero that were attached as "objective evidence" in "support[ ]" of the Motion for Leave,[106] and with it, an application for an emergency setting on the hearing on the Motion to Leave. On April 23, 2023, HMIT filed a pleading entitled a "supplement" to its Motion to Leave ("Supplement"),[107] to which it attached a revised proposed verified complaint ("Proposed Complaint")[108] as Exhibit 1-A to the Motion for Leave and stated that "[t]he Supplement is not intended to amend or supersede the [Motion for Leave]; rather, it is intended as a supplement to address procedural matters and to bring forth additional facts that further confirm the appropriateness of the derivative action."[109] The HMIT Motion for Leave was later amended to eliminate the Dondero Declarations and references to the same (but not the underlying allegations that were supposedly supported by the Dondero Declarations).[110]

[105] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3672.

[106] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3699.

[107] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3760.

[108] *See supra* note 5.

[109] Supplement ¶ 1.

[110] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3815 and 3816. Both of these filings had the Initial Proposed Complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion for Leave.

As earlier noted, HMIT desires leave to sue the Proposed Defendants regarding ***the post-confirmation, pre-Effective Date purchase of allowed unsecured claims***. The Proposed Defendants would be:

> **Seery,** who was a stranger to Highland until approximately four months following the Petition Date when he was brought in as one of the three Independent Directors, and now serves as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and the Trustee of the Claimant Trust (and also was previously Highland's CRO during the case, then CEO, and, also, an Independent Board Member of Highland's general partner during the Highland case). Seery is best understood as the man who took Dondero's place running Highland—per the request of the Committee.
>
> **Claims Purchasers,** who were strangers to Highland until the end of the bankruptcy case. They are identified as Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), which was a special purpose entity created by Farallon to purchase unsecured claims against Highland; Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), which was a special purpose entity created by Stonehill to purchase unsecured claims against Highland (collectively, the "Claims Purchasers"). The Claims Purchasers purchased $240 million face value of already-allowed unsecured claims post-confirmation and pre-Effective Date in the spring of 2021 and another $125 million face value of already-allowed unsecured claims in August 2021. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) notices—giving notice of same—were filed on the bankruptcy clerk's docket regarding these purchases. The claims had previously been held by the creditors known as the Crusader Redeemer Committee, Acis Capital, HarbourVest, and UBS (three of these four creditors formerly served on the Committee during the Highland bankruptcy case).
>
> **John Doe Defendants Nos. 1-10**, which are described to be "currently unknown individuals or business entities who may be identified in discovery as involved in the wrongful transactions at issue."
>
> **Highland,** as a nominal defendant. HMIT added Highland as a nominal defendant in the Revised Proposed Complaint attached to the Supplement.
>
> **Claimant Trust**, as a nominal defendant. HMIT added the Claimant Trust as a nominal defendant in the Revised Proposed Complaint attached to the Supplement.

The proposed plaintiffs would be:

> **HMIT,** which, again, was the largest equity holder in Highland and held a 99.5% limited partnership interest (specifically, Class B/C limited partnership interests). HMIT is the holder of a Class 10 interest under the Plan, pursuant to which HMIT's limited partnership interest in Highland was extinguished as of the Effective Date in exchange for a pro rata share of a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust.

Highland, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor.

Claimant Trust, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT asserts the following six counts: Count I (against Seery) for breach of fiduciary duties; Count II (against the Claims Purchasers and John Doe Defendants) for knowing participation in breach of fiduciary duties; Count III (against all Proposed Defendants) for conspiracy; Count IV (against Muck and Jessup) for equitable disallowance of their claims; Count V (against all Proposed Defendants) for unjust enrichment and constructive trust; and Count VI (against all Proposed Defendants) for declaratory relief.[111] The gist of the Proposed Complaint is as follows. HMIT asserts that something seems amiss regarding the post-confirmation/pre-Effective Date purchase of claims by the Claims Purchasers. Actually, more bluntly, HMIT asserts that "wrongful conduct occurred" and "improper trades" were made.[112] HMIT believes the Claims Purchasers paid around $160 million for the $365 million face amount of claims they purchased. HMIT believes that this amount was too high for any rational claim purchaser (particularly hedge funds who expect high returns) to have paid for the claims—based on Highland's Disclosure Statement and Plan projections regarding the projected distributions under the Plan to holders of allowed unsecured claims. And, of course, Dondero purports to have concluded from the three phone conversations he had with representatives of one of the Claims Purchasers that they did no due diligence before purchasing the claims. Therefore, HMIT surmises, Seery must have given these Claims Purchasers MNPI regarding Highland that convinced them that it was to their economic advantage to purchase the claims. In particular, HMIT surmises Seery must have shared

[111] In the Initial Proposed Complaint, HMIT proposed to bring claims against the various Proposed Defendants in seven counts, including a count for fraud by misrepresentation and material nondisclosure against all Proposed Defendants. In the Proposed Complaint, HMIT abandons its claim for fraud by misrepresentation and material nondisclosure.

[112] Motion for Leave, 7.

MNPI regarding the likely imminent sale of MGM, in which Highland had, directly and indirectly, substantial holdings. As noted earlier, MGM was ultimately purchased by Amazon after a sale process that had been quite publicly discussed in media reports for several months and that was officially announced to the public in late May 2021 (just a few weeks after the Claims Purchasers purchased some of their claims, but a few months ***before*** certain of their claims—the UBS claims—were purchased).[113] In summary, while the Proposed Complaint is lengthy and at times hard to follow, it boils down to allegations that: (a) Seery filed (or caused to be filed) deflated, pessimistic, misleading projections regarding the value of the Debtor's estate in connection with the Plan, (b) then induced very sophisticated unsecured creditors to discount and sell their claims to the likewise very sophisticated Claims Purchasers, (c) which Claims Purchasers are allegedly friendly with Seery, and are now happily approving Seery's allegedly excessive compensation demands post-Effective Date (resulting in less money in the pot to pay off the creditor body in full, and, thus, a diminished likelihood that HMIT will realize any recovery on its contingent Class 10 interest). HMIT argues that Seery should be required to disgorge his compensation. It appears that HMIT also seeks other damages in the form of equitable disallowance of the Claims Purchasers' claims and disgorgement of distributions on account of those claims, the imposition of a constructive trust over all disgorged funds, and declaratory relief.

HMIT claims that, in seeking to file the Proposed Complaint, it is seeking to protect the rights and interests of the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and "innocent stakeholders" who were allegedly injured by Seery's and the Claims Purchasers' alleged conspiratorial and

[113] The MGM-Amazon deal was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for approximately $6.1 billion, net of cash acquired, plus approximately $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid. Credible testimony from Seery at the June 8 Hearing revealed that Highland and entities it controlled tendered their MGM holdings in connection with the Amazon transaction (they did not sell their holdings while the MGM-Amazon deal was under discussion and/or not made public).

fraudulent scheme to line Seery's pockets with excessive compensation for his role as Claimant Trustee. In its Motion for Leave, HMIT states that "[t]he attached Adversary Proceeding alleges claims which are substantially more than 'colorable' based upon plausible allegations that the Proposed Defendants, acting in concert, perpetrated a fraud, including a fraud upon innocent stakeholders, as well as breaches of fiduciary duties and knowing participation in (or aiding or abetting) breaches of fiduciary duty."[114]

F. Is HMIT Really Dondero by Another Name?

The Proposed Defendants argue that HMIT's Motion for Leave is nothing more than a continuation of the harassing and bad-faith litigation by Dondero and his related entities that the Gatekeeper Provisions were intended to prevent and, thus, this is one of multiple reasons that the Motion for Leave should be denied.

To be clear, HMIT asserts that it is controlled by Mark Patrick ("Patrick"), who has been HMIT's administrator since August 2022. Patrick asserts that he is not influenced or controlled by Dondero, in general, and specifically not in its efforts to pursue the Proposed Claims against Seery and the Claims Purchasers. However, the testimony elicited at the June 8 Hearing—the hearing at which HMIT had the burden of showing the court that its Proposed Claims were "colorable" such that it should be allowed to pursue them through the filing of the Proposed Complaint—paints a different picture. Somewhat tellingly, HMIT chose not to call Patrick—allegedly HMIT's only representative and control person—as a witness in support of its Motion for Leave. Rather, Dondero was HMIT's first witness called in support of its motion, and the first

[114] *See* Motion for Leave (Bankr. Dkt. No. 3816) ¶ 3. HMIT notes, in a footnote 6, that "Neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to challenge the Court's Orders or the Plan. In addition, neither this Motion nor the proposed Adversary Complaint seeks to redistribute the assets of the Claimant Trust in a manner that would adversely impact innocent creditors. Rather, the proposed Adversary Proceeding seeks to benefit all innocent stakeholders while working within the terms and provisions of the Plan, as well as the Claimant Trust Agreement."

questions on direct from HMIT's counsel were aimed at establishing that Dondero was not behind the filing of the Motion for Leave and the pursuit of the Proposed Claims.[115] Dondero testified that he did not (i) "have any current official position" with HMIT, (ii) "attempt to exercise [control] on the business affairs of [HMIT]," (iii) "have any official legal relationship with [HMIT] where [he] can attempt to exercise either direct or indirect control over [HMIT]," or (iv) "participate in the decision of whether or not to file the proceedings that are currently pending before Judge Jernigan."[116] After HMIT rested, Highland and the Claimant Trust called Patrick as a witness, and he testified that he was the administrator of HMIT, that HMIT does not have any employees, operations, or revenues, and, when asked if HMIT owned any assets, Patrick testified, with not a great deal of certainty, that "it's my understanding it has a contingent beneficiary interest in the Claimants [sic] Trust" and that is the only asset HMIT has.[117] Patrick testified that HMIT did not owe any money to Dondero personally, but acknowledged that in 2015, HMIT had issued a secured promissory note in favor of Dondero's family trust, Dugaboy, in the amount of approximately $62.6 million (the "Dugaboy Note") in exchange for Dugaboy transferring a portion of its limited partner interests in Highland to HMIT; the Dugaboy Note was secured in part by the Highland limited partnership interests purchased from Dugaboy.[118] Patrick admitted that, if HMIT's Class 10 interest has no value, HMIT would have no ability to pay the Dugaboy Note.[119] He further testified that neither he nor any representative of HMIT had ever spoken with any representative of Farallon or Stonehill, that he had no personal knowledge about any *quid pro quo*, the amount of due diligence Farallon or Stonehill conducted prior to buying their claims, or the terms of

[115] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 113:10-25.

[116] *Id.*

[117] June 8 Hearing Transcript, 307:7-308:2.

[118] *Id.*, 303:11-305:1; Highland Ex. 51, HMIT's $62,657,647.27 *Secured Promissory Note* dated December 24, 2015, in favor of Dugaboy.

[119] *Id.*, 308:3-16.

Seery's compensation package (until the terms were disclosed to them in opposition to the Motion for Leave).[120] Patrick admitted that Dugaboy was paying HMIT's attorneys' fees pursuant to a settlement agreement between HMIT and Dugaboy.[121]

On cross-examination by HMIT's counsel, Patrick further testified that HMIT has not filed any litigation, as plaintiff, other than its efforts to be a plaintiff in the Motion for Leave and its action as a petitioner in the Texas Rule 202 proceeding filed earlier in 2023 in the Texas state court.[122] HMIT's counsel argued that the point of this questioning was that "they're just trying to draw Dondero into this and – this vexatious litigant argument, and we're just developing the fact that obviously Hunter Mountain has only filed – attempting to file this action and a Rule 202 proceeding.[123] But, Dondero and HMIT's counsel referred during the June 8 Hearing to the First Rule 202 Petition (where Dondero was the petitioner) and the Second Rule 202 Petition (where HMIT was the petitioner) as "our" Rule 202 petitions, and also to the numerous attempts at getting the discovery (that Dondero had warned Linn was coming) in the collective. For example, in objecting to the admission of Highland's Exhibit 10 – the Texas state court order denying and dismissing the Second Rule 202 Petition – on the basis of relevance, HMIT's counsel referred to the order as "an order denying ***our second"*** Rule 202 Petition.[124] And, Dondero testified that his warning to Linn in May 2021 that "discovery was coming" was "my response to I knew they had traded on material nonpublic information" and that "I thought it would be a lot easier to get

[120] *Id.*, 308:18-312:12. This testimony from Patrick came after HMIT's counsel objection to counsel's line of questioning regarding Patrick's personal knowledge of the facts supporting the allegations in the Proposed Complaint on the basis that he was invading the attorney work product privilege, which was overruled by this court; HMIT's counsel argued (311:4-19) that the line of questioning was an "invasion of attorney work product . . . [b]ecause they might – he would have knowledge from the efforts and investigation through attorneys in the case."

[121] *Id.*, 312:24-313:18.

[122] *Id.*, 315:3-9.

[123] *Id.*, 316:6-11.

[124] *Id.*, 58:11-13. The court overruled HMIT's relevance objection and admitted Highland's Exhibit 10 into evidence. *Id.*, 58:14-15.

discovery on a situation like this than it has been for the last two years" and that "***we've*** been trying for two years to get . . . discovery."[125]

Dondero's use of an entity over which he exerts influence and control to pursue his own agenda in the bankruptcy case is not new. Rather, this has been part of Dondero's *modus operandi* since the "nasty breakup" between Dondero and Highland that culminated with Dondero's ouster in October 2020, whereby Dondero, after not getting his way in the bankruptcy court, continued to lob objections and create obstacles to Highland's implementation of the Plan through entities he owns or controls. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit specifically upheld this court's finding in the Confirmation Order that Dondero owned or controlled the various entities that had objected to confirmation of the Plan and appealed the Confirmation Order, where the Dondero-related appellants made similar protestations that they are not owned or controlled by Dondero and asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate this court's factual finding because, among other reasons, "[a]ccording to the Funds, the characterization is unfair, as *they* are not litigious like Dondero and are completely independent from him."[126] Based on the totality of the evidence in this proceeding, the court finds that, contrary to the protestations of HMIT's counsel and Patrick otherwise, Dondero is the driving force behind HMIT's Motion for Leave and the Proposed Complaint. The Motion for Leave is just one more attempt by Dondero to press his conspiracy theory that he has pressed for over two years now, unsuccessfully, in Texas state court through Rule 202 proceedings, with the Texas State Securities Board, and with the United States Trustee's office.

[125] *Id.*, 191:5-25.

[126] *Highland Capital*, 48 F.4th at 434-435.

G. Opposition to Motion for Leave: Arguing No Standing and No "Colorable" Claims

Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery (together, the "Highland Parties") filed a joint opposition ("Joint Opposition") to HMIT's Motion for Leave on May 11, 2023.[127] The Claims Purchasers filed a separate objection ("Claims Purchasers' Objection") to the Motion for Leave on May 11, 2023, as well.[128] In the Joint Opposition, the Highland Parties urge the court to deny HMIT leave to pursue the Proposed Claims because, as a threshold matter, HMIT does not have standing to bring them, directly or derivatively against the Proposed Defendants. They argue, in the alternative, that the Motion for Leave should be denied even if HMIT had standing to pursue the Proposed Claims because none of the Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims as that term is used in the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan (and Gatekeeper Orders).[129]

The Claims Purchasers likewise argue that HMIT lacks standing to complain about claims trading in the bankruptcy which occurred between sophisticated Claims Purchasers and sophisticated sellers ("Claims Sellers"), represented by skilled bankruptcy and transactional counsel. Moreover, they argue HMIT cannot show that it or the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust were injured by the claims trading at issue because the Purchased Claims had already been adjudicated as allowed claims in the bankruptcy case—thus, distributions under the Plan on account of the Purchased Claims remain the same, the only difference being who holds the claims. Moreover, even if HMIT could succeed in equitably subordinating the validly transferred ***allowed*** claims, HMIT would still be in the same position it is today: the holder of a

[127] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3783. Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery also filed on May 11 a *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Morris Declaration") that attached 44 Exhibits in support of the Joint Opposition. Bankr. Dkt. No. 3784.

[128] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3780.

[129] *See* Joint Opposition ¶ 139 ("Because HMIT lacks standing, this Court need not reach the merits of HMIT's proposed Adversary Complaint. As a matter of judicial economy, however, the Highland Parties respectfully request that this Court address the lack of merit as an alternative basis to deny the Motion.").

contingent, speculative Class 10 interest that would only be paid after payment, in full, with interest, of all creditors under the Plan. The Claims Purchasers argue in the alternative that the Proposed Claims are not "colorable."

Finally, the Proposed Defendants argue that the standard of review for assessing whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable" (as such term is used in the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeping Orders) is a standard that is a higher than the "plausibility" standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6). They argue that HMIT should be required to meet a higher bar with respect to colorability that includes making a *prima facie* showing that the Proposed Claims have merit (and/or are not without foundation) which requires HMIT to do more than meet the liberal notice-pleading standards.

H. HMIT's Reply to the Proposed Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Leave

In its reply brief ("Reply"), filed by HMIT on May 18, 2023,[130] it argues that it has constitutional standing as an "aggrieved party" to bring the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself.[131] HMIT also argues that it has standing under Delaware Trust law to bring a derivative action on behalf of the Claimant Trust and that it not only has standing to bring the Proposed Claims derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor under the Plan, but it is the best party to bring the claims.[132] Finally, HMIT maintains that the standard of review that the bankruptcy court should apply in assessing the "colorability" of the Proposed Claims is no greater than the standard of review applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which would require the bankruptcy court to look only to the "four corners" of the Proposed Complaint

[130] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3785.

[131] *See* Reply ¶ 7.

[132] See, Reply ¶ 23 n.5, where HMIT argues "The nature of this injury, in addition to Seery's influence over the Claimant Trust, and the lack of prior action by the Claimant Trust to pursue the claims HMIT seeks to pursue derivatively, among other things, demonstrate that HMIT is not only a proper party to assert its derivative claims – but the best party to do so."

and "not weigh extraneous evidence,"[133] take all allegations as true, and view all allegations and inferences in a light most favorable to HMIT. As discussed in greater length below, HMIT argues that, under this standard, the bankruptcy court should not consider evidence in making its determination as to whether the Proposed Complaint presents "colorable" claims.

I. Litigation within the Litigation: The Pre- June 8 Hearing Skirmishes

Suffice it to say there was significant activity before the Motion for Leave actually was presented at the June 8 hearing. HMIT sought an emergency hearing on its Motion for Leave (wanting a hearing on three days' notice). When the bankruptcy court denied an emergency hearing, HMIT unsuccessfully pursued an interlocutory appeal of the denial of an emergency hearing to the district court. HMIT then petitioned for a writ of mandamus at the Fifth Circuit regarding the emergency hearing denial, which was denied by the Fifth Circuit on April 12, 2023.

Next, there were multiple pleadings and hearings regarding ***what kind of hearing*** the bankruptcy court should or should not hold on the Motion for Leave—particularly focusing on whether or not it would be an evidentiary hearing.[134] The resolution of this issue turned on what standard of review the court should apply in exercising its gatekeeping function and determining the colorability of the Proposed Claims. HMIT (although it had submitted two declarations of Dondero with its original Motion for Leave and approximately 350 pages of total evidentiary support) was adamant that there should be no evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, arguing that the standard for review should be the plausibility standard under Rule 12(b)(6)

[133] *See* Reply ¶ 47.

[134] Highland, joined by Seery and the Claims Purchasers, had filed a motion asking the bankruptcy court to set a briefing schedule on the Motion for Leave and to schedule a status conference, indicating that Highland's proposed timetable for same was opposed by HMIT. HMIT subsequently filed a response unopposed to a briefing schedule and status conference, but, before the status conference, HMIT filed a brief, stating it was opposed to there being any evidence at the ultimate hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave—arguing the bankruptcy court did not need evidence to exercise its gatekeeping function and determine if HMIT has a "colorable" claim. Rather, the court need only engage in a Rule 12(b)(6)-type plausibility analysis.

motions to dismiss such that "the threshold inquiry is very, very low. Evidence is not allowed. . . . [S]imilar to a 12(b)(6) inquiry, [the court] is limited to the four corners of the principal pleading – in this case, the complaint, or now the revised complaint."[135] Counsel for the Proposed Defendants argued that the standard of review for colorability here, in the specific context of the court exercising its gatekeeping function under the Plan, is more akin to the standards applied under the Supreme Court's *Barton Doctrine*[136] pursuant to which that the bankruptcy court must apply a higher standard than the 12(b)(6) standard, including the consideration of evidence at the hearing on the motion for leave; if the standard of review presents no greater hurdle to the movant than the 12(b)(6) standard applied to every plaintiff in every case, then the gatekeeping provisions mean nothing and do nothing to protect the parties from the harassing, bad-faith litigation they were put in place to prevent.[137] On May 22, 2023, after receipt of post-hearing briefing on the issue, the court entered an order stating that "the court has determined that there may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave" and "[t]herefore, the parties will be permitted to present evidence (including witness testimony) at the June 8, 2023 hearing [on the Motion to Leave] if they so choose."

Two days later, HMIT filed an emergency motion for expedited discovery or alternatively for continuance of the June 8, 2023 hearing, seeking expedited depositions of corporate

[135] Transcript of April 24, 2023 Status Conference, Bankr. Dkt. No. 3765 ("April 24 Transcript"), 14:6-11.

[136] The *Barton Doctrine* was established in the 19th century Supreme Court case of *Barton v. Barbour*, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), and states that a party wishing to sue a court-appointed trustee or receiver must first obtain leave of the appointing court by making a *prima facie* case that the claim it wishes to bring is not without foundation.

[137] *See* April 24 Transcript, 36:24-37:4 ("[W]e're exactly today where the Court had predicted in entering [the Confirmation Order], that the costs and distraction of this litigation are substantial. And if all we're doing is replicating a 12(b)(6) hearing on a motion for leave, we're actually not doing anything to reduce, as the Court made clear, the burdens, distractions, of litigation."); 37:5-13 ("The Fifth Circuit likewise cited *Barton* in its order affirming the confirmation order. Specifically, it also explained that the provisions, these gatekeeper provisions requiring advance approval were meant to 'screen and prevent bad-faith litigation.' Well that – if that means only what the Plaintiff[ ] say[s] it does, then it really doesn't do anything at all to screen. There's no gatekeeping because their version of what that means is always policed under 12(b)(6) standards.").

representatives of the Claims Purchasers and of Seery and production of documents pursuant to deposition notices and subpoenas duces tecum that HMIT had attached to the motion. On May 26, 2023, this court held yet another status conference. Following the status conference, the court granted in part and denied in part HMIT's request for expedited discovery by ordering only Seery and Dondero to be made available for depositions prior to the June 8 Hearing. The court reached what seemed like appropriate middle ground by allowing the deposition of Seery and allowing the other parties to depose Dondero (for whom sworn declarations had been submitted), but the court was not going to allow any more discovery (i.e., of the Claims Purchasers) at so late an hour. The court was aware that HMIT and Dondero had been seeking discovery relating to the very claims trades that are the subject of the Revised Proposed Complaint from the Claims Purchasers in Texas state court "Rule 202" proceedings for approximately two years, where their attempts were rebuffed.

Approximately 60 hours before the June 8 Hearing, HMIT filed its Witness and Exhibit List disclosing for the first time two potential expert witnesses (along with biographical information and a disclosure regarding the subject matter of their likely testimony). Highland, the Claimant Trust, and Seery filed a joint motion to exclude the expert testimony and documents ("Motion to Exclude"), which the court ultimately granted in a separate order.

During the full-day June 8 Hearing on the Motion to Leave, the court admitted over 50 HMIT exhibits and over 30 Highland/Claimant Trust exhibits. The court heard testimony from HMIT's witnesses Dondero and Seery (as an adverse witness) and from the Highland Parties' witness Mark Patrick, the administrator of HMIT since August 2022 (as an adverse witness). The bankruptcy court allowed HMIT to make a running objection to all evidence—as it continued to argue that evidence was not appropriate.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In determining whether HMIT should be granted leave, pursuant to the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan and the court's prior Gatekeeper Orders, to pursue the Proposed Claims, the court must address the issue of whether HMIT would have ***standing*** to bring the Proposed Claims in the first instance. If so, the next question is whether the Proposed Claims are "***colorable***." But prior to getting into the weeds on ***standing*** and "***colorability,***" some general discussion regarding the topic of claims trading in the bankruptcy world seems appropriate, given that HMIT's Proposed Claims are based, in large part, on allegations of ***improper*** claims trading.

A. Claims Trading in the Context of Bankruptcy Cases—Can It Be Tortious or Otherwise Actionable?

As noted, at the crux of HMIT's desired lawsuit is what this court will refer to as "claims trading activity" that occurred shortly after the Plan was confirmed, but before the Plan went effective. HMIT believes that the claims trading activity gave rise to various torts: breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Seery; knowing participation in breach of fiduciary duty by the other Proposed Defendants; and conspiracy by all Defendants. HMIT also believes that the following remedies should be imposed: equitable disallowance of the Purchased Claims; disgorgement of the alleged profits the Claims Purchasers made on their purchases; and disgorgement of all Seery's compensation received since the beginning of his "collusion" with the other Defendants. Without a doubt, the Motion for Leave and Proposed Complaint revolve almost entirely around the claims trading activity.

This begs the question: ***When (or under what circumstances) might claims trading activity during a bankruptcy case give rise to a cause of action that either the bankruptcy estate or an economic stakeholder in the case might have standing to bring?*** Here, the claims trading

wasn't even "during a bankruptcy case" really—it was post-confirmation and pre-effective date, and it happened to be: (a) after mediation of the claims, (b) after Rule 9019 settlement motions, (c) after objections by Dondero and certain of his family trusts were lodged, (d) after evidentiary hearings, and (e) after orders were ultimately entered ***allowing*** the claims (and in most cases, such orders were appealed). The further crux of HMIT's desired lawsuit is that Seery allegedly "wrongfully facilitated and promoted the sale of large unsecured creditor claims to his close business allies and friends" by sharing ***material non-public information*** to them regarding the potential value of the claims (i.e., the potential value of the bankruptcy estate), and this is what made the claims trading activity particularly pernicious. The alleged sharing of MNPI allegedly caused the Claims Purchasers to purchase their claims without doing any due diligence and with knowledge that the claims would be worth much more than the Plan's "pessimistic" projections might have suggested, and also allowed Seery to plant friendly allies into the creditor constituency (and on the post-confirmation CTOB) that would "rubber stamp" his generous compensation. This is all referred to as "not arm's-length" and "collusive." Notably, the MNPI mostly pertained to a likely future acquisition of MGM by Amazon (which transaction, indeed, occurred in 2022, after being publicly announced in Spring of 2021); as noted earlier, Highland owned, directly and indirectly, common stock in MGM. Also notably, there had been rumors and media attention regarding a potential sale of MGM for many months.[138] In summary, to be clear, HMIT's desired lawsuit is laced with a theme of "insider trading"—although this isn't a situation of securities trading *per se* (i.e., the unsecured Purchased Claims were not securities), and, as noted earlier, the Texas State Securities Board has not seen fit to investigate the claims trading activity.

So, preliminarily, is claims trading in bankruptcy sinister *per se*? The answer is no.

[138] *E.g.,* Benjamin Mullin, *MGM Holdings, Studio Behind 'James Bond,' Explores a Sale,* THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2020, 6:38 p.m.).

The activity of investing in distressed debt (which frequently occurs during a bankruptcy case—sometimes referred to as "claims trading") is ubiquitous and, indeed, has been so for a very long time. As noted by one scholar:

> The creation of a market in bankruptcy claims is the single most important development in the bankruptcy world since the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in 1978. [Citations omitted.] Claims trading has revolutionized bankruptcy by making it a much more market-driven process. [Citations omitted.] . . . The development of a robust market for all types of claims against debtors has changed the cast of characters involved in bankruptcies. In addition to long-standing relational creditors, like trade creditors or a single senior secured bank or bank group, bankruptcy cases now involve professional distressed debt investors, whose interests and behavior are often quite different than traditional relational counterparty creditors.

Adam J. Levitin, *Bankruptcy* Markets*: Making Sense of Claims Trading*, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 64, 65 (2010) (hereinafter "*Bankruptcy Markets*").[139]

As a pure policy matter, some practitioners have bemoaned this claims trading phenomenon, suggesting that "distressed debt traders may sacrifice the long-term viability of a debtor for the ability to realize substantial and quick returns on their investments."[140] Others suggest that claims trading in bankruptcy is beneficial, in that it allows creditors of a debtor an early exit from a potentially long bankruptcy case, enabling them to save expense and administrative hassles, realize immediate liquidity on their claims (albeit discounted), and may

[139] *See also* Aaron Hammer & Michael Brandess, *Claims Trading: The Wild West of Chapter 11s*, AM. BANKR. INST. JOURNAL 62 (Jul./Aug. 2010); Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, *Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11,* 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25 (1990) (noting that "the first recorded instance of American fiduciaries trading claims against insolvent debtors predates all federal bankruptcy laws and goes back to 1790" when the original 13 colonies were insolvent, owing tremendous amounts of debt to various parties in connection with the Revolutionary War; early American investors purchased these debts for approximately 25% of their par value, hoping the claims would be paid at face value by the American government).

[140] Harvey R. Miller, *Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth*, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 2016 (2002). *See also* Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, *Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?*, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (2004); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, *Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?*, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2005).

even permit them to take advantage of a tax loss on their own desired timetable.[141] On the flipside, "[c]aims trading permits an entrance to the bankruptcy process for those investors who want to take the time and effort to monitor the debtor and contribute expertise to the reorganization process."[142]

So, what are the "rules of the road" here? What does the Bankruptcy Code dictate regarding claims trading? The answer is nothing. The Bankruptcy Code itself has no provisions whatsoever regarding claims trading. The only thing resembling any regulation of claims trading during a bankruptcy case is found at Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)—the current version of which went into effect in 1991—and it imposes extremely light regulation—if it could even be called that. This rule requires, in pertinent part (at subsection (2)), that "[i]f a claim other than one based on a publicly traded note, bond, or debenture" is traded during the case after a proof of claim is filed, notice/evidence of that trade must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk by the transferee. The transferor shall then be notified and given 21 days to object. If there is an objection, the bankruptcy court will hold a hearing regarding whether a transfer, in fact, took place. If there is no objection, nothing further needs to happen, and the transferee will be considered substituted for the transferor.

There are several things noteworthy about Rule 3001(e)(2). First, the only party given the opportunity to object is the ***transferor*** of the claim (presumably, in the situation of a dispute regarding whether there was truly an agreement regarding the transfer of the claim). Second, there is no need for a bankruptcy court order approving the transfer (except in the event of an objection

[141] *See Bankruptcy Markets*, at 70. *See also In re Kreisler,* 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Claims trading allows creditors to opt out of the bankruptcy system, trading an uncertain future payment for an immediate one, so long as they can find a purchaser.").

[142] *Bankruptcy Markets* at 70 (citing, among other authorities, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, *Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms*, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 401 (1997) (finding that "vulture investors add value by disciplining managers of distressed firms").

by the alleged transferor). Third, the ***economic consideration paid need not be disclosed to the court or anyone***. Fourth, there is no requirement or definition of timeliness. Finally, it explicitly does not apply with regard to publicly traded debt. This, alone, means that many claims trades are not even reported in a bankruptcy case. But it is not just publicly traded debt that will not be reflected with a Rule 3001(e) filing. For example, bank debt, in modern times, is often syndicated (i.e., fragmented into many beneficial holders of portions of the debt) and only the administrative agent for the syndicate (or the "lead bank") will file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy—thus, as the syndicated interests (participations) change hands, and they frequently do, there typically will not be a Rule 3001(e) notice filed.[143] To be clear here, this syndication-of-bank-debt fact, along with the fact that there are financial products whereby bank debt might be carved up into economic interests separate and apart from legal title to the loan, means there are many situations in which trading of claims during a bankruptcy case is not necessarily transparent or, for that matter, policed by the bankruptcy court. This is the world of modern bankruptcy. Most of the claims trading that gets reported through a Rule 3001(e) notice is the trading of small vendor claims. And this is all regarded as private sale transactions for the most part.[144]

Suffice it to say that there is not a wealth of case law dealing with claims trading in a bankruptcy context. Perhaps this is not surprising, since it is not prohibited and ***is mostly a matter of private contract between buyer and seller***. The case law that does exist seems to arise in situations of perceived bad faith of a purchaser—for example, when there was an attempt to control voting and/or ultimate control of the debtor through the plan process (not always problematic, but

[143] Anne Marrs Huber & Thomas H. Young, *The Trading of Bank Debt in and Out of Chapter 11*, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 1, 3 (2006).

[144] Note that Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) was very different before 1991. Between 1983-1991, the rule required that parties transferring claims inform the court that a transfer of claims was taking place and also disclose the consideration paid for the transferred claims. A hearing would take place prior to the execution of a trade. Judicial involvement was required and resulted in judicial scrutiny of transactions—something that simply does not exist today.

there are outlier cases where this was found to cross a line and result in consequences such as disallowing votes on a plan or even equitable subordination of a claim).[145] Another type of case that has generated case law is where the purchaser of claims occupied a fiduciary status with the debtor.[146] Still another type of case that has generated case law is where there is an attempt to cleanse claims that might have risks because of a seller's malfeasance, by trading the claim to a new claim holder.[147]

The following is a potpourri of the more notable cases that have addressed claims trading in different contexts. Most of them imposed no adverse consequences on claims traders: *In re Kreisler*, 546 F.3d 863, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) (where a corporation named Garlin, that was owned by the individual chapter 7 debtors' sister and close friend, purchased a $900,000 bank claim for $16,500, and there was no disclosure of Garlin's connections to debtors and no Rule 3001(e)(2) notice was filed, the Seventh Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's invocation of the doctrine of equitable subordination to the claim, stating: "Equitable subordination is generally appropriate only if a creditor is guilty of misconduct that causes injury to the interests of other creditors;" the Seventh Circuit further stated that it could "put to one side whether the court's finding of inequitable conduct was correct" because even if there was misconduct, it did not harm the other creditors, who were in the same position whether the original creditor or Garlin happened to own the claim; the Seventh Circuit did note that Garlin's decision to purchase the original bank

[145] *In re Applegate Prop. Ltd.,* 133 B.R. 827, 836 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (designating votes of an affiliate of the debtor that purchased a blocking position to thwart a creditor's plan because it was done in bad faith); *In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.,* 118 B.R. 282, 289–90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (because of bad faith activities, the court designated votes of a claims purchaser who purchased to get a blocking position on a plan). *But see In re First Humanics Corp.,* 124 B.R. 87, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (claims purchased by debtor's former management company to gain standing to file a plan to protect interest of the debtor was in good faith).

[146] *See In re Exec. Office Ctrs., Inc.*, 96 B.R. 642, 649-650 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988) (and numerous old cites therein).

[147] *Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.),* 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), *vacated, Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. (In re Enron Corp.),* 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y 2007); *Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.),* 333 B.R. 205, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

creditor's claim might have disadvantaged the other creditors if it interfered with the trustee's own potential settlement with the original bank creditor (note that the trustee argued that she had been negotiating a deal with bank under which bank might have reduced its claims); however, the trustee presented no evidence that any deal with the bank was imminent or even likely; thus, whether such a deal could have been reached was speculation; equitable subordination was therefore improper."); *Viking Assocs., L.L.C. v. Drewes (In re Olson),* 120 F.3d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1997) (case involved the actions of an entity known as Viking in purchasing all of the unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate of two chapter 7 debtors, Hugo and Jeraldine Olson; Viking was a related entity, owned by the debtors' children, and purchased $525,000 of unsecured claims for $67,000; while the bankruptcy court had discounted the claims down to the purchase amount and subordinated Viking's discounted claims to the claims of the other unsecured creditors, relying on section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Eighth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to do this, and, thus, reversed and remanded; the Eighth Circuit noted that in 1991, Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2) was amended "to restrict the bankruptcy court's power to inspect the terms of" claims transfers. *Id.* at 101 (citing *In re SPM Mfg. Corp.,* 984 F.2d 1305, 1314 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1993)); the text of the rule makes clear that the existence of a "dispute" depends upon an objection by the ***transferor***; where there is no objection by the ***transferor***, there is no longer any role for the court); *Citicorp. Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Papercraft Corp.),* 160 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1998) (large investor who held seat on board of directors of debtor and debtor's parent, and who also had nonpublic information regarding the debtor's value, anonymously purchased 40% of the unsecured claims at a steep discount during the chapter 11 case, and then, having obtained a blocking position for plan voting purposes, proposed a plan to acquire debtor; the claims purchaser's claims were equitably reduced to amount

paid for the claims since investor was a fiduciary who was deemed to have engaged in inequitable conduct); *Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter),* 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ninth Circuit affirmed bankruptcy court's ruling that a secured creditor's purchase of 21 out of 34 unsecured claims in the case was in good faith and it would not be prohibited from voting such claims on the debtor's plan, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 1126(e)); *In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp.,* 145 F.2d 55, 57 & 58 (7th Cir. 1945) (in a case under the old Bankruptcy Act, in which there were more restrictions on claims trading, a debtor and two of its stockholders argued that the claims of purchasers of bonds should be limited to the amounts they paid for them; bankruptcy court special master found, "that, though he did not approve generally the ethics reflected by speculation in such bonds," there was no cause for limitation of the amounts of their claims, pointing out that the persons who had dealt in the bonds were not officials, directors, or stockholders of the corporation and owed no fiduciary duty to the estate or its beneficiaries—rather they were investors or speculators who thought the bonds were selling too cheaply and that they might make a legitimate profit upon them; the district court agreed, as did the Seventh Circuit, noting that "[t]o reduce the participation to the amount paid for securities, in the absence of exceptional circumstances which are not present here, would reduce the value of such bonds to those who have them and want to sell them. This would result in unearned, undeserved profit for the debtor, destroy or impair the sales value of securities by abolishing the profit motive, which inspires purchasers."); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 461 B.R. 200 (Bankr. Del. 2011), *vacated in part*, 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012) (discussion of an equity committee's potential standing to pursue equitable subordination or equitable disallowance of the claims of certain noteholders who had allegedly traded their claims during the chapter 11

case while having material non-public information; while bankruptcy court originally indicating these were viable tools, court later vacated its ruling on this after a settlement was reached).

Suffice it to say that the courts have, more often than not, been unwilling to impose legal consequences, for an actor's involvement with claims trading. At most, in outlier-type situations during a case, courts have taken steps to disallow claims for voting purposes or to subordinate claims to other unsecured creditors for distribution purposes.[148] But the case at bar does not present facts that are typical of any of the situations in reported cases.

For one thing, unlike in the reported cases this court has located, there ***seems to have been complete symmetry of sophistication among the claim sellers and claim purchasers here—and complete symmetry with HMIT for that matter***. All persons involved are highly sophisticated financial institutions, hedge funds, or private equity funds. No one was a "mom-and-pop" type business or vendor that might be vulnerable to chicanery. The claims ranged from being worth $10's of millions of dollars to $100's of millions of dollars in face value. And, of course, the sellers/transferors of the claims have never shown up, subsequent to the claims trading

[148] Note that, while some cases suggest that outright disallowance of an unsecured claim, in the case of "inequitable conduct" might be permitted (not merely equitable subordination to unsecured creditors)—usually citing to *Pepper v. Litton*, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)—the Fifth Circuit has suggested otherwise. *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.,* 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1977) (cleaned up) (noting that "equitable considerations can justify only the subordination of claims, not their disallowance" and also noting that "three conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate[:] (i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct[;] (ii) The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant[; and] (iii) Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." In *Mobile Steel*, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy judge exceeded the bounds of his equitable jurisdiction by disallowing a group of claims and also reversed the subordination of certain claims, on the grounds that the bankruptcy court had made clearly erroneous findings regarding alleged inequitable conduct and other necessary facts. *Contrast In re Lothian Oil Inc.,* 650 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2011) (involving the question of whether a bankruptcy court may ***recharacterize*** a claim as equity rather than debt; the court held yes, but it has nothing to do with inequitable conduct *per se*; rather section 502(b)'s language that a claim should be allowed unless it is "unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law...." is the relevant authority; unlike equitable subordination, recharacterization is about looking at the true substance of a transaction not the conduct of a party (if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck—i.e., equity); the court indicated that section 105 is not a basis to recharacterize debt as equity; it's a matter of looking at state law to determine if there is any basis and looking at the nature of the underlying transaction—as either a lending arrangement or equity infusion.

transactions, to complain about anything. Everyone involved here is, essentially, a behemoth and there is literally no sign of innocent creditors getting harmed. Second, the case at bar is unique in that the claims traded here ***had all been allowed after objections, mediation, and Rule 9019 settlements during the bankruptcy case***. Thus, the amounts that would be paid on them were "locked in," so to speak. There was no risk to a hypothetical claims-purchaser of disallowance, offset, or any "claw-back" litigation (or—one might have reasonably assumed—any type of litigation). Third, the terms for distributions on unsecured claims had been established in a confirmed plan (although the claims were purchased before the effective date of the Plan). Thus, there was a degree of certainty regarding return on investment for the Claims Purchasers here that was much higher than if the claims had been purchased early, during, or mid-way through the case.[149] ***This was post-confirmation, pre-effective date claims purchasing.*** Interestingly, all three of these facts might suggest that little due diligence would be undertaken by any hypothetical purchaser. The rules of the road had been set. The court makes this observation because HMIT has suggested there is something highly suspicious about the fact that Farallon allegedly told Dondero that it did no due diligence before purchasing its claims (leading him to conclude that the Claims Purchasers must have purchased their claims based on receiving MNPI from Seery). Not only has there been no colorable evidence suggesting that insider information was shared, but the lack of due diligence in this context does not reasonably seem suspicious. The claims purchases

[149] *See discussion* in BANKRUPTCY MARKETS, at 91:

> Some claims purchasers buy before the bankruptcy petition is filed, some at the beginning of the case, and some towards the end. For example, there are investors who look to purchase at low prices either when a business is failing or early in the bankruptcy and ride through the case until payouts are fairly certain. [Citations omitted.] These investors might be hoping to buy at 30 cents on the dollar and get a payout at 70 cents on the dollar. Perhaps if they waited another six months, the payout would be 74 cents on the dollar, but the additional 4 cents on the dollar for six months might not be a worthwhile return for the time value of the investment. Other investors might not want to assume the risk that exists in the early days of a case when the fate of the debtor is much less certain, but they would gladly purchase at 70 cents on the dollar at the end of the case to get a payout of 74 cents on the dollar six months later.

were almost like passive investments, at this point—there was no risk of a claim objection and there was a confirmed plan, with a lengthy disclosure statement that described not only plan payment terms and projections, but essentially anything that any investor might want to know.

To reiterate, here, HMIT seeks leave to assert the following causes of action:

I. Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Seery)

II. Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Claims Purchasers)

III. Conspiracy (all Proposed Defendants)

IV. Equitable Disallowance (Claims Purchasers)

V. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust (all Proposed Defendants)

VI. Declaratory Judgment (all Proposed Defendants)

The court struggles to fathom how any of these proposed causes of action or remedies can be applied in the context of: (a) post-confirmation claims trading; (b) where the claims have all been litigated and allowed.

In reflecting on the case law and various Bankruptcy Code provisions, the court can fathom the following hypotheticals in which claims trading during a bankruptcy case might be somehow actionable:

> **Hypothetical #1**: The most obvious situation would be if a purchaser of a claim files a Rule 3001(e) Notice, and the seller/transferor then files an objection thereto. There would then be a contested hearing between purchaser and seller regarding the validity of the transfer with the bankruptcy court issuing an appropriate order after the hearing on the objection. ***As noted, there was no objection to the Rule 3001(e) notices here***.
>
> **Hypothetical #2:** Alternatively, there could be a breach of contract suit between purchaser and seller if one thinks the other breached the purchase-sale agreement somehow. Perhaps torts might also be alleged in such litigation. ***As noted, there is no dispute between purchasers and sellers here.***
>
> **Hypothetical #3:** If there is believed to be fraud in connection with a plan, a party in interest might, pursuant to section 1144 of the Bankruptcy Code, move for

revocation of the plan "at any time before 180 days after the date of entry of the order for confirmation" and the court "may revoke such order if and only if such order was procured by fraud." ***As noted, here HMIT has suggested that the "pessimistic" plan projections may have been fraudulent or misrepresentations somehow. The time elapsed long ago to seek revocation of the Plan.***

Hypothetical #4: As discussed above, in rare situations (bad faith), during a Chapter 11 case, before a plan is confirmed, a claims purchaser's claim might not be allowed for voting purposes. *See* Sections 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code ("the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith"). ***Obviously, in this case, this is not applicable—the claims were purchased post-confirmation.***

Hypothetical #5: As discussed above, in rare situations (inequitable conduct), a court might equitably subordinate ***claims*** to ***other claims***. *See* Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. But here**,** HMIT is seeking either: (a) equitable subordination of the ***claims*** of the Claims Purchaser to HMIT's ***Class 10 former equity interest*** (in contravention of the explicit terms of section 510(c)) or, (b) ***equitable disallowance*** of the claims of the Claims Purchasers (in contravention of *Mobile Steel*).

Hypothetical #6: Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(1) and the Fifth Circuit's *Lothian Oil* case may permit "recharacterization" of a claim from debt to equity in certain circumstances, but not in circumstances like the ones in this case. Here, the claims have already been adjudicated and allowed (some after mediation, and all after Rule 9019 settlement orders). The only way to reconsider a claim in a bankruptcy case that has already been allowed is through Bankruptcy Code section 502(j) ("A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. . . according to the equities of the case."). The problem here is that Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides that a motion for "reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate ***entered without a contest*** is not subject to the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c)" (emphasis added). Here there was most definitely "a contest" with regard to all of these purchased claims. ***Thus, it would appear that any effort to have a court reconsider these claims pursuant to section 502(j) is untimely—as it has been well beyond a year since they were allowed.***

Hypothetical #7: If a party believes "insider trading" occurred there are governmental agencies that investigate and police that. ***Here, the purchased claims (which were not based on bonds or certificated equity interests) would not be securities so as to fall under the SEC's purview. Moreover, there was evidence that HMIT or Dondero-Related entities requested that the Texas State Securities Board investigate the claims trading and the board did not find a basis to pursue anyone for wrongdoing***.

Hypothetical #8: The United States Trustee can investigate wrongdoing by a debtor or unsecured creditors committee. While the United States Trustee would naturally have concerns about members of an unsecured creditors committee (or an officer of a debtor-in-possession) adhering to fiduciary duties and not putting their

> own interests above those of the estate, here, there are a couple of points that seem noteworthy. One, the claims trading activity was post-confirmation so—while certain of the claim-sellers may have still been on the unsecured creditors committee, as the effective date of the plan had not yet occurred—the circumstances are very different than if this had all happened during the early, contentious stages of the case. It seems inconceivable that there was somehow a disparity of information that might be troubling—the Plan had been confirmed and it was available for the world to see. The whole notion of "insider information" (just after confirmation here) feels a bit off-point. Bankruptcy practitioners and judges sometimes call bankruptcy a fishbowl or use the "open kimono" metaphor for good reason. It is generally a very open process. And information-sharing on the part of a debtor-in-possession or unsecured creditors committee is intended to be robust. *See, e.g.,* Bankruptcy Code sections 521 and 1102(b)(3). In a way, HMIT here seems to be complaining about this very situation that the Code and Rules have designed.

In summary, claims trading is a highly ***unregulated*** activity in the bankruptcy world. ***HMIT is attempting to pursue causes of action here that, to this court's knowledge, have never been allowed in a context like this***.

B. Back to Standing—Would HMIT Have Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims?

The Proposed Defendants argue that HMIT lacks standing to bring the Proposed Claims, either: (a) derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust, or (b) directly on behalf of itself. Thus, they argue that this is one reason that the Motion for Leave should be denied.

In making their specific standing arguments, the parties analyze things slightly differently:

The Claims Purchasers focus primarily on HMIT's lack of ***constitutional*** standing but also argue that HMIT does not have ***prudential*** standing under Delaware trust law to bring the Proposed Claims either individually or derivatively. Why do they mention Delaware trust law? Because the Claimant Trust is a Delaware statutory trust governed by the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §§ 3801–29.[150]

The Highland Parties' standing arguments focus almost entirely on HMIT's lack of ***prudential*** standing under Delaware trust law to bring the Proposed Claims.

HMIT argues that the Proposed Defendants "play fast and loose with standing arguments" and that HMIT has ***constitutional*** standing as a "party aggrieved"[151] to bring the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself. HMIT also argues that it has standing under Delaware trust law to bring a

[150] *See* Proposed Complaint, ¶ 26.

[151] Proposed Complaint, ¶7.

derivative action on behalf of the Claimant Trust, and that it not only has standing to bring the Proposed Claims derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor under the Plan, but it is the best party to do so.

1. The Different Types of Standing: Constitutional Versus Prudential

The parties are addressing two concepts of standing that can sometimes be confused and misapplied by both attorneys and judges: ***constitutional Article III standing***, which implicates federal court subject matter jurisdiction,[152] and the narrower standing concept of ***prudential standing***, which does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but nevertheless might prevent a party from having capacity to sue, pursuant to limitations set by courts, statutes or other law.

Article III constitutional standing works as follows: a plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent—not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it must be likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.[153] "If the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to resolve."[154] These elements ensure that a plaintiff has "'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."[155]

[152] Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over enumerated cases and controversies.

[153] *See Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 140 S.Ct. 1615, 1618 (2020)(citing the Supreme Court's seminal case on the tripartite test for Article III constitutional standing, *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), where the Supreme Court stated that "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains [the] three elements"); *see also Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 338; *Abraugh v. Altimus*, 26 F.4th 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing *id.*).

[154] *Transunion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021)(cleaned up).

[155] *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

Apart from this minimal constitutional mandate, courts and statutes have set other limits on the class of persons who may seek judicial remedies—and this is the concept of prudential standing. In its recent opinion in *Abraugh v. Altimus*,[156] the Fifth Circuit set forth a detailed analysis of the two types of "standing," noting that the term "standing" is often "misused" in our legal system, which has led to confusion for both attorneys and judges.[157] The constitutional standing that is necessary for a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction is broader than prudential standing and is only the first hurdle a party must clear before pursuing a claim in federal court.

The Fifth Circuit explained that ***in addition to*** Article III constitutional standing, "courts have occasionally articulated other 'standing' requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy under certain conditions, ***beyond those imposed by Article III***,"[158] such as the "standing" requirement that might be imposed by a statute or by jurisprudence. The *Abraugh* case was a perfect example of the latter.

Abraugh involved the civil rights statutes that provide, among other things, that "a party must have standing under the state wrongful death or survival statutes to bring [a § 1983 cause of action]" and noted that these statutes impose additional "standing" requirements that are a matter of prudential standing, not constitutional standing.[159] In *Abraugh*, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of a § 1983 civil rights cause of action—noting that the district court had stated that it was dismissing based on a "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" because the plaintiff in that action lacked standing.[160] The plaintiff was the mother of a prisoner

[156] 26 F.4th 298.
[157] *Id.* at 303.
[158] *Id.* at 302 (emphasis added).
[159] *Id.* at 302-303.
[160] *Id.* at 301.

who died by suicide while in custody who brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana correctional officers and officials. After finding that the plaintiff/mother lacked standing under Louisiana's wrongful death and survival statutes (because there had been a surviving child and wife of the prisoner who were the proper parties with capacity to sue), the district court held that it was dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the plaintiff/mother may have lacked standing under Louisiana's wrongful death and survival statutes to bring the claim under § 1983, but that type of standing was matter of ***prudential*** standing, and the plaintiff/mother actually ***did*** have ***Article III*** constitutional standing ("a constitutionally cognizable interest in the life of her son").[161] Thus, the district court's error was ***not*** in finding that the plaintiff/mother lacked prudential standing but in improperly conflating the two standing concepts when it held that it had lacked ***subject matter jurisdiction*** to consider any of the plaintiff's/mother's amended complaints.[162] The Fifth Circuit noted specifically that[163]

> prudential standing does not present a jurisdictional question, but "a merits question: who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right?" As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear, "an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). And a violation of this rule is a failure of "prudential" standing. "Not one of our precedents holds that the inquiry is jurisdictional." It goes only to the validity of the cause of action. And "the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction."

Somewhat relevant to this prudential standing discussion is the fact that, in this bankruptcy case, there have been dozens of appeals of bankruptcy court orders by Dondero and Dondero-related entities. In connection therewith, both the district court and the Fifth Circuit, in evaluating the ***appellate standing*** of the appellants, have taken pains to distinguish between the concepts of:

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[161] *Id.*

[162] *Id.* at 301, 303-304. The Fifth Circuit opined that "the district court did not err in describing [the mother's] inability to sue under Louisiana law as a defect of 'standing[, b]ut it is a defect of prudential standing, not Article III standing" thus technically not implicating the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. *Id.* at 303.

[163] *Id.* at 304 (cleaned up).

(a) traditional, constitutional standing, and (b) a type of prudential standing known as the "person aggrieved" test, which is applied in the Fifth Circuit in determining whether a party has ***standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order***—which it describes as a narrower and "more exacting" standard than constitutional standing. As explained in a Fifth Circuit opinion addressing the standing of a Dondero-related entity called NexPoint to appeal bankruptcy court orders allowing professional fees, the "person aggrieved" standard that is typically applied to ascertain bankruptcy ***appellate*** standing originated in a statute in the Bankruptcy Act. The Fifth Circuit continued to apply it after Congress removed the provision when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.[164] Because it is narrower and "more exacting" than the test for Article III constitutional standing, it involves application of prudential standing considerations.[165] The Fifth Circuit describes the "person aggrieved" test for bankruptcy appellant standing as requiring that an appellant show that it was "*directly and adversely affected pecuniarily* by the order of the bankruptcy court," requiring "a higher causal nexus between act and injury than traditional standing . . . that best deals with the unique posture of bankruptcy actions."[166] In affirming the district court's dismissal of NexPoint's appeal of the bankruptcy court's fee orders, due to NexPoint's lack of prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test, the court rejected NexPoint's argument that it had standing to appeal

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[164] *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, L.L.P. (In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.)*, No. 22-10575, 2023 WL 4621466, *2 (5th Cir. July 19, 2023)(citing *In re Coho Energy Inc.*, 395 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2004)(cleaned up)).

[165] *Id.* at *1, **4-6 (where the Fifth Circuit repeatedly throughout its opinion refers to the "person aggrieved" test for standing in bankruptcy actions as a test for "prudential standing."); *see also Dondero v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.*, Civ. Act. No. 3:20-cv-3390-X, 2002 WL 837208 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2022)(where the district court, in addressing Dondero's standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order approving a Rule 9019 settlement (between Highland and Acis Capital Management GP LLC), notes that "[i]t is substantially more difficult to have standing to appeal a bankruptcy court's order than it is to pursue a typical complaint under Article III of the U.S. Constitution" and that "the Fifth Circuit has long recognized that bankruptcy cases' wide-reaching scope calls for a more stringent standing test.").

[166] *See id.* at *3 (cleaned up). The court quotes its 2018 opinion in *Matter of Technicool Sys., Inc. (In re Technicool)*, 896 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2018), which explains why the "person aggrieved" prudential standing standard is applied in bankruptcy actions: "Bankruptcy cases often involve numerous parties with conflicting and overlapping interests. Allowing each and every party to appeal each and every order would clog up the system and bog down the courts. Given the specter of such sclerotic litigation, standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order is, of necessity, *quite limited*." *Id.* (cleaned up).

because "it meets traditional Article III standing requirements [and that the more exacting] prudential standing considerations such as the 'person aggrieved' standard" did not survive the Supreme Court's 2014 *Lexmark*[167] opinion,[168] which addressed standing issues in the context of false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and reminded that courts may not "limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because 'prudence' dictates."[169] The Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's reminder in *Lexmark* did not nullify the "person aggrieved" test for prudential standing in bankruptcy appeals, citing its own decision in *Superior MRI Services Inc. v. Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc.*[170] (rendered a year after *Lexmark* was decided), in which it held that *Lexmark* applied only to the circumstances of that case, "rather than broadly modifying—or undermining—*all* prudential standing concerns, such as the one animating the 'person aggrieved' standard in bankruptcy appeals."[171]

Similarly, in yet another appeal in this bankruptcy case involving three Dondero-related entities as appellants (NexPoint, Dugaboy, and HCMFA)—this one an appeal of a bankruptcy court order authorizing the creation of an indemnity subtrust and entry into an indemnity trust agreement—the district court noted the parties' confusion about the standing issue, as exemplified in the parties' reference to constitutional standing when they were actually arguing that they had prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test: "Although the parties frame this issue as one of constitutional standing . . . they cite case law and present arguments about the prudential

[167] *Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118 (2014).

[168] *Id.* at *2.

[169] *See id.* at *4 (cleaned up).

[170] 778 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2015).

[171] *NexPoint*, 2023 WL 4621466 at *4 (cleaned up). The Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that "*Lexmark* does not expressly reach prudential concerns in bankruptcy appeals and brought no change relevant here." *Id.* at *5 (cleaned up).

standing requirement embodied in the 'person aggrieved' test."[172] The district court noted that it had an "independent obligation to consider constitutional standing before reaching its prudential aspects."[173] The district court dismissed the appeal as to Dugaboy and HCMFA for lack of standing but, upon concluding that NexPoint did have standing, dismissed the appeal as to it on the merits. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.[174] Interestingly, the court noted that, while the parties did not contest the district court's determination that NexPoint had standing to pursue the appeal, it "may consider prudential standing issues *sua sponte*."[175] In doing so, the Fifth Circuit recognized the distinction between constitutional standing and the prudential "person aggrieved" test applied to bankruptcy appeals, which "is, of necessity, quite limited" and "an even more exacting standard than traditional constitutional standing," as it requires an appellant to show that it is "directly, adversely, and financially impacted by a bankruptcy order."[176]

In summary, in analyzing whether HMIT would have standing to bring the Proposed Claims, this court must ***first*** determine whether HMIT would have constitutional standing under Article III (which is a subject matter jurisdiction hurdle) and, assuming it does, then ***additionally*** address whether HMIT would also have prudential standing (i.e., capacity to sue) pursuant to any applicable statutes (e.g., Delaware statutes), jurisprudence, or other substantive law that might ***limit*** who may sue. Notwithstanding HMIT's argument that it has standing under the "person

[172] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-1895-D, 2002 WL 270862, *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2022)(cleaned up). The district court dismissed the appeals of two of the appellants, Dugaboy and HCMFA, finding that they lacked both constitutional standing and prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order after finding the third appellant, NexPoint, to have prudential standing under the "person aggrieved" test. *Id.* at **1-3 and *4.

[173] *Id.* at *1 n.2.

[174] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, 57 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023).

[175] *Id.* at 501 (cleaned up).

[176] *Id.*

aggrieved" test[177]—which, as discussed above, is a matter of prudential standing—this is applied only in the context of bankruptcy ***appellate*** matters.[178] As noted in its most recent opinion discussing standing in an appeal from the Highland bankruptcy case, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that the "person aggrieved" test is a test for bankruptcy ***appellate*** standing, which is narrower than a party in interest's right to be heard in bankruptcy cases in general.[179] The court rejected an argument that Bankruptcy Code § 1109, which provides that "[a] party in interest . . . may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter" confers ***appellate*** standing, noting that "one's standing to appear and be heard before the bankruptcy court [is] a concept distinct from standing to appeal the merits of a decision" and that the "person aggrieved" test for bankruptcy appellate standing is narrower than the test for determining one's standing to appear and be heard in a bankruptcy proceeding.[180]

Thus, the court will now analyze whether HMIT would, at a minimum, have constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims.

2. HMIT Would Lack Article III Constitutional Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims.

As noted above, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have made clear that constitutional standing is necessary for a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. It is only the first hurdle a party must clear before pursuing a claim in federal court. HMIT, as plaintiff, would bear the

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[177] HMIT insists that it has constitutional standing to bring claims on its individual behalf "as an aggrieved party." *See* Reply, ¶ 7.

[178] HMIT's argument in this matter that it has constitutional standing because it is a "party aggrieved" incorrectly conflates the prudential bankruptcy appellate "person aggrieved" test with the broader test that is applied to constitutional standing. The court is not being critical of this mistake. As noted at *supra* note 149, the Fifth Circuit in *Abraugh* pointed out that courts and attorneys alike have created confusion by misusing the term "standing" when they equate a lack of "standing," in all instances, with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, even when the party is found to lack only prudential standing. Thus, HMIT is not alone in its confusion over the two different concepts of standing.

[179] *See NexPoint*, 2023 WL 4621466 at *6.

[180] *Id.* at *6 (cleaned up)("Because Section 1109(b) expands the right to be heard [in a bankruptcy proceeding] to a wider class than those who qualify under the 'person aggrieved' standard, courts considering the issue have concluded that merely being a party in interest is insufficient to confer ***appellate*** standing.")(emphasis added).

burden of establishing: (1) that it suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent—not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) it must be likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.[181]

Concrete and Particularized; Actual or Imminent. As the Supreme Court made clear in the *Lujan* case, the injury in fact element requires a showing that the injury was "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."[182] The Supreme Court in the *Spokeo* case expounded on the "concrete and particularized" requirements of the "injury in fact" element. Particularization requires a showing that the injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way," but while particularization is necessary, it alone is "not sufficient," because an injury in fact must also be "concrete."[183] And, concreteness is "quite different from particularization."[184] A "concrete" injury must be "real," and "not abstract," though it does not mean that the injury must be "tangible," as the injury can be intangible and nevertheless be concrete.[185] In addition to the concreteness and particularization requirements, an injury in fact must be "actual or imminent" such that "allegations of injury that is merely conjectural or hypothetical do not suffice to confer standing."[186] "Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is *certainly*

[181] *See supra* note 153.
[182] *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).
[183] *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 339.
[184] *Id.* at 340.
[185] *Id.*
[186] *Little v. KPMG LLP*, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).

impending"; "allegations of *possible* future injury are not sufficient."[187]

Traceability - Causal Connection. As to the second element—that the injury was caused by the defendant—the Supreme Court in *Lujan* further described it as requiring a showing that "the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant."[188] The "fairly traceable" test requires an examination of "the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury."[189]

Redressability. The third element—redressability—requires the court to examine the connection "between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested."[190] "Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court."[191] "[A] court must determine that there is an available remedy which will have a 'substantial probability' of redressing the plaintiff's injury."[192]

The Claims Purchasers argue that HMIT lacks constitutional standing to pursue the claims asserted in the Proposed Complaint because: (i) neither HMIT nor the Bankruptcy Estate was injured by the Claim Purchasers' acquisition of the claims; and (ii) the Proposed Complaint lacks a theory of cognizable damages to the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and/or the beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust.[193]

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[187] *Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)(cleaned up); *see also Abdullah v. Paxton*, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2023)("[Injury] cannot be speculative, conjectural, or hypothetical [and] [a]llegations of only a 'possible' future injury similarly will not suffice.")(cleaned up).

[188] *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (cleaned up).

[189] *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).

[190] *Id.* (noting "it is important to keep the ['fairly traceable' and 'redressability'] inquiries separate if the 'redressability' component is to focus on the requested relief.").

[191] *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).

[192] *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 129 n.20 (1983)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(cleaned up); *see also Ondrusek v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*, Civ. Act. No. 3:22-cv-1874-N, 2023 WL 2169908, at *5 ("Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that any available remedy would be sufficiently likely to relieve their alleged economic losses. Without a showing of redressability, those harms also cannot support Plaintiff's Article III standing.").

[193] As noted earlier, certain of the Proposed Defendants—the Highland Parties—do not focus on HMIT's lack of constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims against them, but on its lack of prudential standing under

The court agrees with the Claims Purchasers' argument here. What is HMIT's concrete and particularized injury—that is "real" and is not abstract? That is not conjectural or hypothetical? That is actual or imminent?

Recall that, under the Plan, HMIT holds a Class 10 contingent interest in the Claimant Trust that only realizes value if all creditors are paid in full with interest. HMIT alleges the following injury: it has suffered a devaluation of its unvested Contingent Claimant Trust Interest by virtue of the alleged over-compensation of Seery as the Claimant Trustee—Seery's alleged over-compensation depletes the assets in the Claimant Trust available for distribution to creditors under the Plan, such that there is less likely a chance that HMIT ultimately receives any distributions on account of its Class 10 Contingent Claimant Trust Interest.[194] Yet, HMIT testified, through both witnesses Dondero and Patrick, that it had no personal knowledge of what Seery's actual compensation is under the CTA at the time HMIT filed its Motion for Leave. It was clear that HMIT's allegations regarding Seery's "excessive" compensation were based entirely on Dondero's pure speculation. In reality, Seery's base salary is exactly what the bankruptcy court approved during the bankruptcy case by a court order (after negotiations between Seery and the Committee). The CTA now further governs his compensation. The CTA, which was publicly filed ***in advance of*** the Plan confirmation hearing and approved by this court as part of the Plan

applicable law. Because constitutional standing is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the court has an independent duty to determine whether HMIT would have constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims in federal court. The issue cannot be forfeited or waived by a party. *See Abraugh v. Y & H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived. Moreover, courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.")(cleaned up); *Abraugh*, 26 F.4th at 304 ("It is our constitutional duty, of course, to decline subject matter jurisdiction where it does not exist—and that is so whether the parties challenge Article III standing or not.")(cleaned up).

[194] At the June 8 Hearing, HMIT's counsel was unable to identify any other injury HMIT has alleged to have suffered. HMIT's counsel acknowledged that claims trades, in and of themselves, would not "involve injury to the Reorganized Debtor and to the Claimant Trust" and that claims trades are "normally outside the purview of the bankruptcy court" but that "[h]ere, we have alleged . . . . injury [that] takes the form of unearned excessive fees that Mr. Seery has garnered as a result of his relationship and arrangements, as we have alleged, with the Claims Purchasers." June 8 Hearing Transcript, 67:16-68:8. HMIT can only point to Seery's excess compensation as injury.

(which has been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit), specifically provides that Seery's post-Effective Date compensation would include a "Base Salary" (again, same as during the bankruptcy case), a "success fee," and "severance."[195] The CTA discussed the role of the Committee and then the CTOB in setting the success fee and severance and the like. A fully executed copy of the CTA was admitted into evidence at the June 8 Hearing. HMIT is essentially arguing that its injury (i.e., diminished likelihood of realizing value on its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest) stems from a court-sanctioned and creditor-approved process for approving compensation to Seery. Moreover, HMIT has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that, even if Seery received excessive compensation and that compensation is ordered to be returned, HMIT's Contingent Claimant Trust Interest will ever vest. The district court and the Fifth Circuit in various appeals by Dugaboy, another Dondero-related entity that, similar to HMIT, was a holder of a limited partnership interest in Highland whose interests were terminated as of the Effective Date of the Plan in exchange for a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest, have repeatedly rejected Dugaboy's claims to have standing based on the ***speculative nature of its alleged injuries as a contingent beneficiary of the Claimant Trust under the Plan***. For example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an appeal by Dugaboy of the bankruptcy court's order authorizing the creation of an indemnity subtrust, wherein Judge Fitzwater found that, in addition to lacking prudential standing under the

[195] The Disclosure Statement that was approved by this court, after notice and a hearing, on November 24, 2020, provided that "The salient terms of each Trustee's employment, including such Trustee's duties and compensation shall be set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement . . . ." The CTA was part of a Plan Supplement (as amended) that was filed in advance of the confirmation hearing and provided:

> Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Claimant Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall receive compensation of $150,000 per month (the "Base Salary"). Within the first forty-five days following the Confirmation Date, the Claimant Trustee, on the one hand, and the Committee, if prior to the Effective Date, or the Oversight Board, if on or after the Effective Date, on the other, will negotiate go-forward compensation for the Claimant Trustee which will include (a) the Base Salary, (b) a success fee, and (c) severance.

See Highland Ex. 38, at § 3.13(a)(i).

"person aggrieved" test to appeal the bankruptcy court's order, Dugaboy lacked constitutional standing "because they have not identified any injury fairly traceable to the Order: ***the injuries identified are speculative at best and nonexistent at worst***."[196] HMIT's allegations of injury are, without a doubt, "merely conjectural or hypothetical" and are only speculative of possible future injury if its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest ever vests."[197] The court finds that HMIT would not meet the "concrete and particularized" or the "actual or imminent" requirements for an "injury in fact," and, thus, would lack constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims.

With regard to the second requirement of constitutional standing—whether HMIT could show "traceability" with respect to the Claims Purchasers and/or Seery (i.e., a "causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury"[198]), as noted above, there is only a speculative injury. Even if there is unlawful conduct asserted (i.e., sharing of MNPI to Claims Purchasers who then, as a *quid pro quo*, rubber stamped excessive compensation for Seery), there is nothing other than a hypothetical theory of an alleged injury (i.e., an allegedly less likelihood of a distribution on a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest).

With respect to the third requirement of constitutional standing—whether HMIT can show "redressability" (i.e., that it is likely, not speculative, that the injury can be redressed by a favorable

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[196] *Highland Capital Mgt. Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-1895-D, 2022 WL 270862, *1 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2022), *aff'd* 57 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023)(emphasis added); *see also* Judge Scholer's opinion in *Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. (In re Highland Capital Mgt., L.P.)*, Civ. Act. No. 3:21-cv-2268-S, 2022 WL 3701720, *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022)(cleaned up), *aff'd per curium*, No. 22-10831, 2023 WL 2263022 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023) (where Dugaboy had argued that "***its pecuniary interest is . . . a potential recovery under the Plan as one of Debtor's former equity holders***" and that "it ha[d] standing as a 'contingent beneficiary' under the Plan, or a beneficiary who will be entitled to payment after all creditors are paid in full," and Judge Scholer stated, "This assertion is premised on the assumption that Dugaboy's 0.1866% pre-bankruptcy limited partnership interest in Debtor—which was extinguished under the Plan—makes it a contingent beneficiary of the creditor trust created under the Plan. . . . [S]uch a 'speculative prospect of harm is far from a direct, adverse, pecuniary hit' as required to confer standing."

[197] *Little v. KPMG LLP*, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).

[198] *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984).

decision), there are multiple problems here.[199] The major remedy sought here is the equitable disallowance of the allowed Purchased Claims (and disgorgement and/or constructive trust of amounts paid or owed to the Claim Purchasers on account of their claims). There is no such remedy available here. As noted earlier, there is a similar concept of ***equitable subordination*** of a claim to another claim, or of an interest to another interest, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 510(c). But under the literal terms of section 510(c), ***claims cannot be subordinated to interests***. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted in the *Mobile Steel* case,[200] that ***equitable disallowance*** of a claim (as opposed to equitable subordination of a claims) is not an available remedy. Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(1) and the Fifth Circuit's *Lothian Oil* case might permit "recharacterization" of a claim from debt to equity in certain circumstances—but not based on inequitable conduct but rather on the nature of a financial transaction. In any event, here, the claims have already been adjudicated and allowed (some after mediation, and all after Rule 9019 settlement orders). The only way to reconsider a claim in a bankruptcy case that has already been allowed is through Bankruptcy Code section 502(j) ("A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. . . according to the equities of the case."). As noted earlier, the problem here is that Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides that a motion for "reconsideration of an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate ***entered without a contest*** is not subject to the one year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c)" (emphasis added). As further noted earlier, here there was most definitely a "contest" with regard to all of these purchased claims. ***Thus, it would appear***

[199] *See supra* notes 182-184 and accompanying text. The court will note that, as discussed *supra* note 141 and pages 71-72, the remedy of equitable subordination (as to the Claims Purchasers) would not redress HMIT's alleged injury (because equitable subordination of claims to interests is not an available remedy in the Fifth Circuit and thus subordination of the Purchased Claims to other claims would not change HMIT's distributions from the Claimant Trust, if any), and because outright disallowance of all or part of the already allowed Purchased Claims is not an available remedy either, HMIT would not be able to meet the "redressability" requirement with respect to the Claims Purchasers.

[200] *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.*, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).

that any effort to have a court reconsider and potentially disallow these claims pursuant to section 502(j) is untimely—as it has been well beyond a year since they were allowed.

3. HMIT Would Also Lack Prudential Standing to Bring the Proposed Claims.

Even if HMIT would have constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims in an adversary proceeding filed in the bankruptcy court, the Proposed Claims would still be barred if HMIT would lack prudential standing to bring them under applicable state or federal law. HMIT argues that it does have prudential standing under both federal bankruptcy law and Delaware law to pursue the Proposed Claims derivatively and also to bring the Proposed Claims in its individual capacity.

With regard to "federal bankruptcy law," HMIT argues that it has standing pursuant to: (a) Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to derivative actions, which "applies to this proceeding pursuant to" Rule 7023.1 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and (b) *Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co. ("LWE")*,[201] the Fifth Circuit's leading case addressing when a creditors committee may be granted standing to bring causes of action on behalf of a bankruptcy estate. But, federal bankruptcy law does not confer standing ***where the plaintiff otherwise lacks standing under applicable state law***. In other words, whether HMIT would have prudential standing to sue under Delaware law is dispositive of the issue, regardless of the forum. Rule 23.1 "speaks only to the adequacy of the . . . pleadings," and "cannot be understood to 'abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right,'"[202] including a right (or lack thereof) to bring a derivative action under the substantive law of Delaware. Additionally, HMIT's reliance on *LWE* is misplaced: *LWE* permits creditors, in certain circumstances ***during*** a bankruptcy case, to "file

[201] 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).

[202] *Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).

suit on behalf of a debtor-in-possession or a trustee"[203] and does not apply to a party's right to sue, derivatively, on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor or any entity that is the assignee of the former bankruptcy estate's assets. Upon confirmation of the Plan, the bankruptcy estate of Highland ceased to exist;[204] Highland is no longer a debtor-in-possession but a reorganized debtor, and the Claimant Trust is a new entity created under the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement. Even if *LWE* did apply in this ***post***-confirmation context, it supports the application of Delaware law to the issue of prudential standing and does not supersede state-law requirements for standing. In *LWE*, before addressing the requirements a creditors' committee must meet to sue derivatively on behalf of a bankruptcy estate as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, the Fifth Circuit conducted a lengthy analysis to determine "as a threshold issue" whether the creditors' committee in that case could assert its claims under Louisiana law.[205] The court specifically addressed whether the creditors' committee could pursue a derivative action under Louisiana law and concluded that "there is no bar in Louisiana law to actions brought by or in the name of a corporation against the directors and officers of the corporation which benefit only the creditors of the corporation; indeed, Louisiana law specifically recognizes such actions."[206] So, even under *LWE* (which the court does not think applies in this post-confirmation context), if HMIT would be barred from bringing a derivative action on behalf the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust under state law, the analysis stops there.[207] Thus, the court looks to Delaware law to determine if HMIT would have prudential standing to pursue the derivative claims on behalf the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust.

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[203] *LWE*, 858 F.2d at 247.

[204] *See In re Craig's Stores*, 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2001).

[205] *LWE*, 858 F.2d at 236-45.

[206] *Id.* at 243.

[207] *See In re Dura Automotive Sys., LLC*, No. 19-123728 (Bankr. D. Del. June 10, 2020), Docket No. 1115 at 46 (where the Delaware bankruptcy court denied the creditors' committee standing to sue derivatively on behalf of a Delaware LLC because the committee lacked standing under the Delaware LLC Act, stating, "To determine that the third party

HMIT acknowledges that both the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are organized under Delaware law, and thus the cause of action against Seery alleging breach of fiduciary duties to the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are governed by Delaware law under the "Internal Affairs Doctrine."[208] In addition, because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duties claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting theory of liability as to the Claims Purchasers is also governed by Delaware law.[209] For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that HMIT would lack prudential standing under Delaware law to bring the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint, derivatively, on behalf of either the Claimant Trust or the Reorganized Debtor.

a) First, HMIT Would Lack Prudential Standing Under Delaware Law to Bring Derivative Actions on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

The Claimant Trust is a Delaware statutory trust governed by the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. §§ 3801–29,[210] and "to proceed derivatively against a Delaware statutory trust, a plaintiff has the burden of satisfying the continuous ownership requirement" such that "the plaintiff must be a beneficial owner" continuously from "the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains" through "the time of bringing the action."[211] This requirement is "mandatory and exclusive" and only "a beneficial owner" "has standing to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the

may bring the claim under the derivative basis and, thus, step into the shoes of the debtor to pursue them, the Court must look to the law of the debtors' state of incorporation or formation.").

[208] Motion for Leave, ¶ 21 and n.24; *see also* Plan Art. XII.M ("corporate governance matters . . . shall be governed by the laws of the state of organization" of the respective entity); *Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A.*, 34 A.3d 1074, 1081–82 (Del. 2011) ("In American corporation law, the internal affairs doctrine is a dominant and overarching choice of law principle."). The Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are both organized under the laws of Delaware.

[209] *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas).

[210] *See* Proposed Complaint, ¶ 26.

[211] *Hartsel v. Vanguard Grp., Inc.*, 2011 WL 2421003, at *19 n.123 (Del. Ch. June 15, 2011), *aff'd* 38 A.3d 1254 (Del. 2012); 12 Del C. § 3816(b).

Trust."[212] The Highland Parties argue that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust and, therefore, would lack standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust. HMIT argues to the contrary: that it ***is*** currently, and was at all relevant times, a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust under Delaware trust law such that it would have standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust if it were allowed to proceed with the filing of the Proposed Complaint. The disagreement turns on the nature of HMIT's interest under the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement and whether HMIT, as a holder of such interest, would be considered a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust under Delaware trust law.

As noted, pursuant to the Plan, HMIT's former limited partnership interest in Highland was cancelled as of the Effective Date in exchange for its pro rata share of a "Contingent Claimant Trust Interest," as defined under the Plan.[213] HMIT argues that its Contingent Claimant Trust Interest makes it a contingent beneficiary of the Claimant Trust, which makes it a present "beneficial owner" under Delaware trust law.

The Highland Parties argue that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust; rather, the "beneficial owners" of the Claimant Trust are the "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries,"[214] which are defined in the Plan and the CTA as "the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims" (which are in Class 8 under the Plan) and "Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims" (which are in Class 9 under the Plan); [215] HMIT, a holder of a Class 10 interest under the Plan, is neither.

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[212] *In re Nat'l Coll. Student Loan Tr. Litig.*, 251 A.3d 116, 191 (Del. Ch. 2020) (citing *CML V, LLC v. Bax*, 28 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Del. 2011)). HMIT acknowledges this requirement in its Reply: "Delaware statutory trust law provides that a plaintiff in a derivative action on behalf of a trust must be a beneficial owner at the time of the action and at the time of the transaction." Reply, ¶ 19 (citing 12 Del C. § 3816).

[213] *See* Plan Art. III.H.10 and Art. I.B.44.

[214] Section 2.8 of the CTA provides, "The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be the sole beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust . . . ." HMIT Ex. 26, § 2.8.

[215] *See* Plan Art. I.B.44 ("'*Claimant Trust Beneficiaries*' means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the

HMIT, as the holder of a "Contingent Claimant Trust Interest," has only an ***unvested*** contingent interest in the Claimant Trust and, as such, is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust for standing purposes under Delaware trust law. HMIT argues that it "should be treated as a vested Claimant Trust Beneficiary due to [the Proposed Defendants'] wrongful conduct and considering the current value of the Claimant Trust Assets before and after the relief requested herein."[216] The court disagrees.

HMIT's status as a "beneficiary" of the Claimant Trust is defined by the CTA itself, pure and simple. The CTA specifically provides that "Contingent Trust Interests" "shall not have any rights under this Agreement" and will not "be deemed 'Beneficiaries' under this Agreement," "unless and until" they vest in accordance with the Plan and the CTA. It is undisputed that HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest has not vested under the terms of the Plan and the CTA, and the court does not have the power to equitably deem HMIT's Contingent Trust Interest to be vested based on HMIT's unsupported allegation of wrongdoing on the part of Seery, the Claimant Trustee. Thus, the court finds that HMIT is not a "beneficial owner" of the Claimant Trust and, therefore, lacks prudential standing under Delaware law to bring derivative claims on behalf of the Claimant Trust.[217]

Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full, post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests."); CTA § 1.1(h). *See also*, CTA, 1 at n.2 ("For the avoidance of doubt, and as set forth in the Plan, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests will be Claimant Trust Beneficiaries only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan."). HMIT Ex. 26.

[216] Proposed Complaint ¶ 24.

[217] *See Nat'l Coll.*, 251 A.3d at 190–92 (dismissing creditors' derivative claims because they were not "beneficial owners of the Trusts"); *Hartsel*, 2011 WL 2421003, at *19 n.123 (dismissing derivative claims by investors that "no longer own shares" because "those investors no longer have standing to pursue a derivative claim").

b) HMIT Would Likewise Lack Prudential Standing Under Delaware Law to Bring Derivative Actions on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor.

HMIT acknowledges that the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., is a Delaware limited liability partnership governed by the Delaware Limited Partnership Act, 6 Del. C. § 17-101, *et seq.*[218] To bring "a derivative action" on behalf of a limited partnership, "the plaintiff must be a partner or an assignee of a partnership interest" continuously from "the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains" through "the time of bringing the action."[219]

HMIT is not a partner, general or limited, of the Reorganized Debtor limited partnership. HMIT ***was*** a limited partner in the original debtor (specifically, a holder of Class B/C Limited Partnership interests in Highland), but that limited partnership interest was extinguished on August 11, 2021 (the Effective Date of the Plan) per the terms of the Plan, and HMIT does not own any partnership interest in the newly created Reorganized Debtor limited partnership.[220] Because HMIT would not hold a partnership interest in the Reorganized Debtor at "the time of bringing the action," it "lacks derivative standing" to bring claims "on the partnership's behalf."[221] HMIT likewise cannot satisfy "the continuous ownership requirement"; when HMIT's limited partnership interest in the original Debtor was cancelled on the Plan's Effective Date, HMIT "los[t] standing to continue a derivative suit" on behalf of the Debtor.[222] Finally, to the extent HMIT

[218] Proposed Complaint ¶ 25.

[219] 6 Del. C. § 17-1002; *see Tow v. Amegy Bank, N.A.*, 976 F. Supp. 2d 889, 904 (S.D. Tex. 2013) ("The [Delaware] partnership act facially bars any party other than a limited partner from suing derivatively. . . . Delaware courts historically have interpreted the provisions as giving the partners exclusive rights to sue for breach of another party's fiduciary duties to them.") (quoting *CML V, LLC v. Bax*, 6 A.3d 238, 245 (Del. Ch. 2010), *aff'd* 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 2011)); *El Paso Pipeline GP Co. v. Brinckerhoff*, 152 A.3d 1248, 1265 n.87 (Del. 2016) ("The statutory foundation for the continuous ownership requirement in the corporate realm is echoed in the limited partnership context.") (citing 6 Del. C. § 17-211(h)).

[220] *See* Plan Art. IV.A.

[221] *Tow*, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (dismissing derivative claims by creditor on behalf of partnership for lack of standing).

[222] *El Paso*, 152 A.3d at 1265 (cleaned up) (dismissing derivative action for lack of standing where plaintiff's partnership interest was extinguished by a merger transaction); *see also Schmermerhorn v. CenturyTel, Inc. (In re*

seeks to bring a "double derivative" action on behalf of the Claimant Trust based on claims purportedly held by its wholly owned subsidiary, the Reorganized Debtor, HMIT lacks standing. A "double derivative" action is a suit "brought by a shareholder of a parent corporation to enforce a claim belonging to a subsidiary that is either wholly owned or majority controlled."[223] And, under Delaware law, "parent level standing is required to enforce a subsidiary's claim derivatively."[224] Because HMIT would lack derivative standing to bring claims on behalf of the parent Claimant Trust,[225] it also would lack standing to bring a double derivative action.

c) Finally, HMIT Would Also Lack Prudential Standing under Applicable Law to Bring the Proposed Claims As ***Direct*** Claims.

HMIT argues that it has "direct" standing to pursue the Proposed Claims on behalf of itself, individually.[226] But just because HMIT asserts that some or even all of the Proposed Claims are direct, not derivative claims, does not make it so: "a claim is not 'direct' simply because it is pleaded that way."[227] Rather, in determining whether claims are direct or derivative, a court must "look at the substance of the Petition, and the nature of the wrongs alleged therein, rather than the Plaintiffs' characterization."[228] And, under Delaware law, "whether a claim is solely derivative or

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SkyPort Global Commcn's, Inc.), 2011 WL 111427, at *25–26 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2011) (holding that pre-petition shareholders "lack standing to bring a derivative claim" under Delaware law because they "had their equity interests in the company extinguished pursuant to the merger under the Plan"); *In re WorldCom, Inc.*, 351 B.R. 130, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he cancellation of WorldCom shares under the Plan … prevents the required continuation of shareholder status through the litigation.") (cleaned up).

[223] *Lambrecht v. O'Neal*, 3 A.3d 277, 282 (Del. 2010).

[224] *Sagarra*, 34 A.3d at 1079–81 (capitalization omitted) (citing *Lambrecht*, 3 A.3d at 282).

[225] *See supra* pp. 80-82.

[226] *See e.g.*, Motion for Leave ¶ 10 ("HMIT has individual standing to bring this action because Seery owed fiduciary duties directly to HMIT at that time . . . ."); *id.* ¶ 67 (arguing that "HMIT has [d]irect [s]tanding"); Proposed Complaint ¶ 24 ("HMIT has constitutional standing and capacity to bring these claims both individually and derivatively.").

[227] *Schmermerhorn*, 2011 WL 111427, at *26 (quoting *Gatz v. Ponsoldt*, 2004 WL 3029868 at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2004)).

[228] *See id.* (citing *Armstrong v. Capshaw, Goss & Bowers LLP*, 404 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2005)); *see also Moore v. Simon Enters., Inc.*, 919 F.Supp. 1007, 1009 (N.D. Tex. 1995)("The determination of whether a claim is a derivative claim or a direct claim is made by reference to the nature of the wrongs alleged in the complaint, and is not limited by a [party's] characterization or stated intention.")(cleaned up).

may continue as a dual-natured claim 'must turn ***solely*** on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?'"[229] "In addition, to prove that a claim is direct, a plaintiff 'must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation.'"[230] Similarly, in the bankruptcy context, whether a creditor can assert a claim directly or whether the claim belongs to the estate turns on the nature of the injury for which relief is sought: "[i]f the harm to the creditor comes about only because of harm to the debtor, then its injury is derivative, and the claim is property of the estate," such that "only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to pursue the claim for the estate . . . ."[231] "To pursue a claim on its own behalf, a creditor must show this direct injury is not dependent on injury to the estate."[232]

As a reminder, HMIT argues that the injury it has suffered is a devaluation of its interests in the Claimant Trust by virtue of alleged over-compensation of Seery as the Claimant Trustee. HMIT was unable, when pressed during closing arguments, to identify any other injury. It essentially admitted that the claims trades, in and of themselves, would not have harmed the Claimant Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, or individual stakeholders, including HMIT, ***since the Claims Purchasers acquired already allowed unsecured claims, such that the distributions on those claims pursuant to the Plan would be unchanged in the hands of new holders of the claims***.

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[229] *El Paso*, 152 A.3d at 1260 (quoting *Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.*, 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004)) (emphasis in original).

[230] *Id.* (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1033); *see also Schmermerhorn*, 2011 WL 111427, at *24 (same).

[231] *Meridian Cap. CIS Fund v. Burton (In re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C.)*, 912 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).

[232] *Id.*; *see also Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wright (In re Educators Grp. Health Tr.)*, 25 F.3d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994)("If a cause of action alleges only indirect harm to a creditor (i.e., an injury which derives from harm to the debtor), and the debtor could have raised a claim for its direct injury under the applicable law, then the cause of action belongs to the estate.")(citations omitted).

Thus, by its own concessions, any alleged harm to HMIT (through devaluation of assets in the Claimant Trust) "comes about only because of harm to the debtor," so the alleged "injury is derivative."[233] The court concludes that all of the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint allege derivative claims only, and that none would be direct claims against the Proposed Defendants. Thus, HMIT would lack prudential standing to bring any of the Proposed Claims in the Proposed Complaint, so its Motion for Leave should be denied.

d) Some Final Points Regarding Standing.

In this standing discussion, one should not lose sight of the fact that there are both procedural safeguards in place, as well as certain independent individuals in place with fiduciary duties that might act in the event of any shenanigans regarding Claimant Trust activities. Under section 4.1 of the CTA (approved as part of the Plan process), the CTOB, which includes an independent disinterested member in addition to representatives of the Claims Purchasers,[234] oversees the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties, approves his compensation, and may remove him for cause. Moreover, there is a separate "Litigation Trustee" in this case who was brought in, post-confirmation, as an independent fiduciary to pursue claims and causes of action. These independent persons are checks and balances in the post-confirmation wind down of Highland. This is what creditors voted on in connection with the Plan. Seery and the Claims Purchasers are not in sole control of anything. The CTA, as well as Delaware law, very clearly set forth who can bring an action in the event of some colorable claim. This is the reality of prudential

[233] *Meridian*, 912 F.3d at 293–94 ("The creditors' injury (reduced bankruptcy recovery) derived from injury to the debtor (the loss of estate assets), so only the estate could sue the third parties."); *see also El Paso,* 152 A.3d at 1260–61 & n.60 (holding that claim "claims of corporate overpayment are normally treated as causing harm solely to the corporation and, thus, are regarded as derivative") (collecting cases); *Gerber v EPE Holdings, LLC*, 2013 WL 209658, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2013) (holding that claims were derivative because plaintiff had "not identified any independent harm suffered by the limited partners"; "the partnership suffered all the harm at issue—it paid too much").

[234] *See supra* note 23 and accompanying text.

standing. Just as in the *Abraugh* case, where Louisiana law dictated that a mother could not bring a wrongful death case when the deceased prisoner had a surviving wife and child, Delaware law and the CTA dictate here that a contingent beneficiary cannot bring the Proposed Claims here. This is separate and apart from whether the claims are colorable.

C. Are the Proposed Claims "Colorable"?

1. What is the Proper Standard of Review for a "Colorability" Determination?

Although the court has determined that HMIT would ***not*** have standing (constitutional or prudential) to bring the Proposed Claims, this court will nevertheless evaluate whether the claims—assuming HMIT somehow has standing—might be "colorable." This, in turn, requires the court to assess what the legal standard is to determine if a claim is "colorable." As a reminder, the Plan's Gatekeeper Provision and this court's prior Gatekeeper Orders entered in January and July 2020 each required that, before a party may commence or pursue claims relating to the bankruptcy case against certain protected parties, it must first obtain a finding from the bankruptcy court that its proposed claims are "colorable." The Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders did not specifically define "colorable" or what type of legal standard should apply.

HMIT argues that the standard for review to be applied by this court is the same as a simple "plausibility" standard used in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In other words, the court should simply assess whether the allegations of the Proposed Complaint, taken as true and with all inferences drawn in favor of the movant, state a ***plausible*** claim for relief (i.e., colorable equals plausible), and that this standard does not allow for the weighing of evidence by the court.[235] The Proposed Defendants, however, argue that the test for colorability should be more

[235] Reply, ¶ 5 ("[T]he determination of 'colorability' does not allow the 'weighing' of evidence. At most, a Rule 12(b)(6) 'plausibility' standard applies.").

akin to the test applied under the *Barton* doctrine,[236] under which a plaintiff must make a *prima facie* case that a proposed claim against a bankruptcy trustee is "not without foundation." In this regard, they argue that the court can and should consider evidence outside of the four corners of the complaint—especially since HMIT attached to its Motion for Leave, as "evidence" to support it, two declarations of Dondero (as part of a 350-page attachment) and only attempted to withdraw those declarations after the Highland Parties urged that they be permitted to cross-examine Dondero on them.

This court ultimately determined that the "colorability" standard was somewhat of a mixed question of fact and law and, therefore, the parties could put on evidence at the June 8 Hearing if they so-chose. The court would not require it. It was up to the parties. But, in any event, the Proposed Defendants should have an opportunity to cross-examine Dondero on the statements made in his declarations since the declarations had been filed on the docket and the court had reviewed them at this point. HMIT attempted to withdraw the declarations and any reference to them in the Motion for Leave, by filing redacted versions of the Motion for Leave,[237] less than 72 hours before the June 8 Hearing; however, the redacted versions did not redact any allegations in the Motion for Leave that were purportedly supported by the Dondero declarations. Also, HMIT called Dondero as a direct witness, in addition to calling Seery as an adverse witness at the June 8 Hearing, albeit subject to its running objection to the evidentiary format of the hearing.[238] HMIT also filed a witness and exhibit list attaching 80 exhibits and over 2850 pages of evidence and

[236] *Barton v. Barbour,* 104 U.S. 126 (1881).

[237] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3815 and 3816.

[238] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 7:20-24, 112:11-13.

moved for the admission of those exhibits at the June 8 Hearing (again, subject to its running objection to the evidentiary format of the hearing).[239]

In determining what appropriate legal standard applies here in the "colorability" analysis, the context in which the Gatekeeper Provision of the Plan was approved seems very relevant. In determining that the Gatekeeper Provision was legal, necessary, and in the best interest of all of the parties, this court set forth in the Confirmation Order a lengthy discussion of the factual support for it, and made specific findings relating to Dondero's post-petition litigation and the need for inclusion of the Gatekeeper Provision in the Plan.[240] This court observed that "prior to the commencement of the Debtor's bankruptcy case, and while under the direction of Dondero, the Debtor had been involved in a myriad of litigation, some of which had gone on for years and, in some cases, over a decade" and that "[d]uring the last several months, Dondero and the Dondero Related Entities have harassed the Debtor, which has resulted in further substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for the Debtor."[241] This court further found that: (1) Dondero's post-petition litigation "was a result of Dondero failing to obtain creditor support for his plan proposal and consistent with his comments, as set forth in Seery's credible testimony, that if Dondero's plan proposal was not accepted, he would 'burn down the place,'"[242] (2) without the Gatekeeper Provision in place, "Dondero and his related entities will likely commence litigation against the Protected Parties after the Effective Date" and that "the threat of continued litigation by Dondero and his related entities after the Effective Date will impede efforts by the Claimant Trust to monetize assets for the benefit of creditors and result in lower distributions to creditors because of

[239] *See Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with Its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement* ("HMIT W&E List")[Bankr. Dkt. No. 3818] and n.1 thereto; *see also* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 33:7-10.

[240] *See* Confirmation Order ¶¶ 76-79.

[241] *Id.* ¶ 77.

[242] *Id.* ¶ 78. *See supra* note 12.

costs and distraction such litigation or the threats of such litigation would cause,"[243] and, (3) "unless the [court] approves the Gatekeeper Provision, the Claimant Trustee and the Claimant Trust Oversight Board will not be able to obtain D&O insurance,[244] the absence of which will present unacceptable risks to parties currently willing to serve in such roles." Thus, as set forth in the Confirmation Order, the Gatekeeper Provision (and the Gatekeeper Orders as well, which were approved based on the same concerns regarding the threat of continued litigation by Dondero and his related entities) required Dondero and related entities to make a threshold showing of colorability, noting that the:

> Gatekeeper Provision is also within the spirit of the Supreme Court's "Barton Doctrine." *Barton v. Barbour*, 104 U.S. 126 (1881). The Gatekeeper Provision is also consistent with the notion of a prefiling injunction to deter vexatious litigants, that has been approved by the Fifth Circuit in such cases as *Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC,* 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008), and *In re Carroll,* 850 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2017)."[245]

The Fifth Circuit, in approving the Gatekeeper Provision on appeal, noted that that the Plan injunction and Gatekeeper Provision "screen and prevent bad-faith litigation against Highland Capital, its successors, and other bankruptcy participants that could disrupt the Plan's effectiveness."[246]

Again, the court believes it is appropriate to consider the context in which—and the purpose for which—the Gatekeeper Orders and Gatekeeper Provision were entered in assessing

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[243] *Id.*

[244] Asd noted at ⁋ 79 of the Confirmation Order, the bankruptcy court heard testimony from Mark Tauber, a Vice President with AON Financial Services, the Debtor's insurance broker ("AON"), regarding his efforts to obtain D&O insurance for the post-confirmation parties implementing the Plan. Mr. Tauber credibly testified that of all the insurance carriers that AON approached to provide D&O insurance coverage after the Effective Date, the only one willing to do so ***without an exclusion for claims asserted by Mr. Dondero and his affiliates*** required that the Confirmation Order approve the Gatekeeper Provision.

[245] *Id.* ¶ 80.

[246] *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.* (*In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*), 48 F.4th 419, 435 (5th Cir. 2022).

how "colorability" should work here. It seems that applying HMIT's proposed Rule 12(b)(6) "plausibility" standard would impose no hurdle at all to litigants and would render the threshold for bringing claims under the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders entirely duplicative of the motion to dismiss standard that every litigant already faces.

The authorities cited by HMIT in support of its argument for applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard are inapposite. HMIT has cited no authority that addresses the appropriate standard for assessing the "colorability" of claims in the context of a plan gatekeeper provision—specifically, one implemented in response to a demonstrated need to screen and prevent continued bad-faith, harassing litigation against a chapter 11 debtor that would impede the debtor's implementation of a plan, which is what we have here. HMIT relies on a bevy of cases that include benefits coverage disputes under ERISA, Medicare coverage disputes, and constitutional challenges[247]—none of which implicate the *Barton* doctrine and vexatious-litigant concerns that were referenced by the court in the Plan as justifications for the gatekeeping provisions at issue here.

In affirming the Plan's Gatekeeper Provision, the Fifth Circuit stated, "Courts have long recognized bankruptcy courts can perform a gatekeeping function" and noted, by way of example, that "[u]nder the '*Barton* doctrine,' the bankruptcy court may require a party to 'obtain leave of

[247] *See Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.*, 207 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (assessing whether an employee has "a colorable claim to vested benefits" such that the employee may be considered a "participant" under ERISA); *Abraham v. Exxon Corp.*, 85 F.3d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); *Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp.*, 74 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); *Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc. v. BP Expl. & Prods. (In re Deepwater Horizon)*, 732 F.3d 326, 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that claims administrator incorrectly interpreted class settlement agreement by permitting "claimants [with] no colorable legal claim" to receive awards); *Richardson v. United States*, 468 U.S. 317, 326 n.6 (1984) (discussing whether criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim was "colorable" such that it could be appealed before final judgments); *Trippodo v. SP Plus Corp.*, 2021 WL 2446204, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2021) (assessing whether plaintiff stated a "colorable claim" against proposed additional defendants in determining whether plaintiff could amend complaint); *Reyes v. Vanmatre*, 2021 WL 5905557, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2021) (same); *Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar*, 886 F.3d 496, 504 n.15 (5th Cir. 2018) (assessing whether plaintiff raised a "colorable claim" to warrant the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over a Medicare coverage dispute); *Am. Med. Hospice Care, LLC v. Azar*, 2020 WL 9814144, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2020) (same); *Harry v. Colvin*, 2013 WL 12174300, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2013) (considering whether plaintiff asserted a "colorable constitutional claim" such that the court could exercise jurisdiction); *Sabhari v. Mukasey*, 522 F.3d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); *Stanley v. Gonzales*, 476 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).

the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in district court when the action is against the trustee or other bankruptcy-court-appointed officer, for acts done in the actor's official capacity."[248] As noted above, the Fifth Circuit found that the Gatekeeper Provision, which "requires that, before any lawsuit is filed, the plaintiff must seek the bankruptcy court's approval of the claim as 'colorable'"—*i.e.*, to "screen and prevent bad-faith litigation,"—is "sound."[249]

On balance, the court views jurisprudence applying the *Barton* doctrine and vexatious litigant injunctions—while not specifically addressing the "colorability" standard under gatekeeping provisions in a plan[250]—as more informative on how to approach "colorability" than any of the other authorities presented by the parties. One example is *In re VistaCare Group, LLC*.[251]

In *VistaCare*, the Third Circuit noted that, under the *Barton* doctrine, "[a] party seeking leave of court to sue a trustee must make a prima facie case against the trustee, showing that its claim is not without foundation," and emphasized that the "not without foundation" standard, while similar to the standard courts apply in evaluating Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, "involves a greater degree of flexibility" than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because "the bankruptcy court, which given its familiarity with the underlying facts and the parties, is uniquely situated to determine whether a claim against the trustee has merit," and "is also uniquely situated to determine the potential effect of a judgment against the trustee on the debtor's estate."[252] To satisfy the "*prima facie* case standard," "the movant must do more than meet the liberal notice-pleading

[248] *Id.* at 438 (cleaned up).

[249] *Id.* at 435.

[250] The court acknowledges that the *Barton* doctrine itself would not be directly applicable here because HMIT is proposing to bring the Proposed Complaint in the bankruptcy court – the "appointing" court of Seery.

[251] 678 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2012).

[252] *Id.* at 232-233 (cleaned up).

requirements of Rule 8."[253] "[I]f the [bankruptcy] court relied on mere notice-pleading standards rather than evaluating the merits of the allegations, the leave requirement would become meaningless."[254] This court agrees with the notion, that "[t]o apply a less stringent standard would eviscerate the protections" of the Gatekeeper Provision and Gatekeeper Orders.[255] The court notes, as well, that courts in the *Barton* doctrine context regularly hold evidentiary hearings on motions for leave to determine if the proposed complaint meets the necessary threshold for pursuing litigation. The Third Circuit in *VistaCare* noted that "[w]hether to hold a hearing [on a motion for leave to bring suit against a trustee] is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court,"[256] and that "the decision whether to grant leave may involve a 'balancing of the interests of all parties involved,'" which will ordinarily require an evidentiary hearing.[257] The Third Circuit applied "the deferential abuse of discretion standard" in considering whether the bankruptcy court's granting of leave should be affirmed on appeal.[258]

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[253] *In re World Mktg. Chi., LLC*, 584 B.R. 737, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018) (cleaned up; collecting cases).

[254] *Leighton Holdings, Ltd. v. Belofsky (In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P.)*, 2000 WL 1761020, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000).

[255] *World*, 584 B.R. at 743 (quoting *Leighton*, 2000 WL 1761020, at *2).

[256] *VistaCare*, 678 F.3d at 232 n.12.

[257] *Id.* at 233 (quoting *In re Kashani*, 190 B.R. 875, 886–87 (9th Cir. BAP 1995)). The Third Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court's holding of an evidentiary hearing on the motion for leave was appropriate (though not required in every case)). *Id.* at 232 n.12.

[258] *Id.* at 224 ("We review a bankruptcy court's decision to grant a motion for leave to sue a trustee under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.") (citing *In re Linton*, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1998); *In re Beck Indus., Inc.*, 725 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1984)). Courts of appeal routinely apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard to a bankruptcy court's decision regarding whether leave should be granted to sue a trustee. Although the Fifth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, all nine Circuits that have considered this issue have also adopted an abuse-of-discretion standard. *See In re Bednar*, 2021 WL 1625399, at *3 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2021) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court's decision to decline leave to sue the Trustee under the *Barton* doctrine is reviewed for abuse of discretion . . . .") (citing *VistaCare*); *SEC v. N. Am. Clearing, Inc.*, 656 F. App'x 969, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Although we have never determined the standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a *Barton* motion, other Circuits that have considered the issue review a lower court's ruling on a *Barton* motion for an abuse of discretion.") (citing *VistaCare*); *In re Lupo*, 2014 WL 4653064, at *3 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Sept. 17, 2014) ("Appellate courts review a bankruptcy court's decision to deny a motion for leave to sue under the abuse of discretion standard.") (citing *VistaCare*); *Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (In re McKenzie)*, 716 F.3d 404, 422 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that abuse-of-discretion standard applies to *Barton* doctrine); *Alexander v. Hedback*, 718 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to *Barton* doctrine).

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a bankruptcy court's conducting of an evidentiary hearing, in the context of applying a *Barton* doctrine analysis as to a proposed lawsuit against a trustee, without any concern that the inquiry was somehow improper.[259]

Similarly, courts in the vexatious litigant context, where there was an injunction requiring a movant to seek leave to pursue claims, have required movants to "show that the claims sought to be asserted have sufficient merit," including that "the proposed filing is both procedural and legally sound," and "that the claims are not brought for any improper purpose, such as harassment."[260] "For a prefiling injunction to have the intended impact, it must not merely require a reviewing official to apply an already existing level of review," such as the "plausibility" standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.[261] Rather, courts apply "an additional layer of review," and "may appropriately deny leave to file when even part of the pleading fails to satisfy the reviewer that it warrants a federal civil action" or that the "litigant's allegations are unlikely," especially "when prior cases have shown the litigant to be untrustworthy or not credible . . . ."[262]

In summary, the court rejects HMIT's positions: (a) that it need only show, at most, that the allegations in the Proposed Complaint are "plausible" under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for motions to dismiss; and (b) that this court improperly conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Leave (i.e., that consideration of evidence in this context is impermissible). The court notes, again, that HMIT's argument that this court is not permitted to consider evidence in making its "colorability" determination is completely contradictory to HMIT's actions in filing the Motion

[259] *See Howell v. Adler (In re Grodsky)*, 2019 WL 2006020, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2019) (dismissing an action under *Barton* after "a close examination" by the bankruptcy court of the evidence regarding the trustee's actions and finding that "the plaintiffs' allegations are not based in fact"), *aff'd* 799 F. App'x 271 (5th Cir. 2020).

[260] *Silver v. City of San Antonio*, 2020 WL 3803922, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (denying leave to file lawsuit); *see also Silver v. Perez*, 2020 WL 3790489, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (same).

[261] *Silver*, 2020 WL 3803922, at *6.

[262] *Id.*

for Leave, where it attached two Dondero declarations as part of 350 pages of "objective evidence" that "supported" its motion.

The court concludes that the appropriate standard to be applied in making its "colorability" determination in ***this*** bankruptcy case, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function pursuant to the two Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeper Provision in ***this*** Plan, is a broader standard than the "plausibility" standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. It is, rather, a standard that involves ***an additional level of review***—one that places on the proposed plaintiff a burden of making a prima facie case that its proposed claims are ***not without foundation***, are ***not without merit***, and are ***not being pursued for any improper purpose such as harassment***. Additionally, this court may, and should, take into consideration its ***knowledge*** of the ***bankruptcy proceedings*** and ***the parties*** and any additional evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave. For ease of reference, the court will refer to this standard of "colorability" as the "Gatekeeper Colorability Test." The court considers this test as a sort of hybrid of what the *Barton* doctrine contemplates and what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place.

2. HMIT's Proposed Complaint Does Not Present "Colorable" Claims Under this Court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test or Even Under a Rule 12(b)(6) "Plausibility" Standard.

The court finds, in the exercise of its gatekeeping function under the Gatekeeper Orders and the Gatekeeping Provision in the Plan, that the Motion for Leave should be denied as the claims set forth in the Proposed Complaint are not "colorable" claims. The court makes this determination after considering evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing, including the testimony of Dondero, Patrick, and Seery, and the numerous exhibits offered by HMIT and the Highland Parties. HMIT's Proposed Claims lack foundation, are without merit, and appear to be motivated by the improper purposes of vexatiousness and harassment. But, even under the less stringent

"plausibility" standard under Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, where all allegations must be accepted as true, HMIT's "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," fail to "[]cross the line from conceivable to plausible."[263]

HMIT makes unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations in its Motion for Leave and Proposed Complaint that the Claims Purchasers purchased the large allowed unsecured claims only because Seery, while he was CEO of Highland prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, provided them with MNPI and assurances that the Purchased Claims were very valuable. This was allegedly in exchange for their agreement to approve, in their future capacities as members of the CTOB, excessive compensation for Seery in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee after the Effective Date of the Plan. This was an alleged *quid pro quo* that HMIT claims establishes Seery's breach of fiduciary duties and the Claims Purchasers' conspiracy to participate in that breach. As discussed below, these allegations are unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations, and they do not support the inferences that HMIT needs the court to make when it analyzes whether the Proposed Claims are "colorable"—or even merely plausible.

a) HMIT's Proposed Breach of Fiduciary Duties Claim Set Forth in Count I of the Proposed Complaint

Based on HMIT's Proposed Complaint and the evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing, the court finds that HMIT has not pleaded facts that would support a "colorable" breach of fiduciary duties claim against Seery, under this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test, nor a plausible claim pursuant to the Rule 12(b) standard. HMIT alleges that Seery breached his fiduciary duties (i) "[b]y disclosing material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon"

[263] *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679–80 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).

before their purchase of certain Highland claims, and (ii) by receiving "compensation paid to him under the terms of the [CTA] since the Effective Date of the Plan in August 2021."[264]

As earlier noted, both the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are organized under Delaware law and, thus, its proposed Count I against Seery for breach of fiduciary duties to these entities is governed by Delaware law under the "Internal Affairs Doctrine."[265] Under Delaware law, "[t]o bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege '(1) that a fiduciary duty existed and (2) that the defendant breached that duty.'"[266] HMIT fails to plausibly or sufficiently allege either element such that its breach of fiduciary duty claims against Seery could survive.

Under Delaware law, officers and directors generally owe fiduciary duties only to the entity and its stakeholders as a whole, not to individual shareholders.[267] Because Seery did not owe any "duty" to HMIT directly and individually, the Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties to HMIT. HMIT's "legal conclusion[]" that Seery "owed fiduciary duties to HMIT, as equity, and to the Debtor's Estate"[268] "do[es] not suffice" to plausibly allege the existence of any actionable fiduciary relationship.[269] And as discussed earlier in the standing section, HMIT does not have standing to assert a breach of fiduciary claim derivatively on behalf

[264] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 64–67.

[265] Motion for Leave, ¶ 21 and n.24; *see also* Plan Art. XII.M ("corporate governance matters . . . shall be governed by the laws of the state of organization" of the respective entity); *Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. v. Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A.*, 34 A.3d 1074, 1081–82 (Del. 2011) ("In American corporation law, the internal affairs doctrine is a dominant and overarching choice of law principle."). The Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust are both organized under the laws of Delaware.

[266] *Brooks v. United Dev. Funding III, L.P.*, 2020 WL 6132230, at *30 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2020) (quoting *Joseph C. Bamford & Young Min Ban v. Penfold, L.P.*, 2020 WL 967942, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2020)).

[267] *See Gilbert v El Paso Co.*, 1988 WL 124325, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988) ("[D]irectors' fiduciary duty runs to the corporation and to the entire body of shareholders generally, as opposed to specific shareholders or shareholder subgroups.") *aff'd,* 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); *Klaassen v Allegro Dev. Corp.*, 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2013) (same).

[268] Proposed Complaint ¶ 63.

[269] *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555).

of the Claimant Trust or Reorganized Debtor. But even if HMIT had sufficiently alleged the existence of a fiduciary duty by Seery to HMIT—or to the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust that HMIT would have standing to assert—Seery's alleged communications with Farallon would not have breached those duties.

HMIT alleges that Seery ""disclose[d] material non-public information to Stonehill and Farallon," and they "acted on inside information and Seery's secret assurances of great profits."[270] But the Proposed Complaint does not make any factual allegations regarding HMIT's "conclusory allegations," and its "legal conclusions" are "purely speculative, devoid of factual support," and therefore "stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief"[271] (and certainly stop short of being "colorable"). HMIT never alleges when any of these purported communications occurred, what material non-public information Seery provided, and what "assurances of great profits" he made to Farallon or to Stonehill. At the June 8 Hearing, Dondero could only clarify that he believed the MGM Email to have been MNPI and that he ***believed*** that Seery ***must have*** communicated that MNPI to Farallon at some point between December 17, 2020 (the date the MGM Email was sent) and May 28, 2021 (the day that Dondero alleges to have had three telephone calls with representatives of Farallon, Messrs. Patel and Linn, regarding Farallon's purchase of the bankruptcy claims). Dondero alleges that, during these phone calls, Patel and Linn gave Dondero no reason for their purchase of the claims that "made [any] sense." Dondero and Patrick also both testified that neither of them had any personal knowledge: (a) of a *quid pro quo* arrangement between Seery and the Claims Purchasers, (b) of Seery having actually communicated any information from the MGM Email to Farallon, or (c) whether Seery's post-Effective Date compensation had or had not been negotiated in an arms' length transaction. Dondero only

[270] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 3, 64; *see also id.* ¶¶ 13–14, 40, 47, 50.

[271] *Reed v. Linehan (In re Soporex, Inc.)*, 463 B.R. 344, 367, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011) (cleaned up).

speculates regarding these things, because it "made no sense" to him that the Claims Purchasers would have acquired the bankruptcy claims without having received the MNPI. But HMIT admits in the Proposed Complaint that Farallon and Stonehill purchased the Highland claims at discounts of 43% to 65% to their allowed amounts. Thus, they would receive at least an 18% return based on publicly available estimates in Highland's court-approved Disclosure Statement.[272] The evidence established that, if the acquisition of the UBS claims is excluded—recall that the UBS claims were not purchased until August 2021, which was after the May 28, 2021 phones calls that Dondero made to Farallon personnel—the Claims Purchasers would have expected to net over $33 million in profits, or nearly a 30% return on their investment, had Highland met its projections (this is based on the aggregate purchase price of $113 million for the non-UBS claims purchased in the Spring 2021).

To be clear, the only purported MNPI identified in HMIT's Proposed Complaint was the MGM Email Dondero sent to Seery containing "information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM." But, the evidence showed that this information was widely reported in the financial press at the time. Thus, it could not have constituted MNPI as a matter of law.[273] Moreover, the evidence showed that Dondero ***did not*** communicate in the MGM Email the actual inside information that he claimed to have obtained as a board member of MGM–which was that Amazon had met MGM's "strike price" and that the MGM board was going into exclusive negotiations with Amazon to culminate the merger with them (and, thus, Apple was no longer considered a potential purchaser). Dondero admitted that he included Apple in the MGM Email for the purpose of making it look like there was a competitive process still ongoing. In other

[272] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 3, 37, 42.

[273] *See, e.g.*, *SEC v. Cuban*, 2013 WL 791405, at *10–11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that information is not "material, nonpublic information" and "'becomes public when disclosed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public'") (quoting *SEC v. Mayhew*, 121 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1997)).

words, the MGM Email, at the very least, did not include MNPI and, at worst, was deceptive regarding the status of the negotiations between MGM and potential purchasers.

As to HMIT's allegations that Seery's post-Effective Date compensation is "excessive" and that the negotiations between Seery and the CTOB "were not arm's-length,"[274] the evidence at the June 8 Hearing reflected that the allegations are completely speculative, without any foundation whatsoever, and lack merit. And they are also simply not plausible. HMIT fails to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty.[275]

b) HMIT's Proposed Claims Set Forth in Counts II (Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciaries) and III (Conspiracy)

HMIT seeks to hold the Claims Purchasers secondarily liable for Seery's alleged breach of fiduciaries duties on an aiding and abetting theory in Count II of the Proposed Complaint[276] and, along with Seery, on a civil conspiracy theory of liability in Count III of the Proposed Complaint.[277] Because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duties claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties claim against the Claims Purchasers (Count II) is also governed by Delaware law.[278] HMIT's conspiracy cause of action against the Claims

[274] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 4, 13, 54, 74.

[275] *See Pfeffer v. Redstone*, 965 A.2d 676, 690 (Del. 2009) (dismissing claim for breach of duty of loyalty against a director where "conclusory allegations" failed to give rise to inference that director failed to perform fiduciary duties); *McMillan v. Intercargo Corp.*, 768 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2000) (dismissing claim for breach of fiduciary duty where "[a]though the complaint makes the conclusory allegation that the defendants breached their duty of disclosure in a 'bad faith and knowing manner,' no facts pled in the complaint buttress that accusation.").

[276] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 69-74.

[277] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 75-81.

[278] *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas).

Purchasers and Seery (Count III), on the other hand, does not involve a matter of "internal affairs" or of corporate governance, so it is governed by Texas law under the Plan.[279]

As an initial matter, because HMIT does not present either a "colorable"—or even plausible claim—that Seery breached his fiduciary duties, it cannot show that it has alleged a "colorable" or plausible claim for secondary liability for the same alleged wrongdoing.[280] In addition, HMIT's civil conspiracy claim against the Claims Purchasers and Seery is based entirely on Dondero's speculation and unsupported inferences and, thus, HMIT has not "colorably" alleged, or even plausibly alleged, its conspiracy claim. Under Texas law, "civil conspiracy is a theory of vicarious liability and not an independent tort."[281] "[T]he elements of civil conspiracy [are] "(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result."[282] While HMIT alleges that "Defendants conspired with each other to unlawfully breach fiduciary duties,"[283] it is simply a "legal conclusion" and not the kind of allegation that the court must assume to be true even for purposes of determining plausibility under a motion to dismiss.[284]

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[279] *Klinek v. LuxeYard, Inc.*, 596 S.W.3d 437, 450 n.9 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (applying Delaware law to fiduciary duty claim and Texas law to conspiracy theory); (Plan Art. XII.M)(which provides for the application of Texas law to "the rights and obligations arising under this Plan" except for "corporate governance matters.")

[280] *See English v. Narang*, 2019 WL 1300855, at *14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019) ("As a matter of law and logic, there cannot be secondary liability for aiding and abetting an alleged harm in the absence of primary liability.") (cleaned up; collecting cases); *Hill v. Keliher*, 2022 WL 213978, at *10 (Tex. App. Jan. 25, 2022) ("[A] defendant's liability for conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort for which the plaintiff seeks to hold at least one of the named defendants liable.") (quoting *Tilton v. Marshall*, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996)). Because HMIT's breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by Delaware law, its aiding and abetting theory of liability is also governed by Delaware law. *See Xtreme Power Plan Tr. v. Schindler (In re Xtreme Power)*, 563 B.R. 614, 632, 645 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016) (applying Delaware law to claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty involving Delaware corporation headquartered in Texas). By contrast, "conspiracy is not an internal affair" or a matter of corporate governance, so it is governed by Texas law under the Plan. *Klinek v. LuxeYard, Inc.*, 596 S.W.3d 437, 450 n.9 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (applying Delaware law to fiduciary duty claim and Texas law to conspiracy theory); (Plan Art. XII.M).

[281] *Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int'l, LLC*, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019).

[282] *Id.* at 141 (cleaned up).

[283] Proposed Complaint ¶ 76.

[284] *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing *Twombly*, 555 U.S. at 565–66).

HMIT repeats four times that Seery provided MNPI to Farallon and Stonehill as a "as a *quid pro quo*" for "additional compensation,"[285] each time based upon conclusory allegations based "upon information and belief" and, frankly, pure speculation from Dondero that his imagined "scheme," "covert *quid pro quo,*" and secret "conspiracy" between Seery, on the one hand, and Farallon and Stonehill, on the other,[286] ***must have*** occurred because "[i]t made no sense for the [Claims] Purchasers to invest millions of dollars for assets that – per the publicly available information – did not offer a sufficient potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk" (i.e., "[t]he counter-intuitive nature of the purchases at issue compels the conclusion that the [Claims] Purchasers acted on inside information and Seery's assurance of great profits.")[287] Importantly, HMIT admits that the Claims Purchasers would have turned a profit based on the information available to them at the time of their acquisitions of the Purchased Claims.[288] HMIT's allegations about the level of potential profits were contradicted by their own allegations and other evidence admitted at the June 8 Hearing. But Dondero's speculation about what level of projected return would be sufficient to justify the acquisition of the claims by the Claims Purchasers, or any other third-party investor, does not give rise to a plausible inference that they acted improperly.[289] Thus, HMIT cannot meet

[285] Proposed Complaint ¶ 77; *see also id.* ¶¶ 4, 47, 74.

[286] *See id.* ¶ 3 ("Thus, acting within a cloak of secrecy, Seery provided close business acquaintances, the other Defendants with material non-public information concerning the value of assets which they then used to purchase the largest approved unsecured claims.").

[287] *Id.*

[288] *See, e.g.*, *id.* ¶ 3 (alleging that acquiring the claims "did not offer a ***sufficient*** potential profit to justify the publicly disclosed risk")(emphasis added); ¶ 43 ("Furthermore, although the publicly available projections suggested only a small margin of error on any profit potential for its significant investment . . . ."); ¶ 49 ("Yet, in this case, it would have been *impossible* for Stonehill and Farallon (in the absence of inside information) to forecast *any* ***significant*** profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments given the publicly available, negative financial information.") (third emphasis added).

[289] In fact, the court did not allow Mr. Dondero to testify regarding what kind of information a hypothetical investor in bankruptcy claims would require or what level of potential profits would justify the purchase of bankruptcy claims by investors in the bankruptcy claims trading market because he was testifying as a fact witness, not an expert. Thus, the court only allowed Dondero to testify as to what data ***he*** (or entities he controls or controlled) would rely on, what ***his*** risk tolerance would have been, and what level of potential profits ***he*** would have required to purchase an allowed unsecured bankruptcy claim in a post-confirmation situation. June 8 Hearing Transcript, 129:6-130:4.

its burden, under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test, of making a prima facie showing that its allegations do not lack foundation or merit. Nor can it meet a plausibility standard.

In addition, contrary to the Proposed Complaint's statement that it would have been "***impossible*** for Stonehill and Farallon (in the absence of insider information) to forecast ***any*** significant profit at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments," the evidence showed there were already reports in the financial press that MGM was engaging with Amazon, Apple, and others in selling its media portfolio, and thus the prospect of an MGM transaction increasing the value of, and return on, the Purchased Claims, "at the time of their multi-million-dollar investments" was publicly available information.[290] HMIT's suggestion that the Claims Purchasers were in possession of inside information not publicly available when they acquired the Purchased Claims is simply not plausible. Nor is HMIT's allegation that "[u]pon information and belief" Farallon "conducted no due diligence but relied on Seery's profit guarantees" plausible. The allegations regarding Farallon not conducting any due diligence are based, again, entirely on Dondero's speculation and inferences he made from what Patel and Linn (of Farallon) allegedly told him on May 28, 2021; Dondero did not testify that either Patel or Linn ever told him specifically that they had conducted no due diligence. HMIT's allegations in the Proposed Complaint that ***Farallon*** "conducted no due diligence," are based on Dondero's speculation, unsubstantiated, and contradicted by the testimony of Seery, who testified that emails to him from Linn in June 2020 and later in January 2021 indicated to him that Farallon, at least, had been conducting some level of due diligence in that they had been following and paying attention to the

[290] The court notes, as well, that the Claim Purchasers acquired the UBS claims in August 2021—approximately two and a half months ***after*** the announcement of the MGM-Amazon transaction (which was on May 26, 2021)—a fact that HMIT makes no attempt to harmonize with its conspiracy theory that the Claims Purchasers profited from the misuse of MNPI allegedly given to them by Seery.

Highland case.[291] In addition, there are no allegations in the Proposed Complaint regarding whether Stonehill conducted due diligence or not, and Patrick testified that neither he nor HMIT had any personal knowledge of how much due diligence Farallon or Stonehill did prior to acquiring the Purchased Claims.[292] The court finds and concludes that HMIT's allegations of aiding and abetting and conspiracy in Counts II and III of the Proposed Complaint are based on unsubstantiated inferences and speculation, lack internal consistency, and lack consistency with verifiable public facts. Accordingly, HMIT has failed to show that these claims have a foundation and merit and has also failed to show that they are plausible.

c) HMIT's Proposed Claims Set Forth in Counts IV (Equitable Disallowance), V (Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust), and VI (Declaratory Relief) of the Proposed Complaint

i. Count IV (Equitable Disallowance).

In Count IV of its Proposed Complaint, HMIT seeks "equitable disallowance" of the claims acquired by Farallon's and Stonehill's special purpose entities Muck and Jessup, "to the extent over and above their initial investment," and, in the alternative, equitable subordination of their claims to all claims and interests, including HMIT's unvested Class 10 Contingent Claimant Trust Interest, "given [their] willful, inequitable, bad faith conduct" of allegedly "purchasing the Claims based on material non-public information" and being "unfairly advantaged" in "earning significant profits on their purchases."[293] As noted above, these remedies are not available to HMIT.[294]

First, HMIT's request to equitably subordinate the Purchased Claims to all claims and interests is not permitted because Bankruptcy Code § 510(c), by its terms, permits equitable

[291] *See* June 8 Hearing Transcript, 239:6-21.
[292] *See id.*, 310:19-312:2.
[293] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 83-87.
[294] *See infra* pages 74-75.

subordination of a ***claim to other claims*** or an ***interest to other interests*** but does not permit equitable subordination of a ***claim to interests***.

Second, "equitable" disallowance of claims is not an available remedy in the Fifth Circuit pursuant to the *Mobile Steel* case.[295]

Third, reconsideration of an already-allowed claim in a bankruptcy case can only be accomplished through Bankruptcy Code § 502(j), which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, allows reconsideration of allowance of a claim that was allowed following ***a contest*** (which is certainly the case with respect to the Purchased Claims) based on the "equities of the case." But this is only if the request for reconsideration is made within the one-year limitation prescribed in Rule 60(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. HMIT's request for disallowance of Muck and Jessup's Purchased Claims (if it could somehow be construed as a request for reconsideration of their claims), is clearly untimely, as it is being made well beyond a year since their allowance by this court following contests and approval of Rule 9019 settlements. Thus, the court finds that HMIT has not alleged a colorable or even plausible claim in Count IV of the Proposed Complaint and, therefore, the Motion for Leave should be denied.

ii. Count V (Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust)

In Count V of the Proposed Complaint, HMIT alleges that, "by acquiring the Claims using [MNPI], Stonehill and Farallon were unjustly enriched and gained an undue advantage over other creditors and former equity" and that "[a]llowing [the Claims Purchasers] to retain their ill-gotten benefits would be unconscionable;" thus, HMIT alleges, the Claims Purchasers "should be forced to disgorge all distributions over and above their original investment in the Claims as restitution for their unjust enrichment" and "a constructive trust should be imposed on such proceeds . . . ."[296]

[295] *In re Mobile Steel Co., Inc.*, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).

[296] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 89-93.

HMIT alleges further that "Seery was also unjustly enriched by his participation in this scheme and he should be required to disgorge or restitute all compensation he has received from the outset of his collusive activities" and "[a]lternatively he should be required to disgorge and restitute all compensation received since the Effective Date" over which a constructive trust should be imposed.[297] HMIT has not alleged a colorable or even a plausible claim for unjust enrichment or constructive trust in Count V.

Under Texas law,[298] "[u]njust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution of benefits either wrongfully or passively received under circumstances which give rise to an implied or quasi-contractual obligation to repay."[299] Thus, "when a valid, express contract covers the subject matter of the parties' dispute, there can be no recovery under a quasi-contract theory."[300] Here, as noted above, HMIT's only alleged injury is a diminution of the value of its unvested Contingent Claimant Trust Interest by virtue of Seery's allegedly having wrongfully obtained excessive compensation, with the help of the Claims Purchasers. ***Yet Seery's compensation is governed by express agreements*** (i.e., the Plan and the CTA). Thus, HMIT's claim based on unjust enrichment is not an available theory of recovery.

iii. Count VI (Declaratory Relief)

HMIT seeks declaratory relief in Count VI of the Proposed Complaint, essentially, that Dondero's conspiracy theory is correct and that HMIT's would succeed on the merits with respect

[297] *Id.* ¶ 94.

[298] Under the Plan, Texas law governs HMIT's "claim" for unjust enrichment because it is not a "corporate governance matter." (Plan Art. XII.M.) It also governs HMIT's "claim" for constructive trust, which "is merely a remedy used to grant relief on the underlying cause of action." *Sherer v. Sherer*, 393 S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App. 2013).

[299] *Taylor v. Trevino*, 569 F. Supp. 3d 414, 435 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (cleaned up); *see also Yowell v. Granite Operating Co.*, 630 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. App. 2021) (same).

[300] *Taylor*, 569 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (quoting *Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc.*, 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex. 2000)).

to the Proposed Claims if it were permitted leave to bring them in an adversary proceeding.[301] But, a request for declaratory relief is not "an independent cause of action"[302] and "in the absence of any underlying viable claims such relief is unavailable."[303] This court has already found and concluded that HMIT would not have constitutional or prudential standing to bring the underlying causes of action in the Proposed Complaint. This court has also found and concluded that all of the Proposed Claims are without foundation or merit and are not even plausible and are all; being brought for the improper purpose of continuing Dondero's vexatious, harassing, bad-faith litigation. Thus, HMIT would not be entitled to pursue declaratory judgement relief as requested in Count VI of the Proposed Complaint.

d) HMIT Has No Basis to Seek Punitive Damages

HMIT separately alleges that the Claims Purchasers' and Seery's "misconduct was intentional, knowing, willful, in bad faith, fraudulent, and in total disregard of the rights of others," thus entitling HMIT to an award of punitive damages under applicable law. But, HMIT abandoned its proposed fraud claim that was in its Original Proposed Complaint, so its sole claim for primary liability is Seery's alleged breach of his fiduciary duties. And under Delaware law, the "court cannot award punitive damages in [a] fiduciary duty action."[304]

[301] Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 96-99.

[302] *See Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. EEOC*, 70 F.4th 914, 932 (5th Cir. 2023).

[303] *Green v. Wells Fargo Home Mtg.*, 2016 WL 3746276, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) (citing *Collin Cty. v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods*, 915 F.2d 167, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1990)); *see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am.*

[304] *Buchwald v. Renco Grp. (In re Magnesium Corp. of Am.)*, 539 B.R. 31, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing *Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc.*, 902 A.2d 1130, 1154 (Del. Ch. 2006)), *aff'd* 682 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2017).

3. HMIT Does Not Present "Colorable" Claims Under this Court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test Because It Seeks to Bring the Proposed Complaint for Improper Purposes of Harassment and Bad-Faith, Vexatiousness.

Under this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test, in addition to showing that its allegations and claims are not without foundation or merit, HMIT must also show that the Proposed Claims are not being brought for any improper purpose. Taking into consideration the court's knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, the court finds that HMIT is acting at the behest of, and under the control or influence of, Dondero in continuing to pursue harassing, bad faith, vexatious litigation to achieve his desired result in these bankruptcy proceedings. So, in addition to failing to show that its Proposed Claims have foundation and merit, HMIT cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose and, thus, cannot meet the requirements under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test; HMIT's Motion for Leave should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court concludes, having taken into consideration both its knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing on the Motion for Leave, that HMIT's Motion for Leave should be denied for three independent reasons: (1) HMIT would lack constitutional standing to bring the Proposed Claims (and, thus, the federal courts would lack subject matter jurisdiction over the Proposed Claims); (2) even if HMIT would have constitutional standing to pursue the Proposed Claims, it would lack prudential standing to bring the Proposed Claims; and (3) even if HMIT would have both constitutional standing and prudential standing to bring the Proposed Claims, it has not met its burden under the Gatekeeper Colorability Test of showing that its Proposed Claims are "colorable" claims—that the Proposed Claims are not without foundation, not without merit, and not being pursued for an improper purpose. Moreover,

even if this court's Gatekeeper Colorability Test should be replaced with a Rule 12(b)(6) "plausibility" standard, the Proposed Claims are not plausible.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that HMIT's Motion for Leave be, and hereby is **DENIED**.

###End of Memorandum Opinion and Order###

Exhibit 3

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed March 31, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR EXPEDITED HEARING [DE # 3700]

This Order is issued in response to the *Application for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Expedited Haring Request") [DE # 3700] filed by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT" or "Movant") on March 28, 2023, at 4:09 p.m. C.D.T. The Expedited Hearing Request seeks a hearing within three days, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, on HMIT's *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* ("Motion for Leave") which was filed on March 28, 2023, at 4:02 p.m. C.D.T.

The court has concluded that no emergency or other good cause exists, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 9006, and the *Expedited Hearing Request* will be denied. The *Motion for Leave* will be set in the ordinary course (after 21 days' notice to affected parties)—i.e., after April 18, 2023.

The *Motion for Leave* is 37 pages in length and contains 350 pages of attachments. It seeks leave from the bankruptcy court—pursuant to the bankruptcy court's "gatekeeping" role[1] under the confirmed Chapter 11 plan of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Reorganized Debtor")—to sue at least the following parties: Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"); Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"); Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery"); and John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10 (collectively, the "Affected Parties"). The conduct that is described as a basis for the desired lawsuit is certain trading of unsecured claims that occurred in 2021 during the Highland bankruptcy case.[2] It appears that millions of dollars of damages are sought by Movant, who was formerly the largest indirect (ultimate) equity holder of Highland. The legal theories (e.g., breaches of fiduciary duties; fraud; conspiracy; equitable disallowance) are novel in the bankruptcy claims trading context. The bankruptcy court, pursuant to the Highland plan, will need to analyze whether such claims are "colorable" such that leave to sue should be granted.

The Affected Parties—and other parties in interest in the underlying bankruptcy case, for that matter—should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to the *Motion for Leave*. While Movant, HMIT, has alleged that it may be facing a statute of limitations defense as to

[1] The bankruptcy court's "gatekeeping" role was recently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, 48 F.4th 419, 438 (5th Cir. 2022).
[2] Notice of the claims trading was provided in filings in Highland bankruptcy case, as follows: Claim No. 23 (DE ## 2211, 2212, and 2215), Claim Nos. 190 and 191 (DE ## 2697 and 2698), Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153 and 154 (DE # 2263), Claim No. 81 (DE # 2262), Claim No. 72 (DE # 2261).

some claims after April 16, 2023, it appears that Movant has known about the conduct underlying the desired lawsuit for well over a year, based on activity that has occurred in the bankruptcy court. *See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting James Dondero's Motion to Remand Adversary Proceeding to State Court, Denying Fee Reimbursement Request, and Related Rulings, Dondero v. Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC and Farallon Capital Management LLC* [DE # 22], in Adv. Proc. # 21-03051 (January 4, 2022). Thus, the need for an emergency hearing is dubious. Accordingly

IT IS ORDERED that the Expedited Hearing Request is denied.

Counsel shall contact the Courtroom Deputy for a setting on the *Motion for Leave*, which setting shall be no sooner than April 19, 2023.

* * * END OF ORDER * * *

Exhibit 4

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 10, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	Case No. 19-34054-sgj
Reorganized Debtor.	

ORDER FIXING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING DATE WITH RESPECT TO HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE VERIFIED ADVERSARY PROCEEDING AS SUPPLEMENTED

The Court conducted a status conference on April 24, 2023, concerning the final scheduling of *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Docket No. 3699] and Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Docket No. 3760] (collectively, the "Underlying Motion"), as well as whether the hearing on the Underlying Motion would be evidentiary, and the Court having considered (i) the *Opposed Emergency Motion*

to Modify and Fix a Briefing Schedule and Set a Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Docket No. 3738] (the "Motion")[1] filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust; (ii) the *Joinder to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Docket No. 3740] filed by Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C., and Stonehill Capital Management LLC; (iii) the *Response and Reservation of Rights* [Docket No. 3748] filed by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust; (iv) the *Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"* [Docket No. 3758] filed by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, and (v) the arguments of counsel,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Docket No. 3699] and Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Docket No. 3760] (collectively, the "Underlying Motion") shall be held in person on **June 8, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. (Central Time)** before the Honorable Stacey G. C. Jernigan, at **1100 Commerce Street, 14th Floor, Courtroom 1, Dallas, Texas**, and by Webex for those interested but not directly participating in the hearing.

2. Any responses to the Underlying Motion shall be filed no later than May 11, 2023.

3. Any replies in support of the Underlying Motion shall be filed no later than May 18, 2023.

4. The Court will advise the parties on or reasonably after May 18, 2023, whether the Court intends to conduct the hearing on an evidentiary basis.

###End of Order###

[1] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Motion.

Approved as Form Only:

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Counsel for James P. Seery, Jr.

Exhibit 5

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 22, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE HEARING ON HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

[DE ## 3699 & 3760]

Based on the court's review of all of the parties' pleadings and briefing relating to the above-referenced motion and supplemental motion ("Motion for Leave"), the court has determined that there may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave—and, in particular, pertaining to the court's required inquiry into whether "colorable" claims may exist, as described in the Motion for Leave. Therefore, the parties will be permitted to present evidence (including witness testimony) at the June 8, 2023 hearing if they so choose. This may include

examining any witness for whom a Declaration or Affidavit has already been filed. The parties will be allowed no more than three hours of presentation time each (allocated three hours to the movant and three hours to the aggregate respondents). This allocated presentation time may be spent in whatever manner the parties believe will be useful to the court (argument/evidence).

 # # # END OF ORDER # # #

Exhibit 5a

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 22, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE HEARING ON HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

[DE ## 3699 & 3760]

Based on the court's review of all of the parties' pleadings and briefing relating to the above-referenced motion and supplemental motion ("Motion for Leave"), the court has determined that there may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave—and, in particular, pertaining to the court's required inquiry into whether "colorable" claims may exist, as described in the Motion for Leave. Therefore, the parties will be permitted to present evidence (including witness testimony) at the June 8, 2023 hearing if they so choose. This may include

examining any witness for whom a Declaration or Affidavit has already been filed. The parties will be allowed no more than three hours of presentation time each (allocated three hours to the movant and three hours to the aggregate respondents). This allocated presentation time may be spent in whatever manner the parties believe will be useful to the court (argument/evidence).

 # # # END OF ORDER # # #

United States Bankruptcy Court

Northern District of Texas

In re:

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Debtor

Case No. 19-34054-sgj

Chapter 11

CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE

District/off: 0539-3 User: admin

Date Rcvd: May 23, 2023 Form ID: pdf012 Total Noticed: 1

The following symbols are used throughout this certificate:

Symbol	Definition
+	Addresses marked '+' were corrected by inserting the ZIP, adding the last four digits to complete the zip +4, or replacing an incorrect ZIP. USPS regulations require that automation-compatible mail display the correct ZIP.

Notice by first class mail was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center on May 24, 2023:

Recip ID		Recipient Name and Address
aty	+	Alan J. Kornfeld, Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLPL, 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13 Fl, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4114

TOTAL: 1

Notice by electronic transmission was sent to the following persons/entities by the Bankruptcy Noticing Center.
Electronic transmission includes sending notices via email (Email/text and Email/PDF), and electronic data interchange (EDI).

NONE

BYPASSED RECIPIENTS

The following addresses were not sent this bankruptcy notice due to an undeliverable address, *duplicate of an address listed above, *P duplicate of a preferred address, or ## out of date forwarding orders with USPS.

NONE

NOTICE CERTIFICATION

I, Gustava Winters, declare under the penalty of perjury that I have sent the attached document to the above listed entities in the manner shown, and prepared the Certificate of Notice and that it is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.

Meeting of Creditor Notices only (Official Form 309): Pursuant to Fed .R. Bank. P.2002(a)(1), a notice containing the complete Social Security Number (SSN) of the debtor(s) was furnished to all parties listed. This official court copy contains the redacted SSN as required by the bankruptcy rules and the Judiciary's privacy policies.

Date: May 24, 2023 Signature: /s/Gustava Winters

CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

The following persons/entities were sent notice through the court's CM/ECF electronic mail (Email) system on May 22, 2023 at the address(es) listed below:

Name	Email Address
A. Lee Hogewood, III	on behalf of Interested Party NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund lee.hogewood@klgates.com matthew.houston@klgates.com;Sarah.bryant@klgates.com;Mary-Beth.pearson@klgates.com;litigation.docketing@klgates.com;Emily.mather@klgates.com;Artoush.varshosaz@klgates.com
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TOTAL: 476

Exhibit 6

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 26, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER REGARDING HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE JUNE 8, 2023 HEARING

[Dkt. Nos. 3788 and 3791]

Having considered the *Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing* of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") filed on May 24, 2023, at Dkt. No. 3788 ("Motion for Expedited Discovery"), and, separately, on May 25, 2023, at Dkt. No. 3791 ("Motion for Continuance," and, together with the Motion for Expedited Discovery, the "Motions"), and the arguments of counsel at the emergency hearing on the Motions held on Friday May 26, 2023, at 9:30 a.m.,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Continuance be, and hereby is, **DENIED**;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Expedited Discovery be, and hereby is, **GRANTED**, in part and only to the extent as set forth below:

(1) To the extent any party would like to depose either James P. Seery, Jr. or James Dondero in advance of the June 8 hearing ("June 8 Hearing") on HMIT's *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Dkt. No. 3699] and *Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* [Dkt. 3760] (together, the "Motion for Leave"), Mr. Seery and Mr. Dondero shall be made available for depositions ("Depositions") on a date and at a time agreeable to the parties that is no earlier than May 31, 2023, and no later than June 7, 2023, and no discovery or depositions of any other party or witness will be permitted prior to the June 8 hearing; and

(2) None of the parties shall be entitled to any other discovery, including the production of documents from Mr. Seery or Mr. Dondero, or any other party or witness pursuant to a subpoena *duces tecum*, or otherwise, prior to the conduct of the Depositions or to the court's ruling on the Motion for Leave following the June 8, 2023 hearing;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as specifically set forth in this Order, HMIT's Motion for Expedited Discovery be, and hereby is, **DENIED**.

 # # # END OF ORDER # # #

Exhibit 7

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed June 16, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT EVIDENCE [DE # 3820]

I. INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE THIS COURT is yet another dispute in the continuing saga of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Reorganized Debtor").

The Reorganized Debtor has been operating under a confirmed Chapter 11 plan for approximately two years now—a plan having been confirmed on February 22, 2021. The plan was never stayed; it went effective in August 2021; and it was affirmed almost in its entirety by

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (in late summer 2022). A petition for writ of certiorari regarding the plan confirmation order has been pending at the United States Supreme Court since January 2023. Millions of dollars have been paid out to creditors under the plan, although the plan has not been completed.

This court uses the words "continuing saga" because there is a mountain of litigation that is still pending. First, there are numerous adversary proceedings still pending, in which the Reorganized Debtor and a Litigation Trustee appointed under the plan are seeking to liquidate claims that Highland has against others, in order to augment the pot of money available for unsecured creditors. Some of these adversary proceedings involve what seem like simple suits on promissory notes (albeit very large promissory notes), and others involve highly complex torts. There are numerous appeals pending and, from time to time, petitions for writs of mandamus have been filed post-confirmation. And there are new lawsuits popping up around every corner it seems.

To be sure, this post-confirmation litigation is not the "usual stuff," and the adverse parties in this ongoing post-confirmation litigation are not the "usual suspects." For example, the numerous post-confirmation adversary proceedings do not involve preference lawsuits or other Chapter 5 avoidance actions against non-insider creditors—as we so often see proliferate in Chapter 11 cases post-confirmation. And we do not have long-running proof of claim objections pending post-confirmation—because all of the proof of claim objections regarding non-insider creditors were resolved long ago (with major compromises reached and settlements approved by the court—some after formal mediation). And as for the myriad appeals, the non-insider creditors in this case—with proofs of claim asserted in the hundreds of millions of dollars—overwhelmingly supported Highland's confirmed plan and, therefore, they have not been appellants on any of the aforementioned appeals.

So who has been the adverse party in this deluge of post-confirmation litigation? The founder and former Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Highland, Mr. James Dondero personally, and entities that he controls (*e.g.,* family trusts; investment advisory firms; managed funds; and other entities—frequently organized offshore—that were not themselves debtors in the Highland Chapter 11 case but assert party-in-interest status in various capacities). To be clear, Mr. Dondero takes umbrage at the suggestion that ***all*** of the adverse parties in these numerous post-confirmation scuffles are controlled by him.

Which brings us to the current, post-confirmation contested matter before the court. Currently, a party called Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), a Delaware trust, has filed a "gatekeeper motion"—that is, a motion seeking leave from this court to file an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against the Reorganized Debtor's CEO and certain investors who purchased allowed unsecured claims in this case post-confirmation and pre-Effective Date (as further described below). HMIT's gatekeeper motion has given birth to a sideshow, so to speak, regarding ***what, if any, evidence the court ought to consider in connection with HMIT's gatekeeper motion—the latest "act" in such sideshow focusing on the propriety of considering expert testimony.***

Who or what exactly is HMIT? HMIT is an entity with no employees and no income whose only asset is a contingent right of recovery under the Highland confirmed plan—by virtue of HMIT having held a majority (99.5%) of the limited partnership interests in Highland pre-confirmation, which interests were classified in the plan in a "Class 10" (that was projected to receive no recovery). Mr. Dondero asserts that he does not control HMIT. HMIT represents that, since on or about August 2022, it has been solely controlled by a Mr. Mark Patrick (a former employee of Highland who left Highland one week after its Plan was confirmed and went to work for an entity

called "Skyview Group," that was formed by certain former Highland employees, and apparently now advises various affiliate entities of Mr. Dondero).[1] While HMIT only has one asset (the "Class 10" contingent interest), Mark Patrick has testified that HMIT is liable on a $62.6 million-dollar indebtedness that it owes to The Dugaboy Investment Trust (a family trust of which Mr. Dondero is the lifetime beneficiary), pursuant to a promissory note made by HMIT in favor of Dugaboy, in 2015, in exchange for Dugaboy transferring to HMIT an ownership interest in Highland. *See* Transcript 6/8/23 Hearing, at pp. 304-308 [DE # 3843]. *See also* Highland Exh. 51 from 6/8/23 Hearing [DE # 3817]. Mr. Patrick has testified that Dugaboy and HMIT have a settlement, pursuant to which, Dugaboy is paying HMIT's attorney's fees. Transcript 6/8/23 Hearing, at p. at 313:2-18 [DE # 3843].

II. HMIT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LAWSUIT (a.k.a. THE "GATEKEEPER MOTION").

To understand the procedural motion now before the court—***which deals with whether or not the bankruptcy court should allow or exclude expert witness testimony and documents*** (more fully described below)—one must understand the context in which it is being considered, which is the hearing on HMIT's *Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* that was filed by HMIT (the "HMIT Motion for Leave"), which this court loosely refers to sometimes as the "Gatekeeping Motion."

The HMIT Motion for Leave, as alluded to, requests leave from the bankruptcy court to file a post-confirmation, post-Effective Date adversary proceeding pursuant to this bankruptcy court's "gatekeeping" orders and, specifically, the gatekeeping, injunction, and exculpation

[1] *See* DE # 2440 (Transcript of a 6/8/21 Hearing, at pp. 95:18-96:10).

provisions of the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [DE # 1943], as modified (the "Plan"). The HMIT Motion for Leave, with attachments, as first filed, was 387 pages in length, and the attachments included a proposed complaint and two sworn declarations of the aforementioned former CEO of the Reorganized Debtor, Mr. Dondero. The HMIT Motion for Leave was later amended to eliminate the declarations of Mr. Dondero. DE ## 3815 & 3816. In a nutshell, HMIT desires leave to sue certain parties regarding ***the post-confirmation, pre-Effective Date purchase of allowed unsecured claims***. The proposed defendants would be:

> **Mr. James P. Seery, Jr.,** who now serves as the CEO of the Reorganized Debtor and also serves as the Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust created pursuant to the Plan, and also was previously Highland's Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") during the case, then CEO, and, also, an Independent Board Member of Highland's general partner during the Highland case. Mr. Seery is best understood as the man who took Mr. Dondero's place running Highland—per the request of the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee.
>
> **Certain Claims Purchasers,** known as Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"); Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), which was a special purpose entity created by Farallon to purchase unsecured claims against Highland; Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"); and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), which was a special purpose entity created by Stonehill to purchase unsecured claims against Highland (collectively, the "Claims Purchasers"). The Claims Purchasers purchased $240 million face value of unsecured claims post-confirmation and pre-Effective Date—which claims had already been allowed during the Highland case—in the spring of 2021 and another $125 million face value allowed unsecured claims in August 2021. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) notices—giving notice of same—were filed on the bankruptcy clerk's docket regarding these purchases. The claims had previously been held by the creditors known as the Crusader Redeemer Committee, Acis Capital, HarbourVest, and UBS (three of these four creditors formerly served on the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee during the Highland bankruptcy case).
>
> **John Doe Defendant Nos. 1-10**, which are described to be "currently unknown individuals or business entities who may be identified in discovery as involved in the wrongful transactions at issue."

The proposed plaintiffs would be:

HMIT, which represents that it was the largest equity holder in Highland and held a 99.5% limited partnership interest (specifically, Class B/C limited

partnership interests). HMIT represents that it currently holds a Class 10 interest under the confirmed Highland plan, which gives it a contingent interest in the Claimant Trust created under the plan, and as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement ("CTA").

Reorganized Debtor, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor.

Highland Claimant Trust, as a nominal party. HMIT wishes to bring its complaint on behalf of itself and derivatively on behalf of the Highland Claimant Trust.

The gist of the complaint that HMIT seeks leave to file is as follows. HMIT asserts that something seems amiss regarding the post-confirmation/pre-Effective Date purchase of claims by the Claims Purchasers. Actually, more bluntly, HMIT asserts that "wrongful conduct occurred" and "improper trades" were made. HMIT Motion for Leave, 7. HMIT believes the Claim Purchasers paid around $160 million for the $365 million face amount of claims they purchased. HMIT believes that this amount was too high for any rational claim purchaser (particularly hedge funds who expect high returns) to have paid for the claims—based on Highland's Disclosure Statement and Plan projections regarding the projected distributions under the Plan to holders of allowed unsecured claims. Also, Mr. Dondero purports to have concluded from conversations he had with representatives of one of the Claims Purchasers that they did no due diligence before purchasing the claims. Therefore, HMIT surmises, Mr. Seery must have given these claims purchasers material nonpublic information ("MNPI") regarding Highland that convinced them that it was to their economic advantage to purchase the claims. In particular, HMIT surmises Mr. Seery shared MNPI regarding the likely imminent sale of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"), in which Highland had, directly and indirectly, substantial holdings. Indeed, MGM was ultimately purchased by Amazon after a sale process that had been quite publicly discussed in

media reports for several months[2] and that was officially announced to the public in late May 2021 (just a few weeks after the Claims Purchasers purchased some of their claims, but a few months ***before*** certain of their claims—the UBS claims—were purchased).[3] Note that Highland and entities it controlled tendered their MGM holdings in connection with the Amazon transaction (they did not sell their holdings while the MGM-Amazon deal was under discussion and/or not made public). In summary, while HMIT's proposed complaint is lengthy and at times hard to follow, it boils down to allegations that: (a) Mr. Seery filed (or caused to be filed) deflated, pessimistic, misleading projections regarding the value of the Debtor's estate in connection with the Plan, (b) then induced very sophisticated unsecured creditors (who, incidentally, are not complaining) to discount and sell their claims to the likewise very sophisticated Claims Purchasers, (c) which Claims Purchasers are allegedly friendly with Mr. Seery, and are now happily approving Mr. Seery's allegedly excessive compensation demands post-Effective Date (resulting in less money in the pot to pay off the creditor body in full, and, thus, a diminished likelihood that HMIT will realize any recovery on its contingent Class 10 interest). HMIT argues that Mr. Seery should be required to disgorge his compensation. It appears that HMIT also seeks other damages.

The individual counts that HMIT wants to allege are:

I. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (as to Mr. Seery)

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[2] *See* Highland Exh. 25 ("MGM has held preliminary talks with Apple, Netflix and other larger media companies . . . . MGM, in particular, seems like a logical candidate to sell this year. Its owners include Anchorage Capital, Highland Capital and Solus Alternative Asset Management, hedge funds that acquired the company out of bankruptcy in 2010.") (article dated 1/26/20); Highland Exh. 26 (describing prospects of an MGM sale noting that, among its largest shareholders, was "Highland Capital Management, LP") (article October 11, 2020). *See also* Highland Exhs. 27-30 & 34 (various other articles regarding possible sale/suitors of MGM, dated in years 2020 and 2021, and ultimately announcing sale to Amazon on May 26, 2021, for $8.4 billion).

[3] The MGM-Amazon deal was ultimately consummated in March 2022 for approximately $6.1 billion, net of cash acquired, plus approximately $2.5 billion in debt that Amazon assumed and immediately repaid.

II. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duty (as to Claims Purchasers)

III. Fraud by Misrepresentation and Material Nondisclosure (as to all proposed defendants)[4]

IV. Conspiracy (as to all proposed defendants)

V. Equitable Disallowance (as to Muck and Jessup)

VI. Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust (as to all proposed defendants)

V. Declaratory Judgment (as to all proposed defendants)

III. NEXT, THE DELUGE OF ACTIVITY, IN MULTIPLE COURTS, AFTER THE FILING OF THE HMIT MOTION FOR LEAVE.

After the HMIT Motion for Leave was filed on March 28, 2023, there was two-and-a-half months of activity regarding ***what type of hearing the bankruptcy court would hold and when*** on the HMIT Motion for Leave. A timeline is set forth below.

3/28/23: The HMIT Motion for Leave was filed, along with a request for emergency hearing on same. DE ## 3699 & 3700. HMIT requested that the court schedule a hearing on the motion "on three (3) days' notice, and that any responses be filed no later than twenty-four hours before the scheduled hearing sought." DE # 3700, 2. The HMIT Motion for Leave was 37 pages in length, plus another 350 pages of supporting exhibits, including two sworn declarations of Mr. Dondero.

3/31/23: Bankruptcy Court entered order denying an emergency hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave. DE # 3713. The court stated that it would set the hearing on normal notice (at least 21 days' notice), seeing no emergency.

4/4/23-4/12/23: HMIT pursued an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal and then a petition for writ of mandamus regarding the Bankruptcy Court's denial of an emergency hearing at first the District Court and then the Fifth Circuit.

4/13/23: Highland filed a motion asking the Bankruptcy Court to set a briefing schedule on the HMIT Motion for Leave, indicating that Highland's proposed timetable for same was opposed by HMIT. DE # 3738. The Claims Purchaser and Mr. Seery joined in that motion. DE ## 3740 & 3747. HMIT subsequently filed a response unopposed to a briefing schedule and status conference. DE # 3748.

[4] This Count III has gone in and out of the various drafts HMIT has filed with the court and was included in the latest version of the proposed complaint that was filed at DE # 3816.

4/21/23: HMIT filed a Brief [DE # 3758] before the status conference indicating it was opposed to there being any evidence at the ultimate hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave—arguing the Bankruptcy Court did not need evidence in order to exercise its gatekeeping function and determine if HMIT has a "colorable" claim. Rather, the court need only engage in a Rule 12(b)(6)-type plausibility analysis.

4/24/23: The Bankruptcy Court held a status/scheduling conference; there was extensive discussion among all the parties regarding what type of hearing there needed to be on the HMIT Motion for Leave. HMIT was adamant there should be no evidence. Highland and Mr. Seery argued they ought to be able to cross-examine Mr. Dondero since his sworn declarations had been attached to the HMIT Motion for Leave as "objective evidence" that "supported" the HMIT Motion for Leave. DE #3699, p. 2. HMIT stated that it would withdraw Mr. Dondero's declarations, but not if the court was going to allow evidence.

5/11/23: Bankruptcy Court entered Order [DE # 3781] fixing a briefing schedule for the parties and stating that the court would "advise the parties on or reasonably after May 18, 2023, whether the Court intend[ed] to conduct the hearing on an evidentiary basis."

5/22/23: Bankruptcy Court issued an Order [DE # 3787] after receipt of briefing, stating that "the court has determined that there may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave—and, in particular, pertaining to the court's required inquiry into whether 'colorable' claims may exist, as described in the Motion for Leave. Therefore, the parties will be permitted to present evidence (including witness testimony) at the June 8, 2023 hearing if they so choose. This may include examining any witness for whom a Declaration or Affidavit has already been filed. The parties will be allowed no more than three hours of presentation time each (allocated three hours to the movant and three hours to the aggregate respondents). This allocated presentation time may be spent in whatever manner the parties believe will be useful to the court (argument/evidence)."

5/24/23: HMIT filed an emergency motion for expedited discovery or alternatively for continuance of the June 8, 2023 hearing. [DE # 3788 & 3789]. HMIT continued to urge that it did not think presentation of evidence was appropriate in connection with the HMIT Motion for Leave, but that "subject to and without waiving its objections, HMIT requests immediate leave to obtain all of its requested discovery on or before the specific dates identified in each deposition notice (with duces tecum), failing which the hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave should be continued until HMIT has obtained such discovery. The requested discovery is generally described in this Motion, but is set forth with particularity in the Deposition Notices with Duces Tecum attached as Exhibits A-E. [paragraph numbering omitted.] In summary, HMIT seeks expedited depositions of corporate representatives of Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"), Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck"), Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup") and also seeks the deposition of James A. Seery, Jr. ("Seery")." Deposition Notices were attached for each of these five parties. Nothing was stated about a possible need for (or intention to present) expert testimony.

5/26/23: The Bankruptcy Court held yet another status conference in response to HMIT's newest emergency motion. The Bankruptcy Court referred to this as a "second hearing on what kind of hearing we were going to have" on the HMIT Motion for Leave. The court heard more discussions on whether it was appropriate to consider evidence at the hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave. Nothing was mentioned about possible experts. The court, continuing to believe that

there could be mixed questions of fact and law inherent in deciding the HMIT Motion for Leave, granted in part and denied in part HMIT's request for expedited discovery it sought of Mr. Seery and the Claims Purchasers. The Bankruptcy Court issued a follow-up order [DE # 3800] that provided: "(1) To the extent any party would like to depose either James P. Seery, Jr. or James Dondero in advance of the June 8 hearing ("June 8 Hearing") on HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. No. 3699] and Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. 3760] (together, the "Motion for Leave"), Mr. Seery and Mr. Dondero shall be made available for depositions ("Depositions") on a date and at a time agreeable to the parties that is no earlier than May 31, 2023, and no later than June 7, 2023, and no discovery or depositions of any other party or witness will be permitted prior to the June 8 hearing; and (2) None of the parties shall be entitled to any other discovery, including the production of documents from Mr. Seery or Mr. Dondero, or any other party or witness pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, or otherwise, prior to the conduct of the Depositions or to the court's ruling on the Motion for Leave following the June 8, 2023 hearing" The Bankruptcy Court issued this ruling with the expectation—based on everything it heard—that HMIT did not wish for the court to consider evidence but, if it did, it thought it should get to depose Mr. Seery and the Claims Purchasers. The court reached what seemed like appropriate middle ground by allowing the deposition of Mr. Seery and allowing the other parties to depose Mr. Dondero (for whom sworn declarations had been submitted), but the court was not going to allow any more discovery (i.e., of the Claims Purchasers) at so late an hour. The court was aware that HMIT and Mr. Dondero had been seeking discovery from the Claims Purchasers in state court "Rule 202" proceedings for approximately two years.

June 5, 2023 (10:10 pm): HMIT filed its Witness and Exhibit List disclosing two potential expert witnesses (along with biographical information and a disclosure regarding the subject matter of their likely testimony).

June 7, 2023 (4:07 pm): A Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony and Documents was filed by Highland, Mr. Seery, and the Highland Claimant Trust ("Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence").

June 8, 2023 (8:12 am): HMIT filed a Response to the Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence.

June 8, 2023 (9:30 am): The Bankruptcy Court commenced its hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave. The parties desired for court to rule on whether the expert testimony and exhibits should be allowed into the record. After much discussion, the court informed parties that it had not had the opportunity to study their eleventh-hour filings, and that the court would go forward with the hearing as the court had earlier contemplated (three hours per side; no experts for now) and the court would take the Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence under advisement and would schedule a "Day 2" for the hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave for the experts if it determined that was appropriate. The court gave Highland, Mr. Seery, and the Highland Claimant Trust a deadline of 6/12/23 to reply to HMIT's Response. They filed a Reply (in which the Claims Purchasers joined). The Bankruptcy Court ordered no more pleadings would be considered. HMIT filed another pleading on this topic on 6/13/23 [DE # 3845] and Highland and Mr. Seery responded to the HMIT additional pleading [DE # 3846] and then HMIT replied to their response [DE # 3847].

IV. TURNING, FINALLY, TO THE MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT EVIDENCE

As indicated in the timeline above, HMIT designated on June 5, 2023, at 10:10 pm CDT, two expert witnesses to testify at the hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave. The first one was Mr. Scott Van Meter, stating that he "may provide opinion testimony on issues relating to Mr. Seery's compensation and claims trading." The second one was Mr. Steve Pully, stating that he "may provide opinion testimony on issues relating to Mr. Seery's claims trading." To be clear, Mr. Seery is not alleged to have engaged in claims trading (i.e., he is not alleged to have either sold or purchased any claims in the Highland case). Rather, it is surmised by HMIT that Mr. Seery might have shared MNPI with the Claims Purchasers. Details about the two proposed experts' education, experience, and the likely substance of their testimony were provided.

Further, with regard to Mr. Van Meter, HMIT disclosed that he had analyzed the claims trading in the Highland case and holds the opinion that there are "red flags" plausibly indicating the use of MNPI in connection with the claim purchasers' investment in their claims –primarily among them the fact that the claims purchasers allegedly did not undertake due diligence. He also would apparently opine that Mr. Seery's compensation is not reasonable or excessive because not based on any market study and because the Claims Purchasers, as large creditors on the post-confirmation oversight committee, have the ability to control it.

Further, with regard to Mr. Pully, HMIT disclosed that the projections in the publicly available information (presumably the Disclosure Statement and Plan and accompanying exhibits, the Bankruptcy Schedules, and Monthly Operating Reports) would not have rewarded the Claims Purchasers with the type of economic return that hedge funds/private equity firms would expect to realize. Thus, they must have had some MNPI to convince them that the claims purchasing was worthwhile.

There are procedural problems and substantive problems with the Proposed Experts (hereinafter so called).

A. The Procedural Problems.

The timeline set forth above is highly problematic. Highland, Mr. Seery, and the Highland Claimant Trust refer to the timeline here as tantamount to "trial by ambush."

HMIT counters that it, in fact, complied with this court's local rules and national rules as well. As to the local rules, Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(c) of the Northern District of Texas requires, in contested matters, the exchange of exhibits and witness lists with opposing parties at least 3 calendar days before a scheduled hearing (unless a specific order otherwise applies). The hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave was scheduled for June 8, 2023, at 9:30 am CDT, and HMIT filed its exhibit and witness list on June 5, 2023, at 10:10 pm CDT—technically three calendar days before the hearing, albeit less than 72 hours before the hearing. As for the national rules, HMIT states that it was under no duty to disclose the existence or substance of expert testimony prior to the exchange of witness lists, because national Rule 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("FRBP"), applying to contested matters, does not incorporate Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), which defines the content and timing for expert disclosures (unless the court directs otherwise, which it did not here).

HMIT's focus on these rules is disingenuous. The court does not view the Proposed Experts as having been appropriately and timely disclosed in light of the two-and-a-half-month timeline set forth above and—most importantly—the bankruptcy court's multiple prior conferences and orders setting the scope of the hearing and associated discovery. HMIT's revelation (approximately 60 hours before the hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave) that it

sought to offer expert testimony came far too late. HMIT never raised even the prospect of expert testimony at any point in its multiple filings with the bankruptcy court (which consisted of many hundreds of pages) or during the two status/scheduling conferences on the HMIT Motion for Leave. During the two status/scheduling conferences, this court repeatedly asked HMIT what it wanted to do at the hearing on the HMIT Motion for Leave (as far as there being evidence or no evidence—zeroing in on the inconvenient complication for HMIT that it had already put in some evidence, through the filing of the declarations of Mr. Dondero in support of its motion, and this, at the very least, would entitle the parties to cross-examine him on the statements contained in the declarations). HMIT represented that it desired for the hearing to be conducted "on the pleadings only" and that it had or would withdraw the declarations of Mr. Dondero (it had not withdrawn the declarations as of the status/scheduling conferences). But, alternatively, if there would be evidence, HMIT wanted to conduct expedited discovery of documents, fact depositions, and corporate representative depositions. [DE # 3791]. ***HMIT made no mention of any experts***. Only after the bankruptcy court had ruled on HMIT's request for expedited discovery—and expressly limited the scope of discovery—did HMIT reveal its Proposed Experts [DE # 3818]. Obviously, the court would have fully vetted with the parties at the status/scheduling conferences the need for experts and the need for any discovery of them if HMIT mentioned it as a possibility.

Additionally, while HMIT focuses on the fact that FRBP 9014 excludes FRCP 26(a)(2)(b)'s requirements regarding expert witness disclosures and reports (absent the court directing otherwise), FRBP 9014 ***does*** include ***FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)***, in contested matters, which provides that "[a] party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial." *See* FRBP 9014(b); FRBP 7026. As alluded to above, this bankruptcy court had limited pre-hearing discovery to "depositions of Mr. Dondero and/or Mr. Seery" in reliance on

HMIT's representations, which omitted any reference to expert witnesses. By waiting until roughly 60 hours before the hearing to disclose the Proposed Experts, this resulted in Highland, Mr. Seery, and the Highland Claimant Trust not having sufficient time to seek to modify the court's prior status/scheduling orders, let alone take two expert depositions.

B. *The Substantive Problems*.

Finally, on a substantive level, the Proposed Experts' testimony and documents are inadmissible because they will not "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a) provides that a witness who is qualified as an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if, among other requirements, "the expert's scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."

The fact finder here at this stage, in the context of determining whether HMIT's proposed complaint asserts "colorable" claims under the gatekeeper provision of the Plan, obviously, is the bankruptcy judge. The judge, thus, may decide whether the Proposed Experts would help her analyze or understand an issue. This court is well within its discretion to conclude that the Proposed Experts would not advance the judge's analysis. This bankruptcy judge has had years of experience (both before and after her 17 years as a bankruptcy judge) with the topic of claims purchasing that sometimes occurs during a bankruptcy case. The court notes, anecdotally, that the activity of investing in distressed debt (which frequently even occurs during a bankruptcy case—sometimes referred to as "claims trading") is ubiquitous and has, indeed, been for a couple of decades. As noted by one scholar:

> The creation of a market in bankruptcy claims is the single most important development in the bankruptcy world since the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in

> 1978. [Citations omitted.] Claims trading has revolutionized bankruptcy by making it a much more market-driven process. [Citations omitted.] . . . The development of a robust market for all types of claims against debtors has changed the cast of characters involved in bankruptcies. In addition to long-standing relational creditors, like trade creditors or a single senior secured bank or bank group, bankruptcy cases now involve professional distressed debt investors, whose interests and behavior are often quite different than traditional relational counterparty creditors.

ADAM J. LEVITIN, BANKRUPTCY MARKETS: MAKING SENSE OF CLAIMS TRADING, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 64, 65 (2010).

This judge has likewise had decades of experience with hedge funds and private equity funds. The court understands very well financial concepts such as return on investment, risk, and the handicapping of how certain events might impact recoveries. This court can take judicial notice that there was volatility in the capital markets during the time period of this case that would certainly factor into decisions to buy or sell claims.[5] This court understands the concepts of MNPI and fiduciary duties. The judge remembers very well when the possibility of an MGM-Amazon transaction flooded the news in late 2020 and 2021, and then became a reality. The court remembers asking the parties in the Highland case during open court about it, since it was widely known that Highland and its affiliates owned direct or indirect interests in MGM stock. This was before, by the way, certain of the claims purchases that are at issue here were made.

Finally, this judge has decades of experience with executive compensation in bankruptcy cases and in connection with post-confirmation trusts.[6] In fact, this court approved Mr. Seery's

[5] A court "can, of course, take judicial notice of stock prices." *Schweitzer v. Invs. Comm. of Phillips 66 Savings Plan*, 960 F.3d 190, 193 n.3 (5th Cir. 2020).

[6] This court even ran across one article that the above-signing judge published on the topic before she was a judge. *Bringing Home the Bacon, or Just Being a Hog? Employee and Executive Compensation Issues in Chapter 11*, 22nd Annual Bankruptcy Conference, The University of Texas School of Law (Nov. 2003) (co-authored with Frances Smith). The bankruptcy judge does not mean to suggest that a 20-year-old article makes anyone per se an expert. It

compensation early on during the bankruptcy case (in 2020), and his compensation was negotiated by the former members of the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee, among others. Mr. Seery's compensation during this bankruptcy case was obviously subject to a motion, notice and a hearing, and was fully disclosed. Mr. Seery's base compensation now is the same as what this court approved back in 2020. Certainly, in a bankruptcy case, one size does not fit all. Highland is a unique case that has involved great contentiousness and hundreds of millions of dollars of assets. Mr. Seery's compensation reflects these circumstances, among other things.

In summary, with all due respect to the Proposed Experts, it is hard for this court to conceive how they could help this court to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue relative to the gatekeeping motion—as contemplated by Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)—when this court deals with the issues presented by motion, and similar issues, somewhat regularly.

Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion under Fed. R. Evid 702(a) and exclude the Proposed Experts testimony and HMIT Exhibits 39-52 relating to same.

A further opinion and order will be forthcoming on the HMIT Motion for Leave.

END OF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER####

is merely to further the point that a long-term bankruptcy judge with Chapter 11 experience typically has developed expertise regarding executive compensation issues pre-and post-confirmation in Chapter 11 cases.

Exhibit 8

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed July 1, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	)	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	)	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	)	

ORDER STRIKING HMIT'S EVIDENTIARY PROFFER PURSUANT TO RULE 103(a)(2) AND LIMITING BRIEFING

The Court has reviewed Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's ("HMIT") *Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2)* ("Proffer"; Dkt. No. 3858), the *Highland Parties' Joint Objections To And Motion To Strike HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2)* ("Motion"; Dkt. No. 3860) filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr. (collectively, the "Highland Parties"), and the *Claims Purchasers' Joinder to the Highland Parties' Objections and Motion to Strike HMIT's Purported Proffer* (Dkt. No. 3861) filed by Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Farallon Capital Management,

L.L.C., and Stonehill Capital Management LLC (collectively with HMIT and the Highland Parties, the "Parties"). After due deliberation, the Court has determined that good and sufficient cause has been shown for the relief requested in the Motion. It is therefore **ORDERED** that:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED**.

2. The Proffer and its accompanying declarations are stricken from the record for the reasons set forth in the Court's June 27, 2023 email (attached hereto as Exhibit A). The Court directs the Clerk to remove docket entry 3858 from the docket.

3. The Parties shall not file any additional briefs, motions, pleadings, proffers, or other submissions with the Court in connection with the Motion, the Highland Parties' *Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully* (Dkt. No. 3820), or any proposed/excluded expert evidence relative to HMIT's *Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding* (Dkt. No. 3699).

END OF ORDER

Exhibit A

From: Traci Ellison <Traci_Ellison@txnb.uscourts.gov>
Date: June 27, 2023 at 10:24:11 AM CDT
To: "Stancil, Mark - M3Stancil@duanemorris.com" <M3Stancil@duanemorris.com>, "Annable, Zachery Z." <zannable@haywardfirm.com>, "Sawnie A. McEntire" <smcentire@pmmlaw.com>, "Roger L. McCleary" <rmccleary@pmmlaw.com>, "Omar J. Alaniz" <OAlaniz@reedsmith.com>, "McIlwain, Brent R (DAL - X59481)" <Brent.McIlwain@hklaw.com>
Subject: 19-34054-sgj11 Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Dear Counsel:

Please see the following message from Judge Jernigan:

"With regard to the Evidentiary Proffer ("Proffer") of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") filed at DE # 3858 on 6/19/23 (i.e., after the 6/8/23 hearing on HMIT's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [DE # 3699] and after the court's written 6/16/23 ruling regarding the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence), the court has determined that the Proffer is unnecessary. Rule 103(a)(2) does not apply if "the substance" of the excluded evidence "was apparent from the context." Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). Here, "the substance" of the excluded evidence was quite apparent from the "context"--more specifically, the witness and exhibit list filed by HMIT, the proposed exhibits offered [see DE # 3818], and the statements of HMIT's counsel on the record at the 6/8/23 hearing.

The court is aware of the motion to strike the Proffer [DE # 3860] and the Joinder therein [DE # 3861]. The court concludes it is appropriate to grant the motion to strike. The court directs counsel for movants to upload a form of order that grants their motion to strike. The order shall direct the Clerk to mark DE # 3858 as stricken from the record as both filed without authority and unnecessary pursuant to FRE 103(a)(2).

The parties are directed to file no more pleadings in the bankruptcy court regarding this issue of the proposed/excluded expert evidence relative to DE # 3699. The court has ruled [at DE # 3854]."

Thank you,
Traci

Exhibit 9

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed October 4, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	
	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

ORDER DENYING MOTION OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST SEEKING RELIEF PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 7052, 9023, AND 9024

On September 8, 2023, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") filed its *Motion to Alter or Amend Order, To Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or, Alternatively, for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 and Incorporated Brief* (hereinafter, the "Motion").[1] In the Motion, HMIT requests that the court alter or amend its findings set forth in its 105-page Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated August

[1] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3905

25, 2023 (hereinafter, the "Order Denying HMIT's Motion for Leave")[2] in which this court, in the exercise of its "gatekeeping" function pursuant to the Gatekeeper Provision[3] of the Debtors' confirmed Plan[4] and pre-confirmation Gatekeeper Orders, denied HMIT's *Emergency Motion for Leave To File Verified Adversary Proceeding*.[5] The Order Denying HMIT's Motion for Leave was issued following an evidentiary hearing on June 8, 2023.

HMIT now wants the bankruptcy court to reconsider certain findings and conclusions (or make additional ones—or even grant a new hearing) with regard to the Order Denying HMIT's Motion for Leave—specifically pertaining to the subject of HMIT's lack of standing (which was one of multiple reasons the court gave for issuing the Order Denying HMIT's Motion for Leave). The ground articulated by HMIT is as follows: "because post-hearing financial disclosure filings in the bankruptcy matter further evidence [sic] that the court's standing determinations are incorrect and should be corrected." Motion, at ¶ 3.[6] In other words, HMIT suggests that certain "post-hearing financial disclosure filings" filed in the main Highland bankruptcy case by the Reorganized Debtor (on July 6, 2023[7] and July 21, 2023[8]) somehow now demonstrate that HMIT, indeed, has standing to pursue the adversary proceeding that it sought leave to file.

The Motion is denied. First, the court sees no reasonable grounds to reopen the record with these "post-hearing financial disclosures." For one thing, the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings" are not materially different than information that was already on file in the bankruptcy

[2] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3903 & 3904.
[3] Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Order Denying HMIT's Motion for Leave.
[4] The court entered its *Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief* [Bankr. Dkt. No. 1943] on February 22, 2021.
[5] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, 3816, and 3760.
[6] HMIT attached the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings in the bankruptcy matter" as exhibits to the Motion. *See* Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Motion.
[7] Bankr. Dkt. No. 3872.
[8] Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3888 and 3889.

case for all to see, before the June 8, 2023 hearing. *See* Bankr. Dkt. Nos. 3756 & 3757 (routine Post-Confirmation Reports, filed by the Reorganized Debtor on April 21, 2023, which show liabilities, disbursements, and "Remaining investments, notes, and other assets"—albeit without specific values ascribed to the latter). So, to the extent HMIT is arguing that the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings" are something akin to newly discovered evidence or otherwise a ground for granting a new hearing or altering findings, HMIT's argument lacks merit. Moreover, even if this court were to consider the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings," the court disagrees with HMIT's central argument that they demonstrate that HMIT's contingent interest is "in the money" and, thus, that it has both constitutional and prudential standing to pursue the adversary proceeding it wants to file. Notably, HMIT does not give proper attention to the voluminous supplemental notes in the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings" that are integral to understanding the numbers therein. For example, as mentioned in Note 5 therein, the administrative expenses and legal fees of the Reorganized Highland and the post-confirmation trust continue to deplete their assets, due to the fact that "(b) approximately twenty (20) matters are being actively litigated in at least 9 different forums; and (c) based on history, new litigation can be expected." This significant and widespread litigation results in massive indemnification obligations, as well as massive, continuing legal fees and expenses. The assets shown in the "post-hearing financial disclosure filings" will only be available for distribution after satisfaction of all legal fees and expenses and indemnity obligations. As also noted in Note 5 therein, it is expected that the Highland post-confirmation trust and its subsidiaries will operate at an operating loss prospectively. The information in the "adjustments" column of the assets section of the post-hearing financial disclosures "does not assume any expected future operating cash burn, which is expected to be significant." Additionally, as indicated in Note 6, sometimes Highland has been

unable to obtain full and complete information regarding asset values for inclusion in the post-hearing financial disclosures—thus impacting the accuracy of some valuations used. For example,

> The value of SE Multifamily Holdings LLC maintained on this balance sheet is $15.7 million, which is a component of the "Investments" line item and is based on a several years stale book-basis balance sheet. Notwithstanding Dondero-entities' previous disclosures of this interest at values of $20 million and $12 million, Highland also received interest from Dondero to acquire the interest for $3.8 million, among other assets. . . . Highland has initiated proceedings in Delaware to receive books and records relating to SE Multifamily Holdings LLC, for which it has the contractual right and has been seeking for approximately a year, but for which Dondero controlled entities have not provided to date.

In summary, HMIT argues no reasonable grounds to justify any of the relief sought in the Motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion be, and hereby is, **DENIED**.

###END OF ORDER###

HMIT Exhibit 5

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

APPELLANT HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION
IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

COMES NOW Appellant/Movant Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, both in its individual capacity and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust,[1] (collectively, "Appellant" or "HMIT"), and files this Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009(a)(1):

I.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that the "colorable" claim analysis allowed the court to consider evidence and other non-pleading materials including, but not limited to, the court's reasoning that:

1. the colorability analysis is stricter than a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis;

2. the colorability analysis is "akin to the standards applied under the … *Barton* doctrine";

3. the colorability analysis requires a "hybrid" of the *Barton* doctrine and "what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place"; and/or,

[1] And in all capacities and alternative derivative capacities asserted in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, and 3816] ("Emergency Motion"), the supplement to the Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 3760], and the draft Complaint attached to the same [Dkt. No. 3760-1].

4. "[t]here may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave"?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3781, 3790, 3903-04].

B. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant lacked constitutional or prudential standing to bring its claims in its individual and derivative capacities?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

C. Did the bankruptcy court err in alternatively determining that, even under a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, Appellant did not assert colorable claims including, but not limited to, determining that:

1. Appellant's allegations are conclusory, speculative, or constitute "legal conclusions";

2. Appellant's claims or allegations are not "plausible";

3. Appellant's allegations pertaining to a *quid pro quo* are "pure speculation";

4. Proposed Defendant James P. Seery ("Seery") owed no duty to Appellant in any capacity as a matter of law;

5. Appellant failed "to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty";

6. Appellant's allegations pertaining to its aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims are speculative and not plausible;

7. The remedies of equitable disallowance and equitable subordination are not remedies "available" to Appellant as a matter of law;

8. Appellant's unjust enrichment claim is invalid as a matter of law because "Seery's compensation is governed by express agreements";

9. Appellant is not entitled to declaratory relief because it has no colorable claims; and/or

10. Appellant cannot recover punitive damages for its breach of fiduciary duty claim?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

D. Alternatively, even if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the court violate Appellant's due process rights by denying Appellant its requested discovery?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3800, 3853, 3903-04, June 8, 2023 Hearing].

E. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's requested discovery including, but not limited to:

1. ordering that Appellant could not request or obtain any discovery other than a deposition of Seery and James D. Dondero; and/or

2. determining that state court "Rule 202" proceedings supported the denial of discovery?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3800 & June 8, 2023 Hearing; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

F. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's alternative request for a continuance to obtain the requested discovery?

G. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's evidence, or admitting the same for only limited purposes, offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

H. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by overruling Appellant's objections to Appellees' evidence offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

I. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's experts' testimony?

[*See* Dkt. No. 3853; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

J. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by striking Appellant's proffer of its excluded experts' testimony from the record?

[*See* Dkt. No. 3869].

K. Alternatively, if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant had not asserted colorable claims under that "hybrid" analysis including, but not limited to, its findings that:

1. there is no evidence to support that Seery shared material non-public information with the Claims Purchasers;

2. there is no evidence to support the alleged quid pro quo;

3. the material shared was *public* information; and/or

4. the Claims Purchasers had sufficient and lawful reasons to pay the amounts paid for the purchased claims.

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

L. Did the bankruptcy court err in finding that Appellant is controlled by Dondero, and, as such, Appellant "cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose"?

M. Alternatively, does sufficient evidence support the bankruptcy court's evidentiary findings made pursuant to its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis?

N. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying an expedited hearing on Appellant's Motion for Leave? [*See* Dkt. 3713].

O. Does the bankruptcy court's use of a new "colorability" standard to determine if claims by non-debtors against other non-debtors may proceed violate *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny?

P. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or Alternatively, for New Trial under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 including, but not limited to by:

1. declining to consider disclosures that demonstrated that Appellant is "in the money"—an issue pertinent to the court's erroneous standing decisions; and

2. concluding that the disclosures failed to reinforce Appellant's standing to pursue the claims presented?

[Dkt. 3936].

II.
DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

A. Case No. 19-34054-sgj11: HMIT hereby designates the following items in the record on appeal from Cause No. 19-34054-sgj11.

FILE DATE	DOCKET NO. (INCLUDING ALL ATTACHMENTS AND APPENDICES)	DESCRIPTION
01/22/2021	1808	Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)

02/22/2021	1943	Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief
09/09/2022	3503	Motion to Conform Plan filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
02/27/203	3671	Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reorganized Debtor's Motion to Conform Plan
03/28/2023	3699 (3699-1 — 3699-5)	HMIT Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
03/28/2023	3700 (3700-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
03/30/2023	3704	Farallon, Stonehill, Jessup and Muck Objection to Motion for Expedited Hearing
03/30/2023	3705	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
03/30/2023	3706	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
03/30/2023	3707	Highland's Response in Opposition to Emergency Motion for Leave
03/30/2023	3708 (3708-1 — 3708-8)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of the Highland Parties' Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Opposed Application for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
03/31/2023	3712	HMIT Reply in Support of Application for Expedited Hearing
03/31/2023	3713	Order Denying Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/04/2023	3718 (3718-1 — 3718-4)	HMIT Motion for Leave to File Appeal
04/04/2023	3719 (3719-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Appeal

04/05/2023	3720	Order Denying HMIT's Opposed Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/05/2023	3721 (3721-1 — 3721-2)	HMIT Notice of Appeal
04/06/2023	3726 (3726-1)	Certificate of Mailing regarding HMIT Notice of Appeal
04/07/2023	3731	Notice of Docketing Transmittal of Notice of Appeal
04/13/2023	3738 (3738-1)	Highland's Opposed Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix a Briefing Schedule and Set a Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
04/13/2023	3739	Highland's Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/13/2023	3740	Joinder to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date With Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
04/13/2023	3741	Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
04/13/2023	3742	Amended Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
04/13/2023	3745	Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice by Omar Jesus Alaniz filed by James P. Seery Jr.
04/15/2023	3747	Joinder by James P. Seery Jr. to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
04/17/2023	3748	HMIT's Response and Reservation of Rights
04/19/2023	3751	Notice of Status Conference

04/21/2023	3758	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"
04/21/2023	3759	HMIT's Notice of Rescheduling Hearing
04/21/2023	3761	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"[2]
04/23/2023	3760 (3760-1)	HMIT's Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
04/24/2023	3764	Hearing held on 4/24/2023 re: HMIT's Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
04/25/2023	3765	Transcript of Hearing held on 04/24/2023
05/11/2023	3780	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's (i) Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding; and (ii) Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
05/11/2023	3781	Order Fixing Briefing Scheduling and Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding as Supplemented
05/11/2023	3783	Highland and Seery's Joint Response to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
05/11/2023	3784 (3784-1 — 3784-46)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Response
05/18/2023	3785	HMIT's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding

[2] A duplicate of Doc 3758.

05/22/2023	3787	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
05/24/2023	3788 (3788-1 — 3788-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/24/2023	3789	HMIT's Application for Expedited Hearing
05/24/2023	3790	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
05/25/2023	3791 (3791-1 — 3791-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/25/2023	3792	Order Setting Expedited Hearing
05/25/2023	3795	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
05/25/2023	3798 (3798-1)	Highland Parties' Joint Response in Opposition to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery
05/26/2023	3800	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/26/2023	3825	Hearing Held on 05/26/2023
05/26/2023	3826	Hearing Held on 05/26/2023
05/26/2023	3827	Hearing Held on 05/26/2023
05/28/2023	3801	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing

06/05/2023	3815 (3815-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3816 (3816-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3817 (3817-1 — 3817-5)	Highland Parties' Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Evidentiary Hearing on June 8, 2023
06/05/2023	3818 (3818-1 — 3818-9)	HMIT's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement
06/07/2023	3820	Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3821 (3821-1 — 3821-3)	Declaration in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3822 (3822-1)	HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal [WITHDRAWN]
06/07/2023	3823	Joinder to Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
06/07/2023	3824	HMIT's Objections to the Highland Parties' Exhibit and Witness List
06/08/2023	3828	HMIT's Response to Highland Claimant Trust and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Experts Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/08/2023	3839	Hearing held on 06/08/2023
06/09/2023	3831	Audio File. Court Date & Time [05/26/2023 12:53:45 PM]

06/09/2023	3832	Audio File. Court Date & Time [06/08/2023 02:01:09 PM].
06/09/2023	3833	Audio File. Court Date & Time [06/08/2023 02:02:00 PM].
06/09/2023	3834	Audio File. Court Date & Time [06/08/2023 02:02:56 PM].
06/09/2023	3835	Audio File. Court Date & Time [06/08/2023 02:03:54 PM].
06/09/2023	3836	Audio File. Court Date & Time [06/08/2023 02:04:32 PM].
06/09/2023	3837	Request for transcript regarding hearing held on 06/08/2023
06/12/2023	3838	Court admitted exhibits on hearing June 8, 2023
06/12/2023	3841	Highland Parties' Reply in Further Support of their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/12/2023	3842 (3842-1)	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery Jr.'s Reply in Further Support of Their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
06/13/2023	3843	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 06/08/2023
06/13/2023	3844	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 05/26/2023
06/13/2023	3845	HMIT's Request for Oral Hearing or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer
06/13/2023	3846	Response in Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Request for Oral Argument or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Creditor James P. Seery Jr.

06/13/2023	3847	HMIT's Reply to the Highland Parties' Response to Request for Oral Hearing
06/16/2023	3853	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence
06/16/2023	3854	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence
06/19/2023	3858 (3858-1 — 3858-2)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2)[3]
06/23/2023	3860	The Highland Parties' Objections to and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
06/23/2023	3861	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to the Highland Parties' Objections and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
07/05/2023	3869	Order Striking HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) and Limiting Briefing
07/06/2023	3872	Notice of Filing of the Current Balance Sheet of the Highland Claimant Trust filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust
07/21/2023	3888	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
07/21/2023	3889	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by the Highland Claimant Trust
08/17/2023	3901	Withdrawal of HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

[3] HMIT understands that the Court struck this proffer in docket entry 3869. Because the proffer appears to remain on the record and to avoid any argument that HMIT has failed its burden to designate the record, HMIT designates this docket entry out of an abundance of caution.

08/25/2023	3903	Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders": Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
08/25/2023	3904	Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders": Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
09/08/2023	3905 (3905-1 — 3905-6)	Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or, Alternatively, for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 and Incorporated Relief Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
09/08/2023	3906 (3906-1 — 3906-8)	Notice of Appeal filed by HMIT
09/11/2023	3907	Clerk's Correspondence regarding HMIT's Notice of Appeal
09/12/2023	3908 (3908-1 — 3908-8)	Amended Notice of Appeal filed by HMIT
09/22/2023	3928	Notice Regarding Appeal and Pending Post-Judgment Motion filed by HMIT
10/05/2023	3936	Order Denying Motion of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Seeking Relief Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024
10/19/2023	3945 (3945-1 — 3945-10)	Second Amended Notice of Appeal filed by HMIT

B. Exhibits.

Further, the Parties submitted hearing exhibits. HMIT designates for inclusion in the record for appeal all the hearing exhibits submitted to the Court, which were all electronically filed and are in the Court's record and are a part of this Appellate Record. (Docs. 3817 and 3818). The following exhibits are submitted and included in the Court's record:

HMIT Exhibits **(Dkts. 3818, 3818-1, 3818-2, 3818-3, 3818-4, 3818-5. 3818-6, 3818-7, 3818-8, and 3818-9)**
HMIT Exhibits 1-4, 6-80
HCM Exhibits **(Dkts. 3817, 3817-1, 3817-2, 3817-3, 3817-4, 3817-5)**
HCM Exhibits 2-15, 25-34, 36, 38-42, 45-46, 51, 59-60, 100

Dated: October 19, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via ECF notification on October 19, 2023, on all parties receiving electronic notification.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

3133171.1

HMIT Exhibit 6

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

APPELLANT HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

COMES NOW Appellant/Movant Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, both in its individual capacity and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust,[1] (collectively, "Appellant" or "HMIT"), and files this Second Supplemental[2] Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009(a)(1):

I.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that the "colorable" claim analysis allowed the court to consider evidence and other non-pleading materials including, but not limited to, the court's reasoning that:

1. the colorability analysis is stricter than a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis;

2. the colorability analysis is "akin to the standards applied under the … *Barton* doctrine";

3. the colorability analysis requires a "hybrid" of the *Barton* doctrine and "what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place"; and/or,

[1] And in all capacities and alternative derivative capacities asserted in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, and 3816] ("Emergency Motion"), the supplement to the Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 3760], and the draft Complaint attached to the same [Dkt. No. 3760-1].

[2] Appellant files this Second Supplement pursuant to the Clerk's request at Docket #3949 and correspondence on 10/23/2023.

4. "[t]here may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave"?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3781, 3790, 3903-04].

B. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant lacked constitutional or prudential standing to bring its claims in its individual and derivative capacities?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

C. Did the bankruptcy court err in alternatively determining that, even under a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, Appellant did not assert colorable claims including, but not limited to, determining that:

1. Appellant's allegations are conclusory, speculative, or constitute "legal conclusions";

2. Appellant's claims or allegations are not "plausible";

3. Appellant's allegations pertaining to a *quid pro quo* are "pure speculation";

4. Proposed Defendant James P. Seery ("Seery") owed no duty to Appellant in any capacity as a matter of law;

5. Appellant failed "to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty";

6. Appellant's allegations pertaining to its aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims are speculative and not plausible;

7. The remedies of equitable disallowance and equitable subordination are not remedies "available" to Appellant as a matter of law;

8. Appellant's unjust enrichment claim is invalid as a matter of law because "Seery's compensation is governed by express agreements";

9. Appellant is not entitled to declaratory relief because it has no colorable claims; and/or

10. Appellant cannot recover punitive damages for its breach of fiduciary duty claim?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

D. Alternatively, even if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the court violate Appellant's due process rights by denying Appellant its requested discovery?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3800, 3853, 3903-04, June 8, 2023 Hearing].

E. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's requested discovery including, but not limited to:

1. ordering that Appellant could not request or obtain any discovery other than a deposition of Seery and James D. Dondero; and/or

2. determining that state court "Rule 202" proceedings supported the denial of discovery?

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3800 & June 8, 2023 Hearing; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

F. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's alternative request for a continuance to obtain the requested discovery?

G. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's evidence, or admitting the same for only limited purposes, offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

H. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by overruling Appellant's objections to Appellees' evidence offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

I. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's experts' testimony?

[*See* Dkt. No. 3853; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

J. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by striking Appellant's proffer of its excluded experts' testimony from the record?

[*See* Dkt. No. 3869].

K. Alternatively, if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant had not asserted colorable claims under that "hybrid" analysis including, but not limited to, its findings that:

1. there is no evidence to support that Seery shared material non-public information with the Claims Purchasers;

2. there is no evidence to support the alleged quid pro quo;

3. the material shared was *public* information; and/or

4. the Claims Purchasers had sufficient and lawful reasons to pay the amounts paid

for the purchased claims.

[*See* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

L. Did the bankruptcy court err in finding that Appellant is controlled by Dondero, and, as such, Appellant "cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose"?

M. Alternatively, does sufficient evidence support the bankruptcy court's evidentiary findings made pursuant to its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis?

N. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying an expedited hearing on Appellant's Motion for Leave? [*See* Dkt. 3713].

O. Does the bankruptcy court's use of a new "colorability" standard to determine if claims by non-debtors against other non-debtors may proceed violate *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny?

P. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or Alternatively, for New Trial under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 including, but not limited to by:

1. declining to consider disclosures that demonstrated that Appellant is "in the money"—an issue pertinent to the court's erroneous standing decisions; and

2. concluding that the disclosures failed to reinforce Appellant's standing to pursue the claims presented?

[Dkt. 3936].

II.
DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

1. Notice of Appeal

a. Notice of Appeal **[Dkt. 3906];**

b. Amended Notice of Appeal **[Dkt. 3908];** and

c. Second Amended Notice of Appeal **[Dkt. 3945]**

2. The judgment, order, or decree appealed from:

a. Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders": Denying Hunter Mountain Investment

Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceedings **[Dkts. 3903 & 3904];** and

b. Order Denying Motion of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Seeking Relief Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 **[Dkt. 3936]**.

3. Docket sheet.

a. Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054

4. Other Items to be included:

a. HMIT hereby designates the following items in the record on appeal from Cause No. 19-34054-sgj11:

FILE DATE	DOCKET NO. (INCLUDING ALL ATTACHMENTS AND APPENDICES)	DESCRIPTION
01/22/2021	1808	Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)
02/22/2021	1943	Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief
09/09/2022	3503	Motion to Conform Plan filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
02/27/203	3671	Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reorganized Debtor's Motion to Conform Plan
03/28/2023	3699 (3699-1 — 3699-5)	HMIT Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
03/28/2023	3700 (3700-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
03/30/2023	3704	Farallon, Stonehill, Jessup and Muck Objection to Motion for Expedited Hearing
03/30/2023	3705	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference

03/30/2023	3706	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
03/30/2023	3707	Highland's Response in Opposition to Emergency Motion for Leave
03/30/2023	3708 (3708-1 — 3708-8)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of the Highland Parties' Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Opposed Application for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
03/31/2023	3712	HMIT Reply in Support of Application for Expedited Hearing
03/31/2023	3713	Order Denying Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/04/2023	3718 (3718-1 — 3718-4)	HMIT Motion for Leave to File Appeal
04/04/2023	3719 (3719-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Appeal
04/05/2023	3720	Order Denying HMIT's Opposed Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/05/2023	3721 (3721-1 — 3721-2)	HMIT Notice of Appeal
04/06/2023	3726 (3726-1)	Certificate of Mailing regarding HMIT Notice of Appeal
04/07/2023	3731	Notice of Docketing Transmittal of Notice of Appeal
04/13/2023	3738 (3738-1)	Highland's Opposed Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix a Briefing Schedule and Set a Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
04/13/2023	3739	Highland's Motion for Expedited Hearing
04/13/2023	3740	Joinder to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date With Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon

		Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
04/13/2023	3741	Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
04/13/2023	3742	Amended Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
04/13/2023	3745	Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice by Omar Jesus Alaniz filed by James P. Seery Jr.
04/15/2023	3747	Joinder by James P. Seery Jr. to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
04/17/2023	3748	HMIT's Response and Reservation of Rights
04/19/2023	3751	Notice of Status Conference
04/21/2023	3758	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"
04/21/2023	3759	HMIT's Notice of Rescheduling Hearing
04/21/2023	3761	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"[3]
04/23/2023	3760 (3760-1)	HMIT's Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
04/25/2023	3765	Transcript of Hearing held on 04/24/2023
05/11/2023	3780	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's (i) Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding; and (ii) Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck

[3] A duplicate of Doc 3758.

		Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
05/11/2023	3781	Order Fixing Briefing Scheduling and Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding as Supplemented
05/11/2023	3783	Highland and Seery's Joint Response to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
05/11/2023	3784 (3784-1 — 3784-46)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Response
05/18/2023	3785	HMIT's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding
05/22/2023	3787	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
05/24/2023	3788 (3788-1 — 3788-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/24/2023	3789	HMIT's Application for Expedited Hearing
05/24/2023	3790	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
05/25/2023	3791 (3791-1 — 3791-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/25/2023	3792	Order Setting Expedited Hearing
05/25/2023	3795	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

05/25/2023	3798 (3798-1)	Highland Parties' Joint Response in Opposition to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery
05/26/2023	3800	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/28/2023	3801	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
06/05/2023	3815 (3815-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3816 (3816-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3817 (3817-1 — 3817-5)	Highland Parties' Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Evidentiary Hearing on June 8, 2023
06/05/2023	3818 (3818-1 — 3818-9)	HMIT's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement
06/07/2023	3820	Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3821 (3821-1 — 3821-3)	Declaration in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3822 (3822-1)	HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal [WITHDRAWN]
06/07/2023	3823	Joinder to Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

06/07/2023	3824	HMIT's Objections to the Highland Parties' Exhibit and Witness List
06/08/2023	3828	HMIT's Response to Highland Claimant Trust and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Experts Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/09/2023	3837	Request for transcript regarding hearing held on 06/08/2023
06/12/2023	3838	Court admitted exhibits on hearing June 8, 2023 (*See* Docket Entry Nos. 3817 & 3818)
06/12/2023	3841	Highland Parties' Reply in Further Support of their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/12/2023	3842 (3842-1)	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery Jr.'s Reply in Further Support of Their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
06/13/2023	3843	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 06/08/2023
06/13/2023	3844	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 05/26/2023
06/13/2023	3845	HMIT's Request for Oral Hearing or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer
06/13/2023	3846	Response in Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Request for Oral Argument or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Creditor James P. Seery Jr.
06/13/2023	3847	HMIT's Reply to the Highland Parties' Response to Request for Oral Hearing
06/16/2023	3853	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence

06/16/2023	3854	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence
06/19/2023	3858 (3858-1 — 3858-2)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2)[4]
06/23/2023	3860	The Highland Parties' Objections to and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
06/23/2023	3861	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to the Highland Parties' Objections and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
07/05/2023	3869	Order Striking HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) and Limiting Briefing
07/06/2023	3872	Notice of Filing of the Current Balance Sheet of the Highland Claimant Trust filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust
07/21/2023	3888	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
07/21/2023	3889	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by the Highland Claimant Trust
08/17/2023	3901	Withdrawal of HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
09/08/2023	3905 (3905-1 — 3905-6)	Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or, Alternatively, for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 and Incorporated Relief Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

[4] HMIT understands that the Court struck this proffer in docket entry 3869. Because the proffer appears to remain on the record and to avoid any argument that HMIT has failed its burden to designate the record, HMIT designates this docket entry out of an abundance of caution.

09/11/2023	3907	Clerk's Correspondence regarding HMIT's Notice of Appeal
09/22/2023	3928	Notice Regarding Appeal and Pending Post-Judgment Motion filed by HMIT

B. Exhibits.

Further, the Parties submitted hearing exhibits. HMIT designates for inclusion in the record for appeal all the hearing exhibits submitted to the Court, which were all electronically filed and are in the Court's record and are a part of this Appellate Record. (Docs. 3817 and 3818). The following exhibits are submitted and included in the Court's record:

HMIT Exhibits **(Dkts. 3818, 3818-1, 3818-2, 3818-3, 3818-4, 3818-5. 3818-6, 3818-7, 3818-8, and 3818-9)**
HMIT Exhibits 1-4, 6-80
HCM Exhibits **(Dkts. 3817, 3817-1, 3817-2, 3817-3, 3817-4, 3817-5)**
HCM Exhibits 2-15, 25-34, 36, 38-42, 45-46, 51, 59-60, 100

Dated: October 23, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: */s/ Sawnie. A. McEntire*
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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via ECF notification on October 23, 2023, on all parties receiving electronic notification.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

HMIT Exhibit 7

BTXN 099 (rev. 12/14)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

In Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Debtor(s) Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Appellant(s) vs. Highland Capital Management, L.P, et al Appellee(s)	§ § § § § § § § § § § § §	Case No.: 19−34054−sgj11 Chapter No.: 11 Civil Case No.: 3:23−CV−2071−E

TRANSMITTAL AND CERTIFICATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8010, the appeal filed on 9/8/2023 regarding [3903] Memorandum of Opinion Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre−Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders"; Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding. Entered 8/25/2023 by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust in the above styled bankruptcy case is hereby transmitted to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

This record on appeal contains all items listed on the attached index, and is in compliance with Rule 8010 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

All further pleadings or inquiries regarding this matter should be directed to the U.S. District Clerk's Office until such time as the appeal is fully processed in the U.S. District Court.

The above referenced record was delivered to the U.S. District Clerk's Office on December 7, 2023.

DATED: 12/7/23

FOR THE COURT:
Robert P. Colwell, Clerk of Court

by: /s/J. Blanco, Deputy Clerk

HMIT Exhibit 8

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed March 31, 2021

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER APPROVING JOINT STIPULATION AS TO WITHDRAWAL OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S PROOF OF CLAIM NO. 152

Having considered the *Joint Stipulation as to Withdrawal of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Proof of Claim No. 152* [Docket No. 2139] (the "Stipulation"), a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor") and Hunter

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and together with the Debtor, the "Parties"), **IT**

IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Stipulation is **APPROVED**.

###End of Order###

EXHIBIT A

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP
Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No. 143717) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
Ira D. Kharasch (CA Bar No. 109084) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
John A. Morris (NY Bar No. 266326) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

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Email: pkeiffer@romclaw.com

Counsel for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, L. P.

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	
	§	

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

JOINT STIPULATION AS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S PROOF OF CLAIM NO. 152

Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**"), the debtor and debtor-in-possession, and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("**HMIT**") enter into this joint stipulation with regard to the withdrawal of HMIT's Proof of Claim No. 152 (the "**Stipulation**").

Recitals

Whereas, HMIT timely filed Proof of Claim No. 70 on April 2, 2020 and then filed Proof of Claim No. 152 as an amendment, both in the amount of $60,298,739, to preserve asserted defenses of common law and contractual setoff (the "**HMIT POC**");

Whereas, the Debtor on August 26, 2020 commenced Adversary Proceeding No. 20-03105-sgj (the "**Adversary Proceeding**") by filing and serving the *Debtor's (I) Objection to Claim No. 152 of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and (II) Complaint to Subordinate Claim of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and for Declaratory Relief* (the "**Complaint**");

Whereas, the Debtor and HMIT entered into that *Stipulation and Proposed Scheduling Order* (the "**Stipulation**") (AP Docket No. 8) in the Adversary Proceeding (later approved by the Court at AP Docket No. 9), which among other things provided that HMIT "(a) waives its rights, if any, to vote for or against the Plan, whether pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018(a) or otherwise; and (b) agrees not to object to or otherwise oppose confirmation of the Plan, including any amendments thereto (provided that any such amendments do not affect the issues which would be litigated in this Adversary Proceeding);"

Whereas, HMIT complied with the Stipulation and the Court confirmed the Debtor's *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization* (Main Case Docket No. 1943) (the "**Plan**");

Whereas, HMIT wishes to withdraw the HMIT POC, provided that (a) it retains its asserted defenses of common law and contractual setoff with regard to any action the Debtor may

take to enforce its rights under the Contribution Note or the Contribution Agreement (as those terms are defined in the Complaint), and (b) the Debtor dismisses the Adversary Proceeding without prejudice, subject to the Debtor's right to commence a new adversary proceeding to enforce its rights under the Contribution Note or Contribution Agreement or to otherwise pursue any other cause of action against HMIT;

Whereas, HMIT and the Debtor agree that this Stipulation meets the requirements of Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and case law construing the requirements for the withdrawal of a proof of claim after an objection or adversary proceeding has been asserted; and

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby stipulated and agreed, and upon approval of this Stipulation by the Court, it shall be SO ORDERED:

1. That the HMIT POC is hereby deemed withdrawn for all purposes and shall be expunged from the Debtor's claims register, and no distributions shall be made on account of the HMIT POC; and

2. The withdrawal of the HMIT POC is without prejudice to HMIT's asserted defenses of common law and contractual setoff with regard to any action the Debtor may take to enforce its rights under the Contribution Note or the Contribution Agreement (as those terms are defined in the Complaint) or to otherwise pursue any other cause of action against HMIT.

Dated March 31, 2021.

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No.143717)
(*admitted pro hac vice*)
Ira D. Kharasch (CA Bar No. 109084)
(*admitted pro hac vice*)
John A. Morris (NY Bar No. 266326)
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-and-

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-and-

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Counsel for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

HMIT Exhibit 9

FILED
1/20/2023 4:29 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Stephanie Clark DEPUTY

DC-23-01004

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	191st
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
VERIFIED RULE 202 PETITION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Petitioner, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"), files this Verified Petition ("Petition") pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking pre-suit discovery from Respondent Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon") and Respondent Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill") (collectively "Respondents"), to allow HMIT to investigate potential claims against Respondents and other potentially adverse entities, and would respectfully show:

PARTIES

1. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust that was the largest equity holder in Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM"), holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HCM filed chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in 2019 and, as a result of these

proceedings,[1] HMIT held a Class 10 claim which, post-confirmation, was converted to a Contingent Trust Interest in HCM's post-reorganization sole limited partner.

2. Farallon is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in California, which is located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111.

3. Stonehill is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in New York, which is located at 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

4. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, because all or substantially all of the events or omissions giving rise to HMIT's potential common law claims occurred in Dallas County, Texas. In the event HMIT elects to proceed with a lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill, venue of such proceedings will be proper in Dallas County, Texas.

5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.[2] The amount in controversy of any potential claims against Farallon or Stonehill far exceeds this Court's minimum jurisdictional requirements. Without limitation, HMIT specifically seeks to investigate potentially actionable claims for unjust enrichment, imposition of a constructive trust with

[1] These proceedings were initially filed in Delaware but were ultimately transferred to and with venue in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[2] The discovery relief requested in this Petition does not implicate the HCM bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, this Rule 202 Petition is not subject to removal because there is no amount in actual controversy and there is no cause of action currently asserted.

disgorgement, knowing participation in breaches of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with business expectancies.

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Respondents from which discovery is sought because both Farallon and Stonehill are doing business in Texas under Texas law including, without limitation, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §17.042. Consistent with due process, Respondents have established minimum contacts with Texas, and the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Respondents complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. HMIT's potential claims against Respondents arise from and/or relate to Farallon's and Stonehill's contacts in Texas. Respondents also purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law.

SUMMARY

7. HMIT seeks to investigate potential claims relating to the sale and transfer of large, unsecured creditors' claims in HCM's bankruptcy to special purpose entities affiliated with and/or controlled by Farallon and Stonehill (the "Claims"). Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill historically had and benefited from close relationships with James Seery ("Seery"), who was serving as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") at the time of the Claims purchases. Furthermore, still upon information and belief, because Farallon and Stonehill acquired or controlled the acquisition of the Claims under highly questionable

circumstances. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Respondents received material non-public information and were involved in insider trading in connection with the acquisition of the Claims.

8. The pre-suit discovery which HMIT seeks is directly relevant to potential claims, and it is clearly appropriate under Rule 202.1(b). HMIT anticipates the institution of a future lawsuit in which it may be a party due to its status as a stakeholder as former equity in HCM or in its current capacity as a Contingent Trust Interest holder, as well as under applicable statutory and common law principles relating to the rights of trust beneficiaries. In this context, HMIT may seek damages on behalf of itself or, alternatively, in a derivative capacity and without limitation, for damages or disgorgement of monies for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.

9. HMIT currently anticipates a potential lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill as defendants and, as such, Farallon and Stonehill have adverse interests to HMIT in connection with the anticipated lawsuit. The addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: **Farallon Capital Management LLC**, One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111, Telephone: 415-421-2132; **Stonehill Capital Management**, LLC, 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022, 212-739-7474 . Additionally, the following parties also may be parties with adverse interests in any potential lawsuit: **Muck Holdings LLC**, c/o Crowell & Moring LLP, Attn: Paul B. Haskel, 590 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022, 212-530-1823; **Jessup Holdings LLC**, c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan

LLP, Attn: John J. Mandler, 100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390, Orangeburg, NY 10962, 845-6339-7800.

BACKGROUND[3]

A. *Procedural Background*

10. On or about October 16, 2019, HCM filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2019.

11. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee's office appointed a four-member Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") consisting of three judgment creditors—the Redeemer Committee, which is a committee of investors in an HCM-affiliated fund known as the Crusader Fund that obtained an arbitration award against HCM in the hundreds of millions of dollars; Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (collectively "Acis"); and UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS") - and an unpaid vendor, Meta-E Discovery.

12. Following the venue transfer to Texas on December 27, 2019, HCM filed its *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary*

[3] All footnote references to evidence involve documents filed in the HCM bankruptcy proceedings and are cited by "Dkt." reference. HMIT asks the Court to take judicial notice of the documents identified by these docket entries.

Course ("HCM's Governance Motion").[4] On January 9, 2020, the Court signed an order approving HCM's Settlement Motion (the "Governance Order").[5]

13. As part of the Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the UCC's selections—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Strand Advisors, Inc., ("Strand Advisors") HCM's general partner. Following the approval of the Governance Order, the Board then appointed Seery as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") in place of the previous CEO.[6] Seery currently serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust (HCM's sole post-reorganization limited partner) and, upon information and belief, continues to serve as CEO of HCM following the effective date of the HCM bankruptcy reorganization plan ("Plan").[7]

B. Seery's Relationships with Stonehill and Farallon

14. Farallon and Stonehill are two capital management firms (similar to HCM) that, upon information belief, have long-standing relationships with Seery. Upon information and belief, they eventually participated in, directed and/or controlled the acquisition of hundreds of millions of dollars of unsecured Claims in HCM's bankruptcy on behalf of funds which they manage. It appears they did so without any meaningful

[4] Dkt. 281.
[5] Dkt. 339.
[6] Dkt. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.
[7] *See* Dkt. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

due diligence, much less reasonable due diligence, and *ostensibly* based their investment decisions only on Seery's input.

15. Upon information and belief, Seery historically has had a substantial business relationship with Farallon and he previously served as legal counsel to Farallon in other matters. Upon information and belief, Seery also has had a long-standing relationship with Stonehill. GCM Grosvenor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee[8] (an original member of the Unsecured Creditors Committee in HCM's bankruptcy). Upon information and belief, GCM Grosvenor is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. Grosvenor, through Redeemer, also played a large part in appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors and approved his appointment as HCM's CEO and CRO.

C. Claims Trading

16. Imbued with his powers as CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained bankruptcy court approval of settlements with Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and another major creditor, HarbourVest[9] (the "Settlements") (Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest are collectively the "Settling Parties"), resulting in the following allowed claims:[10]

[8] Declaration of John A. Morris [Dkt. 1090], Ex. 1, pp. 15.

[9] "HarbourVest" collectively refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P.

[10] Orders Approving Settlements [Dkt. 1273, Dkt. 1302, Dkt. 1788, Dkt. 2389].

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9
Redeemer	$137 mm	$0 mm
Acis	$23 mm	$0 mm
HarbourVest	$45 mm	$35 mm
UBS	$65 mm	$60 mm

17. Although these Settlements were achieved after years of hard-fought litigation,[11] each of the Settling Parties ***curiously*** sold their claims to Farallon or Stonehill (or affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after they obtained court approval of their Settlements. One of these "trades" occurred within just a few weeks before the Plan's Effective Date.[12] Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill coordinated and controlled the purchase of these Claims through special purpose entities, Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup") (collectively "SPEs").[13] Upon information and belief, both of these SPEs were created on the eve of the Claims purchases for the ostensible purpose of taking and holding title to the Claims.

18. Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill directed and controlled the investment of over $160 million dollars to acquire the Claims in the absence of any publicly available information that could rationally justify this substantial investment. These "trades" are even more surprising because, at the time of the confirmation of HCM's Plan, the Plan provided only pessimistic estimates that these Claims would ever receive full satisfaction:

[11] Order Confirming Plan, pp. 9-11.
[12] Dkt. 2697, 2698.
[13] *See* Notice of Removal [Dkt 2696], ¶ 4.

a. HCM's Disclosure Statement projected payment of 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11;[14]

   i. This meant that Farallon and Stonehill invested more than $163 million in Claims ***when the publicly available information indicated they would receive $0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par on their Class 8 Claims***.

b. In HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report, HCM reported that the amount of Class 8 claims expected to be paid dropped even further from 71% *to 54%* (down approximately $328.3 million);[15]

c. From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the valuation of HCM's assets dropped over $200 million from $566 million to $328.3 million;[16]

d. Despite the stark decline in the valuation of the HCM bankruptcy estate and reduction in percentage of Class 8 Claims expected to be satisfied, Stonehill, through Jessup, and Farallon, through Muck, nevertheless purchased the four largest bankruptcy claims from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively the "Claims") in April and August of 2021[17] in the combined amount of approximately $163 million; and

e. Upon information and belief:

   i. Stonehill, through an SPE, Jessup, acquired the Redeemer Committee's claim for approximately $78 million;[18]

[14] Dkt. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, Exh. A, p. 4.
[15] Dkt. 2949.
[16] Dkt 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.
[17] Notices of Transfers [Dkt. 2211, 2212, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2697, 2698].
[18] July 6, 2021 Letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.

ii. The $23 million Acis claim[19] was sold to Farallon/Muck for approximately $8 million;

iii. HarbourVest sold its combined approximately $80 million in claims to Farallon/Muck for approximately $27 million; and

iv. UBS sold its combined approximately $125 million in claims for approximately $50 million to both Stonehill/Jessup and Farallon/Muck ***at a time when the total projected payout was only approximately $35 million***.

19. In Q3 2021, just over $6 million of the projected $205 million available to satisfy general unsecured claims was disbursed.[20] No additional distributions were made to general unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost $250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—$45 million more than was *ever* projected.[21] According to HCM's Motion for Exit Financing,[22] and a recent motion filed by Dugaboy Investment Trust,[23] there remain ***substantial*** assets to be monetized for the benefit of HCM's creditors. Thus, upon information and belief, the funds managed by Stonehill and Farallon stand to realize significant profits on their Claims purchases. In turn, upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon will garner (or already have garnered) substantial fees – both base fees and performance fees – as the result of their acquiring and/or managing the purchase of the Claims.

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[19] Seery/HCM have argued that $10 million of the Acis claim is self-funding. Dkt. 1271, Transcript of Hearing on Motions to Compromise Controversy with Acis Capital Management [1087] and the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund [1089], p. 197.
[20] Dkt. 3200.
[21] Dkt. 3582.
[22] Dkt. 2229.
[23] Dkt. 3382.

D. ***Material Information is Not Disclosed***

20. Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3 requires debtors to "file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." No public reports required by Rule 2015.3 were filed. Seery testified they simply "fell through the cracks."[24]

21. As part of the HarbourVest Settlement, Seery negotiated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF for approximately $22.5 million as part of the transaction.[25] Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF's assets were comprised of debt and equity in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. ("MGM"). The HCLOF interest was not to be transferred to HCM for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to "to an entity to be designated by the Debtor"—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements.[26]

22. Six days prior to the filing of the motion seeking approval of the HarbourVest Settlement, upon information and belief, it appears that Seery may have acquired material non-public information regarding Amazon's now-consummated interest in acquiring MGM,[27] yet there is no record of Seery's disclosure of such

[24] Dkt. 1905, February 3, 2021 Hearing Transcript, 49:5-21.
[25] Dkt. 1625, p. 9, n. 5.
[26] Dkt. 1625.
[27] Dkt. 150-1.

information to the Court, HCM's creditors, or otherwise. Upon the receipt of this material non-public information, HMIT understands, upon information and belief, that MGM was supposed to be placed on HCM's "restricted list," but Seery nonetheless continued to move forward with deals that involved MGM assets.[28]

23. As HCM additionally held its own direct interest in MGM,[29] the value of MGM was of paramount importance to the value of HCM's bankruptcy estate. HMIT believes, upon information and belief, that Seery conveyed material non-public information regarding MGM to Stonehill and Farallon as inducement to purchase the Claims.

E. ***Seery's Compensation***

24. Upon information and belief, a component of Seery's compensation is a "success fee" that depends on the actual liquidation of HCM's bankruptcy estate assets versus the Plan projections. As current holders of the largest claims against the HCM estate, Muck and Jessup, the SPEs apparently created and controlled by Stonehill and Farallon, were installed as two of the three members of an Oversight Board in charge of monitoring the activities of HCM, as the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust.[30] Thus, along with a single independent restructuring professional, Farallon and

[28] *See* Dkt. 1625, Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, filed December 23, 2020
[29] Motion for Exit Financing.[Dkt.2229]
[30] Dkt. 2801.

Stonehill's affiliates oversee Seery's go-forward compensation, including any "success" fee.[31]

DISCOVERY REQUESTED

25. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Farallon and Stonehill received material non-public information in connection with, and as inducement for, the negotiation and sale of the claims to Farallon and Stonehill or its affiliated SPEs. Discovery is necessary to confirm or deny these allegations and expose potential abuses and unjust enrichment.

26. The requested discovery from Farallon is attached as Exhibit "A", and includes the deposition of one or more of its corporate representatives and the production of documents. The requested discovery from Stonehill is attached as Exhibit "B", and includes the deposition of Stonehill's corporate representative(s) and the production of documents.

27. Pursuant to Rule 202.2(g), the requested discovery will include matters that will allow HMIT to evaluate and determine, among other things:

a. The substance and types of information upon which Stonehill and Farallon relied in making their respective decisions to invest in or acquire the Claims;

b. Whether Farallon and Stonehill conducted due diligence, and the substance of any due diligence when evaluating the Claims;

[31] Claimant Trust Agreement [Dkt. 1656-2].

c. The extent to which Farallon and Stonehill controlled the SPEs, Muck and Jessup, in connection with the acquisition of the Claims;

d. The creation and organizational structure of Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup, as well as the purpose of creating Muck and Jessup as SPEs to hold the Claims;

e. Any internal valuations of Muck or Jessup's net asset value (NAV);

f. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to the Claims;

g. Any documents reflecting expected profits from the purchase of the Claims;

h. All communications between Farallon and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;

i. All communications between Stonehill and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;

j. All documents reflecting the expected payout on the Claims;

k. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and HarbourVest concerning the purchase of the Claims;

l. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and Acis regarding the purchase of the Claims;

m. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and UBS regarding the purchase of the Claims;

n. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and The Redeemer Committee regarding the purchase of the Claims;

o. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill regarding the purchase of the Claims;

p. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill and investors in their respective funds regarding purchase of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

q. All communications between Seery and Stonehill or Farallon regarding Seery's compensation as the Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

r. All documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting any agreements between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding compensation;

s. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Stonehill has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;

t. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Farallon has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;

u. All monies received by and distributed by Muck in connection with the Claims;

v. All monies received by and distributed by Jessup in connection with the Claims;

w. All documents reflecting whether Farallon is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Muck; and

x. All documents reflecting whether Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Jessup.

BENEFIT OUTWEIGHS THE BURDEN

28. The beneficial value of the requested discovery greatly outweighs any conceivable burden that could be placed on the Respondents. The requested information

also should be readily available because the Respondents have been engaged in the bankruptcy proceedings relating to the matters at issue for several years.

29. The important benefit associated with this requested discovery is also clear – it is reasonably calculated to determine whether the Respondents have unjustly garnered tens of millions of dollars of benefit based upon insider information. If this occurred, the monies received as a result of such conduct are properly subject to a constructive trust and disgorged. This would result in substantial funds available for other creditors, including those creditors in Class 10, which includes HMIT as a beneficiary. This significant benefit, in addition to the value of bringing proper light to the activities of Farallon and Stonehill as discussed in this petition, far outweighs any purported burden associated with requiring Respondents to sit for focused depositions concerning the topics and documents identified in Exhibits A and B.

REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORDER

30. After service of this Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on this Petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

31. Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust respectfully requests that the Court issue an order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 authorizing HMIT to take a deposition of designated representatives of Farallon Capital Management, LLC and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. HMIT additionally requests authorization to

issue subpoenas duces tecum compelling the production of documents in connection with the depositions in compliance with Tex. R. Civ. P. 205, and asks that the Court grant HMIT all such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY PLLC

By: */s/ Sawnie A. McEntire*

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Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared Mark Patrick, the affiant, whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath, affiant testified as follows:

> "My name is Mark Patrick. I am the Administrator of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, and I am authorized and capable of making this verification. I have read Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Verified Rule 202 Petition ("Petition"). The facts as stated in the Petition are true and correct based on my personal knowledge and review of relevant documents in the proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054, in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division ."

Mark Patrick

Sworn to and subscribed before me by Mark Patrick on January 20, 2023.

Notary Public in and for
the State of Texas

DEBORAH COLE
Notary ID #134079165
My Commission Expires
November 23, 2026

3116424.1

EXHIBIT "A"

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

TO: Farallon Capital Management, LLC, by and through its attorney of record _____.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199, 202, and 205, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") will take the deposition on oral examination under oath of Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon") on **_____, 2023 at _____ _.m.** before a notary public or other person authorized to administer a proper oath and will be recorded by stenographic means. The deposition will take place at _____ before a court reporter and videographer and will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition may also be recorded by non-stenographic (videotape) means.

Please take further notice that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b), Farallon is requested to designate one or more person(s) most knowledgeable and prepared to testify on behalf of Farallon concerning the topics identified on Exhibit "1", and to produce the documents described in Exhibit "2", attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January ___, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all known counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sawnie A. McEntire

EXHIBIT "A"
TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

For purposes of the attached Exhibits "1" and "2", the following rules and definitions shall apply.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. The terms "all" and "each" shall be construed as all and each.

2. The terms "all" and "any" shall be construed as all and any.

3. The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed either disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

4. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

DEFINITIONS

The terms used herein shall have the following meanings unless the context requires otherwise:

Acis. The term "Acis" refers to Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC, collectively.

Any and *all*. The terms "any" and "all" should be understood in either the most or the least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. "Any" includes the word "all," and "all" includes the term "any."

Bankruptcy Case. The term "Bankruptcy Case" shall mean the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy of Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Case No. 19-34054 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Claims. The term "Claims" shall mean the claims against Highland's Estate transferred to/acquired by Muck and/or Jessup as evidenced by Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 2215, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2697, 2698.

Communication. The term "communication" means any manner in which the mental processes of one individual are related to another, including without limitation, any verbal utterance, correspondence, **email, text message**, statement, transmission of information by computer or other device, letters, telegrams, telexes, cables, telephone

conversations, and records or notations made in connection therewith, notes, memoranda, sound recordings, electronic data storage devices, and any other reported, recorded or graphic matter or document relating to any exchange of information.

Concerning. The term "concerning" means reflecting, regarding, relating to, referring to, describing, evidencing, or constituting.

Document or documents. The terms "document" or "documents" shall mean anything that may be considered to be a document or tangible thing within the meaning of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, including (without limitation) Electronically Stored Information and the originals and all copies of any correspondence, memoranda, handwritten or other notes, letters, files, records, papers, drafts and prior versions, diaries, calendars, telephone or other message slips, invoices, files, statements, books, ledgers, journals, work sheets, inventories, accounts, calculations, computations, studies, reports, indices, summaries, facsimiles, telegrams, telecopied matter, publications, pamphlets, brochures, periodicals, sound recordings, surveys, statistical compilations, work papers, photographs, videos, videotapes, drawings, charts, graphs, models, contracts, illustrations, tabulations, records (including tape recordings and transcriptions thereof) of meetings, conferences and telephone or other conversations or communications, financial statements, photostats, e-mails, microfilm, microfiche, data sheets, data processing cards, computer tapes or printouts, disks, word processing or computer diskettes, computer software, source and object codes, computer programs and other writings, or recorded, transcribed, punched, taped and other written, printed, recorded, digital, or graphic matters and/or electronic data of any kind however produced or reproduced and maintained, prepared, received, or transmitted, including any reproductions or copies of documents which are not identical duplicates of the original and any reproduction or copies of documents of which the originals are not in your possession, custody or control.

Electronically Stored Information or ESI. The terms *"Electronically Stored Information" or "ESI" shall mean and include all documents, notes, photographs, images, digital, analog or other information stored in an electronic medium. Please produce all Documents/ESI in .TIF format (OCR text, single page). Please also provide a Summation Pro Load File (.dii) respect to all such Documents/ESI*

Estate. The term "Estate" means HCM's bankruptcy estate.

Farallon, *you*, and *your*. The terms "Farallon," "you," and "your" shall mean Farallon Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to, Muck Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees,

representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Farallon is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Farallon's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response.

Grosvenor. The term "Grosvenor" refers to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

HarbourVest. The term "HarbourVest" refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P., collectively.

HCM. The term "HCM" refers to debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Jessup. The term "Jessup" refers to Jessup Holdings, LLC.

MGM. The term "MGM" refers to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

Muck. The term "Muck" shall refer to Muck Holdings, LLC.

NAV. The term "NAV" means net asset value.

Oversight Board. The term "Oversight Board" refers to the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (a/k/a the Oversight Board of the Highland Claimant Trust) as identified in Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2801.

Person. The term "person" is defined as any natural person or any business, legal, or governmental entity or association.

Plan. The term "Plan" refers to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified).

Redeemer. The term "Redeemer" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds.

Seery. The term "Seery" refers to James P. ("Jim") Seery.

Settling Parties. The term "Settling Parties" refers to Redeemer, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS, collectively.

Stonehill. The term "Stonehill" refers to Stonehill Capital Management, LLC.

Strand. The term "Strand" refers to Strand Advisors, Inc.

UBS. The term "UBS" refers to UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively.

EXHIBIT "1"

TOPIC CATEGORIES

The witness(es) designated by Farallon to testify on its behalf is (are) requested to testify concerning the following Topic Categories:

a. The substance, types, and sources of information Farallon considered in making any decision to invest in any of the Claims on behalf of itself, Muck, and/or any fund with which Farallon is connected;

b. Whether Farallon conducted due diligence, and the substance and identification of any due diligence (including associated documents), when evaluating any of the Claims;

c. Any and all communications with James Dondero;

d. The extent to which Farallon was involved in creating and organizing Muck in connection with the acquisition of any of the Claims;

e. The organizational structure of Muck (including identification of all members, managing members), as well as the purpose for creating Muck, including, but not limited to, regarding holding title to any of the Claims;

f. Any internal valuations of Muck's Net Asset Value (NAV), as well as all assets owned by Muck;

g. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to any of the Claims;

h. Any documents reflecting profit forecasts relating to any of the Claims;

i. All communications between Farallon and Seery relating to any of the Claims;

j. All forecasted payout(s) on any of the Claims and all documents including or reflecting the same;

k. All communications between Farallon and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

l. Any negotiations between Farallon and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

m. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill regarding any of the Claims;

n. All communications between Farallon and any investors in any fund managed by Farallon regarding any of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

o. All communications between Seery and Farallon regarding Seery's compensation as Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

p. All agreements and other communications between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding Seery's compensation and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting such agreements and other communications;

q. All base fees and performance fees which Farallon has received or may receive in connection with the Claims and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting the same;

r. All monies received by Muck in connection with any of the Claims and any distributions made by Muck to any members of Muck relating to such Claims;

s. Whether Farallon is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Muck or otherwise holds a direct interest in Muck and all documents reflecting the same;

t. All communications between Farallon and any of the following entities concerning any of the Claims:

    i. UCC;

ii. Highland;

iii. Grosvenor;

iv. Muck;

v. the Oversight Board.

u. The sources of funds used by Muck for the acquisition of any of the Claims;

v. The terms and conditions of any agreements governing the transfers of any of the Claims to Muck;

w. Representations made by Farallon, Muck, Seery, and/or the Settling Parties in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims;

x. Farallon's valuation or evaluation of HCM's Estate;

y. Information learned regarding MGM during the pendency of the negotiations relating to the Claims;

z. The appointment of Muck to the Oversight Board;

aa. Farallon's historical relationships and business dealings with Seery and Grovesnor;

bb. Representations made to the bankruptcy court in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims to Muck.

EXHIBIT "2"

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1. Any and all documents created by, prepared for, or received by Farallon concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;
    d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;
    e. any due diligence undertaken by Farallon or Muck prior to acquiring the Claims;
    f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;
    g. the value of HCM's Estate;
    h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;
    i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;
    j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;
    k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and
    l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.
2. Any and all communications between Farallon, on the one hand, and any of the following individuals or entities: (i) Seery, (ii) the UCC, (iii) the Settling Parties, (iv) Stonehill, (vi) Grosvenor, or, (vii) the Oversight Board, concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;

d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;

e. any due diligence undertaken by Farallon or Muck prior to acquiring the Claims;

f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;

g. the value of HCM's Estate;

h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;

i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;

j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;

k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and

l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.

3. All correspondence and/or other documents by or between Farallon and/or Muck and any investors in any fund regarding the Claims and/or the acquisition or transfer of the Claims.

4. Any and all documents reflecting the sources of funding used by Muck to acquire any of the Claims.

5. Organizational and formation documents relating to Muck including, but not limited to, Muck's certificate of formation, company agreement, bylaws, and the identification of all members and managing members.

6. Company resolutions prepared by or on behalf of Muck approving the acquisition of any of the Claims.

7. Any and all documents reflecting any internal or external audits regarding Muck's NAV.

8. Agreements between Farallon and Muck regarding management, advisory, or other services provided to Muck by Farallon.

9. Any and all documents reviewed by Farallon as part of its evaluation and due diligence regarding any of the Claims.

10. Any documents reflecting any communications with James Dondero;

11. Annual fund audits relating to Muck.

12. Muck's NAV Statements.

13. Documents reflecting the fees or other compensation earned by Farallon in connection with the investment in, acquisition of, transfer of, and/or management of any of the Claims.

3116467

EXHIBIT "B"

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

TO: Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, by and through its attorney of record _____.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199, 202, and 205, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") will take the deposition on oral examination under oath of Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill") on **_____, 2023 at _____ _.m.** before a notary public or other person authorized to administer a proper oath and will be recorded by stenographic means. The deposition will take place at _____ before a court reporter and videographer and will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition may also be recorded by non-stenographic (videotape) means.

Please take further notice that, pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b), Stonehill is requested to designate one or more person(s) most knowledgeable and prepared to testify on behalf of Stonehill concerning the topics identified on Exhibit "1", and to produce the documents described in Exhibit "2", attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

Sawnie A. McEntire
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One Riverway, Suite 1800
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 960-7315
Facsimile: (713) 960-7347

Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January ___, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all known counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sawnie A. McEntire

EXHIBIT "A"
TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

For purposes of the attached Exhibits "1" and "2", the following rules and definitions shall apply.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

1. The terms "all" and "each" shall be construed as all and each.

2. The terms "all" and "any" shall be construed as all and any.

3. The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed either disjunctively or conjunctively as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

4. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

DEFINITIONS

The terms used herein shall have the following meanings unless the context requires otherwise:

Acis. The term "Acis" refers to Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC, collectively.

Any and *all*. The terms "any" and "all" should be understood in either the most or the least inclusive sense as necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be construed to be outside its scope. "Any" includes the word "all," and "all" includes the term "any."

Bankruptcy Case. The term "Bankruptcy Case" shall mean the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy of Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Case No. 19-34054 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Claims. The term "Claims" shall mean the claims against Highland's Estate transferred to/acquired by Muck and/or Jessup as evidenced by Bankruptcy Case Dkt. Nos. 2215, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2697, 2698.

Communication. The term "communication" means any manner in which the mental processes of one individual are related to another, including without limitation, any verbal utterance, correspondence, **email, text message**, statement, transmission of information by computer or other device, letters, telegrams, telexes, cables, telephone

conversations, and records or notations made in connection therewith, notes, memoranda, sound recordings, electronic data storage devices, and any other reported, recorded or graphic matter or document relating to any exchange of information.

Concerning. The term "concerning" means reflecting, regarding, relating to, referring to, describing, evidencing, or constituting.

Document or documents. The terms "document" or "documents" shall mean anything that may be considered to be a document or tangible thing within the meaning of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, including (without limitation) Electronically Stored Information and the originals and all copies of any correspondence, memoranda, handwritten or other notes, letters, files, records, papers, drafts and prior versions, diaries, calendars, telephone or other message slips, invoices, files, statements, books, ledgers, journals, work sheets, inventories, accounts, calculations, computations, studies, reports, indices, summaries, facsimiles, telegrams, telecopied matter, publications, pamphlets, brochures, periodicals, sound recordings, surveys, statistical compilations, work papers, photographs, videos, videotapes, drawings, charts, graphs, models, contracts, illustrations, tabulations, records (including tape recordings and transcriptions thereof) of meetings, conferences and telephone or other conversations or communications, financial statements, photostats, e-mails, microfilm, microfiche, data sheets, data processing cards, computer tapes or printouts, disks, word processing or computer diskettes, computer software, source and object codes, computer programs and other writings, or recorded, transcribed, punched, taped and other written, printed, recorded, digital, or graphic matters and/or electronic data of any kind however produced or reproduced and maintained, prepared, received, or transmitted, including any reproductions or copies of documents which are not identical duplicates of the original and any reproduction or copies of documents of which the originals are not in your possession, custody or control.

Electronically Stored Information or ESI. The terms *"Electronically Stored Information" or "ESI" shall mean and include all documents, notes, photographs, images, digital, analog or other information stored in an electronic medium. Please produce all Documents/ESI in .TIF format (OCR text, single page). Please also provide a Summation Pro Load File (.dii) respect to all such Documents/ESI*

Estate. The term "Estate" means HCM's bankruptcy estate.

Farallon. The term "Farallon," refers to Farallon Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to, Muck Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees, representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors,

assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Farallon is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Farallon's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response.

Grosvenor. The term "Grosvenor" refers to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

HarbourVest. The term "HarbourVest" refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P., collectively.

HCM. The term "HCM" refers to debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Jessup. The term "Jessup" refers to Jessup Holdings, LLC.

MGM. The term "MGM" refers to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.

Muck. The term "Muck" shall refer to Muck Holdings, LLC.

NAV. The term "NAV" means net asset value.

Oversight Board. The term "Oversight Board" refers to the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (a/k/a the Oversight Board of the Highland Claimant Trust) as identified in Bankruptcy Case Dkt. No. 2801.

Person. The term "person" is defined as any natural person or any business, legal, or governmental entity or association.

Plan. The term "Plan" refers to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified).

Redeemer. The term "Redeemer" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds.

Seery. The term "Seery" refers to James P. ("Jim") Seery.

Settling Parties. The term "Settling Parties" refers to Redeemer, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS, collectively.

Stonehill," "you," and "your." The terms "Stonehill", "you," and "your" shall mean Stonehill Capital Management, LLC and its corporate parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and entities it manages or operates, including, but not limited to Jessup Holdings, LLC. These terms also include any owners, partners, shareholders, agents, employees,

representatives, attorneys, predecessors, successors, assigns, related entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or entities in which Stonehill is a general partner or owns an entities' general partner, or anyone else acting on Stonehill's behalf, now or at any time relevant to the response .

Strand. The term "Strand" refers to Strand Advisors, Inc.

UBS. The term "UBS" refers to UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively.

EXHIBIT "1"

TOPIC CATEGORIES

The witness(es) designated by Stonehill to testify on its behalf is (are) requested to testify concerning the following Topic Categories:

a. The substance, types, and sources of information Stonehill considered in making any decision to invest in any of the Claims on behalf of itself, Jessup, and/or any fund with which Stonehill is connected;

b. Whether Stonehill conducted due diligence, and the substance and identification of any due diligence (including associated documents), when evaluating any of the Claims;

c. Any and all communications with James Dondero;

d. The extent to which Stonehill was involved in creating and organizing Jessup in connection with the acquisition of any of the Claims;

e. The organizational structure of Jessup (including identification of all members, managing members), as well as the purpose for creating Jessup, including, but not limited to, regarding holding title to any of the Claims;

f. Any internal valuations of Jessup's Net Asset Value (NAV), as well as all assets owned by Jessup;

g. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to any of the Claims;

h. Any documents reflecting profit forecasts relating to any of the Claims;

i. All communications between Stonehill and Seery relating to any of the Claims;

j. All forecasted payout(s) on any of the Claims and all documents including or reflecting the same;

k. All communications between Stonehill and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

l. Any negotiations between Stonehill and any of the Settling Parties concerning any of the Claims;

m. All communications between Stonehill and Farallon regarding any of the Claims;

n. All communications between Stonehill and any investors in any fund managed by Stonehill regarding any of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;

o. All communications between Seery and Stonehill regarding Seery's compensation as Trustee of the Claimant Trust;

p. All agreements and other communications between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding Seery's compensation and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting such agreements and other communications;

q. All base fees and performance fees which Stonehill has received or may receive in connection with the Claims and all documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting the same;

r. All monies received by Jessup in connection with any of the Claims and any distributions made by Jessup to any members of Jessup relating to such Claims;

s. Whether Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Jessup or otherwise holds a direct interest in Jessup and all documents reflecting the same;

t. All communications between Stonehill and any of the following entities concerning any of the Claims:

    i. UCC;

ii. Highland;

iii. Grosvenor;

iv. Jessup;

v. the Oversight Board.

u. The sources of funds used by Jessup for the acquisition of any of the Claims;

v. The terms and conditions of any agreements governing the transfers of any of the Claims to Jessup;

w. Representations made by Stonehill, Jessup, Seery, and/or the Settling Parties in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims;

x. Stonehill's valuation or evaluation of HCM's Estate;

y. Information learned regarding MGM during the pendency of the negotiations relating to the Claims;

z. The appointment of Jessup to the Oversight Board;

aa. Stonehill's historical relationships and business dealings with Seery and Grovesnor;

bb. Representations made to the bankruptcy court in connection with the transfer of any of the Claims to Jessup.

EXHIBIT "2"

DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1. Any and all documents created by, prepared for, or received by Stonehill concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;
    d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;
    e. any due diligence undertaken by Stonehill or Jessup prior to acquiring the Claims;
    f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;
    g. the value of HCM's Estate;
    h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;
    i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;
    j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;
    k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and
    l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.
2. Any and all communications between Stonehill, on the one hand, and any of the following individuals or entities: (i) Seery, (ii) the UCC, (iii) the Settling Parties, (iv) Farallon, (vi) Grosvenor, or, (vii) the Oversight Board, concerning any of the following topics:
    a. the transfer of the Claims;
    b. negotiation and/or consummation of any agreement regarding the transfer of the Claims;
    c. valuation of the Claims or the assets underlying the Claims;

d. promises and representations made in connection with the transfer of the Claims;

e. any due diligence undertaken by Stonehill or Jessup prior to acquiring the Claims;

f. consideration for the transfer of the Claims;

g. the value of HCM's Estate;

h. the projected future value of HCM's Estate;

i. past distributions and projected distributions from HCM's Estate;

j. compensation earned by or paid to Seery in connection with or relating to the Claims;

k. compensation earned by or paid to Seery for his roles as CEO, CRO, and Foreign Representative of HCM, Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust, and/or Independent Director of Strand; and

l. any future compensation to be paid to Seery as Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust.

3. All correspondence and/or other documents by or between Stonehill and/or Jessup and any investors in any fund regarding the Claims and/or the acquisition or transfer of the Claims.

4. Any and all documents reflecting the sources of funding used by Jessup to acquire any of the Claims.

5. Organizational and formation documents relating to Jessup including, but not limited to, Jessup's certificate of formation, company agreement, bylaws, and the identification of all members and managing members.

6. Company resolutions prepared by or on behalf of Jessup approving the acquisition of any of the Claims.

7. Any and all documents reflecting any internal or external audits regarding Jessup's NAV.

8. Agreements between Stonehill and Jessup regarding management, advisory, or other services provided to Jessup by Stonehill.

9. Any and all documents reviewed by Stonehill as part of its evaluation and due diligence regarding any of the Claims.

10. Any documents reflecting any communications with James Dondero;

11. Annual fund audits relating to Jessup.

12. Jessup's NAV Statements.

13. Documents reflecting the fees or other compensation earned by Stonehill in connection with the investment in, acquisition of, transfer of, and/or management of any of the Claims.

3116467

Automated Certificate of eService

This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Timothy Miller on behalf of Timothy Miller
Bar No. 24092839
tmiller@pmmlaw.com
Envelope ID: 72005122
Status as of 1/25/2023 10:01 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
Beatrice Candis		bcandis@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT
Gini Romero		gromero@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT
Roger LMcCleary		rmccleary@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT
Sawnie McEntire		smcentire@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT
Tim Miller		tmiller@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT
Ian Salzer	24110325	isalzer@pmmlaw.com	1/20/2023 4:29:44 PM	SENT

HMIT Exhibit 10

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Petitioner.	§	191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOTICE OF RELATED CASE

In accordance with Local Rules 1.06-1.08, respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill") file this notice of related of case, advising the Court that this Rule 202 case is related to an earlier-filed Rule 202 case styled *In Re: James Dondero*, No. DC-21-09534, filed by James Dondero in July 2021 in the 95th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, the Honorable Monica Purdy presiding.[1] Farallon and Stonehill respectfully contend that this Rule 202 case (i) should be dismissed, or (ii) consistent with the local rules, should be transferred to the 95th Judicial District Court.

[1] In accordance with Local Rule 1.08, a similar notice of related case is being filed contemporaneously in Cause No. DC-21-09534, in the 95th Judicial District Court.

Dated: February 16, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David C. Schulte

David C. Schulte
Texas Bar No. 24037456
david.schulte@hklaw.com
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
1722 Routh St., Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 964-9500 (telephone)
(214) 964-9501 (facsimile)

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. AND STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this document was served on all counsel of record through the Court's e-filing system on February 16, 2023, in accordance with Tex. R. Civ. P 21a.

/s/ David C. Schulte
David C. Schulte

HMIT Exhibit 11

REPORTER'S RECORD

VOLUME 1 OF 1

COURT OF APPEALS CAUSE NO. 00-00-00000-CV

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004-J

IN RE:	)	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	)	
	)	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	)	
INVESTMENT TRUST,	)	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
	)	
	)	
Petitioner.	)	191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S

RULE 202 PETITION

which was heard on

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

On the 22nd day of February 2023, the following proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the Honorable Gena Slaughter, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, and the following proceedings were had, to wit:

Proceedings reported by machine shorthand utilizing computer-assisted realtime transcription.

APPEARANCES:

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ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
Hunter Mountain
Investment Trust

and

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ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS
Farallon Capital
Management, LLC, and
Stonehill Capital
Management LLC

* * *

VOLUME 1 INDEX

PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S

RULE 202 PETITION

which was heard on

Wednesday, February 22, 2023

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS INDEX

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
P-1	Declaration of Mark Patrick	36	42	1
P1-A	Claimant Trust Agreement	36	42	1
P1-B	Division of Corporations - Filing	36	42	1
P1-C	Division of Corporations - Filing	36	42	1
P1-D	Order Approving Debtor's Settlement	36	42	1
P1-E	Order Approving Debtor's Settlement	36	42	1
P1-F	Order Approving Debtor's Settlement	36	42	1
P1-G	Order Approving Debtor's Settlement	36	42	1
P1-H	July 6, 2021, Alvarez & Marsal letter to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder	36 --	41 42	1 1
P1-I	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	36	42	1

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS INDEX continued

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
PI-J	Exhibit A Highland Capital Management, L.P. Disclaimer for Financial Projections	36	42	1
PI-K	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	36	42	1
P-2	Declaration of James Dondero	36	42	1
P2-1	Jim Dondero email dated Thursday, December 2020	36	(41)	1

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS INDEX

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
R-1	Cause No. DC-21-09543 Verified Amended Petition	41	44	1
R-2	Cause No. DC-21-09543 Order	41	44	1
R-3	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-4	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-5	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-6	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-7	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-8	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-9	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-10	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS INDEX continued

Number	Description	Offered	(Excluded) Admitted	Vol
R-11	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-12	United State Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-12239	41	44	1
R-13	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-14	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-15	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-16	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1
R-17	United States Bankruptcy Court Case No. 19-34054	41	44	1

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Counsel.

We are here in DC-23-01004, In re: Hunter Mountain Investment Trust.

And who is here for the plaintiff?

MR. McENTIRE: For the petitioner, Your Honor, Sawnie McEntire and my partner Roger McCleary.

THE COURT: Okay. And then for Farallon?

MR. SCHULTE: My name is David Schulte and I represent both of the respondents. It's Farallon Capital Management, LLC, and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC.

THE COURT: We are here today on a request for a 202 petition. I know one of the issues is the related suit, but let's just plow into it and we'll go from there.

Okay. Counsel?

MR. McENTIRE: May I approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. McENTIRE: And I've given Mr. Schulte copies of all these materials.

In the interest of time, I have all the key pleadings here, which I will give you a copy of.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. McENTIRE: And this is the evidentiary submission that we submitted about a week ago.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. McENTIRE: To the extent you are interested, it is cross-referenced by exhibit number to the references in our petition to the docket in the bankruptcy court.
THE COURT: I appreciate that. Otherwise, I go hunting for stuff.
MR. McENTIRE: This is a PowerPoint.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. McENTIRE: And, lastly, a proposed order.
THE COURT: Wonderful.
MR. McENTIRE: And Mr. Schulte has copies of it all.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. McENTIRE: May I proceed, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. McENTIRE: All right. Your Honor, we are here for leave of court to conduct discovery under Rule 202 to investigate potential claims.
The issue before the court is not whether we have an actual claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We do not even need to state a cause of action. It is simply the investigation of potential claims.

Mr. Mark Patrick is here with us today. He's behind me. Mr. Patrick is the administrator of Hunter Mountain, which is a Delaware trust.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He is the manager of Rand Advisors, which is also an investment manager of the trust. And, in effect, for all intents and purposes, Mr. Patrick manages the assets of the trust on a daily basis.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: There are potential claims that we're investigating. And I'll go through some of these because I know opposing counsel has raised standing issues.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I think we can address all those standing issues.

Insider trading is in itself a wrong as recognized by courts. And I'll refer you to the opinions. We believe there's a breach of fiduciary duties, and that may take a little explanation.

At the time that Farallon and Stonehill acquired these claims, through their special purpose entities Muck and Jessup, they were outsiders.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: But by acquiring the information in the manner in which we believe they did, they became insiders. And when they became insiders, under relevant authorities they owe fiduciary duties.

And at the time they acquired the claims, my client Hunter Mountain Investment Trust was the 99.5 percent interest holder or stakeholder in Highland Capital.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We also believe a knowing participation of breach of fiduciary duties under another name, aiding and abetting. But Texas recognizes it as knowing participation. Unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and tortious interference.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Farallon and Stonehill are effectively hedge funds. And so is Highland Capital.

They were created. They actually did create Muck and Jessup. Those are the two entities that actually are titled with the claims. They acquired it literally days before the transfers.

So the reason we're focusing our discovery effort on Farallon and Stonehill, we are confident that any meaningful discovery -- emails, letters, correspondence, document drafts, things of that nature -- probably predated the existence of Muck and Jessup.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: That's why we're focusing our discovery effort on Farallon and on Stonehill.

But, needless to say, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck and Jessup, having all participated in this acquisition, they're all insiders for purposes of assuming fiduciary duties.

And as I said, outsiders become insiders under the relevant authority. And one key case is the Washington Mutual case --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: -- which we cited in our materials.

I would also just let you know, this is not something in total isolation. We understand we're not privy to the details. But we understand the Texas State Security Board also has an open investigation that has not been closed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And that's by way of background.

202 allows presuit discovery for a couple of reasons. And I won't belabor the point. One is to investigate potential claims.

There is no issue of notice or service here. There's no issue of personal jurisdiction. Farallon and Stonehill made a general appearance.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: There's no issue concerning subject-matter jurisdiction. They actually concede that the court has jurisdiction on page 8 of their response.

The court's inquiry today is a limited judicial inquiry. There are really two avenues which I'll explain, but, first, I think the salient avenue is does the benefit of the discovery outweigh the burden.

And I think as I will hopefully demonstrate, I think that we clearly do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The merits of a potential claim, the case law is clear, is not before the court.

Much of their brief and their response is devoted to trying to attack the fact that there is no duty or things such as standing.

But the reality of it is we are not required to actually prove up a cause of action to this court although I think I can. In this process, I probably certainly can identify a potential cause of action. That's not our obligation to carry our burden.

There was an issue about timely submission of evidence they raised in a footnote, but I think that was resolved before the court took the bench.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I've handed you a binder with Mr. Mark Patrick's affidavit and Jim Dondero's affidavit.

As I understand it, correct me if I'm wrong, you're not objecting to the submission of that evidence. Is that correct?

MR. SCHULTE: Almost.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, I do object to the two declarations that were submitted I believe five days before the hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: As Your Honor is aware, Rule 202 contemplates 15 days' notice. The petition itself was required to be verified. It was verified and then new substance was added by way of these

declarations five days before the hearing.

And so we would argue that that has the effect of amending or supplementing the petition within that 15-day notice period.

All that said, I don't have any issue with the majority of the documents attached to Mr. Patrick's declaration.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So I do object on the grounds of hearsay and timeliness to the declarations.

On Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's declaration, I object to that document on the grounds of hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay. Which one?

MR. SCHULTE: Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's declaration on the basis of hearsay.

All the other documents are I believe file-stamped copies of the pleadings filed in the bankruptcy, which I don't have any issue with that.

And then the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's declaration is an email that's objected to on the basis of hearsay. And it hasn't been proven up as a business record or any other way that will get past hearsay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So those are the limited objections I have to what's in that filing, Your Honor.

MR. McENTIRE: And I will address those objections. And we're prepared to put Mr. Patrick on the stand, if necessary.

I would point out that the case law is very clear that there's no 15-day rule here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We have asked the court to take judicial notice of all of our evidence in our petition itself.

The 15 days is the amount of time you have to give notice before the hearing --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: -- but the case law is clear that I can put live testimony on, I can put affidavit testimony on.

THE COURT: This is an evidentiary hearing.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

And that includes affidavits. And affidavits are routinely accepted in these types of proceedings and I have the case law I can cite to the court.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, in contrast, I think if this were, for example, an injunction hearing, I don't believe that an affidavit would be

the substitute in an injunction hearing for live testimony.

And so if this is an evidentiary standard, I don't think that these affidavits should come in for the truth of the matter asserted. The witnesses should testify to the facts that they want to prove up.

MR. McENTIRE: I could give the court a cite.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Glassdoor, Inc. versus Andra Group.

THE COURT: What was the name of it?

MR. McENTIRE: Glassdoor, Inc. versus Andra Group. It is 560 S.W.3d 281. It specifically addresses the use and relies upon affidavits in the record for purposes of a Rule 202.

So, with that said, I will address it in more detail in a moment. The evidentiary rule, to be clear, is it has to be supported by evidence. Seven days was the date that I picked because it was well in advance. It's the standard rule that's used for discovery issues. It's seven days before a hearing.

So I picked it. He's had it for seven days. He's never filed any written objections to my evidence. None.

And under the Local Rules I would think he would have objected within three business days. He did not do that, and so I'm a little surprised by the objection.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: All right. We do have copies of all the certified records, but I gave you the agenda on that. And we talked about the two declarations.

So the limited judicial inquiry is the only issue before the district court. It's whether or not to allow the discovery, not the merits of any claim yea or nay.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: There's no need for us to even plead a cause of action, although we did.

Mr. Schulte goes to great length in his response to take issue with our cause of action, suggesting we had none. We do. But we're not even under an obligation to plead it; nevertheless, we did.

This is actually a two-part test. The first part was allowing the petitioner -- in this case, Hunter Mountain -- to take the requested deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice, or the likely benefit outweighs the burden. Both apply here.

These trades took place in April of 2021, three of the four. The fourth I think took place in the summer.

And our goal is to obtain the discovery in a timely manner so we do not have any argument, valid or invalid, that there's a limitations issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And so any further delay, such as transferring this to another court or back to the bankruptcy court, which it does not have jurisdiction, would cause tremendous delay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Hunter Mountain, a little bit of background. It is an investment trust. When it has money, it participates directly in funding the Dallas Foundation --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: -- which is a very I think well-respected and recognized charitable foundation.

Certain individuals and pastors from various churches are actually here because Hunter Mountain indirectly, but ultimately, provides a significant source of funding for their outreach programs and their charitable functions and programs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The empirical evidence in the documents that are before the court, regardless of what's in the affidavits, just screams that there was no due diligence here.

Now, we know in Mr. Dondero's affidavit he had a conversation with representatives of Farallon, which would be admissions against interest. They're admissions basically against interest that they effectively did no due diligence.

Yet we believe, upon information and belief, that they invested over $167 million. There are two sets of claims. There's a Class 8 claim and a Class 9 creditor claim.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Their expectations at the time that they acquired these claims was that Class 9 would get zero recovery.

So who spends $167 million when their expectation on return of investment is zero? Who spends $167 million even in Class 8 when the expected return is just 71 percent and is actually declining? And I think it's actually admitted in the affidavit that Mr. Dondero provided.

So without being hyperbolic or exaggerating, the data that was available publicly

was extremely pessimistic and doubtful that there would be any recovery.

We have direct information -- admissions, frankly -- that Farallon had access to non-public material, non-public information. And that was the fact that MGM Studios was up for sale.

Mr. Dondero was on the board of directors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He communicated, because of his responsibilities, this information to Mr. Seery.

And Mr. Seery, apparently, would have been restricted. He couldn't use it or distribute it.

THE COURT: Right.

And I don't know a lot about securities law but, yeah, that would be insider information. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes.

And it appears from the affidavit that Mr. Dondero submitted that Farallon was aware of the information before the sale closed, before they closed their acquisitions.

And Mr. Dondero asked the question are you willing to even sell your claims and they said no. Or even 30 percent more and they said no. We're told that they're going to be very valuable.

Well, no one else had this information, so we have a problem here that we have two outsiders who are now insiders. They've acquired potentially very valuable claims with the sale of MGM.

They also acquired information concerning the portfolios of these companies over which Highland Capital managed and had ownership interests, so we're talking about having access to information that any other bidder or suitor would not have.

So this is how they were divided up. $270 million in Class 8. Each of the creditors right here are the unsecured creditors who sold. They were the sellers.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And these are the claims in the Class 9.

So you have $95 million in Class 9 claims that are being acquired when the expectation is that there will be zero return on investment. You have $270 million where the expectation was extremely low and pessimistic.

And here are the documents. And Mr. Schulte has not objected to these. This particular document is Exhibit 1-J to Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: This came out of the plan. So when the bankruptcy plan was confirmed in February 2021, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck and Jessup, the latter two weren't even in existence.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Farallon and Stonehill were complete strangers to the bankruptcy proceedings, yet they come in in the wake of this information and they invest tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars with no apparent due diligence.

The situation gets even worse. And this is Exhibit 1-I to Mr. Patrick's affidavit. And as I understand, Mr. Schulte does not object to these documents. It's declining. And then, suddenly, they're in the money.

And at the end of the third quarter last year, they're already making 255 million bucks. And that's a far cry from the original investment. This is for both Class 8 and Class 9.

So Mr. Patrick states the purpose of this is to seek cancellation. Another word for it in bankruptcy-ese would be disallowance. But the cancellation of these claims and disgorgement.

If these are ill-gotten gains, regardless of the rubric or the monicker that you place on it --

breach of fiduciary duty as insiders, aiding and abetting or knowing participation in fiduciary duties, because a lot of people have fiduciary duties on this stuff. No matter what you call it, disgorgement is a remedy.

Wrongdoers should not be entitled to profit from their wrongdoing.

Mr. Schulte makes a big point that we can't prove damages. Well, first of all, I don't agree with the conclusion.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: But even if he was right, disgorgement is a proxy for damages. And we have an entitlement and a right to explore how much they have actually received, when did they receive it.

The weathervane is tilting in one direction here, Judge.

Clearly, there is a creditor trust agreement. That's a very important document. It spells out rights and obligations. It's part of the plan.

There's a waterfall. And on page 27 of the creditor trust agreement a waterfall is exactly what it suggests. You have one bucket gets full, you go to the next bucket all the way down.

THE COURT: Class 1 or tier 1.

I can't remember the category. I don't do bankruptcy. But, yeah, those get paid, then the next level, then the next level.

So by the time you get down to level 10, which I think is what Hunter Mountain was, theoretically, there wouldn't have been anything left.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

But here, if Class 8 and Class 9 -- and I will say the big elephant in those two classes are Farallon and Stonehill or their special purpose entity bucket Jessup -- they have 95 percent of that category.

And suddenly they're not entitled to keep what they've got, and suddenly there's a disallowance, or suddenly a cancellation regardless of the theory or the cause of action -- and we have several avenues here -- a lot of money is going to flow into the coffers of Hunter Mountain, and a lot of money will flow into the Dallas Foundation, and a lot of money will flow into the coffers of charities.

So there is standing here. Standing requires the existence of a duty. We think we have duties.

And a concrete injury. And if these claims were manipulated, we have a concrete injury and our proxy is disgorgement.

We've been deprived of an opportunity to share in category 10 or as we just described it in the waterfall under the creditor trust agreement.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Their burden is to show that this discovery has no benefit. No. That's my burden to show benefit. But their burden would be to show that it's overly burdensome to them.

And I find that difficult to understand since part of their response is devoted to the fact that, hey, judge in Dallas County, you should turn this over to Judge Jernigan in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Because it's bankruptcy, you know.

MR. McENTIRE: In bankruptcy, that's their invitation.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Well, if they're inviting us to go do the discovery in bankruptcy court, it doesn't seem to be that burdensome because it's going to be the same discovery.

And, by the way, Judge Jernigan actually does not have jurisdiction over these proceedings. The other earlier proceeding, as you know, they attempted to remove it to her court and it was remanded.

Clearly, she does not have jurisdiction.

The problem with bankruptcy involved, in addition, if I wanted to do Rule 2004 discovery like they're suggesting, that's their invitation. They would like you to push us down the road.

Well, we can't afford to push it down the road. Because if they push it down the road, I've got to go file a motion with Judge Jernigan, get leave to issue subpoenas.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: They have 14 days to file a motion to quash, then I have to file another motion. And it's 21 days before their response is even filed. And there's another 14 or 15 days before the reply is filed. We're looking at 60, 70 days. And that's one of the reasons we selected this procedure.

And, by the way, you hear the phrase forum shopping a lot. Well, without engaging in the negative inference that that term suggests, a plaintiff, a petitioner, has the right to select its venue for a variety of reasons.

Our venue is the state district courts of Texas because it has an accelerated procedure. And that's why we're here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: I've identified the potential causes of action. Entities or people that breach fiduciary duties and receive ill-gotten gains a constructive trust may be imposed, disgorgement. Then we do run into bankruptcy concepts.

But it's important to know that some of these are not bankruptcy. Some of these are common law.

I suggest to the court, I don't have to go get Judge Jernigan's permission to sue Farallon or Stonehill for breach of fiduciary duties. I don't have to get her permission to sue for knowing participation.

If I'm actually looking for equitable disallowance, probably, maybe. But I can do the discovery here and then make that decision whether I need to go back to bankruptcy court.

I'm not foolish. I'm not going to run afoul of Judge Jernigan's orders. If I have to go back to Judge Jernigan to get permission, I will do it.

THE COURT: Right. Because only an idiot runs afoul of the bankruptcy court.

MR. McENTIRE: Hopefully, I'm not that.

So I clearly understand what both my ethical and lawyer obligations are. And I'm not going to run afoul of any court orders.

But some of these remedies don't require

an overview by Judge Jernigan or the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: They have a duty not to commit fraud, whether it's commit fraud against us or commit fraud against the estate.

They have a duty not to interfere with the expectancies that we have as a B/C beneficiary. That's a code name for a former Class 10 creditor.

They have a duty not to trade on inside information, and that's the Washington Mutual case.

And I've just already mentioned that because they were outsiders, they're insiders now.

These are their arguments. Our evidence is timely. It's not untimely. It's not speculative. It's not speculative because the events have already taken place. I'm not talking about something hypothetical.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: My remedy flows from that.

So we're not projecting that I might have a claim later on. I have a claim today. If I have a claim today, I have it today. I have it and I want to confirm it by this discovery. Because their wrongdoing has already taken place, it's not hypothetical, it's not futuristic, it's already occurred.

When they say they have no duty to us, they're just wrong. They have duties not to breach fiduciary duties. We have direct standing I believe to bring a claim in that regard.

We have a right to bring direct standing under the Washington Mutual case, which I'll discuss.

And we also have a right to bring a derivative action.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I notice that they made a comment about that in their response. But I can sue individually.

And I can also bring an action in the alternative as a derivative action for the estate. And these are all valid claims for the estate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Transfer. This is not a related case because it's not the litigation.

So if you just go to the very first instance and you look at the Local Rule, it talks about litigation and causes of action.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: We don't have a cause of action. We're not asserting one in this petition. So this is not a related case that falls within the

four corners of the Local Rule.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the thing is it's still a related case. Like if you file a 202 and then you file a lawsuit, that would be considered related.

I looked at it and you're right. Technically, it's different parties. I'll just say it's a grey zone at best.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

This is not a lawsuit in terms of causes of action. It might be a related case if Mr. Dondero had come in and filed a lawsuit. That would be a related case. Mr. Dondero is not involved in this process, other than as a fact witness.

These are all the evidentiary issues that perhaps he's raised. Live testimony, affidavit testimony is admissible.

The court considered numerous affidavits filed with the court. And that's as recently as 2017. These are all good cases, good law.

Equitable disallowance. It's kind of a fuzzy image. This is a bankruptcy court case, but this is simply to underscore the fact that in addition to my common law remedies there is a very substantial remedy in bankruptcy court.

It's not one I necessarily have to pursue, but if I wanted to I could. But what it does do is it helps to find some duties.

And here, the court has the right to disallow a claim on equitable grounds in extreme instances, perhaps very rare, where it is necessary as a remedy. And they did it in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: This is simply an analogy to securities fraud and the 10b-5 statute.

Insiders of a corporation are not limited to officers and directors, but may include temporary insiders who have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.

Well, what about the MGM stock? The court finds that the Equity Committee -- so here's the equity -- has stated a colorable claim. We were 99.5 percent equity.

The Equity Committee has stated a colorable claim that the settlement noteholders became temporary insiders because they acquired information that was not of public knowledge in connection with their acquisition.

And allowed them to participate in negotiations with JPMC -- JPMorgan Chase -- for the shared goal of reaching a settlement.

So these were outsiders that suddenly became temporary insiders because of access to inside information.

This is not a new concept. It comes from the United States Supreme Court. Fiduciaries cannot utilize inside information.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And we believe we have enough before the court to support and justify a further investigation that this may have occurred.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Now, not a related case. The Jim Dondero case is actually closed.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: And I'll be frank with you. In all candor, I never thought this was a possible related case.

THE COURT: I mean, we're talking about the same events, but there are differences, I agree.

MR. McENTIRE: We're talking about one similar event dealing with Farallon. Other events are different.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: So we have different dates.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Different parties on the petitioner's side, different law firms.

The only common party is Farallon. Alvarez & Marsal are not parties to this but Stonehill is. Stonehill was not a party to the prior proceedings.

And the standing is manifest. With no criticism of Mr. Dondero's lawyer, I searched in his argument where he was articulating standing.

And without going further, I will tell you I think our standing is clear. We're in the money.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We are in the money if there's a disgorgement or a disallowance.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: We have all types of claims, including insider trading and a creation of fiduciary duties.

Our remedies, as far as I can tell, he didn't identify any. We have several. Disgorgement, disallowance, subordination, a variety. And damages.

So we suggest strongly that it is not a related case.

And I must tell you, the reference to say send this to bankruptcy court or defer to the bankruptcy court or send us over to Judge Purdy, with all due respect to opposing counsel, it's really just a delay mechanism.

And what they're seeking to do through their invective, their criticisms, the references to these other courts, is seeking an opportunity to push us down the road and put us in a bad position potentially and a not enviable position in connection with statute of limitations.

Your Honor, we would offer the binder of exhibits that we submitted on February 15, 2022, including the affidavits and all the attached exhibits.

I would ask the court to take judicial notice of all the exhibits that we referred to in our petition, which I think is appropriate since we were specifying with particularity what we were requesting the court to take judicial notice of. And that's the large index, that's the list.

THE COURT: Obviously, I can take judicial notice of any kind of court pleadings, whether they're state or federal.

MR. McENTIRE: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's clear.

MR. McENTIRE: We would offer both affidavits and all the attachments into evidence at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have exhibit numbers for them?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes. It's Exhibit 1 with attachments. 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F and then Exhibit 1-G, Exhibit 1-H, Exhibit 1-J, Exhibit 1-K.

Everything in the binder, Your Honor. It's Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 with the attachments.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I believe they're all identified. I can put a sticker on them, if you'd like.

THE COURT: Yeah. To admit them, it will need a sticker.

So I'm going to hold off on admitting them for just a minute because I do want to hear his objections and then we can go back to it. So just make sure we do that.

I'm not trying to not admit them, but I do want to let him have his objections.

Okay. Anything else, Counsel?

MR. McENTIRE: That's all I have right now, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?

MR. SCHULTE: Should I start with those exhibits, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Why don't you do that. That's probably the easiest way.

MR. SCHULTE: In light of the authorities that Mr. McEntire shared about the affidavits, I'll withdraw the objections to the affidavits or the declarations.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: I'm taking Mr. McEntire's word that those cases say what he says they say.

THE COURT: I'll tell you because 202 is not a lawsuit, you don't necessarily have a right to cross-examine, et cetera. So, yeah, affidavits are frequently used on 202s.

MR. SCHULTE: And that's fine, Your Honor. I'll take Mr. McEntire's word what those cases say.

But I will maintain the objection to Exhibit H -- it's the declaration of Mr. Patrick -- on the grounds of hearsay. That is not a court record or a file-stamped pleading from federal or state court. It's just a letter. So that's hearsay. And it hasn't been properly authenticated.

The other issue is the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's declaration. That's just an email

from Mr. Dondero, so I object on the grounds of hearsay.

THE COURT: Mr. McEntire, what's your response specifically to Exhibit H as attached to the Patrick declaration and then the attachment to the Dondero declaration?

MR. McENTIRE: Exhibit H to Mr. Patrick's affidavit would be hearsay, but there's an exception that it's not controversial.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And there's no indication that there's any challenge of the reliability of the document.

THE COURT: What is the exhibit? I'm trying to pull it up. Sorry.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Exhibit 1-H. It is a letter from Alvarez & Marsal simply indicating what they paid for the claim.

THE COURT: Is it the July 6th, 2021, letter?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've got it.

MR. McENTIRE: And the exhibit to Mr. Dondero's is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, just the state of mind of Farallon.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: He has proved it up that it's authentic. It's a true and accurate copy.

And it goes to the state of mind of Farallon and it goes to the state of mind of Mr. Seery as well who are basically individuals who are trading on inside information.

And Mr. Seery would not have known about the MGM sale but for that email. And Farallon and Stonehill would not know about MGM but for Mr. Seery.

THE COURT: Okay. So the response to hearsay is that it goes to state of mind.

MR. McENTIRE: It goes to state of mind.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel. How do you respond to that?

MR. SCHULTE: I'll start with the last one, Your Honor. I think that's the definition of hearsay, is that you're purporting to establish the state of mind of the parties who are not before the court.

It's been emphasized that Mr. Dondero has no relation to HMIT. And none of the recipients of the email are parties to this proceeding.

This purports to establish the state of mind of Mr. Seery, who is not before the court, and the state of mind of Farallon, just based on the say so of

Mr. Dondero in this email. That's hearsay.

And as for the first letter, this is a letter on the letterhead of A&M which, by the way, is one of the parties in the Dondero Rule 202 petition.

And it's not on the letterhead of any of the parties to this case so the letter isn't properly authenticated.

And I'm not aware of the not controversial exception to hearsay.

THE COURT: Well, there is a thing that talks about if you're admitting something that's just not controverted. Right? It's everybody agrees "X" happened. We're just admitting evidence to have that. So what this basically is is just showing the claim of the funds.

And I guess my question is what's the objection. Is there an objection to the substance of it?

MR. SCHULTE: I don't think there's any dispute that Farallon and Stonehill, through their respective special purpose entities, purchased the claims that are at issue here.

And if that's the sole purpose of admitting this letter into evidence, I don't think that's a matter that's genuinely in dispute.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So if that's the only issue as raised by this letter, I don't know that there's a dispute there.

THE COURT: Right. Well, that's the whole thing.

MR. McENTIRE: I think we're almost solving the issue on the fact of how much they paid, $75 million.

THE COURT: Okay. So I will sustain the objection to the email to Mr. Dondero's declaration, Exhibit P 2-1.

I am going to overrule the objection to -- I don't know what the letter is of the attachment.

MR. McENTIRE: It's Exhibit P 1-H to Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Correct. Sorry.

Okay, Counsel. If you'll proceed.

MR. SCHULTE: May I approach the bench, Your Honor? I have a binder of exhibits also.

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. SCHULTE: These have all been marked with exhibit stickers already. There are tabs for each of the exhibits. They're marked R1 through 17, I believe. And "R," of course, stands for Respondents.

THE COURT: I take the shortcut of calling everybody "Plaintiff" and "Defendant" just because I'm so used to using that language in court.

But I do agree. It's Petitioner and Respondent. You're not technically a defendant.

Okay. So, first of all, I'm going to admit Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, with the sole exception of the email to Mr. Dondero's declaration that I sustained.

And then are there objections to the respondent's exhibits?

MR. McENTIRE: Very few.

I object to Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2 as irrelevant.

THE COURT: What's the objection to 1?

MR. McENTIRE: They're offering the order from Judge Purdy.

THE COURT: Okay. I can take judicial notice of that. I mean, it's a court record from Dallas County. So I don't think that that's particularly relevant.

To be bluntly honest, I looked at it last night. Right? Because of the issue that there's a related case, I pulled that file too and looked at everything.

So I can take judicial notice of that. Whether it's relevant or not, I can look at it. And, obviously, if it's not relevant, I'll disregard it.

MR. McENTIRE: Fair enough.

THE COURT: I'll overrule that objection.

What's next?

MR. McENTIRE: The only other objections are Exhibit 12 and 13. I just don't know what they are or for what purpose they would be offered.

THE COURT: Okay. So 12 is a notice of appearance and request for service in the bankruptcy court on behalf of Hunter Mountain Trust.

So what's the issue, Counsel?

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, these are notices of appearance filed by Hunter Mountain in the bankruptcy court.

And the purpose of these notices is simply to show -- and maybe this is not genuinely in dispute -- that Hunter Mountain, through its counsel, would have received notice of all the activity that was going on in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: It's the same issue I've got with everything that Plaintiff submitted. It's a bankruptcy pleading. I can take notice of it. If it's irrelevant, I'll disregard it.

So I'll overrule that objection.

And then what's 13?

MR. McENTIRE: The same objection.

THE COURT: I'll overrule it because again, I can take judicial notice of those.

MR. McENTIRE: No other objections, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 17 are so admitted.

MR. SCHULTE: May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MR. SCHULTE: HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- races into this court seeking extensive and burdensome presuit discovery about claims trading that took place in the Highland bankruptcy two years ago.

Mr. McEntire has talked about the harm that would result from delay if a different court were to consider this request for presuit discovery. That is a function of waiting two years after the subject claims transfers to seek relief in this court.

The exact same allegations of claims trading and misconduct by Jim Seery -- those allegations are not on the slides that you looked at. But those allegations are common in Mr. Dondero's Rule 202 petition and this petition.

THE COURT: Right. They're common.

I know you make the allegation that Dondero is related to Hunter Mountain, but I guess I don't have any evidence of that.

Or do you have evidence of that? Because otherwise, while it involves some of the same issues in the sense of the underlying facts, technically Farallon is the common respondent.

But there's a different respondent and there's a different petitioner in that case.

MR. SCHULTE: Yes. That's true, Your Honor. And we've said that on information and belief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: That's our suspicion.

We believe that to be the case, but I don't have evidence of it. I didn't hear a denial of it, but, nevertheless, that is where things stand.

But what's important about the case is even if this court and Judge Purdy determined that the cases are not related, what is important is that the same allegations related to this claims trading and the same allegations of inside information being shared by Mr. Seery, those were front and center in the July 2021 petition filed by Mr. Dondero.

Even if there are other dissimilarities between the cases, those are issues that are common.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And it's important to note that as HMIT has filed this petition, it has glossed over issues of its own standing and the assertion of viable claims that will justify this discovery.

Now, I know that HMIT has cited these cases that say, Your Honor, I don't have to state a really specific claim right now.

But you do have to articulate some ground for relief, some theory, that would justify the expense and the burden that you're trying to put the respondents to in responding to all this discovery.

And this isn't simple discovery. We're talking about deposition topics with I believe 29 topics each and 13 sets of really broad discovery requests with a bunch of subcategories.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We're not talking about some minimal burden here. This is an intrusion into entities that are not parties to a lawsuit, but rather this investigation.

And HMIT has ignored that there is a specific mechanism in the bankruptcy court that's

available to it under federal bankruptcy Rule 2004 and that the substance of HMIT's petition, which is claims trading and bankruptcy, falls squarely within the expertise of Judge Jernigan, the presiding bankruptcy judge.

THE COURT: And I agree. You could do this in federal court. But there's a lot of things that can be done in state court or done in federal court.

They get to choose the method of getting the information, so why should I say, theoretically, yes, this is a good thing, I should do it, but, hey, send it to bankruptcy. Why?

MR. SCHULTE: The bankruptcy judge has actually answered that question directly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: It is true, as HMIT has said, the federal bankruptcy court doesn't have jurisdiction over a Rule 202 proceeding. That's not in dispute.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We tried to remove the last case to federal bankruptcy court and it was a state claim.

But what the bankruptcy judge pointed out

when she remanded the case back to Judge Purdy, who ended up dismissing Dondero's petition, is it pointed out, one, there's this mechanism in bankruptcy where they can do the exact same thing, Rule 2004.

And the bankruptcy judge pointed out that it is in the best position to consider Hunter Mountain's request.

It pointed out when it remanded the case that it had grave misgivings about doing so. It confirmed that it is in the best position to consider this presuit discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. This is part of one of the exhibits?

MR. SCHULTE: Yes, Your Honor. This is in one of the opinions that I included in the binder, a courtesy copy of one of those opinions.

THE COURT: Oh, at the back?

MR. SCHULTE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: It's 2022 Bankruptcy Lexis 5.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it.

And real quick, for the record, it's Dondero versus Alvarez & Marsal. It's 2022 Bankruptcy Lexis 5.

MR. SCHULTE: Right.

And in particular, Your Honor, I'm looking at pages 31 to 32 of that order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: What the judge is pointing out here is it has grave misgivings about remanding the case because it knows a thing or two about the Highland bankruptcy, having presided over the case and all the related litigation for over what's now three years.

And it's familiar with the legal and factual issues. It's familiar with the parties. It's familiar with claims trading in a bankruptcy case, which was the very crux of the Dondero petition. It's also the crux of this petition by Hunter Mountain.

And it observed, the bankruptcy court did, that any case that could be fashioned from the investigation would end up in bankruptcy court anyway because it would be related to the Highland bankruptcy.

So you ask a really good question, Your Honor. Why should I ship it off to the bankruptcy court. The answer is Judge Jernigan is in a position to efficiently and practically deal with this request because she deals with it all the time and she is intimately familiar with the legal and factual issues and with claims trading.

It's not like Hunter Mountain gets poured out if it goes to bankruptcy court. It has a mechanism to seek the exact same discovery from Judge Jernigan who is very familiar with these very particular issues.

Now, Hunter Mountain says, well, bankruptcy court is too time-consuming and cumbersome. It's going to take 60 days to even get this before the bankruptcy court.

Well, we're talking about the fact that they've waited two years to file this proceeding related to these claims transfers that took place in 2021.

So, again, what HMIT is asking this court to do is inefficient and is impractical. This court would need to devote a lot of resources to understand what the proper scope of any discovery should be, whether the claims are cognizable.

And that's just a tall order, Your Honor. The request is more appropriately dealt with by the bankruptcy judge, according to a proper bankruptcy filing.

It's undisputed that while the bankruptcy court doesn't have jurisdiction over a 202 petition, there's no question that it has jurisdiction over a Rule 2004 request for discovery, which is the counterpart for this type of discovery in bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: The real issue, Your Honor, and this is the part that Hunter Mountain is dancing around, is that Hunter Mountain doesn't want to be in front of Judge Jernigan.

Judge Jernigan held Mark Patrick -- that is HMIT's principal who verified this petition. She held him along with Dondero and Dondero's counsel and others in civil contempt and sanctioned them nearly $240,000 for trying to join Seery to a lawsuit in violation of Judge Jernigan's gatekeeping orders.

HMIT is trying to dodge the bankruptcy court and its scrutiny of what HMIT is doing as this petition also targets Seery and the inside information that he purportedly gave to Farallon and Stonehill.

This is forum shopping, plain and simple. And the court should dismiss the petition so that HMIT can seek this discovery in bankruptcy court.

Now, I don't want to spend a lot of time on the related case, but I will emphasize just what I've mentioned, which is while some of the parties may be different, we're still talking about the same claims trading activity that took place in 2021 and the same allegations of insider dealing by Seery.

And Judge Purdy, on remand, dismissed

that petition where some of the same arguments were made about judicial efficiency and that the case should be filed in bankruptcy court.

And it bears noting, by the way, that after Judge Purdy dismissed Dondero's Rule 202 petition, where we had argued that this ought to be in the bankruptcy court, Dondero didn't file in the bankruptcy court, which sort of makes the point that they didn't want to be in front of Judge Jernigan on this either.

Okay. Now let's turn to the merits, Your Honor. While Mr. McEntire has gone to great lengths to say we don't have to state claims, he stated five or six on that PowerPoint presentation of claims that he envisions.

But what made it all really crystal clear is in that notice of supplemental evidence, and that includes the declaration of Mr. Patrick, there in paragraphs 15 and 16 it's made clear what Hunter Mountain really wants.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: What the goal of this discovery is is to invalidate the claims that Farallon and Stonehill's entities purchased.

So let's unpack what it is they purchased.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: These are claims that were not ever held by Hunter Mountain. These are claims that were held by Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest.

THE COURT: Right. They were the Class 8 and 9. Right?

MR. SCHULTE: I believe that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Those claims were always superior to whatever it was that Hunter Mountain held.

So Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest held those claims. The parties in the bankruptcy had the opportunity to file objections to those claims. And they did.

And Seery, on behalf of the debtor, negotiated with Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest and reached settlements that resolved the priority and amounts of those claims.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: And then filed what's referred to -- and I'm sure Your Honor knows this -- as a Rule 9019 motion to approve those settlements in the bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Actually, I don't. I've never done bankruptcy but I read it. I know the general process and I did read it.

MR. SCHULTE: All right.

THE COURT: Just FYI, I've never done bankruptcy law. They've got their own rules.

MR. SCHULTE: Well, the parties in the bankruptcy had the opportunity to object to those settlements and some did so.

And after evidentiary hearings, the bankruptcy court granted those motions and allowed and approved those claims.

That is really important, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: That's Exhibits 14 through 17 in the binder that I handed you.

And these are the same exhibits that are referenced in Hunter Mountain's petition. And it bears noting that the U.S. District Court affirmed those orders after appeals were taken.

But the bankruptcy court's approval of the very same claims that Hunter Mountain now seeks to investigate and invalidate is entitled to res judicata.

HMIT can't now second-guess the bankruptcy court's orders approving those very same claims. That's the effect of the investigation that Hunter Mountain seeks, the invalidation of claims that are already bankruptcy court approved.

And it bears noting that each of those four orders, Exhibits 14 through 17, provides the following: quote, "The court" -- the bankruptcy court -- "shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this order."

This would include HMIT's stated goal of conducting discovery to try to invalidate these very claims.

This is yet another reason, Your Honor, to answer your question earlier of why this request for discovery should be posed to the bankruptcy court.

Judge Jernigan, I suspect, would have views on whether her own orders authorizing these claims should be overturned.

Okay. So HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- alleges that after the bankruptcy court approved these claims, Seery disclosed inside information to Farallon and to Stonehill to encourage them to buy these claims from the original claimants. Again, UBS, Redeemer, Acis, and HarbourVest.

Farallon, through Muck, which is its special purpose entity, and Stonehill through Jessup, which is Stonehill's special purpose entity, acquired those transferred claims in 2021.

And there's no magic in bankruptcy court to claims transfers. It's a contractual matter between the transferors and the transferees. It's strictly between them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And there's no bankruptcy court approval that's even required.

The transferee, so in this case Muck and Jessup, had simply to file under federal bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) a notice saying these claims were transferred to us. And they did so.

Your Honor, that's Exhibit 6 through 11 in the binder that I handed to you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: The filings evidencing those claims transfers were public. And Hunter Mountain received the claims transfer notices.

And that's the exhibits that we were talking about, Exhibits 12 through 13, where Hunter Mountain's lawyers had appeared in the case before those claims transfer notices were filed.

So not surprisingly, Hunter Mountain did not file any objections to those claims transfers. And that's not surprising because under Rule 3001, the only party that could object to the claims transfers were

the transferors themselves.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: Essentially saying, hold on. We didn't transfer these claims. But of course there's no dispute that the transfers were made.

Here, HMIT was neither the transferor nor the transferee of the claims. It had no interest in these claims. It never did. It didn't before the claims transfers and it didn't after the claims transfers.

The claims originally belonged to Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest, and they were then transferred to Muck and Jessup, which are Farallon's and Stonehill's entities.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: So why does that matter? That matters because these claims were approved by the bankruptcy court. The claims didn't change or become more valuable after they were transferred. The only difference is who is holding the claims.

So Hunter Mountain says, hold on. What we're alleging here is that the claims that Farallon and Stonehill purchased with the benefit of this purported inside information from Mr. Seery, they're secretly worth more than expected.

Those allegations, they're disputed, to be sure. But let's assume they're true. That situation has zero impact on Hunter Mountain.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: And that's because this is a matter that's strictly between the parties to the claims transfers. Again, Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest on the one hand and Farallon and Stonehill on the other.

And the way we know this is let's pretend that Muck and Jessup didn't buy these claims, Your Honor, and that the claims instead have remained with UBS, HarbourVest, Acis, and whatever the other one I'm forgetting. The claims wouldn't have been transferred, and they would have remained with those entities.

In that case, the original claimants would have held those claims for longer than they wanted. And if HMIT is right, then the claims would have ended up being worth more than even they expected.

So why does that matter? Well, that matters because if that is all true, Hunter Mountain would be in the exact same place today. Neither better nor worse off, it would be in the exact same place.

Either Farallon and Stonehill's entities are gaining more on these claims than they expected

or UBS, HarbourVest, Acis, and Redeemer, they are realizing more on these claims than they expected.

But Hunter Mountain never stood to be paid on these claims to which it was a stranger. These are claims in which Hunter Mountain never had any interest.

THE COURT: So presuming that Hunter Mountain had expressed interest in buying these claims and there was insider trading, you don't think that would be a tortious interference in a potential contract?

MR. SCHULTE: If there was insider trading of the type that Hunter Mountain alleges in this case, it would have no impact on the rights of Hunter Mountain.

If that's true, maybe there was a fraud on the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court would surely be interested in that. Maybe there was a fraud on the transferors. I mean, maybe UBS, Redeemer, Acis -- why do I always forget the third one? -- and HarbourVest.

THE COURT: Like I said, I had a chart last night of all the names. Obviously, I haven't been involved in this case up until now, and there's a lot of names.

MR. SCHULTE: Yes.

The transferors of the claims might say,

well, wait a minute. I wish I would have known this inside information. I'm the one that was really injured here.

Because if there was really meat on this bone, Your Honor, then the injured parties would be the transferors of the claims: Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest.

Because the crux of HMIT's petition is that those entities, the transferors, were duped into selling their claims for too little when the claims were secretly worth more.

Well, if that's true, you would expect that the transferors would be screaming up and down the hallway, saying we didn't get paid enough.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: We are the injured parties here, we are the ones with damages, we want to unwind these claims transfers, or we want to be paid more on these claims transfers.

But the rights of those entities, the transferors, to complain about these allegations doesn't mean that Hunter Mountain can also stand up and say, well, I want to complain too. Because Hunter Mountain never stood to be paid on these claims.

The question is if somebody was duped,

if somebody was injured, if anybody it was the transferors, not Hunter Mountain. The transferors would be the only real parties in interest that would have been injured by what Hunter Mountain alleges.

But it's notable that none of those transferors has filed an objection to these transfers.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: None of them has filed a Rule 202 proceeding. None of them has filed a Rule 2004 proceeding seeking discovery about inside information that Farallon and Stonehill allegedly had. It is Hunter Mountain who is an absolute stranger to these claims trading transactions.

And so HMIT is trying to inject itself into a transaction to which it was never a party and which it never had any interest.

The sellers were entitled to sell those claims to any buyer they wanted to on whatever terms they agreed to.

And if there was some information that they didn't have the benefit of that the buyers did, you would expect the transferors, if anyone at all, to be the ones complaining about it. But that's not what we have here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: All right. Another note that Hunter Mountain glosses over is duty.

So all the claims that were listed on the PowerPoint all require that there must have been some kind of a duty owed by Farallon and Stonehill to Hunter Mountain. But there's no duty owed to a stranger to a claims trading transaction.

Yet again, if anybody were to have a duty owed to it, I guess it would be the transferors of the claims even though that was an arm's length transaction.

But it's not a stranger to the transaction and a stranger that has no interest in the claims that we're talking about here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Nor has Hunter Mountain identified any authority for a private cause of action belonging to Hunter Mountain related to these claims transfers.

Hunter Mountain doesn't have the right to assert claims on behalf of other parties. It only has the right to assert claims on behalf of itself when it has been personally aggrieved.

I heard Mr. McEntire say several times during his presentation that Hunter Mountain had a

99.5 percent equity interest in Highland Capital.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: I think it's important to point out that that equity interest was completely extinguished by the confirmed plan in the bankruptcy case.

As Your Honor pointed out, we have the waterfall, and Classes 1 through 9 have to be paid in full. And you know what Classes 8 and 9 are? General unsecured claims and subordinated claims.

And the only way that Hunter Mountain is ever in the money, as Mr. McEntire was saying, with its Class 10 claim is if Seery, the claimant trustee, certifies that all claims in 1 through 9 are paid in full 100 percent with interest and all indemnity claims are satisfied.

There has been no such certification by Mr. Seery, and there may never be such a certification by Mr. Seery.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So that is real important because the idea that Hunter Mountain stands to somehow gain from this transaction is flawed for the reasons we've already talked about.

But it's also flawed because they have

what is, at best, a contingent interest. It's contingent on things that have not yet occurred. And under the case law, they don't have standing conferred on them in that interest.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: So for all those reasons why there is no interest in the claims, no legal damages, no duty owed to it, no private cause of action belonging to it and a hypothetical and contingent interest, HMIT lacks standing to investigate or challenge these claims and claims transfers to which it was not a party and in which it had zero interest.

And for any or all of the reasons we've talked about, Your Honor, their petition should be dismissed. I welcome any questions the court may have.

THE COURT: No. My head is kind of spinning. Like I said, I spent all day yesterday reading stuff. As I said, I will admit I've never practiced bankruptcy law.

I mean, my joking statement is I pretty much know enough to not be in contempt of bankruptcy court. Because I have cases where one of the defendants or one of the parties ends up in bankruptcy court and whether or not I can proceed with my case, et cetera. That's my whole goal is not to be in contempt of court.

MR. SCHULTE: That should be the goal, is to not be in contempt of the bankruptcy court.

MR. McENTIRE: May I have just five or ten minutes?

THE COURT: I don't have another hearing, so we're fine on time.

MR. McENTIRE: All right. In all due deference to Mr. Schulte, the last 15 minutes of his argument misstates the law.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: The Washington Mutual case addresses almost 90 percent of what he just talked about. Their equity was entitled to bring an action to basically disallow an interest that was acquired by inside information.

Okay. And so he has not addressed the Washington Mutual case at all.

THE COURT: Well, okay. So my question is let's say that the insider trading didn't happen.

I mean, when I was playing with the numbers last night, it doesn't appear that Hunter Mountain, being Class 10, would have gotten anything anyways even if. Right?

Like I said, I did a lot of reading last night, so I want to make sure I understand.

MR. McENTIRE: Fair enough. I think I can address that.

The bottom line is a wrongdoer should not be entitled to profit from his wrong. That's the fundamental premise behind the restatement on restitution. That's the fundamental purpose of the Washington Mutual case.

You have remedies, including disgorgement, disallowance or subordination.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to be devil's advocate because I'm trying to work through this.

So let's say it did happen and the court ordered disgorgement and invalidated these transfers, then the money would just go to the Class 8 and Class 9. Right? To Acis, UBS, HarbourVest, etc.

MR. McENTIRE: No, they would not. Because those claims have already been traded.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's what I'm saying.

If the court said there was insider trading and to disallow the transfer and ordered disgorgement, theoretically, back to Highland Capital, then the money is there.

Okay. So then it would just go to Acis and UBS. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: The remedy here is to subordinate their claims. HarbourVest, UBS, Acis, and the Redeemer committee have sold their claims. They can intervene if they want and that's up to them. If they want to take the position that they were defrauded, that's up to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Otherwise, the remedy is to disgorge the proceeds and put them back into the coffers of the bankruptcy court in which case Category 8 and 9 would be brimful, overflowing, and flow directly into the coffers in Class 10.

And that's the purpose of 15 and 16 in Mr. Patrick's affidavit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I find it amazing that he refers to Judge Jernigan's orders where he said anything dealing with these claims must come back to me. I have exclusive jurisdiction. I recall that argument.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: Well, she could have accepted the removal of Mr. Dondero in that other proceeding. She didn't. She said I don't have jurisdiction over this. I'm sending it back to the state court.

THE COURT: Okay. Because it was filed as a 202. If it had been filed as a Rule 404, then she would have had jurisdiction because you're specifically invoking a state court process. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: I'm invoking exclusively a state court process because of the benefit it provides. That is a strategic choice that this petitioner has elected. It has nothing to do with bankruptcy court, other than bankruptcy court is too slow.

All the invective about the prior contempt order has nothing to do with these proceedings. Mr. Dondero is not involved in these proceedings.

If HarbourVest and UBS want to intervene in some subsequent lawsuit, they have a right to do so. I can't stop them.

But until then, we have stated a cause of action or at least a potential cause of action which is insider trading. That from an outsider makes them an insider that owes fiduciary duties to the equity.

Washington Mutual allowed equity to come in and disallow those claims. And if those claims are disallowed, the Class 10 is going to be overflowing on the waterfall. And that's my client.

A couple of other things. Hunter Mountain

is not a stranger. Hunter Mountain was the big elephant in the room until the effective date of the plan.

We held 99.5 percent of the equity stake and when all of these wrongdoings occurred, Hunter Mountain was still the 99.5 percent equity stakeholder.

It's only after the bankruptcy plan had gone effective, after these claims had already been --

THE COURT: Wait. The insider trading happened after the bankruptcy had been filed but before the bankruptcy was resolved.

So it's during that process. Right?

MR. McENTIRE: You have filing a bankruptcy. You have a bankruptcy plan. You have confirmation of the plan, but it doesn't go effective until six months later.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: After the bankruptcy plan was confirmed and they had dismal estimates of recovery -- 71 percent on Class 8, zero percent on Class 9 -- that's when Farallon and Stonehill purchased the claims.

But they purchased the claims at a time before the bankruptcy wasn't effective. And so the so-called claimant trust agreement had not gone into effect until several months later.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And during this period of time Hunter Mountain was the very, very largest stakeholder.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And so to call it a stranger is just not right and it's not fair because we're anything but a stranger.

They make an argument that Hunter Mountain didn't object to the settlements. Well, so what? I'm not attacking the underlying settlements. I'm attacking the claims transfers.

And then he says, well, why didn't they object to the claims transfers. Well, he finally conceded that the claims transfers are not actually subject to a judicial scrutiny by the bankruptcy court.

This court is uniquely qualified to review these claims transfers as is Judge Jernigan. Insider information is insider information as a rose is a rose is a rose. And any court of law is qualified to determine whether insider information was used.

Judge Jernigan did not say, okay, Farallon, you can buy this claim. There was no judicial process here.

THE COURT: Right. I mean, it's a motion.

We want to do this, just get approval.

MR. McENTIRE: They don't even have to get approval.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: All they have to do is file notice.

THE COURT: Okay. File the notice.

MR. McENTIRE: Judge Jernigan was not involved at all.

We had no reason to object. All we know there's a claims transfer. It's not until later that we discover that inside information was used and that's why we're here.

So we didn't object to the original claims. There was no need to. The original settlements rather. There was no need to. There was no objection to the claims transfers.

There was no mechanism to object, other than what we're doing here today. This is our objection. This is our attempt to object.

Because we believe that they have acquired hundreds of millions of dollars of ill-gotten gain and if that is true, not only will Hunter Mountain be benefited tremendously, but other unsecured creditors. They are very few but they will be also benefited.

Frankly, Judge Jernigan may want that to happen.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: But we're here to get the discovery so I can pull it all together within the next 30 days or 40 days. So I can make decisions before somebody might suggest, hey, well, you should have filed this a little bit earlier.

And so, Judge, that's why we're here, in the interest of time. And that was my decision. That was my strategic decision to bring it here.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McENTIRE: He says that Rule 3001 is the exclusive remedy. Only transferors can complain about transferees or vice versa.

THE COURT: You're not necessarily complaining about the actual transfer. It's how the transfer came about.

MR. McENTIRE: That's right.

And to suggest that that is the governing principle that this court should consider is an absolute contradiction to the Washington Mutual case.

Because if fraud is in play, if inside information is in play, then it impacts everyone who is a stakeholder. Everyone.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And we are one of the largest stakeholders in the bankruptcy proceedings, even today. So that's all I have.

I thank you for your attention, Your Honor. Clearly, the benefit here is we get to uncover some things that need to be uncovered. And we'd like to do it so in a timely fashion.

And if we don't have a claim, we don't have a claim. If we have a claim, then we may file it in a state district court.

And if Judge Jernigan and her gate-keeping orders require us to go there, we'll go there. I'm not going to run afoul of any rule she has, but we need to get this underway.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Your Honor, may I make some rifle-shot responses?

THE COURT: Yeah. That's fine.

MR. SCHULTE: Okay. Mr. McEntire has said that they are one of the largest stakeholders in the Highland bankruptcy based on this 99.5 percent equity. That equity was extinguished in the fifth amended plan.

That's Exhibit 3 that I handed you, Your Honor. That plan was filed in January of 2021

before any of these claims transfers took place. The equity was extinguished by virtue of the plan.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHULTE: Mr. McEntire was talking about this Washington Mutual case. I read the case.

But what he said repeatedly, and I think it's really important to listen to what Mr. McEntire said about this case, is that that court allowed the equity to come in and talk about these transfers.

Hunter Mountain doesn't have any equity. That equity was extinguished in the plan for reasons I just discussed. So for being the largest stakeholder, according to Mr. McEntire, in the bankruptcy what does Hunter Mountain have to show for that? A Class 10.

As Your Honor pointed out, a Class 10 interest, that is below everybody else. And that's where they've been relegated.

And to answer your question, Your Honor, that you posed to Mr. McEntire that I'm not sure was ever answered, HMIT -- Hunter Mountain -- at Class 10 stood to gain nothing when the plan was put together. So the largest stakeholder stood to gain nothing.

I've pointed to the language in the court's order about how the court has exclusive jurisdiction.

And Your Honor nailed the answer to the concern raised by Mr. McEntire, which is the bankruptcy court didn't have jurisdiction over a 202 proceeding. But it unquestionably has authority over the counterpart, 2004 in bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHULTE: Finally, I have never argued and if I did say this, I apologize. I have never argued that Hunter Mountain is somehow a stranger to the bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Right. They were obviously involved in the bankruptcy, but they're a stranger to these transfers.

MR. SCHULTE: Exactly. They were a stranger to these transactions. They didn't have any interest in these claims.

They don't stand to gain anything if the claims are either rescinded or if the claims are invalidated or the transfers are invalidated. They don't stand to get anything because they never had any interest in these claims.

The claims are the claims and either UBS, Redeemer, Acis, and HarbourVest stood to gain more than expected or Farallon and Stonehill stand to gain more than expected.

And if anybody is really injured here, it's not Hunter Mountain. It's the transferors who were duped into these transfers, according to Hunter Mountain. And they would be the ones that would have damage and have a claim along the lines of what Hunter Mountain is trying to assert on behalf of all stakeholders.

Your Honor, I have a proposed order, as Mr. McEntire does.

May I bring it up?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

Okay, Mr. McEntire. Anything else?

MR. McENTIRE: His last few statements are inconsistent with the law, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: Because the law clearly, clearly indicates that we are a beneficiary. And that's what the Washington Mutual case stands for.

THE COURT: Okay. Wait. Let me make sure I know which one.

Do you have a cite for that case?

MR. McENTIRE: Yes, ma'am. It's in the PowerPoint.

THE COURT: That's fine. I just wanted to make sure I could find it.

MR. McENTIRE: There's also a Fifth Circuit case that talks about subordination where a Class 8 and Class 9 would actually be subordinated, Your Honor, to our claim.

So that's another approach to this, is subordination.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: And that's the In re Mobile Steel case out of the Fifth Circuit. I think there's a cite in our brief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McENTIRE: I acknowledge that we're now classified with a different name. We're a B/C limited partner. And we're, in effect, a Class 10 beneficial interest.

But we're there having been a 99.5. And the lion share of any money, 99.5 percent of any money that overflows into bucket No. 10 is ours.

THE COURT: Right.

Okay. I am processing. Obviously, I need to take this into consideration. I haven't had a chance to go through Respondent's exhibits.

I've looked through the plaintiff's exhibits, but now I have much more of a focus of what I'm doing.

So I will try to get you all a ruling by the end of next week. I apologize. I've got a special setting next week that's going to be kind of crazy, but I will do everything I can.

If you all haven't heard from me by next Friday afternoon, call my coordinator Texxa and tell her to bug me.

MR. McENTIRE: Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: You all are excused. Have a great day.

(This completes the Reporter's Record, Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Rule 202 Petition, which was heard on Wednesday, February 22, 2023.)

STATE OF TEXAS)
COUNTY OF DALLAS)

I, Gina M. Udall, Official Court Reporter in and for the 191st District Court of Dallas County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record in the above-styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court and were reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is $750.00 and was paid by the attorney for Respondents.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 1st day of March 2023.

/S/ Gina M. Udall
Gina M. Udall, Texas CSR #6807
Certificate Expires: 10-31-2024
Official Reporter, 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas
George Allen Sr. Courts Building
600 Commerce St., 7th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 653-7146

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**191st JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

DECLARATION OF MARK PATRICK

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

The undersigned provides this Declaration pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001 and declares as follows:

1. My name is Mark Patrick. I am over 21 years of age. I am of sound mind and body and I am competent to make this declaration. Unless otherwise, indicated, the facts stated within this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

2. I submit this declaration in support of Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's ("HMIT") Verified Rule 202 Petition ("Petition"). I previously reviewed and verified the Petition. I am personally familiar with the numerous documents identified in the Petition which are part of the public record in the bankruptcy proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 ("HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings").

3. I serve as the Administrator of HMIT. In this capacity, I am the duly authorized person to act on behalf of HMIT. As such, I am familiar with the organizational structure of HMIT and its status both before and during the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Due to my other affiliations with other interested parties in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings, I am generally familiar with the docket in the HCM

Exhibit

Bankruptcy Proceedings and have attended multiple hearings in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings.

4. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust. It was the largest equity holder in Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM") until the Effective Date of the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified) (the "Plan"). The Effective Date of the Plan occurred on August 11, 2021. Prior to the Effective Date, HMIT was classified as a Class 10 unsecured creditor. Upon the Effective Date, and pursuant to the Plan, HMIT's Class 10 claim was converted to a "Contingent Trust Interest," as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement, which was approved by the Bankruptcy Court as part of the Plan. HMIT was the only stakeholder in Class 10. A true and correct copy of the Claimant Trust Agreement is attached as Exhibit A.

5. Following various orders in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings, Jim Seery was appointed as a member of the Board of Directors ("Board") of Strand Advisors, Inc., HCM's general partner. Subsequently, the Board appointed Jim Seery as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO"). Following the Effective Date of the Plan, Jim Seery continues to serve as the CEO of HCM, but also serves as the Trustee of the Claimant Trust under the terms of a Claimant Trust Agreement which, along with the Plan, identifies the various classes of unsecured creditors, including allowed claims for Class 8, allowed claims for Class 9 and Class 10, as well as the waterfall for potential distributions from the Bankruptcy Estate. Under the Claimant Trust Agreement and the Plan, Unsecured Creditors in Class 8 participate in distributions before Unsecured Creditors in Class 9; Unsecured Creditors in Class 9 participate in distributions before HMIT. The Plan also established an Oversight Committee, which now includes Muck Holdings, LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings, LLC ("Jessup"), over the Claimant Trust.

6. Neither Muck nor Jessup were original creditors in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Rather, as reflected in public filings, Muck was created on March 9, 2021, and Jessup was created on April 8, 2021, well after the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings were under way. The HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings began in 2019. True and correct copies of publicly available information with the Delaware Division of Corporations reflecting Muck and Jessup's dates of formation are attached as Exhibits B and C, respectively.

7. Upon information and belief, Muck is a special purpose entity created by Farallon Capital Management LLC ("Farallon"). Upon information and belief, Jessup is a special purpose entity created by Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill").

Both Farallon and Stonehill are capital management companies or "hedge funds" operating across the United States and throughout the world.

8. As HCM's CEO and CRO, Jim Seery negotiated and obtained bankruptcy court approval for the settlement of claims with four (4) large unsecured creditors of HCM, three of which served on the Unsecured Creditors Committee in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. These unsecured creditors included: (i) the Redeemer Committee, which is a committee of investors in an HCM-affiliated fund known as the Crusader Fund that obtained an arbitration award against HCM; (ii) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (collectively "Acis"); (iii) HarbourVest[1] and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS") (collectively, "Settling Parties"). These settlements are documented in the docket of the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings at Document Nos. 1273, 1302, 1788, and 2389, respectively, and true and correct copies are attached hereto, respectively, as Exhibits D, E, F, and G (collectively, the "Settlements").

9. As reflected in these Settlements, Exhibits D, E, F, and G, each of the Settling Parties received Class 8 and Class 9 claims, as provided below:

Exhibit	Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Total
D	**Redeemer**	$136.7 mm	$0 mm	$136.7 mm
E	**Acis**	$23 mm	$0 mm	$23 mm
F	**HarbourVest**	$45 mm	$35 mm	$80 mm
G	**UBS**	$65 mm	$60 mm	$125 mm
	Total	$269.7 mm	$95 mm	$364.7 mm

10. Following the Settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings, the Settling Parties sold their claims to Muck and Jessup, which, upon information and belief, are the special purpose entities created by Farallon and Stonehill. HMIT was not given an opportunity to bid for these claims. The stated face value or par value of these claims was $364.7 million. To date, these claims represent the vast majority

[1] "HarbourVest" collectively refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P.

(over 90%) of all unsecured creditor claims in Class 8 and Class 9 which, according to the Q3 2022 Report, total $397,485,568.00.[2]

11. Stonehill or Jessup acquired the Redeemer claim for $78 million on or about April 30, 2021. A true and correct copy of a letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds reflecting this purchase price is attached as Exhibit H.

12. In addition to the purchase of the claim from the Redeemer Committee as described above, and continuing upon information and belief, Muck and Jessup paid additional tens of millions of dollars to acquire the Class 8 and Class 9 claims held by UBS, HarbourVest and Acis. Upon information and belief, the magnitude of these investments contrasts sharply with the available public information concerning the expected value of Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

13. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report ("Q3 Report"). According to this Q3 Report, HCM reported that the Class 8 claims were expected to be paid at 54%. This reflects a drop from approximately 71.32% reflected in Exhibit J, which is a public filing available to Farallon and Stonehill in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Thus, at the time of the purchases, the publicly available information indicated that the return on investment was substantially less than 100% for Class 8 creditors and 0% for the Class 9 creditors.

14. Despite earlier, much lower financial disclosures provided by the debtor, HCM, concerning expected distributions, almost $250 million was paid in Q3 2022 to Class 8 general unsecured creditors—$45 million *more* than was *ever* projected. A true and accurate copy of the public filing which reflects these distributions is attached as Exhibit K.

15. The discovery which HMIT seeks is reasonably calculated to confirm whether Farallon or Stonehill (via Muck or Jessup) traded and acquired their claims at issue based upon non-public information. If so, HMIT intends to seek cancellation of these claims in their entirety and disgorgement of all distributions which Farallon or Stonehill (via Muck or Jessup) may have received to date. These distributions are estimated to be at least $173 million. This estimate is based upon the relative proportions of: (1) the Class 8 claims owned by Farallon and Stonehill (via Muck and Jessup) to the total amount of general unsecured claims, (2) and the amount

[2] This number, $397,485,568 assumes the public disclosure of "allowed" general unsecured claims, includes all Class 8 and Class 9 claims. *See infra,* Exhibit K.

previously distributed to general unsecured claimholders to the total amount of general unsecured claims.

16. Under the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement, a cancellation of the claims at issue, together with disgorgement, will free more than $222,480,270 of the over $255 million that has been disbursed to date. This approximate sum, after appropriate offsets, will be available to pay HMIT after taking into account any other residual creditors in Class 8 or Class 9. Under this scenario, as the former holder of 99.5% equity in HCM, HMIT stands to receive substantial financial benefit. Based upon my experience in managing litigation, and in reviewing and approving the payment of outside counsel legal services for many years, the benefit to HMIT clearly outweighs any expense burden that may be imposed on Farallon or Stonehill to comply with basic and simple discovery requests.

17. My name is Mark Patrick my date of birth is April 23, 1972, and my address is 6716 Glenhurst Drive, Dallas, Texas 75254, United States of America. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NOT.

Executed in Dallas County, State of Texas, on the 14th day of February 2023.

Mark Patrick

EXECUTION VERSION

CLAIMANT TRUST AGREEMENT

This Claimant Trust Agreement, effective as of August 11, 2021 (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), by and among Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as debtor and debtor-in-possession, the "Debtor"), as settlor, and James P. Seery, Jr., as trustee (the "Claimant Trustee"), and Wilmington Trust, National Association, a national banking association ("WTNA"), as Delaware trustee (in such capacity hereunder, and not in its individual capacity, the "Delaware Trustee," and together with the Debtor and the Claimant Trustee, the "Parties") for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to the Claimant Trust Assets.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management, L.P. filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case");

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Plan"),[1] which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on February 22, 2021, pursuant to the *Findings of Fact and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor* [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order");

WHEREAS, this Agreement, including all exhibits hereto, is the "Claimant Trust Agreement" described in the Plan and shall be executed on or before the Effective Date in order to facilitate implementation of the Plan; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Claimant Trust Assets are to be transferred to the Claimant Trust (each as defined herein) created and evidenced by this Agreement so that (i) the Claimant Trust Assets can be held in a trust for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled thereto in accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) for the objectives and purposes set forth herein and in the Plan; (ii) the Claimant Trust Assets can be monetized; (iii) the Claimant Trust will transfer Estate Claims to the Litigation Sub-Trust to be prosecuted, settled, abandoned, or resolved as may be determined by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, for the benefit of the Claimant Trust; (iv) proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets, including Estate Claims, may be distributed to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries[2] in accordance with the Plan; (v) the Claimant Trustee can resolve

---

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan. The confirmed Plan included certain amendments filed on February 1, 2021. *See Debtor's Notice of Filing of Plan Supplement to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)*, Docket No. 1875, Exh. B.

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, and as set forth in the Plan, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests will be Claimant Trust Beneficiaries only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

Disputed Claims as set forth herein and in the Plan; and (vi) administrative services relating to the activities of the Claimant Trust and relating to the implementation of the Plan can be performed by the Claimant Trustee.

DECLARATION OF TRUST

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to declare the terms and conditions hereof, and in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements herein contained, the confirmation of the Plan and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, and the Delaware Trustee have executed this Agreement for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to share in the Claimant Trust Assets and, at the direction of such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as provided for in the Plan.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Claimant Trustee and his successors or assigns in trust, under and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and for the performance of and compliance with the terms hereof and of the Plan; provided, however, that upon termination of the Claimant Trust in accordance with Article IX hereof, this Claimant Trust Agreement shall cease, terminate, and be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise specifically provided for herein.

IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED AND DECLARED that the Claimant Trust Assets are to be strictly held and applied by the Claimant Trustee subject to the specific terms set forth below.

ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION AND TERMS

1.1 Certain Definitions. Unless the context shall otherwise require and except as contained in this Section 1.1 or as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the "Definitions," Section 1.1 of the Plan or if not defined therein, shall have the meanings assigned thereto in the applicable Section of the Plan. For all purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Acis" means collectively, Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP.

(b) "Bankruptcy Court" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(c) "Cause" means (i) a Person's willful failure to perform his material duties hereunder (which material duties shall include, without limitation, with respect to a Member, or to the extent applicable, the Claimant Trustee, regular attendance at regularly scheduled meetings of the Oversight Board), which is not remedied within 30 days of notice; (ii) a Person's commission of an act of fraud, theft, or embezzlement during the performance of his or her duties hereunder; (iii) a Person's conviction of a felony (other than a felony that does not involve fraud, theft, embezzlement, or jail time) with all appeals having been exhausted or appeal periods lapsed; or (iv) a Person's gross negligence, bad faith, willful misconduct, or knowing violation of law in the performance of his or her duties hereunder.

(d) "Claimant Trust Agreement" means this Agreement.

(e) "Claimant Trustee" means James P. Seery, Jr., as the initial "Claimant Trustee" hereunder and as defined in the Plan, and any successor Claimant Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(f) "Claimant Trust" means the "Highland Claimant Trust" established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) pursuant to this Agreement.

(g) "Claimant Trust Assets" means (i) other than the Reorganized Debtor Assets (which are expressly excluded from this definition), all other Assets of the Estate, including, but not limited to, all Causes of Action, Available Cash, any proceeds realized or received from such Assets, all rights of setoff, recoupment, and other defenses with respect, relating to, or arising from such Assets, (ii) any Assets transferred by the Reorganized Debtor to the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date, (iii) the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, and (iv) the ownership interests in New GP LLC. For the avoidance of doubt, any Causes of Action that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust shall constitute Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(h) "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries" means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests.

(i) "Claimant Trust Expense Cash Reserve" means $[•] million in Cash to be funded pursuant to the Plan into a bank account of the Claimant Trust on or before the Effective Date for the purpose of paying Claimant Trust Expenses in accordance herewith.

(j) "Claimant Trust Expenses" means the costs, expenses, liabilities and obligations incurred by the Claimant Trust and/or the Claimant Trustee in administering and conducting the affairs of the Claimant Trust, and otherwise carrying out the terms of the Claimant Trust and the Plan on behalf of the Claimant Trust, including without any limitation, any taxes owed by the Claimant Trust, and the fees and expenses of the Claimant Trustee and professional persons retained by the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee in accordance with this Agreement.

(k) "Committee Member" means a Member who is/was also a member of the Creditors' Committee.

(l) "Conflicted Member" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.6(c) hereof.

(m) "Contingent Trust Interests" means the contingent interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests in accordance with the Plan.

(n) "Creditors' Committee" means the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Chapter 11 Case, comprised of Acis, Meta-e Discovery, the Redeemer Committee and UBS.

(o) "Delaware Statutory Trust Act" means the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del C. §3801, et seq. as amended from time to time.

(p) "Delaware Trustee" has the meaning set forth in the introduction hereof.

(q) "Disability" means as a result of the Claimant Trustee's or a Member's incapacity due to physical or mental illness as determined by an accredited physician or psychologist, as applicable, selected by the Claimant Trustee or the Member, as applicable, the Claimant Trustee or such Member has been substantially unable to perform his or her duties hereunder for three (3) consecutive months or for an aggregate of 180 days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.

(r) "Disinterested Members" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.1 hereof.

(s) "Disputed Claims Reserve" means the reserve account to be opened by the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date and funded in an initial amount determined by the Claimant Trustee [(in a manner consistent with the Plan and with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board)] to be sufficient to pay Disputed Claims under the Plan.

(t) "Employees" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

(u) "Employee Claims" means any General Unsecured Claim held by an Employee other than the Claims of the Senior Employees subject to stipulations (provided such stipulations are executed by any such Senior Employee of the Debtor prior to the Effective Date).

(v) "Estate Claims" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [Docket No. 354].

(w) "Equity Trust Interests" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(x) "Exchange Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

(y) "General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests" means interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (including Disputed General Unsecured Claims that are subsequently Allowed) in accordance with the Plan.

(z) "GUC Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests.

(aa) "GUC Payment Certification" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(bb) "HarbourVest" means, collectively, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners, L.P.

(cc) "Investment Advisers Act" means the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended.

(dd) "Investment Company Act" means the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

(ee) "Litigation Sub-Trust" means the sub-trust created pursuant to the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, which shall hold the Claimant Trust Assets that are Estate Claims and investigate, litigate, and/or settle the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust.

(ff) "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" means the litigation sub-trust agreement to be entered into by and between the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee establishing and setting forth the terms and conditions of the Litigation Sub-Trust and governing the rights and responsibilities of the Litigation Trustee.

(gg) "Litigation Trustee" means Marc S. Kirschner, and any successor Litigation Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, who shall be responsible for investigating, litigating, and settling the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

(hh) "Managed Funds" means Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., and any other investment vehicle managed by the Debtor pursuant to an Executory Contract assumed pursuant to the Plan; *provided, however,* that the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. (and its direct and indirect subsidiaries) will not be considered a Managed Fund for purposes hereof.

(ii) "Material Claims" means the Claims asserted by UBS, Patrick Hagaman Daugherty, Integrated Financial Associates, Inc., and the Employees.

(jj) "Member" means a Person that is member of the Oversight Board.

(kk) "New GP LLC" means the general partner of the Reorganized Debtor.

(ll) "Oversight Board" means the board comprised of five (5) Members established pursuant to the Plan and Article III of this Agreement to oversee the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties and otherwise serve the functions set forth in this Agreement and those of the "Claimant Trust Oversight Committee" described in the Plan. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the initial Members of the Oversight Board shall be: (i) Eric Felton, as representative of the Redeemer Committee; (ii) Josh Terry, as representative of Acis; (iii) Elizabeth Kozlowski, as representative of UBS; (iv) Paul McVoy, as representative of Meta-e Discovery; and (v) David Pauker.

(mm) "Plan" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(nn) "Privileges" means the Debtor's rights, title and interests in and to any privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications (whether written or oral) associated with any of the Estate Claims or Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to,

attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege as defined in Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; provided, however, that "Privileges" shall not include the work-product privilege of any non-Employee attorney or attorneys that has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees and the work-product privilege shall remain with the non-Employee attorney or attorneys who created such work product so long as it has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees, or otherwise waived.

(oo) "PSZJ" means Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP.

(pp) "Redeemer Committee" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund.

(qq) "Registrar" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(a) hereof.

(rr) "Reorganized Debtor Assets" means any limited and general partnership interests held by the Debtor, the management of the Managed Funds and those Causes of Action (including, without limitation, claims for breach of fiduciary duty), that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust. For the avoidance of doubt, "Reorganized Debtor Assets" includes any partnership interests or shares of Managed Funds held by the Debtor but does not include the underlying portfolio assets held by the Managed Funds.

(ss) "Securities Act" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(tt) "Subordinated Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold Subordinated Claim Trust Interests.

(uu) "Subordinated Claim Trust Interests" means the subordinated interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claims in accordance with the Plan.

(vv) "TIA" means the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended.

(ww) "Trust Interests" means collectively the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests, Subordinated Claim Trust Interests, and Equity Trust Interests.

(xx) "Trust Register" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.4(b) hereof.

(yy) "Trustees" means collectively the Claimant Trustee and Delaware Trustee, however, it is expressly understood and agreed that the Delaware Trustee shall have none of the duties or liabilities of the Claimant Trustee.

(zz) "UBS" means collectively UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

(aaa) "WilmerHale" Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

1.2 General Construction. As used in this Agreement, the masculine, feminine and neuter genders, and the plural and singular numbers shall be deemed to include the others in all

cases where they would apply. "Includes" and "including" are not limiting and "or" is not exclusive. References to "Articles," "Sections" and other subdivisions, unless referring specifically to the Plan or provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or other law, statute or regulation, refer to the corresponding Articles, Sections and other subdivisions of this Agreement, and the words "herein," "hereafter" and words of similar import refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular Article, Section, or subdivision of this Agreement. Amounts expressed in dollars or following the symbol "$" shall be deemed to be in United States dollars. References to agreements or instruments shall be deemed to refer to such agreements or instruments as the same may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms thereof.

1.3 Incorporation of the Plan. The Plan is hereby incorporated into this Agreement and made a part hereof by this reference.

ARTICLE II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CLAIMANT TRUST

2.1 Creation of Name of Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is hereby created as a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and shall be called the "Highland Claimant Trust." The Claimant Trustee shall be empowered to conduct all business and hold all property constituting the Claimant Trust Assets in such name in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.

(b) The Trustees shall cause to be executed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware the Certificate of Trust and agree to execute, acting solely in their capacity as Trustees, such certificates as may from time to time be required under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act or any other Delaware law.

2.2 Objectives.

(a) The Claimant Trust is established for the purpose of satisfying Allowed General Unsecured Claims and Allowed Subordinated Claims (and only to the extent provided herein, Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) under the Plan, by monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets transferred to it and making distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust shall not continue or engage in any trade or business except to the extent reasonably necessary to monetize and distribute the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with this Agreement and the Plan and act as sole member and manager of New GP LLC. The Claimant Trust shall provide a mechanism for (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets and (ii) the distribution of the proceeds thereof, net of all claims, expenses, charges, liabilities, and obligations of the Claimant Trust, to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with the Plan. In furtherance of this distribution objective, the Claimant Trust will, from time to time, prosecute and resolve objections to certain Claims and Interests as provided herein and in the Plan.

(b) It is intended that the Claimant Trust be classified for federal income tax purposes as a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of section 301.7701-4(d) of the Treasury Regulations. In furtherance of this objective, the Claimant Trustee shall, in his business judgment,

make continuing best efforts to (i) dispose of or monetize the Claimant Trust Assets and resolve Claims, (ii) make timely distributions, and (iii) not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust, in each case in accordance with this Agreement.

2.3 Nature and Purposes of the Claimant Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is organized and established as a trust for the purpose of monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets and making distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in a manner consistent with "liquidating trust" status under Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d). The Claimant Trust shall retain all rights to commence and pursue all Causes of Action of the Debtor other than (i) Estate Claims, which shall be assigned to and commenced and pursued by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (ii) Causes of Action constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets, if any, which shall be commenced and pursued by the Reorganized Debtor at the direction of the Claimant Trust as sole member of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement. The Claimant Trust and Claimant Trustee shall have and retain, and, as applicable, assign and transfer to the Litigation Sub-Trust and Litigation Trustee, any and all rights, defenses, cross-claims and counter-claims held by the Debtor with respect to any Claim as of the Petition Date. On and after the date hereof, in accordance with and subject to the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the authority to (i) compromise, settle or otherwise resolve, or withdraw any objections to Claims against the Debtor, provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall only have the authority to compromise or settle any Employee Claim with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board and in the absence of unanimous consent, any such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust and be litigated, comprised, settled, or otherwise resolved exclusively by the Litigation Trustee and (ii) compromise, settle, or otherwise resolve any Disputed Claims without approval of the Bankruptcy Court, which authority may be shared with or transferred to the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant Trust, pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state trust law, is appointed as the successor-in-interest to, and representative of, the Debtor and its Estate for the retention, enforcement, settlement, and adjustment of all Claims other than Estate Claims, the Employee Claims, and those Claims constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trust shall be administered by the Claimant Trustee, in accordance with this Agreement, for the following purposes:

(i) to manage and monetize the Claimant Trust Assets in an expeditious but orderly manner with a view towards maximizing value within a reasonable time period;

(ii) to litigate and settle Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 (other than the Employee Claims, which shall be litigated and/or settled by the Litigation Trustee if the Oversight Board does not unanimously approve of any proposed settlement of such Employee Claim by the Claimant Trustee) and any of the Causes of Action included in the Claimant Trust Assets (including any cross-claims and counter-claims); provided, however, that Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be litigated and settled by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement;

(iii) to distribute net proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries;

(iv) to distribute funds from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Trust Interests or to the Reorganized Debtor for distribution to Holders of Disputed Claims in each case in accordance with the Plan from time to time as any such Holder's Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(v) to distribute funds to the Litigation Sub-Trust at the direction the Oversight Board;

(vi) to serve as the limited partner of, and to hold the limited partnership interests in, the Reorganized Debtor;

(vii) to serve as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC, the Reorganized Debtor's general partner;

(viii) to oversee the management and monetization of the Reorganized Debtor Assets pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, in its capacity as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the New GP LLC Documents, all with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time in a manner consistent with the Reorganized Debtor's fiduciary duties as investment adviser to the Managed Funds; and

(ix) to perform any other functions and take any other actions provided for or permitted by this Agreement and the Plan, and in any other agreement executed by the Claimant Trustee.

2.4 Transfer of Assets and Rights to the Claimant Trust; Litigation Sub-Trust.

(a) On the Effective Date, pursuant to the Plan, the Debtor shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Claimant Trust Assets and related Privileges held by the Debtor to the Claimant Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan and this Agreement. To the extent certain assets comprising the Claimant Trust Assets, because of their nature or because such assets will accrue or become transferable subsequent to the Effective Date, and cannot be transferred to, vested in, and assumed by the Claimant Trust on such date, such assets shall be considered Reorganized Debtor Assets, which may be subsequently transferred to the Claimant Trust by the Reorganized Debtor consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement after such date.

(b) On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Estate Claims and related Privileges held by the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan, this Agreement, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. Following the transfer of such Privileges, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power to waive the Privileges being so assigned and transferred.

(c) On or before the Effective Date, and continuing thereafter, the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, shall provide (i) for the Claimant Trustee's and Litigation Trustee's reasonable access to all records and information in the Debtor's and Reorganized Debtor's possession, custody or control, (ii) that all Privileges related to the Claimant Trust Assets shall transfer to and vest exclusively in the Claimant Trust (except for those Privileges that will be transferred and assigned to the Litigation Sub-Trust in respect of the Estate Claims), and (iii) subject to Section 3.12(c), the Debtor and Reorganized Debtor shall preserve all records and documents (including all electronic records or documents), including, but not limited to, the Debtor's file server, email server, email archiving system, master journal, SharePoint, Oracle E-Business Suite, Advent Geneva, Siepe database, Bloomberg chat data, and any backups of the foregoing, until such time as the Claimant Trustee, with the consent of the Oversight Board and, if pertaining to any of the Estate Claims, the Litigation Trustee, directs the Reorganized Debtor, as sole member of its general partner, that such records are no longer required to be preserved. For the purposes of transfer of documents, the Claimant Trust or Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, is an assignee and successor to the Debtor in respect of the Claimant Trust Assets and Estate Claims, respectively, and shall be treated as such in any review of confidentiality restrictions in requested documents.

(d) Until the Claimant Trust terminates pursuant to the terms hereof, legal title to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims) and all property contained therein shall be vested at all times in the Claimant Trust as a separate legal entity, except where applicable law in any jurisdiction requires title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, in which case title shall be deemed to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, solely in his capacity as Claimant Trustee. For purposes of such jurisdictions, the term Claimant Trust, as used herein, shall be read to mean the Claimant Trustee.

2.5 Principal Office. The principal office of the Claimant Trust shall be maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the following address: 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

2.6 Acceptance. The Claimant Trustee accepts the Claimant Trust imposed by this Agreement and agrees to observe and perform that Claimant Trust, on and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

2.7 Further Assurances. The Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, and any successors thereof will, upon reasonable request of the Claimant Trustee, execute, acknowledge and deliver such further instruments and do such further acts as may be necessary or proper to transfer to the Claimant Trustee any portion of the Claimant Trust Assets intended to be conveyed hereby and in the Plan in the form and manner provided for hereby and in the Plan and to vest in the Claimant Trustee the powers, instruments or funds in trust hereunder.

2.8 Incidents of Ownership. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be the sole beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall retain only such incidents of ownership as are necessary to undertake the actions and transactions authorized herein.

ARTICLE III.
THE TRUSTEES

3.1 Role. In furtherance of and consistent with the purpose of the Claimant Trust, the Plan, and this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, in the Plan, and in the Confirmation Order, shall serve as Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and maintain, manage, and take action on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

3.2 Authority.

(a) In connection with the administration of the Claimant Trust, in addition to any and all of the powers enumerated elsewhere herein, the Claimant Trustee shall, in an expeditious but orderly manner, monetize the Claimant Trust Assets, make timely distributions and not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust. The Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority and is authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement and the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order relating to the Claimant Trust, within the bounds of this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable law. The Claimant Trustee will monetize the Claimant Trust Assets with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time.

(b) The Claimant Trustee, subject to the limitations set forth in Section 3.3 of this Agreement shall have the right to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, estimate, or otherwise deal with and settle any and all Claims and Causes of Action that are part of the Claimant Trust Assets, other than the Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust, as the Claimant Trustee determines is in the best interests of the Claimant Trust; provided, however, that if the Claimant Trustee proposes a settlement of an Employee Claim and does not obtain unanimous consent of the Oversight Board of such settlement, such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust for the Litigation Trustee to litigate. To the extent that any action has been taken to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, or otherwise deal with and settle any such Claims and Causes of Action prior to the Effective Date, on the Effective Date the Claimant Trustee shall be substituted for the Debtor in connection therewith in accordance with Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7025 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the caption with respect to such pending action shall be changed to the following "[Claimant Trustee], not individually but solely as Claimant Trustee for the Claimant Trust, et al. v. [Defendant]".

(c) Subject in all cases to any limitations contained herein, in the Confirmation Order, or in the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority to:

(i) solely as required by Section 2.4(d), hold legal title to any and all rights of the Claimant Trust and Beneficiaries in or arising from the Claimant Trust Assets, including collecting and receiving any and all money and other property belonging to the Claimant Trust and the right to vote or exercise any other right with respect to any claim or interest relating to the Claimant Trust Assets in any case under the Bankruptcy Code and receive any distribution with respect thereto;

(ii) open accounts for the Claimant Trust and make distributions of Claimant Trust Assets in accordance herewith;

(iii) as set forth in Section 3.11, exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties held by the Debtor with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims), including the authority under section 1123(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, and shall be deemed to be acting as a representative of the Debtor's Estate with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, including with respect to the sale, transfer, or other disposition of the Claimant Trust Assets;

(iv) settle or resolve any Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 other than the Material Claims and any Equity Interests;

(v) sell or otherwise monetize any publicly-traded asset for which there is a marketplace and any other assets (other than the Other Assets (as defined below)) valued less than or equal to $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(vi) upon the direction of the Oversight Board, fund the Litigation Sub-Trust on the Effective Date and as necessary thereafter;

(vii) exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties arising from the Claimant Trust's role as sole member of New GP LLC, and the role of New GP LLC, as general partner of the Reorganized Debtor, including the management of the Managed Funds;

(viii) protect and enforce the rights to the Claimant Trust Assets by any method deemed appropriate, including by judicial proceedings or pursuant to any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium or similar law and general principles of equity;

(ix) obtain reasonable insurance coverage with respect to any liabilities and obligations of the Trustees, Litigation Trustee, and the Members of the Oversight Board solely in their capacities as such, in the form of fiduciary liability insurance, a directors and officers policy, an errors and omissions policy, or otherwise. The cost of any such insurance shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(x) without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, but subject to the terms of this Agreement, employ various consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals, including counsel, tax advisors, consultants, brokers, investment bankers, valuation counselors, and financial advisors, as the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to aid him in fulfilling his obligations under this Agreement; such consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals shall be retained pursuant to whatever fee arrangement the Claimant Trustee deems appropriate, including contingency fee arrangements and any fees and expenses incurred by such professionals engaged by the Claimant Trustee shall be Claimant Trust Expenses and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(xi) retain and approve compensation arrangements of an independent public accounting firm to perform such reviews and/or audits of the financial books and records of the Claimant Trust as may be required by this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable laws and as may be reasonably and appropriate in Claimant Trustee's discretion. Subject to the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee may commit the Claimant Trust to, and shall pay,

such independent public accounting firm reasonable compensation for services rendered and reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred, and all such compensation and reimbursement shall be paid by the Claimant Trustee from Claimant Trust Assets;

(xii) prepare and file (A) tax returns for the Claimant Trust treating the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.671-4(a), (B) an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity, or (C) any periodic or current reports that may be required under applicable law;

(xiii) prepare and send annually to the Beneficiaries, in accordance with the tax laws, a separate statement stating a Beneficiary's interest in the Claimant Trust and its share of the Claimant Trust's income, gain, loss, deduction or credit, and to instruct all such Beneficiaries to report such items on their federal tax returns;

(xiv) to the extent applicable, assert, enforce, release, or waive any attorney-client communication, attorney work product or other Privilege or defense on behalf of the Claimant Trust (including as to any Privilege that the Debtor held prior to the Effective Date), including to provide any information to insurance carriers that the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to utilize applicable insurance coverage for any Claim or Claims;

(xv) subject to Section 3.4, invest the proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets and all income earned by the Claimant Trust, pending any distributions in short-term certificates of deposit, in banks or other savings institutions, or other temporary, liquid investments, such as Treasury bills;

(xvi) request any appropriate tax determination with respect to the Claimant Trust, including a determination pursuant to section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code;

(xvii) take or refrain from taking any and all actions the Claimant Trustee reasonably deems necessary for the continuation, protection, and maximization of the value of the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with purposes hereof;

(xviii) take all steps and execute all instruments and documents necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Claimant Trust and the activities contemplated herein and in the Confirmation Order and the Plan, and take all actions necessary to comply with the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement and the obligations thereunder and hereunder;

(xix) exercise such other powers and authority as may be vested in or assumed by the Claimant Trustee by any Final Order;

(xx) evaluate and determine strategy with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, and hold, pursue, prosecute, adjust, arbitrate, compromise, release, settle or abandon the Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust; and

(xxi) with respect to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, perform all duties and functions of the Distribution Agent as set forth in the Plan, including distributing Cash from

the Disputed Claims Reserve, solely on account of Disputed Class 1 through Class 7 Claims that were Disputed as of the Effective Date, but become Allowed, to the Reorganization Debtor such that the Reorganized Debtor can satisfy its duties and functions as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through Class 7 (the foregoing subparagraphs (i)-(xxi) being collectively, the "Authorized Acts").

(d) The Claimant Trustee and the Oversight Committee will enter into an agreement as soon as practicable after the Effective Date concerning the Claimant Trustee's authority with respect to certain other assets, including certain portfolio company assets (the "Other Assets").

(e) The Claimant Trustee has the power and authority to act as trustee of the Claimant Trust and perform the Authorized Acts through the date such Claimant Trustee resigns, is removed, or is otherwise unable to serve for any reason.

3.3 Limitation of Authority.

(a) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall not (i) be authorized to engage in any trade or business, (ii) take any actions inconsistent with the management of the Claimant Trust Assets as are required or contemplated by applicable law, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement, (iii) take any action in contravention of the Confirmation Order, the Plan, or this Agreement, or (iv) cause New GP LLC to cause the Reorganized Debtor to take any action in contravention of the Plan, Plan Documents or the Confirmation Order.

(b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and in no way limiting the terms of the Plan, the Claimant Trustee must receive the consent by vote of a simple majority of the Oversight Board pursuant to the notice and quorum requirements set forth in Section 4.5 herein, in order to:

(i) terminate or extend the term of the Claimant Trust;

(ii) prosecute, litigate, settle or otherwise resolve any of the Material Claims;

(iii) except otherwise set forth herein, sell or otherwise monetize any assets that are not Other Assets, including Reorganized Debtor Assets (other than with respect to the Managed Funds), that are valued greater than $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(iv) except for cash distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any cash distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Article IV of the Plan;

(v) except for any distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Disputed Claims after such time that such Holder's Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(vi) reserve or retain any cash or cash equivalents in an amount reasonably necessary to meet claims and contingent liabilities (including Disputed Claims and any indemnification obligations that may arise under Section 8.2 of this Agreement), to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, or to fund ongoing operations and administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(vii) borrow as may be necessary to fund activities of the Claimant Trust;

(viii) determine whether the conditions under Section 5.1(c) of this Agreement have been satisfied such that a certification should be filed with the Bankruptcy Court;

(ix) invest the Claimant Trust Assets, proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust (for the avoidance of doubt, this shall not apply to investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor or its subsidiaries solely with respect to Managed Funds);

(x) change the compensation of the Claimant Trustee;

(xi) subject to ARTICLE X, make structural changes to the Claimant Trust or take other actions to minimize any tax on the Claimant Trust Assets; and

(xii) retain counsel, experts, advisors, or any other professionals; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to obtain the consent of the Oversight Board for the retention of (i) PSZJ, WilmerHale, or Development Specialists, Inc. and (ii) any other professional whose expected fees and expenses are estimated at less than or equal to $200,000.

(c) [Reserved.]

3.4 Investment of Cash. The right and power of the Claimant Trustee to invest the Claimant Trust Assets, the proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust, with majority approval of the Oversight Board, shall be limited to the right and power to invest in such Claimant Trust Assets only in Cash and U.S. Government securities as defined in section 29(a)(16) of the Investment Company Act; provided, however that (a) the scope of any such permissible investments shall be further limited to include only those investments that a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d), may be permitted to hold, pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, or any modification in the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") guidelines, whether set forth in IRS rulings, other IRS pronouncements, or otherwise, (b) the Claimant Trustee may retain any Claimant Trust Assets received that are not Cash only for so long as may be required for the prompt and orderly monetization or other disposition of such assets, and (c) the Claimant Trustee may expend the assets of the Claimant Trust (i) as reasonably necessary to meet contingent liabilities (including indemnification and similar obligations) and maintain the value of the assets of the Claimant Trust during the pendency of this Claimant Trust, (ii) to pay Claimant Trust Expenses (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on the Claimant Trust and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with litigation), and (iii) to satisfy other liabilities incurred or assumed by the Claimant Trust (or to which the assets are otherwise subject) in accordance with the Plan or this Agreement).

3.5 Binding Nature of Actions. All actions taken and determinations made by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall he final and binding upon any and all Beneficiaries.

3.6 Term of Service. The Claimant Trustee shall serve as the Claimant Trustee for the duration of the Claimant Trust, subject to death, resignation or removal.

3.7 Resignation. The Claimant Trustee may resign as Claimant Trustee of the Claimant Trust by an instrument in writing delivered to the Bankruptcy Court and Oversight Board at least thirty (30) days before the proposed effective date of resignation. The Claimant Trustee shall continue to serve as Claimant Trustee after delivery of the Claimant Trustee's resignation until the proposed effective date of such resignation, unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board consent to an earlier effective date, which earlier effective date shall be no earlier than the date of appointment of a successor Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.9 hereof becomes effective.

3.8 Removal.

(a) The Claimant Trustee may be removed by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board for Cause for Cause immediately upon notice thereof, or without Cause upon 60 days' prior written notice. Upon the removal of the Claimant Trustee pursuant hereto, the Claimant Trustee will resign, or be deemed to have resigned, from any role or position he or she may have at New GP LLC or the Reorganized Debtor effective upon the expiration of the foregoing 60 day period unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board agree otherwise.

(b) To the extent there is any dispute regarding the removal of a Claimant Trustee (including any dispute relating to any compensation or expense reimbursement due under this Agreement) the Bankruptcy Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate such dispute. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will continue to serve as the Claimant Trustee after his removal until the earlier of (i) the time when a successor Claimant Trustee will become effective in accordance with Section 3.9 of this Agreement or (ii) such date as the Bankruptcy Court otherwise orders.

3.9 Appointment of Successor.

(a) Appointment of Successor. In the event of a vacancy by reason of the death or Disability (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is a natural person), dissolution (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is not a natural person), or removal of the Claimant Trustee, or prospective vacancy by reason of resignation, a successor Claimant Trustee shall be selected by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board. If Members of the Oversight Board are unable to secure a majority vote, the Bankruptcy Court will determine the successor Claimant Trustee on motion of the Members. If a final decree has been entered closing the Chapter 11 Case, the Claimant Trustee may seek to reopen the Chapter 11 Case for the limited purpose of determining the successor Claimant Trustee, and the costs for such motion and costs related to re-opening the Chapter 11 Case shall be paid by the Claimant Trust. The successor Claimant Trustee shall be appointed as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than sixty (60) days after the occurrence of the

vacancy or, in the case of resignation, on the effective date of the resignation of the then acting Claimant Trustee.

(b) Vesting or Rights in Successor Claimant Trustee. Every successor Claimant Trustee appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trust, the exiting Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board, and file with the Bankruptcy Court, an instrument accepting such appointment subject to the terms and provisions hereof. The successor Claimant Trustee, without any further act, deed, or conveyance shall become vested with all the rights, powers, trusts and duties of the exiting Claimant Trustee, except that the successor Claimant Trustee shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of the retiring Claimant Trustee. In no event shall the retiring Claimant Trustee be liable for the acts or omissions of the successor Claimant Trustee.

(c) Interim Claimant Trustee. During any period in which there is a vacancy in the position of Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board shall appoint one of its Members to serve as the interim Claimant Trustee (the "Interim Trustee") until a successor Claimant Trustee is appointed pursuant to Section 3.9(a). The Interim Trustee shall be subject to all the terms and conditions applicable to a Claimant Trustee hereunder. Such Interim Trustee shall not be limited in any manner from exercising any rights or powers as a Member of the Oversight Board merely by such Person's appointment as Interim Trustee.

3.10 Continuance of Claimant Trust. The death, resignation, or removal of the Claimant Trustee shall not operate to terminate the Claimant Trust created by this Agreement or to revoke any existing agency (other than any agency of the Claimant Trustee as the Claimant Trustee) created pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or invalidate any action taken by the Claimant Trustee. In the event of the resignation or removal of the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall promptly (i) execute and deliver, by the effective date of resignation or removal, such documents, instruments, records, and other writings as may be reasonably requested by his successor to effect termination of the exiting Claimant Trustee's capacity under this Agreement and the conveyance of the Claimant Trust Assets then held by the exiting Claimant Trustee to the successor Claimant Trustee; (ii) deliver to the successor Claimant Trustee all non-privileged documents, instruments, records, and other writings relating to the Claimant Trust as may be in the possession or under the control of the exiting Claimant Trustee, provided, the exiting Claimant Trustee shall have the right to make and retain copies of such documents, instruments, records and other writings delivered to the successor Claimant Trustee and the cost of making such copies shall be a Claimant Trust Expense to be paid by the Claimant Trust; and (iii) otherwise assist and cooperate in effecting the assumption of the exiting Claimant Trustee's obligations and functions by his successor, provided the fees and expenses of such assistance and cooperation shall be paid to the exiting Claimant Trustee by the Claimant Trust. The exiting Claimant Trustee shall irrevocably appoint the successor Claimant Trustee as his attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution for it and its name, place and stead to do any and all acts that such exiting Claimant Trustee is obligated to perform under this Section 3.10.

3.11 Claimant Trustee as "Estate Representative". The Claimant Trustee will be the exclusive trustee of the Claimant Trust Assets for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Estate Representative") with respect to the Claimant

Trust Assets, with all rights and powers attendant thereto, in addition to all rights and powers granted in the Plan and in this Agreement; provided that all rights and powers as representative of the Estate pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) shall be transferred to the Litigation Trustee in respect of the Estate Claims and the Employee Claims. The Claimant Trustee will be the successor-in-interest to the Debtor with respect to any action pertaining to the Claimant Trust Assets, which was or could have been commenced by the Debtor prior to the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or Confirmation Order. All actions, claims, rights or interest constituting Claimant Trust Assets are preserved and retained and may be enforced, or assignable to the Litigation Sub-Trust, by the Claimant Trustee as an Estate Representative.

3.12 Books and Records.

(a) The Claimant Trustee shall maintain in respect of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries books and records reflecting Claimant Trust Assets in its possession and the income of the Claimant Trust and payment of expenses, liabilities, and claims against or assumed by the Claimant Trust in such detail and for such period of time as may be necessary to enable it to make full and proper accounting in respect thereof. Such books and records shall be maintained as reasonably necessary to facilitate compliance with the tax reporting requirements of the Claimant Trust and the requirements of Article VII herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Claimant Trustee to file any accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Claimant Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Claimant Trust Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall provide quarterly reporting to the Oversight Board and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of (i) the status of the Claimant Trust Assets, (ii) the balance of Cash held by the Claimant Trust (including in each of the Claimant Trust Expense Reserve and Disputed Claim Reserve), (iii) the determination and any re-determination, as applicable, of the total amount allocated to the Disputed Claim Reserve, (iv) the status of Disputed Claims and any resolutions thereof, (v) the status of any litigation, including the pursuit of the Causes of Action, (vi) the Reorganized Debtor's performance, and (vii) operating expenses; provided, however, that the Claimant Trustee may, with respect to any Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trust Beneficiary, redact any portion of such reports that relate to such Entity's Claim or Equity Interest, as applicable and any reporting provided to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries may be subject to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's agreement to maintain confidentiality with respect to any non-public information.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may dispose some or all of the books and records maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the later of (i) such time as the Claimant Trustee determines, with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board, that the continued possession or maintenance of such books and records is no longer necessary for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, or (ii) upon the termination and winding up of the Claimant Trust under Article IX of this Agreement; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not dispose of any books and records related to the Estate Claims or Employee Claims without the consent of the Litigation Trustee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee shall cause the Reorganized Debtor and its subsidiaries to retain such books and records, and for such periods, as are required to be retained pursuant to Section 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act or any other applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

3.13 Compensation and Reimbursement; Engagement of Professionals.

(a) Compensation and Expenses.

(i) Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Claimant Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall receive compensation of $150,000 per month (the "Base Salary"). Within the first forty-five days following the Confirmation Date, the Claimant Trustee, on the one hand, and the Committee, if prior to the Effective Date, or the Oversight Board, if on or after the Effective Date, on the other, will negotiate go-forward compensation for the Claimant Trustee which will include (a) the Base Salary, (b) a success fee, and (c) severance.

(ii) Expense Reimbursements. All reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the Claimant Trustee in the performance of his or her duties hereunder, shall be reimbursed as Claimant Trust Expenses paid by the Claimant Trust.

(b) Professionals.

(i) Engagement of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall engage professionals from time to time in conjunction with the services provided hereunder. The Claimant Trustee's engagement of such professionals shall be approved by a majority of the Oversight Board as set forth in Section 3.3(b) hereof.

(ii) Fees and Expenses of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any retained professionals as Claimant Trust Expenses.

3.14 Reliance by Claimant Trustee. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Claimant Trustee may rely, and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting, on any resolution, statement, certificate, instrument, opinion, report, notice, request, consent, order or other instrument or document that the Claimant Trustee has no reason to believe to be other than genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties or, in the case of facsimiles, to have been sent by the proper party or parties, and the Claimant Trustee may conclusively rely as to the truth of the statements and correctness of the opinions or direction expressed therein. The Claimant Trustee may consult with counsel and other professionals, and any advice of such counsel or other professionals shall constitute full and complete authorization and protection in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trustee shall have the right at any time to seek instructions from the Bankruptcy Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction concerning the Claimant Trust Assets, this Agreement, the Plan, or any other document executed in connection therewith, and any such instructions given shall be full and complete authorization in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trust shall have the right to seek Orders from the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in Article IX of the Plan.

3.15 Commingling of Claimant Trust Assets. The Claimant Trustee shall not commingle any of the Claimant Trust Assets with his or her own property or the property of any other Person.

3.16 Delaware Trustee.

(a) The Delaware Trustee shall have the limited power and authority, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to (i) accept legal process served on the Claimant Trust in the State of Delaware; and (ii) execute any certificates that are required to be executed under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and file such certificates in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, and take such action or refrain from taking such action under this Agreement, in either case as may be directed in a writing delivered to the Delaware Trustee by the Claimant Trustee and upon which the Delaware Trustee shall be entitled to conclusively and exclusively rely; provided, however, that the Delaware Trustee shall not be required to take or to refrain from taking any such action if the Delaware Trustee shall believe, or shall have been advised by counsel, that such performance is likely to involve the Delaware Trustee in personal liability or to result in personal liability to the Delaware Trustee, or is contrary to the terms of tbis Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes a party or is otherwise contrary to law. The Parties agree not to instruct the Delaware Trustee to take any action or to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes party or that is otherwise contrary to law. Other than as expressly provided for in this Agreement, the Delaware Trustee shall have no duty or power to take any action for or on behalf of the Claimant Trust. For the avoidance of doubt, the Delaware Trustee will only have such rights and obligations as expressly provided by reference to the Delaware Trustee hereunder. The Delaware Trustee shall not be entitled to exercise any powers, nor shall the Delaware Trustee have any of the duties and responsibilities, of the Claimant Trustee set forth herein. The Delaware Trustee shall be one of the trustees of the Claimant Trust for the sole and limited purpose of fulfilling the requirements of Section 3807 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and for taking such actions as are required to be taken by a Delaware Trustee under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act. The duties (including fiduciary duties), liabilities and obligations of the Delaware Trustee shall be limited to those expressly set forth in this Section 3.16 and there shall be no other duties (including fiduciary duties) or obligations, express or implied, at law or in equity, of the Delaware Trustee. To the extent that, at law or in equity, the Delaware Trustee has duties (including fiduciary duties) and liabilities relating thereto to the Claimant Trust, the other parties hereto or any beneficiary of the Claimant Trust, it is hereby understood and agreed by the other parties hereto that such duties and liabilities are replaced by the duties and liabilities of the Delaware Trustee expressly set forth in this Agreement.

(b) The Delaware Trustee shall serve until such time as the Claimant Trustee removes the Delaware Trustee or the Delaware Trustee resigns and a successor Delaware Trustee is appointed by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the terms hereof. The Delaware Trustee may resign at any time upon the giving of at least thirty (30) days' advance written notice to the Claimant Trustee; provided, that such resignation shall not become effective unless and until a successor Delaware Trustee shall have been appointed by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the terms hereof. If the Claimant Trustee does not act within such thirty (30) day period, the Delaware Trustee may apply to the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware for the appointment of a successor Delaware Trustee.

(c) Upon the resignation or removal of the Delaware Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall appoint a successor Delaware Trustee by delivering a written instrument to the

outgoing Delaware Trustee. Any successor Delaware Trustee must satisfy the requirements of Section 3807 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act. Any resignation or removal of the Delaware Trustee and appointment of a successor Delaware Trustee shall not become effective until a written acceptance of appointment is delivered by the successor Delaware Trustee to the outgoing Delaware Trustee and the Claimant Trustee and any undisputed fees, expenses and indemnity due to the outgoing Delaware Trustee are paid. Following compliance with the preceding sentence, the successor Delaware Trustee shall become fully vested with all of the rights, powers, duties and obligations of the outgoing Delaware Trustee under this Agreement, with like effect as if originally named as Delaware Trustee, and the outgoing Delaware Trustee shall be discharged of its duties and obligations under this Agreement.

(d) The Delaware Trustee shall be paid such compensation as agreed to pursuant to a separate fee agreement. The Claimant Trust shall promptly advance and reimburse the Delaware Trustee for all reasonable out-of-pocket costs and expenses (including reasonable legal fees and expenses) incurred by the Delaware Trustee in connection with the performance of its duties hereunder.

(e) WTNA shall not be responsible or liable for any failure or delay in the performance of its obligations under this Agreement arising out of or caused, directly or indirectly, by circumstances beyond its control, including without limitation, any act or provision of any present or future law or regulation or governmental authority; acts of God; earthquakes; fires; floods; wars; terrorism; civil or military disturbances; sabotage; epidemics; riots; interruptions, loss or malfunctions of utilities, computer (hardware or software) or communications service; accidents; labor disputes; acts of civil or military authority or governmental actions; or the unavailability of the Federal Reserve Bank wire or telex or other wire or communication facility.

(f) Any corporation or association into which WTNA may be converted or merged, or with which it may be consolidated, or to which it may sell or transfer all or substantially all of its corporate trust business and assets as a whole or substantially as a whole, or any corporation or association resulting from any such conversion, sale, merger, consolidation or transfer to which the Delaware Trustee is a party, will be and become the successor Delaware Trustee under this Agreement and will have and succeed to the rights, powers, duties, immunities and privileges as its predecessor, without the execution or filing of any instrument or paper or the performance of any further act.

ARTICLE IV.
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD

4.1 Oversight Board Members. The Oversight Board will be comprised of five (5) Members appointed to serve as the board of managers of the Claimant Trust, at least two (2) of which shall be disinterested Members selected by the Creditors' Committee (such disinterested members, the "Disinterested Members"). The initial Members of the Oversight Board will be representatives of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, Meta-e Discovery, UBS, and David Pauker. David Pauker and Paul McVoy, the representative of Meta-e Discovery, shall serve as the initial Disinterested Board Members; provided, however, that if the Plan is confirmed with the Convenience Class or any other convenience class supported by the Creditors' Committee, Meta-

E Discovery and its representative will resign on the Effective Date or as soon as practicable thereafter and be replaced in accordance with Section 4.10 hereof..

4.2 Authority and Responsibilities.

(a) The Oversight Board shall, as and when requested by either of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, or when the Members otherwise deem it to be appropriate or as is otherwise required under the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement, consult with and advise the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee as to the administration and management of the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, this Agreement, and Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement (as applicable) and shall have the other responsibilities and powers as set forth herein. As set forth in the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and herein, the Oversight Board shall have the authority and responsibility to oversee, review, and govern the activities of the Claimant Trust, including the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the performance of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, and shall have the authority to remove the Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.8 hereof or the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; provided, however, that the Oversight Board may not direct either Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee to act inconsistently with their respective duties under this Agreement (including without limitation as set in Section 4.2(e) below), the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or applicable law.

(b) The Oversight Board shall also (i) monitor and oversee the administration of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee's performance of his or her responsibilities under this Agreement, (ii) as more fully set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, approve funding to the Litigation Sub-Trust, monitor and oversee the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee's performance of his responsibilities under the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (iii) perform such other tasks as are set forth herein, in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and in the Plan.

(c) The Claimant Trustee shall consult with and provide information to the Oversight Board in accordance with and pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement to enable the Oversight Board to meet its obligations hereunder.

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to (i) obtain the approval of any action by the Oversight Board to the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is required to be taken by applicable law, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement or (ii) follow the directions of the Oversight Board to take any action the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is prohibited by applicable law the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement.

(e) Notwithstanding provision of this Agreement to the contrary, with respect to the activities of the Reorganized Debtor in its capacity as an investment adviser (and subsidiaries of the Reorganized Debtor that serve as general partner or in an equivalent capacity) to any Managed Funds, the Oversight Board shall not make investment decisions or otherwise participate

in the investment decision making process relating to any such Managed Funds, nor shall the Oversight Board or any member thereof serve as a fiduciary to any such Managed Funds. It is agreed and understood that investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor (or its subsidiary entities) with respect to Managed Funds shall be made by the Claimant Trustee in his capacity as an officer of the Reorganized Debtor and New GP LLC and/or such persons who serve as investment personnel of the Reorganized Debtor from time to time, and shall be subject to the fiduciary duties applicable to such entities and persons as investment adviser to such Managed Funds.

4.3 Fiduciary Duties. The Oversight Board (and each Member in its capacity as such) shall have fiduciary duties to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries consistent with the fiduciary duties that the members of the Creditors' Committee have to unsecured creditors and shall exercise its responsibilities accordingly; provided, however, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to any Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests or Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests until such Holders become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Section 5.1(c) hereof; provided, further, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to a Holder of an Equity Trust Interest if such Holder is named as a defendant in any of the Causes of Action, including Estate Claims, in their capacities as sucb, it being the intent that the Oversight Board's fiduciary duties are to maximize the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, including the Causes of Action. In all circumstances, the Oversight Board shall act in tlie best interests of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and in furtherance of the purpose of the Claimant Trust. Notwitbstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the foregoing shall not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

4.4 Meetings of the Oversight Board. Meetings of the Oversight Board are to be beld as necessary to ensure the operation of the Claimant Trust but in no event less often than quarterly. Special meetings of the Oversight Board may be held whenever and wherever called for by the Claimant Trustee or any Member; provided, however, that notice of any such meeting shall be duly given in writing no less than 48 hours prior to such meeting (such notice requirement being subject to any waiver by the Members in the minutes, if any, or other transcript, if any, of proceedings of the Oversigbt Board). Unless the Oversight Board decides otherwise (which decision shall rest in the reasonable discretion of the Oversight Board), the Claimant Trustee, and each of the Claimant Trustee's designated advisors may, but are not required to, attend meetings of the Oversight Board.

4.5 Unanimous Written Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Oversight Board in a meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by unanimous written consents describing the actions taken, signed by all Members and recorded. If any Member informs the Claimant Trustee (via e-mail or otherwise) that he or she objects to the decision, determination, action, or inaction proposed to be made by unanimous written consent, the Claimant Trustee must use reasonable good faith efforts to schedule a meeting on the issue to be set within 48 hours of the request or as soon thereafter as possible on which all members of the Oversight Board are available in person or by telephone. Such decision, determination, action, or inaction must then be made pursuant to the meeting protocols set forth herein.

4.6 Manner of Acting.

(a) A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Oversight Board shall consist of at least three Members (including no less than one (1) Disinterested Member); provided that if the transaction of business at a meeting would constitute a direct or indirect conflict of interest for the Redeemer Committee, Acis, and/or UBS, at least two Disinterested Members must be present for there to be a quorum. Except as set otherwise forth herein, the majority vote of the Members present at a duly called meeting at which a quorum is present throughout shall be the act of the Oversight Board except as otherwise required by law or as provided in this Agreement. Any or all of the Members may participate in a regular or special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, conference telephone, video conference, or similar communications equipment by means of which all Persons participating in the meeting may hear each other, in which case any required notice of such meeting may generally describe the arrangements (rather than or in addition of the place) for the holding hereof. Any Member participating in a meeting by this means is deemed to be present in person at the meeting. Voting (including on negative notice) may be conducted by electronic mail or individual communications by the applicable Trustee and each Member.

(b) Any Member who is present and entitled to vote at a meeting of the Oversight Board when action is taken is deemed to have assented to the action taken, subject to the requisite vote of the Oversight Board, unless (i) such Member objects at the beginning of the meeting (or promptly upon his/her arrival) to holding or transacting business at the meeting; (ii) his/her dissent or abstention from the action taken is entered in the minutes of the meeting; or (iii) he/she delivers written notice (including by electronic or facsimile transmission) of his/her dissent or abstention to the Oversight Board before its adjournment. The right of dissent or abstention is not available to any Member of the Oversight Board who votes in favor of the action taken.

(c) Prior to a vote on any matter or issue or the taking of any action with respect to any matter or issue, each Member shall report to the Oversight Board any conflict of interest such Member has or may have with respect to the matter or issue at hand and fully disclose the nature of such conflict or potential conflict (including, without limitation, disclosing any and all financial or other pecuniary interests that such Member may have with respect to or in connection with such matter or issue, other than solely as a holder of Trust Interests). A Member who, with respect to a matter or issue, has or who may have a conflict of interest whereby such Member's interests are adverse to the interests of the Claimant Trust shall be deemed a "Conflicted Member" who shall not be entitled to vote or take part in any action with respect to such matter or issue. In the event of a Conflicted Member, the vote or action with respect to such matter or issue giving rise to such conflict shall be undertaken only by Members who are not Conflicted Members and, notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the affirmative vote of only a majority of the Members who are not Conflicted Members shall be required to approve of such matter or issue and the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

(d) Each of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, and UBS shall be deemed "Conflicted Members" with respect to any matter or issue related to or otherwise affecting any of their respective Claim(s) (a "Committee Member Claim Matter"). A unanimous vote of the Disinterested Members shall be required to approve of or otherwise take action with respect to any

Committee Member Claim Matter and, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

4.7 Tenure of the Members of the Oversight Board. The authority of the Members of the Oversight Board will be effective as of the Effective Date and will remain and continue in full force and effect until the Claimant Trust is terminated in accordance with Article IX hereof. The Members of the Oversight Board will serve until such Member's successor is duly appointed or until such Member's earlier death or resignation pursuant to Section 4.8 below, or removal pursuant to Section 4.9 below.

4.8 Resignation. A Member of the Oversight Board may resign by giving prior written notice thereof to the Claimant Trustee and other Members. Such resignation shall become effective on the earlier to occur of (i) the day that is 90 days following the delivery of such notice, (ii) the appointment of a successor in accordance with Section 4.10 below, and (iii) such other date as may be agreed to by the Claimant Trustee and the non-resigning Members of the Oversight Board.

4.9 Removal. A majority of the Oversight Board may remove any Member for Cause or Disability. If any Committee Member has its Claim disallowed in its entirety the representative of such entity will immediately be removed as a Member without the requirement for a vote and a successor will be appointed in the manner set forth herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, upon the termination of the Claimant Trust, any or all of the Members shall be deemed to have resigned.

4.10 Appointment of a Successor Member.

(a) In the event of a vacancy on the Oversight Board (whether by removal, death, or resignation), a new Member may be appointed to fill such position by the remaining Members acting unanimously; provided, however, that any vacancy resulting from the removal, resignation, or death of a Disinterested Member may only be filled by a disinterested Person unaffiliated with any Claimant or constituency in the Chapter 11 Case; provided, further, that if an individual serving as the representative of a Committee Member resigns from its role as representative, such resignation shall not be deemed resignation of the Committee Member itself and such Committee Member shall have the exclusive right to designate its replacement representative for the Oversight Board. The appointment of a successor Member will be further evidenced by the Claimant Trustee's filing with the Bankruptcy Court (to the extent a final decree has not been entered) and posting on the Claimant Trustee's website a notice of appointment, at the direction of the Oversight Board, which notice will include the name, address, and telephone number of the successor Member.

(b) Immediately upon the appointment of any successor Member, the successor Member shall assume all rights, powers, duties, authority, and privileges of a Member hereunder and such rights and privileges will be vested in and undertaken by the successor Member without any further act. A successor Member will not be liable personally for any act or omission of a predecessor Member.

(c) Every successor Member appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trustee and other Members an instrument accepting the appointment

under this Agreement and agreeing to be bound thereto, and thereupon the successor Member without any further act, deed, or conveyance, shall become vested with all rights, powers, trusts, and duties of a Member hereunder.

4.11 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses. Unless determined by the Oversight Board, no Member shall be entitled to compensation in connection with his or her service to the Oversight Board; provided, however, that a Disinterested Member shall be compensated in a manner and amount initially set by the other Members and as thereafter amended from time to time by agreement between the Oversight Board and the Disinterested Member. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will reimburse the Members for all reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Members in connection with the performance of their duties hereunder (which shall not include fees, costs, and expenses of legal counsel).

4.12 Confidentiality. Each Member shall, during the period that such Member serves as a Member under this Agreement and following the termination of this Agreement or following such Member's removal or resignation, hold strictly confidential and not use for personal gain any material, non-public information of or pertaining to any Person to which any of the Claimant Trust Assets relates or of which such Member has become aware in the Member's capacity as a Member ("Confidential Trust Information"), except as otherwise required by law. For the avoidance of doubt, a Member's Affiliates, employer, and employer's Affiliates (and collectively with such Persons' directors, officers, partners, principals and employees, "Member Affiliates") shall not be deemed to have received Confidential Trust Information solely due to the fact that a Member has received Confidential Trust Information in his or her capacity as a Member of the Oversight Board and to the extent that (a) a Member does not disclose any Confidential Trust Information to a Member Affiliate, (b) the business activities of such Member Affiliates are conducted without reference to, and without use of, Confidential Trust Information, and (c) no Member Affiliate is otherwise directed to take, or takes on behalf of a Member or Member Affiliate, any actions that are contrary to the terms of this Section 4.12.

ARTICLE V.
TRUST INTERESTS

5.1 Claimant Trust Interests.

(a) General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (the "GUC Beneficiaries"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claim a General Unsecured Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 8 Claim bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 8 Claims. The General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests shall be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(b) Subordinated Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under tbe Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Class 9 Subordinated Claims (the "Subordinated Beneficiaries"). The

Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claim a Subordinated Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 9 Claim bears to the total of amount of the Allowed Class 9. The Subordinated Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. The Subordinated Beneficiaries shall only be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets after each GUC Beneficiary has been repaid in full with applicable interest on account of such GUC Beneficiary's Allowed General Unsecured Claim, and all Disputed General Unsecured Claims have been resolved, in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(c) Contingent Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Interest becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Contingent Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and Holders of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests (collectively, the "Equity Holders"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and each Holder of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests a Contingent Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interest bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interests, as applicable, under the Plan. Contingent Trust Interests shall not vest, and the Equity Holders shall not have any rights under this Agreement, unless and until the Claimant Trustee files with the Bankruptcy Court a certification that all GUC Beneficiaries have been paid indefeasibly in full, including, to the extent applicable, all accrued and unpaid post-petition interest consistent with the Plan and all Disputed Claims have been resolved (the "GUC Payment Certification"). Equity Holders will only be deemed "Beneficiaries" under this Agreement upon the filing of a GUC Payment Certification with the Bankruptcy Court, at which time the Contingent Trust Interests will vest and be deemed "Equity Trust Interests." The Equity Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to Subordinated Trust Interests, and distributions on account thereof shall only be made if and when Subordinated Beneficiaries have been repaid in full on account of such Subordinated Beneficiary's Allowed Subordinated Claim, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement. The Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests shall be subordinated to the Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests.

5.2 Interests Beneficial Only. The ownership of the beneficial interests in the Claimant Trust shall not entitle the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to any title in or to the Claimant Trust Assets (which title shall be vested in the Claimant Trust) or to any right to call for a partition or division of the Claimant Trust Assets or to require an accounting. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any governance right or other wright to direct Claimant Trust activities.

5.3 Transferability of Trust Interests. No transfer, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other disposition of a Trust Interest may be effected until (i) such action is unanimously approved by the Oversight Board, (ii) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary to assure that any such disposition shall not cause the Claimant Trust to be subject to entity-level taxation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and (iii) either (x) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board, acting unanimously, have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary or appropriate to assure that any such disposition shall not (a) require the Claimant Trust to comply with the registration and/or

reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act or (b) cause any adverse effect under the Investment Advisers Act, or (y) the Oversight Board, acting unanimously, has determined, in its sole and absolute discretion, to cause the Claimant Trust to become a public reporting company and/or make periodic reports under the Exchange Act (provided that it is not required to register under the Investment Company Act or register its securities under the Securities Act) to enable such disposition to be made. In the event that any such disposition is allowed, the Oversight Board and the Claimant Trustee may add such restrictions upon such disposition and other terms of this Agreement as are deemed necessary or appropriate by the Claimant Trustee, with the advice of counsel, to permit or facilitate such disposition under applicable securities and other laws.

5.4 Registry of Trust Interests.

(a) Registrar. The Claimant Trustee shall appoint a registrar, which may be the Claimant Trustee (the "Registrar"), for the purpose of recording ownership of the Trust Interests as provided herein. The Registrar, if other than the Claimant Trustee, shall be an institution or person acceptable to the Oversight Board. For its services hereunder, the Registrar, unless it is the Claimant Trustee, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation from the Claimant Trust as a Claimant Trust Expense.

(b) Trust Register. The Claimant Trustee shall cause to be kept at the office of the Registrar, or at such other place or places as shall be designated by the Registrar from time to time, a registry of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Equity Holders (the "Trust Register"), which shall be maintained pursuant to such reasonable regulations as the Claimant Trustee and the Registrar may prescribe.

(c) Access to Register by Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and their duly authorized representatives shall have the right, upon reasonable prior written notice to the Claimant Trustee, and in accordance with reasonable regulations prescribed by the Claimant Trustee, to inspect and, at the expense of the Claimant Trust Beneficiary make copies of the Trust Register, in each case for a purpose reasonable and related to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's Trust Interest.

5.5 Exemption from Registration. The Parties hereto intend that the rights of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries arising under this Claimant Trust shall not be "securities" under applicable laws, but none of the Parties represent or warrant that such rights shall not be securities or shall not be entitled to exemption from registration under the applicable securities laws. The Oversight Board, acting unanimously, and Claimant Trustee may amend this Agreement in accordance with Article IX hereof to make such changes as are deemed necessary or appropriate with the advice of counsel, to ensure that the Claimant Trust is not subject to registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act. The Trust Interests shall not have consent or voting rights or otherwise confer on the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any rights similar to the rights of a shareholder of a corporation in respect of any actions taken or to be taken, or decisions made or to be made, by the Oversight Board and/or the Claimant Trustee under this Agreement.

5.6 Absolute Owners. The Claimant Trustee may deem and treat the Claimant Trust Beneficiary of record as determined pursuant to this Article 5 as the absolute owner of such Trust Interests for the purpose of receiving distributions and payment thereon or on account thereof and for all other purposes whatsoever.

5.7 Effect of Death, Incapacity, or Bankruptcy. The death, incapacity, or bankruptcy of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary during the term of the Claimant Trust shall not (i) entitle the representatives or creditors of the deceased Beneficiary to any additional rights under this Agreement, or (ii) otherwise affect the rights and obligations of any of other Claimant Trust Beneficiary under this Agreement.

5.8 Change of Address. Any Claimant Trust Beneficiary may, after the Effective Date, select an alternative distribution address by providing notice to the Claimant Trustee identifying such alternative distribution address. Such notification shall be effective only upon receipt by the Claimant Trustee. Absent actual receipt of such notice by the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall not recognize any such change of distribution address.

5.9 Standing. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have standing to direct the Claimant Trustee to do or not to do any act or to institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity against any party upon or with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any direct interest in or to any of the Claimant Trust Assets.

5.10 Limitations on Rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

(a) The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall have no rights other than those set forth in this Agreement, the Confirmation Order, or the Plan (including any Plan Supplement documents incorporated therein).

(b) In any action taken by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, the prevailing party will be entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other costs; provided, however, that any fees and costs shall be borne by the Claimant Trust on behalf of any such Trustee or Member, as set forth herein.

(c) A Claimant Trust Beneficiary who brings any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, may be required by order of the Bankruptcy Court to post a bond ensuring that the full costs of a legal defense can be reimbursed. A request for such bond can be made by the Claimant Trust or by Claimant Trust Beneficiaries constituting in the aggregate at least 50% of the most senior class of Claimant Trust Interests.

(d) Any action brought by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary must be brought in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are deemed to have waived any right to a trial by jury

(e) The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to bring any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or current or former Member, in their capacity as such, shall not survive the final distribution by the Claimant Trust.

ARTICLE VI.
DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Distributions.

(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute to holders of Trust Interests at least annually the Cash on hand net of any amounts that (a) are reasonably necessary to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets pending their monetization or other disposition during the term of the Claimant Trust, (b) are necessary to pay or reserve for reasonably incurred or anticipated Claimant Trust Expenses and any other expenses incurred by the Claimant Trust (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on or payable by the Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets), (c) are necessary to pay or reserve for the anticipated costs and expenses of the Litigation Sub-Trust, (d) are necessary to satisfy or reserve for other liabilities incurred or anticipated by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement (including, but not limited to, indemnification obligations and similar expenses in such amounts and for such period of time as the Claimant Trustee determines, in good faith, may be necessary and appropriate, which determination shall not be subject to consent of the Oversight Board, may not be modified without the express written consent of the Claimant Trustee, and shall survive termination of the Claimant Trustee), (e) are necessary to maintain the Disputed Claims Reserve, and (f) are necessary to pay Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this paragraph, the Claimant Trustee shall exercise reasonable efforts to make initial distributions within six months of the Effective Date, and the Oversight Board may not prevent such initial distributions unless upon a unanimous vote of the Oversight Board. The Claimant Trustee may otherwise distribute all Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust in accordance with this Agreement and the Plan at such time or times as the Claimant Trustee is directed by the Oversight Board.

(b) At the request of the Reorganized Debtor, subject in all respects to the provisions of this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute Cash to the Reorganized Debtor, as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through 7, sufficient to satisfy Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7.

(c) All proceeds of Claimant Trust Assets shall be distributed in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement.

6.2 Manner of Payment or Distribution. All distributions made by the Claimant Trustee on behalf of the Claimant Trust to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be payable by the Claimant Trustee directly to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of record as of the twentieth (20th) day prior to the date scheduled for the distribution, unless such day is not a Business Day, then such date or the distribution shall be the following Business Day, but such distribution shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date.

6.3 Delivery of Distributions. All distributions under this Agreement to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall be made, as applicable, at the address of such Claimant Trust Beneficiary (a) as set forth on the Schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court or (b) on the books and records

of the Debtor or their agents, as applicable, unless the Claimant Trustee has been notified in writing of a change of address pursuant to Section 5.6 hereof.

6.4 Disputed Claims Reserves. There will be no distributions under this Agreement or the Plan on account of Disputed Claims pending Allowance. The Claimant Trustee will maintain a Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan and will make distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan.

6.5 Undeliverable Distributions and Unclaimed Property. All undeliverable distributions and unclaimed property shall be treated in the manner set forth in the Plan.

6.6 *De Minimis* Distributions. Distributions with a value of less than $100 will be treated in accordance with the Plan.

6.7 United States Claimant Trustee Fees and Reports. **After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall pay as a Claimant Trust Expense, all fees incurred under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) by reason of the Claimant Trust's disbursements until the Chapter 11 Case is closed. After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall prepare and serve on the Office of the United States Trustee such quarterly disbursement reports for the Claimant Trust as required by the Office of the United States Trustee Office for as long as the Chapter 11 Case remains open.**

ARTICLE VII.
TAX MATTERS

7.1 Tax Treatment and Tax Returns.

(a) It is intended for the initial transfer of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust to be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable) as if the Debtor transferred the Claimant Trust Assets (other than the amounts set aside in the Disputed Claim Reserve, if the Claimant Trustee makes the election described below) to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and then, immediately thereafter, the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries transferred the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust. Consistent with such treatment, (i) it is intended that the Claimant Trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable), (ii) it is intended that the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries will be treated as the grantors of the Claimant Trust and owners of their respective share of the Claimant Trust Assets for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). The Claimant Trustee shall file all federal income tax returns (and foreign, state, and local income tax returns where applicable) for the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.671-4(a).

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and notify the applicable Beneficiaries of such valuation, and such valuation shall be used consistently by all parties for all federal income tax purposes.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may file an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the

Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity.

7.2 Withholding. The Claimant Trustee may withhold from any amount distributed from the Claimant Trust to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary such sum or sums as are required to be withheld under the income tax laws of the United States or of any state or political subdivision thereof. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the applicable Beneficiary. As a condition to receiving any distribution from the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee may require that the Beneficiary provide such holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Claimant Trustee to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws. If a Beneficiary fails to comply with such a request within one year, such distribution shall be deemed an unclaimed distribution and treated in accordance with Section 6.5(b) of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII.
STANDARD OF CARE AND INDEMNIFICATION

8.1 Standard of Care. None of the Claimant Trustee, acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan, the Delaware Trustee, acting in its capacity as Delaware Trustee, the Oversight Board, or any current or any individual Member, solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board, shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person (including any Claimant Trust Beneficiary) in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over sucb action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the acts or omissions of any such Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member constituted fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. The employees, agents and professionals retained by the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or individual Member shall not be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or any other Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that such acts or omissions by such employee, agent, or professional constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence. None of the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or any Member shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person for the acts or omissions of any employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee taken or not taken in good faith reliance on the advice of professionals or, as applicable, with the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the selection, retention, or supervision of such employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust.

8.2 Indemnification. The Claimant Trustee (including each former Claimant Trustee), WTNA in its individual capacity and as Delaware Trustee, the Oversight Board, and all past and present Members (collectively, in their capacities as such, the "Indemnified Parties") shall be

indemnified by the Claimant Trust against and held harmless by the Claimant Trust from any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, disbursements, and related expenses) to which the Indemnified Parties may become subject in connection with any action, suit, proceeding or investigation brought or threatened against any of the Indemnified Parties in their capacity as Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member, or in connection with any matter arising out of or related to the Plan, this Agreement, or the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or other court of competent jurisdiction that the Indemnified Party's acts or omissions constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. If the Indemnified Party becomes involved in any action, proceeding, or investigation in connection with any matter arising out of or in connection with the Plan, this Agreement or the affairs of the Claimant Trust for which an indemnification obligation could arise, the Indemnified Party shall promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board, as applicable; provided, however, that the failure of an Indemnified Party to promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board of an indemnification obligation will not excuse the Claimant Trust from indemnifying the Indemnified Party unless such delay has caused the Claimant Trust material harm. The Claimant Trust shall pay, advance or otherwise reimburse on demand of an Indemnified Party the Indemnified Party's reasonable legal and other defense expenses (including, without limitation, the cost of any investigation and preparation and attorney fees, disbursements, and other expenses related to any claim that has been brought or threatened to be brought) incurred in connection therewith or in connection with enforcing his or her rights under this Section 8.2 as a Claimant Trust Expense, and the Claimant Trust shall not refuse to make any payments to the Indemnified Party on the assertion that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful misconduct or acted in bad faith; provided that the Indemnified Party shall be required to repay promptly to the Claimant Trust the amount of any such advanced or reimbursed expenses paid to the Indemnified Party to the extent that it shall be ultimately determined by Final Order that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust with respect to which such expenses were paid; provided, further, that any such repayment obligation shall be unsecured and interest free. The Claimant Trust shall indemnify and hold harmless the employees, agents and professionals of the Claimant Trust and Indemnified Parties to the same extent as provided in this Section 8.2 for the Indemnified Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Section 8.2 shall remain available to any former Claimant Trustee, WTNA in its individual capacity and as Delaware Trustee, or Member or the estate of any decedent Claimant Trustee or Member, solely in their capacities as such. The indemnification provided hereby shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which the Indemnified Party may now or in the future be entitled to under the Plan or any applicable insurance policy. The failure of the Claimant Trust to pay or reimburse an Indemnified Party as required under this Section 8.2 shall constitute irreparable harm to the Indemnified Party and such Indemnified Party shall be entitled to specific performance of the obligations herein. The terms of this Section 8.2 shall survive the termination of this Agreement and the resignation or removal of any Indemnified Party.

8.3 No Personal Liability. Except as otherwise provided herein, neither of the Trustees nor Members of the Oversight Board shall be subject to any personal liability whatsoever, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, to any Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust to the fullest extent provided under Section 3803 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, and all Persons asserting claims against the Claimant Trustee, Litigation Trustee, or any Members, or

otherwise asserting claims of any nature in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, shall look solely to the Claimant Trust Assets for satisfaction of any such claims.

8.4 Other Protections. To the extent applicable and not otherwise addressed herein, the provisions and protections set forth in Article IX of the Plan will apply to the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trustee, and the Members.

ARTICLE IX.
TERMINATION

9.1 Duration. The Trustees, the Claimant Trust, and the Oversight Board shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as: (a) the Litigation Trustee determines that the pursuit of Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Estate Claims, (b) the Claimant Trustee determines that the pursuit of Causes of Action (other than Estate Claims) is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Causes of Action, (c) the Clamant Trustee determines that the pursuit of sales of other Claimant Trust Assets is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such sales of Claimant Trust Assets, (d) all objections to Disputed Claims and Equity Interests are fully resolved, (e) the Reorganized Debtor is dissolved, and (f) all Distributions required to be made by the Claimant Trustee to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries under the Plan have been made, but in no event shall the Claimant Trust be dissolved later than three years from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Claimant Trust Assets.

9.2 Distributions in Kind. Upon dissolution of the Claimant Trust, any remaining Claimant Trust Assets that exceed the amounts required to be paid under the Plan will be transferred (in the sole discretion of the Claimant Trustee) in Cash or in-kind to the Holders of the Claimant Trust Interests as provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

9.3 Continuance of the Claimant Trustee for Winding Up. After dissolution of the Claimant Trust and for purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee shall continue to act as such until the Claimant Trustee's duties have been fully performed. Prior to the final distribution of all remaining Claimant Trust Assets, the Claimant Trustee shall be entitled to reserve from such assets any and all amounts required to provide for the Claimant Trustee's own costs and expenses, including a reserve to fund any potential indemnification or similar obligations of the Claimant Trust, until such time as the winding up of the Claimant Trust is completed. Upon the dissolution of the Claimant Trust and completion of the winding up of the assets, liabilities and affairs of the Claimant Trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the Claimant Trustee shall prepare, execute and file a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware to terminate the Claimant Trust pursuant to Section 3810 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (such date upon which the certificate of cancellation is filed shall be referred to as the "Termination Date"). If the Delaware Trustee's signature is required for purposes of filing such certificate of cancellation, the Claimant Trustee shall provide the Delaware

Trustee with written direction to execute such certificate of cancellation, and the Delaware Trustee shall be entitled to conclusively and exclusively rely upon such written direction without further inquiry. Upon the Termination date, the Claimant Trustee shall retain for a period of two (2) years, as a Claimant Trust Expense, the books, records, Claimant Trust Beneficiary lists, and certificated and other documents and files that have been delivered to or created by the Claimant Trustee. At the Claimant Trustee's discretion, all of such records and documents may, but need not, be destroyed at any time after two (2) years from the Termination Date.

9.4 Termination of Duties. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, upon the Termination Date of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board and its Members shall have no further duties or obligations hereunder.

9.5 No Survival. The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries hereunder shall not survive the Termination Date, provided that such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are provided with notice of such Termination Date.

ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS AND WAIVER

The Claimant Trustee, with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board, may amend this Agreement to correct or clarify any non-material provisions. This Agreement may not otherwise be amended, supplemented, otherwise modified, or waived in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by the Claimant Trustee and with the unanimous approval of the Oversight Board, and the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing; provided that the Claimant Trustee must provide the Oversight Board with prior written notice of any non-material amendments, supplements, modifications, or waivers of this Agreement. No amendment or waiver of this Agreement that adversely affects the Delaware Trustee shall be effective unless the Delaware Trustee has consented thereto in writing in its sole and absolute discretion.

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Trust Irrevocable. Except as set forth in this Agreement, establishment of the Claimant Trust by this Agreement shall be irrevocable and shall not be subject to revocation, cancellation or rescission by the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.2 Bankruptcy of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The dissolution, termination, bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar incapacity of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall not permit any creditor, trustee, or any other Claimant Trust Beneficiary to obtain possession of, or exercise legal or equitable remedies with respect to, the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.3 Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have No Legal Title to Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have legal title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.4 Agreement for Benefit of Parties Only. Nothing herein, whether expressed or implied, shall be construed to give any Person other than the Claimant Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in

respect of this Agreement. The Claimant Trust Assets shall be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.5 Notices. All notices, directions, instructions, confirmations, consents and requests required or permitted by the terms hereof shall, unless otherwise specifically provided herein, be in writing and shall be sent by first class mail, facsimile, overnight mail or in the case of mailing to a non-United States address, air mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

(a) If to the Claimant Trustee:

Claimant Trustee
c/o Highland Capital Management, L.P.
100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850
Dallas, Texas 75201

With a copy to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd, 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey Pomerantz (jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com)
Ira Kharasch (ikharasch@pszjlaw.com)
Gregory Demo (gdemo@pszjlaw.com)

(b) If to the Delaware Trustee:

Wilmington Trust, National Association
1100 North Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19890
Attn: Corporate Trust Administration/David Young
Email: nmarlett@wilmingtontrust.com
Phone: (302) 636-6728
Fax: (302) 636-4145

Notice mailed shall be effective on the date mailed or sent. Any Person may change the address at which it is to receive notices under this Agreement by furnishing written notice pursuant to the provisions of this Section 11.5 to the entity to be charged with knowledge of such change.

11.6 Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

11.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all such counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument.

11.8 Binding Effect, etc. All covenants and agreements contained herein shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and their respective successors and assigns. Any notice, direction, consent, waiver or other instrument or action by any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall bind its successors and assigns.

11.9 Headings; References. The headings of the various Sections herein are for convenience of reference only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or provisions hereof.

11.10 Governing Law. This Agreement shall in all respects be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, including all matters of constructions, validity and performance.

11.11 Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto, each Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board), and each Claimant Trust Beneficiary consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement, the Plan or any act or omission of the Claimant Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), Litigation Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), the Oversight Board. or any individual Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board); *provided, however*, that if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such action may be brought in the state or federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas.

11.12 Transferee Liabilities. The Claimant Trust shall have no liability for, and the Claimant Trust Assets shall not be subject to, any claim arising by, through or under the Debtor except as expressly set forth in the Plan or in this Agreement. In no event shall the Claimant Trustee or the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have any personal liability for such claims. If any liability shall be asserted against the Claimant Trust or the Claimant Trustee as the transferee of the Claimant Trust Assets on account of any claimed liability of, through or under the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee may use such part of the Claimant Trust Assets as may be necessary to contest any such claimed liability and to pay, compromise, settle or discharge same on terms reasonably satisfactory to the Claimant Trustee as a Claimant Trust Expense.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Claimant Trust Agreement to be duly executed by their respective officers thereunto duly authorized on the day and year first written above.

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Restructuring Officer

Claimant Trustee

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr., not individually but solely in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee

Wilmington Trust, National Association,
as Delaware Trustee

By: NC Marlett III
Name: Neumann Marlett
Title: Bank Officer

Department of State: Division of Corporations

Allowable Characters

HOME

Entity Details

THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT OF GOOD STANDING

File Number:	5421257	Incorporation Date / Formation Date:	3/9/2021 (mm/dd/yyyy)
Entity Name:	MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC		
Entity Kind:	Limited Liability Company	Entity Type:	General
Residency:	Domestic	State:	DELAWARE

REGISTERED AGENT INFORMATION

Name:	CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY		
Address:	251 LITTLE FALLS DRIVE		
City:	WILMINGTON	County:	New Castle
State:	DE	Postal Code:	19808
Phone:	302-636-5401		

Additional Information is available for a fee. You can retrieve Status for a fee of $10.00 or more detailed information including current franchise tax assessment, current filing history and more for a fee of $20.00.

Would you like ○ Status ○ Status,Tax & History Information

Submit

View Search Results New Entity Search

For help on a particular field click on the Field Tag to take you to the help area.

Exhibit

P 1-B

Department of State: Division of Corporations

Allowable Characters

HOME

Entity Details

THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT OF GOOD STANDING

File Number:	**5822640**	Incorporation Date / Formation Date:	**4/8/2021** (mm/dd/yyyy)
Entity Name:	**JESSUP HOLDINGS LLC**		
Entity Kind:	**Limited Liability Company**	Entity Type:	**General**
Residency:	**Domestic**	State:	**DELAWARE**

REGISTERED AGENT INFORMATION

Name:	**VCORP SERVICES, LLC**		
Address:	**108 W. 13TH STREET SUITE 100**		
City:	**WILMINGTON**	County:	**New Castle**
State:	**DE**	Postal Code:	**19801**
Phone:	**302-658-7581**		

Additional Information is available for a fee. You can retrieve Status for a fee of $10.00 or more detailed information including current franchise tax assessment, current filing history and more for a fee of $20.00.

Would you like ○ Status ○ Status,Tax & History Information

Submit

View Search Results New Entity Search

For help on a particular field click on the Field Tag to take you to the help area.

Exhibit

P 1-C

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed October 22, 2020

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	Related to Docket No. 1089

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH (A) THE REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND (CLAIM NO. 72), AND (B) THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUNDS (CLAIM NO. 81), AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

Upon the *Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72), and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1089] (the "Motion")[2] filed by the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor"); and this

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and no other notice need be provided; and this Court having reviewed the Motion, any and all other documents filed in support of the Motion, and the UBS Objection; and this Court having held an evidentiary hearing October 20, 2020, where it assessed the credibility of the witnesses, considered the evidence admitted into the record, and determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion and at the hearing on the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon overruling any objections to the Motion; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT**:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. The Settlement, attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Morris Declaration, is approved in all respects pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019.

3. The UBS Objection is overruled in its entirety.

4. The Debtor and its agents are authorized to take any and all actions necessary or desirable to implement the Settlement without need of further Court approval or notice.

5. The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or relating to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order

END OF ORDER

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed October 27, 2020

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	Related to Docket Nos. 1087 & 1088

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH (A) ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. AND ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC (CLAIM NO. 23), (B) JOSHUA N. TERRY AND JENNIFER G. TERRY (CLAIM NO. 156), AND (C) ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. (CLAIM NO. 159) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

Having considered the *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (a) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (Claim No. 23), (b) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry (Claim No. 156), and (c) Acis Capital Management, L.P. (Claim No. 159) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1087] (the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

"Motion"),[2] the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement") to *Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (A) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (Claim No. 23), (B) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry (Claim No. 156), and Acis Capital Management, L.P. (Claim No. 159), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1088] (the "Demo Declaration"), and the General Release attached as **Exhibit "2"** (the "Release") to the Demo Declaration filed by the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor"); and this Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement and the Release are fair and equitable; and this Court having, analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to Settlement Agreement and Release, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law; (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay; and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views; and (ii) the extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

this Court having reviewed the Motion, any and all other documents filed in support of the Motion, including the Debtor's Omnibus Reply filed by the Debtor at Docket No. 1211, and all objections thereto, including the objection filed by James Dondero at Docket No. 1121 (the "Dondero 9019 Objection");[3] and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT**:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. The Settlement and the Release, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** and **Exhibit 2** are approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

3. The Dondero 9019 Objection and all other objections to the Motion are overruled in their entirety.

4. All objections to the proofs of claim subject to the Motion[4] are overruled as moot in light of the Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release.

5. The Debtor, the Debtor's agents, the Acis Parties (as defined by the Release), and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary or desirable to implement the Settlement Agreement and the Release without need of further Court approval or notice.

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[3] The objection to the Motion filed by Patrick Hagaman Daugherty at Docket No. 1201 was withdrawn on the record during the hearing on the Motion. The reservations of rights filed by Highland CLO Funding, Ltd., CLO Holdco, Ltd., HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P. and HarbourVest Partners L.P. filed at Docket Nos. 1177, 1191, and 1195 (collectively, the "Reservations") are resolved based on the Debtor's representations on the record, made without objection, that (a) the conditions precedent in Section 1(c) of the Settlement Agreement will not occur and therefore, the Debtor will not, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, transfer all of its direct and indirect right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. to Acis or its nominee, and that (b) none of the parties asserting any of the Reservations are bound by the Release.

[4] The objections include (a) the Debtor's *Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC* [Docket No. 771]; (b) *James Dondero's Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC; and (II) Joinder in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC* [Docket No. 827]; and (c) *UBS (I) Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC and (II) Joinder in the Debtor's Objection* [Docket No. 891].

6. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or relating to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.

END OF ORDER

EXHIBIT 1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement, including all attachments, (the "Agreement") is entered into as of September 9, 2020, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"); (ii) Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"); (iii) Acis Capital Management GP LLC ("Acis GP" and together with Acis LP, "Acis"); (iv) Joshua N. Terry, individually and for the benefit of his individual retirement accounts, and (v) Jennifer G. Terry, individually and for the benefit of her individual retirement accounts and as trustee of the Terry Family 401-K Plan

Each of the foregoing are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (together, the "Mediation Parties"), among others, were directed to mediate their disputes before Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"); and

WHEREAS, during the mediation, the Mediators made an economic proposal to resolve the Claims (the "Mediators' Economic Proposal"), and each of the Mediation Parties accepted the Mediators' Economic Proposal; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have negotiated and executed that certain General Release, dated as of even date herewith (the "Release"),[1] which, among other things, releases the Acis Released Claims and the HCMLP Released Claims; and

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement which incorporates, formalizes, and finalizes the Mediators' Economic Proposal and which, when combined with the Release, will fully and finally resolve the Claims; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement and the Release attached hereto will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019");

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

1. **Settlement of Claims.** In full and complete satisfaction of the Claims:

(a) The proof of claim filed by Acis in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case on December 31, 2019 [Claim No. 23] will be allowed in the amount of $23,000,000 as a general unsecured claim;

[1] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Release.

(b) On the effective date of a plan of reorganization and confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, HCMLP will pay in cash to:

(i) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry $425,000, plus 10% simple interest (calculated on the basis of a 360-day year from and including June 30, 2016), in full and complete satisfaction of the proof of claim filed in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case by Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry on April 8, 2020 [Claim No. 156];

(ii) Acis LP $97,000, which amount represents the legal fees incurred by Acis LP with respect to *NWCC, LLC v. Highland CLO Management, LLC, et al.*, Index No. 654195-2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018), in full and complete satisfaction of the proof of claim filed by Acis LP in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case on April 8, 2020 [Claim No. 159];

(iii) Joshua N. Terry $355,000 in full and complete satisfaction of the legal fees assessed against Highland CLO Funding, Ltd., in *Highland CLO Funding v. Joshua Terry*, [No Case Number], pending in the Royal Court of the Island of Guernsey;

(c) On the effective date of a plan of reorganization proposed by HCMLP and confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, if HMCLP receives written advice of nationally recognized external counsel that it is legally permissible consistent with HCMLP's contractual and legal duties to transfer all of its direct and indirect right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. to Acis or its nominee and that doing so would not reasonably subject HCMLP to liability, HCMLP shall transfer all of its right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., whether its ownership is direct or indirect, to Acis or its nominee, subject at all times to Acis's right to unilaterally reject the transfer in its sole and absolute discretion;

(d) Within five (5) days of the Agreement Effective Date, HCMLP shall:

(i) Move to withdraw, with prejudice, its proof of claim [Claim No. 27] filed in *In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018), and its proof of claim [Claim No. 13] filed in *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018);

(ii) Move to withdraw, with prejudice, Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Application for Administrative Expense Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) filed in the Acis Bankruptcy Case [Docket No. 772];

(e) At all times after the execution of this Agreement:

(i) Only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo in the Acis Appeals, the Parties shall cooperate in seeking to abate or otherwise stay the Acis Appeals vis-à-vis the Parties pending the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date; and

(ii) HCMLP shall cooperate in good faith to promptly return to Acis all property of Acis that is in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control, including but not limited to e-mail communications.

2. **Releases.** The Release is (a) attached to this Agreement as **Appendix A**; (b) an integral component of the Mediator's Economic Proposal and (c) incorporated by reference into this Agreement as if fully set forth herein.

3. **Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.**

(a) The effectiveness of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the Release by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement and the Release expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order. The "Agreement Effective Date" will be the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

(b) The Parties acknowledge and agree that the terms and conditions of this Agreement are conditioned, in all respects, on the execution of the Release by the Parties and the approval of the Release and this Agreement by the Bankruptcy Court. If either the Release or this Settlement Agreement are not approved by the Bankruptcy Court for any reason, this Agreement and the Release will be immediately null and void and of no further force and effect.

4. **Representations and Warranties**. Subject in all respects to Section 3, each Party represents and warrants to the other Party that such Party is fully authorized to enter into and perform the terms of this Agreement and that, as of the Agreement Effective Date, this Agreement and the Release will be fully binding upon each Party in accordance with their terms.

5. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Claims. Nothing in this Agreement will imply, an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the Acis Parties, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the Acis Parties, or any other person.

6. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns, including but not limited to any Chapter 7 trustee appointed for HCMLP.

7. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be specified in any notice delivered or mailed as set forth below:

Acis

Acis Capital Management, LP
4514 Cole Avenue
Suite 600
Dallas, Texas 75205

Attention: Joshua N. Terry
Email: josh@aciscm.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

ROGGE DUNN GROUP, P.C.
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 1900
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Brian P. Shaw
Telephone No.: 214.239.2707
E-mail: shaw@roggedunngroup.com

Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry

25 Highland Park Village, Suite 100-848
Dallas TX 75205
Attention: Joshua N. Terry
Email: joshuanterry@gmail.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

ROGGE DUNN GROUP, P.C.
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 1900
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Brian P. Shaw
Telephone No.: 214.239.2707
E-mail: shaw@roggedunngroup.com

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Legal Department
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
Facsimile No.: 972-628-4147
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910

Facsimile No.: 310-201-0760
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

8. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

9. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

10. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

11. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

12. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

13. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this

Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: Self

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Jennifer G. Terry
Its: Self

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: CEO/CRO

EXHIBIT 2

GENERAL RELEASE

This GENERAL RELEASE (this "Release"), effective on the Effective Date (as defined below), is entered into by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"), (ii) Joshua N. Terry, individually and for the benefit of his individual retirement accounts, Jennifer G. Terry, individually and for the benefit of her individual retirement accounts and as trustee of the Terry Family 401-K Plan (collectively, the "Terry Parties"), (iii) Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (collectively, "Acis") (the Terry Parties and Acis, collectively, the "Acis Parties"), and (iii) those HCMLP Specified Parties (as defined below) who execute this Release (together, the "Parties").

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Parties have asserted or may assert claims that are defined in Section 1 below as the "Acis Released Claims" and the "HCMLP Released Claims" (collectively, the "Claims"); and

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court") entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (together, the "Mediation Parties"), among others, were directed to mediate their disputes before Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"); and

WHEREAS, during the mediation, the Mediators made an economic proposal to resolve the Claims (the "Mediators' Economic Proposal"), and each of the Mediation Parties accepted the Mediators' Economic Proposal; and

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into a general release of all Claims which, when combined with the Mediators' Economic Proposal, will fully and finally resolve the Claims; and

WHEREAS, except in Section 1.c below, this is a general release, meaning the Parties intend hereby to release any and all Claims which the Parties can release, and the Parties are unaware of any Claims between them which are not being released herein; and

WHEREAS, this Release will be appended or otherwise incorporated into a written settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") that will include the terms of the Mediators' Economic Proposal and will be presented to the Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019"), and is only effective upon the Effective Date.

NOW, THEREFORE, after good-faith, arms-length negotiations, and in consideration of the promises made herein and in the Mediators' Economic Proposal, the Parties agree to release each other pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth below.

AGREEMENT

1. Releases.

a. Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, and except as set forth in Section 1d below, each of the Acis Parties on behalf of himself, herself, or itself and each of their respective current or former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue, (A)(i) HCMLP; (ii) Strand; (iii) any entity of which greater than fifty percent of the voting ownership is held directly or indirectly by HCMLP and any entity otherwise controlled by HCMLP; and (iv) any entity managed by either HCMLP or a direct or indirect subsidiary of HCMLP (the foregoing (A)(i) through (A)(iv) the "HCMLP Entities") and (B) with respect to each such HCMLP Entity, such HCMLP Entity's respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns, except as expressly set forth below (the "HCMLP Parties," and together with the HCMLP Entities, the "HCMLP Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Filed Cases, including the proofs of claim [Claim No. 23; 156; 159] filed by the Acis Parties in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case and any objections or potential objections to the Plan or the confirmation thereof (collectively, the "Acis Released Claims"). This release is intended to be general. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the term HCMLP Released Parties **shall not** include NexPoint Advisors (and any of its subsidiaries), the Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries, including CLO Holdco, Ltd.), Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (and any of its subsidiaries), NexBank, SSB (and any of its subsidiaries), James Dondero, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), Dugaboy Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), Grant Scott, David Simek, William Scott, Heather Bestwick, Mark Okada and his family trusts (and the trustees for such trusts in their representative capacities), McKool Smith, PC, Gary Cruciani, Lackey Hershman, LLP, Jamie Welton, or Paul Lackey.

b. Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each HCMLP Released Party hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue the (A) Acis Parties, (B) Acis CLO 2013-1Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-3 Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-4 Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-5 Ltd., Acis CLO 2015-6 Ltd. (collectively, the "Acis CLOs"), and (C) with respect to each such Acis Party and Acis CLO, to the extent applicable, such Acis Party and Acis CLO, their respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents,

affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the foregoing (A), (B), and (C), the "Acis Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Filed Cases (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"). This release is intended to be general. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, this Section 1.b will not affect any right to payment under any notes, debt, equity, or other security issued by any Acis CLO and held by any HCMLP Released Party.

c. The HCMLP Released Parties shall also hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely release, relieve, acquit, remise, and exonerate, and covenant never to sue (A) U.S. Bank National Association, Moody's Investor Services, Inc., and Brigade Capital Management, Inc. and (B) with respect to each such DAF Suit Defendant, to the extent applicable, such DAF Suit Defendant, their respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the foregoing (A) and (B), the "DAF Suit Defendants"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the DAF Lawsuits. This release is not intended to be general.

d. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, if (A) any HCMLP Specified Party has not executed this Release on or before the Effective Date or (B) any HCMLP Released Party, including any HCMLP Specified Party, (i) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten any Acis Released Party on or in connection with any HCMLP Released Claim or any other claim or cause of action arising prior to the date of this Release, (ii) takes any action that, in HCMLP's reasonable judgment, impairs or harms the value of HCMLP, its estate, and its assets; or (iii) in HCMLP's reasonable judgment fails to use commercially reasonable efforts to support confirmation of the Plan and/or the monetization of HCMLP's assets at their maximum value, then (a) such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party) will be deemed to have waived (x) the release and all other protections set forth in Section 1a hereof and will have no further rights, duties, or protections under this Release and (y) any releases set forth in the Plan, (b) the Acis Released Parties, as applicable, may, in their discretion, assert any and all Acis Released Claims against such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party), and (c) any statutes of limitation or other similar defenses are tolled against such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party) from the execution of this Release until ninety (90) days after the Acis Released Parties receive actual written notice of any violation of this Section 1d. For the avoidance of doubt, by signing this Release each of the HCMLP Specified Parties is

acknowledging and agreeing, without limitation, to the terms of this Section 1.d and the tolling agreement set forth herein.

2. Withdrawal/Dismissal of Filed Cases. Within five days of the Effective Date, each Acis Released Party and HCMLP Released Party, to the extent applicable, will coordinate to cause the Filed Cases, including any appeals of any Filed Cases, to he dismissed with prejudice as to any Acis Released Party or HCMLP Released Party; *provided, however,* that there is no obligation to dismiss or withdraw the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case. For the avoidance of doubt, and consistent with this Section, (a) if HMCLP receives written advice of nationally recognized external counsel that it is legally permissible consistent with HCMLP's contractual and legal duties to direct Neutra, Ltd. to move to dismiss all of their appeals arising from the Acis Bankruptcy and that doing so would not reasonably subject HCMLP to liability, HCMLP shall direct Neutra, Ltd. to move to dismiss all of their appeals arising from the Acis Bankruptcy and (b) Acis shall move to dismiss with prejudice its claims against HCMLP asserted in any adversary proceeding in the Acis Bankruptcy Case. To the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo in the Filed Cases, including any appeals thereof, prior to the Effective Date, each Acis Released Party and HCMLP Released Party shall reasonably cooperate in seeking to abate or otherwise stay the Filed Cases vis-à-vis the Parties.

3. Representations and Warranties.

a. Each of the Acis Parties represents and warrants to each of the HCMLP Released Parties and each of the HCMLP Specified Parties who have signed this Release that (a) he, she or it has full authority to release the Acis Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Acis Released Claim to any other person or entity, and that (b) to the best of his, her or its current knowledge, no person or entity other than the Acis Parties has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Acis Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) any of the Acis Parties.

b. Each of HCMLP and each HCMLP Specified Party who has signed this Release represents and warrants to each of the Acis Parties that he, she or it has not sold, transferred, pledged, assigned or hypothecated any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity.

c. Each HCMLP Specified Party and each of HCMLP and Strand represents and warrants to each of the Acis Parties that he, she, or it has full authority to release any HCMLP Released Claims that such HCMLP Specified Party, HCMLP, or Strand personally has against any Acis Party.

d. HCMLP represents and warrants that it is releasing the HCMLP Released Claims on behalf of the HCMLP Entities to the maximum extent permitted by any contractual or other legal rights HCMLP possesses. To the extent any of the HCMLP Entities dispute HCMLP's right to release the HCMLP Released Claims on behalf of any of the HCMLP Entities, HCMLP shall use commercially reasonable efforts to support the Acis Parties' position, if any, that such claims were released herein. For the avoidance of doubt, HCMLP will have no obligations to assist the Acis Parties under this Section if HCMLP has been advised by external counsel that such assistance could subject HCMLP to liability to any third party or if such

assistance would require HCMLP to expend material amounts of time or money. HCMLP shall not argue in any forum that the non-signatory status of any of the HCMLP Entities to this Release shall in any way affect the enforceability of this Release vis-à-vis any of the HCMLP Entities. The Parties agree that all of the HCMLP Entities are intended third-party beneficiaries of this Release.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Acis Parties acknowledge and agree that their sole and exclusive remedy for the breach of the foregoing Sections 3b, 3c, and 3d will be that set forth in Section 1.d hereof.

4. Additional Definitions.

a. "Acis Bankruptcy Case" means, collectively, *In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018)

b. "DAF Lawsuits" means (a) Case No. 1:19-cv-09857-NRB; *The Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al*, formerly pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; and (b) Case No. 1:20-cv-01036-LGS; *The Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. and CLO Holdco, Ltd. v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al*, formerly pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

c. "Effective Date" means the date of an order of the Court approving the Settlement Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

d. "Filed Cases" means (a) the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case, (b) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al*, Case No. 18-03078 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018); (c) *Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Allow Pursuit of Motion for Order to Show Cause for Violations of the Acis Plan Injunction*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11 [Docket No. 593] (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2020); (d) *Joshua and Jennifer Terry v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., James Dondero and Thomas Surgent*, Case No. DC-16-11396, pending in the 162nd District Court of Dallas County Texas; (e) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al v. James Dondero, et al.*, Case No. 20-0360 (Bankruptcy N.D. Tex. 2020); (f) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al v. Gary Cruciani, et al.*, Case No. DC-20-05534, pending in the 162nd District Court of Dallas County Texas; (g) *Highland CLO Funding v. Joshua Terry*, [No Case Number], pending in the Royal Court of the Island of Guernsey; and (b) the Acis Bankruptcy Case.

e. "HCMLP Bankruptcy Case" means *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2019).

f. "HCMLP Specified Party" means Scott Ellington, Isaac Leventon, Thomas Surgent, Frank Waterhouse, Jean Paul Sevilla, David Klos, Kristin Hendrix, Timothy Cournoyer, Stephanie Vitiello, Katie Irving, Jon Poglitsch, or Hunter Covitz. For the avoidance of doubt, each HCMLP Specified Party is a HCMLP Released Party.

g. "Plan" means the *Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, filed in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case [Docket No. 956] as may be amended or restated.

h. "Strand" means Strand Advisors, Inc.

5. Miscellaneous.

a. For the avoidance of doubt, all rights, duties, and obligations of any HCMLP Released Party or Acis Released Party created by this Release or the Settlement Agreement shall survive its execution.

b. This Release, together with the Settlement Agreement and any exhibits thereto, contains the entire agreement between the Parties as to its subject matter and supersedes and replaces any and all prior agreements and undertakings between the Parties relating thereto.

c. This Release may not be modified other than by a signed writing executed by the Parties.

d. The effectiveness of this Release is subject in all respects to entry of an order of the Court approving this Release and the Settlement Agreement and authorizing HCMLP's execution thereof.

e. This Release may be executed in counterparts (including facsimile and electronic transmission counterparts), each of which will be deemed an original but all of which together constitute one and the same instrument, and shall be effective against a Party upon the Effective Date.

f. This Release will be exclusively governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to its conflicts of law principles, and all claims relating to or arising out of this Release, or the breach thereof, whether sounding in contract, tort, or otherwise, will likewise be governed by the laws of the State of Texas, excluding Texas's conflicts of law principles. The Court will retain exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes relating to this Release. In any action to enforce this Release, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: Self

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Jennifer G. Terry
Its: Self

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: CEO/CRO

HCMLP SPECIFIED PARTIES

SCOTT ELLINGTON

_____

ISAAC LEVENTON

_____

THOMAS SURGENT

_____

FRANK WATERHOUSE

_____

JEAN PAUL SEVILLA

_____

DAVID KLOS

_____

KRISTIN HENDRIX

_____

TIMOTHY COURNOYER

_____

STEPHANIE VITIELLO

_____

KATIE IRVING

_____

JON POGLITSCH

_____

HUNTER COVITZ

_____

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed January 20, 2021

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

This matter having come before the Court on *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1625] (the "Motion"),[2] filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor") in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the "Bankruptcy Case"); and this Court having considered (a) the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Motion; (b) the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1631] (the "Morris Declaration"), and the exhibits annexed thereto, including the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement"); (c) the arguments and law cited in the Motion; (d) *James Dondero's Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest* [Docket No. 1697] (the "Dondero Objection"), filed by James Dondero; (e) the *Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1706] (the "Trusts' Objection"), filed by the Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Get Good Trust ("Get Good," and together with Dugaboy, the "Trusts"); (f) *CLO Holdco's Objection to HarbourVest Settlement* [Docket No. 1707] (the "CLOH Objection" and collectively, with the Dondero Objection and the Trusts' Objection, the "Objections"), filed by CLO Holdco, Ltd.; (g) the *Debtor's Omnibus Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1731] (the "Debtor's Reply"), filed by the Debtor; (h) the *HarbourVest Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1734] (the "HarbourVest Reply"), filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"); (i) the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted into evidence during the hearing held on January 14, 2021 (the "Hearing"), including assessing the credibility of the witnesses; and (j) the

arguments made during the Hearing; and this Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement fair and equitable; and this Court having analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to the Settlement Agreement, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law, (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay, and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views, and (ii) the extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. All objections to the Motion are overruled.

3. The Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**, is approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4. All objections to the proofs of claim subject to the Motion[3] are overruled as moot in light of the Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement.

5. The Debtor, HarbourVest, and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

6. Pursuant to the express terms of the *Members Agreement Relating to the Company*, dated November 15, 2017, HarbourVest is authorized to transfer its interests in HCLOF to a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary of the Debtor pursuant to the terms of the *Transfer Agreement for Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.* without the need to obtain the consent of any party or to offer such interests first to any other investor in HCLOF.

7. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this Order.

###End of Order###

[3] This includes the *Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 906].

EXHIBIT 1

EXECUTION VERSION

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of December 23, 2020, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"), on the one hand, and HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (each, a "HarbourVest Party," and collectively, "HarbourVest"), on the other hand. Each of the foregoing are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Case") in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Bankruptcy Court");

WHEREAS, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, Case No. 19-34054-sgj (the "Bankruptcy Court");

WHEREAS, prior to the Petition Date, HarbourVest invested in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF") and acquired an a 49.98% ownership interest in HCLOF (the "HarbourVest Interests");

WHEREAS, the portfolio manager for HCLOF is Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Debtor;

WHEREAS, on April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim in the Bankruptcy Case, which are listed on the Debtor's claims register as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 (the "HarbourVest Claims"), asserting claims against the Debtor relating to its investment in HCLOF;

WHEREAS, on July 30, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (a) Duplicate Claims; (b) Overstated Claims; (c) Late-Filed Claims; (d) Satisfied Claims; (e) No Liability Claims; and (f) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 906], in which the Debtor objected to the HarbourVest Claims;

WHEREAS, on September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Creation (a) Duplicate Claims; (b) Overstated Claims; (c) Late-Filed Claims; (d) Satisfied Claims; (e) No Liability Claims; and (f) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "HarbourVest Response");

WHEREAS, on October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed the *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion" and together with the HarbourVest Response, the "HarbourVest Pleadings");

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WHEREAS, in the HarbourVest Pleadings, HarbourVest asserted, among other things, that the HarbourVest Claims included claims against the Debtor arising from fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of securities laws, and misuse of assets and sought damages in excess of $300,000,000;

WHEREAS, the Debtor disputes the HarbourVest Claims;

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as amended, the "Plan").[1]

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement which incorporates, formalizes, and finalizes the full and final resolution of the HarbourVest Claims and HarbourVest Pleadings; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019").

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

1. **Settlement of Claims.**

(a) In full and complete satisfaction of the HarbourVest Claims, HarbourVest will receive:

(i) an allowed, nonpriority general unsecured claim in the aggregate amount of $45,000,000 (the "Allowed GUC Claim"); and

(ii) an allowed subordinated claim in the aggregate amount of $35,000,000 (the "Allowed Subordinated Claim" and together with the Allowed GUC Claim, the "Allowed Claims").

(b) On the Effective Date, HarbourVest will transfer all of its rights, title, and interest in the HarbourVest Interests to the Debtor or its nominee pursuant to the terms of the *Transfer Agreement for Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.*, attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Transfer Agreements") and the Debtor or its nominee will become a shareholder of HCLOF with respect to the HarbourVest Interests. The terms of the Transfer Agreements are incorporated into this Agreement by reference.

2. **Releases.**

(a) Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each HarbourVest Party on behalf of itself and each of its current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents,

[1] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Plan.

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participants, subsidiaries, parents, successors, designees, and assigns hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue, the Debtor, HCLOF, HCLOF's current and former directors, and the Debtor's current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns, except as expressly set forth below (the "Debtor Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HarbourVest Released Claims").

(b) Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, the Debtor hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue (i) each HarbourVest Party and (ii) each HarbourVest Party's current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the "HarbourVest Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Debtor Released Claims"); *provided, however,* that notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the release contained in this Section 2(b) will apply to the HarbourVest Released Parties set forth in subsection (b)(ii) only with respect to Debtor Released Claims arising from or relating to HarbourVest's ownership of the HarbourVest Interests.

(c) Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the releases set forth herein will not apply with respect to (i) the Allowed Claims, (ii) the claims of Charlotte Investor IV, L.P., or (iii) the duties, rights, or obligations of any Party under this Agreement or the Transfer Agreements.

3. **Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.** The effectiveness of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to cooperate and use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The "Effective Date" will be the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

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4. **Representations and Warranties**. Subject in all respects to Section 3 hereof:

(a) each HarbourVest Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HarbourVest Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HarbourVest Released Claim to any other person or entity, (ii) no person or entity other than such HarbourVest Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HarbourVest Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) of such HarbourVest Party; and (iii) HarbourVest owns all of the HCLOF Interests free and clear of any claims or interests; and

(b) the Debtor represents and warrants to HarbourVest that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Debtor Released Claims and (ii) no person or entity other than the Debtor has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Debtor Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) of the Debtor Party.

5. **Plan Support.**

(a) Each HarbourVest Party hereby agrees that it will (a) vote all HarbourVest Claims held by such HarbourVest Party to accept the Plan, by delivering its duly executed and completed ballots accepting the Plan on a timely basis; and (b) not (i) change, withdraw, or revoke such vote (or cause or direct such vote to be changed withdrawn or revoked); (ii) exercise any right or remedy for the enforcement, collection, or recovery of any claim against the Debtor except in a manner consistent with this Agreement or the Plan, (iii) object to, impede, or take any action other action to interfere with, delay or postpone acceptance or confirmation of the Plan; (iv) directly or indirectly solicit, propose, file, support, participate in the formulation of or vote for, any restructuring, sale of assets (including pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363), merger, workout, or plan of reorganization of the Debtor other than the Plan; or (v) otherwise take any action that would in any material respect interfere with, delay, or postpone the consummation of the Plan; provided, however, that such vote may be revoked (and, upon such revocation, deemed void ab initio) by such HarbourVest Party at any time following the termination of this agreement or the occurrence of a Support Termination Event (it being understood that any termination of this agreement shall entitle each HarbourVest Party to change its vote in accordance with section 1127(d) of the Bankruptcy Code), notwithstanding any voting deadline established by the Bankruptcy Court including without limitation the January 5, 2021, 5:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) deadline established by the *Order Approving Form of Ballots, Voting Deadline and Solicitation Procedures* [Docket No. 1476].

(b) In full resolution of the 3018 Motion, HarbourVest will have a general unsecured claim for voting purposes only in the amount of $45,000,000.

(c) The obligations of the HarbourVest Parties under this Section 5 shall automatically terminate upon the occurrence of any of the following (each a "Support Termination Event"): (i) the effective date of the Plan, (ii) the withdrawal of the Plan, (iii) the entry of an order by the Bankruptcy Court (A) converting the Bankruptcy Case to a case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or (B) appointing an examiner with expanded powers beyond those set forth in sections 1106(a)(3) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code or a trustee in Bankruptcy

EXECUTION VERSION

Case, or (iv) the failure of the Court to enter an order approving the terms of this Agreement and the settlement described herein pursuant to Rule 9019 prior to confirmation of the Plan.

6. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the HarbourVest Claims. Nothing in this Agreement will imply, an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Debtor, HarbourVest, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Debtor, HarbourVest, or any other person.

7. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their successors, and assigns.

8. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have heen given on the date of its delivery, if delivered, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be specified in any notice delivered or mailed as set forth below:

HARBOURVEST

HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Attention: Michael J. Pugatch
One Financial Center
Boston, MA 02111
Telephone No. 617-348-3712
E-mail: mpugatch@harbourvest.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
Attention: M. Natasha Labovitz, Esq.
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone No. 212-909-6649
E-mail: nlabovitz@debevoise.com

THE DEBTOR

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
Facsimile No.: 972-628-4147
E-mail: jpseeryjr@gmail.com

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with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
Facsimile No.: 310-201-0760
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

9. **Advice of Counsel**. Each Party represents that it has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

10. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement and the Transfer Agreement contain the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersede and replace all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

11. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

12. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

13. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

EXECUTION VERSION

14. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

EXECUTION VERSION

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: /s/ James P. Seery, Jr.
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: CEO/CRO

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., by HarbourVest 2017 Global Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Partners L.P., on behalf of funds and accounts under management, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

EXECUTION VERSION

HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HV International VIII Secondary L.P., by HIPEP VIII Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

Exhibit A

TRANSFER AGREEMENT
FOR ORDINARY SHARES OF
HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD.

This Transfer Agreement, dated as of January ____, 2021 (this "**Transfer Agreement**"), is entered into by and among Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (the "**Fund**"), Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. (the "**Portfolio Manager**"), HCMLP Investments, LLC (the "**Transferee**") and each of the following: HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Glohal AIF L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., and HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P. (collectively, the "**Transferors**").

WHEREAS, each Transferor is the record, legal and beneficial owner of the number of ordinary shares ("**Shares**") of the Fund set forth opposite such Transferor's name on Exhibit A hereto (with respect to each Transferor, the "**Transferred Shares**").

WHEREAS the Transferee is an affiliate and wholly owned subsidiary of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("**HCMLP**") which is one of the initial members of the Fund.

WHEREAS, each Transferor wishes to transfer and assign 100% of its rights, title and interest as a shareholder in the Fund, including the Transferred Shares (the "**Interest**") on the terms set forth in this Transfer Agreement.

WHEREAS, subject to and in connection with the approval of that certain Settlement Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof, by and among HCMLP and the Transferors (the "**Settlement Agreement**"), the Transferee desires that the Interest be transferred to Transferee and that thereafter the Transferee will become a Shareholder and the Transferors will no longer be Shareholders.

WHEREAS, the Portfolio Manager desires to consent to such transfers and to the admission of Transferee as a Shareholder on the terms set forth herein, and the Transferors and Transferee agree to such terms.

WHEREAS, the Fund desires to amend its records to reflect the foregoing transfers.

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1. Transfer of Shares and Advisory Board

   a. Each Transferor hereby transfers and assigns all of its rights, title, and interest in its Interest to the Transferee, and the Transferee wishes to be admitted to the Fund as a Shareholder.

   b. In connection with the transfer of the Interest as contemplated herein, the Transferee shall be granted the right to appoint a representative to the Fund's advisory board (the "**Advisory Board**") to replace the Transferors' appointed representative to the Advisory Board.

c. Transferee hereby assumes all of Transferor's rights and obligations in respect of the Interest effective as of the Effective Date (as defined below) and acknowledge that thereafter Transferee shall be subject to the applicable terms and provisions of the Members' Agreement dated as of November 15, 2017 (the "**Members' Agreement**"), the Articles of Incorporation adopted November 15, 2017 (the "**Articles**") and the Subscription and transfer Agreement, dated as of November 15, 2017 among each Transferor, the Fund and the Portfolio Manager (the "**Subscription Agreement**", and together with the Members' Agreement and the Articles, the "**Fund Agreements**") with respect to the Interest. Transferee does not assume any liability or responsibility for any obligations or liabilities incurred by any Transferor prior to the Effective Date of the transfer.

d. Following the transfer, each Transferor shall have no further rights or obligations to any party hereunder in respect of the Interest under the Fund Agreements.

e. This Transfer Agreement, and the parties' obligations hereunder, are conditioned in all respects on the approval by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 of (*i*) this Transfer Agreement and (*ii*) the Settlement Agreement, and each of the parties agree that no further action shall be required from any party for the transfer of the Interest to be effective except as described herein.

2. Transferee's Representations and Warranties. The Transferee represents and warrants to the Transferors, the Portfolio Manager, and the Fund as follows:

a. This Transfer Agreement constitutes a valid and binding obligation of the Transferee, enforceable against it in accordance with its terms;

b. This Transfer Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by or on behalf of the Transferee and such execution and delivery have been duly authorized by all necessary trust action of the Transferee;

c. The Transferee acknowledges receipt of, has read, and is familiar with, the Fund's Offering Memorandum for Placing Shares dated November 15, 2017 (the "**Offering Memorandum**") and the Fund Agreements;

d. The Transferee hereby accepts and receives the Interest from the Transferors for investment, and not with a view to the sale or distribution of any part thereof, and the Transferee has no present intention of selling, granting participations in, or otherwise distributing the same, but subject nevertheless to any requirement of law that the disposition of the Transferee's property shall at all times be within such Transferee's control; and

e. The Transferee is an "Eligible U.S. Investor" as defined in the Offering Memorandum.

3. Transferors' Representations and Warranties. Each Transferor represents and warrants to the Transferee, the Portfolio Manager, and the Fund as follows:

   a. This Transfer Agreement constitutes a valid and binding obligation of the Transferor, enforceable against it in accordance with its terms;

   b. This Transfer Agreement has been duly authorized, and duly and validly executed and delivered by the Transferor and such execution and delivery have been duly authorized by all necessary action of the Transferor; and

   c. As of the date hereof, the Transferor has good and valid title to the Transferor's Interest, free and clear of any liens, vesting requirements or claims by others.

4. Consent to Transfer. Based in part on the representations and warranties of the Transferors and the Transferee which are included herein, and on the terms contained herein, the Portfolio Manager and the Fund hereby consent to the transfers of the Interest, the admission of the Transferee as a Shareholder and the Transferee's appointment of a representative to the Advisory Board, the Portfolio Manager's execution of this Transfer Agreement constituting its prior written consent to the transfers of the Interest for the purposes of article 18.1 of the Articles and this Transfer Agreement constituting express notice in writing to the Fund of the assignment set out at clause 1(c) above for the purposes of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Guernsey) Law, 1979 (as amended).

5. Completion: As of the date of approval by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 of (*i*) this Transfer Agreement and (*ii*) the Settlement Agreement (the "**Effective Date**"):

   a. each Transferor shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Transferee a transfer instrument relating to the Transferred Shares duly executed and completed by that Transferor in favor of the Transferee; and

   b. the Transferee shall deliver to the Transferors and the Fund a duly executed and dated Adherence Agreement (as defined in the Members' Agreement).

   Prior to the Effective Date the Transferee shall procure that:

   c. the board of directors of the Fund shall hold a meeting at which the transfer of the Shares to the Transferee shall be approved and registration in the register of members of the Fund shall be effected on the Effective Date.

6. Miscellaneous.

   a. Each of the parties hereto agree to execute any further instruments and perform any further acts which are or may become reasonably necessary to carry out the intent of this Transfer Agreement or are reasonably requested by the Portfolio Manager, the Fund or a Transferor to complete the transfer of the Interest.

b. The parties to this Transfer Agreement acknowledge that the terms of this Transfer Agreement are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the parties and their respective counsel. Each party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Transfer Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Transfer Agreement, the language or drafting of this Transfer Agreement will not be construed against any party.

c. This Transfer Agreement shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the internal substantive laws of the state of Delaware, without giving effect to conflicts of law principles.

d. The representations, warranties and covenants of the Transferors and the Transferee shall remain in full force and effect following the transfer of the Interest, and the Fund and the Portfolio Manager thereafter may rely on all such representations, warranties and covenants.

e. This Transfer Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Transfer Agreement for any purpose.

f. Captions of sections have been added only for convenience and shall not he deemed to be a part of this Transfer Agreement.

g. This Transfer Agreement is among the parties hereto. No Person that is not a party hereto shall have any right herein as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise except as expressly contemplated hereby.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Transfer Agreement as of the date first above written.

TRANSFEREE:

HCMLP Investments, LLC

By: Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Its: Member

By: _____

Name: James P. Seery, Jr.

Title: Chief Executive Officer

PORTFOLIO MANAGER:

Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd.

By: _____

Name: James P. Seery, Jr.

Title: President

FUND:
Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.

By: _____

Name:

Title:

[Additional Signatures on Following Page]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Transfer Agreement as of the date first above written.

TRANSFERORS:

HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HV International VIII Secondary L.P.

By: HIPEP VIII Associates L.P.
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest GP LLC
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its Managing Member

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited
Its Alternative Investment Fund Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its General Partner

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited
Its Alternative Investment Fund Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its General Partner

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P.

By: HarbourVest 2017 Global Associates L.P.
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest GP LLC
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its Managing Member

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

[Signature Page to Transfer of Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.]

Exhibit A

Transferee Name	Number of Shares	Percentage
HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P.	54,355,482.14	71.0096%
HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P.	7,426,940.38	9.7025%
HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P.	3,713,508.46	4.8513%
HV International VIII Secondary L.P.	9,946,780.11	12.9944%
HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P.	1,103,956.03	1.4422%

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 27, 2021

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH UBS SECURITIES LLC AND UBS AG LONDON BRANCH AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

This matter having come before the Court on *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2199] (the "Motion"),[2] filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor") in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the "Bankruptcy Case"); and this Court having considered (a) the Motion; (b) the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Declaration of Robert J Feinstein in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith [Docket No. 2200] (the "Feinstein Declaration"), and the exhibits annexed thereto including the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement"); (c) the arguments and law cited in the Motion; (d) the *Limited Preliminary Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2268] (the "Trusts' Preliminary Objection"), filed by The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Get Good Trust (collectively the "Trusts"); (e) the *Supplemental Opposition to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2293] (the "Trusts' Supplemental Opposition"), filed by the Trusts; (f) *James Dondero's Objection Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2295] (the "Dondero Objection" and collectively, with the Trusts' Preliminary Objection and the Trusts' Supplemental Opposition, the "Objections"), filed James Dondero; (g) the *Debtor's Omnibus Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2308] (the "Debtor's Reply"), filed by the Debtor; (h) UBS's *Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2310]; (i) the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted into evidence during the hearing held on May 21, 2021 (the "Hearing"), including assessing the credibility of the witness; and (j) the arguments made during the Hearing; and this Court having jurisdiction over

this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement fair and equitable; and this Court having analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to the Settlement Agreement, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law, (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay, and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views, and (ii) that the settlement is the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. All objections to the Motion are overruled.

3. The Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**, is approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4. The Debtor, UBS, and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

5. The Court finds that the Debtor, in its capacity as investment manager of Multi-Strat, exercised sound business judgment in causing Multi-Strat to enter into the Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor, in its capacity as investment manager of Multi-Strat, is authorized to cause Multi-Strat to settle the claims UBS has asserted against Multi-Strat in the State Court and otherwise to cause Multi-Strat to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

6. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this Order.

###End of Order###

EXHIBIT 1

EXECUTION VERSION

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. **No Third Party Beneficiaries**. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. **UBS Covenant Not to Sue.** Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

EXECUTION VERSION

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

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IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC 2029 Century Park East Suite 2060 Los Angeles, CA 90067

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

Exhibit

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Northern DISTRICT OF Texas

Case number 19-34054-sgj11

In re: Highland Capital Management, LP § Case No. 19-34054

§

§

Debtor(s) §

☐ Jointly Administered

Post-confirmation Report

Chapter 11

Quarter Ending Date: 09/30/2021 Petition Date: 10/16/2019

Plan Confirmed Date: 02/22/2021 Plan Effective Date: 08/11/2021

This Post-confirmation Report relates to: ◉ Reorganized Debtor

○ Other Authorized Party or Entity: _____

Name of Authorized Party or Entity

/s/ Zachery Z. Annable

Signature of Responsible Party

10/21/2021

Date

Zachery Z. Annable, Hayward PLLC

Printed Name of Responsible Party

10501 N. Central Expressway, Suite 106
Dallas TX 75231

Address

STATEMENT: This Periodic Report is associated with an open bankruptcy case; therefore, Paperwork Reduction Act exemption 5 C.F.R. § 1320.4(a)(2) applies.

Exhibit

P 1-I

Debtor's Name Highland Capital Management, LP Case No. 19-34054

Part 1: Summary of Post-confirmation Transfers

	Current Quarter	Total Since Effective Date
a. Total cash disbursements	$33,868,509	$28,496,358
b. Non-cash securities transferred	$0	$0
c. Other non-cash property transferred	$0	$0
d. Total transferred (a+b+c)	$33,868,509	$28,496,358

Part 2: Preconfirmation Professional Fees and Expenses

				Approved Current Quarter	Approved Cumulative	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative
a.	Professional fees & expenses (bankruptcy) incurred by or on behalf of the debtor *Aggregate Total*			$2,632,365	$31,771,605	$6,150,655	$30,888,237
	Itemized Breakdown by Firm						
		Firm Name	Role				
	i	Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP	Lead Counsel	$2,519,827	$23,611,818	$4,843,118	$22,789,658
	ii	Development Specialists, Inc.	Financial Professional	$0	$5,658,299	$813,227	$5,658,299
	iii	Kurtzman Carson Consultants	Other	$0	$1,857,660	$330,712	$1,857,660
	iv	Hayward & Associates PLLC	Local Counsel	$112,538	$643,827	$163,599	$582,621

				Approved Current Quarter	Approved Cumulative	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative
b.	Professional fees & expenses (nonbankruptcy) incurred by or on behalf of the debtor *Aggregate Total*			$536,506	$6,183,667	$1,032,709	$5,073,192
	Itemized Breakdown by Firm						
		Firm Name	Role				
	i	Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP	Other	$520,023	$1,149,807	$416,394	$1,009,864
	ii	Foley Gardere, Foley & Lardne	Other	$0	$629,088	$0	$629,088
	iii	Deloitte	Financial Professional	$16,482	$428,361	$0	$206,336
	iv	Mercer (US) Inc.	Other	$0	$170,284	$0	$170,284
	v	Teneo Capital, LLC	Financial Professional	$0	$1,364,823	$616,315	$616,315
	vi	Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale a	Other	$0	$1,389,667	$0	$1,389,667
	vii	Carey Olsen	Other	$0	$280,264	$0	$280,264
	viii	ASW Law	Other	$0	$4,976	$0	$4,976
	ix	Houlihan Lokey Financial Advi	Other	$0	$766,397	$0	$766,397
c.	All professional fees and expenses (debtor & committees)			$4,408,326	$56,849,059	$8,572,805	$54,651,118

Part 3: Recoveries of the Holders of Claims and Interests under Confirmed Plan

	Total Anticipated Payments Under Plan	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative	Allowed Claims	% Paid of Allowed Claims
a. Administrative claims	$0	$15,750	$15,750	$15,750	100%
b. Secured claims	$5,843,261	$691,367	$691,367	$5,886,018	12%
c. Priority claims	$16,498	$19,683	$19,683	$19,683	100%
d. General unsecured claims	$205,144,544	$6,168,473	$6,168,473	$376,622,019	2%
e. Equity interests	$0	$0	$0		

Debtor's Name Highland Capital Management, LP Case No. 19-34054

Part 4: Questionnaire

a. Is this a final report? Yes ○ No ◉

If yes, give date Final Decree was entered: _____

If no, give date when the application for Final Decree is anticipated: _____

b. Are you current with quarterly U.S. Trustee fees as set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1930? Yes ◉ No ○

Privacy Act Statement

28 U.S.C. § 589b authorizes the collection of this information and provision of this information is mandatory. The United States Trustee will use this information to calculate statutory fee assessments under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) and to otherwise evaluate whether a reorganized chapter 11 debtor is performing as anticipated under a confirmed plan. Disclosure of this information may be to a bankruptcy trustee when the information is needed to perform the trustee's duties, or to the appropriate federal, state, local, regulatory, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency when the information indicates a violation or potential violation of law. Other disclosures may be made for routine purposes. For a discussion of the types of routine disclosures that may be made, you may consult the Executive Office for United States Trustee's systems of records notice, UST-001, "Bankruptcy Case Files and Associated Records." *See* 71 Fed. Reg. 59,818 et seq. (Oct. 11, 2006). A copy of the notice may be obtained at the following link: http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/index.htm. Failure to provide this information could result in the dismissal or conversion of your bankruptcy case, or other action by the United States Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Post-confirmation Report and its attachments, if any, are true and correct and that I have been authorized to sign this report.

/s/ James Seery	James Seery
Signature of Responsible Party	Printed Name of Responsible Party
Chief Operating Officer	10/21/2021
Title	Date

EXHIBIT A

Exhibit

P. 1 J

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Disclaimer For Financial Projections

This document includes financial projections for July 2020 through December 2022 (the "Projections") for Highland Capital Management, L.P. "Company"). These Projections have been prepared by DSI with input from management at the Company. The historical information utilized in these Projections has not been audited or reviewed for accuracy by DSI.

This document includes certain statements, estimates and forecasts provided by the Company with respect to the Company's anticipated future performance. These estimates and forecasts contain significant elements of subjective judgment and analysis that may or may not prove to be accurate or correct. There can be no assurance that these statements, estimates and forecasts will be attained and actual outcomes and results may differ materially from what is estimated or forecast herein.

These Projections should not be regarded as a representation of DSI that the projected results will be achieved.

Management may update or supplement these Projections in the future, however, DSI expressly disclaims any obligation to update its report.

These Projections were not prepared with a view toward compliance with published guidelines of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants regarding historical financial statements, projections or forecasts.

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Statement of Assumptions

A. Plan effective date is March 1, 2021
B. All investment assets are sold by December 31, 2022.
C. All demand notes are collected in the year 2021; 3 term notes defaulted and have been demanded based on default provisions; payment estimated in 2021
D. Dugaboy term note with maturity date beyond 12/31/2022 are sold in Q1 2022; in the interim interest income and principal payments are not collected due to prepayment on note
E. Fixed assets currently used in daily operations are sold in June 2021 for $0
F. Highland bonus plan has been terminated in accordance with its terms. Accrual for employee bonuses as of January 2021 are reversed and not paid.
G. All Management advisory or shared service contracts are terminated on their terms by the effective date or shortly thereafter
H. Post-effective date, the reorganized Debtor would retain up to ten HCMLP employees (or hire similar employees) to help monetize the remaining assets.
I. Litigation Trustee budget is $6,500,000.
J. Unrealized gains or losses are not recorded on a monthly basis; all gains or losses are recorded as realized gains or losses upon sale of asset.
K. Plan does not provide for payment of interest to Class 8 holders of general unsecured claims, as set forth in the Plan. If holders of general unsecured claims receive 100% of their allowed claims, they would then be entitled to receive interest at the federal judgement rate, prior to any funds being available for claims or interest of junior priority.
L. Plan assumes zero allowed claims for IFA and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HM").
M. Claim amounts listed in Plan vs. Liquidation schedule are subject to change; claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV. Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets
N. With the exception of Class 2 - Frontier, Classes 1-7 will be paid in full within 30 days of effective date.
O. Class 7 payout limited to 85% of each individual creditor claim or in the aggregate $13.15 million. Plan currently projects Class 7 payout of $10.3 million.
P. See below for Class 8 estimated payout schedule; payout is subject to certain assets being monetized by payout date (no Plan requirement to do so):
    - By September 30, 2021 - $50,000,000
    - By March 31, 2022 – additional $50,000,000
    - By June 30, 2022 – additional $25,000,000
    - All remaining proceeds are assumed to be paid out on or soon after all remaining assets are monetized.
Q. Assumptions subject to revision based on business decision and performance of the business

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Plan Analysis Vs. Liquidation Analysis
(US $000's)

	Plan Analysis	Liquidation Analysis
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020	$ 24,290	$ 24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941	191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution[1][3]	(59,573)	(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	222,658	174,748
Less: Claims paid in full		
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)	(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)	(10,574)
Class 1 - Jefferies Secured Claim	-	-
Class 2 - Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)	(5,781)
Class 3 - Other Secured Claims	(62)	(62)
Class 4 – Priority Non-Tax Claims	(16)	(16)
Class 5 - Retained Employee Claims	-	-
Class 6 - PTO Claims [5]	-	-
Class 7 – Convenience Claims [7][8]	(10,280)	-
Subtotal	(27,793)	(17,514)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865	157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims included in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%	0.00%
Class 8 – General Unsecured Claims [8][10]	273,219	286,100
Subtotal	273,219	286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%	54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-	-
Class 9 – Subordinated Claims	*no distribution*	*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests	*no distribution*	*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A Limited Partnership Interest	*no distribution*	*no distribution*

Footnotes:

[1] Assumes chapter 7 Trustee will not be able to achieve same sales proceeds as Claimant Trustee
Assumes Chapter 7 Trustee engages new professionals to help liquidate assets and terminates any management agreements with funds or CLOS
[2] Sale of investment assets, sale of fixed assets, collection of accounts receivable and interest receivable; Plan includes revenue from managing CLOs
[3] Estimated expenses through final distribution exclude non-cash expenses:
Depreciation of $462 thousand in 2021; Bad debt of $124K in 2021
[4] Unclassified claims include payments for priority tax claims and settlements with previously approved by the Bankruptcy Court
[5] Represents $4.7 million in unpaid professional fees, $4.5 million in timing of payments to vendors and $1.2 million to pay PTO
[6] Debtor will pay all unpaid interest estimated at $253 thousand of Frontier on effective date and continue to pay interest quarterly at 5.25% until Frantier's collateral is sold
[7] Claims payout limited to 85% of each individual creditor claim or limited to a total class payout of $13.15 million
[8] Plan: Class 7 includes $1.2 million estimate for aggregate contract rejections damage; Liquidation Class 8 includes $2.0 million for estimated rejection damages
[10] Class estimates $0 allowed claim for the following creditors: IFA and HM; assumes RCP claims offset against HCMLP interest in RCP fund
UBS claim included at $50.0 million.

Notes:

All claim amounts are estimated as of February 1, 2020 and subject to change

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Balance Sheet
(US $000's)

	Actual Jun-20	Actual Sep-20	Forecast ---> Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22
Assets											
Cash and Cash Equivalents	$ 14,994	$ 5,888	$ 31,047	$ 10,328	$ 40,063	$ 42,833	$ 135,137	$ 80,733	$ 72,238	$ 69,368	$ -
Other Current Assets	13,182	13,651	13,784	15,172	14,671	14,220	9,943	8,268	8,417	8,567	-
Investment Assets	320,912	305,961	283,812	280,946	233,234	171,174	47,503	47,503	25,888	25,888	-
Net Fixed Assets	3,055	2,823	2,592	1,348	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL ASSETS	**$ 352,142**	**$ 328,323**	**$ 331,235**	**$ 307,793**	**$ 287,968**	**$ 228,227**	**$ 192,583**	**$ 136,504**	**$ 106,542**	**$ 103,823**	**$ -**
Liabilities											
Post-petition Liabilities	$ 142,730	$ 135,597	$ 131,230	$ 12,891	$ 10,249	$ 10,503	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -
Pre-petition Liabilities	9,861	9,884	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Claims											
Unclassified	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 2 - Frontier Secured Claim	-	-	-	5,528	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 3 - Other Secured Claims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 4 – Priority Non-Tax Claims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 5 – Retained Employee Claims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 6 - PTO Claims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 7 – Convenience Claims	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 8 – General Unsecured Claims	-	-	-	273,219	273,219	223,219	223,219	173,219	148,219	148,219	78,354
Class 9 – Subordinated Claims [1]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 10 – Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Class 11 – Class A Limited Partnership Interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Claim Payable	9,861	9,884	10,000	278,747	273,219	223,219	223,219	173,219	148,219	148,219	78,354
TOTAL LIABILITIES	**$ 152,591**	**145,481**	**141,230**	**291,639**	**283,468**	**233,723**	**223,219**	**173,219**	**148,219**	**148,219**	**78,354**
Partners' Capital	199,551	182,842	190,005	16,154	4,500	(5,495)	(30,636)	(36,715)	(41,677)	(44,396)	(78,354)
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND PARTNERS' CAPITAL	**$ 352,142**	**$ 328,323**	**$ 331,235**	**$ 307,793**	**$ 287,968**	**$ 228,227**	**$ 192,583**	**$ 136,504**	**$ 106,543**	**$ 103,823**	**$ -**

[1] Class 9 has $60 million of subordinated claims; Debtor anticipates no distributions to Class 9

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Profit/Loss
(US $000's)

	Actual Jan 2020 to June 2020 Total	Actual 3 month ended Sept 2020	Forecast —> 3 month ended Dec 2020	Total 2020	3 month ended Mar 2021	3 month ended Jun 2021	3 month ended Sept 2021	3 month ended Dec 2021	Total 2021
Revenue									
Management Fees	$ 6,572	$ 1,949	$ 2,804	$ 11,325	$ 1,329	$ 856	$ 856	$ 856	$ 3,897
Shared Service Fees	7,672	3,765	3,788	15,225	1,373	45	45	-	1,463
Other Income	3,126	538	340	4,004	316	274	-	-	591
Total revenue	$ 17,370	$ 6,252	$ 6,931	$ 30,554	$ 3,018	$ 1,176	$ 901	$ 856	$ 5,951
Operating Expenses [1]	13,328	9,171	9,399	31,899	12,168	4,897	3,973	3,333	24,371
Income/(loss) From Operations	$ 4,042	$ (2,918)	$ (2,468)	$ (1,345)	$ (9,149)	$ (3,722)	$ (3,072)	$ (2,477)	$ (18,420)
Professional Fees	17,522	7,707	8,351	33,581	7,478	6,583	2,268	1,810	18,138
Other Income/(Expenses) [2]	2,302	1,518	1,059	4,879	(156,042)	326	(93)	29	(155,781)
Operating Gain/(Loss)	$ (11,178)	$ (9,107)	$ (9,761)	$ (30,046)	$ (172,669)	$ (9,978)	$ (5,433)	$ (4,259)	$ (192,339)
Realized and Unrealized Gain/(Loss)									
Other Realized Gains/(Loss)	-	-	-	-	(1,013)	522	-	-	(491)
Net Realized Gain/(Loss) on Sale of Investment	(28,418)	1,549	(8,850)	(35,719)	(168)	(2,198)	(4,563)	(7,581)	(14,510)
Net Change in Unrealized Gain/(Loss) of Investments	(29,929)	(7,450)	4,523	(32,857)	-	-	-	-	-
Net Realized Gain /(Loss) from Equity Method Investees	-	-	(364)	(364)	-	-	-	(13,301)	(13,301)
Net Change in Unrealized Gain /(Loss) from Equity Method Investees	(80,782)	(1,700)	-	(82,482)	-	-	-	-	-
Total Realized and Unrealized Gain/(Loss)	$ (139,129)	$ (7,601)	$ (4,692)	$ (151,422)	$ (1,182)	$ (1,675)	$ (4,563)	$ (20,882)	$ (28,302)
Net Income	$ (150,307)	$ (16,708)	$ (14,453)	$ (181,468)	$ (173,851)	$ (11,654)	$ (9,996)	$ (25,141)	$ (220,641)

Footnotes:
[1] Operating expenses include an adjustment in January 2021 to account for expenses that have not been accrued or paid prior to effective date.
[2] Other income and expenses of $197.3 million in Q1 2021 includes:
[a] $209.7 million was expensed to record for the increase of allowed claims.
[b] Income of $11.7 million for the accrued, but unpaid payroll liability related to the Debtor's deferred bonus programs amount written-off.

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Profit/Loss
(US $000's)

	Forecast —> 3 month ended Mar 2022	3 month ended Jun 2022	3 month ended Sept 2022	3 month ended Dec 2022	Total 2022	Plan
Revenue						
Management Fees	$ 580	$ 580	$ 580	$ 580	$ 2,318	$ 6,215
Shared Service Fees	-	-	-	-	-	1,463
Other Income	-	-	-	-	-	591
Total revenue	$ 580	$ 580	$ 580	$ 580	$ 2,318	$ 8,269
Operating Expenses	3,635	2,679	1,739	6,425	14,478	38,849
Income/(loss) From Operations	$ (3,056)	$ (2,099)	$ (1,159)	$ (5,846)	$ (12,160)	$ (30,580)
Professional Fees	2,921	2,761	1,461	2,176	9,318	27,455
Other Income/(Expenses)	(103)	(101)	(100)	(350)	(654)	(156,434)
Operating Gain/(Loss)	$ (6,079)	$ (4,961)	$ (2,719)	$ (8,371)	$ (22,131)	$ (214,470)
Realized and Unrealized Gain/(Loss)						
Other Realized Gains/(Loss)	-	-	-	(25,587)	(25,587)	(26,078)
Net Realized Gain/(Loss) on Sale of Investment	-	-	-	-	-	(14,510)
Net Change in Unrealized Gain/(Loss) of Investments	-	-	-	-	-	-
Net Realized Gain /(Loss) from Equity Method Investees	-	-	-	-	-	(13,301)
Net Change in Unrealized Gain /(Loss) from Equity Method Investees	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Realized and Unrealized Gain/(Loss)	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ (25,587)	$ (25,587)	$ (53,889)
Net Income	$ (6,079)	$ (4,961)	$ (2,719)	$ (33,958)	$ (47,718)	$ (268,359)

2/1/2021

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Cash Flow Indirect
(US $000's)

	Forecast --->									
	Sep-20	**Dec-20**	**Mar-21**	**Jun-21**	**Sep-21**	**Dec-21**	**Mar-22**	**Jun-22**	**Sep-22**	**Dec-22**
Net (Loss) Income	$ (16,708)	$ (14,453)	$ (173,851)	$ (11,654)	$ (9,996)	$ (25,141)	$ (6,079)	$ (4,961)	$ (2,719)	$ (33,958)
Cash Flow from Operating Activity										
(Increase) / Decrease in Cash										
Depreciation and amortization	231	231	231	231	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other realized (gain)/ loss	-	-	1,013	(522)	-	-	-	-	-	25,587
Investment realized (gain)/ loss	(1,549)	9,214	168	2,198	4,563	20,882	-	-	-	-
Unrealized (gain) / loss	(9,150)	4,523	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(Increase) Decrease in Current Assets	(470)	(133)	(1,388)	501	450	4,277	1,675	(149)	(150)	908
Increase (Decrease) in Current Liabilities	(7,110)	(4,251)	(44,172)	(2,643)	255	(10,503)	-	-	-	-
Net Cash Increase / (Decrease) - Operating Activities	(34,757)	(4,868)	(217,998)	(11,889)	(4,727)	(10,485)	(4,404)	(5,110)	(2,870)	(7,463)
Cash Flow From Investing Activities										
Proceeds from Sale of Fixed Assets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proceeds from Investment Assets	25,650	30,027	2,698	47,152	57,498	102,788	-	21,616	-	7,960
Net Cash Increase / (Decrease) - Investing Activities	25,650	30,027	2,698	47,152	57,498	102,788	-	21,616	-	7,960
Cash Flow from Financing Activities										
Claims payable	-	-	(73,997)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Claim reclasses/(paid)	-	-	278,747	(5,528)	(50,000)	-	(50,000)	(25,000)	-	(69,865)
Maple Avenue Holdings	-	-	(4,975)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Frontier Note	-	-	(5,195)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Net Cash Increase / (Decrease) - Financing Activities	-	-	194,580	(5,528)	(50,000)	-	(50,000)	(25,000)	-	(69,865)
Net Change in Cash	$ (9,107)	$ 25,159	$ (20,719)	$ 29,735	$ 2,770	$ 92,303	$ (54,404)	$ (8,495)	$ (2,870)	$ (69,368)
Beginning Cash	14,994	5,888	31,047	10,328	40,063	42,833	135,137	80,733	72,238	69,368
Ending Cash	$ 5,888	$ 31,047	$ 10,328	$ 40,063	$ 42,833	$ 135,137	$ 80,733	$ 72,238	$ 69,368	$ -

2/1/2021

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Northern DISTRICT OF Texas

Case number 19-34054 sgj11

In re: Highland Capital Management, LP § Case No. 19-34054

Debtor(s) §

☐ Jointly Administered

Post-confirmation Report

Chapter 11

Quarter Ending Date: 09/30/2022 Petition Date: 10/16/2019

Plan Confirmed Date: 02/22/2021 Plan Effective Date: 08/11/2021

This Post-confirmation Report relates to: ◉ Reorganized Debtor

○ Other Authorized Party or Entity: _____

Name of Authorized Party or Entity

/s/ Zachery Z. Annable
Signature of Responsible Party

10/21/2022
Date

Zachery Z. Annable, Hayward PLLC
Printed Name of Responsible Party

10501 N. Central Expressway, Suite 106
Dallas TX 75231
Address

STATEMENT: This Periodic Report is associated with an open bankruptcy case; therefore, Paperwork Reduction Act exemption 5 C.F.R. § 1320.4(a)(2) applies.

Exhibit

P 1-K

Debtor's Name Highland Capital Management, LP | Case No. 19-34054

Part 1: Summary of Post-confirmation Transfers

	Current Quarter	Total Since Effective Date
a. Total cash disbursements	$10,725,675	$94,905,199
b. Non-cash securities transferred	$0	$0
c. Other non-cash property transferred	$0	$5,194,652
d. Total transferred (a+b+c)	$10,725,675	$100,099,851

Part 2: Preconfirmation Professional Fees and Expenses

				Approved Current Quarter	Approved Cumulative	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative
a.	Professional fees & expenses (bankruptcy) incurred by or on behalf of the debtor		*Aggregate Total*	$0	$33,005,136	$0	$33,005,136
	Itemized Breakdown by Firm						
		Firm Name	Role				
	i	Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	Lead Counsel	$0	$24,312,860	$0	$24,312,860
	ii	Development Specialists, Inc.	Financial Professional	$0	$5,765,448	$0	$5,765,448
	iii	Kurtzman Carson Consultants	Other	$0	$2,054,716	$0	$2,054,716
	iv	Hayward & Associates PLLC	Local Counsel	$0	$872,112	$0	$872,112
	v						
	vi						
	vii						
	viii						
	ix						
	x						
	xi						
	xii						
	xiii						
	xiv						
	xv						
	xvi						
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				Approved Current Quarter	Approved Cumulative	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative
b.	Professional fees & expenses (nonbankruptcy) incurred by or on behalf of the debtor *Aggregate Total*			$0	$7,604,472	$0	$7,604,472
	Itemized Breakdown by Firm						
		Firm Name	Role				
	i	Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP	Other	$0	$1,149,807	$0	$1,149,807
	ii	Foley Gardere, Foley & Lardne	Other	$0	$629,088	$0	$629,088
	iii	Deloitte	Financial Professional	$0	$553,413	$0	$553,413
	iv	Mercer (US) Inc.	Other	$0	$204,767	$0	$204,767
	v	Teneo Capital, LLC	Financial Professional	$0	$1,364,823	$0	$1,364,823
	vi	Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale	Other	$0	$2,650,937	$0	$2,650,937

Debtor's Name Highland Capital Management, LP Case No. 19-34054

	vii	Carey Olsen	Other	$0	$280,264	$0	$280,264
	viii	ASW Law	Other	$0	$4,976	$0	$4,976
	ix	Houlihan Lokey Financial Advi	Other	$0	$766,397	$0	$766,397
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c.	All professional fees and expenses (debtor & committees)			$0	$60,171,929	$0	$60,171,929

Part 3: Recoveries of the Holders of Claims and Interests under Confirmed Plan

	Total Anticipated Payments Under Plan	Paid Current Quarter	Paid Cumulative	Allowed Claims	% Paid of Allowed Claims
a. Administrative claims	$0	$0	$15,750	$15,750	100%
b. Secured claims	$5,843,261	$0	$5,274,477	$5,274,477	100%
c. Priority claims	$16,498	$1,108,943	$1,213,832	$1,213,832	100%
d. General unsecured claims	$205,144,544	$248,999,332	$255,201,228	$397,485,568	64%
e. Equity interests	$0	$0	$0		

Part 4: Questionnaire

a. Is this a final report? Yes ○ No ◉

If yes, give date Final Decree was entered: _____

If no, give date when the application for Final Decree is anticipated: _____

b. Are you current with quarterly U.S. Trustee fees as set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1930? Yes ◉ No ○

Privacy Act Statement

28 U.S.C. § 589b authorizes the collection of this information and provision of this information is mandatory. The United States Trustee will use this information to calculate statutory fee assessments under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) and to otherwise evaluate whether a reorganized chapter 11 debtor is performing as anticipated under a confirmed plan. Disclosure of this information may be to a bankruptcy trustee when the information is needed to perform the trustee's duties, or to the appropriate federal, state, local, regulatory, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency when the information indicates a violation or potential violation of law. Other disclosures may be made for routine purposes. For a discussion of the types of routine disclosures that may be made, you may consult the Executive Office for United States Trustee's systems of records notice, UST-001, "Bankruptcy Case Files and Associated Records." *See* 71 Fed. Reg. 59,818 et seq. (Oct. 11, 2006). A copy of the notice may be obtained at the following link: http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/index.htm. Failure to provide this information could result in the dismissal or conversion of your bankruptcy case, or other action by the United States Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Post-confirmation Report and its attachments, if any, are true and correct and that I have been authorized to sign this report.

/s/ James Seery
Signature of Responsible Party

James Seery
Printed Name of Responsible Party

CEO
Title

10/21/2022
Date



Page 1



Other Page 1



Page 2 Minus Tables



Bankruptcy Table 1-50



Bankruptcy Table 51-100



Non-Bankruptcy Table 1-50



Non-Bankruptcy Table 51-100



Part 3, Part 4, Last Page

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	**191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

DECLARATION OF JAMES DONDERO

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

The undersigned provides this Declaration pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 132.001 and declares as follows:

1. My name is James Dondero. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age. I am of sound mind and body, and I am competent to make this declaration. The facts stated within this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

2. I previously served as the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM"). Jim Seery succeeded me in this capacity following the entry of various orders in the bankruptcy proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 ("HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings").

3. On December 17, 2020, I sent an email to employees at HCM, including the then Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer Jim Seery, containing non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple's interest in acquiring MGM. I became aware of this information due to my involvement as a member of the board of MGM. My purpose was to alert Mr. Seery and others that MGM stock, which was owned either directly or indirectly by HCM, should be on a restricted list and not be involved in any trades. A true and correct copy of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

Exhibit

P 2

4. In late Spring of 2021, I had phone calls with two principals at Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), Raj Patel and Michael Linn. During these phone calls, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn informed me that Farallon had a deal in place to purchase the Acis and HarbourVest claims, which I understood to refer to claims that were a part of settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn stated that Farallon agreed to purchase these claims based solely on conversations with Mr. Seery because they had made significant profits when Mr. Seery told them to purchase other claims in the past. They also stated they were particularly optimistic because of the expected sale of MGM.

5. During one of these calls involving Mr. Linn, I asked whether they would sell the claims for 30% more than they had paid. Mr. Linn said no because Mr. Seery said they were worth a lot more. I asked Mr. Linn if he would sell at any price and he said that he was unwilling to do so. I believe these conversations with Farallon were taped by Farallon.

6. My name is James Dondero, my date of birth is June 29, 1962, and my address is 3807 Miramar Ave., Dallas, Texas 75205, United States of America. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NOT.

Executed in Dallas County, State of Texas, on the 15th day of February 2023.

JAMES DONDERO

From: Jim Dondero <JDondero@highlandcapital.com>
To: Thomas Surgent <TSurgent@HighlandCapital.com>, Jim Seery <jpseeryjr@gmail.com>, Scott Ellington <SEllington@HighlandCapital.com>, "Joe Sowin" <JSowin@HighlandCapital.com>, Jason Post <JPost@NexpointAdvisors.com>
Cc: "D. Lynn (\"Judge Lynn\")" <michael.lynn@bondsellis.com>, Bryan Assink <bryan.assink@bondsellis.com>
Subject: Trading restriction re MGM - material non public information
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:14:39 -0600
Importance: Normal

Just got off a pre board call, board call at 3:00. Update is as follows: Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in Data Room. Both continue to express material interest.
Probably first quarter event, will update as facts change. Note also any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.

Sent from my iPhone

Exhibit

P 2-1

FILED
5/2/2022 9:27 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Martin Reyes DEPUTY

CAUSE NO. DC-21-09534

IN RE JAMES DONDERO,	§	**IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
	§	
Petitioner.	§	**95th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
	§	
	§	**DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

VERIFIED AMENDED PETITION TO TAKE DEPOSITION BEFORE SUIT AND SEEK DOCUMENTS

Petitioner James Dondero respectfully requests that this Court order, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202, the deposition of the corporate representatives and/or employees of Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC, and of Farallon Capital Management, LLC. Petitioner further requests that the Court order certain limited, yet relevant, documents to be provided under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2 as set forth in below.

Petitioner would respectfully show the Court that:

I.

PARTIES

1. Petitioner James Dondero ("Petitioner") is an individual resident in Dallas County, Texas, and is impacted by the potential acts and omissions.

2. Respondent Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("A&M") is a Delaware limited liability company serving as an investment adviser, with offices in Dallas County, Texas, at 2100 Ross Ave., 21st Floor, Dallas, Texas 75201.

3. Respondent Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") is an investment fund located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111, and Respondent Michael Lin is a principal at Farallon.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. The anticipated lawsuit would include common law claims.

5. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Respondent Alvarez & Marsal because it maintains a regular place of business in Dallas County. Personal jurisdiction is also proper under Tex. Cir. Prac. Rem. Code § 17.003, and under §17.042(1)-(3) because A&M contracted with counterparties, Joshua Terry and Acis Capital Management, L.P., both of whom at the time had their principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas, and because its acts on behalf of the Crusader Funds (as defined below), if they occurred as believed they did, will have been tortious as to Petitioner. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction because the action concerns the sale of personal property located in Dallas County in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Farallon because it contracted with A&M to purchase claims in the Highland Capital Management, L.P. Chapter 11 bankruptcy ("Highland bankruptcy") upon the recommendation of James Seery, Highland's CEO. Such acts, if shown to have occurred as believed and under the alleged circumstances, will have been tortious as to the Petitioner. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction because the action concerns the sale of personal property located in Dallas County in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

7. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, where venue of the anticipated lawsuit may lie and where the property at issue exists, and where a substantial amount of the acts and omissions underlying the potential suit occurred.

8. Removal is not proper because there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because a Rule 202 petition does not meet Article III of the United States Constitution's standing requirement.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9. This matter arises out of purchase of certain bankruptcy claims in the Highland Bankruptcy.

10. Petitioner is the founder and former CEO of Highland Capital Management, L.P., currently a bankrupt debtor. He is also an investor in Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd. and several of its companion and affiliated funds (the "Crusader Funds"). Therefore, Petitioner has an interest in seeing to it that A&M properly marketed the claims for proper purposes and for the right price.

11. Until recently, the Crusader Funds were managed by Highland, and then by A&M when those funds went into liquidation.

12. Petitioner has an interest in the bankruptcy estate by virtue of his affiliation, and the fact that he is an adviser and/or manager of several trusts who own the equity of the debtor and therefore has an interest in seeing the equity properly protected in bankruptcy.

13. Shortly after the Highland bankruptcy was filed, the Chapter 11 Trustee issued an invitation to creditors to serve on the unsecured creditors committee (the "UCC").

14. The Trustee's invitation included a condition: namely, that anyone who served on the committee would have to agree that they would not sell their claims or in any way alienate them (including allowing them to be used as security) without leave of Court. Specifically, the United Trustee's instruction sheet stated:

> Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer

> claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed questionnaire and accepting membership on official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from the committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violation, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

15. Upon information and belief, two of the Highland creditors – the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund, who between them owned approximately $191 million in claims in the bankruptcy as well as other assets (the "Crusader Claims") – sold their Claims and assets to Jessup Holdings LLC, a subsidiary of Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Alvarez and Marsal made this sale, which was in violation of the foregoing order.

16. Alvarez and Marsal arguably owe fiduciary duties to the funds and funds investors, and may have violated those duties by failing to conduct a sale for proper value, and/or by engaging in other acts that resulted in a sale of assets that was not authorized and/or not allowed by the terms of the funds or by law.

17. Around the same time, another Highland creditor—Joshua Terry and Acis Capital Management, who have approximately $25 million in claims—also sold their claims to Muck Holdings, LLC, set up by Farallon Capital Management (the "Acis Claims").

18. And a third creditor, HarbourVest, sold its $80 million worth of claims (the "HarbourVest Claims") to Muck Holding as well.

19. The above interests are generally referred to hereinafter as the "Claims".

20. The sales of the Claims were not reported contemporaneously as they were supposed to have been, nor was leave of the bankruptcy court ever sought, much less obtained, for the sales.

21. However, Acis/Terry, and Crusader continued to serve on the UCC for a substantial period of time as if they hadn't sold their claims at all.

22. As was discovered by the Petitioner, the current CEO of Highland, James Seery, has an age-old connection to Farallon and to Stonehill and, upon information and belief, advised Farallon and Stonehill to purchase the Claims.

23. On a telephone call between Petitioner and Michael Lin, a representative of Farallon, Mr. Lin informed Petitioner that Farallon had purchased the claims sight unseen and with no due diligence—100% relying on Mr. Seery's say-so because they had made so much money in the past when Mr. Seery told them to purchase claims.

24. In other words, Mr. Seery had inside information on the price and value of the claims that he shared with no one but Farallon for their benefit.

25. Mr. Seery's management duties come with a federally-imposed fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act of 1940.

26. Mr. Seery had much to gain by Farallon holding the claims—namely, his knowledge that Farallon—as a friendly investor—would allow him to remain as CEO while Highland remains bankrupt and get paid (whereas plainly, the selling members of the UCC were ready to move on, thus truncating Seery's supposed gravy train). Mr. Seery's rich compensation package incentivized him to continue the bankruptcy for as long as possible.

27. However, Mr. Seery is privy to material non-public information (i.e., "Inside Information") of many of the securities that Highland deals in, as well as in the funds that Mr. Seery manages through Highland. One of the assets was a publicly traded security that Highland was an insider of, and therefore, should not have traded (whether directly or indirectly), given its possession of insider information.

28. Thus, his confidential tip to Farallon to purchase the claims may have violated certain of his duties as a Registered Investment Adviser, federal Securities laws, and his duties to the bankruptcy estate.

29. Mr. Seery's duties also involve duties to manage the bankruptcy estate in a manner that would expeditiously resolve the bankruptcy. If the Unsecured Creditor Committee members (Acis, HarbourVest, and Redeemer) were indeed interested in selling their claims for less than the notional amount, then that would have been publicized in the required court filing. By failing to file them publicly and seeking court approval, the bankruptcy has been prolonged whilst Farallon seeks to reap a massive windfall return on its investment—a return that Seery apparently promised.

30. The sale of assets authorized by A&M was not pursuant to normal means, and there is reason to doubt that A&M sought or obtained the highest price for the assets that it sold.

IV.

RELIEF SOUGHT FROM ALVAREZ AND MARSAL

31. Petitioner asks this Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take a pre-suit deposition of a designated representative, or representatives, of A&M, on the following topics, and to investigate any potential lawsuits arising out of the highly irregular manner in which the assets were marketed and sold, within ten days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties:

a. A&M's rights and responsibilities and duties, including, but not limited to, under A&M's agreement(s) with the Crusader Funds and the Agreement(s) of those funds governing Petitioner's rights and duties as an investor (whether directly or indirectly);

b. The solicitation, offer, valuation, marketing, negotiation, and sale of the Highland bankruptcy claims or other assets by A&M on behalf of the Crusader Funds (and/or the Redeemer Committee) to any or all of Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC, or any third party;

c. A&M's valuation, and negotiation of the price, of the Claims, its bases therefor, and what it communicated to potential purchasers about the value of the Claims, if anything;

d. The negotiations and communications leading up to the purchase or sale of the Claims, including, but not limited to:

i. Any discussions with James Seery or anyone at or on behalf of Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Creditors Committee, Sidley Austin, LLP, and/or F.T.I. Consulting, regarding the Claims, any plans with regards to Highland Capital Management, L.P., the liquidation or the value of the Claims, the likelihood of and quantum of payout of the Claims, the pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation;

ii. Any discussions with the purchasers of the Claims or other assets to, including, but not limited to, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC or Muck Holdings, LLC, regarding the Claims or other assets, Highland Capital Management, L.P., the value of the Claims, the likely payout of the Claims, the pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation.

32. As part of the Court's Order, Petitioner requests this Court to require A&M to produce the following documents at their respective depositions:

a. All offers to sell or purchase the Claims and/or all correspondence regarding same;

b. A&M's agreement(s) with the Crusader Funds and the Agreement(s) of those funds governing Petitioner's rights and duties as an investor (whether directly or indirectly);

c. Any document reflecting the purported assets of, or valuation of, Highland Capital Management, L.P. at the time of the sale or marketing of the Claims;

d. Marketing materials, presentations, decks, information sheets, spreadsheets, or other documents sent to or provided to any purchaser, whether in a data room or as part of any marketing pitch, or during any due diligence process, relating to or concerning the liquidation value, potential or likely return on investment, asset valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims;

e. All documents, agreements, contracts (including any drafts, letters of intent, confidentiality agreements, term sheets) or communications related to same,

relating to or concerning the valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims (or any subset of the Claims);

f. Communications with James Seery or any other person on behalf of the Debtor, the U.S. Trustee's office, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, Joshua Terry, Acis Capital Management, LLC, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, or Muck Holdings, LLC (or anyone representing or signing on behalf of the foregoing) regarding the sale of the Claims or other assets, the value thereof, the expected amount or percentage of the Claims that would be paid and when such payment was expected to occur, the liquidation value of Highland Capital Management, L.P., potential sources of other cash to pay the claims, the liquidation of the Claims, the likely return from purchasing the Claims, the underlying assets securing the Claims.

g. Proofs of purchase of the Claims and other assets of the Crusader entities.

V.

RELIEF SOUGHT FROM FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC AND MICHAEL LIN

33. Petitioner asks this Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take a pre-suit deposition of a designated representative, or representatives, of Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. or Muck Holdings, LLC, and to depose Michael Lin, on the following topics, to investigate any potential lawsuits arising out of the highly irregular manner in which the assets were marketed and sold, within ten days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties:

a. Farallon, Muck Holdings, LLC, and/or Lin's understanding of the value of the Claims, the assets held or controlled by or to be acquired by Highland Capital Management, L.P.., the liquidation value of the Estate of Highland Capital Management, L.P., and/or Claims, how and when the claims were expected to be paid and what the expected percentage payoff was going to be, and the bases for such understanding or belief, and what was communicated to them about the value of the Claims;

b. The negotiations and communications leading up to the purchase or sale of the Claims, including, but not limited to, any discussions with sellers of any of the Claims regarding the Claims and the sale/purchase of the Claims, discussions with James Seery or anyone at or on behalf of Highland Capital Management, L.P. regarding the Claims and his plans with regards to Highland, the value of the Claims, the likely payout of the Claims, the

pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation, or any disclosures by James Seery or Highland Capital Management, L.P. regarding how the Claims were going to be paid;

c. Farallon and Michael Lin's awareness of material non-public information regarding Highland Capital Management, L.P. or securities held by Highland Capital Management, L.P.;

d. Farallon and Michael Lin's relationship with James Seery or Highland Capital Management, L.P. and their knowledge of his role and their ongoing relationship with him.

34. As part of the Court's Order, Petitioner requests this Court to require Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C., Muck Holdings LLC, and Michael Lin to produce the following documents at their respective depositions:

a. All offers to sell or purchase the Claims and/or all correspondence regarding same;

b. Any document reflecting the purported assets of, or valuation of, Highland Capital Management, L.P. at the time of the sale or marketing of the Claims;

c. Marketing materials, presentations, decks, information sheets, spreadsheets, or other documents sent to or provided to any purchaser, whether in a data room or as part of any marketing pitch, or during any due diligence process, relating to or concerning the liquidation value, potential or likely return on investment, asset valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims.

d. All agreements, contracts, or other documents (including any drafts, letters of intent, confidentiality agreements, term sheets, or communications related to same) relating to or concerning the valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims (or any subset of the Claims);

e. All communications with James Seery or any other person on behalf of the Debtor, the U.S. Trustee's office, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, Joshua Terry, Acis Capital Management, LLC, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC or Muck Holdings, LLC (or anyone representing or signing on behalf of the foregoing) regarding the sale of the Claims or other assets, the value thereof, the expected amount or percentage of the Claims that would be paid and when such payment was expected to occur, the liquidation value of Highland Capital Management, L.P., potential sources of other cash to pay the Claims, the liquidation of the

Claims, the likely return from purchasing the Claims, the underlying assets securing the Claims.

f. Proofs of purchase of the Claims and other assets of the Crusader entities.

VI.

REQUEST FOR HEARING & ORDERS

35. After service of this Amended Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on the Petition and order the requested relief.

36. Document discovery is permitted by Rule 199.2. Rule 202.5 states that "depositions authorized by this Rule are governed by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. The scope of discovery in depositions authorized by this rule is the same as if the anticipated suit or potential claim had been filed…." Rule 199.2 governs such actions and "expressly allows a party noticing a deposition to include a request for production of documents or tangible things within the scope of discovery and within the witness's possession, custody, or control." *In re City of Tatum*, 567 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018) (holding that district court properly ordered document discovery in Rule 202 action). *See also* Tex. R. Civ. P. 205.1(c) (authorizing party to compel discovery from a nonparty by court order or subpoena, including a request for production served with a deposition notice). *See also City of Dall. v. City of Corsicana*, Nos. 10-14-00090-CV, 10-14-00171-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 20, 2015) ("Under rule 202, documents can be requested in connection with a deposition…. Accordingly, the trial court's order is not an abuse of discretion to the extent that it allows Navarro to obtain documents in an oral deposition under rule 199 or a deposition on written questions under rule 200."); *In re Anand*, No. 01-12-01106-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4157, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2013) ("the language of these rules when read together

permits a petition seeking a pre-suit deposition under Rule 202 to also request the production of documents").

37. **FOR THESE REASONS**, Petitioner asks the Court to set a date for hearing on this Amended Petition, and after the hearing, to find that the likely benefit of allowing Petitioner to take the requested depositions outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure. Petitioner further asks the Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take the oral depositions of the Respondents after proper notice and service at the offices of Sbaiti & Company PLLC, 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 4900W, Dallas, Texas 75201, within ten (10) days of the Court's Order, or as otherwise agreed to by the parties, and to produce the requested documents prior to said deposition. Petitioner also seeks any further relief to which he may be justly entitled.

Dated: May 2, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti
Texas Bar No. 24058096
Brad J. Robinson
Texas Bar No. 24058076
2200 Ross Avenue – Suite 4900W
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Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of May, 2022.

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti
Mazin A. Sbaiti

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
DALLAS COUNTY §

Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared James Dondero (hereinafter "Affiant"), who is over the age of 21 and of sound mind and body, who being by me duly sworn, on his oath deposed and said that he has read the foregoing Amended Verified Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit, and that the statements of fact therein are within his personal knowledge and are true and correct as stated, Further, Affiant stated that the Affiant has personal knowledge because of Affiant's relationships and interactions as described therein.

James Dondero

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this 25 day of April, 2022, to certify which witness my hand and official seal.

My commission expires on 12.9.2025.

Notary Public of the State of Texas

seal

Robin Morrison
My Commission Expires
12/9/2025
Notary ID
133483390

Automated Certificate of eService

This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Kim James on behalf of Mazin Sbaiti
Bar No. 24058096
krj@sbaitilaw.com
Envelope ID: 64114982
Status as of 5/3/2022 2:58 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
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Charlotte Casso		bcc@sbaitilaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT

CAUSE NO. DC-21-09534

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
JAMES DONDERO,	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Petitioner.	§	95TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER

Came on for consideration the *Verified Amended Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit and Seek Documents* ("Petition") filed by petitioner James Dondero ("Dondero"). The Court, having considered the Petition, the responses filed by respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("A&M"), the record, and applicable authorities, and having conducted a hearing on the Petition on June 1, 2022, concludes that Dondero's Petition should be denied and that this case should be dismissed. Therefore,

The Court ORDERS that Dondero's Petition be, and is hereby, DENIED, and that this case be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

THE COURT SO ORDERS.

Signed this 1st day of June, 2022.

HONORABLE MONICA PURDY

Exhibit

R 2

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:	)	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	)	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	)	

FIFTH AMENDED PLAN OF REORGANIZATION OF HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. (AS MODIFIED)

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP
Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No.143717)
Ira D. Kharasch (CA Bar No. 109084)
Gregory V. Demo (NY Bar No. 5371992)
10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, 13th Floor
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HAYWARD & ASSOCIATES PLLC
Melissa S. Hayward (TX Bar No. 24044908)
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Dallas, TX 75231
Telephone: (972) 755-7100
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Email: MHayward@HaywardFirm.com
ZAnnable@HaywardFirm.com:

Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

Exhibit

R 3

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

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DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 11 PLAN OF REORGANIZATION

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., as debtor and debtor-in-possession in the above-captioned case (the "Debtor"), proposes the following chapter 11 plan of reorganization (the "Plan") for, among other things, the resolution of the outstanding Claims against, and Equity Interests in, the Debtor. Unless otherwise noted, capitalized terms used in this Plan have the meanings set forth in Article I of this Plan. The Debtor is the proponent of this Plan within the meaning of section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Reference is made to the Disclosure Statement (as such term is defined herein and distributed contemporaneously herewith) for a discussion of the Debtor's history, business, results of operations, historical financial information, projections and assets, and for a summary and analysis of this Plan and the treatment provided for herein. There also are other agreements and documents that may be Filed with the Bankruptcy Court that are referenced in this Plan or the Disclosure Statement as Exhibits and Plan Documents. All such Exhibits and Plan Documents are incorporated into and are a part of this Plan as if set forth in full herein. Subject to the other provisions of this Plan, and in accordance with the requirements set forth in section 1127 of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3019, the Debtor reserves the right to alter, amend, modify, revoke, or withdraw this Plan prior to the Effective Date.

If this Plan cannot be confirmed, for any reason, then subject to the terms set forth herein, this Plan may be revoked.

ARTICLE I.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION, COMPUTATION OF TIME, GOVERNING LAW AND DEFINED TERMS

A. Rules of Interpretation, Computation of Time and Governing Law

For purposes hereof: (a) in the appropriate context, each term, whether stated in the singular or the plural, shall include both the singular and the plural, and pronouns stated in the masculine, feminine or neuter gender shall include the masculine, feminine and the neuter gender; (b) any reference herein to a contract, lease, instrument, release, indenture or other agreement or document being in a particular form or on particular terms and conditions means that the referenced document, as previously amended, modified or supplemented, if applicable, shall be substantially in that form or substantially on those terms and conditions; (c) any reference herein to an existing document or exhibit having been Filed or to be Filed shall mean that document or exhibit, as it may thereafter be amended, modified or supplemented in accordance with its terms; (d) unless otherwise specified, all references herein to "Articles," "Sections," "Exhibits" and "Plan Documents" are references to Articles, Sections, Exhibits and Plan Documents hereof or hereto; (e) unless otherwise stated, the words "herein," "hereof," "hereunder" and "hereto" refer to this Plan in its entirety rather than to a particular portion of this Plan; (f) captions and headings to Articles and Sections are inserted for convenience of reference only and are not intended to be a part of or to affect the interpretation hereof; (g) any reference to an Entity as a Holder of a Claim or Equity Interest includes such Entity's successors and assigns;

(h) the rules of construction set forth in section 102 of the Bankruptcy Code shall apply; (i) any term used in capitalized form herein that is not otherwise defined but that is used in the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules shall have the meaning assigned to that term in the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules, as the case may be; and (j) "$" or "dollars" means Dollars in lawful currency of the United States of America. The provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) shall apply in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed herein.

B. Defined Terms

Unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall have the following meanings when used in capitalized form herein:

1. "*Acis*" means collectively Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP.

2. "*Administrative Expense Claim*" means any Claim for costs and expenses of administration of the Chapter 11 Case that is Allowed pursuant to sections 503(b), 507(a)(2), 507(b) or 1114(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, including, without limitation, (a) the actual and necessary costs and expenses incurred after the Petition Date and through the Effective Date of preserving the Estate and operating the business of the Debtor; and (b) all fees and charges assessed against the Estate pursuant to sections 1911 through 1930 of chapter 123 of title 28 of the United States Code, and that have not already been paid by the Debtor during the Chapter 11 Case and a Professional Fee Claim.

3. "*Administrative Expense Claims Bar Date*" means, with respect to any Administrative Expense Claim (other than a Professional Fee Claim) becoming due on or prior to the Effective Date, 5:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) on such date that is forty-five days after the Effective Date.

4. "*Administrative Expense Claims Objection Deadline*" means, with respect to any Administrative Expense Claim, the later of (a) ninety (90) days after the Effective Date and (b) sixty (60) days after the timely Filing of the applicable request for payment of such Administrative Expense Claim; *provided, however,* that the Administrative Expense Claims Objection Deadline may be extended by the Bankruptcy Court upon a motion by the Claimant Trustee.

5. "*Affiliate*" of any Person means any Entity that, with respect to such Person, either (i) is an "affiliate" as defined in section 101(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, or (ii) is an "affiliate" as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933, or (iii) directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, such Person. For the purposes of this definition, the term "control" (including, without limitation, the terms "controlled by" and "under common control with") means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction in any respect of the management or policies of a Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.

6. "*Allowed*" means, with respect to any Claim, except as otherwise provided in the Plan: (a) any Claim that is evidenced by a Proof of Claim that has been timely Filed by the

Bar Date, or that is not required to be evidenced by a Filed Proof of Claim under the Bankruptcy Code or a Final Order; (b) a Claim that is listed in the Schedules as not contingent, not unliquidated, and not disputed and for which no Proof of Claim has been timely filed; (c) a Claim Allowed pursuant to the Plan or an order of the Bankruptcy Court that is not stayed pending appeal; or (d) a Claim that is not Disputed (including for which a Proof of Claim has been timely filed in a liquidated and noncontingent amount that has not been objected to by the Claims Objection Deadline or as to which any such objection has been overruled by Final Order); *provided, however,* that with respect to a Claim described in clauses (a) and (b) above, such Claim shall be considered Allowed only if and to the extent that, with respect to such Claim, no objection to the allowance thereof has been interposed within the applicable period of time fixed by the Plan, the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or the Bankruptcy Court, or such an objection is so interposed and the Claim shall have been Allowed as set forth above.

7. "*Allowed Claim or Equity Interest*" means a Claim or an Equity Interest of the type that has been Allowed.

8. "*Assets*" means all of the rights, titles, and interest of the Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, or Claimant Trust, in and to property of whatever type or nature, including, without limitation, real, personal, mixed, intellectual, tangible, and intangible property, the Debtor's books and records, and the Causes of Action.

9. "*Available Cash*" means any Cash in excess of the amount needed for the Claimant Trust and Reorganized Debtor to maintain business operations as determined in the sole discretion of the Claimant Trustee.

10. "*Avoidance Actions*" means any and all avoidance, recovery, subordination or other actions or remedies that may be brought by and on behalf of the Debtor or its Estate under the Bankruptcy Code or applicable nonbankruptcy law, including, without limitation, actions or remedies arising under sections 502, 510, 544, 545, and 547-553 of the Bankruptcy Code or under similar state or federal statutes and common law, including fraudulent transfer laws

11. "*Ballot*" means the form(s) distributed to holders of Impaired Claims or Equity Interests entitled to vote on the Plan on which to indicate their acceptance or rejection of the Plan.

12. "*Bankruptcy Code*" means title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, as amended from time to time and as applicable to the Chapter 11 Case.

13. "*Bankruptcy Court*" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, or any other court having jurisdiction over the Chapter 11 Case.

14. "*Bankruptcy Rules*" means the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, in each case as amended from time to time and as applicable to the Chapter 11 Case.

15. "*Bar Date*" means the applicable deadlines set by the Bankruptcy Court for the filing of Proofs of Claim against the Debtor as set forth in the Bar Date Order, which deadlines may be or have been extended for certain Claimants by order of the Bankruptcy Court.

16. "*Bar Date Order*" means the *Order (I) Establishing Bar Dates for Filing Proofs of Claim and (II) Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof* [D.I. 488].

17. "*Business Day*" means any day, other than a Saturday, Sunday or "legal holiday" (as defined in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a)).

18. "*Cash*" means the legal tender of the United States of America or the equivalent thereof.

19. "*Causes of Action*" means any action, claim, cross-claim, third-party claim, cause of action, controversy, demand, right, Lien, indemnity, contribution, guaranty, suit, obligation, liability, debt, damage, judgment, account, defense, remedy, offset, power, privilege, license and franchise of any kind or character whatsoever, in each case whether known, unknown, contingent or non-contingent, matured or unmatured, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, disputed or undisputed, foreseen or unforeseen, direct or indirect, choate or inchoate, secured or unsecured, assertable directly or derivatively (including, without limitation, under alter ego theories), whether arising before, on, or after the Petition Date, in contract or in tort, in law or in equity or pursuant to any other theory of law. For the avoidance of doubt, Cause of Action includes, without limitation,: (a) any right of setoff, counterclaim or recoupment and any claim for breach of contract or for breach of duties imposed by law or in equity; (b) the right to object to Claims or Equity Interests; (c) any claim pursuant to section 362 or chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code; (d) any claim or defense including fraud, mistake, duress and usury, and any other defenses set forth in section 558 of the Bankruptcy Code; (e) any claims under any state or foreign law, including, without limitation, any fraudulent transfer or similar claims; (f) the Avoidance Actions, and (g) the Estate Claims. The Causes of Action include, without limitation, the Causes of Action belonging to the Debtor's Estate listed on the schedule of Causes of Action to be filed with the Plan Supplement.

20. "*CEO/CRO*" means James P. Seery, Jr., the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer.

21. "*Chapter 11 Case*" means the Debtor's case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code commenced on the Petition Date in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court and transferred to the Bankruptcy Court on December 4, 2019, and styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11.

22. "*Claim*" means any "claim" against the Debtor as defined in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.

23. "*Claims Objection Deadline*" means the date that is 180 days after the Confirmation Date; *provided, however,* the Claims Objection Deadline may be extended by the Bankruptcy Court upon a motion by the Claimant Trustee.

24. "*Claimant Trust*" means the trust established for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries on the Effective Date in accordance with the terms of this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

25. "*Claimant Trust Agreement*" means the agreement Filed in the Plan Supplement establishing and delineating the terms and conditions of the Claimant Trust.

26. "*Claimant Trust Assets*" means (i) other than the Reorganized Debtor Assets (which are expressly excluded from this definition), all other Assets of the Estate, including, but not limited to, all Causes of Action, Available Cash, any proceeds realized or received from such Assets, all rights of setoff, recoupment, and other defenses with respect, relating to, or arising from such Assets, (ii) any Assets transferred by the Reorganized Debtor to the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date, (iii) the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, and (iv) the ownership interests in New GP LLC. For the avoidance of doubt, any Causes of Action that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust shall constitute Reorganized Debtor Assets.

27. "*Claimant Trust Beneficiaries*" means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full, post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests.

28. "*Claimant Trustee*" means James P. Seery, Jr., the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer, or such other Person identified in the Plan Supplement who will act as the trustee of the Claimant Trust in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and Claimant Trust Agreement or any replacement trustee pursuant to (and in accordance with) the Claimant Trust Agreement. The Claimant Trustee shall be responsible for, among other things, monetizing the Estate's investment assets, resolving Claims (other than those Claims assigned to the Litigation Sub-Trust for resolution), and, as the sole officer of New GP LLC, winding down the Reorganized Debtor's business operations.

29. "*Claimant Trust Expenses*" means all reasonable legal and other reasonable professional fees, costs, and expenses incurred by the Trustees on account of administration of the Claimant Trust, including any reasonable administrative fees and expenses, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, reasonable insurance costs, taxes, reasonable escrow expenses, and other expenses.

30. "*Claimant Trust Interests*" means the non-transferable interests in the Claimant Trust that are issued to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries pursuant to this Plan; *provided*, *however*, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, Class B Limited Partnership Interests, and Class C Limited Partnership Interests will not be deemed to hold

Claimant Trust Interests unless and until the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to such Holders vest in accordance with the terms of this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

31. "*Claimant Trust Oversight Committee*" means the committee of five Persons established pursuant to ARTICLE IV of this Plan to oversee the Claimant Trustee's performance of its duties and otherwise serve the functions described in this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

32. "*Class*" means a category of Holders of Claims or Equity Interests as set forth in ARTICLE III hereof pursuant to section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

33. "*Class A Limited Partnership Interest*" means the Class A Limited Partnership Interests as defined in the Limited Partnership Agreement held by The Dugaboy Investment Trust, Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust – Exempt Trust 2, Mark and Pamela Okada – Exempt Descendants' Trust, and Mark Kiyoshi Okada, and the General Partner Interest.

34. "*Class B Limited Partnership Interest*" means the Class B Limited Partnership Interests as defined in the Limited Partnership Agreement held by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust.

35. "*Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests*" means, collectively, the Class B Limited Partnership and Class C Limited Partnership Interests.

36. "*Class C Limited Partnership Interest*" means the Class C Limited Partnership Interests as defined in the Limited Partnership Agreement held by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust.

37. "*Committee*" means the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed by the U.S. Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) on October 29, 2019 [D.I. 65], consisting of (i) the Redeemer Committee of Highland Crusader Fund, (ii) Meta-e Discovery, (iii) UBS, and (iv) Acis.

38. "*Confirmation Date*" means the date on which the clerk of the Bankruptcy Court enters the Confirmation Order on the docket of the Bankruptcy Court.

39. "*Confirmation Hearing*" means the hearing held by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to section 1128 of the Bankruptcy Code to consider confirmation of this Plan, as such hearing may be adjourned or continued from time to time.

40. "*Confirmation Order*" means the order of the Bankruptcy Court confirming this Plan pursuant to section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.

41. *"Convenience Claim"* means any prepetition, liquidated, and unsecured Claim against the Debtor that as of the Confirmation Date is less than or equal to $1,000,000 or any General Unsecured Claim that makes the Convenience Class Election. For the avoidance of doubt, the Reduced Employee Claims will be Convenience Claims.

42. "*Convenience Claim Pool*" means the $13,150,000 in Cash that shall be available upon the Effective Date for distribution to Holders of Convenience Claims under the Plan as set forth herein. Any Cash remaining in the Convenience Claim Pool after all distributions on account of Convenience Claims have been made will be transferred to the Claimant Trust and administered as a Claimant Trust Asset.

43. "*Convenience Class Election*" means the option provided to each Holder of a General Unsecured Claim that is a liquidated Claim as of the Confirmation Date on their Ballot to elect to reduce their claim to $1,000,000 and receive the treatment provided to Convenience Claims.

44. "*Contingent Claimant Trust Interests"* means the contingent Claimant Trust Interests to be distributed to Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, Holders of Class B Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Class C Limited Partnership Interests in accordance with this Plan, the rights of which shall not vest, and consequently convert to Claimant Trust Interests, unless and until the Claimant Trustee Files a certification that all holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full, plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full, all accrued and unpaid post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved. As set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests will be subordinated to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests.

45. "*Debtor*" means Highland Capital Management, L.P. in its capacity as debtor and debtor in possession in the Chapter 11 Case.

46. *"Delaware Bankruptcy Court"* means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

47. "*Disclosure Statement*" means that certain *Disclosure Statement for Debtor's Fifth Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization*, as amended, supplemented, or modified from time to time, which describes this Plan, including all exhibits and schedules thereto and references therein that relate to this Plan.

48. "*Disputed*" means with respect to any Claim or Equity Interest, any Claim or Equity Interest that is not yet Allowed.

49. "*Disputed Claims Reserve*" means the appropriate reserve(s) or account(s) to be established on the Initial Distribution Date and maintained by the Claimant Trustee for distributions on account of Disputed Claims that may subsequently become an Allowed Claim.

50. "*Disputed Claims Reserve Amount*" means, for purposes of determining the Disputed Claims Reserve, the Cash that would have otherwise been distributed to a Holder of a Disputed Claim at the time any distributions of Cash are made to the Holders of Allowed Claims. The amount of the Disputed Claim upon which the Disputed Claims Reserve is calculated shall be: (a) the amount set forth on either the Schedules or the filed Proof of Claim, as applicable; (b) the amount agreed to by the Holder of the Disputed Claim and the Claimant Trustee or

Reorganized Debtor, as applicable; (c) the amount ordered by the Bankruptcy Court if it enters an order disallowing, in whole or in part, a Disputed Claim; or (d) as otherwise ordered by the Bankruptcy Court, including an order estimating the Disputed Claim.

51. "*Distribution Agent*" means the Claimant Trustee, or any party designated by the Claimant Trustee to serve as distribution agent under this Plan.

52. "*Distribution Date*" means the date or dates determined by the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, on or after the Initial Distribution Date upon which the Distribution Agent shall make distributions to holders of Allowed Claims and Interests entitled to receive distributions under the Plan.

53. "*Distribution Record Date*" means the date for determining which Holders of Claims and Equity Interests are eligible to receive distributions hereunder, which date shall be the Effective Date or such later date determined by the Bankruptcy Court.

54. "*Effective Date*" means the Business Day that this Plan becomes effective as provided in ARTICLE VIII hereof.

55. "*Employees*" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

56. "*Enjoined Parties*" means (i) all Entities who have held, hold, or may hold Claims against or Equity Interests in the Debtor (whether or not proof of such Claims or Equity Interests has been filed and whether or not such Entities vote in favor of, against or abstain from voting on the Plan or are presumed to have accepted or deemed to have rejected the Plan), (ii) James Dondero ("Dondero"), (iii) any Entity that has appeared and/or filed any motion, objection, or other pleading in this Chapter 11 Case regardless of the capacity in which such Entity appeared and any other party in interest, (iv) any Related Entity, and (v) the Related Persons of each of the foregoing.

57. "*Entity*" means any "entity" as defined in section 101(15) of the Bankruptcy Code and also includes any Person or any other entity.

58. "*Equity Interest*" means any Equity Security in the Debtor, including, without limitation, all issued, unissued, authorized or outstanding partnership interests, shares, of stock or limited company interests, the Class A Limited Partnership Interests, the Class B Limited Partnership Interests, and the Class C Limited Partnership Interests.

59. "*Equity Security*" means an "equity security" as defined in section 101(16) of the Bankruptcy Code.

60. "*Estate*" means the bankruptcy estate of the Debtor created by virtue of section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code upon the commencement of the Chapter 11 Case.

61. "*Estate Claims*" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [D.I. 354].

62. "*Exculpated Parties*" means, collectively, (i) the Debtor and its successors and assigns, direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries, and the Managed Funds, (ii) the Employees, (iii) Strand, (iv) the Independent Directors, (v) the Committee, (vi) the members of the Committee (in their official capacities), (vii) the Professionals retained by the Debtor and the Committee in the Chapter 11 Case, (viii) the CEO/CRO; and (ix) the Related Persons of each of the parties listed in (iv) through (viii); *provided, however,* that, for the avoidance of doubt, none of James Dondero, Mark Okada, NexPoint Advisors, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries and managed entities), the Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries, including CLO Holdco, Ltd., and managed entities), Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (and any of its subsidiaries, members, and managed entities), Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries and managed entities), NexBank, SSB (and any of its subsidiaries), the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), the Dugaboy Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), or Grant Scott is included in the term "Exculpated Party."

63. "*Executory Contract*" means a contract to which the Debtor is a party that is subject to assumption or rejection under sections 365 or 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code.

64. "*Exhibit*" means an exhibit annexed hereto or to the Disclosure Statement (as such exhibits are amended, modified or otherwise supplemented from time to time), which are incorporated by reference herein.

65. "*Federal Judgment Rate*" means the post-judgment interest rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as of the Effective Date.

66. "*File*" or "*Filed*" or "*Filing*" means file, filed or filing with the Bankruptcy Court or its authorized designee in the Chapter 11 Case.

67. "*Final Order*" means an order or judgment of the Bankruptcy Court, which is in full force and effect, and as to which the time to appeal, petition for *certiorari*, or move for a new trial, reargument or rehearing has expired and as to which no appeal, petition for *certiorari*, or other proceedings for a new trial, reargument or rehearing shall then be pending or as to which any right to appeal, petition for *certiorari*, new trial, reargument, or rehearing shall have been waived in writing in form and substance satisfactory to the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, or, in the event that an appeal, writ of *certiorari*, new trial, reargument, or rehearing thereof has been sought, such order of the Bankruptcy Court shall have been determined by the highest court to which such order was appealed, or *certiorari*, new trial, reargument or rehearing shall have been denied and the time to take any further appeal, petition for *certiorari*, or move for a new trial, reargument or rehearing shall have expired; *provided, however*, that the possibility that a motion under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or any analogous rule under the Bankruptcy Rules, may be Filed with respect to such order shall not preclude such order from being a Final Order.

68. "*Frontier Secured Claim*" means the loan from Frontier State Bank to the Debtor in the principal amount of $7,879,688.00 made pursuant to that certain First Amended and Restated Loan Agreement, dated March 29, 2018.

69. "*General Partner Interest*" means the Class A Limited Partnership Interest held by Strand, as the Debtor's general partner.

70. "*General Unsecured Claim*" means any prepetition Claim against the Debtor that is not Secured and is not a/an: (a) Administrative Expense Claim; (b) Professional Fee Claim; (c) Priority Tax Claim; (d) Priority Non-Tax Claim; or (e) Convenience Claim.

71. "*Governmental Unit*" means a "governmental unit" as defined in section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code.

72. "*GUC Election*" means the option provided to each Holder of a Convenience Claim on their Ballot to elect to receive the treatment provided to General Unsecured Claims.

73. "*Holder*" means an Entity holding a Claim against, or Equity Interest in, the Debtor.

74. "*Impaired*" means, when used in reference to a Claim or Equity Interest, a Claim or Equity Interest that is impaired within the meaning of section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code.

75. "*Independent Directors*" means John S. Dubel, James P. Seery, Jr., and Russell Nelms, the independent directors of Strand appointed on January 9, 2020, and any additional or replacement directors of Strand appointed after January 9, 2020, but prior to the Effective Date.

76. "*Initial Distribution Date*" means, subject to the "Treatment" sections in ARTICLE III hereof, the date that is on or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, when distributions under this Plan shall commence to Holders of Allowed Claims and Equity Interests.

77. "*Insurance Policies*" means all insurance policies maintained by the Debtor as of the Petition Date.

78. "*Jefferies Secured Claim*" means any Claim in favor of Jefferies, LLC, arising under that certain Prime Brokerage Customer Agreement, dated May 24, 2013, between the Debtor and Jefferies, LLC, that is secured by the assets, if any, maintained in the prime brokerage account created by such Prime Brokerage Customer Agreement.

79. "*Lien*" means a "lien" as defined in section 101(37) of the Bankruptcy Code and, with respect to any asset, includes, without limitation, any mortgage, lien, pledge, charge, security interest or other encumbrance of any kind, or any other type of preferential arrangement that has the practical effect of creating a security interest, in respect of such asset.

80. "*Limited Partnership Agreement*" means that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended.

81. "*Litigation Sub-Trust*" means the sub-trust established within the Claimant Trust or as a wholly –owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust on the Effective Date in each case in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and Claimant Trust Agreement. As set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, the Litigation Sub-Trust shall hold the Claimant Trust Assets that are Estate Claims.

82. "*Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement*" means the agreement filed in the Plan Supplement establishing and delineating the terms and conditions of the Litigation Sub-Trust.

83. "*Litigation Trustee*" means the trustee appointed by the Committee and reasonably acceptable to the Debtor who shall be responsible for investigating, litigating, and settling the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

84. "*Managed Funds*" means Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., and any other investment vehicle managed by the Debtor pursuant to an Executory Contract assumed pursuant to this Plan.

85. "*New Frontier Note*" means that promissory note to be provided to the Allowed Holders of Class 2 Claims under this Plan and any other documents or security agreements securing the obligations thereunder.

86. "*New GP LLC*" means a limited liability company incorporated in the State of Delaware pursuant to the New GP LLC Documents to serve as the general partner of the Reorganized Debtor on the Effective Date.

87. "*New GP LLC Documents*" means the charter, operating agreement, and other formational documents of New GP LLC.

88. "*Ordinary Course Professionals Order*" means that certain *Order Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 327, 328, and 330 of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing the Debtor to Retain, Employ, and Compensate Certain Professionals Utilized by the Debtor in the Ordinary Course* [D.I. 176].

89. "*Other Unsecured Claim*" means any Secured Claim other than the Jefferies Secured Claim and the Frontier Secured Claim.

90. *"Person*" means a "person" as defined in section 101(41) of the Bankruptcy Code and also includes any natural person, individual, corporation, company, general or limited partnership, limited liability company, unincorporated organization firm, trust, estate, business trust, association, joint stock company, joint venture, government, governmental agency, Governmental Unit or any subdivision thereof, the United States Trustee, or any other entity, whether acting in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity.

91. "*Petition Date*" means October 16, 2019.

92. "*Plan*" means this *Debtor's Fifth Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization*, including the Exhibits and the Plan Documents and all supplements, appendices,

and schedules thereto, either in its present form or as the same may be altered, amended, modified or otherwise supplemented from time to time.

93. "*Plan Distribution*" means the payment or distribution of consideration to Holders of Allowed Claims and Allowed Equity Interests under this Plan.

94. "*Plan Documents*" means any of the documents, other than this Plan, but including, without limitation, the documents to be filed with the Plan Supplement, to be executed, delivered, assumed, or performed in connection with the occurrence of the Effective Date, and as may be modified consistent with the terms hereof with the consent of the Committee.

95. "*Plan Supplement*" means the ancillary documents necessary for the implementation and effectuation of the Plan, including, without limitation, (i) the form of Claimant Trust Agreement, (ii) the forms of New GP LLC Documents, (iii) the form of Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, (iv) the Sub-Servicer Agreement (if applicable), (v) the identity of the initial members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, (vi) the form of Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; (vii) the schedule of retained Causes of Action; (viii) the New Frontier Note, (ix) the schedule of Employees; (x) the form of Senior Employee Stipulation,; and (xi) the schedule of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases to be assumed pursuant to this Plan, which, in each case, will be in form and substance reasonably acceptable to the Debtor and the Committee.

96. "*Priority Non-Tax Claim*" means a Claim entitled to priority pursuant to section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, including any Claims for paid time-off entitled to priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, other than a Priority Tax Claim or an Administrative Claim.

97. "*Pro Rata*" means the proportion that (a) the Allowed amount of a Claim or Equity Interest in a particular Class bears to (b) the aggregate Allowed amount of all Claims or Equity Interests in such Class.

98. "*Professional*" means (a) any Entity employed in the Chapter 11 Case pursuant to section 327, 328 363 or 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise and (b) any Entity seeking compensation or reimbursement of expenses in connection with the Chapter 11 Case pursuant to sections 327, 328, 330, 331, 363, 503(b), 503(b)(4) and 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code.

99. "*Professional Fee Claim*" means a Claim under sections 328, 330(a), 331, 363, 503 or 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code, with respect to a particular Professional, for compensation for services rendered or reimbursement of costs, expenses or other charges incurred after the Petition Date and prior to and including the Effective Date.

100. "*Professional Fee Claims Bar Date*" means with respect to Professional Fee Claims, the Business Day which is sixty (60) days after the Effective Date or such other date as approved by order of the Bankruptcy Court.

101. "*Professional Fee Claims Objection Deadline*" means, with respect to any Professional Fee Claim, thirty (30) days after the timely Filing of the applicable request for payment of such Professional Fee Claim.

102. "*Professional Fee Reserve*" means the reserve established and funded by the Claimant Trustee pursuant this Plan to provide sufficient funds to satisfy in full unpaid Allowed Professional Fee Claims.

103. "*Proof of Claim*" means a written proof of Claim or Equity Interest Filed against the Debtor in the Chapter 11 Case.

104. "*Priority Tax Claim*" means any Claim of a Governmental Unit of the kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.

105. "*Protected Parties*" means, collectively, (i) the Debtor and its successors and assigns, direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries, and the Managed Funds, (ii) the Employees, (iii) Strand, (iv) the Reorganized Debtor, (v) the Independent Directors, (vi) the Committee, (vii) the members of the Committee (in their official capacities), (viii) the Claimant Trust, (ix) the Claimant Trustee, (x) the Litigation Sub-Trust, (xi) the Litigation Trustee, (xii) the members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (in their official capacities), (xiii) New GP LLC, (xiv) the Professionals retained by the Debtor and the Committee in the Chapter 11 Case, (xv) the CEO/CRO; and (xvi) the Related Persons of each of the parties listed in (iv) through (xv); *provided, however,* that, for the avoidance of doubt, none of James Dondero, Mark Okada, NexPoint Advisors, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries and managed entities), the Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries, including CLO Holdco, Ltd., and managed entities), Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (and any of its subsidiaries, members, and managed entities), NexBank, SSB (and any of its subsidiaries), Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries and managed entities), the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), the Dugaboy Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), or Grant Scott is included in the term "Protected Party."

106. "*PTO Claims*" means any Claim for paid time off in favor of any Debtor employee in excess of the amount that would qualify as a Priority Non-Tax Claim under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.

107. "*Reduced Employee Claims*" has the meaning set forth in ARTICLE IX.D.

108. "*Reinstated*" means, with respect to any Claim or Equity Interest, (a) leaving unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which a Claim entitles the Holder of such Claim or Equity Interest in accordance with section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code or (b) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles the Holder of such Claim or Equity Interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of such Claim or Equity Interest after the occurrence of a default: (i) curing any such default that occurred before or after the Petition Date, other than a default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code or of a kind that section 365(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly does not require to be cured; (ii) reinstating the maturity of such Claim or Equity Interest as such maturity existed before such default; (iii) compensating the Holder of such Claim or Equity Interest for any

damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such Holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law; (iv) if such Claim or Equity Interest arises from any failure to perform a nonmonetary obligation, other than a default arising from failure to operate a non-residential real property lease subject to section 365(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, compensating the Holder of such Claim or Equity Interest (other than any Debtor or an insider of any Debtor) for any actual pecuniary loss incurred by such Holder as a result of such failure; and (v) not otherwise altering the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which such Claim entitles the Holder of such Claim.

109. "*Rejection Claim*" means any Claim for monetary damages as a result of the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease pursuant to the Confirmation Order.

110. "*Related Entity*" means, without duplication, (a) Dondero, (b) Mark Okada ("Okada"), (c) Grant Scott ("Scott"), (d) Hunter Covitz ("Covitz"), (e) any entity or person that was an insider of the Debtor on or before the Petition Date under Section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code, including, without limitation, any entity or person that was a non-statutory insider, (f) any entity that, after the Effective Date, is an insider or Affiliate of one or more of Dondero, Okada, Scott, Covitz, or any of their respective insiders or Affiliates, including, without limitation, The Dugaboy Investment Trust, (g) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and any of its direct or indirect parents, (h) the Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P., and any of its direct or indirect subsidiaries, and (i) Affiliates of the Debtor and any other Entities listed on the Related Entity List.

111. "*Related Entity List*" means that list of Entities filed with the Plan Supplement.

112. "*Related Persons*" means, with respect to any Person, such Person's predecessors, successors, assigns (whether by operation of law or otherwise), and each of their respective present, future, or former officers, directors, employees, managers, managing members, members, financial advisors, attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, consultants, professionals, advisors, shareholders, principals, partners, subsidiaries, divisions, management companies, heirs, agents, and other representatives, in each case solely in their capacity as such.

113. "*Released Parties*" means, collectively, (i) the Independent Directors; (ii) Strand (solely from the date of the appointment of the Independent Directors through the Effective Date); (iii) the CEO/CRO; (iv) the Committee; (v) the members of the Committee (in their official capacities), (vi) the Professionals retained by the Debtor and the Committee in the Chapter 11 Case; and (vii) the Employees.

114. "*Reorganized Debtor*" means the Debtor, as reorganized pursuant to this Plan on and after the Effective Date.

115. "*Reorganized Debtor Assets*" means any limited and general partnership interests held by the Debtor, the management of the Managed Funds and those Causes of Action (including, without limitation, claims for breach of fiduciary duty), that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust. For the avoidance of doubt, "Reorganized

Debtor Assets" includes any partnership interests or shares of Managed Funds held by the Debtor but does not include the underlying portfolio assets held by the Managed Funds.

116. "*Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement*" means that certain Fifth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., by and among the Claimant Trust, as limited partner, and New GP LLC, as general partner, Filed with the Plan Supplement.

117. "*Restructuring*" means the restructuring of the Debtor, the principal terms of which are set forth in this Plan and the Disclosure Statement.

118. "*Retained Employee Claim*" means any Claim filed by a current employee of the Debtor who will be employed by the Reorganized Debtor upon the Effective Date.

119. "*Schedules*" means the schedules of Assets and liabilities, statements of financial affairs, lists of Holders of Claims and Equity Interests and all amendments or supplements thereto Filed by the Debtor with the Bankruptcy Court [D.I. 247].

120. "*Secured*" means, when referring to a Claim: (a) secured by a Lien on property in which the Debtor's Estate has an interest, which Lien is valid, perfected, and enforceable pursuant to applicable law or by reason of a Bankruptcy Court order, or that is subject to setoff pursuant to section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the interest of the Debtor's Estate in such property or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as applicable, as determined pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code or (b) Allowed pursuant to the Plan as a Secured Claim.

121. "*Security*" or "*security*" means any security as such term is defined in section 101(49) of the Bankruptcy Code.

122. "*Senior Employees*" means the senior employees of the Debtor Filed in the Plan Supplement.

123. "*Senior Employee Stipulation*" means the agreements filed in the Plan Supplement between each Senior Employee and the Debtor.

124. "*Stamp or Similar Tax*" means any stamp tax, recording tax, personal property tax, conveyance fee, intangibles or similar tax, real estate transfer tax, sales tax, use tax, transaction privilege tax (including, without limitation, such taxes on prime contracting and owner-builder sales), privilege taxes (including, without limitation, privilege taxes on construction contracting with regard to speculative builders and owner builders), and other similar taxes imposed or assessed by any Governmental Unit.

125. "*Statutory Fees*" means fees payable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930.

126. "*Strand*" means Strand Advisors, Inc., the Debtor's general partner.

127. "*Sub-Servicer*" means a third-party selected by the Claimant Trustee to service or sub-service the Reorganized Debtor Assets.

128. "*Sub-Servicer Agreement*" means the agreement that may be entered into providing for the servicing of the Reorganized Debtor Assets by the Sub-Servicer.

129. "*Subordinated Claim*" means any Claim that is subordinated to the Convenience Claims and General Unsecured Claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510 or order entered by the Bankruptcy Court.

130. "*Subordinated Claimant Trust Interests*" means the Claimant Trust Interests to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims under the Plan, which such interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to the Claimant Trust Interests distributed to Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims as provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

131. "*Trust Distribution*" means the transfer of Cash or other property by the Claimant Trustee to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

132. "*Trustees*" means, collectively, the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee.

133. "*UBS*" means, collectively, UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

134. "*Unexpired Lease*" means a lease to which the Debtor is a party that is subject to assumption or rejection under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

135. "*Unimpaired*" means, with respect to a Class of Claims or Equity Interests that is not impaired within the meaning of section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code.

136. "*Voting Deadline*" means the date and time by which all Ballots to accept or reject the Plan must be received in order to be counted under the under the Order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Disclosure Statement as containing adequate information pursuant to section 1125(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and authorizing the Debtor to solicit acceptances of the Plan.

137. "*Voting Record Date*" means November 23, 2020.

ARTICLE II.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AND PRIORITY TAX CLAIMS

A. Administrative Expense Claims

On the later of the Effective Date or the date on which an Administrative Expense Claim becomes an Allowed Administrative Expense Claim, or, in each such case, as soon as practicable thereafter, each Holder of an Allowed Administrative Expense Claim (other than Professional Fee Claims) will receive, in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Allowed Administrative Expense Claim either (i) payment in full in Available Cash for the unpaid portion of such Allowed Administrative Expense Claim; or (ii) such other less favorable treatment as agreed to in writing by the Debtor or the Reorganized

Debtor, as applicable, and such Holder; *provided, however,* that Administrative Expense Claims incurred by the Debtor in the ordinary course of business may be paid in the ordinary course of business in the discretion of the Debtor in accordance with such applicable terms and conditions relating thereto without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court. All statutory fees payable under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) shall be paid as such fees become due.

If an Administrative Expense Claim (other than a Professional Fee Claim) is not paid by the Debtor in the ordinary course, the Holder of such Administrative Expense Claim must File, on or before the applicable Administrative Expense Claims Bar Date, and serve on the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, and such other Entities who are designated by the Bankruptcy Rules, the Confirmation Order or other order of the Bankruptcy Court, an application for allowance and payment of such Administrative Expense Claim.

Objections to any Administrative Expense Claim (other than a Professional Fee Claim) must be Filed and served on the Debtor or the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, and the party asserting such Administrative Expense Claim by the Administrative Expense Claims Objection Deadline.

B. Professional Fee Claims

Professionals or other Entities asserting a Professional Fee Claim for services rendered through the Effective Date must submit fee applications under sections 327, 328, 329,330, 331, 503(b) or 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code and, upon entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court granting such fee applications, such Professional Fee Claim shall promptly be paid in Cash in full to the extent provided in such order.

Professionals or other Entities asserting a Professional Fee Claim for services rendered on or prior to the Effective Date must File, on or before the Professional Fee Claims Bar Date, and serve on the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, and such other Entities who are designated as requiring such notice by the Bankruptcy Rules, the Confirmation Order or other order of the Bankruptcy Court, an application for final allowance of such Professional Fee Claim.

Objections to any Professional Fee Claim must be Filed and served on the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, and the party asserting the Professional Fee Claim by the Professional Fee Claim Objection Deadline. Each Holder of an Allowed Professional Fee Claim will be paid by the Debtor or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, in Cash within ten (10) Business Days of entry of the order approving such Allowed Professional Fee Claim.

On the Effective Date, the Claimant Trustee shall establish the Professional Fee Reserve. The Professional Fee Reserve shall vest in the Claimant Trust and shall be maintained by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement. The Claimant Trust shall fund the Professional Fee Reserve on the Effective Date in an estimated amount determined by the Debtor in good faith prior to the Confirmation Date and that approximates the total projected amount of unpaid Professional Fee Claims on the Effective Date. Following the payment of all Allowed Professional Fee Claims, any excess funds in the Professional Fee

Reserve shall be released to the Claimant Trust to be used for other purposes consistent with the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

C. Priority Tax Claims

On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of (i) the Initial Distribution Date if such Priority Tax Claim is an Allowed Priority Tax Claim as of the Effective Date or (ii) the date on which such Priority Tax Claim becomes an Allowed Priority Tax Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Priority Tax Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Allowed Priority Tax Claim, at the election of the Debtor: (a) Cash in an amount equal to the amount of such Allowed Priority Tax Claim, (b) payment of such Allowed Priority Tax Claim in accordance with section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (c) such other less favorable treatment as agreed to in writing by the Debtor and such Holder. Payment of statutory fees due pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) will be made at all appropriate times until the entry of a final decree; *provided, however*, that the Debtor may prepay any or all such Claims at any time, without premium or penalty.

ARTICLE III.
CLASSIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED CLAIMS AND EQUITY INTERESTS

A. Summary

All Claims and Equity Interests, except Administrative Expense Claims and Priority Tax Claims, are classified in the Classes set forth below. In accordance with section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Administrative Expense Claims, and Priority Tax Claims have not been classified.

The categories of Claims and Equity Interests listed below classify Claims and Equity Interests for all purposes including, without limitation, confirmation and distribution pursuant to the Plan and pursuant to sections 1122 and 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Plan deems a Claim or Equity Interest to be classified in a particular Class only to the extent that the Claim or Equity Interest qualifies within the description of that Class and will be deemed classified in a different Class to the extent that any remainder of such Claim or Equity Interest qualifies within the description of such different Class. A Claim or Equity Interest is in a particular Class only to the extent that any such Claim or Equity Interest is Allowed in that Class and has not been paid, released or otherwise settled (in each case, by the Debtor or any other Entity) prior to the Effective Date.

B. Summary of Classification and Treatment of Classified Claims and Equity Interests

Class	Claim	Status	Voting Rights
1	Jefferies Secured Claim	Unimpaired	Deemed to Accept
2	Frontier Secured Claim	Impaired	Entitled to Vote
3	Other Secured Claims	Unimpaired	Deemed to Accept
4	Priority Non-Tax Claim	Unimpaired	Deemed to Accept
5	Retained Employee Claim	Unimpaired	Deemed to Accept
6	PTO Claims	Unimpaired	Deemed to Accept
7	Convenience Claims	Impaired	Entitled to Vote
8	General Unsecured Claims	Impaired	Entitled to Vote
9	Subordinated Claims	Impaired	Entitled to Vote
10	Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests	Impaired	Entitled to Vote
11	Class A Limited Partnership Interests	Impaired	Entitled to Vote

C. Elimination of Vacant Classes

Any Class that, as of the commencement of the Confirmation Hearing, does not have at least one Holder of a Claim or Equity Interest that is Allowed in an amount greater than zero for voting purposes shall be considered vacant, deemed eliminated from the Plan for purposes of voting to accept or reject the Plan, and disregarded for purposes of determining whether the Plan satisfies section 1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to such Class.

D. Impaired/Voting Classes

Claims and Equity Interests in Class 2 and Class 7 through Class 11 are Impaired by the Plan, and only the Holders of Claims or Equity Interests in those Classes are entitled to vote to accept or reject the Plan.

E. Unimpaired/Non-Voting Classes

Claims in Class 1 and Class 3 through Class 6 are Unimpaired by the Plan, and such Holders are deemed to have accepted the Plan and are therefore not entitled to vote on the Plan.

F. Impaired/Non-Voting Classes

There are no Classes under the Plan that will not receive or retain any property and no Classes are deemed to reject the Plan.

G. Cramdown

If any Class of Claims or Equity Interests is deemed to reject this Plan or does not vote to accept this Plan, the Debtor may (i) seek confirmation of this Plan under section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or (ii) amend or modify this Plan in accordance with the terms hereof and the

Bankruptcy Code. If a controversy arises as to whether any Claims or Equity Interests, or any class of Claims or Equity Interests, are Impaired, the Bankruptcy Court shall, after notice and a hearing, determine such controversy on or before the Confirmation Date.

H. Classification and Treatment of Claims and Equity Interests

1. *Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim*

- *Classification*: Class 1 consists of the Jefferies Secured Claim.

- *Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Holder of an Allowed Class 1 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Allowed Class 1 Claim, at the election of the Debtor: (A) Cash equal to the amount of such Allowed Class 1 Claim; (B) such other less favorable treatment as to which the Debtor and the Holder of such Allowed Class 1 Claim will have agreed upon in writing; or (C) such other treatment rendering such Claim Unimpaired. Each Holder of an Allowed Class 1 Claim will retain the Liens securing its Allowed Class 1 Claim as of the Effective Date until full and final payment of such Allowed Class 1 Claim is made as provided herein.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 1 is Unimpaired, and the Holders of Class 1 Claims are conclusively deemed to have accepted this Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Holders of Class 1 Claims are not entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan and will not be solicited.

2. *Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim*

- *Classification*: Class 2 consists of the Frontier Secured Claim.

- *Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Holder of an Allowed Class 2 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Allowed Class 2 Claim: (A) Cash in an amount equal to all accrued but unpaid interest on the Frontier Claim through and including the Effective Date and (B) the New Frontier Note. The Holder of an Allowed Class 2 Claim will retain the Liens securing its Allowed Class 2 Claim as of the Effective Date until full and final payment of such Allowed Class 2 Claim is made as provided herein.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 2 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 2 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

3. *Class 3 – Other Secured Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 3 consists of the Other Secured Claims.

- *Allowance and Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of (i) the Initial Distribution Date if such Class 3 Claim is Allowed on the Effective Date or (ii) the date on which such Class 3 Claim becomes an Allowed Class 3 Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Class 3 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, its Allowed Claim 3 Claim, at the option of the Debtor, or following the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trustee, as applicable, (i) Cash equal to such Allowed Other Secured Claim, (ii) the collateral securing its Allowed Other Secured Claim, plus postpetition interest to the extent required under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b), or (iii) such other treatment rendering such Claim Unimpaired.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 3 is Unimpaired, and the Holders of Class 3 Claims are conclusively deemed to have accepted this Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Holders of Class 3 Claims are not entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan and will not be solicited.

4. *Class 4 – Priority Non-Tax Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 4 consists of the Priority Non-Tax Claims.

- *Allowance and Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of (i) the Initial Distribution Date if such Class 4 Claim is Allowed on the Effective Date or (ii) the date on which such Class 4 Claim becomes an Allowed Class 4 Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Class 4 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, its Allowed Claim 4 Claim Cash equal to the amount of such Allowed Class 4 Claim.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 4 is Unimpaired, and the Holders of Class 4 Claims are conclusively deemed to have accepted this Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Holders of Class 4 Claims are not entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan and will not be solicited.

5. *Class 5 – Retained Employee Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 5 consists of the Retained Employee Claims.

- *Allowance and Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Allowed Class 5 Claim will be Reinstated.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 5 is Unimpaired, and the Holders of Class 5 Claims are conclusively deemed to have accepted this Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Holders of Class 5 Claims are not entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan and will not be solicited.

6. *Class 6 – PTO Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 6 consists of the PTO Claims.

- *Allowance and Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of (i) the Initial Distribution Date if such Class 6 Claim is Allowed on the Effective Date or (ii) the date on which such Class 6 Claim becomes an Allowed Class 6 Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Class 6 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, its Allowed Claim 6 Claim Cash equal to the amount of such Allowed Class 6 Claim.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 6 is Unimpaired, and the Holders of Class 6 Claims are conclusively deemed to have accepted this Plan pursuant to section 1126(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Holders of Class 6 Claims are not entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan and will not be solicited.

7. *Class 7 – Convenience Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 7 consists of the Convenience Claims.

- *Allowance and Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of (i) the Initial Distribution Date if such Class 7 Claim is Allowed on the Effective Date or (ii) the date on which such Class 7 Claim becomes an Allowed Class 7 Claim, each Holder of an Allowed Class 7 Claim will receive in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, its Allowed Class 7 Claim (1) the treatment provided to Allowed Holders of Class 8 General Unsecured Claims if the Holder of such Class 7 Claim makes the GUC Election or (2) an amount in Cash equal to the lesser of (a) 85% of the Allowed amount of such Holder's Class 7 Claim or (b) such Holder's Pro Rata share of the Convenience Claims Cash Pool.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 7 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 7 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

8. *Class 8 – General Unsecured Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 8 consists of the General Unsecured Claims.

- *Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Holder of an Allowed Class 8 Claim, in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Claim shall receive (i) its Pro Rata share of the Claimant Trust Interests, (ii) such other less favorable treatment as to which such Holder and the Claimant Trustee shall have agreed upon in writing, or (iii) the treatment provided to Allowed Holders of Class 7 Convenience Claims if the Holder of such Class 8 General Unsecured Claim is eligible and makes a valid Convenience Class Election.

  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, after the Effective Date and subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust, as applicable, will have and will retain any and all rights and defenses under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law that the Debtor had with respect to any General Unsecured Claim, except with respect to any General Unsecured Claim Allowed by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 8 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 8 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

9. *Class 9 – Subordinated Claims*

- *Classification*: Class 9 consists of the Subordinated Claims.

  Treatment: On the Effective Date, Holders of Subordinated Claims shall receive either (i) their Pro Rata share of the Subordinated Claimant Trust Interests or, (ii) such other less favorable treatment as to which such Holder and the Claimant Trustee may agree upon in writing.

  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, after the Effective Date and subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust, as applicable, will have and will retain any and all rights and defenses under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law that the Debtor had with respect to any Subordinated Claim, except with respect to any Subordinated Claim Allowed by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 9 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 9 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

10. *Class 10 – Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests*

- *Classification*: Class 10 consists of the Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests.

- *Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Holder of an Allowed Class 10 Claim, in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Claim shall receive (i) its Pro Rata share of the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests or (ii) such other less favorable treatment as to which such Holder and the Claimant Trustee shall have agreed upon in writing.

  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, after the Effective Date and subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust, as applicable, will have and will retain any and all rights and defenses under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law that the Debtor had with respect to any Class B/C Limited Partnership Interest Claim, except with respect to any Class B/C Limited Partnership Interest Claim Allowed by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 10 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 10 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

11. *Class 11 – Class A Limited Partnership Interests*

- *Classification*: Class 11 consists of the Class A Limited Partnership Interests.

- *Treatment*: On or as soon as reasonably practicable after the Effective Date, each Holder of an Allowed Class 11 Claim, in full satisfaction, settlement, discharge and release of, and in exchange for, such Claim shall receive (i) its Pro Rata share of the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests or (ii) such other less favorable treatment as to which such Holder and the Claimant Trustee shall have agreed upon in writing.

  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, after the Effective Date and subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust, as applicable, will have and will retain any and all rights and defenses under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law that the Debtor had with respect to any Class A Limited Partnership Interest, except with respect to any Class A Limited Partnership Interest Allowed by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court.

- *Impairment and Voting*: Class 11 is Impaired, and the Holders of Class 11 Claims are entitled to vote to accept or reject this Plan.

I. Special Provision Governing Unimpaired Claims

Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, nothing under the Plan will affect the Debtor's rights in respect of any Unimpaired Claims, including, without limitation, all rights in respect of legal and equitable defenses to or setoffs or recoupments against any such Unimpaired Claims.

J. Subordinated Claims

The allowance, classification, and treatment of all Claims under the Plan shall take into account and conform to the contractual, legal, and equitable subordination rights relating thereto, whether arising under general principles of equitable subordination, section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise. Under section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code, upon written notice and hearing, the Debtor the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trustee reserve the right to seek entry of an order by the Bankruptcy Court to re-classify or to subordinate any Claim in accordance with any contractual, legal, or equitable subordination relating thereto, and the treatment afforded any Claim under the Plan that becomes a subordinated Claim at any time shall be modified to reflect such subordination.

ARTICLE IV.
MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN

A. Summary

As discussed in the Disclosure Statement, the Plan will be implemented through (i) the Claimant Trust, (ii) the Litigation Sub-Trust, and (iii) the Reorganized Debtor.

On the Effective Date, all Class A Limited Partnership Interests, including the Class A Limited Partnership Interests held by Strand, as general partner, and Class B/C Limited Partnerships in the Debtor will be cancelled, and new Class A Limited Partnership Interests in the Reorganized Debtor will be issued to the Claimant Trust and New GP LLC – a newly-chartered limited liability company wholly-owned by the Claimant Trust. The Claimant Trust, as limited partner, will ratify New GP LLC's appointment as general partner of the Reorganized Debtor, and on and following the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust will be the Reorganized Debtor's limited partner and New GP LLC will be its general partner. The Claimant Trust, as limited partner, and New GP LLC, as general partner, will execute the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, which will amend and restate, in all respects, the Debtor's current Limited Partnership Agreement. Following the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtor will be managed consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement by New GP LLC. The sole managing member of New GP LLC will be the Claimant Trust, and the Claimant Trustee will be the sole officer of New GP LLC on the Effective Date.

Following the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust will administer the Claimant Trust Assets pursuant to this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement, and the Litigation Trustee will pursue, if applicable, the Estate Claims pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and the Plan. The Reorganized Debtor will administer the Reorganized Debtor Assets and, if needed, with the utilization of a Sub-Servicer, which administration will include, among other things, managing the wind down of the Managed Funds.

Although the Reorganized Debtor will manage the wind down of the Managed Funds, it is currently anticipated that neither the Reorganized Debtor nor the Claimant Trust will assume or assume and assign the contracts between the Debtor and certain Related Entities pursuant to which the Debtor provides shared services and sub-advisory services to those Related Entities. The Debtor believes that the continued provision of the services under such contracts will not be

cost effective.

The Reorganized Debtor will distribute all proceeds from the wind down to the Claimant Trust, as its limited partner, and New GP LLC, as its general partner, in each case in accordance with the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement. Such proceeds, along with the proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets, will ultimately be distributed to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as set forth in this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

B. The Claimant Trust[2]

1. Creation and Governance of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust.

On or prior to the Effective Date, the Debtor and the Claimant Trustee shall execute the Claimant Trust Agreement and shall take all steps necessary to establish the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust in accordance with the Plan in each case for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Additionally, on or prior to the Effective Date, the Debtor shall irrevocably transfer and shall be deemed to have irrevocably transferred to the Claimant Trust all of its rights, title, and interest in and to all of the Claimant Trust Assets, and in accordance with section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Claimant Trust Assets shall automatically vest in the Claimant Trust free and clear of all Claims, Liens, encumbrances, or interests subject only to the Claimant Trust Interests and the Claimant Trust Expenses, as provided for in the Claimant Trust Agreement, and such transfer shall be exempt from any stamp, real estate transfer, mortgage from any stamp, transfer, reporting, sales, use, or other similar tax.

The Claimant Trustee shall be the exclusive trustee of the Claimant Trust Assets, excluding the Estate Claims and the Litigation Trustee shall be the exclusive trustee with respect to the Estate Claims in each case for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets. The Claimant Trustee shall also be responsible for resolving all Claims and Equity Interests in Class 8 through Class 11, under the supervision of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee.

On the Effective Date, the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee shall execute the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and shall take all steps necessary to establish the Litigation Sub-Trust. Upon the creation of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Claimant Trust shall irrevocably transfer and assign to the Litigation Sub-Trust the Estate Claims. The Claimant Trust shall be governed by the Claimant Trust Agreement and administered by the Claimant Trustee. The powers, rights, and responsibilities of the Claimant Trustee shall be specified in the Claimant Trust Agreement and shall include the authority and responsibility to, among other things, take the actions set forth in this ARTICLE IV, subject to any required reporting to the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee as may be set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement. The Claimant Trust shall hold and distribute the Claimant Trust Assets (including the proceeds from the Estate Claims, if any) in accordance with the provisions of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement; *provided* that the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee may direct the Claimant Trust to reserve

[2] In the event of a conflict between the terms of this summary and the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement or the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, as applicable, shall control.

Cash from distributions as necessary to fund the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust. Other rights and duties of the Claimant Trustee and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be as set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement. After the Effective Date, neither the Debtor nor the Reorganized Debtor shall have any interest in the Claimant Trust Assets.

The Litigation Sub-Trust shall be governed by the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and administered by the Litigation Trustee. The powers, rights, and responsibilities of the Litigation Trustee shall be specified in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and shall include the authority and responsibility to, among other things, take the actions set forth in this ARTICLE IV, subject to any required reporting as may be set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall investigate, prosecute, settle, or otherwise resolve the Estate Claims in accordance with the provisions of the Plan and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement and shall distribute the proceeds therefrom to the Claimant Trust for distribution. Other rights and duties of the Litigation Trustee shall be as set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

2. *Claimant Trust Oversight Committee*

The Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the management and monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets, and the management of the Reorganized Debtor (through the Claimant Trust's role as managing member of New GP LLC) and the Litigation Sub-Trust will be overseen by the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, subject to the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, as applicable.

The Claimant Trust Oversight Committee will initially consist of five members. Four of the five members will be representatives of the members of the Committee: (i) the Redeemer Committee of Highland Crusader Fund, (ii) UBS, (iii) Acis, and (iv) Meta-e Discovery. The fifth member will be an independent, natural Person chosen by the Committee and reasonably acceptable to the Debtor. The members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee may be replaced as set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement. The identity of the members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee will be disclosed in the Plan Supplement.

As set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement, in no event will any member of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee with a Claim against the Estate be entitled to vote, opine, or otherwise be involved in any matters related to such member's Claim.

The independent member(s) of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee may be entitled to compensation for their services as set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement. Any member of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee may be removed, and successor chosen, in the manner set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

3. *Purpose of the Claimant Trust.*

The Claimant Trust shall be established for the purpose of (i) managing and monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets, subject to the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement and the oversight of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, (ii) serving as the limited partner of, and holding the limited partnership interests in, the Reorganized Debtor, (iii) serving as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC, the Reorganized Debtor's general partner, (iv) in its capacity as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC, overseeing the management and

monetization of the Reorganized Debtor Assets pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement; and (v) administering the Disputed Claims Reserve and serving as Distribution Agent with respect to Disputed Claims in Class 7 or Class 8.

In its management of the Claimant Trust Assets, the Claimant Trust will also reconcile and object to the General Unsecured Claims, Subordinated Claims, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Class A Limited Partnership Interests, as provided for in this Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement, and make Trust Distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-4(d), with no objective to continue or engage in the conduct of a trade or business.

The purpose of the Reorganized Debtor is discussed at greater length in ARTICLE IV.C.

4. *Purpose of the Litigation Sub-Trust.*

The Litigation Sub-Trust shall be established for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims. Any proceeds therefrom shall be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries pursuant to the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement.

5. *Claimant Trust Agreement and Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.*

The Claimant Trust Agreement generally will provide for, among other things:

(i) the payment of the Claimant Trust Expenses;

(ii) the payment of other reasonable expenses of the Claimant Trust;

(iii) the retention of employees, counsel, accountants, financial advisors, or other professionals and the payment of their reasonable compensation;

(iv) the investment of Cash by the Claimant Trustee within certain limitations, including those specified in the Plan;

(v) the orderly monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets;

(vi) litigation of any Causes of Action, which may include the prosecution, settlement, abandonment, or dismissal of any such Causes of Action, subject to reporting and oversight by the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee;

(vii) the resolution of Claims and Equity Interests in Class 8 through Class 11, subject to reporting and oversight by the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee;

(viii) the administration of the Disputed Claims Reserve and distributions to be made therefrom; and

(ix) the management of the Reorganized Debtor, including the utilization of a Sub-Servicer, with the Claimant Trust serving as the managing member of New GP LLC.

Except as otherwise ordered by the Bankruptcy Court, the Claimant Trust Expenses shall be paid from the Claimant Trust Assets in accordance with the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement. The Claimant Trustee may establish a reserve for the payment of Claimant Trust Expense (including, without limitation, any reserve for potential indemnification claims as authorized and provided under the Claimant Trust Agreement), and shall periodically replenish such reserve, as necessary.

In furtherance of, and consistent with the purpose of, the Claimant Trust and the Plan, the Trustees, for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, shall, subject to reporting and oversight by the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee as set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement: (i) hold the Claimant Trust Assets for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, (ii) make Distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as provided herein and in the Claimant Trust Agreement, and (iii) have the sole power and authority to prosecute and resolve any Causes of Action and objections to Claims and Equity Interests (other than those assigned to the Litigation Sub-Trust), without approval of the Bankruptcy Court. Except as otherwise provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall be responsible for all decisions and duties with respect to the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trust Assets; *provided, however,* that the prosecution and resolution of any Estate Claims included in the Claimant Trust Assets shall be the responsibility of the Litigation Trustee. The Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement generally will provide for, among other things:

(i) the payment of other reasonable expenses of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(ii) the retention of employees, counsel, accountants, financial advisors, or other professionals and the payment of their reasonable compensation; and

(iii) the investigation and prosecution of Estate Claims, which may include the prosecution, settlement, abandonment, or dismissal of any such Estate Claims, subject to reporting and oversight as set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

The Trustees, on behalf of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, may each employ, without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, employees and other professionals (including those previously retained by the Debtor and the Committee) to assist in carrying out the Trustees' duties hereunder and may compensate and reimburse the reasonable expenses of these professionals without further Order of the Bankruptcy Court from the Claimant Trust Assets in accordance with the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

The Claimant Trust Agreement and Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement may include reasonable and customary provisions that allow for indemnification by the Claimant Trust in favor of the Claimant Trustee, Litigation Trustee, and the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee. Any such indemnification shall be the sole responsibility of the Claimant Trust and payable solely from the Claimant Trust Assets.

6. *Compensation and Duties of Trustees.*

The salient terms of each Trustee's employment, including such Trustee's duties and compensation shall be set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and the Litigation Sub-Trust

Agreement, as appropriate. The Trustees shall each be entitled to reasonable compensation in an amount consistent with that of similar functionaries in similar types of bankruptcy cases.

7. *Cooperation of Debtor and Reorganized Debtor.*

To effectively investigate, prosecute, compromise and/or settle the Claims and/or Causes of Action that constitute Claimant Trust Assets (including Estate Claims), the Claimant Trustee, Litigation Trustee, and each of their professionals may require reasonable access to the Debtor's and Reorganized Debtor's documents, information, and work product relating to the Claimant Trust Assets. Accordingly, the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, shall reasonably cooperate with the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, as applicable, in their prosecution of Causes of Action and in providing the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee with copies of documents and information in the Debtor's possession, custody, or control on the Effective Date that either Trustee indicates relates to the Estate Claims or other Causes of Action.

The Debtor and Reorganized Debtor shall preserve all records, documents or work product (including all electronic records, documents, or work product) related to the Claims and Causes of Action, including Estate Claims, until the earlier of (a) the dissolution of the Reorganized Debtor or (b) termination of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust.

8. *United States Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Claimant Trust.*

Unless the IRS requires otherwise, for all United States federal income tax purposes, the parties shall treat the transfer of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust as: (a) a transfer of the Claimant Trust Assets (other than the amounts set aside in the Disputed Claims Reserve, if the Claimant Trustee makes the election described in Section 7 below) directly to the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries followed by (b) the transfer by the such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to the Claimant Trust of such Claimant Trust Assets in exchange for the Claimant Trust Interests. Accordingly, the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be treated for United States federal income tax purposes as the grantors and owners of their respective share of the Claimant Trust Assets. The foregoing treatment shall also apply, to the extent permitted by applicable law, for state and local income tax purposes.

9. *Tax Reporting.*

(a) The Claimant Trustee shall file tax returns for the Claimant Trust treating the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.671-4(a). The Claimant Trustee may file an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claims Reserve as a separate taxable entity.

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall be responsible for payment, out of the Claimant Trust Assets, of any taxes imposed on the Claimant Trust or its assets.

(c) The Claimant Trustee shall determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and notify the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of such valuation, and such valuation shall be used consistently for all federal income tax purposes.

(d) The Claimant Trustee shall distribute such tax information to the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as the Claimant Trustee determines is required by applicable law.

10. *Claimant Trust Assets.*

The Claimant Trustee shall have the exclusive right, on behalf of the Claimant Trust, to institute, file, prosecute, enforce, abandon, settle, compromise, release, or withdraw any and all Causes of Action included in the Claimant Trust Assets (except for the Estate Claims) without any further order of the Bankruptcy Court, and the Claimant Trustee shall have the exclusive right, on behalf of the Claimant Trust, to sell, liquidate, or otherwise monetize all Claimant Trust Assets, except as otherwise provided in this Plan or in the Claimant Trust Agreement, without any further order of the Bankruptcy Court. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Litigation Trustee shall have the exclusive right to institute, file, prosecute, enforce, abandon, settle, compromise, release, or withdraw any and all Estate Claims included in the Claimant Trust Assets without any further order of the Bankruptcy Court.

From and after the Effective Date, the Trustees, in accordance with section 1123(b)(3) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and on behalf of the Claimant Trust, shall each serve as a representative of the Estate with respect to any and all Claimant Trust Assets, including the Causes of Action and Estate Claims, as appropriate, and shall retain and possess the right to (a) commence, pursue, settle, compromise, or abandon, as appropriate, any and all Causes of Action in any court or other tribunal and (b) sell, liquidate, or otherwise monetize all Claimant Trust Assets.

11. *Claimant Trust Expenses.*

From and after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall, in the ordinary course of business and without the necessity of any approval by the Bankruptcy Court, pay the reasonable professional fees and expenses incurred by the Claimant Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust, and any professionals retained by such parties and entities from the Claimant Trust Assets, except as otherwise provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

12. *Trust Distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.*

The Claimant Trustee, in its discretion, may make Trust Distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries at any time and/or use the Claimant Trust Assets or proceeds thereof, *provided* that such Trust Distributions or use is otherwise permitted under the terms of the Plan, the Claimant Trust Agreement, and applicable law.

13. *Cash Investments.*

With the consent of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, the Claimant Trustee may invest Cash (including any earnings thereon or proceeds therefrom) in a manner consistent with the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement; *provided, however,* that such investments are

investments permitted to be made by a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-4(d), as reflected therein, or under applicable IRS guidelines, rulings or other controlling authorities.

14. *Dissolution of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust.*

The Trustees and the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as: (a) the Litigation Trustee determines that the pursuit of Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Estate Claims, (b) the Claimant Trustee determines that the pursuit of Causes of Action (other than Estate Claims) is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Causes of Action, (c) the Clamant Trustee determines that the pursuit of sales of other Claimant Trust Assets is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such sales of Claimant Trust Assets, (d) all objections to Disputed Claims and Equity Interests are fully resolved, (e) the Reorganized Debtor is dissolved, and (f) all Distributions required to be made by the Claimant Trustee to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries under the Plan have been made, but in no event shall the Claimant Trust be dissolved later than three years from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions, without a favorable letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service or an opinion of counsel that any further extension would not adversely affect the status of the Claimant Trust as a liquidating trust for federal income tax purposes) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Claimant Trust Assets; *provided, however,* that each extension must be approved, upon a finding that the extension is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of the Claimant Trust Assets, by the Bankruptcy Court within 6 months of the beginning of the extended term and no extension, together with any prior extensions, shall exceed three years without a favorable letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service or an opinion of counsel that any further extension would not adversely affect the status of the Claimant Trust as a liquidating trust for federal income tax purposes.

Upon dissolution of the Claimant Trust, and pursuant to the Claimant Trust Agreement, any remaining Claimant Trust Assets that exceed the amounts required to be paid under the Plan will be transferred (in the sole discretion of the Claimant Trustee) in Cash or in-kind to the Holders of the Claimant Trust Interests as provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

C. The Reorganized Debtor

1. *Corporate Existence*

The Debtor will continue to exist after the Effective Date, with all of the powers of partnerships pursuant to the law of the State of Delaware and as set forth in the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement.

2. *Cancellation of Equity Interests and Release*

On the Effective Date, (i) all prepetition Equity Interests, including the Class A Limited Partnership Interests and the Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, in the Debtor shall be canceled, and (ii) all obligations or debts owed by, or Claims against, the Debtor on account of, or based upon, the Interests shall be deemed as cancelled, released, and discharged, including all obligations or duties by the Debtor relating to the Equity Interests in any of the Debtor's formation documents, including the Limited Partnership Agreement.

3. *Issuance of New Partnership Interests*

On the Effective Date, the Debtor or the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, will issue new Class A Limited Partnership Interests to (i) the Claimant Trust, as limited partner, and (ii) New GP LLC, as general partner, and will admit (a) the Claimant Trust as the limited partner of the Reorganized Debtor, and (b) New GP LLC as the general partner of the Reorganized Debtor. The Claimant Trust, as limited partner, will ratify New GP LLC's appointment as general partner of the Reorganized Debtor. Also, on the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust, as limited partner, and New GP LLC, as general partner, will execute the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement and receive partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement.

The Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement does not provide for, and specifically disclaims, the indemnification obligations under the Limited Partnership Agreement, including any such indemnification obligations that accrued or arose or could have been brought prior to the Effective Date. Any indemnification Claims under the Limited Partnership Agreement that accrued, arose, or could have been filed prior to the Effective Date will be resolved through the Claims resolution process provided that a Claim is properly filed in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, the Plan, or the Bar Date Order. Each of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust reserve all rights with respect to any such indemnification Claims.

4. *Management of the Reorganized Debtor*

Subject to and consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, the Reorganized Debtor shall be managed by its general partner, New GP LLC. The initial officers and employees of the Reorganized Debtor shall be selected by the Claimant Trustee. The Reorganized Debtor may, in its discretion, also utilize a Sub-Servicer in addition to or in lieu of the retention of officers and employees.

As set forth in the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, New GP LLC will receive a fee for managing the Reorganized Debtor. Although New GP LLC will be a limited liability company, it will elect to be treated as a C-Corporation for tax purposes. Therefore, New GP LLC (and any taxable income attributable to it) will be subject to corporate income taxation on a standalone basis, which may reduce the return to Claimants.

5. Vesting of Assets in the Reorganized Debtor

Except as otherwise provided in this Plan or the Confirmation Order, on or after the Effective Date, all Reorganized Debtor Assets will vest in the Reorganized Debtor, free and clear of all Liens, Claims, charges or other encumbrances pursuant to section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code except with respect to such Liens, Claims, charges and other encumbrances that are specifically preserved under this Plan upon the Effective Date.

The Reorganized Debtor shall be the exclusive trustee of the Reorganized Debtor Assets for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the Reorganized Debtor Assets.

6. Purpose of the Reorganized Debtor

Except as may be otherwise provided in this Plan or the Confirmation Order, the Reorganized Debtor will continue to manage the Reorganized Debtor Assets (which shall include, for the avoidance of doubt, serving as the investment manager of the Managed Funds) and may use, acquire or dispose of the Reorganized Debtor Assets and compromise or settle any Claims with respect to the Reorganized Debtor Assets without supervision or approval by the Bankruptcy Court and free of any restrictions of the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Rules. The Reorganized Debtor shall oversee the resolution of Claims in Class 1 through Class 7.

Without limiting the foregoing, the Reorganized Debtor will pay the charges that it incurs after the Effective Date for Professionals' fees, disbursements, expenses or related support services (including reasonable fees relating to the preparation of Professional fee applications) in the ordinary course of business and without application or notice to, or order of, the Bankruptcy Court.

7. Distribution of Proceeds from the Reorganized Debtor Assets; Transfer of Reorganized Debtor Assets

Any proceeds received by the Reorganized Debtor will be distributed to the Claimant Trust, as limited partner, and New GP LLC, as general partner, in the manner set forth in the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement. As set forth in the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, the Reorganized Debtor may, from time to time distribute Reorganized Debtor Assets to the Claimant Trust either in Cash or in-kind, including to institute the wind-down and dissolution of the Reorganized Debtor. Any assets distributed to the Claimant Trust will be (i) deemed transferred in all respects as forth in ARTICLE IV.B.1, (ii) deemed Claimant Trust Assets, and (iii) administered as Claimant Trust Assets.

D. Company Action

Each of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, and the Trustees, as applicable, may take any and all actions to execute, deliver, File or record such contracts, instruments, releases and other agreements or documents and take such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and implement the provisions of this Plan, the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, or the New GP LLC Documents, as applicable, in

the name of and on behalf of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Trustees, as applicable, and in each case without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court, act or action under applicable law, regulation, order, or rule or any requirement of further action, vote or other approval or authorization by the security holders, officers, or directors of the Debtor or the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, or by any other Person.

Prior to, on or after the Effective Date (as appropriate), all matters provided for pursuant to this Plan that would otherwise require approval of the stockholders, partners, directors, managers, or members of the Debtor, any Related Entity, or any Affiliate thereof (as of prior to the Effective Date) will be deemed to have been so approved and will be in effect prior to, on or after the Effective Date (as appropriate) pursuant to applicable law and without any requirement of further action by the stockholders, partners, directors, managers or members of such Persons, or the need for any approvals, authorizations, actions or consents of any Person.

All matters provided for in this Plan involving the legal or corporate structure of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, and any legal or corporate action required by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, in connection with this Plan, will be deemed to have occurred and will be in full force and effect in all respects, in each case without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court, act or action under applicable law, regulation, order, or rule or any requirement of further action, vote or other approval or authorization by the security holders, partners, directors, managers, or members of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, or by any other Person. On the Effective Date, the appropriate officers of the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, as well as the Trustees, are authorized to issue, execute, deliver, and consummate the transactions contemplated by, the contracts, agreements, documents, guarantees, pledges, consents, securities, certificates, resolutions and instruments contemplated by or described in this Plan in the name of and on behalf of the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor, as well as the Trustees, in each case without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court, act or action under applicable law, regulation, order, or rule or any requirement of further action, vote or other approval or authorization by any Person. The appropriate officer of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, as well as the Trustees, will be authorized to certify or attest to any of the foregoing actions.

E. Release of Liens, Claims and Equity Interests

Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or in any contract, instrument, release or other agreement or document entered into or delivered in connection with the Plan, from and after the Effective Date and concurrently with the applicable distributions made pursuant to the Plan, all Liens, Claims, Equity Interests, mortgages, deeds of trust, or other security interests against the property of the Estate will be fully released, terminated, extinguished and discharged, in each case without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court, act or action under applicable law, regulation, order, or rule or the vote, consent, authorization or approval of any Entity. Any Entity holding such Liens or Equity Interests extinguished pursuant to the prior sentence will, pursuant to section 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code, promptly execute and deliver to the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, such instruments of termination, release, satisfaction and/or assignment (in recordable form) as may be reasonably requested by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable. For the avoidance of

doubt, this section is in addition to, and shall not be read to limit in any respects, ARTICLE IV.C.2.

F. Cancellation of Notes, Certificates and Instruments

Except for the purpose of evidencing a right to a distribution under this Plan and except as otherwise set forth in this Plan, on the Effective Date, all agreements, instruments, Securities and other documents evidencing any prepetition Claim or Equity Interest and any rights of any Holder in respect thereof shall be deemed cancelled, discharged, and of no force or effect. The holders of or parties to such cancelled instruments, Securities, and other documentation will have no rights arising from or related to such instruments, Securities, or other documentation or the cancellation thereof, except the rights provided for pursuant to this Plan, and the obligations of the Debtor thereunder or in any way related thereto will be fully released, terminated, extinguished and discharged, in each case without further notice to or order of the Bankruptcy Court, act or action under applicable law, regulation, order, or rule or any requirement of further action, vote or other approval or authorization by any Person. For the avoidance of doubt, this section is in addition to, and shall not be read to limit in any respects, ARTICLE IV.C.2.

G. Cancellation of Existing Instruments Governing Security Interests

Upon payment or other satisfaction of an Allowed Class 1 or Allowed Class 2 Claim, or promptly thereafter, the Holder of such Allowed Class 1 or Allowed Class 2 Claim shall deliver to the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, any collateral or other property of the Debtor held by such Holder, together with any termination statements, instruments of satisfaction, or releases of all security interests with respect to its Allowed Class 1 or Allowed Class 2 Claim that may be reasonably required to terminate any related financing statements, mortgages, mechanics' or other statutory Liens, or *lis pendens*, or similar interests or documents.

H. Control Provisions

To the extent that there is any inconsistency between this Plan as it relates to the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, this Plan shall control.

I. Treatment of Vacant Classes

Any Claim or Equity Interest in a Class considered vacant under ARTICLE III.C of this Plan shall receive no Plan Distributions.

J. Plan Documents

The documents, if any, to be Filed as part of the Plan Documents, including any documents filed with the Plan Supplement, and any amendments, restatements, supplements, or other modifications to such documents, and any consents, waivers, or other deviations under or from any such documents, shall be incorporated herein by this reference (including to the applicable definitions in ARTICLE I hereof) and fully enforceable as if stated in full herein.

The Debtor and the Committee are currently working to finalize the forms of certain of the Plan Documents to be filed with the Plan Supplement. To the extent that the Debtor and the Committee cannot agree as to the form and content of such Plan Documents, they intend to submit the issue to non-binding mediation pursuant to the *Order Directing Mediation* entered on August 3, 2020 [D.I. 912].

K. Highland Capital Management, L.P. Retirement Plan and Trust

The Highland Capital Management, L.P. Retirement Plan And Trust ("Pension Plan") is a single-employer defined benefit pension plan covered by Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"). 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461. The Debtor is the contributing sponsor and, as such, the PBGC asserts that the Debtor is liable along with any members of the contributing sponsor's controlled-group within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(13), (14) with respect to the Pension Plan.

Upon the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtor shall be deemed to have assumed the Pension Plan and shall comply with all applicable statutory provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC"), including, but not limited to, satisfying the minimum funding standards pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 412, 430, and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082, 1083; paying the PBGC premiums in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306 and 1307; and administering the Pension Plan in accordance with its terms and the provisions of ERISA and the IRC. In the event that the Pension Plan terminates after the Plan of Reorganization Effective Date, the PBGC asserts that the Reorganized Debtor and each of its controlled group members will be responsible for the liabilities imposed by Title IV of ERISA.

Notwithstanding any provision of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or the Bankruptcy Code (including section 1141 thereof) to the contrary, neither the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or the Bankruptcy Code shall be construed as discharging, releasing, exculpating or relieving the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or any person or entity in any capacity, from any liability or responsibility, if any, with respect to the Pension Plan under any law, governmental policy, or regulatory provision. PBGC and the Pension Plan shall not be enjoined or precluded from enforcing such liability or responsibility against any person or entity as a result of any of the provisions of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor reserves the right to contest any such liability or responsibility.

ARTICLE V.
TREATMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED LEASES

A. Assumption, Assignment, or Rejection of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases

Unless an Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease: (i) was previously assumed or rejected by the Debtor pursuant to this Plan on or prior to the Confirmation Date; (ii) previously expired or terminated pursuant to its own terms or by agreement of the parties thereto; (iii) is the subject of a motion to assume filed by the Debtor on or before the Confirmation Date; (iv) contains a change of control or similar provision that would be triggered by the Chapter 11 Case (unless such provision has been irrevocably waived); or (v) is specifically designated as a

contract or lease to be assumed in the Plan or the Plan Supplement, on the Confirmation Date, each Executory Contract and Unexpired Lease shall be deemed rejected pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, without the need for any further notice to or action, order, or approval of the Bankruptcy Court, unless such Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease is listed in the Plan Supplement.

At any time on or prior to the Confirmation Date, the Debtor may (i) amend the Plan Supplement in order to add or remove a contract or lease from the list of contracts to be assumed or (ii) assign (subject to applicable law) any Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease, as determined by the Debtor in consultation with the Committee, or the Reorganized Debtor, as applicable.

The Confirmation Order will constitute an order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the above-described assumptions, rejections, and assumptions and assignments. Except as otherwise provided herein or agreed to by the Debtor and the applicable counterparty, each assumed Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease shall include all modifications, amendments, supplements, restatements, or other agreements related thereto, and all rights related thereto. Modifications, amendments, supplements, and restatements to prepetition Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases that have been executed by the Debtor during the Chapter 11 Case shall not be deemed to alter the prepetition nature of the Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease or the validity, priority, or amount of any Claims that may arise in connection therewith. To the extent applicable, no change of control (or similar provision) will be deemed to occur under any such Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease.

If certain, but not all, of a contract counterparty's Executory Contracts and/or Unexpired Leases are rejected pursuant to the Plan, the Confirmation Order shall be a determination that such counterparty's Executory Contracts and/or Unexpired Leases that are being assumed pursuant to the Plan are severable agreements that are not integrated with those Executory Contracts and/or Unexpired Leases that are being rejected pursuant to the Plan. Parties seeking to contest this finding with respect to their Executory Contracts and/or Unexpired Leases must file a timely objection to the Plan on the grounds that their agreements are integrated and not severable, and any such dispute shall be resolved by the Bankruptcy Court at the Confirmation Hearing (to the extent not resolved by the parties prior to the Confirmation Hearing).

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Debtor shall assume or reject that certain real property lease with Crescent TC Investors L.P. ("Landlord") for the Debtor's headquarters located at 200/300 Crescent Ct., Suite #700, Dallas, Texas 75201 (the "Lease") in accordance with the notice to Landlord, procedures and timing required by 11 U.S.C. §365(d)(4), as modified by that certain *Agreed Order Granting Motion to Extend Time to Assume or Reject Unexpired Nonresidential Real Property Lease* [Docket No. 1122].

B. Claims Based on Rejection of Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases

Any Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease not assumed or rejected on or before the Confirmation Date shall be deemed rejected, pursuant to the Confirmation Order. Any Person asserting a Rejection Claim shall File a proof of claim within thirty days of the Effective Date. Any Rejection Claims that are not timely Filed pursuant to this Plan shall be forever disallowed

and barred. If one or more Rejection Claims are timely Filed, the Claimant Trustee may File an objection to any Rejection Claim.

Rejection Claims shall be classified as General Unsecured Claims and shall be treated in accordance with ARTICLE III of this Plan.

C. Cure of Defaults for Assumed or Assigned Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases

Any monetary amounts by which any Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease to be assumed or assigned hereunder is in default shall be satisfied, under section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, by the Debtor upon assumption or assignment thereof, by payment of the default amount in Cash as and when due in the ordinary course or on such other terms as the parties to such Executory Contracts may otherwise agree. The Debtor may serve a notice on the Committee and parties to Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases to be assumed or assigned reflecting the Debtor's or Reorganized Debtor's intention to assume or assign the Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease in connection with this Plan and setting forth the proposed cure amount (if any).

If a dispute regarding (1) the amount of any payments to cure a default, (2) the ability of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or any assignee to provide "adequate assurance of future performance" (within the meaning of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code) under the Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease to be assumed or assigned or (3) any other matter pertaining to assumption or assignment, the cure payments required by section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code will be made following the entry of a Final Order or orders resolving the dispute and approving the assumption or assignment.

Assumption or assignment of any Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease pursuant to the Plan or otherwise and full payment of any applicable cure amounts pursuant to this ARTICLE V.C shall result in the full release and satisfaction of any cure amounts, Claims, or defaults, whether monetary or nonmonetary, including defaults of provisions restricting the change in control or ownership interest composition or other bankruptcy-related defaults, arising under any assumed or assigned Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease at any time prior to the effective date of assumption or assignment. Any and all Proofs of Claim based upon Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases that have been assumed or assigned in the Chapter 11 Case, including pursuant to the Confirmation Order, and for which any cure amounts have been fully paid pursuant to this ARTICLE V.C, shall be deemed disallowed and expunged as of the Confirmation Date without the need for any objection thereto or any further notice to or action, order, or approval of the Bankruptcy Court.

ARTICLE VI.
PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISTRIBUTIONS

A. Dates of Distributions

Except as otherwise provided in this Plan, on the Effective Date or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter (or if a Claim is not an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest on the Effective Date, on the date that such Claim or Equity Interest becomes an Allowed Claim or Equity

Interest, or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter), each Holder of an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest against the Debtor shall receive the full amount of the distributions that this Plan provides for Allowed Claims or Allowed Equity Interests in the applicable Class and in the manner provided herein. If any payment or act under this Plan is required to be made or performed on a date that is not on a Business Day, then the making of such payment or the performance of such act may be completed on the next succeeding Business Day, but shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date. If and to the extent there are Disputed Claims or Equity Interests, distributions on account of any such Disputed Claims or Equity Interests shall be made pursuant to the provisions provided in this Plan. Except as otherwise provided in this Plan, Holders of Claims and Equity Interests shall not be entitled to interest, dividends or accruals on the distributions provided for therein, regardless of whether distributions are delivered on or at any time after the Effective Date.

Upon the Effective Date, all Claims and Equity Interests against the Debtor shall be deemed fixed and adjusted pursuant to this Plan and none of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust will have liability on account of any Claims or Equity Interests except as set forth in this Plan and in the Confirmation Order. All payments and all distributions made by the Distribution Agent under this Plan shall be in full and final satisfaction, settlement and release of all Claims and Equity Interests against the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor.

At the close of business on the Distribution Record Date, the transfer ledgers for the Claims against the Debtor and the Equity Interests in the Debtor shall be closed, and there shall be no further changes in the record holders of such Claims and Equity Interests. The Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Trustees, and the Distribution Agent, and each of their respective agents, successors, and assigns shall have no obligation to recognize the transfer of any Claims against the Debtor or Equity Interests in the Debtor occurring after the Distribution Record Date and shall be entitled instead to recognize and deal for all purposes hereunder with only those record holders stated on the transfer ledgers as of the close of business on the Distribution Record Date irrespective of the number of distributions to be made under this Plan to such Persons or the date of such distributions.

B. Distribution Agent

Except as provided herein, all distributions under this Plan shall be made by the Claimant Trustee, as Distribution Agent, or by such other Entity designated by the Claimant Trustee, as a Distribution Agent on the Effective Date or thereafter. The Reorganized Debtor will be the Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through Class 7.

The Claimant Trustee, or such other Entity designated by the Claimant Trustee to be the Distribution Agent, shall not be required to give any bond or surety or other security for the performance of such Distribution Agent's duties unless otherwise ordered by the Bankruptcy Court.

The Distribution Agent shall be empowered to (a) effect all actions and execute all agreements, instruments, and other documents necessary to perform its duties under this Plan; (b) make all distributions contemplated hereby; (c) employ professionals to represent it with respect to its responsibilities; and (d) exercise such other powers as may be vested in the

Distribution Agent by order of the Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to this Plan, or as deemed by the Distribution Agent to be necessary and proper to implement the provisions hereof.

The Distribution Agent shall not have any obligation to make a particular distribution to a specific Holder of an Allowed Claim if such Holder is also the Holder of a Disputed Claim.

C. Cash Distributions

Distributions of Cash may be made by wire transfer from a domestic bank, except that Cash payments made to foreign creditors may be made in such funds and by such means as the Distribution Agent determines are necessary or customary in a particular foreign jurisdiction.

D. Disputed Claims Reserve

On or prior to the Initial Distribution Date, the Claimant Trustee shall establish, fund and maintain the Disputed Claims Reserve(s) in the appropriate Disputed Claims Reserve Amounts on account of any Disputed Claims.

E. Distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve

The Disputed Claims Reserve shall at all times hold Cash in an amount no less than the Disputed Claims Reserve Amount. To the extent a Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim pursuant to the terms of this Plan, within 30 days of the date on which such Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim pursuant to the terms of this Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute from the Disputed Claims Reserve to the Holder thereof any prior distributions, in Cash, that would have been made to such Allowed Claim if it had been Allowed as of the Effective Date. For the avoidance of doubt, each Holder of a Disputed Claim that subsequently becomes an Allowed Claim will also receive its Pro Rata share of the Claimant Trust Interests. If, upon the resolution of all Disputed Claims any Cash remains in the Disputed Claims Reserve, such Cash shall be transferred to the Claimant Trust and be deemed a Claimant Trust Asset.

F. Rounding of Payments

Whenever this Plan would otherwise call for, with respect to a particular Person, payment of a fraction of a dollar, the actual payment or distribution shall reflect a rounding of such fraction to the nearest whole dollar (up or down), with half dollars being rounded down. To the extent that Cash to be distributed under this Plan remains undistributed as a result of the aforementioned rounding, such Cash or stock shall be treated as "Unclaimed Property" under this Plan.

G. *De Minimis* Distribution

Except as to any Allowed Claim that is Unimpaired under this Plan, none of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Distribution Agent shall have any obligation to make any Plan Distributions with a value of less than $100, unless a written request therefor is received by the Distribution Agent from the relevant recipient at the addresses set forth in ARTICLE VI.J hereof within 120 days after the later of the (i) Effective Date and (ii) the date such Claim becomes an Allowed Claim. *De minimis* distributions for which no such request is timely received shall

revert to the Claimant Trust. Upon such reversion, the relevant Allowed Claim (and any Claim on account of missed distributions) shall be automatically deemed satisfied, discharged and forever barred, notwithstanding any federal or state escheat laws to the contrary.

H. Distributions on Account of Allowed Claims

Except as otherwise agreed by the Holder of a particular Claim or as provided in this Plan, all distributions shall be made pursuant to the terms of this Plan and the Confirmation Order. Except as otherwise provided in this Plan, distributions to any Holder of an Allowed Claim shall, to the extent applicable, be allocated first to the principal amount of any such Allowed Claim, as determined for U.S. federal income tax purposes and then, to the extent the consideration exceeds such amount, to the remainder of such Claim comprising accrued but unpaid interest, if any (but solely to the extent that interest is an allowable portion of such Allowed Claim).

I. General Distribution Procedures

The Distribution Agent shall make all distributions of Cash or other property required under this Plan, unless this Plan specifically provides otherwise. All Cash and other property held by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, for ultimate distribution under this Plan shall not be subject to any claim by any Person.

J. Address for Delivery of Distributions

Distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims, to the extent provided for under this Plan, shall be made (1) at the addresses set forth in any written notices of address change delivered to the Debtor and the Distribution Agent; (2) at the address set forth on any Proofs of Claim Filed by such Holders (to the extent such Proofs of Claim are Filed in the Chapter 11 Case), (2), or (3) at the addresses in the Debtor's books and records.

If there is any conflict or discrepancy between the addresses set forth in (1) through (3) in the foregoing sentence, then (i) the address in Section (2) shall control; (ii) if (2) does not apply, the address in (1) shall control, and (iii) if (1) does not apply, the address in (3) shall control.

K. Undeliverable Distributions and Unclaimed Property

If the distribution to the Holder of any Allowed Claim is returned to the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust as undeliverable, no further distribution shall be made to such Holder, and Distribution Agent shall not have any obligation to make any further distribution to the Holder, unless and until the Distribution Agent is notified in writing of such Holder's then current address.

Any Entity that fails to claim any Cash within six months from the date upon which a distribution is first made to such Entity shall forfeit all rights to any distribution under this Plan and such Cash shall thereafter be deemed an Claimant Trust Asset in all respects and for all purposes. Entities that fail to claim Cash shall forfeit their rights thereto and shall have no claim whatsoever against the Debtor's Estate, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, or against any Holder of an Allowed Claim to whom distributions are made by the Distribution Agent.

L. Withholding Taxes

In connection with this Plan, to the extent applicable, the Distribution Agent shall comply with all tax withholding and reporting requirements imposed on them by any Governmental Unit, and all distributions made pursuant to this Plan shall be subject to such withholding and reporting requirements. The Distribution Agent shall be entitled to deduct any U.S. federal, state or local withholding taxes from any Cash payments made with respect to Allowed Claims, as appropriate. As a condition to receiving any distribution under this Plan, the Distribution Agent may require that the Holder of an Allowed Claim entitled to receive a distribution pursuant to this Plan provide such Holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Distribution Agent to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws. If a Holder fails to comply with such a request within one year, such distribution shall be deemed an unclaimed distribution. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the applicable recipient for all purposes of this Plan.

M. Setoffs

The Distribution Agent may, to the extent permitted under applicable law, set off against any Allowed Claim and any distributions to be made pursuant to this Plan on account of such Allowed Claim, the claims, rights and causes of action of any nature that the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Distribution Agent may hold against the Holder of such Allowed Claim that are not otherwise waived, released or compromised in accordance with this Plan; *provided, however*, that neither such a setoff nor the allowance of any Claim hereunder shall constitute a waiver or release by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee of any such claims, rights and causes of action that the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or Claimant Trustee possesses against such Holder. Any Holder of an Allowed Claim subject to such setoff reserves the right to challenge any such setoff in the Bankruptcy Court or any other court with jurisdiction with respect to such challenge.

N. Surrender of Cancelled Instruments or Securities

As a condition precedent to receiving any distribution pursuant to this Plan on account of an Allowed Claim evidenced by negotiable instruments, securities, or notes canceled pursuant to ARTICLE IV of this Plan, the Holder of such Claim will tender the applicable negotiable instruments, securities, or notes evidencing such Claim (or a sworn affidavit identifying the negotiable instruments, securities, or notes formerly held by such Holder and certifying that they have been lost), to the Distribution Agent unless waived in writing by the Distribution Agent.

O. Lost, Stolen, Mutilated or Destroyed Securities

In addition to any requirements under any applicable agreement and applicable law, any Holder of a Claim or Equity Interest evidenced by a security or note that has been lost, stolen, mutilated, or destroyed will, in lieu of surrendering such security or note to the extent required by this Plan, deliver to the Distribution Agent: (i) evidence reasonably satisfactory to the Distribution Agent of such loss, theft, mutilation, or destruction; and (ii) such security or indemnity as may be required by the Distribution Agent to hold such party harmless from any

damages, liabilities, or costs incurred in treating such individual as a Holder of an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest. Upon compliance with ARTICLE VI.O of this Plan as determined by the Distribution Agent, by a Holder of a Claim evidenced by a security or note, such Holder will, for all purposes under this Plan, be deemed to have surrendered such security or note to the Distribution Agent.

ARTICLE VII.
PROCEDURES FOR RESOLVING CONTINGENT, UNLIQUIDATED AND DISPUTED CLAIMS

A. Filing of Proofs of Claim

Unless such Claim appeared in the Schedules and is not listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, or such Claim has otherwise been Allowed or paid, each Holder of a Claim was required to file a Proof of Claim on or prior to the Bar Date.

B. Disputed Claims

Following the Effective Date, each of the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, may File with the Bankruptcy Court an objection to the allowance of any Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest, request the Bankruptcy Court subordinate any Claims to Subordinated Claims, or any other appropriate motion or adversary proceeding with respect to the foregoing by the Claims Objection Deadline or, at the discretion of the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trustee, as applicable, compromised, settled, withdrew or resolved without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, and (ii) unless otherwise provided in the Confirmation Order, the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, are authorized to settle, or withdraw any objections to, any Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interests following the Effective Date without further notice to creditors (other than the Entity holding such Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest) or authorization of the Bankruptcy Court, in which event such Claim or Equity Interest shall be deemed to be an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest in the amount compromised for purposes of this Plan.

C. Procedures Regarding Disputed Claims or Disputed Equity Interests

No payment or other distribution or treatment shall be made on account of a Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest unless and until such Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest becomes an Allowed Claim or Equity Interests and the amount of such Allowed Claim or Equity Interest, as applicable, is determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or by stipulation between the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust, as applicable, and the Holder of the Claim or Equity Interest.

D. Allowance of Claims and Equity Interests

Following the date on which a Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest becomes an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest after the Distribution Date, the Distribution Agent shall make a distribution to the Holder of such Allowed Claim or Equity Interest in accordance with the Plan.

1. Allowance of Claims

After the Effective Date and subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, will have and will retain any and all rights and defenses under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law that the Debtor had with respect to any Claim. Except as expressly provided in this Plan or in any order entered in the Chapter 11 Case prior to the Effective Date (including, without limitation, the Confirmation Order), no Claim or Equity Interest will become an Allowed Claim or Equity Interest unless and until such Claim or Equity Interest is deemed Allowed under this Plan or the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Court has entered an order, including, without limitation, the Confirmation Order, in the Chapter 11 Case allowing such Claim or Equity Interest.

2. Estimation

Subject to the other provisions of this Plan, the Debtor, prior to the Effective Date, and the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, after the Effective Date, may, at any time, request that the Bankruptcy Court estimate (a) any Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest pursuant to applicable law and in accordance with this Plan and (b) any contingent or unliquidated Claim pursuant to applicable law, including, without limitation, section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Bankruptcy Court will retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 to estimate any Disputed Claim or Disputed Equity Interest, contingent Claim or unliquidated Claim, including during the litigation concerning any objection to any Claim or Equity Interest or during the pendency of any appeal relating to any such objection. All of the aforementioned objection, estimation and resolution procedures are cumulative and not exclusive of one another. Claims or Equity Interests may be estimated and subsequently compromised, settled, withdrawn or resolved by any mechanism approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The rights and objections of all parties are reserved in connection with any such estimation proceeding.

3. Disallowance of Claims

Any Claims or Equity Interests held by Entities from which property is recoverable under sections 542, 543, 550, or 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, or that are a transferee of a transfer avoidable under sections 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, shall be deemed disallowed pursuant to section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, and holders of such Claims or Interests may not receive any distributions on account of such Claims or Interests until such time as such Causes of Action against that Entity have been settled or a Bankruptcy Court Order with respect thereto has been entered and all sums due, if any, to the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, by that Entity have been turned over or paid to the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust, as applicable.

EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED HEREIN OR AS AGREED TO BY THE DEBTOR, REORGANIZED DEBTOR, OR CLAIMANT TRUSTEE, AS APPLICABLE, ANY AND ALL PROOFS OF CLAIM FILED AFTER THE BAR DATE SHALL BE DEEMED DISALLOWED AND EXPUNGED AS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER NOTICE TO OR ACTION, ORDER, OR APPROVAL OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT, AND HOLDERS OF SUCH CLAIMS MAY NOT RECEIVE ANY DISTRIBUTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH CLAIMS, UNLESS SUCH

LATE PROOF OF CLAIM HAS BEEN DEEMED TIMELY FILED BY A FINAL ORDER.

ARTICLE VIII.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS PLAN

A. Conditions Precedent to the Effective Date

The Effective Date of this Plan will be conditioned upon the satisfaction or waiver by the Debtor (and, to the extent such condition requires the consent of the Committee, the consent of the Committee with such consent not to be unreasonably withheld), pursuant to the provisions of ARTICLE VIII.B of this Plan of the following:

- This Plan and the Plan Documents, including the Claimant Trust Agreement and the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, and all schedules, documents, supplements and exhibits to this Plan shall have been Filed in form and substance reasonably acceptable to the Debtor and the Committee.

- The Confirmation Order shall have become a Final Order and shall be in form and substance reasonably acceptable to the Debtor and the Committee. The Confirmation Order shall provide that, among other things, (i) the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, or the Litigation Trustee are authorized to take all actions necessary or appropriate to effectuate and consummate this Plan, including, without limitation, (a) entering into, implementing, effectuating, and consummating the contracts, instruments, releases, and other agreements or documents created in connection with or described in this Plan, (b) assuming the Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases set forth in the Plan Supplement, (c) making all distributions and issuances as required under this Plan; and (d) entering into any transactions as set forth in the Plan Documents; (ii) the provisions of the Confirmation Order and this Plan are nonseverable and mutually dependent; (iii) the implementation of this Plan in accordance with its terms is authorized; (iv) pursuant to section 1146 of the Bankruptcy Code, the delivery of any deed or other instrument or transfer order, in furtherance of, or in connection with this Plan, including any deeds, bills of sale, or assignments executed in connection with any disposition or transfer of Assets contemplated under this Plan, shall not be subject to any Stamp or Similar Tax; and (v) the vesting of the Claimant Trust Assets in the Claimant Trust and the Reorganized Debtor Assets in the Reorganized Debtor, in each case as of the Effective Date free and clear of liens and claims to the fullest extent permissible under applicable law pursuant to section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code except with respect to such Liens, Claims, charges and other encumbrances that are specifically preserved under this Plan upon the Effective Date.

- All documents and agreements necessary to implement this Plan, including without limitation, the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, the Claimant Trust Agreement, and the New GP LLC Documents, in each case in form and substance reasonably acceptable to the Debtor and the Committee, shall have (a) been tendered for delivery, and (b) been effected by, executed by, or otherwise deemed binding

upon, all Entities party thereto and shall be in full force and effect. All conditions precedent to such documents and agreements shall have been satisfied or waived pursuant to the terms of such documents or agreements.

- All authorizations, consents, actions, documents, approvals (including any governmental approvals), certificates and agreements necessary to implement this Plan, including, without limitation, the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, the Claimant Trust Agreement, and the New GP LLC Documents, shall have been obtained, effected or executed and delivered to the required parties and, to the extent required, filed with the applicable governmental units in accordance with applicable laws and any applicable waiting periods shall have expired without any action being taken or threatened by any competent authority that would restrain or prevent effectiveness or consummation of the Restructuring.

- The Debtor shall have obtained applicable directors' and officers' insurance coverage that is acceptable to each of the Debtor, the Committee, the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, the Claimant Trustee and the Litigation Trustee.

- The Professional Fee Reserve shall be funded pursuant to this Plan in an amount determined by the Debtor in good faith.

B. Waiver of Conditions

The conditions to effectiveness of this Plan set forth in this ARTICLE VIII (other than that the Confirmation Order shall have been entered) may be waived in whole or in part by the Debtor (and, to the extent such condition requires the consent of the Committee, the consent of the Committee) and any applicable parties in Section VII.A of this Plan, without notice, leave or order of the Bankruptcy Court or any formal action other than proceeding to confirm or effectuate this Plan. The failure to satisfy or waive a condition to the Effective Date may be asserted by the Debtor regardless of the circumstances giving rise to the failure of such condition to be satisfied. The failure of the Debtor to exercise any of the foregoing rights will not be deemed a waiver of any other rights, and each right will be deemed an ongoing right that may be asserted at any time by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable.

C. Dissolution of the Committee

On the Effective Date, the Committee will dissolve, and the members of the Committee and the Committee's Professionals will cease to have any role arising from or relating to the Chapter 11 Case, except in connection with final fee applications of Professionals for services rendered prior to the Effective Date (including the right to object thereto). The Professionals retained by the Committee and the members thereof will not be entitled to assert any fee claims for any services rendered to the Committee or expenses incurred in the service of the Committee after the Effective Date, except for reasonable fees for services rendered, and actual and necessary costs incurred, in connection with any applications for allowance of Professional Fees pending on the Effective Date or filed and served after the Effective Date pursuant to the Plan. Nothing in the Plan shall prohibit or limit the ability of the Debtor's or Committee's

Professionals to represent either of the Trustees or to be compensated or reimbursed per the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement in connection with such representation.

ARTICLE IX.
EXCULPATION, INJUNCTION AND RELATED PROVISIONS

A. General

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Plan to the contrary, the allowance, classification and treatment of all Allowed Claims and Equity Interests and their respective distributions and treatments under the Plan shall take into account the relative priority and rights of the Claims and the Equity Interests in each Class in connection with any contractual, legal and equitable subordination rights relating thereto whether arising under general principles of equitable subordination, section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise.

B. Discharge of Claims

To the fullest extent provided under section 1141(d)(1)(A) and other applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Plan or the Confirmation Order, all consideration distributed under this Plan will be in exchange for, and in complete satisfaction, settlement, discharge, and release of, all Claims and Equity Interests of any kind or nature whatsoever against the Debtor or any of its Assets or properties, and regardless of whether any property will have been distributed or retained pursuant to this Plan on account of such Claims or Equity Interests. Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Plan or the Confirmation Order, upon the Effective Date, the Debtor and its Estate will be deemed discharged and released under and to the fullest extent provided under section 1141(d)(1)(A) and other applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code from any and all Claims and Equity Interests of any kind or nature whatsoever, including, but not limited to, demands and liabilities that arose before the Confirmation Date, and all debts of the kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of the Bankruptcy Code.

C. Exculpation

Subject in all respects to ARTICLE XII.D of this Plan, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, no Exculpated Party will have or incur, and each Exculpated Party is hereby exculpated from, any claim, obligation, suit, judgment, damage, demand, debt, right, Cause of Action, remedy, loss, and liability for conduct occurring on or after the Petition Date in connection with or arising out of (i) the filing and administration of the Chapter 11 Case; (ii) the negotiation and pursuit of the Disclosure Statement, the Plan, or the solicitation of votes for, or confirmation of, the Plan; (iii) the funding or consummation of the Plan (including the Plan Supplement) or any related agreements, instruments, or other documents, the solicitation of votes on the Plan, the offer, issuance, and Plan Distribution of any securities issued or to be issued pursuant to the Plan, including the Claimant Trust Interests, whether or not such Plan Distributions occur following the Effective Date; (iv) the implementation of the Plan; and (v) any negotiations, transactions, and documentation in connection with the foregoing clauses (i)-(iv); *provided*, *however,* the foregoing will not apply to (a) any acts or omissions of an Exculpated Party arising out of or related to acts or omissions that constitute bad faith, fraud, gross

negligence, criminal misconduct, or willful misconduct or (b) Strand or any Employee other than with respect to actions taken by such Entities from the date of appointment of the Independent Directors through the Effective Date. This exculpation shall be in addition to, and not in limitation of, all other releases, indemnities, exculpations, any other applicable law or rules, or any other provisions of this Plan, including ARTICLE IV.C.2, protecting such Exculpated Parties from liability.

D. Releases by the Debtor

On and after the Effective Date, each Released Party is deemed to be, hereby conclusively, absolutely, unconditionally, irrevocably, and forever released and discharged by the Debtor and the Estate, in each case on behalf of themselves and their respective successors, assigns, and representatives, including, but not limited to, the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust from any and all Causes of Action, including any derivative claims, asserted on behalf of the Debtor, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, matured or unmatured, existing or hereafter arising, in law, equity, contract, tort or otherwise, that the Debtor or the Estate would have been legally entitled to assert in their own right (whether individually or collectively) or on behalf of the holder of any Claim against, or Interest in, a Debtor or other Person.

Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the foregoing release does not release: (i) any obligations of any party under the Plan or any document, instrument, or agreement executed to implement the Plan, (ii) the rights or obligations of any current employee of the Debtor under any employment agreement or plan, (iii) the rights of the Debtor with respect to any confidentiality provisions or covenants restricting competition in favor of the Debtor under any employment agreement with a current or former employee of the Debtor, (iv) any Avoidance Actions, or (v) any Causes of Action arising from willful misconduct, criminal misconduct, actual fraud, or gross negligence of such applicable Released Party as determined by Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, any release provided pursuant to this ARTICLE IX.D (i) with respect to a Senior Employee, is conditioned in all respects on (a) such Senior Employee executing a Senior Employee Stipulation on or prior to the Effective Date and (b) the reduction of such Senior Employee's Allowed Claim as set forth in the Senior Employee Stipulation (such amount, the "Reduced Employee Claim"), and (ii) with respect to any Employee, including a Senior Employee, shall be deemed null and void and of no force and effect (1) if there is more than one member of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee who does not represent entities holding a Disputed or Allowed Claim (the "Independent Members"), the Claimant Trustee and the Independent Members by majority vote determine or (2) if there is only one Independent Member, the Independent Member after discussion with the Claimant Trustee, determines (in each case after discussing with the full Claimant Trust Oversight Committee) that such Employee (regardless of whether the Employee is then currently employed by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee):

- sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, the Litigation

Sub-Trust, or any of their respective employees or agents, or any Released Party on or in connection with any claim or cause of action arising prior to the Effective Date,

- has taken any action that, impairs or harms the value of the Claimant Trust Assets or the Reorganized Debtor Assets, or

- (x) upon the request of the Claimant Trustee, has failed to provide reasonable assistance in good faith to the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to (1) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets or Reorganized Debtor Assets, as applicable, or (2) the resolution of Claims, or (y) has taken any action that impedes or frustrates the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to any of the foregoing.

Provided, however, that the release provided pursuant to this ARTICLE IX.D will vest and the Employee will be indefeasibly released pursuant to this ARTICLE IX.D if such Employee's release has not been deemed null and void and of no force and effect on or prior to the date that is the date of dissolution of the Claimant Trust pursuant to the Claimant Trust Agreement.

By executing the Senior Employee Stipulation embodying this release, each Senior Employee acknowledges and agrees, without limitation, to the terms of this release and the tolling agreement contained in the Senior Employee Stipulation.

The provisions of this release and the execution of a Senior Employee Stipulation will not in any way prevent or limit any Employee from (i) prosecuting its Claims, if any, against the Debtor's Estate, (ii) defending him or herself against any claims or causes of action brought against the Employee by a third party, or (iii) assisting other persons in defending themselves from any Estate Claims brought by the Litigation Trustee (but only with respect to Estate Claims brought by the Litigation Trustee and not collection or other actions brought by the Claimant Trustee).

E. Preservation of Rights of Action

1. Maintenance of Causes of Action

Except as otherwise provided in this Plan, after the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust will retain all rights to commence, pursue, litigate or settle, as appropriate, any and all Causes of Action included in the Reorganized Debtor Assets or Claimant Trust Assets, as applicable, whether existing as of the Petition Date or thereafter arising, in any court or other tribunal including, without limitation, in an adversary proceeding Filed in the Chapter 11 Case and, as the successors in interest to the Debtor and the Estate, may, and will have the exclusive right to, enforce, sue on, settle, compromise, transfer or assign (or decline to do any of the foregoing) any or all of the Causes of Action without notice to or approval from the Bankruptcy Court.

2. Preservation of All Causes of Action Not Expressly Settled or Released

Unless a Cause of Action against a Holder of a Claim or an Equity Interest or other Entity is expressly waived, relinquished, released, compromised or settled in this Plan or any Final

Order (including, without limitation, the Confirmation Order), such Cause of Action is expressly reserved for later adjudication by the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust, as applicable (including, without limitation, Causes of Action not specifically identified or of which the Debtor may presently be unaware or that may arise or exist by reason of additional facts or circumstances unknown to the Debtor at this time or facts or circumstances that may change or be different from those the Debtor now believes to exist) and, therefore, no preclusion doctrine, including, without limitation, the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, waiver, estoppel (judicial, equitable or otherwise) or laches will apply to such Causes of Action as a consequence of the confirmation, effectiveness, or consummation of this Plan based on the Disclosure Statement, this Plan or the Confirmation Order, except where such Causes of Action have been expressly released in this Plan or any other Final Order (including, without limitation, the Confirmation Order). In addition, the right of the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust to pursue or adopt any claims alleged in any lawsuit in which the Debtor is a plaintiff, defendant or an interested party, against any Entity, including, without limitation, the plaintiffs or co-defendants in such lawsuits, is expressly reserved.

F. Injunction

Upon entry of the Confirmation Order, all Enjoined Parties are and shall be permanently enjoined, on and after the Effective Date, from taking any actions to interfere with the implementation or consummation of the Plan.

Except as expressly provided in the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or a separate order of the Bankruptcy Court, all Enjoined Parties are and shall be permanently enjoined, on and after the Effective Date, with respect to any Claims and Equity Interests, from directly or indirectly (i) commencing, conducting, or continuing in any manner any suit, action, or other proceeding of any kind (including any proceeding in a judicial, arbitral, administrative or other forum) against or affecting the Debtor or the property of the Debtor, (ii) enforcing, levying, attaching (including any prejudgment attachment), collecting, or otherwise recovering, enforcing, or attempting to recover or enforce, by any manner or means, any judgment, award, decree, or order against the Debtor or the property of the Debtor, (iii) creating, perfecting, or otherwise enforcing in any manner, any security interest, lien or encumbrance of any kind against the Debtor or the property of the Debtor, (iv) asserting any right of setoff, directly or indirectly, against any obligation due to the Debtor or against property or interests in property of the Debtor, except to the limited extent permitted under Sections 553 and 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (v) acting or proceeding in any manner, in any place whatsoever, that does not conform to or comply with the provisions of the Plan.

The injunctions set forth herein shall extend to, and apply to any act of the type set forth in any of clauses (i)-(v) of the immediately preceding paragraph against any successors of the Debtor, including, but not limited to, the Reorganized Debtor, the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the Claimant Trust and their respective property and interests in property.

Subject in all respects to ARTICLE XII.D, no Enjoined Party may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Protected Party that arose or

arises from or is related to the Chapter 11 Case, the negotiation of the Plan, the administration of the Plan or property to be distributed under the Plan, the wind down of the business of the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the administration of the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust, or the transactions in furtherance of the foregoing without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining, after notice and a hearing, that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of any kind, including, but not limited to, negligence, bad faith, criminal misconduct, willful misconduct, fraud, or gross negligence against a Protected Party and (ii) specifically authorizing such Enjoined Party to bring such claim or cause of action against any such Protected Party; *provided, however,* the foregoing will not apply to a claim or cause of action against Strand or against any Employee other than with respect to actions taken, respectively, by Strand or by such Employee from the date of appointment of the Independent Directors through the Effective Date. The Bankruptcy Court will have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim or cause of action is colorable and, only to the extent legally permissible and as provided for in ARTICLE XI, shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying colorable claim or cause of action.

G. Duration of Injunctions and Stays

ARTICLE II. Unless otherwise provided in this Plan, in the Confirmation Order, or in a Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court, (i) all injunctions and stays entered during the Chapter 11 Case and in existence on the Confirmation Date shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with their terms; and (ii) the automatic stay arising under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code shall remain in full force and effect subject to Section 362(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, and to the extent necessary if the Debtor does not receive a discharge, the Court will enter an equivalent order under Section 105.

H. Continuance of January 9 Order

Unless otherwise provided in this Plan, in the Confirmation Order, or in a Final Order of the Bankruptcy Court, the restrictions set forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the *Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course*, entered by the Bankruptcy Court on January 9, 2020 [D.I. 339] shall remain in full force and effect following the Effective Date.

ARTICLE X.
BINDING NATURE OF PLAN

On the Effective Date, and effective as of the Effective Date, the Plan, including, without limitation, the provisions in ARTICLE IX, will bind, and will be deemed binding upon, all Holders of Claims against and Equity Interests in the Debtor and such Holder's respective successors and assigns, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, notwithstanding whether or not such Holder will receive or retain any property or interest in property under the Plan. All Claims and Debts shall be fixed and adjusted pursuant to this Plan. The Plan shall also bind any taxing authority, recorder of deeds, or similar official for any county, state,

Governmental Unit or parish in which any instrument related to the Plan or related to any transaction contemplated thereby is to be recorded with respect to nay taxes of the kind specified in Bankruptcy Code section 1146(a).

ARTICLE XI.
RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to sections 105 and 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code and notwithstanding the entry of the Confirmation Order and the occurrence of the Effective Date, the Bankruptcy Court shall, after the Effective Date, retain such jurisdiction over the Chapter 11 Case and all Entities with respect to all matters related to the Chapter 11 Case, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and this Plan to the maximum extent legally permissible, including, without limitation, jurisdiction to:

- allow, disallow, determine, liquidate, classify, estimate or establish the priority, secured, unsecured, or subordinated status of any Claim or Equity Interest, including, without limitation, the resolution of any request for payment of any Administrative Expense Claim and the resolution of any and all objections to the allowance or priority of any Claim or Equity Interest;

- grant or deny any applications for allowance of compensation or reimbursement of expenses authorized pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code or this Plan, for periods ending on or before the Effective Date; *provided*, *however*, that, from and after the Effective Date, the Reorganized Debtor shall pay Professionals in the ordinary course of business for any work performed after the Effective Date subject to the terms of this Plan and the Confirmation Order, and such payment shall not be subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court;

- resolve any matters related to the assumption, assignment or rejection of any Executory Contract or Unexpired Lease to which the Debtor is party or with respect to which the Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, or Claimant Trust may be liable and to adjudicate and, if necessary, liquidate, any Claims arising therefrom, including, without limitation, any dispute regarding whether a contract or lease is or was executory or expired;

- make any determination with respect to a claim or cause of action against a Protected Party as set forth in ARTICLE IX;

- resolve any claim or cause of action against an Exculpated Party or Protected Party arising from or related to the Chapter 11 Case, the negotiation of this Plan, the administration of the Plan or property to be distributed under the Plan, the wind down of the business of the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, or the transactions in furtherance of the foregoing;

- if requested by the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trustee, authorize, approve, and allow any sale, disposition, assignment or other transfer of the Reorganized Debtor Assets or Claimant Trust Assets, including any break-up compensation or

expense reimbursement that may be requested by a purchaser thereof*; provided, however*, that neither the Reorganized Debtor nor the Claimant Trustee shall be required to seek such authority or approval from the Bankruptcy Court unless otherwise specifically required by this Plan or the Confirmation Order;

- if requested by the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trustee, authorize, approve, and allow any borrowing or the incurrence of indebtedness, whether secured or unsecured by the Reorganized Debtor or Claimant Trust; *provided, however*, that neither the Reorganized Debtor nor the Claimant Trustee shall be required to seek such authority or approval from the Bankruptcy Court unless otherwise specifically required by this Plan or the Confirmation Order;

- resolve any issues related to any matters adjudicated in the Chapter 11 Case;

- ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims and Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of this Plan;

- decide or resolve any motions, adversary proceedings, contested or litigated matters and any other Causes of Action (including Estate Claims) that are pending as of the Effective Date or that may be commenced in the future, including approval of any settlements, compromises, or other resolutions as may be requested by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, or the Litigation Trustee whether under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 or otherwise, and grant or deny any applications involving the Debtor that may be pending on the Effective Date or instituted by the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, or Litigation Trustee after the Effective Date, provided that the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, and the Litigation Trustee shall reserve the right to commence actions in all appropriate forums and jurisdictions;

- enter such orders as may be necessary or appropriate to implement, effectuate, or consummate the provisions of this Plan, the Plan Documents, and all other contracts, instruments, releases, and other agreements or documents adopted in connection with this Plan, the Plan Documents, or the Disclosure Statement;

- resolve any cases, controversies, suits or disputes that may arise in connection with the implementation, effectiveness, consummation, interpretation, or enforcement of this Plan or any Entity's obligations incurred in connection with this Plan;

- issue injunctions and enforce them, enter and implement other orders or take such other actions as may be necessary or appropriate to restrain interference by any Entity with implementation, effectiveness, consummation, or enforcement of this Plan, except as otherwise provided in this Plan;

- enforce the terms and conditions of this Plan and the Confirmation Order;

- resolve any cases, controversies, suits or disputes with respect to the release, exculpation, indemnification, and other provisions contained herein and enter such

orders or take such others actions as may be necessary or appropriate to implement or enforce all such releases, injunctions and other provisions;

- enter and implement such orders or take such others actions as may be necessary or appropriate if the Confirmation Order is modified, stayed, reversed, revoked or vacated;

- resolve any other matters that may arise in connection with or relate to this Plan, the Disclosure Statement, the Confirmation Order, the Plan Documents, or any contract, instrument, release, indenture or other agreement or document adopted in connection with this Plan or the Disclosure Statement; and

- enter an order concluding or closing the Chapter 11 Case after the Effective Date.

ARTICLE XII.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A. Payment of Statutory Fees and Filing of Reports

All outstanding Statutory Fees shall be paid on the Effective Date. All such fees payable, and all such fees that become due and payable, after the Effective Date shall be paid by the Reorganized Debtor when due or as soon thereafter as practicable until the Chapter 11 Case is closed, converted, or dismissed. The Claimant Trustee shall File all quarterly reports due prior to the Effective Date when they become due, in a form reasonably acceptable to the U.S. Trustee. After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trustee shall File with the Bankruptcy Court quarterly reports when they become due, in a form reasonably acceptable to the U.S. Trustee. The Reorganized Debtor shall remain obligated to pay Statutory Fees to the Office of the U.S. Trustee until the earliest of the Debtor's case being closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

B. Modification of Plan

Effective as of the date hereof and subject to the limitations and rights contained in this Plan: (a) the Debtor reserves the right, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, to amend or modify this Plan prior to the entry of the Confirmation Order with the consent of the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld; and (b) after the entry of the Confirmation Order, the Debtor may, after notice and hearing and entry of an order of the Bankruptcy Court, amend or modify this Plan, in accordance with section 1127(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or remedy any defect or omission or reconcile any inconsistency in this Plan in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the purpose and intent of this Plan.

C. Revocation of Plan

The Debtor reserves the right to revoke or withdraw this Plan prior to the Confirmation Date and to File a subsequent chapter 11 plan with the consent of the Committee. If the Debtor revokes or withdraws this Plan prior to the Confirmation Date, then: (i) this Plan shall be null and void in all respects; (ii) any settlement or compromise embodied in this Plan, assumption of Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases effected by this Plan and any document or agreement

executed pursuant hereto shall be deemed null and void except as may be set forth in a separate order entered by the Bankruptcy Court; and (iii) nothing contained in this Plan shall: (a) constitute a waiver or release of any Claims by or against, or any Equity Interests in, the Debtor or any other Entity; (b) prejudice in any manner the rights of the Debtor or any other Entity; or (c) constitute an admission, acknowledgement, offer or undertaking of any sort by the Debtor or any other Entity.

D. Obligations Not Changed

Notwithstanding anything in this Plan to the contrary, nothing herein will affect or otherwise limit or release any non-Debtor Entity's (including any Exculpated Party's) duties or obligations, including any contractual and indemnification obligations, to the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or any other Entity whether arising under contract, statute, or otherwise.

E. Entire Agreement

Except as otherwise described herein, this Plan supersedes all previous and contemporaneous negotiations, promises, covenants, agreements, understandings, and representations on such subjects, all of which have become merged and integrated into this Plan.

F. Closing of Chapter 11 Case

The Claimant Trustee shall, after the Effective Date and promptly after the full administration of the Chapter 11 Case, File with the Bankruptcy Court all documents required by Bankruptcy Rule 3022 and any applicable order of the Bankruptcy Court to close the Chapter 11 Case.

G. Successors and Assigns

This Plan shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Debtor and its successors and assigns, including, without limitation, the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee. The rights, benefits, and obligations of any Person or Entity named or referred to in this Plan shall be binding on, and shall inure to the benefit of, any heir, executor, administrator, successor, or assign of such Person or Entity.

H. Reservation of Rights

Except as expressly set forth herein, this Plan shall have no force or effect unless and until the Bankruptcy Court enters the Confirmation Order and the Effective Date occurs. Neither the filing of this Plan, any statement or provision contained herein, nor the taking of any action by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, or any other Entity with respect to this Plan shall be or shall be deemed to be an admission or waiver of any rights of: (1) the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee with respect to the Holders of Claims or Equity Interests or other Entity; or (2) any Holder of a Claim or an Equity Interest or other Entity prior to the Effective Date.

Neither the exclusion or inclusion by the Debtor of any contract or lease on any exhibit, schedule, or other annex to this Plan or in the Plan Documents, nor anything contained in this

Plan, will constitute an admission by the Debtor that any such contract or lease is or is not an executory contract or lease or that the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, or their respective Affiliates has any liability thereunder.

Except as explicitly provided in this Plan, nothing herein shall waive, excuse, limit, diminish, or otherwise alter any of the defenses, claims, Causes of Action, or other rights of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee under any executory or non-executory contract.

Nothing in this Plan will increase, augment, or add to any of the duties, obligations, responsibilities, or liabilities of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, under any executory or non-executory contract or lease.

If there is a dispute regarding whether a contract or lease is or was executory at the time of its assumption under this Plan, the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, shall have thirty (30) days following entry of a Final Order resolving such dispute to alter their treatment of such contract.

I. Further Assurances

The Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable, all Holders of Claims and Equity Interests receiving distributions hereunder, and all other Entities shall, from time to time, prepare, execute and deliver any agreements or documents and take any other actions as may be necessary or advisable to effectuate the provisions and intent of this Plan or the Confirmation Order. On or before the Effective Date, the Debtor shall File with the Bankruptcy Court all agreements and other documents that may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and further evidence the terms and conditions hereof.

J. Severability

If, prior to the Confirmation Date, any term or provision of this Plan is determined by the Bankruptcy Court to be invalid, void, or unenforceable, the Bankruptcy Court will have the power to alter and interpret such term or provision to make it valid or enforceable to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with the original purpose of the term or provision held to be invalid, void, or unenforceable, and such term or provision will then be applicable as altered or interpreted. Notwithstanding any such holding, alteration or interpretation, the remainder of the terms and provisions of this Plan will remain in full force and effect and will in no way be affected, impaired, or invalidated by such holding, alteration, or interpretation. The Confirmation Order will constitute a judicial determination and will provide that each term and provision of this Plan, as it may have been altered or interpreted in accordance with the foregoing, is valid and enforceable pursuant to its terms.

K. Service of Documents

All notices, requests, and demands to or upon the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee to be effective shall be in writing and, unless otherwise expressly provided herein, shall be deemed to have been duly given or made when actually delivered addressed as follows:

If to the Claimant Trust:

Highland Claimant Trust
c/o Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.

If to the Debtor:

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.

with copies to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 277-6910
Facsimile: (310) 201-0760
Attn: Jeffrey N. Pomerantz, Esq.
Ira D. Kharasch, Esq.
Gregory V. Demo, Esq.

If to the Reorganized Debtor:

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
with copies to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey N. Pomerantz, Esq.
Ira D. Kharasch, Esq.
Gregory V. Demo, Esq.

L. Exemption from Certain Transfer Taxes Pursuant to Section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code

To the extent permitted by applicable law, pursuant to section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, any transfers of property pursuant hereto shall not be subject to any Stamp or Similar Tax or governmental assessment in the United States, and the Confirmation Order shall direct the appropriate federal, state or local governmental officials or agents or taxing authority to forego

the collection of any such Stamp or Similar Tax or governmental assessment and to accept for filing and recordation instruments or other documents pursuant to such transfers of property without the payment of any such Stamp or Similar Tax or governmental assessment. Such exemption specifically applies, without limitation, to (i) all actions, agreements and documents necessary to evidence and implement the provisions of and the distributions to be made under this Plan; (ii) the maintenance or creation of security or any Lien as contemplated by this Plan; and (iii) assignments, sales, or transfers executed in connection with any transaction occurring under this Plan.

M. Governing Law

Except to the extent that the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules or other federal law is applicable, or to the extent that an exhibit or schedule to this Plan provides otherwise, the rights and obligations arising under this Plan shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the laws of Texas, without giving effect to the principles of conflicts of law of such jurisdiction; *provided, however,* that corporate governance matters relating to the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, New GP LLC, or the Claimant Trust, as applicable, shall be governed by the laws of the state of organization of the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, New GP LLC, or the Claimant Trustee, as applicable.

N. Tax Reporting and Compliance

The Debtor is hereby authorized to request an expedited determination under section 505(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of the tax liability of the Debtor is for all taxable periods ending after the Petition Date through, and including, the Effective Date.

O. Exhibits and Schedules

All exhibits and schedules to this Plan, if any, including the Exhibits and the Plan Documents, are incorporated and are a part of this Plan as if set forth in full herein.

P. Controlling Document

In the event of an inconsistency between this Plan and any other instrument or document created or executed pursuant to this Plan, or between this Plan and the Disclosure Statement, this Plan shall control. The provisions of this Plan, the Disclosure Statement, and any Plan Document, on the one hand, and of the Confirmation Order, on the other hand, shall be construed in a manner consistent with each other so as to effectuate the purposes of each; *provided, however*, that if there is determined to be any inconsistency between any provision of this Plan, the Disclosure Statement, and any Plan Document, on the one hand, and any provision of the Confirmation Order, on the other hand, that cannot be so reconciled, then, solely to the extent of such inconsistency, the provisions of the Confirmation Order shall govern, and any such provisions of the Confirmation Order shall be deemed a modification of this Plan, the Disclosure Statement, and the Plan Documents, as applicable.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

Dated: January 22, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer

Prepared by:

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

Exhibit
R 4

In re:	)	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	)	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	)	

DEBTOR'S NOTICE OF FILING OF PLAN SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIFTH AMENDED PLAN OF REORGANIZATION OF HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. (WITH TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor"), filed the *Debtor's Notice of Filing of*

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Supplement to Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P., on November 13, 2020 [Docket No. 1389] (the "Initial Supplement"). The Initial Supplement included Exhibits A-H to the Plan (as defined below).

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472].

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Debtor filed the *Debtor's Notice of Filing of Supplement to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* on December 18, 2020 [Docket No. 1606] (the "Second Supplement"). The Second Supplement included Exhibits I-K to the Plan.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Debtor filed the *Debtor's Notice of Filing of Supplement to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* on January 4, 2021 [Docket No. 1656] (the "Third Supplement"). The Third Supplement included Exhibits L-P to the Plan.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as subsequently amended and/or modified, the "Plan").

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Debtor hereby files the documents included herewith as **Exhibits Q-CC** (collectively, the "Fourth Plan Supplement") further supplementing the Plan:

Exhibit Q: Amended Schedule of Retained Causes of Action (supersedes Exhibits E and L);

Exhibit R: Amended Form of Claimant Trust Agreement (supersedes Exhibits A and M);

Exhibit S: Redline of Form of Claimant Trust Agreement (against Exhibit M);

Exhibit T: Amended Form of Litigation Trust Agreement (supersedes Exhibits D and O);

Exhibit U: Redline of Form of Litigation Trust Agreement (against Exhibit P)

Exhibit V: Amended Form of Senior Employee Stipulation (supersedes Exhibit H and J);

Exhibit W: Redline of Form of Senior Employee Stipulation (against Exhibit J);

Exhibit X: Schedule of Contracts and Leases to Be Assumed (supersedes Exhibit H and I);

Exhibit Y: Related Entity List;

Exhibit Z Form of Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement (supersedes Exhibit C);

Exhibit AA Redline of Form of Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement (against Exhibit C);

Exhibit BB Senior Employee Stipulation (executed by Thomas Surgent);

Exhibit CC Senior Employee Stipulation (executed by Frank Waterhouse); and

Exhibit DD Schedule of Employees (supersedes Exhibit G).

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that this *Notice of Filing of Plan Supplement to the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (with technical modifications)* (the "Notice of Plan Supplement") is being served on parties-in-interest without the Fourth Plan Supplement attached. Any party-in-interest wishing to obtain copies of the Plan or the Fourth Plan Supplement may do so by (i) contacting the Debtor's Solicitation Agent, KCC, at (i) 1-877-573-3984 (toll free) or 1-310-751-1829 (if international) or by email at HighlandInfo@kccllc.com, or (ii) viewing such documents by accessing them online at https://kccllc.net/HCMLP. The documents are also available on the Court's website: www.txnb.uscourts.gov. Please note that a PACER password and login are needed to access documents on the Court's website.

Dated: January 22, 2021.

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

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-and-

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/s/ Zachery Z. Annable

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

EXHIBIT Q

Schedule of Causes of Action

The Causes of Action shall include, *without limitation*, any cause of action based on the following:

breach of fiduciary duties, breach of duty of care, breach of duty of loyalty, usurpation of corporate opportunities, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, misappropriation of assets, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, gross negligence, fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent transfer, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, tortious interference, *quantum meruit*, unjust enrichment, abuse of process, alter ego, substantive consolidation, recharacterization, business disparagement, indemnity, claims for recovery of distributions or dividends, claims for indemnification, promissory estoppel, quasi-contract claims, any counterclaims, equitable subordination, avoidance actions provided for under sections 544 or 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, claims brought under state law, claims brought under federal law, claims under any common-law theory of tort or law or equity, and any claims similar in nature to the foregoing claims.

The Causes of Action shall include, *without limitation*, any cause of action against the following persons and entities:

James Dondero, Mark Okada, Grant Scott, John Honis, any current or former insider of the Debtor, the Dugaboy Investment Trust, Charitable DAF Holdco, Ltd, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Nexbank Capital, Inc. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc., NexPoint Advisors GP, LLC, NexPoint Advisors, L.P., Strand Advisors XVI, Inc., Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., NexAnnuity Holdings, Inc., the entities listed on the attached **Annex 1** hereto, any current or former employee of the Debtor, and any entity directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or operated for the benefit of the foregoing persons or entities.

The Causes of Action shall include, *without limitation*, any cause of action arising from the following transactions:

The transfer of ownership interests in the Debtor to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, the creation or transfer of any notes receivable from the Debtor or from any entity related to the Debtor, the creation or transfer of assets to or from any charitable foundation or trust, the formation, performance, or breach of any contract for the Debtor to provide investment management, support services, or any other services, and the distribution of assets or cash from the Debtor to partners of the Debtor.

Annex 1

11 Estates Lane, LLC
1110 Waters, LLC
140 Albany, LLC
1525 Dragon, LLC
17720 Dickerson, LLC
1905 Wylie LLC
2006 Milam East Partners GP, LLC
2006 Milam East Partners, L.P.
201 Tarrant Partners, LLC
2014 Corpus Weber Road LLC
2325 Stemmons HoldCo, LLC
2325 Stemmons Hotel Partners, LLC
2325 Stemmons TRS, Inc.
300 Lamar, LLC
3409 Rosedale, LLC
3801 Maplewood, LLC
3801 Shenandoah, L.P.
3820 Goar Park LLC
400 Seaman, LLC
401 Ame, L.P.
4201 Locust, L.P.
4312 Belclaire, LLC
5833 Woodland, L.P.
5906 DeLoache, LLC
5950 DeLoache, LLC
7758 Ronnie, LLC
7759 Ronnie, LLC
AA Shotguns, LLC
Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd.
Acis CLO 2017-7 Ltd
Acis CLO Management GP, LLC
Acis CLO Management GP, LLC *(fka Acis CLO Opportunity Funds GP, LLC)*
Acis CLO Management Holdings, L.P.
Acis CLO Management Intermediate Holdings I, LLC
Acis CLO Management Intermediate Holdings II, LLC
Acis CLO Management, LLC *(fka Acis CLO Opportunity Funds SLP, LLC)*
Acis CLO Trust
Acis CLO Value Fund II Charitable DAF Ltd.
Acis CMOA Trust
Advisors Equity Group LLC
Alamo Manhattan Hotel I, LLC (Third Party)
Allenby, LLC
Allisonville RE Holdings, LLC
AM Uptown Hotel, LLC
Apex Care, L.P
Asbury Holdings, LLC *(fka HCSLR Camelback Investors (Delaware), LLC)*
Ascendant Advisors
Atlas IDF GP, LLC
Atlas IDF, LP
BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure, LLC
BDC Toys Holdco, LLC
Beacon Mountain, LLC
Bedell Trust Ireland Limited (Charitable trust account)
Ben Roby (third party)
BH Equities, LLC
BH Heron Pointe, LLC
BH Hollister, LLC
BH Willowdale Manager, LLC
Big Spring Partners, LLC
Blair Investment Partners, LLC
Bloomdale, LLC
Brave Holdings III Inc.
Brentwood CLO, Ltd.
Brentwood Investors Corp.
Brian Mitts
Bristol Bay Funding Ltd.
Bristol Bay Funding, Ltd.
BVP Property, LLC
C-1 Arbors, Inc.
C-1 Cutter's Point, Inc.
C-1 Eaglecrest, Inc.
C-1 Silverbrook, Inc.
Cabi Holdco GP, LLC
Cabi Holdco I, Ltd
Cabi Holdco I, Ltd.

Cabi Holdco, L.P.
California Public Employees' Retirement System
Camelback Residential Investors, LLC
Camelback Residential Investors, LLC *(fka Sevilla Residential Partners, LLC)*
Camelback Residential Partners, LLC
Capital Real Estate - Latitude, LLC
Castle Bio Manager, LLC
Castle Bio, LLC
CG Works, Inc.
CG Works, Inc.
(fka Common Grace Ventures, Inc.)
Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.
Charitable DAF GP, LLC
Charitable DAF HoldCo, Ltd
Charitable DAF HoldCo, Ltd.
Claymore Holdings, LLC
CLO HoldCo, Ltd
CLO Holdco, Ltd.
Corbusier, Ltd.
Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc.
Corpus Weber Road Member LLC
CP Equity Hotel Owner, LLC
CP Equity Land Owner, LLC
CP Equity Owner, LLC
CP Hotel TRS, LLC
CP Land Owner, LLC
CP Tower Owner, LLC
CRE - Lat, LLC
Credit Suisse, Cayman Islands Branch
Crossings 2017 LLC
Crown Global Insurance Company (third party)
Dallas Cityplace MF SPE Owner LLC
Dallas Lease and Finance, L.P.
Dana Scott Breault
James Dondero
Reese Avry Dondero
Jameson Drue Dondero
Dana Sprong (Third Party)
David c. Hopson
De Kooning, Ltd.
deKooning, Ltd.
DFA/BH Autumn Ridge, LLC
Dolomiti, LLC
DrugCrafters, L.P.
Dugaboy Investment Trust
Dugaboy Management, LLC
Dugaboy Project Management GP, LLC
Eagle Equity Advisors, LLC
Eames, Ltd.
Eastland CLO, Ltd.
Eastland Investors Corp.
EDS Legacy Heliport, LLC
EDS Legacy Partners Owner, LLC
EDS Legacy Partners, LLC
Empower Dallas Foundation, Inc.
ENA 41, LLC
Entegra Strat Superholdco, LLC
Entegra-FRO Holdco, LLC
Entegra-FRO Superholdco, LLC
Entegra-HOCF Holdco, LLC
Entegra-NHF Holdco, LLC
Entegra-NHF Superholdco, LLC
Entegra-RCP Holdco, LLC
Estates on Maryland Holdco, LLC
Estates on Maryland Owners SM, Inc.
Estates on Maryland Owners, LLC
Estates on Maryland, LLC
Falcon E&P Four Holdings, LLC
Falcon E&P One, LLC
Falcon E&P Opportunities Fund, L.P.
Falcon E&P Opportunities GP, LLC
Falcon E&P Royalty Holdings, LLC
Falcon E&P Six, LLC
Falcon E&P Two, LLC
Falcon Four Midstream, LLC
Falcon Four Upstream, LLC
Falcon Incentive Partners GP, LLC
Falcon Incentive Partners, LP
Falcon Six Midstream, LLC
Flamingo Vegas Holdco, LLC *(fka Cabi Holdco, LLC)*
Four Rivers Co-Invest GP, LLC
Four Rivers Co-Invest, L.P.

FRBH Abbington SM, Inc.
FRBH Abbington, LLC
FRBH Arbors, LLC
FRBH Beechwood SM, Inc.
FRBH Beechwood, LLC
FRBH C1 Residential, LLC
FRBH Courtney Cove SM, Inc.
FRBH Courtney Cove, LLC
FRBH CP, LLC
FRBH Duck Creek, LLC
FRBH Eaglecrest, LLC
FRBH Edgewater JV, LLC
FRBH Edgewater Owner, LLC
FRBH Edgewater SM, Inc.
FRBH JAX-TPA, LLC
FRBH Nashville Residential, LLC
FRBH Regatta Bay, LLC
FRBH Sabal Park SM, Inc.
FRBH Sabal Park, LLC
FRBH Silverbrook, LLC
FRBH Timberglen, LLC
FRBH Willow Grove SM, Inc.
FRBH Willow Grove, LLC
FRBH Woodbridge SM, Inc.
FRBH Woodbridge, LLC
Freedom C1 Residential, LLC
Freedom Duck Creek, LLC
Freedom Edgewater, LLC
Freedom JAX-TPA Residential, LLC
Freedom La Mirage, LLC
Freedom LHV LLC
Freedom Lubbock LLC
Freedom Miramar Apartments, LLC
Freedom Sandstone, LLC
Freedom Willowdale, LLC
Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditorios BB Votorantim Highland Infraestrutura
G&E Apartment REIT The Heights at Olde Towne, LLC
G&E Apartment REIT The Myrtles at Olde Towne, LLC
GAF REIT, LLC
GAF Toys Holdco, LLC
Gardens of Denton II, L.P.
Gardens of Denton III, L.P.
Gleneagles CLO, Ltd.
Goverannce RE, Ltd.
Governance Re, Ltd.
Governance, Ltd.
Grant Scott
Grant Scott, Trustee of The SLHC Trust
Grayson CLO, Ltd.
Grayson Investors Corp.
Greater Kansas City Community Foundation (third party)
Greenbriar CLO, Ltd.
Greg Busseyt
Gunwale LLC
Gunwale, LLC
Hakusan, LLC
Hammark Holdings LLC
Hampton Ridge Partners, LLC
Harbourvest Entities
Harko, LLC
Harry Bookey/Pam Bookey (third party)
Haverhill Acquisition Co., LLC
Haygood, LLC
HB 2015 Family LP (third party)
HCBH 11611 Ferguson, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe II, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe III, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe, LLC
HCBH Hampton Woods SM, Inc.
HCBH Hampton Woods, LLC
HCBH Overlook SM, Inc.
HCBH Overlook, LLC
HCBH Rent Investors, LLC
HCMS Falcon GP, LLC
HCMS Falcon, L.P.
HCO Holdings, LLC
HCOF Preferred Holdings, L.P.
HCOF Preferred Holdings, LP
HCOF Preferred Holdings, Ltd.
HCRE 1775 James Ave, LLC
HCRE Addison TRS, LLC

HCRE Addison, LLC *(fka HWS Addison, LLC)*

HCRE Hotel Partner, LLC *(fka HCRE HWS Partner, LLC)*

HCRE Las Colinas TRS, LLC

HCRE Las Colinas, LLC *(fka HWS Las Colinas, LLC)*

HCRE Plano TRS, LLC

HCRE Plano, LLC *(fka HWS Plano, LLC)*

HCREF-I Holding Corp.

HCREF-II Holding Corp.

HCREF-III Holding Corp.

HCREF-IV Holding Corp.

HCREF-IX Holding Corp.

HCREF-V Holding Corp.

HCREF-VI Holding Corp.

HCREF-VII Holding Corp.

HCREF-VIII Holding Corp.

HCREF-XI Holding Corp.

HCREF-XII Holding Corp.

HCREF-XIII Holding Corp.

HCREF-XIV Holding Corp.

HCREF-XV Holding Corp.

HCSLR Camelback Investors (Cayman), Ltd.

HCSLR Camelback, LLC

HCT Holdco 2 Ltd.

HCT Holdco 2, Ltd.

HE 41, LLC

HE Capital 232 Phase I Property, LLC

HE Capital 232 Phase I, LLC

HE Capital Asante, LLC

HE Capital Fox Trails, LLC

HE Capital KR, LLC

HE Capital, LLC

HE CLO Holdco, LLC

HE Mezz Fox Trails, LLC

HE Mezz KR, LLC

HE Peoria Place Property, LLC

HE Peoria Place, LLC

Heron Pointe Investors, LLC

Hewett's Island CLO I-R, Ltd.

HFP Asset Funding II, Ltd.

HFP Asset Funding III, Ltd.

HFP CDO Construction Corp.

HFP GP, LLC

HFRO Sub, LLC

Hibiscus HoldCo, LLC

Highland - First Foundation Income Fund

Highland 401(k) Plan

Highland 401K Plan

Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund GP, LLC

Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund, L.P.

Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund, Ltd.

Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Master Fund, L.P.

Highland Brasil, LLC

Highland Capital Brasil Gestora de Recursos (*fka Highland Brasilinvest Gestora de Recursos, LTDA; fka HBI Consultoria Empresarial, LTDA)*

Highland Capital Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd

Highland Capital Management AG

Highland Capital Management AG
(Highland Capital Management SA)
(Highland Capital Management Ltd)

Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P.

Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. *(fka Pyxis Capital, L.P.)*

Highland Capital Management Korea Limited

Highland Capital Management Latin America, L.P.

Highland Capital Management LP Retirement Plan and Trust

Highland Capital Management Multi-Strategy Insurance Dedicated Fund, L.P.

Highland Capital Management Real Estate Holdings I, LLC

Highland Capital Management Real Estate Holdings II, LLC

Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Highland Capital Management, L.P. Charitable Fund

Highland Capital Management, L.P. Retirement Plan and Trust

Highland Capital Management, L.P., as trustee of Acis CMOA Trust and nominiee for and on behalf of Highland CLO Assets Holdings Limited

Highland Capital Management, L.P., as trustee of Highland Latin America Trust and nominee for and on behalf of Highland Latin America LP, Ltd.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., as trustee of Highland Latin America Trust and nominiee for and on behalf of Highland Latin America LP, Ltd.

Highland Capital Management, LP

Highland Capital Management, LP Charitable Fund

Highland Capital Multi-Strategy Fund, LP

Highland Capital of New York, Inc.

Highland Capital Special Allocation, LLC

Highland CDO Holding Company

Highland CDO Opportunity Fund GP, L.P.

Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, L.P.

Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd.

Highland CDO Opportunity GP, LLC

Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P.

Highland CDO Trust

Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd.

Highland CLO Assets Holdings Limited

Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.

Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.

Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. *(fka Acis Loan Funding, Ltd.)*

Highland CLO Gaming Holdings, LLC

Highland CLO Holdings Ltd.

Highland CLO Holdings, Ltd. (as of 12.19.17)

Highland CLO Management Ltd.

Highland CLO Trust

Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings GP, Ltd.

Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P.

Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Financing, LLC

Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd.

Highland Credit Opportunities Holding Corporation

Highland Credit Opportunities Japanese Feeder Sub-Trust

Highland Credit Opportunities Japanese Unit Trust (Third Party)

Highland Credit Strategies Fund, L.P.

Highland Credit Strategies Fund, Ltd.

Highland Credit Strategies Holding Corporation

Highland Credit Strategies Holding Corporation

Highland Credit Strategies Master Fund, L.P.

Highland Dallas Foundation, Inc.

Highland Dynamic Income Fund GP, LLC

Highland Dynamic Income Fund GP, LLC *(fka Highland Capital Loan GP, LLC)*

Highland Dynamic Income Fund, L.P.

Highland Dynamic Income Fund, L.P. *(fka Highland Capital Loan Fund, L.P.)*

Highland Dynamic Income Fund, Ltd.

Highland Dynamic Income Fund, Ltd. *(fka Highland Loan Fund, Ltd.)*

Highland Dynamic Income Master Fund, L.P.

Highland Dynamic Income Master Fund, L.P. *(fka Highland Loan Master Fund, L.P.)*

Highland Employee Retention Assets LLC

Highland Energy Holdings, LLC

Highland Energy MLP Fund *(fka Highland Energy and Materials Fund)*

Highland Equity Focus Fund, L.P.

Highland ERA Management, LLC

Highland eSports Private Equity Fund

Highland Financial Corp.

Highland Financial Partners, L.P.

Highland Fixed Income Fund

Highland Flexible Income UCITS Fund

Highland Floating Rate Fund

Highland Floating Rate Opportunites Fund
Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund
Highland Fund Holdings, LLC
Highland Funds I
Highland Funds II
Highland Funds III
Highland GAF Chemical Holdings, LLC
Highland General Partner, LP
Highland Global Allocation Fund
Highland Global Allocation Fund *(fka Highland Global Allocation Fund II)*
Highland GP Holdings, LLC
Highland HCF Advisor Ltd.
Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., as Trustee for and on behalf of Acis CLO Trust, as nominee for and on behalf of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (as of 3.29.18)
Highland Healthcare Equity Income and Growth Fund
Highland iBoxx Senior Loan ETF
Highland Income Fund
Highland Income Fund *(fka Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund)*
Highland Kansas City Foundation, Inc.
Highland Latin America Consulting, Ltd.
Highland Latin America GP, Ltd.
Highland Latin America LP, Ltd.
Highland Latin America Trust
Highland Legacy Limited
Highland LF Chemical Holdings, LLC
Highland Loan Funding V, LLC
Highland Loan Funding V, Ltd.
Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
Highland Marcal Holding, Inc.
Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P.
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P. *(fka Highland Credit Opportunities CDO GP, L.P.)*
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P. *(fka Highland Credit Opportunities Fund, L.P., fka Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)*
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd.
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd. *(fka Highland Credit Opportunities Fund, Ltd.)*
Highland Multi Strategy Credit GP, LLC
Highland Multi Strategy Credit GP, LLC *(fka Highland Credit Opportunities CDO GP, LLC)*
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LP
Highland Multi-Strategy IDF GP, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Multi-Strategy Master Fund, LP
Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master SubFund II, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master Subfund, LLC
Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
Highland Park CDO 1, Ltd.
Highland Park CDO I, Ltd.
Highland Premier Growth Equity Fund
Highland Premium Energy & Materials Fund
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund I, L.P.
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund I, LP
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund II, L.P.
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund II, LP
Highland Prometheus Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Receivables Finance I, LLC
Highland Restoration Capital Partners GP, LLC
Highland Restoration Capital Partners Master, L.P.
Highland Restoration Capital Partners Offshore, L.P.
Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P.
Highland Santa Barbara Foundation, Inc.
Highland Select Equity Fund GP, L.P.
Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P.
Highland Select Equity GP, LLC
Highland Select Equity Master Fund, L.P.

Highland Small-Cap Equity Fund
Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
(fka Highland Premier Growth Equity Fund)

Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company
Highland SunBridge GP, LLC
Highland Tax-Exempt Fund
Highland TCI Holding Company, LLC
Highland Total Return Fund
Highland's Roads Land Holding Company, LLC
Hirst, Ltd.
HMCF PB Investors, LLC
HMx2 Investment Trust
(Matt McGraner)
Hockney, Ltd.
HRT North Atlanta, LLC
HRT Timber Creek, LLC
HRTBH North Atlanta, LLC
HRTBH Timber Creek, LLC
Huber Funding LLC
Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
HWS Investors Holdco, LLC
Internal Investors
Intertrust
James D. Dondero
Reese Avry Dondero
Jameson Drue Dondero
James Dondero
James Dondero and Mark Okada
James Dondero
Reese Avry Dondero
Jameson Drue Dondero
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd.
Jasper CLO, Ltd.
Jewelry Ventures I, LLC
JMIJM, LLC
Joanna E. Milne Irrevocable Trust dated Nov 25 1998 (third party)
John Honis
John L. Holt, Jr.
John R. Sears, Jr.
Karisopolis, LLC
Keelhaul LLC
KHM Interests, LLC (third party)
Kuilima Montalban Holdings, LLC
Kuilima Resort Holdco, LLC
KV Cameron Creek Owner, LLC
Lakes at Renaissance Park Apartments Investors, L.P.
Lakeside Lane, LLC
Landmark Battleground Park II, LLC
Lane Britain
Larry K. Anders
LAT Battleground Park, LLC
LAT Briley Parkway, LLC
Lautner, Ltd.
Leawood RE Holdings, LLC
Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd.
Liberty CLO Holdco, Ltd.
Liberty CLO, Ltd.
Liberty Sub, Ltd.
Long Short Equity Sub, LLC
Longhorn Credit Funding LLC
Longhorn Credit Funding LLC - A
Longhorn Credit Funding LLC - B
Longhorn Credit Funding LLC (LHB)
Longhorn Credit Funding, LLC
Lurin Real Estate Holdings V, LLC
Maple Avenue Holdings, LLC
MaplesFS Limited
Marc C. Manzo
Mark and Pam Okada Family Trust - Exempt Descendants' Trust
Mark and Pam Okada Family Trust - Exempt Trust #2
Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Descendants' Trust
Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Descendants' Trust #2
Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Trust #2
Mark K. Okada
Mark Okada

Mark Okada and Pam Okada
Mark Okada and Pam Okada, as joint owners
Mark Okada/Pamela Okada
Markham Fine Jewelers, L.P.
Markham Fine Jewelers, LP
Matt McGraner
Meritage Residential Partners, LLC
MGM Studios HoldCo, Ltd.
Michael Rossi
ML CLO XIX Sterling (Cayman), Ltd.
N/A
Nancy Dondero
NCI Apache Trail LLC
NCI Assets Holding Company LLC
NCI Country Club LLC
NCI Fort Worth Land LLC
NCI Front Beach Road LLC
NCI Minerals LLC
NCI Royse City Land LLC
NCI Stewart Creek LLC
NCI Storage, LLC
Neil Labatte
Neutra, Ltd.
New Jersey Tissue Company Holdco, LLC
(fka Marcal Paper Mills Holding Company, LLC)
NexAnnuity Holdings, Inc.
NexBank Capital Trust I
NexBank Capital, Inc.
NexBank Land Advisors, Inc.
NexBank Securities Inc.
NexBank Securities, Inc.
NexBank SSB
NexBank Title, Inc.
(dba NexVantage Title Services)
NexBank, SSB
NexPoint Advisors GP, LLC
NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
NexPoint Capital REIT, LLC
NexPoint Capital, Inc.
NexPoint Capital, Inc. *(fka NexPoint Capital, LLC)*
NexPoint CR F/H DST, LLC
NexPoint Credit Strategies Fund
NexPoint Discount Strategies Fund
(fka NexPoint Discount Yield Fund)
NexPoint DRIP
NexPoint Energy and Materials Opportunities Fund *(fka NexPoint Energy Opportunities Fund)*
NexPoint Event-Driven Fund
(fkaNexPoint Merger Arbitrage Fund)
NexPoint Flamingo DST
NexPoint Flamingo Investment Co, LLC
NexPoint Flamingo Leaseco, LLC
NexPoint Flamingo Manager, LlC
NexPoint Flamingo Property Manager, LlC
NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
NexPoint Hospitality Trust
NexPoint Hospitality, Inc.
NexPoint Hospitality, LLC
NexPoint Insurance Distributors, LLC
NexPoint Insurance Solutions GP, LLC
NexPoint Insurance Solutions GP, LLC
(fka Highland Capital Insurance Solutions GP, LLC)
NexPoint Insurance Solutions, L.P.
(fka Highland Capital Insurance Solutions, L.P.)
NexPoint Latin American Opportunities Fund
NexPoint Legacy 22, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte Equity, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte Manager, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte, LLC
(fka NREA Lincoln Porte, LLC)
NexPoint Multifamily Capital Trust, Inc.
NexPoint Multifamily Capital Trust, Inc.
(fka NexPoint Multifamily Realty Trust, Inc., fka Highland Capital Realty Trust, Inc.)
NexPoint Multifamily Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Peoria, LLC
NexPoint Polo Glen DST
NexPoint Polo Glen Holdings, LLC
NexPoint Polo Glen Investment Co, LLC

NexPoint Polo Glen Leaseco, LLC
NexPoint Polo Glen Manager, LLC
NexPoint RE Finance Advisor GP, LLC
NexPoint RE Finance Advisor, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors III, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors IV, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors V, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VI, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VII GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VII, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VIII, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Capital, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Capital, LLC *(fka Highland Real Estate Capital, LLC, fka Highland Multifamily Credit Fund, LLC)*
NexPoint Real Estate Finance OP GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Finance Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Finance, Inc.
NexPoint Real Estate Opportunities, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Opportunities, LLC *(fka Freedom REIT LLC)*
NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC (fka HCRE Partners, LLC)
NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC (fka HCRE Partners, LLC)
NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
NexPoint Residential Trust Inc.
NexPoint Residential Trust Operating Partnership GP, LLC
NexPoint Residential Trust Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Residential Trust Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Residential Trust, Inc.
NexPoint Securities, Inc.
(fka Highland Capital Funds Distributor, Inc.)
(fka Pyxis Distributors, Inc.)
NexPoint Strategic Income Fund
(fka NexPoint Opportunistic Credit Fund, fka NexPoint Distressed Strategies Fund)
NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
(fka NexPoint Credit Strategies Fund)
NexPoint Texas Multifamily Portfolio DST
(fka NREA Southeast Portfolio Two, DST)
NexPoint WLIF I Borrower, LLC
NexPoint WLIF I, LLC
NexPoint WLIF II Borrower, LLC
NexPoint WLIF II, LLC
NexPoint WLIF III Borrower, LLC
NexPoint WLIF III, LLC
NexPoint WLIF, LLC (Series I)
NexPoint WLIF, LLC (Series II)
NexPoint WLIF, LLC (Series III)
NexStrat LLC
NexVest, LLC
NexWash LLC
NFRO REIT Sub, LLC
NFRO TRS, LLC
NHF CCD, Inc.
NHT 2325 Stemmons, LLC
NHT Beaverton TRS, LLC
(fka NREA Hotel TRS, Inc.)
NHT Beaverton, LLC
NHT Bend TRS, LLC
NHT Bend, LLC
NHT Destin TRS, LLC
NHT Destin, LLC
NHT DFW Portfolio, LLC
NHT Holdco, LLC
NHT Holdings, LLC
NHT Intermediary, LLC
NHT Nashville TRS, LLC
NHT Nashville, LLC
NHT Olympia TRS, LLC
NHT Olympia, LLC
NHT Operating Partnership GP, LLC
NHT Operating Partnership II, LLC
NHT Operating Partnership, LLC
NHT Salem, LLC

NHT SP Parent, LLC
NHT SP TRS, LLC
NHT SP, LLC
NHT Tigard TRS, LLC
NHT Tigard, LLC
NHT TRS, Inc.
NHT Uptown, LLC
NHT Vancouver TRS, LLC
NHT Vancouver, LLC
NLA Assets LLC
NMRT TRS, Inc.
NREA Adair DST Manager, LLC
NREA Adair Investment Co, LLC
NREA Adair Joint Venture, LLC
NREA Adair Leaseco Manager, LLC
NREA Adair Leaseco, LLC
NREA Adair Property Manager LLC
NREA Adair, DST
NREA Ashley Village Investors, LLC
NREA Cameron Creek Investors, LLC
NREA Cityplace Hue Investors, LLC
NREA Crossing Investors LLC
NREA Crossings Investors, LLC
NREA Crossings Ridgewood Coinvestment, LLC *(fka NREA Crossings Ridgewood Investors, LLC)*
NREA DST Holdings, LLC
NREA El Camino Investors, LLC
NREA Estates Inc.
NREA Estates Investment Co, LLC
NREA Estates Leaseco, LLC
NREA Estates Manager, LLC
NREA Estates Property Manager, LLC
NREA Estates, DST
NREA Gardens DST Manager LLC
NREA Gardens DST Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Investment Co, LLC
NREA Gardens Leaseco Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Leaseco, LLC
NREA Gardens Property Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Springing LLC
NREA Gardens Springing Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens, DST
NREA Hidden Lake Investment Co, LLC
NREA Hue Investors, LLC
NREA Keystone Investors, LLC
NREA Meritage Inc.
NREA Meritage Investment Co, LLC
NREA Meritage Leaseco, LLC
NREA Meritage Manager, LLC
NREA Meritage Property Manager, LLC
NREA Meritage, DST
NREA Oaks Investors, LLC
NREA Retreat Investment Co, LLC
NREA Retreat Leaseco, LLC
NREA Retreat Manager, LLC
NREA Retreat Property Manager, LLC
NREA Retreat, DST
NREA SE MF Holdings LLC
NREA SE MF Holdings, LLC
NREA SE MF Investment Co, LLC
NREA SE MF Investment Co, LLC
NREA SE Multifamily LLC
NREA SE Multifamily, LLC
NREA SE One Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE Three Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE Two Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles, DST
(Converted from DK Gateway Andros, LLC)
NREA SE1 Arborwalk Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Arborwalk Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Arborwalk, DST
(Converted from MAR Arborwalk, LLC)
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing, DST
(Converted from Apartment REIT Towne Crossing, LP)
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch, DST
(Converted from SOF Walker Ranch Owner, L.P.)
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake Leaseco, LLC

NREA SE2 Hidden Lake Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake, DST
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake, DST
(Converted from SOF Hidden Lake SA Owner, L.P.)
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge, DST
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge, DST
(Converted from MAR Vista Ridge, L.P.)
NREA SE2 West Place Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE2 West Place Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 West Place, DST
(Converted from Landmark at West Place, LLC)
NREA SE3 Arboleda Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Arboleda Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Arboleda, DST
(Converted from G&E Apartment REIT Arboleda, LLC)
NREA SE3 Fairways Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Fairways Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Fairways, DST
(Converted from MAR Fairways, LLC)
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis, DST
(Converted from Landmark at Grand Oasis, LP)
NREA Southeast Portfolio One Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio One, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio One, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Three Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio Three, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Three, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Two Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio Two, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Two, LLC
NREA SOV Investors, LLC
NREA Uptown TRS, LLC
NREA VB I LLC
NREA VB II LLC
NREA VB III LLC
NREA VB IV LLC
NREA VB Pledgor I LLC
NREA VB Pledgor I, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor II LLC
NREA VB Pledgor II, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor III LLC
NREA VB Pledgor III, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor IV LLC
NREA VB Pledgor IV, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor V LLC
NREA VB Pledgor V, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VI LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VI, LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VII LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VII, LLC
NREA VB SM, Inc.
NREA VB V LLC
NREA VB VI LLC
NREA VB VII LLC
NREA Vista Ridge Investment Co, LLC
NREC AR Investors, LLC
NREC BM Investors, LLC
NREC BP Investors, LLC
NREC Latitude Investors, LLC
NREC REIT Sub, Inc.
NREC TRS, Inc.
NREC WW Investors, LLC
NREF OP I Holdco, LLC
NREF OP I SubHoldco, LLC
NREF OP I, L.P.
NREF OP II Holdco, LLC
NREF OP II SubHoldco, LLC
NREF OP II, L.P.
NREF OP IV REIT Sub TRS, LLC
NREF OP IV REIT Sub, LLC
NREF OP IV, L.P.
NREO NW Hospitality Mezz, LLC
NREO NW Hospitality, LLC
NREO Perilune, LLC
NREO SAFStor Investors, LLC
NREO TRS, Inc.
NRESF REIT Sub, LLC

NXRT Abbington, LLC
NXRT Atera II, LLC
NXRT Atera, LLC
NXRT AZ2, LLC
NXRT Barrington Mill, LLC
NXRT Bayberry, LLC
NXRT Bella Solara, LLC
NXRT Bella Vista, LLC
NXRT Bloom, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP I, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP I, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP II, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP II, LLC
NXRT Brandywine LP, LLC
NXRT Brandywine LP, LLC
NXRT Brentwood Owner, LLC
NXRT Brentwood, LLC
NXRT Cedar Pointe Tenant, LLC
NXRT Cedar Pointe, LLC
NXRT Cityview, LLC
NXRT Cornerstone, LLC
NXRT Crestmont, LLC
NXRT Crestmont, LLC
NXRT Enclave, LLC
NXRT Glenview, LLC
NXRT H2 TRS, LLC
NXRT Heritage, LLC
NXRT Hollister TRS LLC
NXRT Hollister, LLC
NXRT LAS 3, LLC
NXRT Master Tenant, LLC
NXRT Nashville Residential, LLC
NXRT Nashville Residential, LLC *(fka Freedom Nashville Residential, LLC)*
NXRT North Dallas 3, LLC
NXRT Old Farm, LLC
NXRT Pembroke Owner, LLC
NXRT Pembroke, LLC
NXRT PHX 3, LLC
NXRT Radbourne Lake, LLC
NXRT Rockledge, LLC
NXRT Sabal Palms, LLC
NXRT SM, Inc.
NXRT Steeplechase, LLC
NXRT Stone Creek, LLC
NXRT Summers Landing GP, LLC
NXRT Summers Landing LP, LLC
NXRT Torreyana, LLC
NXRT Vanderbilt, LLC
NXRT West Place, LLC
NXRTBH AZ2, LLC
NXRTBH Barrington Mill Owner, LLC
NXRTBH Barrington Mill SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Barrington Mill, LLC
NXRTBH Bayberry, LLC
NXRTBH Cityview, LLC
NXRTBH Colonnade, LLC
NXRTBH Cornerstone Owner, LLC
NXRTBH Cornerstone SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Cornerstone, LLC
NXRTBH Dana Point SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Dana Point, LLC
NXRTBH Foothill SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Foothill, LLC
NXRTBH Heatherstone SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Heatherstone, LLC
NXRTBH Hollister Tenant, LLC
NXRTBH Hollister, LLC
NXRTBH Madera SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Madera, LLC
NXRTBH McMillan, LLC
NXRTBH North Dallas 3, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm II, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm Tenant, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm, LLC
NXRTBH Radbourne Lake, LLC
NXRTBH Rockledge, LLC
NXRTBH Sabal Palms, LLC
NXRTBH Steeplechase, LLC
(dba Southpoint Reserve at Stoney Creek)-VA
NXRTBH Stone Creek, LLC
NXRTBH Vanderbilt, LLC
NXRTBH Versailles SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Versailles, LLC
Oak Holdco, LLC
Oaks CGC, LLC

Okada Family Revocable Trust
Oldenburg, Ltd.
Pam Capital Funding GP Co. Ltd.
Pam Capital Funding, L.P.
PamCo Cayman Ltd.
Park West 1700 Valley View Holdco, LLC
Park West 2021 Valley View Holdco, LLC
Park West Holdco, LLC
Park West Portfolio Holdco, LLC
Participants of Highland 401K Plan
Patrick Willoughby-McCabe
PCMG Trading Partners XXIII, L.P.
PCMG Trading Partners XXIII, LP
PDK Toys Holdco, LLC
Pear Ridge Partners, LLC
Penant Management GP, LLC
Penant Management LP
PensionDanmark Holding A/S
PensionDanmark Pensionsforsikringsaktieselskab
Peoria Place Development, LLC (30% cash contributions - profit participation only)
Perilune Aero Equity Holdings One, LLC
Perilune Aviation LLC
PetroCap Incentive Holdings III. L.P.
PetroCap Incentive Partners II GP, LLC
PetroCap Incentive Partners II, L.P.
PetroCap Incentive Partners III GP, LLC
PetroCap Incentive Partners III, LP
PetroCap Management Company LLC
PetroCap Partners II GP, LLC
PetroCap Partners II, L.P.
PetroCap Partners III GP, LLC
PetroCap Partners III, L.P.
Pharmacy Ventures I, LLC
Pharmacy Ventures II, LLC
Pollack, Ltd.
Powderhorn, LLC
PWM1 Holdings, LLC
PWM1, LLC
RADCO - Bay Meadows, LLLP
RADCO - Bay Park, LLLP
RADCO NREC Bay Meadows Holdings, LLC
RADCO NREC Bay Park Holdings, LLC
Ramarim, LLC
Rand Advisors Series I Insurance Fund
Rand Advisors Series II Insurance Fund
Rand Advisors, LLC
Rand PE Fund I, L.P.
Rand PE Fund I, L.P. - Series 1
Rand PE Fund Management, LLC
Rand PE Holdco, LLC
Realdania
Red River CLO, Ltd.
Red River Investors Corp.
Riverview Partners SC, LLC
Rockwall CDO II Ltd.
Rockwall CDO II, Ltd.
Rockwall CDO, Ltd.
Rockwall Investors Corp.
Rothko, Ltd.
RTT Bella Solara, LLC
RTT Bloom, LLC
RTT Financial, Inc.
RTT Hollister, LLC
RTT Rockledge, LLC
RTT Torreyana, LLC
SALI Fund Partners, LLC
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association
Sandstone Pasadena Apartments, LLC
Sandstone Pasadena, LLC
Santa Barbara Foundation (third party)
Saturn Oil & Gas LLC
SBC Master Pension Trust
Scott Matthew Siekielski
SE Battleground Park, LLC
SE Battleground Park, LLC
SE Glenview, LLC
SE Governors Green Holdings, L.L.C.
SE Governors Green Holdings, L.L.C. *(fka SCG Atlas Governors Green Holdings, L.L.C.)*
SE Governors Green I, LLC
SE Governors Green II, LLC

SE Governors Green II, LLC
SE Governors Green REIT, L.L.C.
SE Governors Green REIT, L.L.C. *(fka SCG Atlas Governors Green REIT, L.L.C.)*

SE Governors Green, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Governors Green, L.L.C.)*
SE Gulfstream Isles GP, LLC
SE Gulfstream Isles GP, LLC
SE Gulfstream Isles LP, LLC
SE Gulfstream Isles LP, LLC
SE Heights at Olde Towne, LLC
SE Heights at Olde Towne, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park GP I, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park GP II, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park GP II, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park LP, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park LP, LLC
SE Multifamily Holdings LLC
SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC
SE Multifamily REIT Holdings LLC
SE Myrtles at Olde Towne, LLC
SE Myrtles at Olde Towne, LLC
SE Oak Mill I Holdings, LLC
SE Oak Mill I Holdings, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I Holdings, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill I Owner, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill I REIT, LLC
SE Oak Mill I REIT, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I REIT, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill I, LLC
SE Oak Mill I, LLC
SE Oak Mill II Holdings, LLC
SE Oak Mill II Holdings, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II Holdings, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill II Owner, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill II REIT, LLC
SE Oak Mill II REIT, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II REIT, L.L.C.)*
SE Oak Mill II, LLC
SE Oak Mill II, LLC
SE Quail Landing, LLC
SE River Walk, LLC
SE Riverwalk, LLC
SE SM, Inc.
SE Stoney Ridge Holdings, L.L.C. *(fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge Holdings, L.L.C.)*
SE Stoney Ridge Holdings, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge I, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge I, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge II, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge II, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge REIT, L.L.C. *(fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge REIT, L.L.C.)*
SE Stoney Ridge REIT, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge, LLC *(fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge, L.L.C.)*
SE Victoria Park, LLC
SE Victoria Park, LLC
Sentinel Re Holdings, Ltd.
Sentinel Reinsurance Ltd.
SFH1, LLC
SFR WLIF I, LLC *(fka NexPoint WLIF I, LLC)*
SFR WLIF II, LLC *(NexPoint WLIF II, LLC)*
SFR WLIF III, LLC *(NexPoint WLIF III, LLC)*
SFR WLIF Manager, LLC *(NexPoint WLIF Manager, LLC)*
SFR WLIF, LLC *(NexPoint WLIF, LLC)*
SFR WLIF, LLC Series I
SFR WLIF, LLC Series II
SFR WLIF, LLC Series III
SH Castle BioSciences, LLC
Small Cap Equity Sub, LLC
Socially Responsible Equity Sub, LLC
SOF Brandywine I Owner, L.P.
SOF Brandywine II Owner, L.P.
SOF-X GS Owner, L.P.
Southfork Cayman Holdings, Ltd.
Southfork CLO, Ltd.

Specialty Financial Products Designated Activity Company *(fka Specialty Financial Products Limited)*

Spiritus Life, Inc.

SRL Sponsor LLC

SRL Whisperwod LLC

SRL Whisperwood Member LLC

SRL Whisperwood Venture LLC

SSB Assets LLC

Starck, Ltd.

Stemmons Hospitality, LLC

Steve Shin

Stonebridge Capital, Inc.

Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund

Strand Advisors III, Inc.

Strand Advisors IV, LLC

Strand Advisors IX, LLC

Strand Advisors V, LLC

Strand Advisors XIII, LLC

Strand Advisors XVI, Inc.

Strand Advisors, Inc.

Stratford CLO, Ltd.

Summers Landing Apartment Investors, L.P.

Term Loan B
(10% cash contributions - profit participation only)

The Dallas Foundation

The Dallas Foundation (third party)

The Dondero Insurance Rabbi Trust

The Dugaboy Investment Trust

The Dugaboy Investment Trust U/T/A Dated Nov 15, 2010

The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust No. 1

The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust No. 2

The Get Good Trust

The Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Descendants' Trust

The Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Trust #2

The Ohio State Life Insurance Company

The Okada Family Foundation, Inc.

The Okada Insurance Rabbi Trust

The SLHC Trust

The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

The Twentysix Investment Trust
(Third Party Investor)

Thomas A. Neville

Thread 55, LLC

Tihany, Ltd.

Todd Travers

Tranquility Lake Apartments Investors, L.P.

Tuscany Acquisition, LLC

Uptown at Cityplace Condominium Association, Inc.

US Gaming OpCo, LLC

US Gaming SPV, LLC

US Gaming, LLC

Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

VB GP LLC

VB Holding, LLC

VB One, LLC

VB OP Holdings LLC

VBAnnex C GP, LLC

VBAnnex C Ohio, LLC

VBAnnex C, LP

Ventoux Capital, LLC
(Matt Goetz)

VineBrook Annex B, L.P.

VineBrook Annex I, L.P.

VineBrook Homes Merger Sub II LLC

VineBrook Homes Merger Sub LLC

VineBrook Homes OP GP, LLC

VineBrook Homes Operating Partnership, L.P.

VineBrook Homes Trust, Inc.

VineBrook Partners I, L.P.

VineBrook Partners II, L.P.

VineBrook Properties, LLC

Virginia Retirement System

Vizcaya Investment, LLC

Wake LV Holdings II, Ltd.

Wake LV Holdings, Ltd.

Walter Holdco GP, LLC

Walter Holdco I, Ltd.

Walter Holdco, L.P.

Warhol, Ltd.
Warren Chang
Westchester CLO, Ltd.
William L. Britain
Wright Ltd.
Wright, Ltd.
Yellow Metal Merchants, Inc.

EXHIBIT R

CLAIMANT TRUST AGREEMENT

This Claimant Trust Agreement, effective as of _____ , 2021 (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), by and among Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as debtor and debtor-in-possession, the "Debtor"), as settlor, and James P. Seery, Jr., as trustee (the "Claimant Trustee"), and [____] as Delaware trustee (the "Delaware Trustee," and together with the Debtor and the Claimant Trustee, the "Parties") for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to the Claimant Trust Assets.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management, L.P. filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case");

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Plan"),[1] which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on _____, 2021, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor [Docket No. •] (the "Confirmation Order");

WHEREAS, this Agreement, including all exhibits hereto, is the "Claimant Trust Agreement" described in the Plan and shall be executed on or before the Effective Date in order to facilitate implementation of the Plan; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Claimant Trust Assets are to be transferred to the Claimant Trust (each as defined herein) created and evidenced by this Agreement so that (i) the Claimant Trust Assets can be held in a trust for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled thereto in accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) for the objectives and purposes set forth herein and in the Plan; (ii) the Claimant Trust Assets can be monetized; (iii) the Claimant Trust will transfer Estate Claims to the Litigation Sub-Trust to be prosecuted, settled, abandoned, or resolved as may be determined by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, for the benefit of the Claimant Trust; (iv) proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets, including Estate Claims, may be distributed to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries[2] in accordance with the Plan; (v) the Claimant Trustee can resolve Disputed Claims as set forth herein and in the Plan; and

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, and as set forth in the Plan, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests will be Claimant Trust Beneficiaries only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

(vi) administrative services relating to the activities of the Claimant Trust and relating to the implementation of the Plan can be performed by the Claimant Trustee.

DECLARATION OF TRUST

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to declare the terms and conditions hereof, and in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements herein contained, the confirmation of the Plan and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, and the Delaware Trustee have executed this Agreement for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to share in the Claimant Trust Assets and, at the direction of such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as provided for in the Plan.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Claimant Trustee and his successors or assigns in trust, under and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and for the performance of and compliance with the terms hereof and of the Plan; provided, however, that upon termination of the Claimant Trust in accordance with Article IX hereof, this Claimant Trust Agreement shall cease, terminate, and be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise specifically provided for herein.

IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED AND DECLARED that the Claimant Trust Assets are to be strictly held and applied by the Claimant Trustee subject to the specific terms set forth below.

ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION AND TERMS

1.1 Certain Definitions. Unless the context shall otherwise require and except as contained in this Section 1.1 or as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the "Definitions," Section 1.1 of the Plan or if not defined therein, shall have the meanings assigned thereto in the applicable Section of the Plan. For all purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Acis" means collectively, Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP.

(b) "Bankruptcy Court" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(c) "Cause" means (i) a Person's willful failure to perform his material duties hereunder (which material duties shall include, without limitation, with respect to a Member, or to the extent applicable, the Claimant Trustee, regular attendance at regularly scheduled meetings of the Oversight Board), which is not remedied within 30 days of notice; (ii) a Person's commission of an act of fraud, theft, or embezzlement during the performance of his or her duties hereunder; (iii) a Person's conviction of a felony (other than a felony that does not involve fraud, theft, embezzlement, or jail time) with all appeals having been exhausted or appeal periods lapsed; or (iv) a Person's gross negligence, bad faith, willful misconduct, or knowing violation of law in the performance of his or her duties hereunder.

(d) "Claimant Trust Agreement" means this Agreement.

(e) "Claimant Trustee" means James P. Seery, Jr., as the initial "Claimant Trustee" hereunder and as defined in the Plan, and any successor Claimant Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(f) "Claimant Trust" means the "Highland Claimant Trust" established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) pursuant to this Agreement.

(g) "Claimant Trust Assets" means (i) other than the Reorganized Debtor Assets (which are expressly excluded from this definition), all other Assets of the Estate, including, but not limited to, all Causes of Action, Available Cash, any proceeds realized or received from such Assets, all rights of setoff, recoupment, and other defenses with respect, relating to, or arising from such Assets, (ii) any Assets transferred by the Reorganized Debtor to the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date, (iii) the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, and (iv) the ownership interests in New GP LLC. For the avoidance of doubt, any Causes of Action that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust shall constitute Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(h) "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries" means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests.

(i) "Claimant Trust Expense Cash Reserve" means $[•] million in Cash to be funded pursuant to the Plan into a bank account of the Claimant Trust on or before the Effective Date for the purpose of paying Claimant Trust Expenses in accordance herewith.

(j) "Claimant Trust Expenses" means the costs, expenses, liabilities and obligations incurred by the Claimant Trust and/or the Claimant Trustee in administering and conducting the affairs of the Claimant Trust, and otherwise carrying out the terms of the Claimant Trust and the Plan on behalf of the Claimant Trust, including without any limitation, any taxes owed by the Claimant Trust, and the fees and expenses of the Claimant Trustee and professional persons retained by the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee in accordance with this Agreement.

(k) "Committee Member" means a Member who is/was also a member of the Creditors' Committee.

(l) "Conflicted Member" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.6(c) hereof.

(m) "Contingent Trust Interests" means the contingent interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests in accordance with the Plan.

(n) "Creditors' Committee" means the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Chapter 11 Case, comprised of Acis, Meta-e Discovery, the Redeemer Committee and UBS.

(o) "Delaware Statutory Trust Act" means the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del C. §3801, et seq. as amended from time to time.

(p) "Delaware Trustee" has the meaning set forth in the introduction hereof.

(q) "Disability" means as a result of the Claimant Trustee's or a Member's incapacity due to physical or mental illness as determined by an accredited physician or psychologist, as applicable, selected by the Claimant Trustee or the Member, as applicable, the Claimant Trustee or such Member has been substantially unable to perform his or her duties hereunder for three (3) consecutive months or for an aggregate of 180 days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.

(r) "Disinterested Members" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.1 hereof.

(s) "Disputed Claims Reserve" means the reserve account to be opened by the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date and funded in an initial amount determined by the Claimant Trustee [(in a manner consistent with the Plan and with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board)] to be sufficient to pay Disputed Claims under the Plan.

(t) "Employees" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

(u) "Employee Claims" means any General Unsecured Claim held by an Employee other than the Claims of the Senior Employees subject to stipulations (provided such stipulations are executed by any such Senior Employee of the Debtor prior to the Effective Date).

(v) "Estate Claims" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [Docket No. 354].

(w) "Equity Trust Interests" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(x) "Exchange Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

(y) "General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests" means interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (including Disputed General Unsecured Claims that are subsequently Allowed) in accordance with the Plan.

(z) "GUC Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests.

(aa) "GUC Payment Certification" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(bb) "HarbourVest" means, collectively, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners, L.P.

(cc) "Investment Advisers Act" means the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended.

(dd) "Investment Company Act" means the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

(ee) "Litigation Sub-Trust" means the sub-trust created pursuant to the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, which shall hold the Claimant Trust Assets that are Estate Claims and investigate, litigate, and/or settle the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust.

(ff) "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" means the litigation sub-trust agreement to be entered into by and between the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee establishing and setting forth the terms and conditions of the Litigation Sub-Trust and governing the rights and responsibilities of the Litigation Trustee.

(gg) "Litigation Trustee" means Marc S. Kirschner, and any successor Litigation Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, who shall be responsible for investigating, litigating, and settling the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

(hh) "Managed Funds" means Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., and any other investment vehicle managed by the Debtor pursuant to an Executory Contract assumed pursuant to the Plan; *provided, however,* that the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. (and its direct and indirect subsidiaries) will not be considered a Managed Fund for purposes hereof.

(ii) "Material Claims" means the Claims asserted by UBS, Patrick Hagaman Daugherty, Integrated Financial Associates, Inc., and the Employees.

(jj) "Member" means a Person that is member of the Oversight Board.

(kk) "New GP LLC" means the general partner of the Reorganized Debtor.

(ll) "Oversight Board" means the board comprised of five (5) Members established pursuant to the Plan and Article III of this Agreement to oversee the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties and otherwise serve the functions set forth in this Agreement and those of the "Claimant Trust Oversight Committee" described in the Plan. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the initial Members of the Oversight Board shall be: (i) Eric Felton, as representative of the Redeemer Committee; (ii) Josh Terry, as representative of Acis; (iii) Elizabeth Kozlowski, as representative of UBS; (iv) Paul McVoy, as representative of Meta-e Discovery; and (v) David Pauker.

(mm) "Plan" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(nn) "Privileges" means the Debtor's rights, title and interests in and to any privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications (whether written or oral) associated with any of the Estate Claims or Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to, attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege as defined in Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; provided, however, that "Privileges" shall not include the work-product privilege of any non-Employee attorney or attorneys that has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees and the work-product privilege shall remain with the non-Employee attorney or attorneys who created such work product so long as it has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees, or otherwise waived.

(oo) "PSZJ" means Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP.

(pp) "Redeemer Committee" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund.

(qq) "Registrar" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(a) hereof.

(rr) "Reorganized Debtor Assets" means any limited and general partnership interests held by the Debtor, the management of the Managed Funds and those Causes of Action (including, without limitation, claims for breach of fiduciary duty), that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust. For the avoidance of doubt, "Reorganized Debtor Assets" includes any partnership interests or shares of Managed Funds held by the Debtor but does not include the underlying portfolio assets held by the Managed Funds.

(ss) "Securities Act" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(tt) "Subordinated Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold Subordinated Claim Trust Interests.

(uu) "Subordinated Claim Trust Interests" means the subordinated interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claims in accordance with the Plan.

(vv) "TIA" means the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended.

(ww) "Trust Interests" means collectively the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests, Subordinated Claim Trust Interests, and Equity Trust Interests.

(xx) "Trust Register" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(b) hereof.

(yy) "Trustees" means collectively the Claimant Trustee and Delaware Trustee.

(zz) "UBS" means collectively UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

(aaa) "WilmerHale" Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

1.2 General Construction. As used in this Agreement, the masculine, feminine and neuter genders, and the plural and singular numbers shall be deemed to include the others in all cases where they would apply. "Includes" and "including" are not limiting and "or" is not exclusive. References to "Articles," "Sections" and other subdivisions, unless referring specifically to the Plan or provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or other law, statute or regulation, refer to the corresponding Articles, Sections and other subdivisions of this Agreement, and the words "herein," "hereafter" and words of similar import refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular Article, Section, or subdivision of this Agreement. Amounts expressed in dollars or following the symbol "$" shall be deemed to be in United States dollars. References to agreements or instruments shall be deemed to refer to such agreements or instruments as the same may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms thereof.

1.3 Incorporation of the Plan. The Plan is hereby incorporated into this Agreement and made a part hereof by this reference.

ARTICLE II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CLAIMANT TRUST

2.1 Creation of Name of Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is hereby created as a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and shall be called the "Highland Claimant Trust." The Claimant Trustee shall be empowered to conduct all business and hold all property constituting the Claimant Trust Assets in such name in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.

(b) The Trustees shall cause to be executed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware the Certificate of Trust and agree to execute, acting solely in their capacity as Trustees, such certificates as may from time to time be required under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act or any other Delaware law.

2.2 Objectives.

(a) The Claimant Trust is established for the purpose of satisfying Allowed General Unsecured Claims and Allowed Subordinated Claims (and only to the extent provided herein, Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) under the Plan, by monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets transferred to it and making distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust shall not continue or engage in any trade or business except to the extent reasonably necessary to monetize and distribute the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with this Agreement and the Plan and act as sole member and manager of New GP LLC. The Claimant Trust shall provide a mechanism for (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets and (ii) the distribution of the proceeds thereof, net of all claims, expenses, charges, liabilities, and obligations of the Claimant Trust, to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with the Plan. In furtherance of this distribution objective, the Claimant Trust will, from time to time, prosecute and resolve objections to certain Claims and Interests as provided herein and in the Plan.

(b) It is intended that the Claimant Trust be classified for federal income tax purposes as a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of section 301.7701-4(d) of the Treasury Regulations. In furtherance of this objective, the Claimant Trustee shall, in his business judgment, make continuing best efforts to (i) dispose of or monetize the Claimant Trust Assets and resolve Claims, (ii) make timely distributions, and (iii) not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust, in each case in accordance with this Agreement.

2.3 Nature and Purposes of the Claimant Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is organized and established as a trust for the purpose of monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets and making distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in a manner consistent with "liquidating trust" status under Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d). The Claimant Trust shall retain all rights to commence and pursue all Causes of Action of the Debtor other than (i) Estate Claims, which shall be assigned to and commenced and pursued by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (ii) Causes of Action constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets, if any, which shall be commenced and pursued by the Reorganized Debtor at the direction of the Claimant Trust as sole member of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement. The Claimant Trust and Claimant Trustee shall have and retain, and, as applicable, assign and transfer to the Litigation Sub-Trust and Litigation Trustee, any and all rights, defenses, cross-claims and counter-claims held by the Debtor with respect to any Claim as of the Petition Date. On and after the date hereof, in accordance with and subject to the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the authority to (i) compromise, settle or otherwise resolve, or withdraw any objections to Claims against the Debtor, provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall only have the authority to compromise or settle any Employee Claim with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board and in the absence of unanimous consent, any such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust and be litigated, comprised, settled, or otherwise resolved exclusively by the Litigation Trustee and (ii) compromise, settle, or otherwise resolve any Disputed Claims without approval of the Bankruptcy Court, which authority may be shared with or transferred to the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant Trust,

pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state trust law, is appointed as the successor-in-interest to, and representative of, the Debtor and its Estate for the retention, enforcement, settlement, and adjustment of all Claims other than Estate Claims, the Employee Claims, and those Claims constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trust shall be administered by the Claimant Trustee, in accordance with this Agreement, for the following purposes:

(i) to manage and monetize the Claimant Trust Assets in an expeditious but orderly manner with a view towards maximizing value within a reasonable time period;

(ii) to litigate and settle Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 (other than the Employee Claims, which shall be litigated and/or settled by the Litigation Trustee if the Oversight Board does not unanimously approve of any proposed settlement of such Employee Claim by the Claimant Trustee) and any of the Causes of Action included in the Claimant Trust Assets (including any cross-claims and counter-claims); provided, however, that Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be litigated and settled by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement;

(iii) to distribute net proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries;

(iv) to distribute funds from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Trust Interests or to the Reorganized Debtor for distribution to Holders of Disputed Claims in each case in accordance with the Plan from time to time as any such Holder's Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(v) to distribute funds to the Litigation Sub-Trust at the direction the Oversight Board;

(vi) to serve as the limited partner of, and to hold the limited partnership interests in, the Reorganized Debtor;

(vii) to serve as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC, the Reorganized Debtor's general partner;

(viii) to oversee the management and monetization of the Reorganized Debtor Assets pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, in its capacity as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the New GP LLC Documents, all with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time in a manner consistent with the Reorganized Debtor's fiduciary duties as investment adviser to the Managed Funds; and

(ix) to perform any other functions and take any other actions provided for or permitted by this Agreement and the Plan, and in any other agreement executed by the Claimant Trustee.

2.4 Transfer of Assets and Rights to the Claimant Trust; Litigation Sub-Trust.

(a) On the Effective Date, pursuant to the Plan, the Debtor shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Claimant Trust Assets and related Privileges held by the Debtor to the Claimant Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan and this Agreement. To the extent certain assets comprising the Claimant Trust Assets, because of their nature or because such assets will accrue or become transferable subsequent to the Effective Date, and cannot be transferred to, vested in, and assumed by the Claimant Trust on such date, such assets shall be considered Reorganized Debtor Assets, which may be subsequently transferred to the Claimant Trust by the Reorganized Debtor consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement after such date.

(b) On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Estate Claims and related Privileges held by the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan, this Agreement, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. Following the transfer of such Privileges, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power to waive the Privileges being so assigned and transferred.

(c) On or before the Effective Date, and continuing thereafter, the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, shall provide (i) for the Claimant Trustee's and Litigation Trustee's reasonable access to all records and information in the Debtor's and Reorganized Debtor's possession, custody or control, (ii) that all Privileges related to the Claimant Trust Assets shall transfer to and vest exclusively in the Claimant Trust (except for those Privileges that will be transferred and assigned to the Litigation Sub-Trust in respect of the Estate Claims), and (iii) subject to Section 3.12(c), the Debtor and Reorganized Debtor shall preserve all records and documents (including all electronic records or documents), including, but not limited to, the Debtor's file server, email server, email archiving system, master journal, SharePoint, Oracle E-Business Suite, Advent Geneva, Siepe database, Bloomberg chat data, and any backups of the foregoing, until such time as the Claimant Trustee, with the consent of the Oversight Board and, if pertaining to any of the Estate Claims, the Litigation Trustee, directs the Reorganized Debtor, as sole member of its general partner, that such records are no longer required to be preserved. For the purposes of transfer of documents, the Claimant Trust or Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, is an assignee and successor to the Debtor in respect of the Claimant Trust Assets and Estate Claims, respectively, and shall be treated as such in any review of confidentiality restrictions in requested documents.

(d) Until the Claimant Trust terminates pursuant to the terms hereof, legal title to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims) and all property contained therein shall be vested at all times in the Claimant Trust as a separate legal entity, except where applicable law in any jurisdiction requires title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, in which case title shall be deemed to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, solely in his capacity as Claimant Trustee. For purposes of such jurisdictions, the term Claimant Trust, as used herein, shall be read to mean the Claimant Trustee.

2.5 Principal Office. The principal office of the Claimant Trust shall be maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the following address:[_____].

2.6 Acceptance. The Claimant Trustee accepts the Claimant Trust imposed by this Agreement and agrees to observe and perform that Claimant Trust, on and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

2.7 Further Assurances. The Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, and any successors thereof will, upon reasonable request of the Claimant Trustee, execute, acknowledge and deliver such further instruments and do such further acts as may be necessary or proper to transfer to the Claimant Trustee any portion of the Claimant Trust Assets intended to be conveyed hereby and in the Plan in the form and manner provided for hereby and in the Plan and to vest in the Claimant Trustee the powers, instruments or funds in trust hereunder.

2.8 Incidents of Ownership. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be the sole beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall retain only such incidents of ownership as are necessary to undertake the actions and transactions authorized herein.

ARTICLE III.
THE TRUSTEES

3.1 Role. In furtherance of and consistent with the purpose of the Claimant Trust, the Plan, and this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, in the Plan, and in the Confirmation Order, shall serve as Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and maintain, manage, and take action on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

3.2 Authority.

(a) In connection with the administration of the Claimant Trust, in addition to any and all of the powers enumerated elsewhere herein, the Claimant Trustee shall, in an expeditious but orderly manner, monetize the Claimant Trust Assets, make timely distributions and not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust. The Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority and is authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement and the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order relating to the Claimant Trust, within the bounds of this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable law. The Claimant Trustee will monetize the Claimant Trust Assets with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time.

(b) The Claimant Trustee, subject to the limitations set forth in Section 3.3 of this Agreement shall have the right to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, estimate, or otherwise deal with and settle any and all Claims and Causes of Action that are part of the Claimant Trust Assets, other than the Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust, as the Claimant Trustee determines is in the best interests of the Claimant Trust; provided, however, that if the Claimant Trustee proposes a settlement of an Employee Claim and does not obtain unanimous consent of the Oversight Board of such settlement, such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust for the Litigation Trustee to litigate. To the extent that any action has been taken to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, or

otherwise deal with and settle any such Claims and Causes of Action prior to the Effective Date, on the Effective Date the Claimant Trustee shall be substituted for the Debtor in connection therewith in accordance with Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7025 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the caption with respect to such pending action shall be changed to the following "[Claimant Trustee], not individually but solely as Claimant Trustee for the Claimant Trust, et al. v. [Defendant]".

(c) Subject in all cases to any limitations contained herein, in the Confirmation Order, or in the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority to:

(i) solely as required by Section 2.4(c), hold legal title to any and all rights of the Claimant Trust and Beneficiaries in or arising from the Claimant Trust Assets, including collecting and receiving any and all money and other property belonging to the Claimant Trust and the right to vote or exercise any other right with respect to any claim or interest relating to the Claimant Trust Assets in any case under the Bankruptcy Code and receive any distribution with respect thereto;

(ii) open accounts for the Claimant Trust and make distributions of Claimant Trust Assets in accordance herewith;

(iii) as set forth in Section 3.11, exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties held by the Debtor with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims), including the authority under section 1123(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, and shall be deemed to be acting as a representative of the Debtor's Estate with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, including with respect to the sale, transfer, or other disposition of the Claimant Trust Assets;

(iv) settle or resolve any Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 other than the Material Claims and any Equity Interests;

(v) sell or otherwise monetize any publicly-traded asset for which there is a marketplace and any other assets (other than the Other Assets (as defined below)) valued less than or equal to $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(vi) upon the direction of the Oversight Board, fund the Litigation Sub-Trust on the Effective Date and as necessary thereafter;

(vii) exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties arising from the Claimant Trust's role as sole member of New GP LLC, and the role of New GP LLC, as general partner of the Reorganized Debtor, including the management of the Managed Funds;

(viii) protect and enforce the rights to the Claimant Trust Assets by any method deemed appropriate, including by judicial proceedings or pursuant to any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium or similar law and general principles of equity;

(ix) obtain reasonable insurance coverage with respect to any liabilities and obligations of the Trustees, Litigation Trustee, and the Members of the Oversight Board solely in their capacities as such, in the form of fiduciary liability insurance, a directors and

officers policy, an errors and omissions policy, or otherwise. The cost of any such insurance shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(x) without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, but subject to the terms of this Agreement, employ various consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals, including counsel, tax advisors, consultants, brokers, investment bankers, valuation counselors, and financial advisors, as the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to aid him in fulfilling his obligations under this Agreement; such consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals shall be retained pursuant to whatever fee arrangement the Claimant Trustee deems appropriate, including contingency fee arrangements and any fees and expenses incurred by such professionals engaged by the Claimant Trustee shall be Claimant Trust Expenses and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(xi) retain and approve compensation arrangements of an independent public accounting firm to perform such reviews and/or audits of the financial books and records of the Claimant Trust as may be required by this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable laws and as may be reasonably and appropriate in Claimant Trustee's discretion. Subject to the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee may commit the Claimant Trust to, and shall pay, such independent public accounting firm reasonable compensation for services rendered and reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred, and all such compensation and reimbursement shall be paid by the Claimant Trustee from Claimant Trust Assets;

(xii) prepare and file (A) tax returns for the Claimant Trust treating the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.671-4(a), (B) an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity, or (C) any periodic or current reports that may be required under applicable law;

(xiii) prepare and send annually to the Beneficiaries, in accordance with the tax laws, a separate statement stating a Beneficiary's interest in the Claimant Trust and its share of the Claimant Trust's income, gain, loss, deduction or credit, and to instruct all such Beneficiaries to report such items on their federal tax returns;

(xiv) to the extent applicable, assert, enforce, release, or waive any attorney-client communication, attorney work product or other Privilege or defense on behalf of the Claimant Trust (including as to any Privilege that the Debtor held prior to the Effective Date), including to provide any information to insurance carriers that the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to utilize applicable insurance coverage for any Claim or Claims;

(xv) subject to Section 3.4, invest the proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets and all income earned by the Claimant Trust, pending any distributions in short-term certificates of deposit, in banks or other savings institutions, or other temporary, liquid investments, such as Treasury bills;

(xvi) request any appropriate tax determination with respect to the Claimant Trust, including a determination pursuant to section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code;

(xvii) take or refrain from taking any and all actions the Claimant Trustee reasonably deems necessary for the continuation, protection, and maximization of the value of the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with purposes hereof;

(xviii) take all steps and execute all instruments and documents necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Claimant Trust and the activities contemplated herein and in the Confirmation Order and the Plan, and take all actions necessary to comply with the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement and the obligations thereunder and hereunder;

(xix) exercise such other powers and authority as may be vested in or assumed by the Claimant Trustee by any Final Order;

(xx) evaluate and determine strategy with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, and hold, pursue, prosecute, adjust, arbitrate, compromise, release, settle or abandon the Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust; and

(xxi) with respect to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, perform all duties and functions of the Distribution Agent as set forth in the Plan, including distributing Cash from the Disputed Claims Reserve, solely on account of Disputed Class 1 through Class 7 Claims that were Disputed as of the Effective Date, but become Allowed, to the Reorganization Debtor such that the Reorganized Debtor can satisfy its duties and functions as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through Class 7 (the foregoing subparagraphs (i)-(xxi) being collectively, the "Authorized Acts").

(d) The Claimant Trustee and the Oversight Committee will enter into an agreement as soon as practicable after the Effective Date concerning the Claimant Trustee's authority with respect to certain other assets, including certain portfolio company assets (the "Other Assets").

(e) The Claimant Trustee has the power and authority to act as trustee of the Claimant Trust and perform the Authorized Acts through the date such Claimant Trustee resigns, is removed, or is otherwise unable to serve for any reason.

3.3 Limitation of Authority.

(a) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall not (i) be authorized to engage in any trade or business, (ii) take any actions inconsistent with the management of the Claimant Trust Assets as are required or contemplated by applicable law, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement, (iii) take any action in contravention of the Confirmation Order, the Plan, or this Agreement, or (iv) cause New GP LLC to cause the Reorganized Debtor to take any action in contravention of the Plan, Plan Documents or the Confirmation Order.

(b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and in no way limiting the terms of the Plan, the Claimant Trustee must receive the consent by vote of a simple majority

of the Oversight Board pursuant to the notice and quorum requirements set forth in Section 4.5 herein, in order to:

(i) terminate or extend the term of the Claimant Trust;

(ii) prosecute, litigate, settle or otherwise resolve any of the Material Claims;

(iii) except otherwise set forth herein, sell or otherwise monetize any assets that are not Other Assets, including Reorganized Debtor Assets (other than with respect to the Managed Funds), that are valued greater than $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(iv) except for cash distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any cash distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Article IV of the Plan;

(v) except for any distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Disputed Claims after such time that such Holder's Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(vi) reserve or retain any cash or cash equivalents in an amount reasonably necessary to meet claims and contingent liabilities (including Disputed Claims and any indemnification obligations that may arise under Section 8.2 of this Agreement), to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, or to fund ongoing operations and administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(vii) borrow as may be necessary to fund activities of the Claimant Trust;

(viii) determine whether the conditions under Section 5.1(c) of this Agreement have been satisfied such that a certification should be filed with the Bankruptcy Court;

(ix) invest the Claimant Trust Assets, proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust (for the avoidance of doubt, this shall not apply to investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor or its subsidiaries solely with respect to Managed Funds);

(x) change the compensation of the Claimant Trustee;

(xi) subject to ARTICLE X, make structural changes to the Claimant Trust or take other actions to minimize any tax on the Claimant Trust Assets; and

(xii) retain counsel, experts, advisors, or any other professionals; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to obtain the consent of the Oversight Board for the retention of (i) PSZJ, WilmerHale, or Development Specialists, Inc. and

(ii) any other professional whose expected fees and expenses are estimated at less than or equal to $200,000.

(c) [Reserved.]

3.4 Investment of Cash. The right and power of the Claimant Trustee to invest the Claimant Trust Assets, the proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust, with majority approval of the Oversight Board, shall be limited to the right and power to invest in such Claimant Trust Assets only in Cash and U.S. Government securities as defined in section 29(a)(16) of the Investment Company Act; provided, however that (a) the scope of any such permissible investments shall be further limited to include only those investments that a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d), may be permitted to hold, pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, or any modification in the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") guidelines, whether set forth in IRS rulings, other IRS pronouncements, or otherwise, (b) the Claimant Trustee may retain any Claimant Trust Assets received that are not Cash only for so long as may be required for the prompt and orderly monetization or other disposition of such assets, and (c) the Claimant Trustee may expend the assets of the Claimant Trust (i) as reasonably necessary to meet contingent liabilities (including indemnification and similar obligations) and maintain the value of the assets of the Claimant Trust during the pendency of this Claimant Trust, (ii) to pay Claimant Trust Expenses (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on the Claimant Trust and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with litigation), and (iii) to satisfy other liabilities incurred or assumed by the Claimant Trust (or to which the assets are otherwise subject) in accordance with the Plan or this Agreement).

3.5 Binding Nature of Actions. All actions taken and determinations made by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon any and all Beneficiaries.

3.6 Term of Service. The Claimant Trustee shall serve as the Claimant Trustee for the duration of the Claimant Trust, subject to death, resignation or removal.

3.7 Resignation. The Claimant Trustee may resign as Claimant Trustee of the Claimant Trust by an instrument in writing delivered to the Bankruptcy Court and Oversight Board at least thirty (30) days before the proposed effective date of resignation. The Claimant Trustee shall continue to serve as Claimant Trustee after delivery of the Claimant Trustee's resignation until the proposed effective date of such resignation, unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board consent to an earlier effective date, which earlier effective date shall be no earlier than the date of appointment of a successor Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.9 hereof becomes effective.

3.8 Removal.

(a) The Claimant Trustee may be removed by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board for Cause for Cause immediately upon notice thereof, or without Cause upon 60 days' prior written notice. Upon the removal of the Claimant Trustee pursuant hereto, the Claimant Trustee will resign, or be deemed to have resigned, from any role or position he or she

may have at New GP LLC or the Reorganized Debtor effective upon the expiration of the foregoing 60 day period unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board agree otherwise.

(b) To the extent there is any dispute regarding the removal of a Claimant Trustee (including any dispute relating to any compensation or expense reimbursement due under this Agreement) the Bankruptcy Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate such dispute. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will continue to serve as the Claimant Trustee after his removal until the earlier of (i) the time when a successor Claimant Trustee will become effective in accordance with Section 3.9 of this Agreement or (ii) such date as the Bankruptcy Court otherwise orders.

3.9 Appointment of Successor.

(a) Appointment of Successor. In the event of a vacancy by reason of the death or Disability (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is a natural person), dissolution (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is not a natural person), or removal of the Claimant Trustee, or prospective vacancy by reason of resignation, a successor Claimant Trustee shall be selected by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board. If Members of the Oversight Board are unable to secure a majority vote, the Bankruptcy Court will determine the successor Claimant Trustee on motion of the Members. If a final decree has been entered closing the Chapter 11 Case, the Claimant Trustee may seek to reopen the Chapter 11 Case for the limited purpose of determining the successor Claimant Trustee, and the costs for such motion and costs related to re-opening the Chapter 11 Case shall be paid by the Claimant Trust. The successor Claimant Trustee shall be appointed as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than sixty (60) days after the occurrence of the vacancy or, in the case of resignation, on the effective date of the resignation of the then acting Claimant Trustee.

(b) Vesting or Rights in Successor Claimant Trustee. Every successor Claimant Trustee appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trust, the exiting Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board, and file with the Bankruptcy Court, an instrument accepting such appointment subject to the terms and provisions hereof. The successor Claimant Trustee, without any further act, deed, or conveyance shall become vested with all the rights, powers, trusts and duties of the exiting Claimant Trustee, except that the successor Claimant Trustee shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of the retiring Claimant Trustee. In no event shall the retiring Claimant Trustee be liable for the acts or omissions of the successor Claimant Trustee.

(c) Interim Claimant Trustee. During any period in which there is a vacancy in the position of Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board shall appoint one of its Members to serve as the interim Claimant Trustee (the "Interim Trustee") until a successor Claimant Trustee is appointed pursuant to Section 3.9(a). The Interim Trustee shall be subject to all the terms and conditions applicable to a Claimant Trustee hereunder. Such Interim Trustee shall not be limited in any manner from exercising any rights or powers as a Member of the Oversight Board merely by such Person's appointment as Interim Trustee.

3.10 Continuance of Claimant Trust. The death, resignation, or removal of the Claimant Trustee shall not operate to terminate the Claimant Trust created by this Agreement or to revoke any existing agency (other than any agency of the Claimant Trustee as the Claimant Trustee) created pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or invalidate any action taken by the Claimant Trustee. In the event of the resignation or removal of the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall promptly (i) execute and deliver, by the effective date of resignation or removal, such documents, instruments, records, and other writings as may be reasonably requested by his successor to effect termination of the exiting Claimant Trustee's capacity under this Agreement and the conveyance of the Claimant Trust Assets then held by the exiting Claimant Trustee to the successor Claimant Trustee; (ii) deliver to the successor Claimant Trustee all non-privileged documents, instruments, records, and other writings relating to the Claimant Trust as may be in the possession or under the control of the exiting Claimant Trustee, provided, the exiting Claimant Trustee shall have the right to make and retain copies of such documents, instruments, records and other writings delivered to the successor Claimant Trustee and the cost of making such copies shall be a Claimant Trust Expense to be paid by the Claimant Trust; and (iii) otherwise assist and cooperate in effecting the assumption of the exiting Claimant Trustee's obligations and functions by his successor, provided the fees and expenses of such assistance and cooperation shall be paid to the exiting Claimant Trustee by the Claimant Trust. The exiting Claimant Trustee shall irrevocably appoint the successor Claimant Trustee as his attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution for it and its name, place and stead to do any and all acts that such exiting Claimant Trustee is obligated to perform under this Section 3.10.

3.11 Claimant Trustee as "Estate Representative". The Claimant Trustee will be the exclusive trustee of the Claimant Trust Assets for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Estate Representative") with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, with all rights and powers attendant thereto, in addition to all rights and powers granted in the Plan and in this Agreement; provided that all rights and powers as representative of the Estate pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) shall be transferred to the Litigation Trustee in respect of the Estate Claims and the Employee Claims. The Claimant Trustee will be the successor-in-interest to the Debtor with respect to any action pertaining to the Claimant Trust Assets, which was or could have been commenced by the Debtor prior to the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or Confirmation Order. All actions, claims, rights or interest constituting Claimant Trust Assets are preserved and retained and may be enforced, or assignable to the Litigation Sub-Trust, by the Claimant Trustee as an Estate Representative.

3.12 Books and Records.

(a) The Claimant Trustee shall maintain in respect of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries books and records reflecting Claimant Trust Assets in its possession and the income of the Claimant Trust and payment of expenses, liabilities, and claims against or assumed by the Claimant Trust in such detail and for such period of time as may be necessary to enable it to make full and proper accounting in respect thereof. Such books and records shall be maintained as reasonably necessary to facilitate compliance with the tax reporting requirements of the Claimant Trust and the requirements of Article VII herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Claimant Trustee to file any

accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Claimant Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Claimant Trust Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall provide quarterly reporting to the Oversight Board and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of (i) the status of the Claimant Trust Assets, (ii) the balance of Cash held by the Claimant Trust (including in each of the Claimant Trust Expense Reserve and Disputed Claim Reserve), (iii) the determination and any re-determination, as applicable, of the total amount allocated to the Disputed Claim Reserve, (iv) the status of Disputed Claims and any resolutions thereof, (v) the status of any litigation, including the pursuit of the Causes of Action, (vi) the Reorganized Debtor's performance, and (vii) operating expenses; provided, however, that the Claimant Trustee may, with respect to any Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trust Beneficiary, redact any portion of such reports that relate to such Entity's Claim or Equity Interest, as applicable and any reporting provided to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries may be subject to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's agreement to maintain confidentiality with respect to any non-public information.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may dispose some or all of the books and records maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the later of (i) such time as the Claimant Trustee determines, with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board, that the continued possession or maintenance of such books and records is no longer necessary for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, or (ii) upon the termination and winding up of the Claimant Trust under Article IX of this Agreement; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not dispose of any books and records related to the Estate Claims or Employee Claims without the consent of the Litigation Trustee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee shall cause the Reorganized Debtor and its subsidiaries to retain such books and records, and for such periods, as are required to be retained pursuant to Section 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act or any other applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

3.13 Compensation and Reimbursement; Engagement of Professionals.

(a) Compensation and Expenses.

(i) Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Claimant Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall receive compensation of $150,000 per month (the "Base Salary"). Within the first forty-five days following the Confirmation Date, the Claimant Trustee, on the one hand, and the Committee, if prior to the Effective Date, or the Oversight Board, if on or after the Effective Date, on the other, will negotiate go-forward compensation for the Claimant Trustee which will include (a) the Base Salary, (b) a success fee, and (c) severance.

(ii) Expense Reimbursements. All reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the Claimant Trustee in the performance of his or her duties hereunder, shall be reimbursed as Claimant Trust Expenses paid by the Claimant Trust.

(b) Professionals.

(i) Engagement of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall engage professionals from time to time in conjunction with the services provided hereunder. The Claimant Trustee's engagement of such professionals shall be approved by a majority of the Oversight Board as set forth in Section 3.3(b) hereof.

(ii) Fees and Expenses of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any retained professionals as Claimant Trust Expenses.

3.14 Reliance by Claimant Trustee. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Claimant Trustee may rely, and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting, on any resolution, statement, certificate, instrument, opinion, report, notice, request, consent, order or other instrument or document that the Claimant Trustee has no reason to believe to be other than genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties or, in the case of facsimiles, to have been sent by the proper party or parties, and the Claimant Trustee may conclusively rely as to the truth of the statements and correctness of the opinions or direction expressed therein. The Claimant Trustee may consult with counsel and other professionals, and any advice of such counsel or other professionals shall constitute full and complete authorization and protection in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trustee shall have the right at any time to seek instructions from the Bankruptcy Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction concerning the Claimant Trust Assets, this Agreement, the Plan, or any other document executed in connection therewith, and any such instructions given shall be full and complete authorization in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trust shall have the right to seek Orders from the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in Article IX of the Plan.

3.15 Commingling of Claimant Trust Assets. The Claimant Trustee shall not commingle any of the Claimant Trust Assets with his or her own property or the property of any other Person.

3.16 Delaware Trustee. The Delaware Trustee shall have the power and authority, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to (i) accept legal process served on the Claimant Trust in the State of Delaware; and (ii) execute any certificates that are required to be executed under the Statutory Trust Act and file such certificates in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, and take such action or refrain from taking such action under this Agreement as may be directed in a writing delivered to the Delaware Trustee by the Claimant Trustee; provided, however, that the Delaware Trustee shall not be required to take or to refrain from taking any such action if the Delaware Trustee shall believe, or shall have been advised by counsel, that such performance is likely to involve the Delaware Trustee in personal liability or to result in personal liability to the Delaware Trustee, or is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes a party or is otherwise contrary to law. The Parties agree not to instruct the Delaware Trustee to take any action or to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes party or that is otherwise contrary to law. Other than as

expressly provided for in this Agreement, the Delaware Trustee shall have no duty or power to take any action for or on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

ARTICLE IV.
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD

4.1 Oversight Board Members. The Oversight Board will be comprised of five (5) Members appointed to serve as the board of managers of the Claimant Trust, at least two (2) of which shall be disinterested Members selected by the Creditors' Committee (such disinterested members, the "Disinterested Members"). The initial Members of the Oversight Board will be representatives of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, Meta-e Discovery, UBS, and David Pauker. David Pauker and Paul McVoy, the representative of Meta-e Discovery, shall serve as the initial Disinterested Board Members; provided, however, that if the Plan is confirmed with the Convenience Class or any other convenience class supported by the Creditors' Committee, Meta-E Discovery and its representative will resign on the Effective Date or as soon as practicable thereafter and be replaced in accordance with Section 4.10 hereof..

4.2 Authority and Responsibilities.

(a) The Oversight Board shall, as and when requested by either of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, or when the Members otherwise deem it to be appropriate or as is otherwise required under the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement, consult with and advise the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee as to the administration and management of the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, this Agreement, and Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement (as applicable) and shall have the other responsibilities and powers as set forth herein. As set forth in the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and herein, the Oversight Board shall have the authority and responsibility to oversee, review, and govern the activities of the Claimant Trust, including the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the performance of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, and shall have the authority to remove the Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.7 hereof or the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; provided, however, that the Oversight Board may not direct either Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee to act inconsistently with their respective duties under this Agreement (including without limitation as set in Section 4.2(e) below), the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or applicable law.

(b) The Oversight Board shall also (i) monitor and oversee the administration of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee's performance of his or her responsibilities under this Agreement, (ii) as more fully set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, approve funding to the Litigation Sub-Trust, monitor and oversee the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee's performance of his responsibilities under the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (iii) perform such other tasks as are set forth herein, in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and in the Plan.

(c) The Claimant Trustee shall consult with and provide information to the Oversight Board in accordance with and pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement to enable the Oversight Board to meet its obligations hereunder.

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to (i) obtain the approval of any action by the Oversight Board to the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is required to be taken by applicable law, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement or (ii) follow the directions of the Oversight Board to take any action the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is prohibited by applicable law the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement.

(e) Notwithstanding provision of this Agreement to the contrary, with respect to the activities of the Reorganized Debtor in its capacity as an investment adviser (and subsidiaries of the Reorganized Debtor that serve as general partner or in an equivalent capacity) to any Managed Funds, the Oversight Board shall not make investment decisions or otherwise participate in the investment decision making process relating to any such Managed Funds, nor shall the Oversight Board or any member thereof serve as a fiduciary to any such Managed Funds. It is agreed and understood that investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor (or its subsidiary entities) with respect to Managed Funds shall be made by the Claimant Trustee in his capacity as an officer of the Reorganized Debtor and New GP LLC and/or such persons who serve as investment personnel of the Reorganized Debtor from time to time, and shall be subject to the fiduciary duties applicable to such entities and persons as investment adviser to such Managed Funds.

4.3 Fiduciary Duties. The Oversight Board (and each Member in its capacity as such) shall have fiduciary duties to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries consistent with the fiduciary duties that the members of the Creditors' Committee have to unsecured creditors and shall exercise its responsibilities accordingly; provided, however, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to any Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests or Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests until such Holders become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Section 5.1(c) hereof; provided, further, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to a Holder of an Equity Trust Interest if such Holder is named as a defendant in any of the Causes of Action, including Estate Claims, in their capacities as such, it being the intent that the Oversight Board's fiduciary duties are to maximize the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, including the Causes of Action. In all circumstances, the Oversight Board shall act in the best interests of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and in furtherance of the purpose of the Claimant Trust. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the foregoing shall not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

4.4 Meetings of the Oversight Board. Meetings of the Oversight Board are to be held as necessary to ensure the operation of the Claimant Trust but in no event less often than quarterly. Special meetings of the Oversight Board may be held whenever and wherever called for by the Claimant Trustee or any Member; provided, however, that notice of any such meeting shall be duly given in writing no less than 48 hours prior to such meeting (such notice requirement being subject to any waiver by the Members in the minutes, if any, or other transcript, if any, of proceedings of the Oversight Board). Unless the Oversight Board decides otherwise (which decision shall rest in the reasonable discretion of the Oversight Board), the

Claimant Trustee, and each of the Claimant Trustee's designated advisors may, but are not required to, attend meetings of the Oversight Board.

4.5 Unanimous Written Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Oversight Board in a meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by unanimous written consents describing the actions taken, signed by all Members and recorded. If any Member informs the Claimant Trustee (via e-mail or otherwise) that he or she objects to the decision, determination, action, or inaction proposed to be made by unanimous written consent, the Claimant Trustee must use reasonable good faith efforts to schedule a meeting on the issue to be set within 48 hours of the request or as soon thereafter as possible on which all members of the Oversight Board are available in person or by telephone. Such decision, determination, action, or inaction must then be made pursuant to the meeting protocols set forth herein.

4.6 Manner of Acting.

(a) A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Oversight Board shall consist of at least three Members (including no less than one (1) Disinterested Member); provided that if the transaction of business at a meeting would constitute a direct or indirect conflict of interest for the Redeemer Committee, Acis, and/or UBS, at least two Disinterested Members must be present for there to be a quorum. Except as set forth in Sections 3.3(c), 4.9(a), 5.2, 5.4, 6.1, 9.1, and 10, herein, the majority vote of the Members present at a duly called meeting at which a quorum is present throughout shall be the act of the Oversight Board except as otherwise required by law or as provided in this Agreement. Any or all of the Members may participate in a regular or special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, conference telephone, video conference, or similar communications equipment by means of which all Persons participating in the meeting may hear each other, in which case any required notice of such meeting may generally describe the arrangements (rather than or in addition of the place) for the holding hereof. Any Member participating in a meeting by this means is deemed to be present in person at the meeting. Voting (including on negative notice) may be conducted by electronic mail or individual communications by the applicable Trustee and each Member.

(b) Any Member who is present and entitled to vote at a meeting of the Oversight Board when action is taken is deemed to have assented to the action taken, subject to the requisite vote of the Oversight Board, unless (i) such Member objects at the beginning of the meeting (or promptly upon his/her arrival) to holding or transacting business at the meeting; (ii) his/her dissent or abstention from the action taken is entered in the minutes of the meeting; or (iii) he/she delivers written notice (including by electronic or facsimile transmission) of his/her dissent or abstention to the Oversight Board before its adjournment. The right of dissent or abstention is not available to any Member of the Oversight Board who votes in favor of the action taken.

(c) Prior to a vote on any matter or issue or the taking of any action with respect to any matter or issue, each Member shall report to the Oversight Board any conflict of interest such Member has or may have with respect to the matter or issue at hand and fully disclose the nature of such conflict or potential conflict (including, without limitation, disclosing any and all financial or other pecuniary interests that such Member may have with respect to or

in connection with such matter or issue, other than solely as a holder of Trust Interests). A Member who, with respect to a matter or issue, has or who may have a conflict of interest whereby such Member's interests are adverse to the interests of the Claimant Trust shall be deemed a "Conflicted Member" who shall not be entitled to vote or take part in any action with respect to such matter or issue. In the event of a Conflicted Member, the vote or action with respect to such matter or issue giving rise to such conflict shall be undertaken only by Members who are not Conflicted Members and, notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the affirmative vote of only a majority of the Members who are not Conflicted Members shall be required to approve of such matter or issue and the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

(d) Each of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, and UBS shall be deemed "Conflicted Members" with respect to any matter or issue related to or otherwise affecting any of their respective Claim(s) (a "Committee Member Claim Matter"). A unanimous vote of the Disinterested Members shall be required to approve of or otherwise take action with respect to any Committee Member Claim Matter and, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

4.7 Tenure of the Members of the Oversight Board. The authority of the Members of the Oversight Board will be effective as of the Effective Date and will remain and continue in full force and effect until the Claimant Trust is terminated in accordance with Article X hereof. The Members of the Oversight Board will serve until such Member's successor is duly appointed or until such Member's earlier death or resignation pursuant to Section 4.7 below, or removal pursuant to Section 4.8 below.

4.8 Resignation. A Member of the Oversight Board may resign by giving not less than 90 days prior written notice thereof to the Claimant Trustee and other Members. Such resignation shall become effective on the earlier to occur of (i) the day specified in such notice and (ii) the appointment of a successor in accordance with Section 4.9 below.

4.9 Removal. A majority of the Oversight Board may remove any Member for Cause or Disability. If any Committee Member has its Claim disallowed in its entirety the representative of such entity will immediately be removed as a Member without the requirement for a vote and a successor will be appointed in the manner set forth herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, upon the termination of the Claimant Trust, any or all of the Members shall be deemed to have resigned.

4.10 Appointment of a Successor Member.

(a) In the event of a vacancy on the Oversight Board (whether by removal, death, or resignation), a new Member may be appointed to fill such position by the remaining Members acting unanimously; provided, however, that any vacancy resulting from the removal, resignation, or death of a Disinterested Member may only be filled by a disinterested Person unaffiliated with any Claimant or constituency in the Chapter 11 Case; provided, further, that if an individual serving as the representative of a Committee Member resigns from its role as representative, such resignation shall not be deemed resignation of the Committee Member itself and such Committee Member shall have the exclusive right to designate its replacement representative for the Oversight Board. The appointment of a successor Member will be further

evidenced by the Claimant Trustee's filing with the Bankruptcy Court (to the extent a final decree has not been entered) and posting on the Claimant Trustee's website a notice of appointment, at the direction of the Oversight Board, which notice will include the name, address, and telephone number of the successor Member.

(b) Immediately upon the appointment of any successor Member, the successor Member shall assume all rights, powers, duties, authority, and privileges of a Member hereunder and such rights and privileges will be vested in and undertaken by the successor Member without any further act. A successor Member will not be liable personally for any act or omission of a predecessor Member.

(c) Every successor Member appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trustee and other Members an instrument accepting the appointment under this Agreement and agreeing to be bound thereto, and thereupon the successor Member without any further act, deed, or conveyance, shall become vested with all rights, powers, trusts, and duties of a Member hereunder.

4.11 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses. Unless determined by the Oversight Board, no Member shall be entitled to compensation in connection with his or her service to the Oversight Board; provided, however, that a Disinterested Member shall be compensated in a manner and amount initially set by the other Members and as thereafter amended from time to time by agreement between the Oversight Board and the Disinterested Member. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will reimburse the Members for all reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Members in connection with the performance of their duties hereunder (which shall not include fees, costs, and expenses of legal counsel).

4.12 Confidentiality. Each Member shall, during the period that such Member serves as a Member under this Agreement and following the termination of this Agreement or following such Member's removal or resignation, hold strictly confidential and not use for personal gain any material, non-public information of or pertaining to any Person to which any of the Claimant Trust Assets relates or of which such Member has become aware in the Member's capacity as a Member ("Confidential Trust Information"), except as otherwise required by law. For the avoidance of doubt, a Member's Affiliates, employer, and employer's Affiliates (and collectively with such Persons' directors, officers, partners, principals and employees, "Member Affiliates") shall not be deemed to have received Confidential Trust Information solely due to the fact that a Member has received Confidential Trust Information in his or her capacity as a Member of the Oversight Board and to the extent that (a) a Member does not disclose any Confidential Trust Information to a Member Affiliate, (b) the business activities of such Member Affiliates are conducted without reference to, and without use of, Confidential Trust Information, and (c) no Member Affiliate is otherwise directed to take, or takes on behalf of a Member or Member Affiliate, any actions that are contrary to the terms of this Section 4.11.

ARTICLE V.
TRUST INTERESTS

5.1 Claimant Trust Interests.

(a) General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (the "GUC Beneficiaries"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claim a General Unsecured Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 8 Claim bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 8 Claims. The General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests shall be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(b) Subordinated Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Class 9 Subordinated Claims (the "Subordinated Beneficiaries"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claim a Subordinated Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 9 Claim bears to the total of amount of the Allowed Class 9. The Subordinated Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. The Subordinated Beneficiaries shall only be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets after each GUC Beneficiary has been repaid in full with applicable interest on account of such GUC Beneficiary's Allowed General Unsecured Claim, and all Disputed General Unsecured Claims have been resolved, in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(c) Contingent Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Interest becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Contingent Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and Holders of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests (collectively, the "Equity Holders"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and each Holder of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests a Contingent Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interest bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interests, as applicable, under the Plan. Contingent Trust Interests shall not vest, and the Equity Holders shall not have any rights under this Agreement, unless and until the Claimant Trustee files with the Bankruptcy Court a certification that all GUC Beneficiaries have been paid indefeasibly in full, including, to the extent applicable, all accrued and unpaid post-petition interest consistent with the Plan and all Disputed Claims have been resolved (the "GUC Payment Certification"). Equity Holders will only be deemed "Beneficiaries" under this Agreement upon the filing of a GUC Payment Certification with the Bankruptcy Court, at which time the Contingent Trust Interests will vest and be deemed "Equity Trust Interests." The Equity Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to Subordinated Trust Interests, and distributions on account thereof shall only be made if and when Subordinated Beneficiaries have been repaid in full on account of such Subordinated Beneficiary's Allowed Subordinated Claim, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement. The Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests shall be subordinated to the Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests.

5.2 Interests Beneficial Only. The ownership of the beneficial interests in the Claimant Trust shall not entitle the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to any title in or to the Claimant

Trust Assets (which title shall be vested in the Claimant Trust) or to any right to call for a partition or division of the Claimant Trust Assets or to require an accounting. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any governance right or other wright to direct Claimant Trust activities.

5.3 Transferability of Trust Interests. No transfer, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other disposition of a Trust Interest may be effected until (i) such action is unanimously approved by the Oversight Board, (ii) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary to assure that any such disposition shall not cause the Claimant Trust to be subject to entity-level taxation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and (iii) either (x) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board, acting unanimously, have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary or appropriate to assure that any such disposition shall not (a) require the Claimant Trust to comply with the registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act or (b) cause any adverse effect under the Investment Advisers Act, or (y) the Oversight Board, acting unanimously, has determined, in its sole and absolute discretion, to cause the Claimant Trust to become a public reporting company and/or make periodic reports under the Exchange Act (provided that it is not required to register under the Investment Company Act or register its securities under the Securities Act) to enable such disposition to be made. In the event that any such disposition is allowed, the Oversight Board and the Claimant Trustee may add such restrictions upon such disposition and other terms of this Agreement as are deemed necessary or appropriate by the Claimant Trustee, with the advice of counsel, to permit or facilitate such disposition under applicable securities and other laws.

5.4 Registry of Trust Interests.

(a) Registrar. The Claimant Trustee shall appoint a registrar, which may be the Claimant Trustee (the "Registrar"), for the purpose of recording ownership of the Trust Interests as provided herein. The Registrar, if other than the Claimant Trustee, shall be an institution or person acceptable to the Oversight Board. For its services hereunder, the Registrar, unless it is the Claimant Trustee, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation from the Claimant Trust as a Claimant Trust Expense.

(b) Trust Register. The Claimant Trustee shall cause to be kept at the office of the Registrar, or at such other place or places as shall be designated by the Registrar from time to time, a registry of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Equity Holders (the "Trust Register"), which shall be maintained pursuant to such reasonable regulations as the Claimant Trustee and the Registrar may prescribe.

(c) Access to Register by Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and their duly authorized representatives shall have the right, upon reasonable prior written notice to the Claimant Trustee, and in accordance with reasonable regulations prescribed by the Claimant Trustee, to inspect and, at the expense of the Claimant Trust Beneficiary make copies of the Trust Register, in each case for a purpose reasonable and related to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's Trust Interest.

5.5 Exemption from Registration. The Parties hereto intend that the rights of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries arising under this Claimant Trust shall not be "securities" under applicable laws, but none of the Parties represent or warrant that such rights shall not be securities or shall not be entitled to exemption from registration under the applicable securities laws. The Oversight Board, acting unanimously, and Claimant Trustee may amend this Agreement in accordance with Article IX hereof to make such changes as are deemed necessary or appropriate with the advice of counsel, to ensure that the Claimant Trust is not subject to registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act. The Trust Interests shall not have consent or voting rights or otherwise confer on the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any rights similar to the rights of a shareholder of a corporation in respect of any actions taken or to be taken, or decisions made or to be made, by the Oversight Board and/or the Claimant Trustee under this Agreement.

5.6 Absolute Owners. The Claimant Trustee may deem and treat the Claimant Trust Beneficiary of record as determined pursuant to this Article 5 as the absolute owner of such Trust Interests for the purpose of receiving distributions and payment thereon or on account thereof and for all other purposes whatsoever.

5.7 Effect of Death, Incapacity, or Bankruptcy. The death, incapacity, or bankruptcy of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary during the term of the Claimant Trust shall not (i) entitle the representatives or creditors of the deceased Beneficiary to any additional rights under this Agreement, or (ii) otherwise affect the rights and obligations of any of other Claimant Trust Beneficiary under this Agreement.

5.8 Change of Address. Any Claimant Trust Beneficiary may, after the Effective Date, select an alternative distribution address by providing notice to the Claimant Trustee identifying such alternative distribution address. Such notification shall be effective only upon receipt by the Claimant Trustee. Absent actual receipt of such notice by the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall not recognize any such change of distribution address.

5.9 Standing. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have standing to direct the Claimant Trustee to do or not to do any act or to institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity against any party upon or with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any direct interest in or to any of the Claimant Trust Assets.

5.10 Limitations on Rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

(a) The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall have no rights other than those set forth in this Agreement, the Confirmation Order, or the Plan (including any Plan Supplement documents incorporated therein).

(b) In any action taken by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, the prevailing party will be entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other costs; provided, however, that any fees and costs shall be borne by the Claimant Trust on behalf of any such Trustee or Member, as set forth herein.

(c) A Claimant Trust Beneficiary who brings any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, may be required by order of the Bankruptcy Court to post a bond ensuring that the full costs of a legal defense can be reimbursed. A request for such bond can be made by the Claimant Trust or by Claimant Trust Beneficiaries constituting in the aggregate at least 50% of the most senior class of Claimant Trust Interests.

(d) Any action brought by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary must be brought in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are deemed to have waived any right to a trial by jury

(e) The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to bring any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or current or former Member, in their capacity as such, shall not survive the final distribution by the Claimant Trust.

ARTICLE VI.
DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Distributions.

(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute to holders of Trust Interests at least annually the Cash on hand net of any amounts that (a) are reasonably necessary to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets pending their monetization or other disposition during the term of the Claimant Trust, (b) are necessary to pay or reserve for reasonably incurred or anticipated Claimant Trust Expenses and any other expenses incurred by the Claimant Trust (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on or payable by the Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets), (c) are necessary to pay or reserve for the anticipated costs and expenses of the Litigation Sub-Trust, (d) are necessary to satisfy or reserve for other liabilities incurred or anticipated by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement (including, but not limited to, indemnification obligations and similar expenses in such amounts and for such period of time as the Claimant Trustee determines, in good faith, may be necessary and appropriate, which determination shall not be subject to consent of the Oversight Board, may not be modified without the express written consent of the Claimant Trustee, and shall survive termination of the Claimant Trustee), (e) are necessary to maintain the Disputed Claims Reserve, and (f) are necessary to pay Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this paragraph, the Claimant Trustee shall exercise reasonable efforts to make initial distributions within six months of the Effective Date, and the Oversight Board may not prevent such initial distributions unless upon a unanimous vote of the Oversight Board. The Claimant Trustee may otherwise distribute all Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust in accordance with this Agreement and the Plan at such time or times as the Claimant Trustee is directed by the Oversight Board.

(b) At the request of the Reorganized Debtor, subject in all respects to the provisions of this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute Cash to the Reorganized Debtor, as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through 7, sufficient to satisfy Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7.

(c) All proceeds of Claimant Trust Assets shall be distributed in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement.

6.2 Manner of Payment or Distribution. All distributions made by the Claimant Trustee on behalf of the Claimant Trust to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be payable by the Claimant Trustee directly to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of record as of the twentieth (20th) day prior to the date scheduled for the distribution, unless such day is not a Business Day, then such date or the distribution shall be the following Business Day, but such distribution shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date.

6.3 Delivery of Distributions. All distributions under this Agreement to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall be made, as applicable, at the address of such Claimant Trust Beneficiary (a) as set forth on the Schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court or (b) on the books and records of the Debtor or their agents, as applicable, unless the Claimant Trustee has been notified in writing of a change of address pursuant to Section 5.6 hereof.

6.4 Disputed Claims Reserves. There will be no distributions under this Agreement or the Plan on account of Disputed Claims pending Allowance. The Claimant Trustee will maintain a Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan and will make distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan.

6.5 Undeliverable Distributions and Unclaimed Property. All undeliverable distributions and unclaimed property shall be treated in the manner set forth in the Plan.

6.6 *De Minimis* Distributions. Distributions with a value of less than $100 will be treated in accordance with the Plan.

6.7 United States Claimant Trustee Fees and Reports. **After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall pay as a Claimant Trust Expense, all fees incurred under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) by reason of the Claimant Trust's disbursements until the Chapter 11 Case is closed. After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall prepare and serve on the Office of the United States Trustee such quarterly disbursement reports for the Claimant Trust as required by the Office of the United States Trustee Office for as long as the Chapter 11 Case remains open.**

ARTICLE VII.
TAX MATTERS

7.1 Tax Treatment and Tax Returns.

(a) It is intended for the initial transfer of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust to be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable) as if the Debtor transferred the Claimant Trust Assets (other than the amounts set aside in the Disputed Claim Reserve, if the Claimant Trustee makes the election described below) to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and then, immediately thereafter, the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries transferred the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust. Consistent with such treatment, (i) it is intended that the Claimant Trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes

where applicable), (ii) it is intended that the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries will be treated as the grantors of the Claimant Trust and owners of their respective share of the Claimant Trust Assets for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). The Claimant Trustee shall file all federal income tax returns (and foreign, state, and local income tax returns where applicable) for the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.671-4(a).

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and notify the applicable Beneficiaries of such valuation, and such valuation shall be used consistently by all parties for all federal income tax purposes.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may file an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity.

7.2 Withholding. The Claimant Trustee may withhold from any amount distributed from the Claimant Trust to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary such sum or sums as are required to be withheld under the income tax laws of the United States or of any state or political subdivision thereof. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the applicable Beneficiary. As a condition to receiving any distribution from the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee may require that the Beneficiary provide such holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Claimant Trustee to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws. If a Beneficiary fails to comply with such a request within one year, such distribution shall be deemed an unclaimed distribution and treated in accordance with Section 6.5(b) of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII.
STANDARD OF CARE AND INDEMNIFICATION

8.1 Standard of Care. None of the Claimant Trustee, acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan, the Delaware Trustee, acting in its capacity as Delaware Trustee, the Oversight Board, or any current or any individual Member, solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board, shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person (including any Claimant Trust Beneficiary) in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the acts or omissions of any such Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member constituted fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. The employees, agents and professionals retained by the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or individual Member shall not be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or any other Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise

jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that such acts or omissions by such employee, agent, or professional constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence. None of the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or any Member shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person for the acts or omissions of any employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee taken or not taken in good faith reliance on the advice of professionals or, as applicable, with the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the selection, retention, or supervision of such employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust.

8.2 Indemnification. The Claimant Trustee (including each former Claimant Trustee), Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, and all past and present Members (collectively, in their capacities as such, the "Indemnified Parties") shall be indemnified by the Claimant Trust against and held harmless by the Claimant Trust from any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, disbursements, and related expenses) to which the Indemnified Parties may become subject in connection with any action, suit, proceeding or investigation brought or threatened against any of the Indemnified Parties in their capacity as Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member, or in connection with any matter arising out of or related to the Plan, this Agreement, or the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or other court of competent jurisdiction that the Indemnified Party's acts or omissions constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. If the Indemnified Party becomes involved in any action, proceeding, or investigation in connection with any matter arising out of or in connection with the Plan, this Agreement or the affairs of the Claimant Trust for which an indemnification obligation could arise, the Indemnified Party shall promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board, as applicable; provided, however, that the failure of an Indemnified Party to promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board of an indemnification obligation will not excuse the Claimant Trust from indemnifying the Indemnified Party unless such delay has caused the Claimant Trust material harm. The Claimant Trust shall pay, advance or otherwise reimburse on demand of an Indemnified Party the Indemnified Party's reasonable legal and other defense expenses (including, without limitation, the cost of any investigation and preparation and attorney fees, disbursements, and other expenses related to any claim that has been brought or threatened to be brought) incurred in connection therewith or in connection with enforcing his or her rights under this Section 8.2 as a Claimant Trust Expense, and the Claimant Trust shall not refuse to make any payments to the Indemnified Party on the assertion that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful misconduct or acted in bad faith; provided that the Indemnified Party shall be required to repay promptly to the Claimant Trust the amount of any such advanced or reimbursed expenses paid to the Indemnified Party to the extent that it shall be ultimately determined by Final Order that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful fraud, misconduct, or negligence in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust with respect to which such expenses were paid; provided, further, that any such repayment obligation shall be unsecured and interest free. The Claimant Trust shall indemnify and hold harmless the employees, agents and professionals of the Claimant Trust and Indemnified Parties to the same extent as provided in this Section 8.2 for the Indemnified Parties.

For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Section 8.2 shall remain available to any former Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, or Member or the estate of any decedent Claimant Trustee or Member, solely in their capacities as such. The indemnification provided hereby shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which the Indemnified Party may now or in the future be entitled to under the Plan or any applicable insurance policy. The failure of the Claimant Trust to pay or reimburse an Indemnified Party as required under this Section 8.2 shall constitute irreparable harm to the Indemnified Party and such Indemnified Party shall be entitled to specific performance of the obligations herein.

8.3 No Personal Liability. Except as otherwise provided herein, neither of the Trustees nor Members of the Oversight Board shall be subject to any personal liability whatsoever, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, to any Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust to the fullest extent provided under Section 3803 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, and all Persons asserting claims against the Claimant Trustee, Litigation Trustee, or any Members, or otherwise asserting claims of any nature in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, shall look solely to the Claimant Trust Assets for satisfaction of any such claims.

8.4 Other Protections. To the extent applicable and not otherwise addressed herein, the provisions and protections set forth in Article IX of the Plan will apply to the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trustee, and the Members.

ARTICLE IX.
TERMINATION

9.1 Duration. The Trustees, the Claimant Trust, and the Oversight Board shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as: (a) the Litigation Trustee determines that the pursuit of Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Estate Claims, (b) the Claimant Trustee determines that the pursuit of Causes of Action (other than Estate Claims) is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Causes of Action, (c) the Clamant Trustee determines that the pursuit of sales of other Claimant Trust Assets is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such sales of Claimant Trust Assets, (d) all objections to Disputed Claims and Equity Interests are fully resolved, (e) the Reorganized Debtor is dissolved, and (f) all Distributions required to be made by the Claimant Trustee to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries under the Plan have been made, but in no event shall the Claimant Trust be dissolved later than three years from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Claimant Trust Assets.

9.2 Distributions in Kind. Upon dissolution of the Claimant Trust, any remaining Claimant Trust Assets that exceed the amounts required to be paid under the Plan will be transferred (in the sole discretion of the Claimant Trustee) in Cash or in-kind to the Holders of the Claimant Trust Interests as provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

9.3 Continuance of the Claimant Trustee for Winding Up. After dissolution of the Claimant Trust and for purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee shall continue to act as such until the Claimant Trustee's duties have been fully performed. Prior to the final distribution of all remaining Claimant Trust Assets, the Claimant Trustee shall be entitled to reserve from such assets any and all amounts required to provide for the Claimant Trustee's own costs and expenses, including a reserve to fund any potential indemnification or similar obligations of the Claimant Trust, until such time as the winding up of the Claimant Trust is completed. Upon the dissolution of the Claimant Trust and completion of the winding up of the assets, liabilities and affairs of the Claimant Trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the Claimant Trustee shall file a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware to terminate the Claimant Trust pursuant to Section 3810 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (such date upon which the certificate of cancellation is filed shall be referred to as the "Termination Date"). Upon the Termination date, the Claimant Trustee shall retain for a period of two (2) years, as a Claimant Trust Expense, the books, records, Claimant Trust Beneficiary lists, and certificated and other documents and files that have been delivered to or created by the Claimant Trustee. At the Claimant Trustee's discretion, all of such records and documents may, but need not, be destroyed at any time after two (2) years from the Termination Date.

9.4 Termination of Duties. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, upon the Termination Date of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board and its Members shall have no further duties or obligations hereunder.

9.5 No Survival. The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries hereunder shall not survive the Termination Date, provided that such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are provided with notice of such Termination Date.

ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS AND WAIVER

The Claimant Trustee, with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board, may amend this Agreement to correct or clarify any non-material provisions. This Agreement may not otherwise be amended, supplemented, otherwise modified, or waived in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by the Claimant Trustee and with the unanimous approval of the Oversight Board, and the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing; provided that the Claimant Trustee must provide the Oversight Board with prior written notice of any non-material amendments, supplements, modifications, or waivers of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Trust Irrevocable. Except as set forth in this Agreement, establishment of the Claimant Trust by this Agreement shall be irrevocable and shall not be subject to revocation, cancellation or rescission by the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.2 Bankruptcy of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The dissolution, termination, bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar incapacity of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall not

permit any creditor, trustee, or any other Claimant Trust Beneficiary to obtain possession of, or exercise legal or equitable remedies with respect to, the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.3 Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have No Legal Title to Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have legal title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.4 Agreement for Benefit of Parties Only. Nothing herein, whether expressed or implied, shall be construed to give any Person other than the Claimant Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement. The Claimant Trust Assets shall be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.5 Notices. All notices, directions, instructions, confirmations, consents and requests required or permitted by the terms hereof shall, unless otherwise specifically provided herein, be in writing and shall be sent by first class mail, facsimile, overnight mail or in the case of mailing to a non-United States address, air mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

(a) If to the Claimant Trustee:

Claimant Trustee
c/o **[insert contact info for Claimant Trustee]**

With a copy to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd, 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey Pomerantz (jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com)
Ira Kharasch (ikharasch@pszjlaw.com)
Gregory Demo (gdemo@pszjlaw.com)

Notice mailed shall be effective on the date mailed or sent. Any Person may change the address at which it is to receive notices under this Agreement by furnishing written notice pursuant to the provisions of this Section 11.5 to the entity to be charged with knowledge of such change.

11.6 Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

11.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all such counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument.

11.8 Binding Effect, etc. All covenants and agreements contained herein shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, and the

Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and their respective successors and assigns. Any notice, direction, consent, waiver or other instrument or action by any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall bind its successors and assigns.

11.9 Headings; References. The headings of the various Sections herein are for convenience of reference only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or provisions hereof.

11.10 Governing Law. This Agreement shall in all respects be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, including all matters of constructions, validity and performance.

11.11 Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto, each Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board), and each Claimant Trust Beneficiary consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement, the Plan or any act or omission of the Claimant Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), Litigation Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), the Oversight Board. or any individual Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board); *provided, however*, that if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such action may be brought in the state or federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas.

11.12 Transferee Liabilities. The Claimant Trust shall have no liability for, and the Claimant Trust Assets shall not be subject to, any claim arising by, through or under the Debtor except as expressly set forth in the Plan or in this Agreement. In no event shall the Claimant Trustee or the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have any personal liability for such claims. If any liability shall be asserted against the Claimant Trust or the Claimant Trustee as the transferee of the Claimant Trust Assets on account of any claimed liability of, through or under the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee may use such part of the Claimant Trust Assets as may be necessary to contest any such claimed liability and to pay, compromise, settle or discharge same on terms reasonably satisfactory to the Claimant Trustee as a Claimant Trust Expense.

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IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Claimant Trust Agreement to be duly executed by their respective officers thereunto duly authorized on the day and year first written above.

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Restructuring Officer

Claimant Trustee

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr., not individually but solely in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee

EXHIBIT S

CLAIMANT TRUST AGREEMENT

This Claimant Trust Agreement, effective as of _____ , 2021 (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), by and among Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as debtor and debtor-in-possession, the "Debtor"), as settlor, and James P. Seery, Jr., as trustee (the "Claimant Trustee"), and [____] as Delaware trustee (the "Delaware Trustee," and together with the Debtor and the Claimant Trustee, the "Parties") for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to the Claimant Trust Assets.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management, L.P. filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case");

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Plan"),[1] which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on _____, 2021, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor [Docket No. •] (the "Confirmation Order");

WHEREAS, this Agreement, including all exhibits hereto, is the "Claimant Trust Agreement" described in the Plan and shall be executed on or before the Effective Date in order to facilitate implementation of the Plan; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Claimant Trust Assets are to be transferred to the Claimant Trust (each as defined herein) created and evidenced by this Agreement so that (i) the Claimant Trust Assets can be held in a trust for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled thereto in accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) for the objectives and purposes set forth herein and in the Plan; (ii) the Claimant Trust Assets can be monetized; (iii) the Claimant Trust will transfer Estate Claims to the Litigation Sub-Trust to be prosecuted, settled, abandoned, or resolved as may be determined by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, for the benefit of the Claimant Trust; (iv) proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets, including Estate Claims, may be distributed to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries[2] in accordance with the Plan; (v) the Claimant Trustee can resolve Disputed Claims as set forth herein and in the Plan; and (vi) administrative services relating to the activities of the Claimant Trust and relating to the implementation of the Plan can be performed by the Claimant Trustee.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, and as set forth in the Plan, Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests will be Claimant Trust Beneficiaries only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

DECLARATION OF TRUST

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to declare the terms and conditions hereof, and in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements herein contained, the confirmation of the Plan and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Debtor, the Claimant Trustee, and the Delaware Trustee have executed this Agreement for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries entitled to share in the Claimant Trust Assets and, at the direction of such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as provided for in the Plan.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Claimant Trustee and his successors or assigns in trust, under and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and for the performance of and compliance with the terms hereof and of the Plan; provided, however, that upon termination of the Claimant Trust in accordance with Article IX hereof, this Claimant Trust Agreement shall cease, terminate, and be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise specifically provided for herein.

IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED AND DECLARED that the Claimant Trust Assets are to be strictly held and applied by the Claimant Trustee subject to the specific terms set forth below.

ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION AND TERMS

1.1 Certain Definitions. Unless the context shall otherwise require and except as contained in this Section 1.1 or as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the "Definitions," Section 1.1 of the Plan or if not defined therein, shall have the meanings assigned thereto in the applicable Section of the Plan. For all purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Acis" means collectively, Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP.

(b) "Bankruptcy Court" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(c) "Cause" means (i) a Person's willful failure to perform his material duties hereunder (which material duties shall include, without limitation, with respect to a Member, or to the extent applicable, the Claimant Trustee, regular attendance at regularly scheduled meetings of the Oversight Board), which is not remedied within 30 days of notice; (ii) a Person's commission of an act of fraud, theft, or embezzlement during the performance of his or her duties hereunder; (iii) a Person's conviction of a felony (other than a felony that does not involve fraud, theft, embezzlement, or jail time) with all appeals having been exhausted or appeal periods lapsed; or (iv) a Person's gross negligence, bad faith, willful misconduct, or knowing violation of law in the performance of his or her duties hereunder.

(d) "Claimant Trust Agreement" means this Agreement.

(e) "Claimant Trustee" means James P. Seery, Jr., as the initial "Claimant Trustee" hereunder and as defined in the Plan, and any successor Claimant Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(f) "Claimant Trust" means the "Highland Claimant Trust" established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) pursuant to this Agreement.

(g) "Claimant Trust Assets" means (i) other than the Reorganized Debtor Assets (which are expressly excluded from this definition), all other Assets of the Estate, including, but not limited to, all Causes of Action, Available Cash, any proceeds realized or received from such Assets, all rights of setoff, recoupment, and other defenses with respect, relating to, or arising from such Assets, (ii) any Assets transferred by the Reorganized Debtor to the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date, (iii) the limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor, and (iv) the ownership interests in New GP LLC. For the avoidance of doubt, any Causes of Action that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust shall constitute Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(h) "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries" means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent applicable, post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests.

(i) "Claimant Trust Expense Cash Reserve" means $[•] million in Cash to be funded pursuant to the Plan into a bank account of the Claimant Trust on or before the Effective Date for the purpose of paying Claimant Trust Expenses in accordance herewith.

(j) "Claimant Trust Expenses" means the costs, expenses, liabilities and obligations incurred by the Claimant Trust and/or the Claimant Trustee in administering and conducting the affairs of the Claimant Trust, and otherwise carrying out the terms of the Claimant Trust and the Plan on behalf of the Claimant Trust, including without any limitation, any taxes owed by the Claimant Trust, and the fees and expenses of the Claimant Trustee and professional persons retained by the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee in accordance with this Agreement.

(k) "Committee Member" means a Member who is/was also a member of the Creditors' Committee.

(l) "Conflicted Member" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.6(c) hereof.

(m) "Contingent Trust Interests" means the contingent interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests in accordance with the Plan.

(n) "Creditors' Committee" means the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Chapter 11 Case, comprised of Acis, Meta-e Discovery, the Redeemer Committee and UBS.

(o) "Delaware Statutory Trust Act" means the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del C. §3801, et seq. as amended from time to time.

(p) "Delaware Trustee" has the meaning set forth in the introduction hereof.

(q) "Disability" means as a result of the Claimant Trustee's or a Member's incapacity due to physical or mental illness as determined by an accredited physician or psychologist, as applicable, selected by the Claimant Trustee or the Member, as applicable, the Claimant Trustee or such Member has been substantially unable to perform his or her duties hereunder for three (3) consecutive months or for an aggregate of 180 days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.

(r) "Disinterested Members" has the meaning set forth in Section 4.1 hereof.

(s) "Disputed Claims Reserve" means the reserve account to be opened by the Claimant Trust on or after the Effective Date and funded in an initial amount determined by the Claimant Trustee [(in a manner consistent with the Plan and with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board)] to be sufficient to pay Disputed Claims under the Plan.

(t) "Employees" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

(u) "Employee Claims" means any General Unsecured Claim held by an Employee other than the Claims of the Senior Employees subject to stipulations (provided such stipulations are executed by any such Senior Employee of the Debtor prior to the Effective Date).

(v) "Estate Claims" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [Docket No. 354].

(w) "Equity Trust Interests" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(x) "Exchange Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

(y) "General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests" means interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (including Disputed General Unsecured Claims that are subsequently Allowed) in accordance with the Plan.

(z) "GUC Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests.

(aa) "GUC Payment Certification" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.1(c) hereof.

(bb) "HarbourVest" means, collectively, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners, L.P.

(cc) "Investment Advisers Act" means the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended.

(dd) "Investment Company Act" means the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

(ee) "Litigation Sub-Trust" means the sub-trust created pursuant to the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, which shall hold the Claimant Trust Assets that are Estate Claims and investigate, litigate, and/or settle the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust.

(ff) "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" means the litigation sub-trust agreement to be entered into by and between the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee establishing and setting forth the terms and conditions of the Litigation Sub-Trust and governing the rights and responsibilities of the Litigation Trustee.

(gg) "Litigation Trustee" means Marc S. Kirschner, and any successor Litigation Trustee that may be appointed pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, who shall be responsible for investigating, litigating, and settling the Estate Claims for the benefit of the Claimant Trust in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement.

(hh) "Managed Funds" means Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., and any other investment vehicle managed by the Debtor pursuant to an Executory Contract assumed pursuant to the Plan; *provided, however,* that the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P. (and its direct and indirect subsidiaries) will not be considered a Managed Fund for purposes hereof.

(ii) "Material Claims" means the Claims asserted by UBS, Patrick Hagaman Daugherty, Integrated Financial Associates, Inc., and the Employees.

(jj) "Member" means a Person that is member of the Oversight Board.

(kk) "New GP LLC" means the general partner of the Reorganized Debtor.

(ll) "Oversight Board" means the board comprised of five (5) Members established pursuant to the Plan and Article III of this Agreement to oversee the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties and otherwise serve the functions set forth in this Agreement and those of the "Claimant Trust Oversight Committee" described in the Plan. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the initial Members of the Oversight Board shall be: (i) Eric Felton, as representative of the Redeemer Committee; (ii) Josh Terry, as representative of Acis; (iii) Elizabeth Kozlowski, as representative of UBS; (iv) Paul McVoy, as representative of Meta-e Discovery; and (v) David Pauker.

(mm) "Plan" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(nn) "Privileges" means the Debtor's rights, title and interests in and to any privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications (whether written or oral) associated with any of the Estate Claims or Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to, attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege as defined in Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; provided, however, that "Privileges" shall not include the work-product privilege of any non-Employee attorney or attorneys that has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees and the work-product privilege shall remain with the non-Employee attorney or attorneys who created such work product so long as it has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees, or otherwise waived.

(oo) "PSZJ" means Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP.

(pp) "Redeemer Committee" means the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund.

(qq) "Registrar" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(a) hereof.

(rr) "Reorganized Debtor Assets" means any limited and general partnership interests held by the Debtor, the management of the Managed Funds and those Causes of Action (including, without limitation, claims for breach of fiduciary duty), that, for any reason, are not capable of being transferred to the Claimant Trust. For the avoidance of doubt, "Reorganized Debtor Assets" includes any partnership interests or shares of Managed Funds held by the Debtor but does not include the underlying portfolio assets held by the Managed Funds.

(ss) "Securities Act" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(tt) "Subordinated Beneficiaries" means the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries who hold Subordinated Claim Trust Interests.

(uu) "Subordinated Claim Trust Interests" means the subordinated interests in the Claimant Trust to be distributed to Holders of Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claims in accordance with the Plan.

(vv) "TIA" means the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended.

(ww) "Trust Interests" means collectively the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests, Subordinated Claim Trust Interests, and Equity Trust Interests.

(xx) "Trust Register" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(b) hereof.

(yy) "Trustees" means collectively the Claimant Trustee and Delaware Trustee.

(zz) "UBS" means collectively UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

(aaa) "WilmerHale" Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

1.2 General Construction. As used in this Agreement, the masculine, feminine and neuter genders, and the plural and singular numbers shall be deemed to include the others in all cases where they would apply. "Includes" and "including" are not limiting and "or" is not exclusive. References to "Articles," "Sections" and other subdivisions, unless referring specifically to the Plan or provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or other law, statute or regulation, refer to the corresponding Articles, Sections and other subdivisions of this Agreement, and the words "herein," "hereafter" and words of similar import refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular Article, Section, or subdivision of this Agreement. Amounts expressed in dollars or following the symbol "$" shall be deemed to be in United States dollars. References to agreements or instruments shall be deemed to refer to such agreements or instruments as the same may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms thereof.

1.3 Incorporation of the Plan. The Plan is hereby incorporated into this Agreement and made a part hereof by this reference.

ARTICLE II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CLAIMANT TRUST

2.1 Creation of Name of Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is hereby created as a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and shall be called the "Highland Claimant Trust." The Claimant Trustee shall be empowered to conduct all business and hold all property constituting the Claimant Trust Assets in such name in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.

(b) The Trustees shall cause to be executed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware the Certificate of Trust and agree to execute, acting solely in their capacity as Trustees, such certificates as may from time to time be required under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act or any other Delaware law.

2.2 Objectives.

(a) The Claimant Trust is established for the purpose of satisfying Allowed General Unsecured Claims and Allowed Subordinated Claims (and only to the extent provided herein, Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests and Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) under the Plan, by monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets transferred to it and making distributions to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust shall not continue or engage in any trade or business except to the extent reasonably necessary to monetize and distribute the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with this Agreement and the Plan and act as sole member and manager of New GP LLC. The Claimant Trust shall provide a mechanism for (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets and (ii) the distribution of the proceeds thereof, net of all claims, expenses, charges, liabilities, and obligations of the Claimant Trust, to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with the Plan. In furtherance of this distribution objective, the Claimant Trust will, from time to time, prosecute and resolve objections to certain Claims and Interests as provided herein and in the Plan.

(b) It is intended that the Claimant Trust be classified for federal income tax purposes as a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of section 301.7701-4(d) of the Treasury Regulations. In furtherance of this objective, the Claimant Trustee shall, in his business judgment, make continuing best efforts to (i) dispose of or monetize the Claimant Trust Assets and resolve Claims, (ii) make timely distributions, and (iii) not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust, in each case in accordance with this Agreement.

2.3 Nature and Purposes of the Claimant Trust.

(a) The Claimant Trust is organized and established as a trust for the purpose of monetizing the Claimant Trust Assets and making distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in a manner consistent with "liquidating trust" status under Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d). The Claimant Trust shall retain all rights to commence and pursue all Causes of Action of the Debtor other than (i) Estate Claims, which shall be assigned to and commenced and pursued by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (ii) Causes of Action constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets, if any, which shall be commenced and pursued by the Reorganized Debtor at the direction of the Claimant Trust as sole member of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement. The Claimant Trust and Claimant Trustee shall have and retain, and, as applicable, assign and transfer to the Litigation Sub-Trust and Litigation Trustee, any and all rights, defenses, cross-claims and counter-claims held by the Debtor with respect to any Claim as of the Petition Date. On and after the date hereof, in accordance with and subject to the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the authority to (i) compromise, settle or otherwise resolve, or withdraw any objections to Claims against the Debtor, provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall only have the authority to compromise or settle any Employee Claim with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board and in the absence of unanimous consent, any such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust and be litigated, comprised, settled, or otherwise resolved exclusively by the Litigation Trustee and (ii) compromise, settle, or otherwise resolve any Disputed Claims without approval of the Bankruptcy Court, which authority may be shared with or transferred to the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant Trust, pursuant to section

1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state trust law, is appointed as the successor-in-interest to, and representative of, the Debtor and its Estate for the retention, enforcement, settlement, and adjustment of all Claims other than Estate Claims, the Employee Claims, and those Claims constituting Reorganized Debtor Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trust shall be administered by the Claimant Trustee, in accordance with this Agreement, for the following purposes:

(i) to manage and monetize the Claimant Trust Assets in an expeditious but orderly manner with a view towards maximizing value within a reasonable time period;

(ii) to litigate and settle Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 (other than the Employee Claims, which shall be litigated and/or settled by the Litigation Trustee if the Oversight Board does not unanimously approve of any proposed settlement of such Employee Claim by the Claimant Trustee) and any of the Causes of Action included in the Claimant Trust Assets (including any cross-claims and counter-claims); provided, however, that Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be litigated and settled by the Litigation Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement;

(iii) to distribute net proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries;

(iv) to distribute funds from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Trust Interests or to the Reorganized Debtor for distribution to Holders of Disputed Claims in each case in accordance with the Plan from time to time as any such Holder's Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(v) to distribute funds to the Litigation Sub-Trust at the direction the Oversight Board;

(vi) to serve as the limited partner of, and to hold the limited partnership interests in, the Reorganized Debtor;

(vii) to serve as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC, the Reorganized Debtor's general partner;

(viii) to oversee the management and monetization of the Reorganized Debtor Assets pursuant to the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement, in its capacity as the sole member and manager of New GP LLC pursuant to the terms of the New GP LLC Documents, all with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time in a manner consistent with the Reorganized Debtor's fiduciary duties as investment adviser to the Managed Funds; and

(ix) to perform any other functions and take any other actions provided for or permitted by this Agreement and the Plan, and in any other agreement executed by the Claimant Trustee.

2.4 Transfer of Assets and Rights to the Claimant Trust; Litigation Sub-Trust.

(a) On the Effective Date, pursuant to the Plan, the Debtor shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Claimant Trust Assets and related Privileges held by the Debtor to the Claimant Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan and this Agreement. To the extent certain assets comprising the Claimant Trust Assets, because of their nature or because such assets will accrue or become transferable subsequent to the Effective Date, and cannot be transferred to, vested in, and assumed by the Claimant Trust on such date, such assets shall be considered Reorganized Debtor Assets, which may be subsequently transferred to the Claimant Trust by the Reorganized Debtor consistent with the terms of the Reorganized Limited Partnership Agreement after such date.

(b) On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Estate Claims and related Privileges held by the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Trust free and clear of all Claims, Interests, Liens, and other encumbrances, and liabilities, except as provided in the Plan, this Agreement, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement. Following the transfer of such Privileges, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power to waive the Privileges being so assigned and transferred.

(c) On or before the Effective Date, and continuing thereafter, the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, shall provide (i) for the Claimant Trustee's and Litigation Trustee's reasonable access to all records and information in the Debtor's and Reorganized Debtor's possession, custody or control, (ii) that all Privileges related to the Claimant Trust Assets shall transfer to and vest exclusively in the Claimant Trust (except for those Privileges that will be transferred and assigned to the Litigation Sub-Trust in respect of the Estate Claims), and (iii) subject to Section 3.12(c), the Debtor and Reorganized Debtor shall preserve all records and documents (including all electronic records or documents), including, but not limited to, the Debtor's file server, email server, email archiving system, master journal, SharePoint, Oracle E-Business Suite, Advent Geneva, Siepe database, Bloomberg chat data, and any backups of the foregoing, until such time as the Claimant Trustee, with the consent of the Oversight Board and, if pertaining to any of the Estate Claims, the Litigation Trustee, directs the Reorganized Debtor, as sole member of its general partner, that such records are no longer required to be preserved. For the purposes of transfer of documents, the Claimant Trust or Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, is an assignee and successor to the Debtor in respect of the Claimant Trust Assets and Estate Claims, respectively, and shall be treated as such in any review of confidentiality restrictions in requested documents.

(d) Until the Claimant Trust terminates pursuant to the terms hereof, legal title to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims) and all property contained therein shall be vested at all times in the Claimant Trust as a separate legal entity, except where applicable law in any jurisdiction requires title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, in which case title shall be deemed to be vested in the Claimant Trustee, solely in his capacity as Claimant Trustee. For purposes of such jurisdictions, the term Claimant Trust, as used herein, shall be read to mean the Claimant Trustee.

2.5 Principal Office. The principal office of the Claimant Trust shall be maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the following address:[_____].

2.6 Acceptance. The Claimant Trustee accepts the Claimant Trust imposed by this Agreement and agrees to observe and perform that Claimant Trust, on and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

2.7 Further Assurances. The Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, and any successors thereof will, upon reasonable request of the Claimant Trustee, execute, acknowledge and deliver such further instruments and do such further acts as may be necessary or proper to transfer to the Claimant Trustee any portion of the Claimant Trust Assets intended to be conveyed hereby and in the Plan in the form and manner provided for hereby and in the Plan and to vest in the Claimant Trustee the powers, instruments or funds in trust hereunder.

2.8 Incidents of Ownership. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be the sole beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall retain only such incidents of ownership as are necessary to undertake the actions and transactions authorized herein.

ARTICLE III.
THE TRUSTEES

3.1 Role. In furtherance of and consistent with the purpose of the Claimant Trust, the Plan, and this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, in the Plan, and in the Confirmation Order, shall serve as Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets for the benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and maintain, manage, and take action on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

3.2 Authority.

(a) In connection with the administration of the Claimant Trust, in addition to any and all of the powers enumerated elsewhere herein, the Claimant Trustee shall, in an expeditious but orderly manner, monetize the Claimant Trust Assets, make timely distributions and not unduly prolong the duration of the Claimant Trust. The Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority and is authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement and the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order relating to the Claimant Trust, within the bounds of this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable law. The Claimant Trustee will monetize the Claimant Trust Assets with a view toward maximizing value in a reasonable time.

(b) The Claimant Trustee, subject to the limitations set forth in Section 3.3 of this Agreement shall have the right to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, estimate, or otherwise deal with and settle any and all Claims and Causes of Action that are part of the Claimant Trust Assets, other than the Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust, as the Claimant Trustee determines is in the best interests of the Claimant Trust; provided, however, that if the Claimant Trustee proposes a settlement of an Employee Claim and does not obtain unanimous consent of the Oversight Board of such settlement, such Employee Claim shall be transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust for the Litigation Trustee to litigate. To the extent that

any action has been taken to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, or otherwise deal with and settle any such Claims and Causes of Action prior to the Effective Date, on the Effective Date the Claimant Trustee shall be substituted for the Debtor in connection therewith in accordance with Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7025 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the caption with respect to such pending action shall be changed to the following "[Claimant Trustee], not individually but solely as Claimant Trustee for the Claimant Trust, et al. v. [Defendant]".

(c) Subject in all cases to any limitations contained herein, in the Confirmation Order, or in the Plan, the Claimant Trustee shall have the power and authority to:

(i) solely as required by Section 2.4(c), hold legal title to any and all rights of the Claimant Trust and Beneficiaries in or arising from the Claimant Trust Assets, including collecting and receiving any and all money and other property belonging to the Claimant Trust and the right to vote or exercise any other right with respect to any claim or interest relating to the Claimant Trust Assets in any case under the Bankruptcy Code and receive any distribution with respect thereto;

(ii) open accounts for the Claimant Trust and make distributions of Claimant Trust Assets in accordance herewith;

(iii) as set forth in Section 3.11, exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties held by the Debtor with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets (other than Estate Claims), including the authority under section 1123(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, and shall be deemed to be acting as a representative of the Debtor's Estate with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, including with respect to the sale, transfer, or other disposition of the Claimant Trust Assets;

(iv) settle or resolve any Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 other than the Material Claims and any Equity Interests;

(v) sell or otherwise monetize any publicly-traded asset for which there is a marketplace and any other assets (other than the Other Assets (as defined below)) valued less than or equal to $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(vi) upon the direction of the Oversight Board, fund the Litigation Sub-Trust on the Effective Date and as necessary thereafter;

(vii) exercise and perform the rights, powers, and duties arising from the Claimant Trust's role as sole member of New GP LLC, and the role of New GP LLC, as general partner of the Reorganized Debtor, including the management of the Managed Funds;

(viii) protect and enforce the rights to the Claimant Trust Assets by any method deemed appropriate, including by judicial proceedings or pursuant to any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium or similar law and general principles of equity;

(ix) obtain reasonable insurance coverage with respect to any liabilities and obligations of the Trustees, Litigation Trustee, and the Members of the Oversight Board

solely in their capacities as such, in the form of fiduciary liability insurance, a directors and officers policy, an errors and omissions policy, or otherwise. The cost of any such insurance shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(x) without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, but subject to the terms of this Agreement, employ various consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals, including counsel, tax advisors, consultants, brokers, investment bankers, valuation counselors, and financial advisors, as the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to aid him in fulfilling his obligations under this Agreement; such consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals shall be retained pursuant to whatever fee arrangement the Claimant Trustee deems appropriate, including contingency fee arrangements and any fees and expenses incurred by such professionals engaged by the Claimant Trustee shall be Claimant Trust Expenses and paid by the Claimant Trustee from the Claimant Trust Assets;

(xi) retain and approve compensation arrangements of an independent public accounting firm to perform such reviews and/or audits of the financial books and records of the Claimant Trust as may be required by this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable laws and as may be reasonably and appropriate in Claimant Trustee's discretion. Subject to the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee may commit the Claimant Trust to, and shall pay, such independent public accounting firm reasonable compensation for services rendered and reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred, and all such compensation and reimbursement shall be paid by the Claimant Trustee from Claimant Trust Assets;

(xii) prepare and file (A) tax returns for the Claimant Trust treating the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.671-4(a), (B) an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity, or (C) any periodic or current reports that may be required under applicable law;

(xiii) prepare and send annually to the Beneficiaries, in accordance with the tax laws, a separate statement stating a Beneficiary's interest in the Claimant Trust and its share of the Claimant Trust's income, gain, loss, deduction or credit, and to instruct all such Beneficiaries to report such items on their federal tax returns;

(xiv) to the extent applicable, assert, enforce, release, or waive any attorney-client communication, attorney work product or other Privilege or defense on behalf of the Claimant Trust (including as to any Privilege that the Debtor held prior to the Effective Date), including to provide any information to insurance carriers that the Claimant Trustee deems necessary to utilize applicable insurance coverage for any Claim or Claims;

(xv) subject to Section 3.4, invest the proceeds of the Claimant Trust Assets and all income earned by the Claimant Trust, pending any distributions in short-term certificates of deposit, in banks or other savings institutions, or other temporary, liquid investments, such as Treasury bills;

(xvi) request any appropriate tax determination with respect to the Claimant Trust, including a determination pursuant to section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code;

(xvii) take or refrain from taking any and all actions the Claimant Trustee reasonably deems necessary for the continuation, protection, and maximization of the value of the Claimant Trust Assets consistent with purposes hereof;

(xviii) take all steps and execute all instruments and documents necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Claimant Trust and the activities contemplated herein and in the Confirmation Order and the Plan, and take all actions necessary to comply with the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement and the obligations thereunder and hereunder;

(xix) exercise such other powers and authority as may be vested in or assumed by the Claimant Trustee by any Final Order;

(xx) evaluate and determine strategy with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, and hold, pursue, prosecute, adjust, arbitrate, compromise, release, settle or abandon the Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust; and

(xxi) with respect to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, perform all duties and functions of the Distribution Agent as set forth in the Plan, including distributing Cash from the Disputed Claims Reserve, solely on account of Disputed Class 1 through Class 7 Claims that were Disputed as of the Effective Date, but become Allowed, to the Reorganization Debtor such that the Reorganized Debtor can satisfy its duties and functions as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through Class 7 (the foregoing subparagraphs (i)-(xxi) being collectively, the "Authorized Acts").

(d) The Claimant Trustee and the Oversight Committee will enter into an agreement as soon as practicable after the Effective Date concerning the Claimant Trustee's authority with respect to certain other assets, including certain portfolio company assets (the "Other Assets").

(e) The Claimant Trustee has the power and authority to act as trustee of the Claimant Trust and perform the Authorized Acts through the date such Claimant Trustee resigns, is removed, or is otherwise unable to serve for any reason.

3.3 Limitation of Authority.

(a) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee shall not (i) be authorized to engage in any trade or business, (ii) take any actions inconsistent with the management of the Claimant Trust Assets as are required or contemplated by applicable law, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement, (iii) take any action in contravention of the Confirmation Order, the Plan, or this Agreement, or (iv) cause New GP LLC to cause the Reorganized Debtor to take any action in contravention of the Plan, Plan Documents or the Confirmation Order.

(b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and in no way limiting the terms of the Plan, the Claimant Trustee must receive the consent by vote of a simple majority

of the Oversight Board pursuant to the notice and quorum requirements set forth in Section 4.5 herein, in order to:

(i) terminate or extend the term of the Claimant Trust;

(ii) prosecute, litigate, settle or otherwise resolve any of the Material Claims;

(iii) except otherwise set forth herein, sell or otherwise monetize any assets that are not Other Assets, including Reorganized Debtor Assets (other than with respect to the Managed Funds), that are valued greater than $3,000,000 (over a thirty-day period);

(iv) except for cash distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any cash distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Article IV of the Plan;

(v) except for any distributions made in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, make any distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve to Holders of Disputed Claims after such time that such Holder's Claim becomes an Allowed Claim under the Plan;

(vi) reserve or retain any cash or cash equivalents in an amount reasonably necessary to meet claims and contingent liabilities (including Disputed Claims and any indemnification obligations that may arise under Section 8.2 of this Agreement), to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, or to fund ongoing operations and administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(vii) borrow as may be necessary to fund activities of the Claimant Trust;

(viii) determine whether the conditions under Section 5.1(c) of this Agreement have been satisfied such that a certification should be filed with the Bankruptcy Court;

(ix) invest the Claimant Trust Assets, proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust (for the avoidance of doubt, this shall not apply to investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor or its subsidiaries solely with respect to Managed Funds);

(x) change the compensation of the Claimant Trustee;

(xi) subject to ARTICLE X, make structural changes to the Claimant Trust or take other actions to minimize any tax on the Claimant Trust Assets; and

(xii) retain counsel, experts, advisors, or any other professionals; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to obtain the consent of the Oversight Board for the retention of (i) PSZJ, WilmerHale, or Development Specialists, Inc. and

(ii) any other professional whose expected fees and expenses are estimated at less than or equal to $200,000.

(c) [Reserved.]

3.4 Investment of Cash. The right and power of the Claimant Trustee to invest the Claimant Trust Assets, the proceeds thereof, or any income earned by the Claimant Trust, with majority approval of the Oversight Board, shall be limited to the right and power to invest in such Claimant Trust Assets only in Cash and U.S. Government securities as defined in section 29(a)(16) of the Investment Company Act; provided, however that (a) the scope of any such permissible investments shall be further limited to include only those investments that a "liquidating trust" within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d), may be permitted to hold, pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, or any modification in the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") guidelines, whether set forth in IRS rulings, other IRS pronouncements, or otherwise, (b) the Claimant Trustee may retain any Claimant Trust Assets received that are not Cash only for so long as may be required for the prompt and orderly monetization or other disposition of such assets, and (c) the Claimant Trustee may expend the assets of the Claimant Trust (i) as reasonably necessary to meet contingent liabilities (including indemnification and similar obligations) and maintain the value of the assets of the Claimant Trust during the pendency of this Claimant Trust, (ii) to pay Claimant Trust Expenses (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on the Claimant Trust and reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses in connection with litigation), and (iii) to satisfy other liabilities incurred or assumed by the Claimant Trust (or to which the assets are otherwise subject) in accordance with the Plan or this Agreement).

3.5 Binding Nature of Actions. All actions taken and determinations made by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon any and all Beneficiaries.

3.6 Term of Service. The Claimant Trustee shall serve as the Claimant Trustee for the duration of the Claimant Trust, subject to death, resignation or removal.

3.7 Resignation. The Claimant Trustee may resign as Claimant Trustee of the Claimant Trust by an instrument in writing delivered to the Bankruptcy Court and Oversight Board at least thirty (30) days before the proposed effective date of resignation. The Claimant Trustee shall continue to serve as Claimant Trustee after delivery of the Claimant Trustee's resignation until the proposed effective date of such resignation, unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board consent to an earlier effective date, which earlier effective date shall be no earlier than the date of appointment of a successor Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.9 hereof becomes effective.

3.8 Removal.

(a) The Claimant Trustee may be removed by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board for Cause for Cause immediately upon notice thereof, or without Cause upon 60 days' prior written notice. Upon the removal of the Claimant Trustee pursuant hereto, the Claimant Trustee will resign, or be deemed to have resigned, from any role or position he or she

may have at New GP LLC or the Reorganized Debtor effective upon the expiration of the foregoing 60 day period unless the Claimant Trustee and a simple majority of the Oversight Board agree otherwise.

(b) To the extent there is any dispute regarding the removal of a Claimant Trustee (including any dispute relating to any compensation or expense reimbursement due under this Agreement) the Bankruptcy Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate such dispute. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will continue to serve as the Claimant Trustee after his removal until the earlier of (i) the time when a successor Claimant Trustee will become effective in accordance with Section 3.9 of this Agreement or (ii) such date as the Bankruptcy Court otherwise orders.

3.9 Appointment of Successor.

(a) Appointment of Successor. In the event of a vacancy by reason of the death or Disability (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is a natural person), dissolution (in the case of a Claimant Trustee that is not a natural person), or removal of the Claimant Trustee, or prospective vacancy by reason of resignation, a successor Claimant Trustee shall be selected by a simple majority vote of the Oversight Board. If Members of the Oversight Board are unable to secure a majority vote, the Bankruptcy Court will determine the successor Claimant Trustee on motion of the Members. If a final decree has been entered closing the Chapter 11 Case, the Claimant Trustee may seek to reopen the Chapter 11 Case for the limited purpose of determining the successor Claimant Trustee, and the costs for such motion and costs related to re-opening the Chapter 11 Case shall be paid by the Claimant Trust. The successor Claimant Trustee shall be appointed as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than sixty (60) days after the occurrence of the vacancy or, in the case of resignation, on the effective date of the resignation of the then acting Claimant Trustee.

(b) Vesting or Rights in Successor Claimant Trustee. Every successor Claimant Trustee appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trust, the exiting Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board, and file with the Bankruptcy Court, an instrument accepting such appointment subject to the terms and provisions hereof. The successor Claimant Trustee, without any further act, deed, or conveyance shall become vested with all the rights, powers, trusts and duties of the exiting Claimant Trustee, except that the successor Claimant Trustee shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of the retiring Claimant Trustee. In no event shall the retiring Claimant Trustee be liable for the acts or omissions of the successor Claimant Trustee.

(c) Interim Claimant Trustee. During any period in which there is a vacancy in the position of Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board shall appoint one of its Members to serve as the interim Claimant Trustee (the "Interim Trustee") until a successor Claimant Trustee is appointed pursuant to Section 3.9(a). The Interim Trustee shall be subject to all the terms and conditions applicable to a Claimant Trustee hereunder. Such Interim Trustee shall not be limited in any manner from exercising any rights or powers as a Member of the Oversight Board merely by such Person's appointment as Interim Trustee.

3.10 Continuance of Claimant Trust. The death, resignation, or removal of the Claimant Trustee shall not operate to terminate the Claimant Trust created by this Agreement or to revoke any existing agency (other than any agency of the Claimant Trustee as the Claimant Trustee) created pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or invalidate any action taken by the Claimant Trustee. In the event of the resignation or removal of the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall promptly (i) execute and deliver, by the effective date of resignation or removal, such documents, instruments, records, and other writings as may be reasonably requested by his successor to effect termination of the exiting Claimant Trustee's capacity under this Agreement and the conveyance of the Claimant Trust Assets then held by the exiting Claimant Trustee to the successor Claimant Trustee; (ii) deliver to the successor Claimant Trustee all non-privileged documents, instruments, records, and other writings relating to the Claimant Trust as may be in the possession or under the control of the exiting Claimant Trustee, provided, the exiting Claimant Trustee shall have the right to make and retain copies of such documents, instruments, records and other writings delivered to the successor Claimant Trustee and the cost of making such copies shall be a Claimant Trust Expense to be paid by the Claimant Trust; and (iii) otherwise assist and cooperate in effecting the assumption of the exiting Claimant Trustee's obligations and functions by his successor, provided the fees and expenses of such assistance and cooperation shall be paid to the exiting Claimant Trustee by the Claimant Trust. The exiting Claimant Trustee shall irrevocably appoint the successor Claimant Trustee as his attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution for it and its name, place and stead to do any and all acts that such exiting Claimant Trustee is obligated to perform under this Section 3.10.

3.11 Claimant Trustee as "Estate Representative". The Claimant Trustee will be the exclusive trustee of the Claimant Trust Assets for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Estate Representative") with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets, with all rights and powers attendant thereto, in addition to all rights and powers granted in the Plan and in this Agreement; provided that all rights and powers as representative of the Estate pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) shall be transferred to the Litigation Trustee in respect of the Estate Claims and the Employee Claims. The Claimant Trustee will be the successor-in-interest to the Debtor with respect to any action pertaining to the Claimant Trust Assets, which was or could have been commenced by the Debtor prior to the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or Confirmation Order. All actions, claims, rights or interest constituting Claimant Trust Assets are preserved and retained and may be enforced, or assignable to the Litigation Sub-Trust, by the Claimant Trustee as an Estate Representative.

3.12 Books and Records.

(a) The Claimant Trustee shall maintain in respect of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries books and records reflecting Claimant Trust Assets in its possession and the income of the Claimant Trust and payment of expenses, liabilities, and claims against or assumed by the Claimant Trust in such detail and for such period of time as may be necessary to enable it to make full and proper accounting in respect thereof. Such books and records shall be maintained as reasonably necessary to facilitate compliance with the tax reporting requirements of the Claimant Trust and the requirements of Article VII herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Claimant Trustee to file any

accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Claimant Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Claimant Trust Assets.

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall provide quarterly reporting to the Oversight Board and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of (i) the status of the Claimant Trust Assets, (ii) the balance of Cash held by the Claimant Trust (including in each of the Claimant Trust Expense Reserve and Disputed Claim Reserve), (iii) the determination and any re-determination, as applicable, of the total amount allocated to the Disputed Claim Reserve, (iv) the status of Disputed Claims and any resolutions thereof, (v) the status of any litigation, including the pursuit of the Causes of Action, (vi) the Reorganized Debtor's performance, and (vii) operating expenses; provided, however, that the Claimant Trustee may, with respect to any Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trust Beneficiary, redact any portion of such reports that relate to such Entity's Claim or Equity Interest, as applicable and any reporting provided to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries may be subject to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's agreement to maintain confidentiality with respect to any non-public information.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may dispose some or all of the books and records maintained by the Claimant Trustee at the later of (i) such time as the Claimant Trustee determines, with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board, that the continued possession or maintenance of such books and records is no longer necessary for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, or (ii) upon the termination and winding up of the Claimant Trust under Article IX of this Agreement; provided, however, the Claimant Trustee shall not dispose of any books and records related to the Estate Claims or Employee Claims without the consent of the Litigation Trustee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee shall cause the Reorganized Debtor and its subsidiaries to retain such books and records, and for such periods, as are required to be retained pursuant to Section 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act or any other applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

3.13 Compensation and Reimbursement; Engagement of Professionals.

(a) Compensation and Expenses.

(i) Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Claimant Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall receive compensation of $150,000 per month (the "Base Salary"). Within the first forty-five days following the Confirmation Date, ~~including any severance, as agreed to by~~ the Claimant Trustee, on the one hand, and the Committee, if ~~agreed upon~~ prior to the Effective Date, or the Oversight Board, if ~~agreed upon~~ on or after the Effective Date~~.~~, on the other, will negotiate go-forward compensation for the Claimant Trustee which will include (a) the Base Salary, (b) a success fee, and (c) severance.

(ii) Expense Reimbursements. All reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the Claimant Trustee in the performance of his or her duties hereunder, shall be reimbursed as Claimant Trust Expenses paid by the Claimant Trust.

(b) Professionals.

(i) Engagement of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall engage professionals from time to time in conjunction with the services provided hereunder. The Claimant Trustee's engagement of such professionals shall be approved by a majority of the Oversight Board as set forth in Section 3.3(b) hereof.

(ii) Fees and Expenses of Professionals. The Claimant Trustee shall pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any retained professionals as Claimant Trust Expenses.

3.14 Reliance by Claimant Trustee. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Claimant Trustee may rely, and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting, on any resolution, statement, certificate, instrument, opinion, report, notice, request, consent, order or other instrument or document that the Claimant Trustee has no reason to believe to be other than genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties or, in the case of facsimiles, to have been sent by the proper party or parties, and the Claimant Trustee may conclusively rely as to the truth of the statements and correctness of the opinions or direction expressed therein. The Claimant Trustee may consult with counsel and other professionals, and any advice of such counsel or other professionals shall constitute full and complete authorization and protection in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trustee shall have the right at any time to seek instructions from the Bankruptcy Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction concerning the Claimant Trust Assets, this Agreement, the Plan, or any other document executed in connection therewith, and any such instructions given shall be full and complete authorization in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Claimant Trustee in accordance therewith. The Claimant Trust shall have the right to seek Orders from the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in Article IX of the Plan.

3.15 Commingling of Claimant Trust Assets. The Claimant Trustee shall not commingle any of the Claimant Trust Assets with his or her own property or the property of any other Person.

3.16 Delaware Trustee. The Delaware Trustee shall have the power and authority, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to (i) accept legal process served on the Claimant Trust in the State of Delaware; and (ii) execute any certificates that are required to be executed under the Statutory Trust Act and file such certificates in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, and take such action or refrain from taking such action under this Agreement as may be directed in a writing delivered to the Delaware Trustee by the Claimant Trustee; provided, however, that the Delaware Trustee shall not be required to take or to refrain from taking any such action if the Delaware Trustee shall believe, or shall have been advised by counsel, that such performance is likely to involve the Delaware Trustee in personal liability or to result in personal liability to the Delaware Trustee, or is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes a party or is otherwise contrary to law. The Parties agree not to instruct the Delaware Trustee to take any action or to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Claimant Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes party or that is otherwise contrary to law. Other than as

expressly provided for in this Agreement, the Delaware Trustee shall have no duty or power to take any action for or on behalf of the Claimant Trust.

ARTICLE IV.
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD

4.1 Oversight Board Members. The Oversight Board will be comprised of five (5) Members appointed to serve as the board of managers of the Claimant Trust, at least two (2) of which shall be disinterested Members selected by the Creditors' Committee (such disinterested members, the "Disinterested Members"). The initial Members of the Oversight Board will be representatives of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, Meta-e Discovery, UBS, and David Pauker. David Pauker and Paul McVoy, the representative of Meta-e Discovery, shall serve as the initial Disinterested Board Members; provided, however, that if the Plan is confirmed with the Convenience Class or any other convenience class supported by the Creditors' Committee, Meta-E Discovery and its representative will resign on the Effective Date or as soon as practicable thereafter and be replaced in accordance with Section 4.10 hereof..

4.2 Authority and Responsibilities.

(a) The Oversight Board shall, as and when requested by either of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, or when the Members otherwise deem it to be appropriate or as is otherwise required under the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement, consult with and advise the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee as to the administration and management of the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust, as applicable, in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, this Agreement, and Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement (as applicable) and shall have the other responsibilities and powers as set forth herein. As set forth in the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and herein, the Oversight Board shall have the authority and responsibility to oversee, review, and govern the activities of the Claimant Trust, including the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the performance of the Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee, and shall have the authority to remove the Claimant Trustee in accordance with Section 3.7 hereof or the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; provided, however, that the Oversight Board may not direct either Claimant Trustee and Litigation Trustee to act inconsistently with their respective duties under this Agreement (including without limitation as set in Section 4.2(e) below), the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or applicable law.

(b) The Oversight Board shall also (i) monitor and oversee the administration of the Claimant Trust and the Claimant Trustee's performance of his or her responsibilities under this Agreement, (ii) as more fully set forth in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, approve funding to the Litigation Sub-Trust, monitor and oversee the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee's performance of his responsibilities under the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and (iii) perform such other tasks as are set forth herein, in the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, and in the Plan.

(c) The Claimant Trustee shall consult with and provide information to the Oversight Board in accordance with and pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement to enable the Oversight Board to meet its obligations hereunder.

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the Claimant Trustee shall not be required to (i) obtain the approval of any action by the Oversight Board to the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is required to be taken by applicable law, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement or (ii) follow the directions of the Oversight Board to take any action the extent that the Claimant Trustee, in good faith, reasonably determines, based on the advice of legal counsel, that such action is prohibited by applicable law the Plan, the Confirmation Order, or this Agreement.

(e) Notwithstanding provision of this Agreement to the contrary, with respect to the activities of the Reorganized Debtor in its capacity as an investment adviser (and subsidiaries of the Reorganized Debtor that serve as general partner or in an equivalent capacity) to any Managed Funds, the Oversight Board shall not make investment decisions or otherwise participate in the investment decision making process relating to any such Managed Funds, nor shall the Oversight Board or any member thereof serve as a fiduciary to any such Managed Funds. It is agreed and understood that investment decisions made by the Reorganized Debtor (or its subsidiary entities) with respect to Managed Funds shall be made by the Claimant Trustee in his capacity as an officer of the Reorganized Debtor and New GP LLC and/or such persons who serve as investment personnel of the Reorganized Debtor from time to time, and shall be subject to the fiduciary duties applicable to such entities and persons as investment adviser to such Managed Funds.

4.3 Fiduciary Duties. The Oversight Board (and each Member in its capacity as such) shall have fiduciary duties to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries consistent with the fiduciary duties that the members of the Creditors' Committee have to unsecured creditors and shall exercise its responsibilities accordingly; provided, however, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to any Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests or Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests until such Holders become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in accordance with Section 5.1(c) hereof; provided, further, that the Oversight Board shall not owe fiduciary obligations to a Holder of an Equity Trust Interest if such Holder is named as a defendant in any of the Causes of Action, including Estate Claims, in their capacities as such, it being the intent that the Oversight Board's fiduciary duties are to maximize the value of the Claimant Trust Assets, including the Causes of Action. In all circumstances, the Oversight Board shall act in the best interests of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and in furtherance of the purpose of the Claimant Trust. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the foregoing shall not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

4.4 Meetings of the Oversight Board. Meetings of the Oversight Board are to be held as necessary to ensure the operation of the Claimant Trust but in no event less often than quarterly. Special meetings of the Oversight Board may be held whenever and wherever called for by the Claimant Trustee or any Member; provided, however, that notice of any such meeting shall be duly given in writing no less than 48 hours prior to such meeting (such notice requirement being subject to any waiver by the Members in the minutes, if any, or other transcript, if any, of proceedings of the Oversight Board). Unless the Oversight Board decides otherwise (which decision shall rest in the reasonable discretion of the Oversight Board), the Claimant Trustee, and each of the Claimant Trustee's designated advisors may, but are not required to, attend meetings of the Oversight Board.

4.5 Unanimous Written Consent. Any action required or permitted to be taken by the Oversight Board in a meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by unanimous written consents describing the actions taken, signed by all Members and recorded. If any Member informs the Claimant Trustee (via e-mail or otherwise) that he or she objects to the decision, determination, action, or inaction proposed to be made by unanimous written consent, the Claimant Trustee must use reasonable good faith efforts to schedule a meeting on the issue to be set within 48 hours of the request or as soon thereafter as possible on which all members of the Oversight Board are available in person or by telephone. Such decision, determination, action, or inaction must then be made pursuant to the meeting protocols set forth herein.

4.6 Manner of Acting.

(a) A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Oversight Board shall consist of at least three Members (including no less than one (1) Disinterested Member); provided that if the transaction of business at a meeting would constitute a direct or indirect conflict of interest for the Redeemer Committee, Acis, and/or UBS, at least two Disinterested Members must be present for there to be a quorum. Except as set forth in Sections 3.3(c), 4.9(a), 5.2, 5.4, 6.1, 9.1, and 10, herein, the majority vote of the Members present at a duly called meeting at which a quorum is present throughout shall be the act of the Oversight Board except as otherwise required by law or as provided in this Agreement. Any or all of the Members may participate in a regular or special meeting by, or conduct the meeting through the use of, conference telephone, video conference, or similar communications equipment by means of which all Persons participating in the meeting may hear each other, in which case any required notice of such meeting may generally describe the arrangements (rather than or in addition of the place) for the holding hereof. Any Member participating in a meeting by this means is deemed to be present in person at the meeting. Voting (including on negative notice) may be conducted by electronic mail or individual communications by the applicable Trustee and each Member.

(b) Any Member who is present and entitled to vote at a meeting of the Oversight Board when action is taken is deemed to have assented to the action taken, subject to the requisite vote of the Oversight Board, unless (i) such Member objects at the beginning of the meeting (or promptly upon his/her arrival) to holding or transacting business at the meeting; (ii) his/her dissent or abstention from the action taken is entered in the minutes of the meeting; or (iii) he/she delivers written notice (including by electronic or facsimile transmission) of his/her dissent or abstention to the Oversight Board before its adjournment. The right of dissent or abstention is not available to any Member of the Oversight Board who votes in favor of the action taken.

(c) Prior to a vote on any matter or issue or the taking of any action with respect to any matter or issue, each Member shall report to the Oversight Board any conflict of interest such Member has or may have with respect to the matter or issue at hand and fully disclose the nature of such conflict or potential conflict (including, without limitation, disclosing any and all financial or other pecuniary interests that such Member may have with respect to or in connection with such matter or issue, other than solely as a holder of Trust Interests). A Member who, with respect to a matter or issue, has or who may have a conflict of interest whereby such Member's interests are adverse to the interests of the Claimant Trust shall be deemed a "Conflicted Member" who shall not be entitled to vote or take part in any action with respect to

such matter or issue. In the event of a Conflicted Member, the vote or action with respect to such matter or issue giving rise to such conflict shall be undertaken only by Members who are not Conflicted Members and, notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the affirmative vote of only a majority of the Members who are not Conflicted Members shall be required to approve of such matter or issue and the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

(d) Each of Acis, the Redeemer Committee, and UBS shall be deemed "Conflicted Members" with respect to any matter or issue related to or otherwise affecting any of their respective Claim(s) (a "Committee Member Claim Matter"). A unanimous vote of the Disinterested Members shall be required to approve of or otherwise take action with respect to any Committee Member Claim Matter and, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the same shall be the act of the Oversight Board.

4.7 Tenure of the Members of the Oversight Board. The authority of the Members of the Oversight Board will be effective as of the Effective Date and will remain and continue in full force and effect until the Claimant Trust is terminated in accordance with Article X hereof. The Members of the Oversight Board will serve until such Member's successor is duly appointed or until such Member's earlier death or resignation pursuant to Section 4.7 below, or removal pursuant to Section 4.8 below.

4.8 Resignation. A Member of the Oversight Board may resign by giving not less than 90 days prior written notice thereof to the Claimant Trustee and other Members. Such resignation shall become effective on the earlier to occur of (i) the day specified in such notice and (ii) the appointment of a successor in accordance with Section 4.9 below.

4.9 Removal. A majority of the Oversight Board may remove any Member for Cause or Disability. If any Committee Member has its Claim disallowed in its entirety the representative of such entity will immediately be removed as a Member without the requirement for a vote and a successor will be appointed in the manner set forth herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, upon the termination of the Claimant Trust, any or all of the Members shall be deemed to have resigned.

4.10 Appointment of a Successor Member.

(a) In the event of a vacancy on the Oversight Board (whether by removal, death, or resignation), a new Member may be appointed to fill such position by the remaining Members acting unanimously; provided, however, that any vacancy resulting from the removal, resignation, or death of a Disinterested Member may only be filled by a disinterested Person unaffiliated with any Claimant or constituency in the Chapter 11 Case; provided, further, that if an individual serving as the representative of a Committee Member resigns from its role as representative, such resignation shall not be deemed resignation of the Committee Member itself and such Committee Member shall have the exclusive right to designate its replacement representative for the Oversight Board. The appointment of a successor Member will be further evidenced by the Claimant Trustee's filing with the Bankruptcy Court (to the extent a final decree has not been entered) and posting on the Claimant Trustee's website a notice of appointment, at the direction of the Oversight Board, which notice will include the name, address, and telephone number of the successor Member.

(b) Immediately upon the appointment of any successor Member, the successor Member shall assume all rights, powers, duties, authority, and privileges of a Member hereunder and such rights and privileges will be vested in and undertaken by the successor Member without any further act. A successor Member will not be liable personally for any act or omission of a predecessor Member.

(c) Every successor Member appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Claimant Trustee and other Members an instrument accepting the appointment under this Agreement and agreeing to be bound thereto, and thereupon the successor Member without any further act, deed, or conveyance, shall become vested with all rights, powers, trusts, and duties of a Member hereunder.

4.11 Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses. Unless determined by the Oversight Board, no Member shall be entitled to compensation in connection with his or her service to the Oversight Board; provided, however, that a Disinterested Member shall be compensated in a manner and amount initially set by the other Members and as thereafter amended from time to time by agreement between the Oversight Board and the Disinterested Member. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Claimant Trustee will reimburse the Members for all reasonable and documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Members in connection with the performance of their duties hereunder (which shall not include fees, costs, and expenses of legal counsel).

4.12 Confidentiality. Each Member shall, during the period that such Member serves as a Member under this Agreement and following the termination of this Agreement or following such Member's removal or resignation, hold strictly confidential and not use for personal gain any material, non-public information of or pertaining to any Person to which any of the Claimant Trust Assets relates or of which such Member has become aware in the Member's capacity as a Member ("Confidential Trust Information"), except as otherwise required by law. For the avoidance of doubt, a Member's Affiliates, employer, and employer's Affiliates (and collectively with such Persons' directors, officers, partners, principals and employees, "Member Affiliates") shall not be deemed to have received Confidential Trust Information solely due to the fact that a Member has received Confidential Trust Information in his or her capacity as a Member of the Oversight Board and to the extent that (a) a Member does not disclose any Confidential Trust Information to a Member Affiliate, (b) the business activities of such Member Affiliates are conducted without reference to, and without use of, Confidential Trust Information, and (c) no Member Affiliate is otherwise directed to take, or takes on behalf of a Member or Member Affiliate, any actions that are contrary to the terms of this Section 4.11.

ARTICLE V.
TRUST INTERESTS

5.1 Claimant Trust Interests.

(a) General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 8 General Unsecured Claims (the "GUC Beneficiaries"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class

8 General Unsecured Claim a General Unsecured Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 8 Claim bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 8 Claims. The General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests shall be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(b) Subordinated Claim Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Claim becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Subordinated Claim Trust Interests to Holders of Class 9 Subordinated Claims (the "Subordinated Beneficiaries"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of an Allowed Class 9 Subordinated Claim a Subordinated Claim Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 9 Claim bears to the total of amount of the Allowed Class 9. The Subordinated Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to the General Unsecured Claim Trust Interests. The Subordinated Beneficiaries shall only be entitled to distributions from the Claimant Trust Assets after each GUC Beneficiary has been repaid in full with applicable interest on account of such GUC Beneficiary's Allowed General Unsecured Claim, and all Disputed General Unsecured Claims have been resolved, in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

(c) Contingent Trust Interests. On the date hereof, or on the date such Interest becomes Allowed under the Plan, the Claimant Trust shall issue Contingent Interests to Holders of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and Holders of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests (collectively, the "Equity Holders"). The Claimant Trustee shall allocate to each Holder of Allowed Class 10 Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and each Holder of Allowed Class 11 Class A Limited Partnership Interests a Contingent Trust Interest equal to the ratio that the amount of each Holder's Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interest bears to the total amount of the Allowed Class 10 or Class 11 Interests, as applicable, under the Plan. Contingent Trust Interests shall not vest, and the Equity Holders shall not have any rights under this Agreement, unless and until the Claimant Trustee files with the Bankruptcy Court a certification that all GUC Beneficiaries have been paid indefeasibly in full, including, to the extent applicable, all accrued and unpaid post-petition interest consistent with the Plan and all Disputed Claims have been resolved (the "GUC Payment Certification"). Equity Holders will only be deemed "Beneficiaries" under this Agreement upon the filing of a GUC Payment Certification with the Bankruptcy Court, at which time the Contingent Trust Interests will vest and be deemed "Equity Trust Interests." The Equity Trust Interests shall be subordinated in right and priority to Subordinated Trust Interests, and distributions on account thereof shall only be made if and when Subordinated Beneficiaries have been repaid in full on account of such Subordinated Beneficiary's Allowed Subordinated Claim, in accordance with the terms of the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement. The Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests shall be subordinated to the Equity Trust Interests distributed to Allowed Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests.

5.2 Interests Beneficial Only. The ownership of the beneficial interests in the Claimant Trust shall not entitle the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to any title in or to the Claimant Trust Assets (which title shall be vested in the Claimant Trust) or to any right to call for a partition or division of the Claimant Trust Assets or to require an accounting. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any governance right or other wright to direct Claimant Trust activities.

5.3 Transferability of Trust Interests. No transfer, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other disposition of a Trust Interest may be effected until (i) such action is unanimously approved by the Oversight Board, (ii) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary to assure that any such disposition shall not cause the Claimant Trust to be subject to entity-level taxation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, and (iii) either (x) the Claimant Trustee and Oversight Board, acting unanimously, have received such legal advice or other information that they, in their sole and absolute discretion, deem necessary or appropriate to assure that any such disposition shall not (a) require the Claimant Trust to comply with the registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act or (b) cause any adverse effect under the Investment Advisers Act, or (y) the Oversight Board, acting unanimously, has determined, in its sole and absolute discretion, to cause the Claimant Trust to become a public reporting company and/or make periodic reports under the Exchange Act (provided that it is not required to register under the Investment Company Act or register its securities under the Securities Act) to enable such disposition to be made. In the event that any such disposition is allowed, the Oversight Board and the Claimant Trustee may add such restrictions upon such disposition and other terms of this Agreement as are deemed necessary or appropriate by the Claimant Trustee, with the advice of counsel, to permit or facilitate such disposition under applicable securities and other laws.

5.4 Registry of Trust Interests.

(a) Registrar. The Claimant Trustee shall appoint a registrar, which may be the Claimant Trustee (the "Registrar"), for the purpose of recording ownership of the Trust Interests as provided herein. The Registrar, if other than the Claimant Trustee, shall be an institution or person acceptable to the Oversight Board. For its services hereunder, the Registrar, unless it is the Claimant Trustee, shall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation from the Claimant Trust as a Claimant Trust Expense.

(b) Trust Register. The Claimant Trustee shall cause to be kept at the office of the Registrar, or at such other place or places as shall be designated by the Registrar from time to time, a registry of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Equity Holders (the "Trust Register"), which shall be maintained pursuant to such reasonable regulations as the Claimant Trustee and the Registrar may prescribe.

(c) Access to Register by Beneficiaries. The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and their duly authorized representatives shall have the right, upon reasonable prior written notice to the Claimant Trustee, and in accordance with reasonable regulations prescribed by the Claimant Trustee, to inspect and, at the expense of the Claimant Trust Beneficiary make copies of the Trust Register, in each case for a purpose reasonable and related to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's Trust Interest.

5.5 Exemption from Registration. The Parties hereto intend that the rights of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries arising under this Claimant Trust shall not be "securities" under applicable laws, but none of the Parties represent or warrant that such rights shall not be securities or shall not be entitled to exemption from registration under the applicable securities laws. The Oversight Board, acting unanimously, and Claimant Trustee may amend this

Agreement in accordance with Article IX hereof to make such changes as are deemed necessary or appropriate with the advice of counsel, to ensure that the Claimant Trust is not subject to registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act. The Trust Interests shall not have consent or voting rights or otherwise confer on the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any rights similar to the rights of a shareholder of a corporation in respect of any actions taken or to be taken, or decisions made or to be made, by the Oversight Board and/or the Claimant Trustee under this Agreement.

5.6 Absolute Owners. The Claimant Trustee may deem and treat the Claimant Trust Beneficiary of record as determined pursuant to this Article 5 as the absolute owner of such Trust Interests for the purpose of receiving distributions and payment thereon or on account thereof and for all other purposes whatsoever.

5.7 Effect of Death, Incapacity, or Bankruptcy. The death, incapacity, or bankruptcy of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary during the term of the Claimant Trust shall not (i) entitle the representatives or creditors of the deceased Beneficiary to any additional rights under this Agreement, or (ii) otherwise affect the rights and obligations of any of other Claimant Trust Beneficiary under this Agreement.

5.8 Change of Address. Any Claimant Trust Beneficiary may, after the Effective Date, select an alternative distribution address by providing notice to the Claimant Trustee identifying such alternative distribution address. Such notification shall be effective only upon receipt by the Claimant Trustee. Absent actual receipt of such notice by the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee shall not recognize any such change of distribution address.

5.9 Standing. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have standing to direct the Claimant Trustee to do or not to do any act or to institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity against any party upon or with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have any direct interest in or to any of the Claimant Trust Assets.

5.10 Limitations on Rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

(a) The Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall have no rights other than those set forth in this Agreement, the Confirmation Order, or the Plan (including any Plan Supplement documents incorporated therein).

(b) In any action taken by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, the prevailing party will be entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other costs; provided, however, that any fees and costs shall be borne by the Claimant Trust on behalf of any such Trustee or Member, as set forth herein.

(c) A Claimant Trust Beneficiary who brings any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or a current or former Member, in their capacity as such, may be required by order of the Bankruptcy Court to post a bond ensuring that the full costs of a legal defense can be reimbursed. A request for such bond can be made by the Claimant Trust or by

Claimant Trust Beneficiaries constituting in the aggregate at least 50% of the most senior class of Claimant Trust Interests.

(d) Any action brought by a Claimant Trust Beneficiary must be brought in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are deemed to have waived any right to a trial by jury

(e) The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries to bring any action against the Claimant Trust, a current or former Trustee, or current or former Member, in their capacity as such, shall not survive the final distribution by the Claimant Trust.

ARTICLE VI.
DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Distributions.

(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute to holders of Trust Interests at least annually the Cash on hand net of any amounts that (a) are reasonably necessary to maintain the value of the Claimant Trust Assets pending their monetization or other disposition during the term of the Claimant Trust, (b) are necessary to pay or reserve for reasonably incurred or anticipated Claimant Trust Expenses and any other expenses incurred by the Claimant Trust (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on or payable by the Claimant Trustee with respect to the Claimant Trust Assets), (c) are necessary to pay or reserve for the anticipated costs and expenses of the Litigation Sub-Trust, (d) are necessary to satisfy or reserve for other liabilities incurred or anticipated by the Claimant Trustee in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement (including, but not limited to, indemnification obligations and similar expenses in such amounts and for such period of time as the Claimant Trustee determines, in good faith, may be necessary and appropriate, which determination shall not be subject to consent of the Oversight Board, may not be modified without the express written consent of the Claimant Trustee, and shall survive termination of the Claimant Trustee), (e) are necessary to maintain the Disputed Claims Reserve, and (f) are necessary to pay Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this paragraph, the Claimant Trustee shall exercise reasonable efforts to make initial distributions within six months of the Effective Date, and the Oversight Board may not prevent such initial distributions unless upon a unanimous vote of the Oversight Board. The Claimant Trustee may otherwise distribute all Claimant Trust Assets on behalf of the Claimant Trust in accordance with this Agreement and the Plan at such time or times as the Claimant Trustee is directed by the Oversight Board.

(b) At the request of the Reorganized Debtor, subject in all respects to the provisions of this Agreement, the Claimant Trustee shall distribute Cash to the Reorganized Debtor, as Distribution Agent with respect to Claims in Class 1 through 7, sufficient to satisfy Allowed Claims in Class 1 through Class 7.

(c) All proceeds of Claimant Trust Assets shall be distributed in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement.

6.2 Manner of Payment or Distribution. All distributions made by the Claimant Trustee on behalf of the Claimant Trust to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries shall be payable by the Claimant Trustee directly to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of record as of the twentieth (20th) day prior to the date scheduled for the distribution, unless such day is not a Business Day, then such date or the distribution shall be the following Business Day, but such distribution shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date.

6.3 Delivery of Distributions. All distributions under this Agreement to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall be made, as applicable, at the address of such Claimant Trust Beneficiary (a) as set forth on the Schedules filed with the Bankruptcy Court or (b) on the books and records of the Debtor or their agents, as applicable, unless the Claimant Trustee has been notified in writing of a change of address pursuant to Section 5.6 hereof.

6.4 Disputed Claims Reserves. There will be no distributions under this Agreement or the Plan on account of Disputed Claims pending Allowance. The Claimant Trustee will maintain a Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan and will make distributions from the Disputed Claims Reserve as set forth in the Plan.

6.5 Undeliverable Distributions and Unclaimed Property. All undeliverable distributions and unclaimed property shall be treated in the manner set forth in the Plan.

6.6 *De Minimis* Distributions. Distributions with a value of less than $100 will be treated in accordance with the Plan.

6.7 United States Claimant Trustee Fees and Reports. **After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall pay as a Claimant Trust Expense, all fees incurred under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) by reason of the Claimant Trust's disbursements until the Chapter 11 Case is closed. After the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall prepare and serve on the Office of the United States Trustee such quarterly disbursement reports for the Claimant Trust as required by the Office of the United States Trustee Office for as long as the Chapter 11 Case remains open.**

ARTICLE VII.
TAX MATTERS

7.1 Tax Treatment and Tax Returns.

(a) It is intended for the initial transfer of the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust to be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable) as if the Debtor transferred the Claimant Trust Assets (other than the amounts set aside in the Disputed Claim Reserve, if the Claimant Trustee makes the election described below) to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and then, immediately thereafter, the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries transferred the Claimant Trust Assets to the Claimant Trust. Consistent with such treatment, (i) it is intended that the Claimant Trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable), (ii) it is intended that the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries will be treated as the grantors of the Claimant Trust and owners of their respective share of the Claimant Trust Assets

for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). The Claimant Trustee shall file all federal income tax returns (and foreign, state, and local income tax returns where applicable) for the Claimant Trust as a grantor trust pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.671-4(a).

(b) The Claimant Trustee shall determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and notify the applicable Beneficiaries of such valuation, and such valuation shall be used consistently by all parties for all federal income tax purposes.

(c) The Claimant Trustee may file an election pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.468B-9(c) to treat the Disputed Claims Reserve as a disputed ownership fund, in which case the Claimant Trustee will file federal income tax returns and pay taxes for the Disputed Claim Reserve as a separate taxable entity.

7.2 Withholding. The Claimant Trustee may withhold from any amount distributed from the Claimant Trust to any Claimant Trust Beneficiary such sum or sums as are required to be withheld under the income tax laws of the United States or of any state or political subdivision thereof. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the applicable Beneficiary. As a condition to receiving any distribution from the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee may require that the Beneficiary provide such holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Claimant Trustee to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws. If a Beneficiary fails to comply with such a request within one year, such distribution shall be deemed an unclaimed distribution and treated in accordance with Section 6.5(b) of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII.
STANDARD OF CARE AND INDEMNIFICATION

8.1 Standard of Care. None of the Claimant Trustee, acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan, the Delaware Trustee, acting in its capacity as Delaware Trustee, the Oversight Board, or any current or any individual Member, solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board, shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person (including any Claimant Trust Beneficiary) in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the acts or omissions of any such Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member constituted fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. The employees, agents and professionals retained by the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or individual Member shall not be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or any other Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that such acts or omissions by such employee, agent, or professional constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence. None of

the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or any Member shall be personally liable to the Claimant Trust or to any Person for the acts or omissions of any employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust or Claimant Trustee taken or not taken in good faith reliance on the advice of professionals or, as applicable, with the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the selection, retention, or supervision of such employee, agent or professional of the Claimant Trust.

8.2 Indemnification. The Claimant Trustee (including each former Claimant Trustee), Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, and all past and present Members (collectively, in their capacities as such, the "Indemnified Parties") shall be indemnified by the Claimant Trust against and held harmless by the Claimant Trust from any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, disbursements, and related expenses) to which the Indemnified Parties may become subject in connection with any action, suit, proceeding or investigation brought or threatened against any of the Indemnified Parties in their capacity as Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member, or in connection with any matter arising out of or related to the Plan, this Agreement, or the affairs of the Claimant Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or other court of competent jurisdiction that the Indemnified Party's acts or omissions constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. If the Indemnified Party becomes involved in any action, proceeding, or investigation in connection with any matter arising out of or in connection with the Plan, this Agreement or the affairs of the Claimant Trust for which an indemnification obligation could arise, the Indemnified Party shall promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board, as applicable; provided, however, that the failure of an Indemnified Party to promptly notify the Claimant Trustee and/or Oversight Board of an indemnification obligation will not excuse the Claimant Trust from indemnifying the Indemnified Party unless such delay has caused the Claimant Trust material harm. The Claimant Trust shall pay, advance or otherwise reimburse on demand of an Indemnified Party the Indemnified Party's reasonable legal and other defense expenses (including, without limitation, the cost of any investigation and preparation and attorney fees, disbursements, and other expenses related to any claim that has been brought or threatened to be brought) incurred in connection therewith or in connection with enforcing his or her rights under this Section 8.2 as a Claimant Trust Expense, and the Claimant Trust shall not refuse to make any payments to the Indemnified Party on the assertion that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful misconduct or acted in bad faith; provided that the Indemnified Party shall be required to repay promptly to the Claimant Trust the amount of any such advanced or reimbursed expenses paid to the Indemnified Party to the extent that it shall be ultimately determined by Final Order that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful fraud, misconduct, or negligence in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust with respect to which such expenses were paid; provided, further, that any such repayment obligation shall be unsecured and interest free. The Claimant Trust shall indemnify and hold harmless the employees, agents and professionals of the Claimant Trust and Indemnified Parties to the same extent as provided in this Section 8.2 for the Indemnified Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Section 8.2 shall remain available to any former Claimant Trustee, Delaware Trustee, or Member or the estate of any decedent Claimant Trustee or Member, solely in their capacities as such. The indemnification provided hereby shall be a Claimant Trust Expense and

shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which the Indemnified Party may now or in the future be entitled to under the Plan or any applicable insurance policy. The failure of the Claimant Trust to pay or reimburse an Indemnified Party as required under this Section 8.2 shall constitute irreparable harm to the Indemnified Party and such Indemnified Party shall be entitled to specific performance of the obligations herein.

8.3 No Personal Liability. Except as otherwise provided herein, neither of the Trustees nor Members of the Oversight Board shall be subject to any personal liability whatsoever, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, to any Person in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust to the fullest extent provided under Section 3803 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, and all Persons asserting claims against the Claimant Trustee, Litigation Trustee, or any Members, or otherwise asserting claims of any nature in connection with the affairs of the Claimant Trust, shall look solely to the Claimant Trust Assets for satisfaction of any such claims.

8.4 Other Protections. To the extent applicable and not otherwise addressed herein, the provisions and protections set forth in Article IX of the Plan will apply to the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trustee, and the Members.

ARTICLE IX.
TERMINATION

9.1 Duration. The Trustees, the Claimant Trust, and the Oversight Board shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as: (a) the Litigation Trustee determines that the pursuit of Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Estate Claims, (b) the Claimant Trustee determines that the pursuit of Causes of Action (other than Estate Claims) is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Causes of Action, (c) the Clamant Trustee determines that the pursuit of sales of other Claimant Trust Assets is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such sales of Claimant Trust Assets, (d) all objections to Disputed Claims and Equity Interests are fully resolved, (e) the Reorganized Debtor is dissolved, and (f) all Distributions required to be made by the Claimant Trustee to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries under the Plan have been made, but in no event shall the Claimant Trust be dissolved later than three years from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Claimant Trust Assets.

9.2 Distributions in Kind. Upon dissolution of the Claimant Trust, any remaining Claimant Trust Assets that exceed the amounts required to be paid under the Plan will be transferred (in the sole discretion of the Claimant Trustee) in Cash or in-kind to the Holders of the Claimant Trust Interests as provided in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

9.3 Continuance of the Claimant Trustee for Winding Up. After dissolution of the Claimant Trust and for purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee shall continue to act as such until the Claimant Trustee's duties have been

fully performed. Prior to the final distribution of all remaining Claimant Trust Assets, the Claimant Trustee shall be entitled to reserve from such assets any and all amounts required to provide for the Claimant Trustee's own costs and expenses, including a reserve to fund any potential indemnification or similar obligations of the Claimant Trust, until such time as the winding up of the Claimant Trust is completed. Upon the dissolution of the Claimant Trust and completion of the winding up of the assets, liabilities and affairs of the Claimant Trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the Claimant Trustee shall file a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware to terminate the Claimant Trust pursuant to Section 3810 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (such date upon which the certificate of cancellation is filed shall be referred to as the "Termination Date"). Upon the Termination date, the Claimant Trustee shall retain for a period of two (2) years, as a Claimant Trust Expense, the books, records, Claimant Trust Beneficiary lists, and certificated and other documents and files that have been delivered to or created by the Claimant Trustee. At the Claimant Trustee's discretion, all of such records and documents may, but need not, be destroyed at any time after two (2) years from the Termination Date.

9.4 Termination of Duties. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, upon the Termination Date of the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Oversight Board and its Members shall have no further duties or obligations hereunder.

9.5 No Survival. The rights of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries hereunder shall not survive the Termination Date, provided that such Claimant Trust Beneficiaries are provided with notice of such Termination Date.

ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS AND WAIVER

The Claimant Trustee, with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board, may amend this Agreement to correct or clarify any non-material provisions. This Agreement may not otherwise be amended, supplemented, otherwise modified, or waived in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by the Claimant Trustee and with the unanimous approval of the Oversight Board, and the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing; provided that the Claimant Trustee must provide the Oversight Board with prior written notice of any non-material amendments, supplements, modifications, or waivers of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Trust Irrevocable. Except as set forth in this Agreement, establishment of the Claimant Trust by this Agreement shall be irrevocable and shall not be subject to revocation, cancellation or rescission by the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.2 Bankruptcy of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. The dissolution, termination, bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar incapacity of any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall not permit any creditor, trustee, or any other Claimant Trust Beneficiary to obtain possession of, or exercise legal or equitable remedies with respect to, the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.3 Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have No Legal Title to Claimant Trust Assets. No Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall have legal title to any part of the Claimant Trust Assets.

11.4 Agreement for Benefit of Parties Only. Nothing herein, whether expressed or implied, shall be construed to give any Person other than the Claimant Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement. The Claimant Trust Assets shall be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

11.5 Notices. All notices, directions, instructions, confirmations, consents and requests required or permitted by the terms hereof shall, unless otherwise specifically provided herein, be in writing and shall be sent by first class mail, facsimile, overnight mail or in the case of mailing to a non-United States address, air mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

(a) If to the Claimant Trustee:

Claimant Trustee
c/o **[insert contact info for Claimant Trustee]**

With a copy to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd, 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey Pomerantz (jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com)
Ira Kharasch (ikharasch@pszjlaw.com)
Gregory Demo (gdemo@pszjlaw.com)

Notice mailed shall be effective on the date mailed or sent. Any Person may change the address at which it is to receive notices under this Agreement by furnishing written notice pursuant to the provisions of this Section 11.5 to the entity to be charged with knowledge of such change.

11.6 Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

11.7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all such counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument.

11.8 Binding Effect, etc. All covenants and agreements contained herein shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, and the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, and their respective successors and assigns. Any notice, direction, consent, waiver or other instrument or action by any Claimant Trust Beneficiary shall bind its successors and assigns.

11.9 Headings; References. The headings of the various Sections herein are for convenience of reference only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or provisions hereof.

11.10 Governing Law. This Agreement shall in all respects be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, including all matters of constructions, validity and performance.

11.11 Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto, each Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board), and each Claimant Trust Beneficiary consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement ~~or the Plan~~, the Plan or any act or omission of the Claimant Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), Litigation Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), the Oversight Board, or any individual Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board); *provided, however*, that if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such action may be brought in the state or federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas.

11.12 Transferee Liabilities. The Claimant Trust shall have no liability for, and the Claimant Trust Assets shall not be subject to, any claim arising by, through or under the Debtor except as expressly set forth in the Plan or in this Agreement. In no event shall the Claimant Trustee or the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries have any personal liability for such claims. If any liability shall be asserted against the Claimant Trust or the Claimant Trustee as the transferee of the Claimant Trust Assets on account of any claimed liability of, through or under the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trustee may use such part of the Claimant Trust Assets as may be necessary to contest any such claimed liability and to pay, compromise, settle or discharge same on terms reasonably satisfactory to the Claimant Trustee as a Claimant Trust Expense.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Claimant Trust Agreement to be duly executed by their respective officers thereunto duly authorized on the day and year first written above.

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Restructuring Officer

Claimant Trustee

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr., not individually but solely in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee

Document comparison by Workshare 9.5 on Friday, January 22, 2021 4:38:30 PM

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Description	DOCS_NY-#41280-v9-Highland_-_Claimant_Trust_Agreement
Document 2 ID	PowerDocs://DOCS_NY/41280/10
Description	DOCS_NY-#41280-v10-Highland_-_Claimant_Trust_Agreement
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Deletions	5
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Moved to	0
Style change	0
Format changed	0
Total changes	16

EXHIBIT T

LITIGATION SUB-TRUST AGREEMENT

This Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, effective as of _____, 2021 (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), by and among James P. Seery, Jr., as trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trustee"), [____] as Delaware Trustee, and Marc S. Kirschner as trustee (the "Litigation Trustee," and together with the Claimant Trustee and Delaware Trustee, the "Parties") of the Litigation Sub-Trust for the benefit of the Claimant Trust as sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor") filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case");

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Plan"),[1] which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on _____, 2021, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor [Docket No. •] (the "Confirmation Order");

WHEREAS, this Agreement, including all exhibits hereto, is the "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" described in the Plan and shall be executed on or before the Effective Date in order to facilitate implementation of the Plan; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets are hereby to be transferred by the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust (each as defined herein) created and evidenced by this Agreement so that (i) Estate Claims can be investigated, prosecuted, settled, abandoned, resolved, and otherwise monetized as may be determined by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; (ii) proceeds of Estate Claims can be remitted to the Claimant Trust as Claimant Trust Assets for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries (as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement) in accordance with the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement; (iii) the Litigation Trustee can investigate, litigate, settle, or otherwise resolve any Filed Claims relating to the Estate Claims, including the Employee Claims; and (iv) administrative services relating to the activities of the Litigation Sub-Trust can be performed by the Litigation Trustee.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

DECLARATION OF TRUST

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to declare the terms and conditions hereof, and in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements herein contained, the confirmation of the Plan and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Litigation Trustee and the Claimant Trustee have executed this Agreement for the benefit of the Claimant Trust as provided for in the Plan.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Litigation Trustee and his successors or assigns in trust, under and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, and for the performance of and compliance with the terms hereof and of the Plan; provided, however, that upon termination of the Litigation Sub-Trust in accordance with Article IX hereof, this Litigation Trust Agreement shall cease, terminate, and be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise specifically provided for herein.

IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED AND DECLARED that the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets are to be strictly held and applied by the Litigation Trustee subject to the specific terms set forth below.

ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION AND TERMS

1.1 Certain Definitions. Unless the context shall otherwise require and except as contained in this Section 1.1 or as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the "Definitions," Section 1.1 of the Plan or if not defined therein, shall have the meanings assigned thereto in the applicable Section of the Plan. For all purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Bankruptcy Court" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(b) "Cause" means (i) a Person's willful failure to perform his material duties hereunder (which material duties shall include, without limitation, regular attendance at regularly scheduled meetings of the Oversight Board), which is not remedied within 30 days of notice; (ii) a Person's commission of an act of fraud, theft, or embezzlement during the performance of his or her duties hereunder; (iii) a Person's conviction of a felony with all appeals having been exhausted or appeal periods lapsed; or (iv) a Person's gross negligence, bad faith, willful misconduct, or knowing violation of law in the performance of his or her duties hereunder.

(c) "Claimant Trust Agreement" means the Claimant Trust Agreement dated [___], 2021, by and between the Debtor, Claimant Trustee, and Delaware Trustee.

(d) "Claimant Trustee" means James P. Seery, Jr., as the initial "Claimant Trustee" under the Claimant Trust Agreement and as defined in the Plan, and any successor Claimant Trustee who may be appointed pursuant to the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(e) "Claimant Trust" means the "Highland Claimant Trust" established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) pursuant to the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(f) "Delaware Statutory Trust Act" means the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del C. §3801, et seq. as amended from time to time.

(g) "Delaware Trustee" has the meaning set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(h) "Disability" means as a result of the Litigation Trustee's incapacity due to physical or mental illness as determined by an accredited physician or psychologist, as applicable, selected by the Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Trustee has been substantially unable to perform his or her duties hereunder for three (3) consecutive months or for an aggregate of 180 days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.

(i) "Estate Claims" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [Docket No. 354].

(j) "Employee" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

(k) "Employee Claims" means any General Unsecured Claim held by an Employee other than the Claims of the Senior Employees subject to stipulations (provided such stipulations are executed by any such Senior Employee of the Debtor prior to the Effective Date).

(l) "Litigation Sub-Trust" means the sub-trust created pursuant to this Agreement, and in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d).

(m) "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" means this Agreement.

(n) "Litigation Sub-Trust Assets" means the Estate Claims and the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve.

(o) "Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary" means the Claimant Trust.

(p) "Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses" means the costs, expenses, liabilities and obligations incurred by the Litigation Sub-Trust and/or the Litigation Trustee in administering and conducting the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, and otherwise carrying out the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Plan on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust, including without any limitation, any taxes owed by the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the fees and expenses of the Litigation Trustee and professional persons retained by the Litigation Sub-Trust or Litigation Trustee in accordance with Article 3.12(b) of this Agreement.

(q) "Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve" means $[•] million in Cash to be funded by the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, pursuant to the Plan into a bank account of the Litigation Sub-Trust (or of the Claimant Trust for the benefit of the

Litigation Sub-Trust) on or before the Effective Date for the purpose of paying Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses in accordance herewith.

(r) "Litigation Trustee" means Marc S. Kirschner as the initial "Litigation Trustee" hereunder and under the Plan, and any successor Litigation Trustee who may be appointed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(s) "Oversight Board" has the meaning set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(t) "Plan" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(u) "Privileges" means the Debtor's rights, title and interests in and to any privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications (whether written or oral) associated with any of the Estate Claims or Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to, attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege as defined in Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; provided, however, that "Privileges" shall not include the work-product privilege of any non-Employee attorney or attorneys that has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees and the work-product privilege shall remain with the non-Employee attorney or attorneys who created such work product so long as it has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees, or otherwise waived.

(v) "Securities Act" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(w) "TIA" means the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended.

(x) "Trust Interests" means the trust interest(s) to be distributed to the Claimant Trust as the sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

(y) "Trust Register" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(b) hereof.

1.2 General Construction. As used in this Agreement, the masculine, feminine and neuter genders, and the plural and singular numbers shall be deemed to include the others in all cases where they would apply. "Includes" and "including" are not limiting and "or" is not exclusive. References to "Articles," "Sections" and other subdivisions, unless referring specifically to the Plan or provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or other law, statute or regulation, refer to the corresponding Articles, Sections and other subdivisions of this Agreement, and the words "herein," "hereafter" and words of similar import refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular Article, Section, or subdivision of this Agreement. Amounts expressed in dollars or following the symbol "$" shall be deemed to be in United States dollars. References to agreements or instruments shall be deemed to refer to such agreements or instruments as the same may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms thereof.

1.3 Incorporation of the Plan. The Plan is hereby incorporated into this Agreement and made a part hereof by this reference.

ARTICLE II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LITIGATION SUB-TRUST

2.1 Establishment of Sub-Trust.

(a) The Parties, pursuant to the Plan and the Confirmation Order and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, hereby establish a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act on behalf of the Claimant Trust as the sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, which shall be known as the "Highland Litigation Sub-Trust," on the terms set forth herein. The Litigation Trustee may use this name in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein as the Litigation Trustee sees fit.

(b) The Litigation Trustee shall cause to be executed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware the Certificate of Trust and agree to execute, acting solely in his capacity as Litigation Trustee, such certificates as may from time to time be required under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act or any other Delaware law.

2.2 Nature and Purposes of the Litigation Sub-Trust. The Litigation Sub-Trust is organized and established as a trust for the purpose of monetizing the Estate Claims and making distributions to Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary in a manner consistent with "liquidating trust" status under Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d). The Litigation Sub-Trust shall serve as a mechanism for investigating, prosecuting, settling, resolving, and otherwise monetizing all Estate Claims and distributing the proceeds of such Estate Claims to the Claimant Trust in a timely fashion in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement. The Litigation Sub-Trust and Litigation Trustee shall have and retain any and all rights, defenses, cross-claims and counter-claims held by the Debtor with respect to any Estate Claim as of the Petition Date. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Litigation Sub-Trust shall have the sole responsibility for the pursuit and settlement of the Estate Claims, and, subject to the terms of the Claimant Trustee Agreement, the sole power and authority to allow or settle and compromise any Claims related to the Estate Claims, including, without limitation, Employee Claims. For the avoidance of doubt, the Litigation Sub-Trust, pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state trust law, is appointed as the successor-in-interest to, and representative of, the Debtor and its Estate for the retention, enforcement, settlement, and adjustment of all Estate Claims and Employee Claims (in accordance with the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement).

2.3 Transfer of Assets and Rights to the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(a) On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall automatically an irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Estate Claims, Employee Claims, and Privileges. For purposes of the transfer of documents, the Litigation Sub-Trust is an assignee and successor to the Debtor in respect of the Estate Claims and Employee Claims and shall be treated as such in any review of confidentiality restrictions in requested documents. For the avoidance of doubt, following the Effective Date, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power to waive the Privileges being so assigned and transferred.

(b) Until the Litigation Sub-Trust terminates pursuant to the terms hereof, legal title to the Estate Claims shall be vested at all times in the Litigation Sub-Trust as a separate legal entity, except where applicable law in any jurisdiction requires title to any part of the Estate Claims to be vested in the Litigation Trustee, in which case title shall be deemed to be vested in the Litigation Trustee, solely in his capacity as Litigation Trustee. For purposes of such jurisdictions, the term Litigation Sub-Trust, as used herein, shall be read to mean the Litigation Trustee.

(c) In accordance with section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Litigation Trustee may enforce all rights to commence and pursue, as appropriate, any and all Estate Claims after the Effective Date. No Person or entity may rely on the absence of a specific reference in the Plan to any Estate Claim against them as any indication that the Litigation Trustee will not pursue any and all available Estate Claims or objections against them. Unless any Estate Claim against a Person or Entity are expressly waived, relinquished, exculpated, released, compromised, or settled in the Plan or an order of the Bankruptcy Court, the Litigation Trustee expressly reserves all Estate Claims for later adjudication, and, therefore, no preclusion doctrine including the doctrine of res judicata, collateral, estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, estoppel (judicial, equitable, or otherwise), or laches, shall apply to such Estate Claims upon, after, or as a consequence of the Confirmation Order.

2.4 Principal Office. The principal office of the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be maintained by the Litigation Trustee at the following address: Goldin Associates, a Teneo Company, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10118.

2.5 Acceptance. The Litigation Trustee accepts the Litigation Sub-Trust imposed by this Agreement and agrees to observe and perform that Litigation Sub-Trust, on and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

2.6 Further Assurances. The Claimant Trustee and any successors thereof will, upon reasonable request of the Litigation Trustee, execute, acknowledge and deliver such further instruments and do such further acts as may be necessary or proper to transfer to the Litigation Trustee any portion of the Claimant Trust Assets intended to be conveyed hereby and in the Plan in the form and manner provided for hereby and in the Plan and to vest in the Litigation Trustee the powers, instruments or funds in trust hereunder.

2.7 Incidents of Ownership. The Claimant Trust shall be the sole beneficiary of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee shall retain only such incidents of ownership as are necessary to undertake the actions and transactions authorized herein.

ARTICLE III.
THE LITIGATION TRUSTEE

3.1 Role. In furtherance of and consistent with the purpose of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Plan, and this Agreement, the Litigation Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, in the Plan, and in the Confirmation Order, shall serve as Litigation Trustee with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets for the benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and maintain, manage, and take action on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust.

3.2 Authority.

(a) In connection with the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, in addition to any and all of the powers enumerated elsewhere herein, the Litigation Trustee shall, in an expeditious but orderly manner, investigate, prosecute, settle, and otherwise resolve the Estate Claims. The Litigation Trustee shall have the power and authority and is authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement and the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust, within the bounds of this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable law.

(b) The Litigation Trustee, subject to the limitations set forth in Section 3.3 of this Agreement shall have the right to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, estimate, or otherwise deal with and settle any and all Estate Claims and Employee Claims (in accordance with the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement). To the extent that any action has been taken to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, or otherwise deal with and settle any such Estate Claims or Employee Claims prior to the Effective Date, on the Effective Date the Litigation Trustee shall be substituted for the Debtor in connection therewith in accordance with Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7025 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the caption with respect to such pending action shall be changed to the following "Marc Kirschner, not individually but solely as Litigation Trustee for the Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, et al. v. [Defendant]".

(c) Subject in all cases to any limitations contained herein, in the Confirmation Order, or in the Plan, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power and authority to:

(i) hold legal title to any and all rights in or arising from the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, including, but not limited to, the right to collect any and all money and other property belonging to the Litigation Sub-Trust (including any proceeds of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets);

(ii) perform the duties, exercise the powers, and asserts the rights of a trustee under sections 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, including the right to assert claims, defenses, offsets, and privileges;

(iii) subject to any approval of the Oversight Board that may be required under Section 3.3(b), protect and enforce the rights of the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to any Litigation Sub-Trust Assets by any method deemed appropriate, including, without limitation, by judicial proceeds, or pursuant to any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium, or similar law and general principles of equity;

(iv) determine and satisfy any and all liabilities created, incurred, or assumed by the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(v) subject to any approval of the Oversight Board that may be required under Section 3.3(b), investigate, analyze, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, mediate, sue on or defend, prosecute, abandon, dismiss, exercise rights, powers and privileges with respect to or otherwise deal with and settle, in accordance with the terms set forth in this Agreement, all

Estate Claims, Employee Claims, or any other Causes of Action in favor of or against the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(vi) with respect to any Estate Claim, avoid and recover transfers of the Debtor's property as may be permitted by the Bankruptcy Code or applicable state law;

(vii) subject to applicable law, seek the examination of any Entity or Person with respect to the Estate Claims;

(viii) make all payments relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets;

(ix) assess, enforce, release, or waive any privilege or defense on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, or the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, if applicable;

(x) prepare, or have prepared, and file, if necessary, with the appropriate taxing authority any and all tax returns, information returns, and other required documents with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust, and pay taxes properly payable by the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(xi) if not otherwise covered by insurance coverage obtained by the Claimant Trust, obtain reasonable insurance coverage with respect to any liabilities and obligations of the Litigation Trustee, solely in his capacity as such, in the form of fiduciary liability insurance, a directors and officers policy, an errors and omissions policy, or otherwise. The cost of any such insurance shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense and paid by the Litigation Trustee from the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Reserve;

(xii) without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, but subject to the terms of this Agreement, employ various consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals, including counsel, tax advisors, consultants, brokers, investment bankers, valuation counselors, and financial advisors, as the Litigation Trustee deems necessary to aid him in fulfilling his obligations under this Agreement; such consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals shall be retained pursuant to whatever fee arrangement the Litigation Trustee deems appropriate, including contingency fee arrangements and any fees and expenses incurred by such professionals engaged by the Litigation Trustee shall be Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses and paid by the Litigation Trustee from the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve;

(xiii) to the extent applicable, assert, enforce, release, or waive any Privilege or defense on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust (including as to any Privilege that the Debtor held prior to the Effective Date), including to provide any information to insurance carriers that the Litigation Trustee deems necessary to utilize applicable insurance coverage for any Claim or Claims;

(xiv) take all steps and execute all instruments and documents necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the activities contemplated herein and in the Confirmation Order and the Plan, and take all actions necessary to comply with the

Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement and the obligations thereunder and hereunder; and

(xv) exercise such other powers and authority as may be vested in or assumed by the Litigation Trustee by any Final Order (the foregoing subparagraphs (i)-(xv) being collectively, the "Authorized Acts").

(d) The Litigation Trustee has the power and authority to act as trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust and perform the Authorized Acts through the date such Litigation Trustee resigns, is removed, or is otherwise unable to serve for any reason.

(e) Any determinations by the Liquidation Trustee, under the direction of the Oversight Board, with respect to the amount or timing of settlement or other disposition of any Estate Claims settled in accordance with the terms of this Agreement shall be conclusive and binding on the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and all other parties of interest following the entry of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction approving such settlement or other disposition to the extent required or obtained.

3.3 Limitation of Authority.

(a) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee shall not (i) be authorized to engage in any trade or business, (ii) take any actions inconsistent with the management of the Estate Claims as required or contemplated by applicable law, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement, or (iii) take any action in contravention of the Confirmation Order, the Plan, or this Agreement.

(b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and in no way limiting the terms of the Plan, the Litigation Trustee must receive the consent by vote of a simple majority of the Oversight Board pursuant to the notice and quorum requirements set forth in Section 4.5 of the Claimant Trust Agreement, in order to:

(i) terminate or extend the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(ii) commence litigation with respect to any Estate Claims and, if applicable under the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to (x) litigate, resolve, or settle coverage and/or the liability of any insurer under any insurance policy or legal action related thereto, or (y) pursue avoidance, recovery, or similar remedies that may be brought under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under similar or related state or federal statutes or common law, including fraudulent transfer law;

(iii) settle, dispose of, or abandon any Estate Claims (including any counterclaims to the extent such counterclaims are set off against the proceeds of any such Estate Claim);

(iv) borrow funds as may be necessary to fund litigation or other costs of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(v) reserve or retain any cash or cash equivalents in the Litigation Sub-Trust Cash Reserve in an amount reasonably necessary to meet claims and contingent liabilities;

(vi) change the compensation of the Litigation Trustee; and

(vii) retain counsel, experts, advisors, or any other professionals.

(c) [Reserved]

3.4 Binding Nature of Actions. All actions taken and determinations made by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

3.5 Term of Service. The Litigation Trustee shall serve as the Litigation Trustee for the duration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, subject to death, resignation or removal.

3.6 Resignation. The Litigation Trustee may resign as trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust by an instrument in writing delivered to the Bankruptcy Court and Oversight Board at least thirty (30) days before the proposed effective date of resignation. The Litigation Trustee shall continue to serve as Litigation Trustee after delivery of the Litigation Trustee's resignation until the proposed effective date of such resignation, unless the Litigation Trustee and a [simple majority] of the Oversight Board consent to an earlier effective date, which earlier effective date shall be no earlier than the date of appointment of a successor Litigation Trustee in accordance with Section 3.8 hereof becomes effective.

3.7 Removal.

(a) The Litigation Trustee may be removed by a [simple majority] vote of the Oversight Board for Cause, immediately upon notice thereof, or without Cause, upon [60 days'] prior written notice.

(b) To the extent there is any dispute regarding the removal of a Litigation Trustee (including any dispute relating to any compensation or expense reimbursement due under this Agreement) the Bankruptcy Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate such dispute. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Trustee will continue to serve as the Litigation Trustee after his removal until the earlier of (i) the time when a successor Litigation Trustee will become effective in accordance with Section 3.8 of this Agreement or (ii) such date as the Bankruptcy Court otherwise orders.

3.8 Appointment of Successor.

(a) Appointment of Successor. In the event of a vacancy by reason of the death, Disability, or removal of the Litigation Trustee, or prospective vacancy by reason of resignation, a successor Litigation Trustee shall be selected by a [simple majority] vote of the Oversight Board. If Members of the Oversight Board are unable to secure a majority vote, the Bankruptcy Court will determine the successor Litigation Trustee on motion of the Members. If a final decree has been entered closing the Chapter 11 Case, the Litigation Trustee may seek to reopen the Chapter 11 Case for the limited purpose of determining the successor Litigation

Trustee, and the costs for such motion and costs related to re-opening the Chapter 11 Case shall be paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust, or the Claimant Trust on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust. The successor Litigation Trustee shall be appointed as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than sixty (60) days after the occurrence of the vacancy or, in the case of resignation, on the effective date of the resignation of the then acting Litigation Trustee.

(b) Vesting or Rights in Successor Litigation Trustee. Every successor Litigation Trustee appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the exiting Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board, and file with the Bankruptcy Court, an instrument accepting such appointment subject to the terms and provisions hereof. The successor Litigation Trustee, without any further act, deed, or conveyance shall become vested with all the rights, powers, trusts and duties of the exiting Litigation Trustee except that the successor Litigation Trustee shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of the retiring Litigation Trustee. In no event shall the retiring Litigation Trustee be liable for the acts or omissions of the successor Litigation Trustee.

(c) Interim Litigation Trustee. During any period in which there is a vacancy in the position of Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board shall appoint one of its Members or the Claimant Trustee to serve as the interim Litigation Trustee (the "Interim Trustee") until a successor Litigation Trustee is appointed pursuant to Section 3.8(a). The Interim Trustee shall be subject to all the terms and conditions applicable to a Litigation Trustee hereunder. Such Interim Trustee shall not be limited in any manner from exercising any rights or powers as a Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trustee, as applicable, merely by such Person's appointment as Interim Trustee.

3.9 Continuance of Litigation Sub-Trust. The death, resignation, or removal of the Litigation Trustee shall not operate to terminate the Litigation Sub-Trust created by this Agreement or to revoke any existing agency (other than any agency of the Litigation Trustee as the Litigation Trustee) created pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or invalidate any action taken by the Litigation Trustee. In the event of the resignation or removal of the Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Trustee shall promptly (i) execute and deliver, by the effective date of resignation or removal, such documents, instruments, records, and other writings as may be reasonably requested by his successor to effect termination of the exiting Litigation Trustee's capacity under this Agreement and the conveyance of the Estate Claims then held by the exiting Litigation Trustee to the successor Litigation Trustee; (ii) deliver to the successor Litigation Trustee all non-privileged documents, instruments, records, and other writings relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust as may be in the possession or under the control of the exiting Litigation Trustee, provided, the exiting Litigation Trustee shall have the right to make and retain copies of such documents, instruments, records and other writings delivered to the successor Litigation Trustee and the cost of making such copies shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense to be paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust; and (iii) otherwise assist and cooperate in effecting the assumption of the exiting Litigation Trustee's obligations and functions by his successor, provided the fees and expenses of such assistance and cooperation shall be paid to the exiting Litigation Trustee by the Litigation Sub-Trust. The exiting Litigation Trustee shall irrevocably appoint the successor Litigation Trustee as his attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution for it and its name, place and stead to do any and all acts that such exiting Litigation Trustee is obligated to perform under this Section 3.9.

3.10 Litigation Trustee as "Estate Representative". The Litigation Trustee will be the exclusive trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Estate Representative") with respect to the Estate Claims, with all rights and powers attendant thereto, in addition to all rights and powers granted in the Plan and in this Agreement. The Litigation Trustee will be the successor-in-interest to the Debtor with respect to any action pertaining to the Estate Claims, which was or could have been commenced by the Debtor prior to the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or Confirmation Order. All actions, claims, rights or interests constituting or relating to Estate Claims are preserved and retained and may be enforced by the Litigation Trustee as an Estate Representative.

3.11 Books and Records.

(a) The Litigation Trustee shall maintain, in respect of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Claimant Trust, books and records pertinent to Estate Claims in its possession and the income of the Litigation Sub-Trust and payment of expenses, liabilities, and claims against or assumed by the Litigation Sub-Trust in such detail and for such period of time as may be necessary to enable it to make full and proper accounting in respect thereof. Such books and records shall be maintained as reasonably necessary to facilitate compliance with the tax reporting requirements of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the requirements of Article VII herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Litigation Trustee to file any accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Litigation Sub-Trust. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Trustee shall to retain such books and records, and for such periods, with respect to any Reorganized Debtor Assets as are required to be retained pursuant to Section 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act or any other applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

(b) The Litigation Trustee may dispose some or all of the books and records maintained by the Litigation Trustee at the later of (i) such time as the Litigation Trustee determines, with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board, that the continued possession or maintenance of such books and records is no longer necessary for the benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust, including with respect to the Estate Claims, or (ii) upon the termination and winding up of the Litigation Sub-Trust under Article IX of this Agreement.

3.12 Reports.

(a) Financial and Status Reports. The fiscal year of the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be the calendar year. Within 90 days after the end of each calendar year during the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust, and within 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter during (other than the fourth quarter) the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust and as soon as practicable upon termination of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee shall make available upon request to the Oversight Board or Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary appearing on its records as of the end of such period or such date of termination, a written report including: (i) unaudited financial statements of the Litigation Sub-Trust for such period, and, if the end of a calendar year, an unaudited report (which may be prepared by an independent certified public accountant

employed by the Litigation Trustee) reflecting the result of such agreed-upon procedures relating to the financial accounting administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust as proposed by the Litigation Trustee; (ii) a summary description of any action taken by the Litigation Sub-Trust that, in the judgment of the Litigation Trustee, materially affects the Litigation Sub-Trust and of which notice has not previously been given to the Oversight Board or Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, provided, that any such description shall not include any privileged or confidential information of the Litigation Trustee; and (iii) a description of the progress of liquidating the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets and making distributions to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and any other material information relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets and the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust deemed appropriate to be disclosed by the Litigation Trustee, which description shall include a written report detailing, among other things, the litigation status of the Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust, any settlements entered into by the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to the Estate Claims, the proceeds recovered to date from Estate Claims, and the distributions made by the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(b) Annual Plan and Budget. If instructed by the Oversight Board, the Litigation Trustee shall prepare and submit to the Oversight Board for approval an annual plan and budget in such detail as reasonably requested.

3.13 Compensation and Reimbursement; Engagement of Professionals.

(a) Compensation and Expenses.

(i) Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Litigation Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Litigation Trustee shall receive initial compensation in a manner and amount as agreed upon by the Committee. Any additional compensation or compensation of a Successor Litigation Trustee shall be determined by the Oversight Board.

(ii) Expense Reimbursements. All reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the Litigation Trustee in the performance of his or her duties hereunder, shall be reimbursed as Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(b) Professionals.

(i) Engagement of Professionals. The Litigation Trustee shall engage professionals from time to time in conjunction with the services provided hereunder. The Litigation Trustee's engagement of such professionals shall be approved by a majority of the Oversight Board as set forth in Section 3.3(b) hereof.

(ii) Fees and Expenses of Professionals. The Litigation Trustee shall pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any retained professionals as Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses.

3.14 Reliance by Litigation Trustee. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Litigation Trustee may rely, and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting, on any resolution, statement, certificate, instrument, opinion, report, notice, request, consent, order or other instrument or document that the Litigation Trustee has no reason to believe to be other

than genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties or, in the case of facsimiles, to have been sent by the proper party or parties, and the Litigation Trustee may conclusively rely as to the truth of the statements and correctness of the opinions or direction expressed therein. The Litigation Trustee may consult with counsel and other professionals, and any advice of such counsel or other professionals shall constitute full and complete authorization and protection in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Litigation Trustee in accordance therewith. The Litigation Trustee shall have the right at any time to seek instructions from the Bankruptcy Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction concerning Estate Claims, this Agreement, the Plan, or any other document executed in connection therewith, and any such instructions given shall be full and complete authorization in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Litigation Trustee in accordance therewith. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall have the right to seek Orders from the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in Article IX of the Plan.

3.15 Commingling of Litigation Sub-Trust Assets. The Litigation Trustee shall not commingle any of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets with his or her own property or the property of any other Person.

3.16 [Delaware Trustee. The Delaware Trustee shall have the power and authority, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to (i) accept legal process served on the Litigation Sub-Trust in the State of Delaware; and (ii) execute any certificates that are required to be executed under the Statutory Trust Act and file such certificates in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, and take such action or refrain from taking such action under this Agreement as may be directed in a writing delivered to the Delaware Trustee by the Litigation Trustee; provided, however, that the Delaware Trustee shall not be required to take or to refrain from taking any such action if the Delaware Trustee shall believe, or shall have been advised by counsel, that such performance is likely to involve the Delaware Trustee in personal liability or to result in personal liability to the Delaware Trustee, or is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes a party or is otherwise contrary to law. The Parties agree not to instruct the Delaware Trustee to take any action or to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes party or that is otherwise contrary to law. Other than as expressly provided for in this Agreement, the Delaware Trustee shall have no duty or power to take any action for or on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust.]

ARTICLE IV.
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD

The Oversight Board shall be governed by Article IV of the Claimant Trust Agreement.

ARTICLE V.
TRUST INTERESTS

5.1 Litigation Sub-Trust Interests. On the date hereof, the Litigation Sub-Trust shall issue Trust Interests to the Claimant Trust as the sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary. The Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall be entitled to distributions from the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

5.2 Transferability of Trust Interests. No transfer, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other disposition of a Trust Interest may be effected.

5.3 Exemption from Registration. The Parties hereto intend that the rights of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary arising under this Litigation Sub-Trust shall not be "securities" under applicable laws, but none of the Parties represent or warrant that such rights shall not be securities or shall not be entitled to exemption from registration under the applicable securities laws. The Oversight Board, acting unanimously, and Litigation Trustee may amend this Agreement in accordance with Article IX hereof to make such changes as are deemed necessary or appropriate with the advice of counsel, to ensure that the Litigation Sub-Trust is not subject to registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act. The Trust Interests shall not have consent or voting rights or otherwise confer on the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary any rights similar to the rights of a shareholder of a corporation in respect of any actions taken or to be taken, or decisions made or to be made, by the Oversight Board and/or the Litigation Trustee under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI.
DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Distributions. The Litigation Trustee shall distribute Cash proceeds of the Estate Claims to the Claimant Trust within 30 days of receipt of such Cash proceeds, net of any amounts that (a) are reasonably necessary to maintain the value of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets pending their monetization or other disposition during the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust, (b) are necessary to pay or reserve for reasonably incurred or anticipated Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses and any other expenses incurred by the Litigation Sub-Trust (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on or payable by the Litigation Trustee with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets), and (c) are necessary to satisfy or reserve for other liabilities incurred or anticipated by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement (including, but not limited to, indemnification obligations and similar expenses).

6.2 Manner of Payment or Distribution. All distributions made by the Litigation Trustee on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall be payable by the Litigation Trustee directly to the Claimant Trust, as sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, on the date scheduled for the distribution, unless such day is not a Business Day, then such date or the distribution shall be the following Business Day, but such distribution shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date.

6.3 Delivery of Distributions. All distributions under this Agreement to the Claimant Trust shall be made pursuant to wire instructions provided by the Claimant Trustee to the Litigation Trustee.

ARTICLE VII.
TAX MATTERS

7.1 Tax Treatment and Tax Returns. It is intended that the Litigation Sub-Trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable) the sole beneficiary of which is the Claimant Trust. Consistent

with such treatment, it is intended that the transfer of the Litigation Sub Trust Assets from the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub Trust will be treated as a non-event for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). Further, because the Claimant Trust is itself intended to be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable),it is intended that the beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust will be treated as the grantor of the Litigation Sub-Trust and owner of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). The Litigation Trustee shall cooperate with the Claimant Trustee in connection with the preparation and filing of any federal income tax returns (and foreign, state, and local income tax returns where applicable) or information statements relating to the Litigation Sub Trust Assets.

7.2 Withholding. The Litigation Trustee may withhold from any amount distributed from the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary such sum or sums as are required to be withheld under the income tax laws of the United States or of any state or political subdivision thereof. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary. As a condition to receiving any distribution from the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee may require that the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary provide such holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Litigation Trustee to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws.

ARTICLE VIII.
STANDARD OF CARE AND INDEMNIFICATION

8.1 Standard of Care. None of the Litigation Trustee, acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan, the Oversight Board, or any individual Member, solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board, shall be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or to any Person (including the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries) in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the acts or omissions of any such Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member constituted fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. The employees, agents and professionals retained by the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, or Oversight Board shall not be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or any other Person in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that such acts or omissions by such employee, agent, or professional constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence. None of the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or any Member shall be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or to any Person for the acts or omissions of any employee, agent or professional of the Litigation Sub-Trust or Litigation Trustee, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the Litigation

Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the selection, retention, or supervision of such employee, agent or professional of the Litigation Sub-Trust.

8.2 Indemnification. The Litigation Trustee (including each former Litigation Trustee), Oversight Board, and all past and present Members (collectively, the "Indemnified Parties") shall be indemnified by the Litigation Sub-Trust against and held harmless by the Litigation Sub-Trust from any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, disbursements, and related expenses) to which the Indemnified Parties may become subject in connection with any action, suit, proceeding or investigation brought or threatened against any of the Indemnified Parties in their capacity as Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member, or in connection with any matter arising out of or related to the Plan, this Agreement, or the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or other court of competent jurisdiction that the Indemnified Party's acts or omissions constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. If the Indemnified Party becomes involved in any action, proceeding, or investigation in connection with any matter arising out of or in connection with the Plan, this Agreement or the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust for which an indemnification obligation could arise, the Indemnified Party shall promptly notify the Litigation Trustee and/or Oversight Board, as applicable; provided, however, that the failure of an Indemnified Party to promptly notify the Litigation Trustee and/or Oversight Board of an indemnification obligation will not excuse the Litigation Sub-Trust from indemnifying the Indemnified Party unless such delay has caused the Litigation Sub-Trust material harm. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall periodically advance or otherwise reimburse on demand the Indemnified Party's reasonable legal and other expenses (including, without limitation, the cost of any investigation and preparation and attorney fees, disbursements, and related expenses) incurred in connection therewith as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense, but the Indemnified Party shall be required to repay promptly to the Litigation Sub-Trust the amount of any such advanced or reimbursed expenses paid to the Indemnified Party to the extent that it shall be ultimately determined by Final Order that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful fraud, misconduct, or negligence in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to which such expenses were paid. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall indemnify and hold harmless the employees, agents and professionals of the Litigation Sub-Trust and Indemnified Parties to the same extent as provided in this Section 8.2 for the Indemnified Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Section 8.2 shall remain available to any former Litigation Trustee or Member or the estate of any decedent Litigation Trustee or Member. The indemnification provided hereby shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense.

8.3 To the extent applicable, the provisions and protections set forth in Article IX of the Plan will apply to the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Members.

ARTICLE IX.
TERMINATION

9.1 Duration. The Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the Oversight Board shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as the Litigation Trustee determines that the Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify

further pursuit of such Estate, and all Distributions required to be made by the Litigation Trustee to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary under the Plan and this Agreement have been made, but in no event shall the Litigation Sub-Trust be dissolved later than [three years] from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets.

9.2 Continuance of the Litigation Trustee for Winding Up. After dissolution of the Litigation Sub-Trust and for purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee shall continue to act as such until the Litigation Trustee's duties have been fully performed. Prior to the final distribution of all remaining Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, the Litigation Trustee shall be entitled to reserve from such assets any and all amounts required to provide for the Litigation Trustee's own costs and expenses, including a reserve to fund any potential indemnification or similar obligations of the Litigation Sub-Trust, until such time as the winding up of the Litigation Sub-Trust is completed. Upon the dissolution of the Litigation Sub-Trust and completion of the winding up of the assets, liabilities and affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the Litigation Trustee shall file a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware to terminate the Litigation Sub-Trust pursuant to Section 3810 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (such date upon which the certificate of cancellation is filed shall be referred to as the "Termination Date"). Subject in all respects to 3.11, upon the Termination date, the Litigation Trustee shall retain for a period of two (2) years, as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense, the books, records, and certificated and other documents and files that have been delivered to or created by the Litigation Trustee. Subject in all respects to Section 3.11, at the Litigation Trustee's discretion, all of such records and documents may, but need not, be destroyed at any time after two (2) years from the Termination Date.

9.3 Termination of Duties. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, upon the Termination Date of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board, and its Members shall have no further duties or obligations hereunder.

ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS AND WAIVER

The Litigation Trustee, with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board, may amend this Agreement to correct or clarify any non-material provisions. This Agreement may not otherwise be amended, supplemented, otherwise modified, or waived in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by the Litigation Trustee and with the unanimous approval of the Oversight Board, and the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing; provided that the Litigation Trustee must provide the Oversight Board with prior written notice of any non-material amendments, supplements, modifications, or waivers of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Trust Irrevocable. Except as set forth in this Agreement, establishment of the Litigation Sub-Trust by this Agreement shall be irrevocable and shall not be subject to revocation, cancellation or rescission by the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

11.2 Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary has No Legal Title to Litigation Sub-Trust Assets. The Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall have no legal title to any part of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets.

11.3 Agreement for Benefit of Parties Only. Nothing herein, whether expressed or implied, shall be construed to give any Person other than the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement. The Litigation Sub-Trust Assets shall be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

11.4 Notices. All notices, directions, instructions, confirmations, consents and requests required or permitted by the terms hereof shall, unless otherwise specifically provided herein, be in writing and shall be sent by first class mail, facsimile, overnight mail or in the case of mailing to a non-United States address, air mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

(a) If to the Litigation Trustee:

Marc S. Kirschner
c/o Goldin Associates LLC, a Teneo Company
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10118

With a copy to:

[insert contact for counsel to the Litigation Trustee].

(b) If to the Claimant Trustee:

Claimant Trustee
c/o **[insert contact info for Claimant Trustee]**

With a copy to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd, 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey Pomerantz (jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com)
Ira Kharasch (ikharasch@pszjlaw.com)
Gregory Demo (gdemo@pszjlaw.com)

Notice mailed shall be effective on the date mailed or sent. Any Person may change the address at which it is to receive notices under this Agreement by furnishing written notice pursuant to the provisions of this Section 11.4 to the entity to be charged with knowledge of such change.

11.5 Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

11.6 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all such counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument.

11.7 Binding Effect, etc. All covenants and agreements contained herein shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, and their respective successors and assigns. Any notice, direction, consent, waiver or other instrument or action by any Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall bind its successors and assigns.

11.8 Headings; References. The headings of the various Sections herein are for convenience of reference only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or provisions hereof.

11.9 Governing Law. This Agreement shall in all respects be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, including all matters of constructions, validity and performance.

11.10 Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto, each Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board), and each Claimant Trust Beneficiary consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement, the Plan or any act or omission of the Claimant Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), Litigation Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), the Oversight Board. or any individual Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board); *provided, however*, that if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such action may be brought in the state or federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas.

11.11 Transferee Liabilities. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall have no liability for, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets shall not be subject to, any claim arising by, through or under the Debtor except as expressly set forth in the Plan or in this Agreement. In no event shall the Litigation Trustee or the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary have any personal liability for such claims. If any liability shall be asserted against the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Litigation Trustee as the transferee of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets on account of any claimed liability of,

through or under the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the Litigation Trustee may use such part of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets as may be necessary to contest any such claimed liability and to pay, compromise, settle or discharge same on terms reasonably satisfactory to the Litigation Trustee as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense.

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IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Litigation Trust Agreement to be duly executed by their respective officers thereunto duly authorized on the day and year first written above.

Claimant Trustee

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr., not individually but solely in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee

Litigation Trustee

By: _____
Marc S. Kirschner, not individually but solely in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee

EXHIBIT U

LITIGATION SUB-TRUST AGREEMENT

This Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement, effective as of _____, 2021 (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement"), by and among James P. Seery, Jr., as trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trustee"), [____] as Delaware Trustee, and Marc S. Kirschner as trustee (the "Litigation Trustee," and together with the Claimant Trustee ~~[~~and Delaware Trustee~~]~~, the "Parties") of the Litigation Sub-Trust for the benefit of the Claimant Trust as sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor") filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case");

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified from time to time, the "Plan"),[1] which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on _____, 2021, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Order Confirming Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor [Docket No. •] (the "Confirmation Order");

WHEREAS, this Agreement, including all exhibits hereto, is the "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" described in the Plan and shall be executed on or before the Effective Date in order to facilitate implementation of the Plan; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan and Confirmation Order, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets are hereby to be transferred by the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust (each as defined herein) created and evidenced by this Agreement so that (i) Estate Claims can be investigated, prosecuted, settled, abandoned, resolved, and otherwise monetized as may be determined by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement; (ii) proceeds of Estate Claims can be remitted to the Claimant Trust as Claimant Trust Assets for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries (as defined in the Claimant Trust Agreement) in accordance with the Plan and Claimant Trust Agreement; (iii) the Litigation Trustee can investigate, litigate, settle, or otherwise resolve any Filed Claims relating to the Estate Claims, including the Employee Claims; and (iv) administrative services relating to the activities of the Litigation Sub-Trust can be performed by the Litigation Trustee.

DECLARATION OF TRUST

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to declare the terms and conditions hereof, and in consideration of the premises and mutual agreements herein contained, the confirmation of the

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

Plan and of other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Litigation Trustee and the Claimant Trustee have executed this Agreement for the benefit of the Claimant Trust as provided for in the Plan.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto the Litigation Trustee and his successors or assigns in trust, under and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and for the benefit of the Claimant Trust, and for the performance of and compliance with the terms hereof and of the Plan; provided, however, that upon termination of the Litigation Sub-Trust in accordance with Article IX hereof, this Litigation Trust Agreement shall cease, terminate, and be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise specifically provided for herein.

IT IS FURTHER COVENANTED AND DECLARED that the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets are to be strictly held and applied by the Litigation Trustee subject to the specific terms set forth below.

ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION AND TERMS

1.1 Certain Definitions. Unless the context shall otherwise require and except as contained in this Section 1.1 or as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the "Definitions," Section 1.1 of the Plan or if not defined therein, shall have the meanings assigned thereto in the applicable Section of the Plan. For all purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(a) "Bankruptcy Court" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(b) "Cause" means (i) a Person's willful failure to perform his material duties hereunder (which material duties shall include, without limitation, regular attendance at regularly scheduled meetings of the Oversight Board), which is not remedied within 30 days of notice; (ii) a Person's commission of an act of fraud, theft, or embezzlement during the performance of his or her duties hereunder; (iii) a Person's conviction of a felony with all appeals having been exhausted or appeal periods lapsed; or (iv) a Person's gross negligence, bad faith, willful misconduct, or knowing violation of law in the performance of his or her duties hereunder.

(c) "Claimant Trust Agreement" means the Claimant Trust Agreement dated [___], 2021, by and between the Debtor, Claimant Trustee, and Delaware Trustee.

(d) "Claimant Trustee" means James P. Seery, Jr., as the initial "Claimant Trustee" under the Claimant Trust Agreement and as defined in the Plan, and any successor Claimant Trustee who may be appointed pursuant to the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(e) "Claimant Trust" means the "Highland Claimant Trust" established in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d) pursuant to the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(f) "Delaware Statutory Trust Act" means the Delaware Statutory Trust Act 12 Del C. §3801, et seq. as amended from time to time.

(g) "Delaware Trustee" has the meaning set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(h) "Disability" means as a result of the Litigation Trustee's incapacity due to physical or mental illness as determined by an accredited physician or psychologist, as applicable, selected by the Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Trustee has been substantially unable to perform his or her duties hereunder for three (3) consecutive months or for an aggregate of 180 days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive months.

(i) "Estate Claims" has the meaning given to it in Exhibit A to the *Notice of Final Term Sheet* [Docket No. 354].

(j) "Employee" means the employees of the Debtor set forth in the Plan Supplement.

(k) "Employee Claims" means any General Unsecured Claim held by an Employee other than the Claims of the Senior Employees subject to stipulations (provided such stipulations are executed by any such Senior Employee of the Debtor prior to the Effective Date).

(l) "Litigation Sub-Trust" means the sub-trust created pursuant to this Agreement, and in accordance with the Delaware Statutory Trust Act and Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d).

(m) "Litigation Sub-Trust Agreement" means this Agreement.

(n) "Litigation Sub-Trust Assets" means the Estate Claims and the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve.

(o) "Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary" means the Claimant Trust.

(p) "Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses" means the costs, expenses, liabilities and obligations incurred by the Litigation Sub-Trust and/or the Litigation Trustee in administering and conducting the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, and otherwise carrying out the terms of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Plan on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust, including without any limitation, any taxes owed by the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the fees and expenses of the Litigation Trustee and professional persons retained by the Litigation Sub-Trust or Litigation Trustee in accordance with Article 3.12(b) of this Agreement.

(q) "Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve" means $[•] million in Cash to be funded by the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, as applicable, pursuant to the Plan into a bank account of the Litigation Sub-Trust (or of the Claimant Trust for the benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust) on or before the Effective Date for the purpose of paying Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses in accordance herewith.

(r) "Litigation Trustee" means Marc S. Kirschner as the initial "Litigation Trustee" hereunder and under the Plan, and any successor Litigation Trustee who may be appointed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

(s) "Oversight Board" has the meaning set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(t) "Plan" has the meaning set forth in the Recitals hereof.

(u) "Privileges" means the Debtor's rights, title and interests in and to any privilege or immunity attaching to any documents or communications (whether written or oral) associated with any of the Estate Claims or Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to, attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege as defined in Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; provided, however, that "Privileges" shall not include the work-product privilege of any non-Employee attorney or attorneys that has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees and the work-product privilege shall remain with the non-Employee attorney or attorneys who created such work product so long as it has not been previously shared with the Debtor or any of its employees, or otherwise waived.

(v) "Securities Act" means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

(w) "TIA" means the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, as amended.

(x) "Trust Interests" means the trust interest(s) to be distributed to the Claimant Trust as the sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

(y) "Trust Register" has the meaning given to it in Section 5.3(b) hereof.

1.2 General Construction. As used in this Agreement, the masculine, feminine and neuter genders, and the plural and singular numbers shall be deemed to include the others in all cases where they would apply. "Includes" and "including" are not limiting and "or" is not exclusive. References to "Articles," "Sections" and other subdivisions, unless referring specifically to the Plan or provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, or other law, statute or regulation, refer to the corresponding Articles, Sections and other subdivisions of this Agreement, and the words "herein," "hereafter" and words of similar import refer to this Agreement as a whole and not to any particular Article, Section, or subdivision of this Agreement. Amounts expressed in dollars or following the symbol "$" shall be deemed to be in United States dollars. References to agreements or instruments shall be deemed to refer to such agreements or instruments as the same may be amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified in accordance with the terms thereof.

1.3 Incorporation of the Plan. The Plan is hereby incorporated into this Agreement and made a part hereof by this reference.

ARTICLE II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LITIGATION SUB-TRUST

2.1 Establishment of Sub-Trust.

(a) The Parties, pursuant to the Plan and the Confirmation Order and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, hereby establish a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act on behalf of the Claimant Trust as the sole

Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, which shall be known as the "Highland Litigation Sub-Trust," on the terms set forth herein. The Litigation Trustee may use this name in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein as the Litigation Trustee sees fit.

(b) The Litigation Trustee shall cause to be executed and filed in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware the Certificate of Trust and agree to execute, acting solely in his capacity as Litigation Trustee, such certificates as may from time to time be required under the Delaware Statutory Trust Act or any other Delaware law.

2.2 Nature and Purposes of the Litigation Sub-Trust. The Litigation Sub-Trust is organized and established as a trust for the purpose of monetizing the Estate Claims and making distributions to Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary in a manner consistent with "liquidating trust" status under Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-4(d). The Litigation Sub-Trust shall serve as a mechanism for investigating, prosecuting, settling, resolving, and otherwise monetizing all Estate Claims and distributing the proceeds of such Estate Claims to the Claimant Trust in a timely fashion in accordance with the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and this Agreement. The Litigation Sub-Trust and Litigation Trustee shall have and retain any and all rights, defenses, cross-claims and counter-claims held by the Debtor with respect to any Estate Claim as of the Petition Date. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Litigation Sub-Trust shall have the sole responsibility for the pursuit and settlement of the Estate Claims, and, subject to the terms of the Claimant Trustee Agreement, the sole power and authority to allow or settle and compromise any Claims related to the Estate Claims, including, without limitation, Employee Claims. For the avoidance of doubt, the Litigation Sub-Trust, pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state trust law, is appointed as the successor-in-interest to, and representative of, the Debtor and its Estate for the retention, enforcement, settlement, and adjustment of all Estate Claims and Employee Claims (in accordance with the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement).

2.3 Transfer of Assets and Rights to the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(a) On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, the Claimant Trust shall automatically an irrevocably transfer, assign, and deliver, and shall be deemed to have transferred, assigned, and delivered, all Estate Claims, Employee Claims, and Privileges. For purposes of the transfer of documents, the Litigation Sub-Trust is an assignee and successor to the Debtor in respect of the Estate Claims and Employee Claims and shall be treated as such in any review of confidentiality restrictions in requested documents. For the avoidance of doubt, following the Effective Date, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power to waive the Privileges being so assigned and transferred.

(b) Until the Litigation Sub-Trust terminates pursuant to the terms hereof, legal title to the Estate Claims shall be vested at all times in the Litigation Sub-Trust as a separate legal entity, except where applicable law in any jurisdiction requires title to any part of the Estate Claims to be vested in the Litigation Trustee, in which case title shall be deemed to be vested in the Litigation Trustee, solely in his capacity as Litigation Trustee. For purposes of such jurisdictions, the term Litigation Sub-Trust, as used herein, shall be read to mean the Litigation Trustee.

(c) In accordance with section 1123(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Litigation Trustee may enforce all rights to commence and pursue, as appropriate, any and all Estate Claims after the Effective Date. No Person or entity may rely on the absence of a specific reference in the Plan to any Estate Claim against them as any indication that the Litigation Trustee will not pursue any and all available Estate Claims or objections against them. Unless any Estate Claim against a Person or Entity are expressly waived, relinquished, exculpated, released, compromised, or settled in the Plan or an order of the Bankruptcy Court, the Litigation Trustee expressly reserves all Estate Claims for later adjudication, and, therefore, no preclusion doctrine including the doctrine of res judicata, collateral, estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, estoppel (judicial, equitable, or otherwise), or laches, shall apply to such Estate Claims upon, after, or as a consequence of the Confirmation Order.

2.4 Principal Office. The principal office of the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be maintained by the Litigation Trustee at the following address: Goldin Associates, a Teneo Company, 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10118.

2.5 Acceptance. The Litigation Trustee accepts the Litigation Sub-Trust imposed by this Agreement and agrees to observe and perform that Litigation Sub-Trust, on and subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and in the Plan.

2.6 Further Assurances. The Claimant Trustee and any successors thereof will, upon reasonable request of the Litigation Trustee, execute, acknowledge and deliver such further instruments and do such further acts as may be necessary or proper to transfer to the Litigation Trustee any portion of the Claimant Trust Assets intended to be conveyed hereby and in the Plan in the form and manner provided for hereby and in the Plan and to vest in the Litigation Trustee the powers, instruments or funds in trust hereunder.

2.7 Incidents of Ownership. The Claimant Trust shall be the sole beneficiary of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee shall retain only such incidents of ownership as are necessary to undertake the actions and transactions authorized herein.

ARTICLE III.
THE LITIGATION TRUSTEE

3.1 Role. In furtherance of and consistent with the purpose of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Plan, and this Agreement, the Litigation Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, in the Plan, and in the Confirmation Order, shall serve as Litigation Trustee with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets for the benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and maintain, manage, and take action on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust.

3.2 Authority.

(a) In connection with the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, in addition to any and all of the powers enumerated elsewhere herein, the Litigation Trustee shall, in an expeditious but orderly manner, investigate, prosecute, settle, and otherwise resolve the Estate Claims. The Litigation Trustee shall have the power and authority and is authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement

and the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust, within the bounds of this Agreement, the Plan, the Confirmation Order, and applicable law.

(b) The Litigation Trustee, subject to the limitations set forth in Section 3.3 of this Agreement shall have the right to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, estimate, or otherwise deal with and settle any and all Estate Claims and Employee Claims (in accordance with the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement). To the extent that any action has been taken to prosecute, defend, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, abandon, or otherwise deal with and settle any such Estate Claims or Employee Claims prior to the Effective Date, on the Effective Date the Litigation Trustee shall be substituted for the Debtor in connection therewith in accordance with Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable by Rule 7025 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the caption with respect to such pending action shall be changed to the following "Marc Kirschner, not individually but solely as Litigation Trustee for the Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, et al. v. [Defendant]".

(c) Subject in all cases to any limitations contained herein, in the Confirmation Order, or in the Plan, the Litigation Trustee shall have the power and authority to:

(i) hold legal title to any and all rights in or arising from the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, including, but not limited to, the right to collect any and all money and other property belonging to the Litigation Sub-Trust (including any proceeds of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets);

(ii) perform the duties, exercise the powers, and asserts the rights of a trustee under sections 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, including the right to assert claims, defenses, offsets, and privileges;

(iii) subject to any approval of the Oversight Board that may be required under Section 3.3(b), protect and enforce the rights of the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to any Litigation Sub-Trust Assets by any method deemed appropriate, including, without limitation, by judicial proceeds, or pursuant to any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, moratorium, or similar law and general principles of equity;

(iv) determine and satisfy any and all liabilities created, incurred, or assumed by the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(v) subject to any approval of the Oversight Board that may be required under Section 3.3(b), investigate, analyze, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, mediate, sue on or defend, prosecute, abandon, dismiss, exercise rights, powers and privileges with respect to or otherwise deal with and settle, in accordance with the terms set forth in this Agreement, all Estate Claims, Employee Claims, or any other Causes of Action in favor of or against the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(vi) with respect to any Estate Claim, avoid and recover transfers of the Debtor's property as may be permitted by the Bankruptcy Code or applicable state law;

(vii) subject to applicable law, seek the examination of any Entity or Person with respect to the Estate Claims;

(viii) make all payments relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets;

(ix) assess, enforce, release, or waive any privilege or defense on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, or the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, if applicable;

(x) prepare, or have prepared, and file, if necessary, with the appropriate taxing authority any and all tax returns, information returns, and other required documents with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust, and pay taxes properly payable by the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(xi) if not otherwise covered by insurance coverage obtained by the Claimant Trust, obtain reasonable insurance coverage with respect to any liabilities and obligations of the Litigation Trustee, solely in his capacity as such, in the form of fiduciary liability insurance, a directors and officers policy, an errors and omissions policy, or otherwise. The cost of any such insurance shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense and paid by the Litigation Trustee from the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Reserve;

(xii) without further order of the Bankruptcy Court, but subject to the terms of this Agreement, employ various consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals, including counsel, tax advisors, consultants, brokers, investment bankers, valuation counselors, and financial advisors, as the Litigation Trustee deems necessary to aid him in fulfilling his obligations under this Agreement; such consultants, third-party service providers, and other professionals shall be retained pursuant to whatever fee arrangement the Litigation Trustee deems appropriate, including contingency fee arrangements and any fees and expenses incurred by such professionals engaged by the Litigation Trustee shall be Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses and paid by the Litigation Trustee from the Litigation Sub-Trust Expense Cash Reserve;

(xiii) to the extent applicable, assert, enforce, release, or waive any Privilege or defense on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust (including as to any Privilege that the Debtor held prior to the Effective Date), including to provide any information to insurance carriers that the Litigation Trustee deems necessary to utilize applicable insurance coverage for any Claim or Claims;

(xiv) take all steps and execute all instruments and documents necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the activities contemplated herein and in the Confirmation Order and the Plan, and take all actions necessary to comply with the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement and the obligations thereunder and hereunder; and

(xv) exercise such other powers and authority as may be vested in or assumed by the Litigation Trustee by any Final Order (the foregoing subparagraphs (i)-(xv) being collectively, the "Authorized Acts").

(d) The Litigation Trustee has the power and authority to act as trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust and perform the Authorized Acts through the date such Litigation Trustee resigns, is removed, or is otherwise unable to serve for any reason.

(e) Any determinations by the Liquidation Trustee, under the direction of the Oversight Board, with respect to the amount or timing of settlement or other disposition of any Estate Claims settled in accordance with the terms of this Agreement shall be conclusive and binding on the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and all other parties of interest following the entry of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction approving such settlement or other disposition to the extent required or obtained.

3.3 Limitation of Authority.

(a) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Litigation Trustee shall not (i) be authorized to engage in any trade or business, (ii) take any actions inconsistent with the management of the Estate Claims as required or contemplated by applicable law, the Confirmation Order, the Plan, and this Agreement, or (iii) take any action in contravention of the Confirmation Order, the Plan, or this Agreement.

(b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and in no way limiting the terms of the Plan, the Litigation Trustee must receive the consent by vote of a simple majority of the Oversight Board pursuant to the notice and quorum requirements set forth in Section 4.5 of the Claimant Trust Agreement, in order to:

(i) terminate or extend the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(ii) commence litigation with respect to any Estate Claims and, if applicable under the terms of the Claimant Trust Agreement, the Employee Claims, including, without limitation, to (x) litigate, resolve, or settle coverage and/or the liability of any insurer under any insurance policy or legal action related thereto, or (y) pursue avoidance, recovery, or similar remedies that may be brought under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under similar or related state or federal statutes or common law, including fraudulent transfer law;

(iii) settle, dispose of, or abandon any Estate Claims (including any counterclaims to the extent such counterclaims are set off against the proceeds of any such Estate Claim);

(iv) borrow funds as may be necessary to fund litigation or other costs of the Litigation Sub-Trust;

(v) reserve or retain any cash or cash equivalents in the Litigation Sub-Trust Cash Reserve in an amount reasonably necessary to meet claims and contingent liabilities;

(vi) change the compensation of the Litigation Trustee; and

(vii) retain counsel, experts, advisors, or any other professionals.

(c) [Reserved]

3.4 Binding Nature of Actions. All actions taken and determinations made by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

3.5 Term of Service. The Litigation Trustee shall serve as the Litigation Trustee for the duration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, subject to death, resignation or removal.

3.6 Resignation. The Litigation Trustee may resign as trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust by an instrument in writing delivered to the Bankruptcy Court and Oversight Board at least thirty (30) days before the proposed effective date of resignation. The Litigation Trustee shall continue to serve as Litigation Trustee after delivery of the Litigation Trustee's resignation until the proposed effective date of such resignation, unless the Litigation Trustee and a [simple majority] of the Oversight Board consent to an earlier effective date, which earlier effective date shall be no earlier than the date of appointment of a successor Litigation Trustee in accordance with Section 3.8 hereof becomes effective.

3.7 Removal.

(a) The Litigation Trustee may be removed by a [simple majority] vote of the Oversight Board for Cause, immediately upon notice thereof, or without Cause, upon [60 days'] prior written notice.

(b) To the extent there is any dispute regarding the removal of a Litigation Trustee (including any dispute relating to any compensation or expense reimbursement due under this Agreement) the Bankruptcy Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate such dispute. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Trustee will continue to serve as the Litigation Trustee after his removal until the earlier of (i) the time when a successor Litigation Trustee will become effective in accordance with Section 3.8 of this Agreement or (ii) such date as the Bankruptcy Court otherwise orders.

3.8 Appointment of Successor.

(a) Appointment of Successor. In the event of a vacancy by reason of the death, Disability, or removal of the Litigation Trustee, or prospective vacancy by reason of resignation, a successor Litigation Trustee shall be selected by a [simple majority] vote of the Oversight Board. If Members of the Oversight Board are unable to secure a majority vote, the Bankruptcy Court will determine the successor Litigation Trustee on motion of the Members. If a final decree has been entered closing the Chapter 11 Case, the Litigation Trustee may seek to reopen the Chapter 11 Case for the limited purpose of determining the successor Litigation Trustee, and the costs for such motion and costs related to re-opening the Chapter 11 Case shall be paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust, or the Claimant Trust on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust. The successor Litigation Trustee shall be appointed as soon as practicable, but in any event no later than sixty (60) days after the occurrence of the vacancy or, in the case of resignation, on the effective date of the resignation of the then acting Litigation Trustee.

(b) Vesting or Rights in Successor Litigation Trustee. Every successor Litigation Trustee appointed hereunder shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the exiting Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board, and file with the Bankruptcy Court, an instrument accepting such appointment subject to the terms and provisions hereof. The successor Litigation Trustee, without any further act, deed, or conveyance shall become vested with all the rights, powers, trusts and duties of the exiting Litigation Trustee except that the successor Litigation Trustee shall not be liable for the acts or omissions of the retiring Litigation Trustee. In no event shall the retiring Litigation Trustee be liable for the acts or omissions of the successor Litigation Trustee.

(c) Interim Litigation Trustee. During any period in which there is a vacancy in the position of Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board shall appoint one of its Members or the Claimant Trustee to serve as the interim Litigation Trustee (the "Interim Trustee") until a successor Litigation Trustee is appointed pursuant to Section 3.8(a). The Interim Trustee shall be subject to all the terms and conditions applicable to a Litigation Trustee hereunder. Such Interim Trustee shall not be limited in any manner from exercising any rights or powers as a Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trustee, as applicable, merely by such Person's appointment as Interim Trustee.

3.9 Continuance of Litigation Sub-Trust. The death, resignation, or removal of the Litigation Trustee shall not operate to terminate the Litigation Sub-Trust created by this Agreement or to revoke any existing agency (other than any agency of the Litigation Trustee as the Litigation Trustee) created pursuant to the terms of this Agreement or invalidate any action taken by the Litigation Trustee. In the event of the resignation or removal of the Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Trustee shall promptly (i) execute and deliver, by the effective date of resignation or removal, such documents, instruments, records, and other writings as may be reasonably requested by his successor to effect termination of the exiting Litigation Trustee's capacity under this Agreement and the conveyance of the Estate Claims then held by the exiting Litigation Trustee to the successor Litigation Trustee; (ii) deliver to the successor Litigation Trustee all non-privileged documents, instruments, records, and other writings relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust as may be in the possession or under the control of the exiting Litigation Trustee, provided, the exiting Litigation Trustee shall have the right to make and retain copies of such documents, instruments, records and other writings delivered to the successor Litigation Trustee and the cost of making such copies shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense to be paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust; and (iii) otherwise assist and cooperate in effecting the assumption of the exiting Litigation Trustee's obligations and functions by his successor, provided the fees and expenses of such assistance and cooperation shall be paid to the exiting Litigation Trustee by the Litigation Sub-Trust. The exiting Litigation Trustee shall irrevocably appoint the successor Litigation Trustee as his attorney-in-fact and agent with full power of substitution for it and its name, place and stead to do any and all acts that such exiting Litigation Trustee is obligated to perform under this Section 3.9.

3.10 Litigation Trustee as "Estate Representative". The Litigation Trustee will be the exclusive trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(3), as well as the representative of the Estate appointed pursuant to section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Estate Representative") with respect to the Estate Claims, with all rights and powers attendant thereto, in addition to all rights and powers granted

in the Plan and in this Agreement. The Litigation Trustee will be the successor-in-interest to the Debtor with respect to any action pertaining to the Estate Claims, which was or could have been commenced by the Debtor prior to the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or Confirmation Order. All actions, claims, rights or interests constituting or relating to Estate Claims are preserved and retained and may be enforced by the Litigation Trustee as an Estate Representative.

3.11 Books and Records.

(a) The Litigation Trustee shall maintain, in respect of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the Claimant Trust, books and records pertinent to Estate Claims in its possession and the income of the Litigation Sub-Trust and payment of expenses, liabilities, and claims against or assumed by the Litigation Sub-Trust in such detail and for such period of time as may be necessary to enable it to make full and proper accounting in respect thereof. Such books and records shall be maintained as reasonably necessary to facilitate compliance with the tax reporting requirements of the Litigation Sub-Trust and the requirements of Article VII herein. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Litigation Trustee to file any accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Litigation Sub-Trust. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Litigation Trustee shall to retain such books and records, and for such periods, with respect to any Reorganized Debtor Assets as are required to be retained pursuant to Section 204-2 of the Investment Advisers Act or any other applicable laws, rules, or regulations.

(b) The Litigation Trustee may dispose some or all of the books and records maintained by the Litigation Trustee at the later of (i) such time as the Litigation Trustee determines, with the unanimous consent of the Oversight Board, that the continued possession or maintenance of such books and records is no longer necessary for the benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust, including with respect to the Estate Claims, or (ii) upon the termination and winding up of the Litigation Sub-Trust under Article IX of this Agreement.

3.12 Reports.

(a) Financial and Status Reports. The fiscal year of the Litigation Sub-Trust shall be the calendar year. Within 90 days after the end of each calendar year during the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust, and within 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter during (other than the fourth quarter) the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust and as soon as practicable upon termination of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee shall make available upon request to the Oversight Board or Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary appearing on its records as of the end of such period or such date of termination, a written report including: (i) unaudited financial statements of the Litigation Sub-Trust for such period, and, if the end of a calendar year, an unaudited report (which may be prepared by an independent certified public accountant employed by the Litigation Trustee) reflecting the result of such agreed-upon procedures relating to the financial accounting administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust as proposed by the Litigation Trustee; (ii) a summary description of any action taken by the Litigation Sub-Trust that, in the judgment of the Litigation Trustee, materially affects the Litigation Sub-Trust and of which notice has not previously been given to the Oversight Board or Litigation Sub-Trust

Beneficiary, provided, that any such description shall not include any privileged or confidential information of the Litigation Trustee; and (iii) a description of the progress of liquidating the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets and making distributions to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and any other material information relating to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets and the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust deemed appropriate to be disclosed by the Litigation Trustee, which description shall include a written report detailing, among other things, the litigation status of the Estate Claims transferred to the Litigation Sub-Trust, any settlements entered into by the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to the Estate Claims, the proceeds recovered to date from Estate Claims, and the distributions made by the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(b) Annual Plan and Budget. If instructed by the Oversight Board, the Litigation Trustee shall prepare and submit to the Oversight Board for approval an annual plan and budget in such detail as reasonably requested.

3.13 Compensation and Reimbursement; Engagement of Professionals.

(a) Compensation and Expenses.

(i) Compensation. As compensation for any services rendered by the Litigation Trustee in connection with this Agreement, the Litigation Trustee shall receive initial compensation in a manner and amount as agreed upon by the Committee. Any additional compensation or compensation of a Successor Litigation Trustee shall be determined by the Oversight Board.

(ii) Expense Reimbursements. All reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the Litigation Trustee in the performance of his or her duties hereunder, shall be reimbursed as Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses paid by the Litigation Sub-Trust.

(b) Professionals.

(i) Engagement of Professionals. The Litigation Trustee shall engage professionals from time to time in conjunction with the services provided hereunder. The Litigation Trustee's engagement of such professionals shall be approved by a majority of the Oversight Board as set forth in Section 3.3(b) hereof.

(ii) Fees and Expenses of Professionals. The Litigation Trustee shall pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any retained professionals as Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses.

3.14 Reliance by Litigation Trustee. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Litigation Trustee may rely, and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting, on any resolution, statement, certificate, instrument, opinion, report, notice, request, consent, order or other instrument or document that the Litigation Trustee has no reason to believe to be other than genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties or, in the case of facsimiles, to have been sent by the proper party or parties, and the Litigation Trustee may conclusively rely as to the truth of the statements and correctness of the opinions or direction expressed therein. The Litigation Trustee may consult with counsel and other professionals, and any advice of such counsel or other professionals shall constitute full and complete authorization

and protection in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Litigation Trustee in accordance therewith. The Litigation Trustee shall have the right at any time to seek instructions from the Bankruptcy Court, or any other court of competent jurisdiction concerning Estate Claims, this Agreement, the Plan, or any other document executed in connection therewith, and any such instructions given shall be full and complete authorization in respect of any action taken or not taken by the Litigation Trustee in accordance therewith. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall have the right to seek Orders from the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in Article IX of the Plan.

3.15 Commingling of Litigation Sub-Trust Assets. The Litigation Trustee shall not commingle any of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets with his or her own property or the property of any other Person.

3.16 [Delaware Trustee. The Delaware Trustee shall have the power and authority, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to (i) accept legal process served on the Litigation Sub-Trust in the State of Delaware; and (ii) execute any certificates that are required to be executed under the Statutory Trust Act and file such certificates in the office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware, and take such action or refrain from taking such action under this Agreement as may be directed in a writing delivered to the Delaware Trustee by the Litigation Trustee; provided, however, that the Delaware Trustee shall not be required to take or to refrain from taking any such action if the Delaware Trustee shall believe, or shall have been advised by counsel, that such performance is likely to involve the Delaware Trustee in personal liability or to result in personal liability to the Delaware Trustee, or is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes a party or is otherwise contrary to law. The Parties agree not to instruct the Delaware Trustee to take any action or to refrain from taking any action that is contrary to the terms of this Agreement or of any document contemplated hereby to which the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Delaware Trustee is or becomes party or that is otherwise contrary to law. Other than as expressly provided for in this Agreement, the Delaware Trustee shall have no duty or power to take any action for or on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust.]

ARTICLE IV.
THE OVERSIGHT BOARD

The Oversight Board shall be governed by Article IV of the Claimant Trust Agreement.

ARTICLE V.
TRUST INTERESTS

5.1 Litigation Sub-Trust Interests. On the date hereof, the Litigation Sub-Trust shall issue Trust Interests to the Claimant Trust as the sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary. The Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall be entitled to distributions from the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets in accordance with the terms of the Plan and this Agreement.

5.2 Transferability of Trust Interests. No transfer, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other disposition of a Trust Interest may be effected.

5.3 Exemption from Registration. The Parties hereto intend that the rights of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary arising under this Litigation Sub-Trust shall not be "securities" under applicable laws, but none of the Parties represent or warrant that such rights shall not be securities or shall not be entitled to exemption from registration under the applicable securities laws. The Oversight Board, acting unanimously, and Litigation Trustee may amend this Agreement in accordance with Article IX hereof to make such changes as are deemed necessary or appropriate with the advice of counsel, to ensure that the Litigation Sub-Trust is not subject to registration and/or reporting requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the TIA, or the Investment Company Act. The Trust Interests shall not have consent or voting rights or otherwise confer on the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary any rights similar to the rights of a shareholder of a corporation in respect of any actions taken or to be taken, or decisions made or to be made, by the Oversight Board and/or the Litigation Trustee under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI.
DISTRIBUTIONS

6.1 Distributions. The Litigation Trustee shall distribute Cash proceeds of the Estate Claims to the Claimant Trust within 30 days of receipt of such Cash proceeds, net of any amounts that (a) are reasonably necessary to maintain the value of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets pending their monetization or other disposition during the term of the Litigation Sub-Trust, (b) are necessary to pay or reserve for reasonably incurred or anticipated Litigation Sub-Trust Expenses and any other expenses incurred by the Litigation Sub-Trust (including, but not limited to, any taxes imposed on or payable by the Litigation Trustee with respect to the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets), and (c) are necessary to satisfy or reserve for other liabilities incurred or anticipated by the Litigation Trustee in accordance with the Plan and this Agreement (including, but not limited to, indemnification obligations and similar expenses).

6.2 Manner of Payment or Distribution. All distributions made by the Litigation Trustee on behalf of the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall be payable by the Litigation Trustee directly to the Claimant Trust, as sole Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, on the date scheduled for the distribution, unless such day is not a Business Day, then such date or the distribution shall be the following Business Day, but such distribution shall be deemed to have been completed as of the required date.

6.3 Delivery of Distributions. All distributions under this Agreement to the Claimant Trust shall be made pursuant to wire instructions provided by the Claimant Trustee to the Litigation Trustee.

ARTICLE VII.
TAX MATTERS

7.1 Tax Treatment and Tax Returns. It is intended that the Litigation Sub-Trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable) the sole beneficiary of which is the Claimant Trust. Consistent with such treatment, it is intended that the transfer of the Litigation Sub Trust Assets from the Claimant Trust to the Litigation Sub Trust will be treated as a non-event for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). Further, because

the Claimant Trust is itself intended to be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable),it is intended that the beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust will be treated as the grantor of the Litigation Sub-Trust and owner of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets for federal income tax purposes (and foreign, state, and local income tax purposes where applicable). The Litigation Trustee shall cooperate with the Claimant Trustee in connection with the preparation and filing of any federal income tax returns (and foreign, state, and local income tax returns where applicable) or information statements relating to the Litigation Sub Trust Assets.

7.2 Withholding. The Litigation Trustee may withhold from any amount distributed from the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary such sum or sums as are required to be withheld under the income tax laws of the United States or of any state or political subdivision thereof. Any amounts withheld pursuant hereto shall be deemed to have been distributed to and received by the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary. As a condition to receiving any distribution from the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee may require that the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary provide such holder's taxpayer identification number and such other information and certification as may be deemed necessary for the Litigation Trustee to comply with applicable tax reporting and withholding laws.

ARTICLE VIII.
STANDARD OF CARE AND INDEMNIFICATION

8.1 Standard of Care. None of the Litigation Trustee, acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan, the Oversight Board, or any individual Member, solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board, shall be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or to any Person (including the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries) in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the acts or omissions of any such Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member constituted fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. The employees, agents and professionals retained by the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, or Oversight Board shall not be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or any other Person in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that such acts or omissions by such employee, agent, or professional constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct or gross negligence. None of the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or any Member shall be personally liable to the Litigation Sub-Trust or to any Person for the acts or omissions of any employee, agent or professional of the Litigation Sub-Trust or Litigation Trustee, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or, if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action, or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such other court of competent jurisdiction that the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the selection, retention, or supervision of such employee, agent or professional of the Litigation Sub-Trust.

8.2 Indemnification. The Litigation Trustee (including each former Litigation Trustee), Oversight Board, and all past and present Members (collectively, the "Indemnified Parties") shall be indemnified by the Litigation Sub-Trust against and held harmless by the Litigation Sub-Trust from any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, disbursements, and related expenses) to which the Indemnified Parties may become subject in connection with any action, suit, proceeding or investigation brought or threatened against any of the Indemnified Parties in their capacity as Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, or Member, or in connection with any matter arising out of or related to the Plan, this Agreement, or the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, unless it is ultimately determined by order of the Bankruptcy Court or other court of competent jurisdiction that the Indemnified Party's acts or omissions constituted willful fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. If the Indemnified Party becomes involved in any action, proceeding, or investigation in connection with any matter arising out of or in connection with the Plan, this Agreement or the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust for which an indemnification obligation could arise, the Indemnified Party shall promptly notify the Litigation Trustee and/or Oversight Board, as applicable; provided, however, that the failure of an Indemnified Party to promptly notify the Litigation Trustee and/or Oversight Board of an indemnification obligation will not excuse the Litigation Sub-Trust from indemnifying the Indemnified Party unless such delay has caused the Litigation Sub-Trust material harm. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall periodically advance or otherwise reimburse on demand the Indemnified Party's reasonable legal and other expenses (including, without limitation, the cost of any investigation and preparation and attorney fees, disbursements, and related expenses) incurred in connection therewith as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense, but the Indemnified Party shall be required to repay promptly to the Litigation Sub-Trust the amount of any such advanced or reimbursed expenses paid to the Indemnified Party to the extent that it shall be ultimately determined by Final Order that the Indemnified Party engaged in willful fraud, misconduct, or negligence in connection with the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust with respect to which such expenses were paid. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall indemnify and hold harmless the employees, agents and professionals of the Litigation Sub-Trust and Indemnified Parties to the same extent as provided in this Section 8.2 for the Indemnified Parties. For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of this Section 8.2 shall remain available to any former Litigation Trustee or Member or the estate of any decedent Litigation Trustee or Member. The indemnification provided hereby shall be a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense.

8.3 To the extent applicable, the provisions and protections set forth in Article IX of the Plan will apply to the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Members.

ARTICLE IX.
TERMINATION

9.1 Duration. The Litigation Trustee, the Litigation Sub-Trust, and the Oversight Board shall be discharged or dissolved, as the case may be, at such time as the Litigation Trustee determines that the Estate Claims is not likely to yield sufficient additional proceeds to justify further pursuit of such Estate, and all Distributions required to be made by the Litigation Trustee to the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary under the Plan and this Agreement have been made, but in no event shall the Litigation Sub-Trust be dissolved later than [three years] from the Effective Date unless the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made within the six-month period before such

third anniversary (and, in the event of further extension, by order of the Bankruptcy Court, upon motion made at least six months before the end of the preceding extension), determines that a fixed period extension (not to exceed two years, together with any prior extensions) is necessary to facilitate or complete the recovery on, and liquidation of, the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets.

9.2 Continuance of the Litigation Trustee for Winding Up. After dissolution of the Litigation Sub-Trust and for purpose of liquidating and winding up the affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee shall continue to act as such until the Litigation Trustee's duties have been fully performed. Prior to the final distribution of all remaining Litigation Sub-Trust Assets, the Litigation Trustee shall be entitled to reserve from such assets any and all amounts required to provide for the Litigation Trustee's own costs and expenses, including a reserve to fund any potential indemnification or similar obligations of the Litigation Sub-Trust, until such time as the winding up of the Litigation Sub-Trust is completed. Upon the dissolution of the Litigation Sub-Trust and completion of the winding up of the assets, liabilities and affairs of the Litigation Sub-Trust pursuant to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the Litigation Trustee shall file a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware to terminate the Litigation Sub-Trust pursuant to Section 3810 of the Delaware Statutory Trust Act (such date upon which the certificate of cancellation is filed shall be referred to as the "Termination Date"). Subject in all respects to 3.11, upon the Termination date, the Litigation Trustee shall retain for a period of two (2) years, as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense, the books, records, and certificated and other documents and files that have been delivered to or created by the Litigation Trustee. Subject in all respects to Section 3.11, at the Litigation Trustee's discretion, all of such records and documents may, but need not, be destroyed at any time after two (2) years from the Termination Date.

9.3 Termination of Duties. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, upon the Termination Date of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Board, and its Members shall have no further duties or obligations hereunder.

ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS AND WAIVER

The Litigation Trustee, with the consent of a simple majority of the Oversight Board, may amend this Agreement to correct or clarify any non-material provisions. This Agreement may not otherwise be amended, supplemented, otherwise modified, or waived in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by the Litigation Trustee and with the unanimous approval of the Oversight Board, and the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing; provided that the Litigation Trustee must provide the Oversight Board with prior written notice of any non-material amendments, supplements, modifications, or waivers of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XI.
MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Trust Irrevocable. Except as set forth in this Agreement, establishment of the Litigation Sub-Trust by this Agreement shall be irrevocable and shall not be subject to revocation, cancellation or rescission by the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

11.2 Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary has No Legal Title to Litigation Sub-Trust Assets. The Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall have no legal title to any part of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets.

11.3 Agreement for Benefit of Parties Only. Nothing herein, whether expressed or implied, shall be construed to give any Person other than the Litigation Trustee, Oversight Board, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary any legal or equitable right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement. The Litigation Sub-Trust Assets shall be held for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary.

11.4 Notices. All notices, directions, instructions, confirmations, consents and requests required or permitted by the terms hereof shall, unless otherwise specifically provided herein, be in writing and shall be sent by first class mail, facsimile, overnight mail or in the case of mailing to a non-United States address, air mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

(a) If to the Litigation Trustee:

Marc S. Kirschner
c/o Goldin Associates LLC, a Teneo Company
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10118

With a copy to:

[insert contact for counsel to the Litigation Trustee].

(b) If to the Claimant Trustee:

Claimant Trustee
c/o **[insert contact info for Claimant Trustee]**

With a copy to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
10100 Santa Monica Blvd, 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Attn: Jeffrey Pomerantz (jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com)
Ira Kharasch (ikharasch@pszjlaw.com)
Gregory Demo (gdemo@pszjlaw.com)

Notice mailed shall be effective on the date mailed or sent. Any Person may change the address at which it is to receive notices under this Agreement by furnishing written notice pursuant to the provisions of this Section 11.4 to the entity to be charged with knowledge of such change.

11.5 Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition

or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

11.6 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all such counterparts shall together constitute but one and the same instrument.

11.7 Binding Effect, etc. All covenants and agreements contained herein shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Litigation Trustee, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary, and their respective successors and assigns. Any notice, direction, consent, waiver or other instrument or action by any Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary shall bind its successors and assigns.

11.8 Headings; References. The headings of the various Sections herein are for convenience of reference only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or provisions hereof.

11.9 Governing Law. This Agreement shall in all respects be governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, including all matters of constructions, validity and performance.

11.10 Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto, each Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board), and each Claimant Trust Beneficiary consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement ~~or the Plan~~, the Plan or any act or omission of the Claimant Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), Litigation Trustee (acting in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee or in any other capacity contemplated by this Agreement or the Plan), the Oversight Board, or any individual Member (solely in their capacity as Members of the Oversight Board); *provided, however*, that if the Bankruptcy Court either declines to exercise jurisdiction over such action or cannot exercise jurisdiction over such action, such action may be brought in the state or federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas.

11.11 Transferee Liabilities. The Litigation Sub-Trust shall have no liability for, and the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets shall not be subject to, any claim arising by, through or under the Debtor except as expressly set forth in the Plan or in this Agreement. In no event shall the Litigation Trustee or the Litigation Sub-Trust Beneficiary have any personal liability for such claims. If any liability shall be asserted against the Litigation Sub-Trust or the Litigation Trustee as the transferee of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets on account of any claimed liability of, through or under the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the Litigation Trustee may use such part of the Litigation Sub-Trust Assets as may be necessary to contest any such claimed liability and to pay, compromise, settle or discharge same on terms reasonably satisfactory to the Litigation Trustee as a Litigation Sub-Trust Expense.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Litigation Trust Agreement to be duly executed by their respective officers thereunto duly authorized on the day and year first written above.

Claimant Trustee

By: _____
James P. Seery, Jr., not individually but solely in his capacity as the Claimant Trustee

Litigation Trustee

By: _____
Marc S. Kirschner, not individually but solely in his capacity as the Litigation Trustee

Document comparison by Workshare 9.5 on Friday, January 22, 2021 4:39:24 PM

Input:	
Document 1 ID	PowerDocs://DOCS_NY/41525/8
Description	DOCS_NY-#41525-v8-Highland_-_Litigation_Trust_Agreement
Document 2 ID	PowerDocs://DOCS_NY/41525/9
Description	DOCS_NY-#41525-v9-Highland_-_Litigation_Trust_Agreement
Rendering set	Standard

Legend:	
Insertion	
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Style change	
Format change	
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Moved cell	
Split/Merged cell	
Padding cell	

Statistics:	
	Count
Insertions	6
Deletions	3
Moved from	0
Moved to	0
Style change	0
Format changed	0
Total changes	9

EXHIBIT V

SENIOR EMPLOYEE STIPULATION AND TOLLING AGREEMENT EXTENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION

This stipulation (the "Stipulation") is entered into as of [_____], by and between **[EMPLOYEE NAME]** (the "Senior Employee") and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"). The Debtor and the Senior Employee are individually referred to as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties".

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.,* Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case"):

WHEREAS, on October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee appointed the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") in the Chapter 11 Case;

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* (as may be further amended or supplemented, the "Plan")[1] [Docket No. 1472]. A hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan is currently scheduled for January 26, 2021.

WHEREAS, prior to and during the course of the Chapter 11 Case, the Senior Employee was employed by the Debtor as its [_____] and in such role provided services to the Debtor;

WHEREAS, (i) certain amounts that were allegedly due to be paid to the Senior Employee for the partial year of 2018 in installments due on February 28, 2020 and August 31, 2020; and (ii) certain amounts that were due to the Senior Employee in respect of the 2017 Deferred Award that vested after three years on May 31, 2020 ((i) and (ii), collectively, the "Bonus Amount") were not paid because of objections raised by the Committee;

WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the total Bonus Amount through and including the date hereof is $ [_____];

WHEREAS, on [___], the Senior Employee filed a proof of claim [Claim No. [_]] (the "Proof of Claim"), which included a claim for the Bonus Amount;

WHEREAS, as set forth in the Proof of Claim, the Senior Employee may have other Claims against the Debtor in addition to the Bonus Amount (the "Other Employee Claims" and together with the Bonus Amount, the "Senior Employee Claims")[2]:

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, the "Other Employee Claims" shall include all prepetition and postpetition Claims of

WHEREAS, the Committee has alleged that certain causes of action against the Senior Employee may exist, which causes of action have been or will be retained pursuant to the Plan (the "Causes of Action"):

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the release of certain of the Causes of Action (the "Released Causes of Action") against the Senior Employee as set forth in therein (the "Employee Release"):

WHEREAS, both the Employee Release and the payment of the Bonus Amount (as reduced pursuant to this Agreement) are conditioned on the Senior Employee executing this Stipulation on or prior to the Confirmation Date;

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the creation of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust and the appointment of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (the "CTOC") to oversee such entities;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, each of the Parties stipulates and agrees as follows:

1. Covenant Not to Sue. In consideration of the Senior Employee's agreement to toll the statutes of limitation with respect to any Causes of Action that can be asserted against him and to waive a portion of the Bonus Amount which would otherwise be part of the Senior Employee Claim, the Debtor and any of its successors or assigns, including the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust (collectively, the "HCMLP Parties"), agree not to initiate or commence any lawsuit, action or proceeding for the purpose of prosecuting any Released Causes of Action against the Senior Employee from the date of this Stipulation until the earlier of (a) thirty calendar days after the Notice Date and (b) the Dissolution Date (each as defined below) (such date, the "Termination Date"). This Stipulation shall expire upon the Termination Date and shall thereafter be of no further force and effect; *provided, however,* that the termination of this Stipulation shall not affect the treatment of the Bonus Amount set forth in Section 5 hereof or in the Plan.

2. Non-Compliance: Vesting.

a. As set forth in the Plan, the Senior Employee acknowledges and agrees that the Employee Release will be deemed null and void and of no force and effect (1) if there is more than one member of the CTOC who does not represent entities holding a Disputed or Allowed Claim (the "Independent Members"), the Claimant Trustee and the Independent Members by majority vote determine or (2) if there is only one Independent Member, the Independent Member after discussion with the Claimant Trustee, determines (in each case after discussing with the full CTOC) that such Employee (regardless of whether the Employee is then currently employed by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee):

(1) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists

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the Senior Employee, including paid time off claims, claims (if applicable) for severance amounts under applicable employment agreements, and administrative claims (if applicable) but shall not include the Bonus Amount.

any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust, or any of their respective employees or agents, or any Released Party on or in connection with any claim or cause of action arising prior to the Effective Date,

(2) has taken any action that, impairs or harms the value of the Claimant Trust Assets or the Reorganized Debtor Assets,

(3) has violated the confidentiality provisions of Section 4 below, or

(4) (x) upon the request of the Claimant Trustee, has failed to provide reasonable assistance in good faith to the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets or Reorganized Debtor Assets, as applicable, or (ii) the resolution of Claims, or (y) has taken any action that impedes or frustrates the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to any of the foregoing. If such determination under this Section 2a is made, the Claimant Trustee will deliver a notice of non-compliance with the Plan (the "Notice") to the Senior Employee. Such Notice will be effective when deemed delivered pursuant to Section 8.h hereof (the "Notice Date").

b. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Employee Release will vest and all Released Causes of Action that may or could be brought against the Senior Employee will be indefeasibly released solely to the extent set forth in Article IX.D of the Plan so long as the Notice Date does not occur on or before the date that the Claimant Trust is dissolved (such date, the "Dissolution Date").

c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Stipulation or any other document, Senior Employee expressly reserves the right to take all actions necessary to pursue enforcement and payment of the Other Employee Claims, and such actions shall not violate the terms of this Stipulation; provided, that, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Stipulation shall prejudice the rights of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to object to or otherwise challenge any Other Employee Claims or limit the Senior Employee's obligations under Section 8 hereof. Additionally, this Agreement does not affect or impair Senior Employee's rights, if any, to seek indemnification from any party, including, without limitation, the Debtor, any HCMLP Parties, or any other affiliates thereof nor does it affect or impair the right of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to challenge such request.

3. Tolling of Statutes of Limitation. In consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that the statute of limitations applicable to any Cause of Action is hereby tolled as of, and extended from, the date of this Stipulation through and including the Termination Date (the "Tolling Period"). The Tolling Period shall be excluded from any calculation of any statute of limitations period applicable to any Cause of Action that may be brought by the HCMLP Parties against the Senior Employee. The Senior Employee acknowledges that he will be estopped from arguing that this Stipulation is ineffective to extend the time within which the HCMLP Parties must commence an action to pursue any Cause of Action.

4. Confidentiality. In further consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that, in addition to existing obligations to maintain all business sensitive information concerning the HCMLP Parties in strictest confidence, each Senior Employee further agrees to keep all discussions, information and observations including, but not limited to, attorney-client privileged or work product information (collectively "Confidential Information") relating to the activities or planned activities of the HCMLP Parties strictly confidential. Each Senior Employee covenants and represents that it will not discuss such Confidential Information with anyone, other than the Senior Employee's personal attorney, the Claimant Trustee, or its respective representatives.

5. Bonus Amount.

a. The Senior Employee has agreed to forfeit a percentage of his Bonus Amount in consideration for the Employee Release and acknowledges that such agreement is an integral part of this Stipulation. The Senior Employee hereby agrees that (i) the Bonus Amount will be treated as an Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claim) under the Plan and, to the extent required, will reduce his Bonus Amount as required to qualify for such treatment, (ii) the Senior Employee will receive the treatment provided to other Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claims), (iii) the Allowed Class 7 distribution on the Bonus Amount will be further reduced by 5% (the "Reduced Amount"), and (iv) the Reduced Amount will be forever waived and released. Except as set forth herein, nothing herein will prejudice or otherwise impact any Other Employee Claim, or prevent the Senior Employee from prosecuting, pursuing, or enforcing any Other Employee Claim.

b. For the avoidance of doubt, although the Employee Release can be nullified as set forth in Section 2, any such nullification will have no effect on the treatment of the Senior Employee's Bonus Amount pursuant to this Section 5.

6. Other Employee Claims. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the Senior Employee is not entitled to make the Convenience Class Election with respect to the Other Employee Claims.

7. Effective Date. The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court and the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan. If, for any reason, the Plan is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or the Effective Date does not occur, this Stipulation will be null and void and of no force and effect.

8. Plan Support. The Senior Employee agrees that he will use commercially reasonable efforts to assist the Debtor in confirmation of the Plan, including, without limitation, filing a notice of such Senior Employee's withdrawal from the *Senior Employees' Limited Objection to Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization* [Docket No. 1669], and vote, if applicable, the Bonus Amount, the Other Employee Claims, and any other Claims in favor of the Plan.

9. Miscellaneous.

a. Counterparts. This Stipulation may be signed in counterparts and

such signatures may be delivered by facsimile or other electronic means.

b. Binding Effect. This Stipulation shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any and all successors-in-interests, assigns, and legal representatives, of any Party.

c. Authority. Each Party to this Stipulation and each person executing this document on behalf of any Party to this Stipulation warrants and represents that he, she, or it has the power and authority to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this Stipulation.

d. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation sets forth the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements and discussions. This Stipulation may only be amended by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.

e. No Waiver and Reservation of Rights. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Stipulation shall be, or deemed to be, a waiver of any rights, remedies, or privileges of any of the Parties. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Stipulation is without prejudice to any Party's rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law, whether at law or in equity, and each Party hereby reserves all of such rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law.

f. No Admission of Liability. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Causes of Action. Nothing in this Agreement will imply an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Senior Employee and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Senior Employee.

g. No Waiver If Breach. The Parties agree that no breach of any provision hereof can be waived except in writing. The waiver of a breach of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach of any provision hereof.

h. Notice. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered by email, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be subsequently specified in writing by any Party and delivered to all other Parties pursuant to this Section:

Senior Employee

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
Email: [_____]

With a copy to:

Attorneys for Senior Employee

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
Email: [_____]

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P
[_____]
[_____]
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: [_____]
Email: [_____]

With a copy to:

Attorneys for HCMLP

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
Email: [_____]

i. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Stipulation; (b) executed this Stipulation upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Stipulation, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Stipulation and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

j. Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

k. Governing Law: Venue. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

SENIOR EMPLOYEE

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

EXHIBIT W

SENIOR EMPLOYEE STIPULATION AND TOLLING AGREEMENT EXTENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION

This stipulation (the "Stipulation") is entered into as of [_____], by and between **[EMPLOYEE NAME]** (the "Senior Employee") and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"). The Debtor and the Senior Employee are individually referred to as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties".

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.,* Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case"):

WHEREAS, on October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee appointed the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") in the Chapter 11 Case;

WHEREAS, on November ~~13,~~24, 2020, the Debtor filed the ~~*Third*~~*Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* (as may be further amended~~,~~ or supplemented~~, or otherwise modified from time to time,~~ the "Plan")~~:~~[1] [Docket No. 1472]. A hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan is currently scheduled for January 26, 2021.

WHEREAS, prior to and during the course of the Chapter 11 Case, the Senior Employee was employed by the Debtor as its [_____] and in such role provided services to the Debtor;

WHEREAS, ~~the Senior Employee is owed for his services~~ (i) certain amounts that were allegedly due to be paid to the Senior Employee for the partial year of 2018 in installments due on February 28, 2020 and August 31, 2020; and (ii) certain amounts that were due to the Senior Employee in respect of the 2017 Deferred Award that vested after three years on May 31, 2020 ((i) and (ii), collectively, the "~~Earned Amounts~~"):~~WHEREAS, the Committee objected to the Senior Employee receiving the Earned Amounts during the Chapter 11 Case and the Earned Amounts, although earned, was not paid~~Bonus Amount") were not paid because of objections raised by the Committee;

WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the total ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount through and including the date hereof~~ owed to the Senior Employee~~ is $ [_____];

WHEREAS, on [___], the Senior Employee filed a proof of claim [Claim No. [_]] (the "Proof of Claim"), which included a claim for the Bonus Amount;

WHEREAS, as set forth in the Proof of Claim, the Senior Employee may have other~~ prepetition and postpetition~~ Claims against the Debtor in addition to the ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount (the "Other Employee Claims" and together with the Bonus Amount, the "Senior

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

Employee Claims")[2]:

WHEREAS, the Committee has alleged that certain causes of action against the Senior Employee may exist, which causes of action have been or will be retained pursuant to the Plan (the "Causes of Action"):

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the release of ~~such~~certain of the Causes of Action (the "Released Causes of Action") against the Senior Employee as set forth in therein (the "Employee Release"):

WHEREAS, both the Employee Release ~~is~~and the payment of the Bonus Amount (as reduced pursuant to this Agreement) are conditioned on the Senior Employee executing this Stipulation on or prior to the ~~Effective Date of the Plan and reducing his Earned Amounts as set forth herein~~Confirmation Date;

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the creation of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust and the appointment of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (the "CTOC") to oversee such entities;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, each of the Parties stipulates and agrees as follows:

1. Covenant Not to Sue. In consideration of the Senior Employee's agreement to toll the statutes of limitation with respect to any Causes of Action that can be asserted against him and to waive a portion of the ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount which would otherwise ~~due to~~be part of the Senior Employee Claim, the Debtor and any of its successors or assigns, including the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust (collectively, the "HCMLP Parties"), agree not to initiate or commence any lawsuit, action or proceeding for the purpose of prosecuting any Released Causes of Action against the Senior Employee from the date of this Stipulation until the earlier of (a) thirty calendar days after the Notice Date and (b) the Dissolution Date (each as defined below) (such date, the "Termination Date"). This Stipulation shall expire upon the Termination Date and shall thereafter be of no further force and effect; *provided, however,* that the termination of this Stipulation shall not affect the treatment of the ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount set forth in Section 5 hereof or in the Plan.

2. Non-Compliance: Vesting.

a. As set forth in the Plan, the Senior Employee acknowledges and agrees that the Employee Release will be deemed null and void and of no force and effect (1) if there is more than one member of the CTOC who does not represent entities holding a Disputed or Allowed Claim (the "Independent Members"), the Claimant Trustee and the Independent Members by majority vote determine or (2) if there is only one Independent Member, the Independent Member after discussion with the Claimant Trustee, determines (in each case after discussing with the full CTOC) that such Employee (regardless of whether the Employee is then

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, the "Other Employee Claims" shall include all prepetition and postpetition Claims of the Senior Employee ~~except for the Earned Amounts~~, including paid time off claims, claims (if applicable) for severance amounts under applicable employment agreements, and administrative claims (if applicable) but shall not include the Bonus Amount.

currently employed by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee):

(1) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust, or any of their respective employees or agents, or any Released Party on or in connection with any claim or cause of action arising prior to the Effective Date,

(2) has taken any action that, impairs or harms the value of the Claimant Trust Assets or the Reorganized Debtor Assets,

(3) has violated the confidentiality provisions of Section 4 below, or

(4) (x) upon the request of the Claimant Trustee, has failed to provide reasonable assistance in good faith to the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets or Reorganized Debtor Assets, as applicable, or (ii) the resolution of Claims, or (y) has taken any action that impedes or frustrates the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to any of the foregoing. If such determination under this Section 2a is made, the Claimant Trustee will deliver a notice of non-compliance with the Plan (the "Notice") to the Senior Employee. Such Notice will be effective when deemed delivered pursuant to Section 8.h hereof (the "Notice Date").

b. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Employee Release will vest and all Released Causes of Action that may or could be brought against the Senior Employee will be indefeasibly released solely to the extent set forth in Article IX.D of the Plan so long as the Notice Date does not occur on or before the date that the Claimant Trust is dissolved (such date, the "Dissolution Date").

c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Stipulation or any other document, Senior Employee expressly reserves the right to take all actions necessary to pursue enforcement and payment of the Other Employee Claims, and such actions shall not violate the terms of this Stipulation; provided, that, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Stipulation shall prejudice the rights of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to object to or otherwise challenge any Other Employee Claims or limit the Senior Employee's obligations under Section 8 hereof. Additionally, this Agreement does not affect or impair Senior Employee's rights, if any, to seek indemnification from any party, including, without limitation, the Debtor, any HCMLP Parties, or any other affiliates thereof nor does it affect or impair the right of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to challenge such request.

3. Tolling of Statutes of Limitation. In consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that the statute of ~~limitation~~limitations applicable to any Cause of Action is hereby tolled as of, and extended from, the date of this Stipulation through and including the Termination Date (the "Tolling Period"). The Tolling Period shall be excluded from any calculation of any statute of limitations period applicable to any Cause of Action that may be brought by the HCMLP Parties against the Senior Employee. The Senior Employee acknowledges that he will be estopped from arguing that

this Stipulation is ineffective to extend the time within which the HCMLP Parties must commence an action to pursue any Cause of Action.

4. Confidentiality. In further consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that, in addition to existing obligations to maintain all business sensitive information concerning the HCMLP Parties in strictest confidence, each Senior Employee further agrees to keep all discussions, information and observations including, but not limited to, attorney-client privileged or work product information (collectively "Confidential Information") relating to the activities or planned activities of the HCMLP Parties strictly confidential. Each Senior Employee covenants and represents that it will not discuss such Confidential Information with anyone, other than the Senior Employee's personal attorney, the Claimant Trustee, or its respective representatives.

5. ~~Earned Amounts.~~Bonus Amount.

a. The Senior Employee has agreed to forfeit a percentage of his Bonus Amount in consideration for the Employee Release and acknowledges that such agreement is an integral part of this Stipulation. The Senior Employee hereby agrees that (i) the ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount will be treated as an Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claim) under the Plan and, to the extent required, will reduce his ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount as required to qualify for such treatment, (ii) the Senior Employee will receive the treatment provided to other Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claims), (iii) the ~~Earned Amounts~~Allowed Class 7 distribution on the Bonus Amount will be further reduced by ~~40~~5% (the "Reduced Amount"), and (iv) the Reduced Amount will be forever waived and released. Except as set forth herein, nothing herein will prejudice or otherwise impact any Other Employee Claim, or prevent the Senior Employee from prosecuting, pursuing, or enforcing any Other Employee Claim.

b. For the avoidance of doubt, although the Employee Release can be nullified as set forth in Section 2, any such nullification will have no effect on the treatment of the Senior Employee's ~~Earned Amounts~~Bonus Amount pursuant to this Section 5.

6. Other Employee Claims. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the Senior Employee is not entitled to make the Convenience Class Election with respect to the Other Employee Claims.

7. ~~6.~~ Effective Date. The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court and the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan. If, for any reason, the Plan is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or the Effective Date does not occur, this Stipulation will be null and void and of no force and effect.

8. ~~7.~~ Plan Support. The Senior Employee agrees that he will use commercially reasonable efforts to assist the Debtor in confirmation of the Plan ~~and vote any~~, including, without limitation, filing a notice of such Senior Employee's withdrawal from the *Senior Employees' Limited Objection to Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization* [Docket No. 1669], and vote, if applicable, the Bonus Amount, the Other Employee Claims, and

any other Claims in favor of the Plan.

9. ~~8.~~ Miscellaneous.

a. Counterparts. This Stipulation may be signed in counterparts and such signatures may be delivered by facsimile or other electronic means.

b. Binding Effect. This Stipulation shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any and all successors-in-interests, assigns, and legal representatives, of any Party.

c. Authority. Each Party to this Stipulation and each person executing this document on behalf of any Party to this Stipulation warrants and represents that he, she, or it has the power and authority to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this Stipulation.

d. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation sets forth the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements and discussions. This Stipulation may only be amended by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.

e. No Waiver and Reservation of Rights. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Stipulation shall be, or deemed to be, a waiver of any rights, remedies, or privileges of any of the Parties. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Stipulation is without prejudice to any Party's rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law, whether at law or in equity, and each Party hereby reserves all of such rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law.

f. No Admission of Liability. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Causes of Action. Nothing in this Agreement will imply an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Senior Employee and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Senior Employee.

g. No Waiver If Breach. The Parties agree that no breach of any provision hereof can be waived except in writing. The waiver of a breach of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach of any provision hereof.

h. Notice. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered by email, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be subsequently specified in writing by any Party and delivered to all other Parties pursuant to this Section:

Senior Employee

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]

[_____]
Email: [_____]

With a copy to:

Attorneys for Senior Employee

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
Email: [_____]

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P
[_____]
[_____]
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: [_____]
Email: [_____]

With a copy to:

Attorneys for HCMLP

[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
[_____]
Email: [_____]

i. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Stipulation; (b) executed this Stipulation upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Stipulation, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Stipulation and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

j. Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

k. Governing Law: Venue. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

SENIOR EMPLOYEE

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

Document comparison by Workshare 9.5 on Thursday, January 21, 2021 4:39:21 PM

Input:	
Document 1 ID	PowerDocs://DOCS_NY/41454/10
Description	DOCS_NY-#41454-v10-Highland_-_Senior_Employee_Stipulation
Document 2 ID	PowerDocs://DOCS_NY/41454/18
Description	DOCS_NY-#41454-v18-Highland_-_Senior_Employee_Stipulation
Rendering set	Standard

Legend:	
Insertion	
~~Deletion~~	
~~Moved from~~	
Moved to	
Style change	
Format change	
~~Moved deletion~~	
Inserted cell	
Deleted cell	
Moved cell	
Split/Merged cell	
Padding cell	

Statistics:	
	Count
Insertions	44
Deletions	32
Moved from	0
Moved to	0
Style change	0
Format changed	0
Total changes	76

EXHIBIT X

Schedule of Contracts and Leases to Be Assumed

1. Advisory Services Agreement, dated November 21, 2011, effective June 20, 2011, by and between Carey International, Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
2. Amended and Restated Advisory Services Agreement, dated March 4, 2013, by and between Trussway Holdings, Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
3. Reference Portfolio Management Agreement, dated March 4, 2004, by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Citibank N.A.
4. Advisory Services Agreement, dated May 25, 2011, by and between CCS Medical, Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
5. Amended and Restated Advisory Services Agreement, dated February 28, 2013, by and between Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
6. Prime Brokerage Agreement by and between Jefferies LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated May 24, 2013.
7. Amended and Restated Shared Services Agreement, dated August 21, 2015, by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Falcon E&P Opportunities GP, LLC.
8. Amended and Restated Administrative Services Agreement, effective as of August 21, 2015, by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Petrocap Partners II GP, LLC.
9. Office Lease, between Crescent Investors, L.P., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
10. Paylocity Corporation Services Agreement, between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Paylocity Corporation, dated November 19, 2012.
11. Electronic Trading Services Agreement, between SunTrust Robinson Humphrey Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated February 6, 2019.
12. Letter Agreement, between FTI Consulting, Inc., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated November 19, 2018.
13. Administrative Services Agreement, dated January 1, 2018, between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston.
14. Electronic Communications: Customer Authorization & Indemnification, between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, dated August 9, 2016.
15. Letter Agreement, dated August 9, 2016, Electronic Access Terms and Conditions, by and between The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.
16. Shared Services Agreement by and between Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated effective October 27, 2017.

17. Sub-Advisory Agreement, by and between Highland HCF Advisors, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, dated effective October 27, 2017.

18. Collateral Management Agreement, dated November 2, 2006, by and between Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

19. Management Agreement, dated November 15, 2007, between Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners Offshore, L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners Master L.P., Highland Restoration Capital Partners GP, LLC, and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

20. Investment Management Agreement, between Highland Capital Multi-Strategy Fund, L.P., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated July 31, 2006.

21. Investment Management Agreement, between Highland Capital Multi-Strategy Master Fund, L.P., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated July 31, 2006.

22. Management Agreement, dated August 22, 2007, between and among Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Walkers Fund Services Limited, as trustee of Highland Credit Opportunities Japanese Unit Trust.

23. Third Amended and Restated Investment Management Agreement, by and among Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated November 1, 2013.

24. Investment Management Agreement, dated March 31, 2015, by and among Highland Select Equity Master Fund, L.P., Highland Select Equity Fund GP, L.P., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

25. Amended and Restated Investment Management Agreement, dated February 27, 2017, by and among Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P., Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund I, L.P., Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund II, L.P., Highland SunBridge GP, LLC, and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

26. Servicing Agreement, dated December 20, 2007, by and among Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

27. Investment Management Agreement, dated November 1, 2007, by and between Longhorn Credit Funding, LLC, and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as amended)

28. Reference Portfolio Management Agreement, dated August 1, 2016, by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., and Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

29. Collateral Servicing Agreement, dated December 20, 2006, by and among Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

30. Portfolio Management Agreement, dated March 15, 2005, by and among Southfork CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

31. Amended and Restated Portfolio Management Agreement, dated November 30, 2005, by and among Jaspar CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

32. Servicing Agreement, dated May 31, 2007, by and among Westchester CLO, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

33. Servicing Agreement, dated May 10, 2006, by and among Rockwall CDO Ltd. and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as amended)

34. Portfolio Management Agreement, dated December 8, 2005, by and between Liberty CLO, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

35. Servicing Agreement, dated March 27, 2008, by and among Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

36. Servicing Agreement, dated May 9, 2007, by and among Rockwall CDO II Ltd. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

37. Collateral Management Agreement, by and between, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd. and Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated August 1, 2001.

38. Collateral Management Agreement, dated August 18, 1999, by and between Highland Legacy Limited and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

39. Servicing Agreement, dated November 30, 2006, by and among Grayson CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as amended)

40. Servicing Agreement, dated October 25, 2007, by and among Stratford CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

41. Servicing Agreement, dated August 3, 2006, by and among Red River CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as amended)

42. Servicing Agreement, dated December 21, 2006, by and among Brentwood CLO, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

43. Servicing Agreement, dated March 13, 2007, by and among Eastland CLO Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

44. Portfolio Management, Agreement, dated October 13, 2005, by and among Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

45. AT&T Managed Internet Service, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and AT&T Corp., dated February 24, 2015.

46. ViaWest, Master Service Agreement, dated October 3, 2011, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and ViaWest

47. Stockholders' Agreement, dated April 15, 2005, by and between American Banknote Corporation and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

48. Stockholders' Agreement and Amendment No. 1, dated January 25, 2011, by and between Carey Holdings, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

49. Stockholders' Agreement and Amendment, dated March 24, 2010, by and between Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

50. Members' Agreement and Amendment, dated November 15, 2017, by and between Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

51. Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement and Amendment, dated January 16, 2013, by and between Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

52. Stockholders' Agreement and Amendments, dated October 24, 2008, by and between JHT Holdings, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

53. Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of Highland Dynamic Income Fund, L.P., dated February 25, 2013, by and between Highland Dynamic Income Fund GP, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

54. Highland Multi-Strategy Fund, L.P. Limited Partnership Agreement, dated July 6, 2006, by and between Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, L.P. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

55. Operating Agreement of HE Capital, LLC (as amended), dated September 27, 2007, by and between ENA Capital, LLC Ellman Management Group, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

56. Limited Liability Company Agreement of Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master SubFund II, LLC, dated February 27, 2007, by and between Highland Multi-Strategy Master Fund, L.P. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

57. Limited Liability Company Agreement of Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master SubFund, LLC, dated July 19, 2006, by and between Highland Multi-Strategy Master Fund, L.P. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

58. Highland Capital Management, L.P., Limited Liability Company Agreement of Highland Receivables Finance 1, LLC, by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

59. Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P. and Amendments, dated November 6, 2007, by and between Highland Restoration Capital Partners GP, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

60. Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Select Equity Fund GP, L.P., dated October 2005, by and between Highland Select Equity Fund GP, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

61. Agreement of Limited Partnership of Penant Management LP, dated December 12, 2012, by and between Penant Management GP, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

62. Agreement of Limited Partnership of Petrocap Incentive Partners III, LP, dated April 12, 2018, by and between Petrocap Incentive Partners III GP, LLC, Petrocap Incentive Holdings III, LP and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

63. Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Petrocap Partners II, LP, dated October 30, 2014, by and between Petrocap Partners II GP, LLC, Petrocap Incentive Partners II, LP and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

64. Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Credit Opportunities CDO GP, L.P., dated December 29, 2005, by and between Highland Credit Opportunities CDO GP, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

65. Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., dated November 1, 2014, by and between Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

66. DUO Security, 2 factor authentication, by and between DUO Security and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

67. GoDaddy Domain Registrations, by and between GoDaddy and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

68. Highland Loan Fund, Ltd. et al, Investment Management Agreement, dated July 31, 2001, by and between Highland Loan Fund, Ltd. et al and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

69. E Mailflow Monitoring, by and between Mxtoolbox and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

70. Cloud single sign on for HR related employee login, by and between Onelogin and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

71. Collateral Management Agreement, dated May 19, 1998, by and between Pam Capital Funding LP, Ranger Asset Mgt LP and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

72. Collateral Management Agreement, dated August 6, 1997, by and between Pamco Cayman Ltd., Ranger Asset Mgt LP and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

73. Order Addenda, dated January 28, 2020, by and between CenturyLink Communications, LLC and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

74. Service Agreement (as amended), dated April 1, 2005, by and between Intex Solutions, Inc. and Highland Capital Management, L.P.

75. Amendment No. 1 to Servicing Agreement, October 2, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd. et al

76. Interim Collateral Management Agreement, June 15, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Rockwall CDO Ltd

77. Amendment No. 1 to Servicing Agreement, October 2, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Rockwall CDO Ltd

78. Collateral Servicing Agreement dated December 20, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Highland Park CDO I, Ltd.; The Bank of New York Trust Company, National Association

79. Representations and Warranties Agreement, dated December 20, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Highland Park CDO I, Ltd.

80. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated March 27, 2008, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd.; State Street Bank and Trust Company

81. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated December 20, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Greenbriar CLO, Ltd.; State Street Bank and Trust Company

82. Collateral Acquisition Agreement, dated March 13, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Eastland CLO, Ltd

83. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated March 13, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Eastland CLO, Ltd. and Investors Bank and Trust Company

84. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated October 13, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Gleneagles CLO, Ltd.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association

85. Collateral Acquisition Agreement, dated November 30, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Grayson CLO, Ltd.

86. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated November 30, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Grayson CLO, Ltd.; Investors Bank & Trust Company

87. Collateral Acquisition Agreement, dated August 3, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO, Ltd.

88. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated August 3, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO, Ltd.; U.S. Bank National Association

89. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement, dated April 19, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company

90. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement, dated February 2, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

91. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement (Amendment No. 2), dated May 5, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

92. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement (Amendment No. 1), dated April 12, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

93. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement (Amendment No. 3), dated June 22, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

94. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement (Amendment No. 4), dated July 17, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

95. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated February 2, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; U.S. Bank National Association; IXIS Financial Products Inc.

96. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated April 18, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company; U.S. Bank National Association

97. Master Participation Agreement, dated June 5, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Red River CLO Ltd.; Grand Central Asset Trust

98. A&R Asset Acquisition Agreement, dated July 18, 2001, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Salomon Smith Barney Inc.; Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.

99. A&R Master Participation Agreement, dated July 18, 2001, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Salomon Brothers Holding Company; Highland Loan Funding V Ltd.

100. Collateral Acquisition Agreement, dated June 29, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Jasper CLO Ltd.

101. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated June 29, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Jasper CLO Ltd.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association

102. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement, dated March 24, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Jasper CLO Ltd; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; and IXIS Financial Products Inc.

103. Master Warehousing and Participation Agreement (Amendment No. 1), dated May 16, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Jasper CLO Ltd; MMP-5 Funding, LLC; and IXIS Financial Products Inc.

104. Securities Account Control Agreement, dated June 29, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association

105. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated December 8, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Liberty CLO Ltd.

106. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated May 10, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Rockwall CDO Ltd; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association

107. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated May 9, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Rockwall CDO II, Ltd.; Investors Bank & Trust Company

108. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated March 15, 2005, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Southfork CLO Ltd.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association

109. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated October 25, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Stratford CLO Ltd.; State Street

110. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated August 18, 2004, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Valhalla CLO, Ltd.; JPMorgan Chase Bank

111. Extension/Buy-Out Agreement, dated August 18, 2004, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Citigroup Financial Products Inc.; Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

112. Collateral Acquisition Agreement, dated May 31, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Westchester CLO, Ltd.

113. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated May 31, 2007, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Westchester CLO, Ltd.; Investors Bank & Trust Company

114. Collateral Administration Agreement, dated December 21, 2006, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Brentwood CLO, Ltd.; Investors Bank & Trust Company

115. Indemnification and Guaranty Agreement between Highland Capital Management, Strand Advisors, Inc. and James Seery

116. Indemnification and Guaranty Agreement between Highland Capital Management, Strand Advisors, Inc. and John Dubel

117. Indemnification and Guaranty Agreement between Highland Capital Management, Strand Advisors, Inc. and Russell Nelms

118. Colocation Service Order dated October 14, 2019 between Highland Capital Management and Dawn US Holdings, LLC d/b/a Evoque Date Center Solutions

119. Tradesuite Web Module Services/Agreement between Highland Capital Management and DTCC ITP LLC

EXHIBIT Y

1. Debtor

Highland Capital Management, L.P.

2. Professionals

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Development Specialists, Inc.
Bradley Sharp
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC
Jenner & Block
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnel LLP
Morrison Cohen LLP
Latham & Watkins LLP
Richards Layton & Finger
Winstead PC
Rogge Dunn Group, PC
Blank Rome LLP
FTI Consulting
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor
Reid Collins Tsai
Deloitte
Price Waterhouse Coopers
Maples (Cayman)
Bell Nunnally
Rowlett Hill Collins LLP
Anderson Mori & Tomotsune
Culhane Meadows PLLC
Kim & Chang
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
Wilmer Hale
Carey Olsen
ASW Law
Eric Felton
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP
Morrison Cohen LLP
Latham & Watkins LLP
Richards Layton & Finger
Winstead PC
Rogge Dunn Group, PC
Blank Rome LLP

3. Top 20 Unsecured Creditors

Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC
American Arbitration Association
Andrews Kurth LLP
Bates White, LLC
Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP
CLO Holdco, Ltd.
Connolly Gallagher LLP
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
DLA Piper LLP (US)
Duff & Phelps, LLC
Foley Gardere
Joshua & Jennifer Terry
Lackey Hershman LLP
McKool Smith, P.C.
Meta-e Discovery LLC
NWCC, LLC
Patrick Daugherty
Redeemer Committee of The Highland Crusader Fund
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC

4. Equity Holders (Direct and Indirect)

Atlas IDF GP LLC
Beacon Mountain LLC
Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
James Dondero
Mark K. Okada
Strand Advisors, Inc.
The Dugaboy Investment Trust
The Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust – Exempt Trust #1
The Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust – Exempt Trust #2

5. Affiliated Parties

Acis CLO Management GP, LLC
Acis CLO Management Holdings, L.P.
Acis CLO Management Intermediate Holdings I, LLC
Acis CLO Management Intermediate Holdings II, LLC
Acis CLO Management, LLC
Acis CMOA Trust
Advisors Equity Group LLC
Asbury Holdings, LLC
Castle Bio Manager, LLC
De Kooning, Ltd.
Eagle Equity Advisors, LLC
Eames, Ltd.
Gunwale LLC

HCREF-I Holding Corp.
HCREF-XI Holding Corp.
HCREF-XII Holding Corp.
HE Capital Fox Trails, LLC
HE Capital, LLC
HE Mezz Fox Trails, LLC
HE Peoria Place Property, LLC
HE Peoria Place, LLC
HFP CDO Construction Corp.
HFP GP, LLC
Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund GP, LLC
Highland Brasil, LLC
Highland Capital Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Highland Capital Management Korea
Highland Capital Management Korea Limited
Highland Capital Management Korea Limited (Relying Advisor)
Highland Capital Multi-Strategy Fund, LP
Highland CDO Holding Company
Highland CDO Opportunity Fund GP, L.P.
Highland CDO Opportunity GP, LLC
Highland CLO Assets Holdings Limited
Highland CLO Holdings Ltd.
Highland CLO Management, Ltd.
Highland Dynamic Income Fund GP, LLC
Highland Employee Retention Assets LLC
Highland ERA Management, LLC
Highland Financial Corp.
Highland Financial Partners, L.P.
Highland Fund Holdings, LLC
Highland HCF Advisor Ltd. (Relying Advisor)
Highland HCF Advisors Ltd.
Highland Latin America Consulting, Ltd
Highland Latin America GP Ltd.
Highland Latin America GP, Ltd.
Highland Latin America LP, Ltd.
Highland Latin America Trust
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund GP, L.P.
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.
Highland Multi Strategy Credit GP, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LP
Highland Multi-Strategy Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master SubFund II, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Onshore Master Subfund, LLC
Highland Receivables Finance I, LLC
Highland Restoration Capital Partners GP, LLC
Highland Select Equity GP, LLC
Highland Select Equity Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company
Highland SunBridge GP, LLC
Hirst, Ltd.

Hockney, Ltd.
Lautner, Ltd.
Maple Avenue Holdings, LLC
Neutra, Ltd.
NexPoint Insurance Distributors, LLC
NexPoint Insurance Solutions GP, LLC
NexPoint Insurance Solutions, L.P.
NHT Holdco, LLC
NREA SE MF Holdings, LLC
NREA SE MF Investment Co, LLC
NREA SE Multifamily, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Arborwalk Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Arborwalk Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge Manager, LLC
NREA SE2 West Place Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE2 West Place Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Arboleda Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Arboleda Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Fairways Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Fairways Manager, LLC
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis Leaseco, LLC
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio One Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio Three Manager, LLC
NREA Southeast Portfolio Two Manager, LLC
Oldenburg, Ltd.
Penant Management LP
Pershing LLC
PetroCap Incentive Partners III, LP
Pollack, Ltd.
SE Battleground Park, LLC
SE Glenview, LLC
SE Governors Green II, LLC
SE Gulfstream Isles GP, LLC
SE Gulfstream Isles LP, LLC
SE Heights at Olde Towne, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park GP I, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park GP II, LLC
SE Lakes at Renaissance Park LP, LLC
SE Multifamily Holdings LLC
SE Multifamily REIT Holdings LLC
SE Myrtles at Olde Towne, LLC

SE Quail Landing, LLC
SE River Walk, LLC
SE SM, Inc.
SE Stoney Ridge II, LLC
SE Victoria Park, LLC
SH Castle BioSciences, LLC
Starck, Ltd.
The Dondero Insurance Rabbi Trust
The Okada Insurance Rabbi Trust
Tihany, Ltd.
US Gaming SPV, LLC
US Gaming, LLC
Warhol, Ltd.
Wright, Ltd.

6. Other Parties

11 Estates Lane, LLC
1110 Waters, LLC
140 Albany, LLC
1525 Dragon, LLC
17720 Dickerson, LLC
1905 Wylie LLC
2006 Milam East Partners GP, LLC
2006 Milam East Partners, L.P.
201 Tarrant Partners, LLC
2014 Corpus Weber Road LLC
2325 Stemmons HoldCo, LLC
2325 Stemmons Hotel Partners, LLC
2325 Stemmons TRS, Inc.
300 Lamar, LLC
3409 Rosedale, LLC
3801 Maplewood, LLC
3801 Shenandoah, L.P.
3820 Goar Park LLC
400 Seaman, LLC
401 Ame, L.P.
4201 Locust, L.P.
4312 Belclaire, LLC
5833 Woodland, L.P.
5906 DeLoache, LLC
5950 DeLoache, LLC
7758 Ronnie, LLC
7759 Ronnie, LLC
AA Shotguns, LLC
Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd.
Acis CLO 2017-7 Ltd
Acis CLO Trust
Allenby, LLC
Allisonville RE Holdings, LLC
AM Uptown Hotel, LLC

Apex Care, L.P
Ascendant Advisors
Asury Holdings, LLC (fka HCSLR Camelback Investors (Delaware), LLC)
Atlas IDF LP
Atlas IDF, LP
Baylor University
BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure, LLC
BDC Toys Holdco, LLC
BH Willowdale Manager, LLC
Big Spring Partners, LLC
Bloomdale, LLC
Brentwood CLO, Ltd.
Brentwood Investors Corp.
Bristol Bay Funding Ltd.
C-1 Arbors, Inc.
C-1 Cutter's Point, Inc.
C-1 Eaglecrest, Inc.
C-1 Silverbrook, Inc.
Cabi Holdco GP, LLC
Cabi Holdco I, Ltd.
Cabi Holdco, L.P.
Camelback Residential Investors, LLC (fka Sevilla Residential Partners, LLC)
Camelback Residential Partners, LLC
Capital Real Estate - Latitude, LLC
Castle Bio, LLC
CG Works, Inc. (fka Common Grace Ventures, Inc.)
Claymore Holdings, LLC
Concord Management, LLC
Corbusier, Ltd.
CP Equity Hotel Owner, LLC
CP Equity Land Owner, LLC
CP Equity Owner, LLC
CP Hotel TRS, LLC
CP Land Owner, LLC
CP Tower Owner, LLC
Crossings 2017 LLC
Crown Global Insurance Company
Dallas Cityplace MF SPE Owner LLC
Dallas Lease and Finance, L.P.
DFA/BH Autumn Ridge, LLC
Dolomiti, LLC
DrugCrafters, L.P.
Dugaboy Management, LLC
Dugaboy Project Management GP, LLC
Dustin Norris
Eastland CLO, Ltd.
Eastland Investors Corp.
EDS Legacy Heliport, LLC
EDS Legacy Partners Owner, LLC
EDS Legacy Partners, LLC
Entegra Strat Superholdco, LLC

Entegra-FRO Holdco, LLC
Entegra-FRO Superholdco, LLC
Entegra-HOCF Holdco, LLC
Entegra-NHF Holdco, LLC
Entegra-NHF Superholdco, LLC
Entegra-RCP Holdco, LLC
Estates on Maryland Holdco, LLC
Estates on Maryland Owners SM, Inc.
Estates on Maryland Owners, LLC
Estates on Maryland, LLC
Falcon E&P Four Holdings, LLC
Falcon E&P One, LLC
Falcon E&P Opportunities Fund GP LLC
Falcon E&P Opportunities Fund, L.P.
Falcon E&P Opportunities GP, LLC
Falcon E&P Royalty Holdings, LLC
Falcon E&P Six, LLC
Falcon E&P Two, LLC
Falcon Four Midstream, LLC
Falcon Four Upstream, LLC
Falcon Incentive Partners GP, LLC
Falcon Incentive Partners, LP
Falcon Six Midstream, LLC
Fix Asset Management
Flamingo Vegas Holdco, LLC (fka Cabi Holdco, LLC)
Four Rivers Co-Invest, L.P.
Frank Waterhouse
FRBH Abbington SM, Inc.
FRBH Abbington, LLC
FRBH Arbors, LLC
FRBH Beechwood SM, Inc.
FRBH Beechwood, LLC
FRBH C1 Residential, LLC
FRBH Courtney Cove SM, Inc.
FRBH Courtney Cove, LLC
FRBH CP, LLC
FRBH Duck Creek, LLC
FRBH Eaglecrest, LLC
FRBH Edgewater JV, LLC
FRBH Edgewater Owner, LLC
FRBH Edgewater SM, Inc.
FRBH JAX-TPA, LLC
FRBH Nashville Residential, LLC
FRBH Regatta Bay, LLC
FRBH Sabal Park SM, Inc.
FRBH Sabal Park, LLC
FRBH Silverbrook, LLC
FRBH Timberglen, LLC
FRBH Willow Grove SM, Inc.
FRBH Willow Grove, LLC
FRBH Woodbridge SM, Inc.

FRBH Woodbridge, LLC
Freedom C1 Residential, LLC
Freedom Duck Creek, LLC
Freedom Edgewater, LLC
Freedom JAX-TPA Residential, LLC
Freedom La Mirage, LLC
Freedom LHV LLC
Freedom Lubbock LLC
Freedom Miramar Apartments, LLC
Freedom Sandstone, LLC
Freedom Willowdale, LLC
FRM Investment Management
Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditorios BB Votorantim Highland Infraestrutura
G&E Apartment REIT The Heights at Olde Towne, LLC
G&E Apartment REIT The Myrtles at Olde Towne, LLC
GAF REIT, LLC
GAF Toys Holdco, LLC
Gardens of Denton II, L.P.
Gardens of Denton III, L.P.
Gleneagles CLO, Ltd.
Governance Ltd.
Governance Re, Ltd.
Governance, Ltd.
Grayson CLO, Ltd.
Grayson Investors Corp.
Greenbriar CLO, Ltd.
Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
Hakusan, LLC
Hammark Holdings LLC
Hampton Ridge Partners, LLC
Harko, LLC
Haverhill Acquisition Co., LLC
Haygood, LLC
HCBH 11611 Ferguson, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe II, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe III, LLC
HCBH Buffalo Pointe, LLC
HCBH Hampton Woods SM, Inc.
HCBH Hampton Woods, LLC
HCBH Overlook SM, Inc.
HCBH Overlook, LLC
HCBH Rent Investors, LLC
HCF Funds
HCMS Falcon GP, LLC
HCMS Falcon, L.P.
HCO Holdings, LLC
HCOF Preferred Holdings, LP
HCOF Preferred Holdings, Ltd.
HCRE 1775 James Ave, LLC
HCRE Addison TRS, LLC
HCRE Addison, LLC (fka HWS Addison, LLC)

HCRE Hotel Partner, LLC (fka HCRE HWS Partner, LLC)
HCRE Las Colinas TRS, LLC
HCRE Las Colinas, LLC (fka HWS Las Colinas, LLC)
HCRE Partners, LLC
HCRE Plano TRS, LLC
HCRE Plano, LLC (fka HWS Plano, LLC)
HCREF-II Holding Corp.
HCREF-III Holding Corp.
HCREF-IV Holding Corp.
HCREF-IX Holding Corp.
HCREF-V Holding Corp.
HCREF-VI Holding Corp.
HCREF-VII Holding Corp.
HCREF-VIII Holding Corp.
HCREF-XIII Holding Corp.
HCREF-XIV Holding Corp.
HCREF-XV Holding Corp.
HCSLR Camelback Investors (Cayman), Ltd.
HCSLR Camelback, LLC
HE 41, LLC
HE Capital 232 Phase I Property, LLC
HE Capital 232 Phase I, LLC
HE Capital Asante, LLC
HE Capital KR, LLC
HE CLO Holdco, LLC
HE Mezz KR, LLC
Heron Pointe Investors, LLC
HFP Asset Funding II, Ltd.
HFP Asset Funding III, Ltd.
HFRO Sub, LLC
Hibiscus HoldCo, LLC
Highland - First Foundation Income Fund
Highland 401(k) Plan
Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund, L.P.
Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund, Ltd.
Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Capital Brasil Gestora de Recursos (fka Highland Brasilinvest Gestora de Recursos, LTDA; fka HBI Consultoria Empresarial, LTDA)
Highland Capital Insurance Solutions GP LLC
Highland Capital Insurance Solutions LP
Highland Capital Management AG (Highland Capital Management SA) (Highland Capital Management Ltd)
Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. (fka Pyxis Capital, L.P.)
Highland Capital Management Latin America, L.P.
Highland Capital Management Latin America, L.P. (Relying Advisor)
Highland Capital Management Multi-Strategy Insurance Dedicated Fund, L.P.
Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
Highland Capital Management, L.P.
Highland Capital Management, L.P. Charitable Fund
Highland Capital Management, L.P. Retirement Plan and Trust
Highland Capital of New York

Highland Capital of New York, Inc.
Highland Capital Real Estate Fund GP, LLC
Highland Capital Special Allocation, LLC
Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, L.P.
Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd.
Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P.
Highland CDO Trust
Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd.
Highland CLO Assets Holdings Limited
Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (fka Acis Loan Funding, Ltd.)
Highland CLO Gaming Holdings, LLC
Highland CLO Management Ltd.
Highland CLO Trust
Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings GP, Ltd.
Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P.
Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Financing, LLC
Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd.
Highland Credit Opportunities Holding Corporation
Highland Credit Opportunities Japanese Feeder Sub-Trust
Highland Credit Strategies Fund, L.P.
Highland Credit Strategies Fund, Ltd.
Highland Credit Strategies Holding Corporation
Highland Credit Strategies Master Fund, L.P.
Highland Crusader Fund
Highland Dynamic Income Fund, L.P. (fka Highland Capital Loan Fund, L.P.)
Highland Dynamic Income Fund, Ltd. (fka Highland Loan Fund, Ltd.)
Highland Dynamic Income Master Fund, L.P. (fka Highland Loan Master Fund, L.P.)
Highland Energy Holdings, LLC
Highland Energy MLP Fund (fka Highland Energy and Materials Fund)
Highland eSports Private Equity Fund
Highland Fixed Income Fund
Highland Flexible Income UCITS Fund
Highland Floating Rate Fund
Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund (fka Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund II)
Highland Fund Holdings, LLC
Highland Funds I
Highland Funds II
Highland Funds III
Highland GAF Chemical Holdings, LLC
Highland General Partner, LP
Highland Global Allocation Fund (fka Highland Global Allocation Fund II)
Highland GP Holdings, LLC
Highland Healthcare Equity Income and Growth Fund
Highland iBoxx Senior Loan ETF
Highland Income Fund (fka Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund)
Highland Legacy Limited
Highland LF Chemical Holdings, LLC
Highland Loan Funding V, Ltd.
Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
Highland Marcal Holding, Inc.

Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd. (fka Highland Credit Opportunities Fund, Ltd.)
Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, Ltd. (fka Highland Credit Opportunities Fund, Ltd.)
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LLC
Highland Multi-Strategy Fund GP, LP
Highland Multi-Strategy IDF GP, LLC
Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
Highland Park CDO 1, Ltd.
Highland Premium Energy & Materials Fund
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund I, L.P.
Highland Prometheus Feeder Fund II, L.P.
Highland Prometheus Master Fund, L.P.
Highland RCP Fund II, L.P.
Highland RCP II GP, LLC
Highland RCP II SLP GP, LLC
Highland RCP II SLP, L.P.
Highland RCP Parallel Fund II, L.P.
Highland Restoration Capital Partners Master, L.P.
Highland Restoration Capital Partners Offshore, L.P.
Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P.
Highland Select Equity Fund GP, L.P.
Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P.
Highland Small-Cap Equity Fund
Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund (fka Highland Premier Growth Equity Fund)
Highland Tax-Exempt Fund
Highland TCI Holding Company, LLC
Highland Total Return Fund
Highland's Roads Land Holding Company, LLC
HMCF PB Investors, LLC
HRT North Atlanta, LLC
HRT Timber Creek, LLC
HRTBH North Atlanta, LLC
HRTBH Timber Creek, LLC
Huber Funding LLC
HWS Investors Holdco, LLC
James Dondero
Jasper CLO, Ltd.
Jewelry Ventures I, LLC
JMIJM, LLC
John Honis
Karisopolis, LLC
Keelhaul LLC
Kuilima Montalban Holdings, LLC
Kuilima Resort Holdco, LLC
KV Cameron Creek Owner, LLC
Lakes at Renaissance Park Apartments Investors, L.P.
Lakeside Lane, LLC
Landmark Battleground Park II, LLC
LAT Battleground Park, LLC
LAT Briley Parkway, LLC
Lauren Thedford

Leawood RE Holdings, LLC
Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd.
Liberty CLO, Ltd.
Long Short Equity Sub, LLC
Longhorn Credit Funding, LLC
Lurin Real Estate Holdings V, LLC
Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Descendants' Trust
Mark and Pamela Okada Family Trust - Exempt Trust #2
Mark Okada
Markham Fine Jewelers, L.P.
Meritage Residential Partners, LLC
ML CLO XIX Sterling (Cayman), Ltd.
NCI Assets Holding Company LLC
New Jersey Tissue Company Holdco, LLC (fka Marcal Paper Mills Holding Company, LLC)
NexAnnuity Holdings, Inc.
NexBank Capital Inc.
NexBank Capital Trust I
NexBank Capital, Inc.
NexBank Land Advisors, Inc.
NexBank Securities, Inc.
NexBank SSB
NexBank Title, Inc. (dba NexVantage Title Services)
NexBank Wealth Advisors
NexPoint Advisors GP, LLC
NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
NexPoint Capital Inc.
NexPoint Capital REIT, LLC
NexPoint Capital, Inc. (fka NexPoint Capital, LLC)
NexPoint CR F/H DST, LLC
NexPoint Discount Strategies Fund (fka NexPoint Discount Yield Fund)
NexPoint Energy and Materials Opportunities Fund (fka NexPoint Energy Opportunities Fund)
NexPoint Event-Driven Fund (fkaNexPoint Merger Arbitrage Fund)
NexPoint Flamingo DST
NexPoint Flamingo Investment Co, LLC
NexPoint Flamingo Leaseco, LLC
NexPoint Flamingo Manager, LlC
NexPoint Funds
NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
NexPoint Hospitality Trust
NexPoint Hospitality, Inc.
NexPoint Hospitality, LLC
NexPoint Latin American Opportunities Fund
NexPoint Legacy 22, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte Equity, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte Manager, LLC
NexPoint Lincoln Porte, LLC (fka NREA Lincoln Porte, LLC)
NexPoint Multifamily Capital Trust, Inc. (fka NexPoint Multifamily Realty Trust, Inc., fka Highland Capital Realty Trust, Inc.)
NexPoint Multifamily Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Peoria, LLC
NexPoint RE Finance Advisor GP, LLC

NexPoint RE Finance Advisor, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors III, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors IV, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors V, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VI, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VII GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VII, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors VIII, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Advisors, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Capital, LLC (fka Highland Real Estate Capital, LLC, fka Highland Multifamily Credit Fund, LLC)
NexPoint Real Estate Finance OP GP, LLC
NexPoint Real Estate Finance Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Real Estate Finance, Inc.
NexPoint Real Estate Opportunities, LLC (fka Freedom REIT LLC)
NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC (fka HCRE Partners, LLC)
NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
NexPoint Residential Trust Inc.
NexPoint Residential Trust Operating Partnership GP, LLC
NexPoint Residential Trust Operating Partnership, L.P.
NexPoint Securities, Inc. (fka Highland Capital Funds Distributor, Inc.) (fka Pyxis Distributors, Inc.)
NexPoint Strategic Income Fund (fka NexPoint Opportunistic Credit Fund, fka NexPoint Distressed Strategies Fund)
NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (fka NexPoint Credit Strategies Fund)
NexPoint Texas Multifamily Portfolio DST (fka NREA Southeast Portfolio Two, DST)
NexPoint WLIF I Borrower, LLC
NexPoint WLIF II Borrower, LLC
NexPoint WLIF III Borrower, LLC
NexStrat LLC
NexVest, LLC
NexWash LLC
NFRO REIT Sub, LLC
NFRO TRS, LLC
NHF CCD, Inc.
NHT 2325 Stemmons, LLC
NHT Beaverton TRS, LLC (fka NREA Hotel TRS, Inc.)
NHT Beaverton, LLC
NHT Bend TRS, LLC
NHT Bend, LLC
NHT Destin TRS, LLC
NHT Destin, LLC
NHT DFW Portfolio, LLC
NHT Holdings, LLC
NHT Intermediary, LLC
NHT Nashville TRS, LLC
NHT Nashville, LLC
NHT Olympia TRS, LLC
NHT Olympia, LLC
NHT Operating Partnership GP, LLC

NHT Operating Partnership II, LLC
NHT Operating Partnership, LLC
NHT Salem, LLC
NHT SP Parent, LLC
NHT SP TRS, LLC
NHT SP, LLC
NHT Tigard TRS, LLC
NHT Tigard, LLC
NHT TRS, Inc.
NHT Uptown, LLC
NHT Vancouver TRS, LLC
NHT Vancouver, LLC
NMRT TRS, Inc.
NREA Adair DST Manager, LLC
NREA Adair Investment Co, LLC
NREA Adair Joint Venture, LLC
NREA Adair Leaseco Manager, LLC
NREA Adair Leaseco, LLC
NREA Adair Property Manager LLC
NREA Adair, DST
NREA Ashley Village Investors, LLC
NREA Cameron Creek Investors, LLC
NREA Cityplace Hue Investors, LLC
NREA Crossings Investors, LLC
NREA Crossings Ridgewood Coinvestment, LLC (fka NREA Crossings Ridgewood Investors, LLC)
NREA DST Holdings, LLC
NREA El Camino Investors, LLC
NREA Estates Inc.
NREA Estates Investment Co, LLC
NREA Estates Leaseco, LLC
NREA Estates Manager, LLC
NREA Estates Property Manager, LLC
NREA Estates, DST
NREA Gardens DST Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Investment Co, LLC
NREA Gardens Leaseco Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Leaseco, LLC
NREA Gardens Property Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens Springing LLC
NREA Gardens Springing Manager, LLC
NREA Gardens, DST
NREA Hidden Lake Investment Co, LLC
NREA Hue Investors, LLC
NREA Keystone Investors, LLC
NREA Meritage Inc.
NREA Meritage Investment Co, LLC
NREA Meritage Leaseco, LLC
NREA Meritage Manager, LLC
NREA Meritage Property Manager, LLC
NREA Meritage, DST
NREA Oaks Investors, LLC

NREA Retreat Investment Co, LLC
NREA Retreat Leaseco, LLC
NREA Retreat Manager, LLC
NREA Retreat Property Manager, LLC
NREA Retreat, DST
NREA SE One Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE Three Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE Two Property Manager, LLC
NREA SE1 Andros Isles, DST (Converted from DK Gateway Andros, LLC)
NREA SE1 Arborwalk, DST (Converted from MAR Arborwalk, LLC)
NREA SE1 Towne Crossing, DST (Converted from Apartment REIT Towne Crossing, LP)
NREA SE1 Walker Ranch, DST (Converted from SOF Walker Ranch Owner, L.P.)
NREA SE2 Hidden Lake, DST (Converted from SOF Hidden Lake SA Owner, L.P.)
NREA SE2 Vista Ridge, DST (Converted from MAR Vista Ridge, L.P.)
NREA SE2 West Place, DST (Converted from Landmark at West Place, LLC)
NREA SE3 Arboleda, DST (Converted from G&E Apartment REIT Arboleda, LLC)
NREA SE3 Fairways, DST (Converted from MAR Fairways, LLC)
NREA SE3 Grand Oasis, DST (Converted from Landmark at Grand Oasis, LP)
NREA Southeast Portfolio One, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Three, DST
NREA Southeast Portfolio Two, LLC
NREA SOV Investors, LLC
NREA Uptown TRS, LLC
NREA VB I LLC
NREA VB II LLC
NREA VB III LLC
NREA VB IV LLC
NREA VB Pledgor I LLC
NREA VB Pledgor II LLC
NREA VB Pledgor III LLC
NREA VB Pledgor IV LLC
NREA VB Pledgor V LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VI LLC
NREA VB Pledgor VII LLC
NREA VB SM, Inc.
NREA VB V LLC
NREA VB VI LLC
NREA VB VII LLC
NREA Vista Ridge Investment Co, LLC
NREC AR Investors, LLC
NREC Latitude Investors, LLC
NREC REIT Sub, Inc.
NREC TRS, Inc.
NREC WW Investors, LLC
NREF OP I Holdco, LLC
NREF OP I SubHoldco, LLC
NREF OP I, L.P.
NREF OP II Holdco, LLC
NREF OP II SubHoldco, LLC
NREF OP II, L.P.
NREF OP IV REIT Sub TRS, LLC

NREF OP IV REIT Sub, LLC
NREF OP IV, L.P.
NREO NW Hospitality Mezz, LLC
NREO NW Hospitality, LLC
NREO Perilune, LLC
NREO SAFStor Investors, LLC
NREO TRS, Inc.
NRESF REIT Sub, LLC
NXRT Abbington, LLC
NXRT Atera II, LLC
NXRT Atera, LLC
NXRT AZ2, LLC
NXRT Barrington Mill, LLC
NXRT Bayberry, LLC
NXRT Bella Solara, LLC
NXRT Bella Vista, LLC
NXRT Bloom, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP I, LLC
NXRT Brandywine GP II, LLC
NXRT Brandywine LP, LLC
NXRT Brentwood Owner, LLC
NXRT Brentwood, LLC
NXRT Cedar Pointe Tenant, LLC
NXRT Cedar Pointe, LLC
NXRT Cityview, LLC
NXRT Cornerstone, LLC
NXRT Crestmont, LLC
NXRT Enclave, LLC
NXRT Glenview, LLC
NXRT H2 TRS, LLC
NXRT Heritage, LLC
NXRT Hollister TRS LLC
NXRT Hollister, LLC
NXRT LAS 3, LLC
NXRT Master Tenant, LLC
NXRT Nashville Residential, LLC (fka Freedom Nashville Residential, LLC)
NXRT North Dallas 3, LLC
NXRT Old Farm, LLC
NXRT Pembroke Owner, LLC
NXRT Pembroke, LLC
NXRT PHX 3, LLC
NXRT Radbourne Lake, LLC
NXRT Rockledge, LLC
NXRT Sabal Palms, LLC
NXRT SM, Inc.
NXRT Steeplechase, LLC
NXRT Stone Creek, LLC
NXRT Summers Landing GP, LLC
NXRT Summers Landing LP, LLC
NXRT Torreyana, LLC
NXRT Vanderbilt, LLC

NXRT West Place, LLC
NXRTBH AZ2, LLC
NXRTBH Barrington Mill Owner, LLC
NXRTBH Barrington Mill SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Barrington Mill, LLC
NXRTBH Bayberry, LLC
NXRTBH Cityview, LLC
NXRTBH Colonnade, LLC
NXRTBH Cornerstone Owner, LLC
NXRTBH Cornerstone SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Cornerstone, LLC
NXRTBH Dana Point SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Dana Point, LLC
NXRTBH Foothill SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Foothill, LLC
NXRTBH Heatherstone SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Heatherstone, LLC
NXRTBH Hollister Tenant, LLC
NXRTBH Hollister, LLC
NXRTBH Madera SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Madera, LLC
NXRTBH McMillan, LLC
NXRTBH North Dallas 3, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm II, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm Tenant, LLC
NXRTBH Old Farm, LLC
NXRTBH Radbourne Lake, LLC
NXRTBH Rockledge, LLC
NXRTBH Sabal Palms, LLC
NXRTBH Steeplechase, LLC (dba Southpoint Reserve at Stoney Creek)-VA
NXRTBH Stone Creek, LLC
NXRTBH Vanderbilt, LLC
NXRTBH Versailles SM, Inc.
NXRTBH Versailles, LLC
Oak Holdco, LLC
Oaks CGC, LLC
Okada Family Revocable Trust
Pam Capital Funding GP Co. Ltd.
Pam Capital Funding, L.P.
PamCo Cayman Ltd.
Park West 1700 Valley View Holdco, LLC
Park West 2021 Valley View Holdco, LLC
Park West Holdco, LLC
Park West Portfolio Holdco, LLC
PCMG Trading Partners XXIII, L.P.
PDK Toys Holdco, LLC
Pear Ridge Partners, LLC
Penant Management GP, LLC
PensionDanmark Pensionsforsikringsaktieselskab
Perilune Aero Equity Holdings One, LLC
PetroCap Incentive Partners II, L.P.

PetroCap Partners II, L.P.
PetroCap Partners III, L.P.
Pharmacy Ventures I, LLC
Pharmacy Ventures II, LLC
Powderhorn, LLC
PWM1 Holdings, LLC
PWM1, LLC
RADCO NREC Bay Meadows Holdings, LLC
RADCO NREC Bay Park Holdings, LLC
Ramarim, LLC
Rand Advisors Series I Insurance Fund
Rand Advisors Series II Insurance Fund
Rand PE Fund I, L.P.
Rand PE Fund Management LLC
Red River CLO, Ltd.
Red River Investors Corp.
Riverview Partners SC, LLC
Rockwall CDO II Ltd.
Rockwall CDO, Ltd.
Rockwall Investors Corp.
Rothko, Ltd.
RTT Hollister, LLC
RTT Rockledge, LLC
Sandstone Pasadena Apartments, LLC
Scott Ellington
SE Governors Green Holdings, L.L.C. (fka SCG Atlas Governors Green Holdings, L.L.C.)
SE Governors Green I, LLC
SE Governors Green REIT, L.L.C. (fka SCG Atlas Governors Green REIT, L.L.C.)
SE Governors Green, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Governors Green, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill I Holdings, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I Holdings, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill I Owner, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill I REIT, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill I REIT, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill I, LLC
SE Oak Mill II Holdings, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II Holdings, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill II Owner, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill II REIT, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Oak Mill II REIT, L.L.C.)
SE Oak Mill II, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge Holdings, L.L.C. (fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge Holdings, L.L.C.)
SE Stoney Ridge I, LLC
SE Stoney Ridge REIT, L.L.C. (fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge REIT, L.L.C.)
SE Stoney Ridge, LLC (fka SCG Atlas Stoney Ridge, L.L.C.)
SFH1, LLC
SFR WLIF I, LLC (fka NexPoint WLIF I, LLC)
SFR WLIF II, LLC (NexPoint WLIF II, LLC)
SFR WLIF III, LLC (NexPoint WLIF III, LLC)
SFR WLIF Manager, LLC (NexPoint WLIF Manager, LLC)
SFR WLIF, LLC (NexPoint WLIF, LLC)
SFR WLIF, LLC Series I
SFR WLIF, LLC Series II
SFR WLIF, LLC Series III
Small Cap Equity Sub, LLC

Socially Responsible Equity Sub, LLC
SOF Brandywine I Owner, L.P.
SOF Brandywine II Owner, L.P.
SOF-X GS Owner, L.P.
Southfork Cayman Holdings, Ltd.
Southfork CLO, Ltd.
Specialty Financial Products Designated Activity Company (fka Specialty Financial Products Limited)
Spiritus Life, Inc.
SRL Whisperwod LLC
SRL Whisperwood Member LLC
SRL Whisperwood Venture LLC
SSB Assets LLC
Stonebridge PEF
Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund
Strand Advisors III, Inc.
Strand Advisors IV, LLC
Strand Advisors IX, LLC
Strand Advisors V, LLC
Strand Advisors XIII, LLC
Strand Advisors XVI, Inc.
Strand Advisors, Inc.
Stratford CLO, Ltd.
Summers Landing Apartment Investors, L.P.
The Dugaboy Investment Trust
The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust No. 1
The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust No. 2
The Get Good Trust
The Ohio State Life Insurance Company
The Okada Family Foundation, Inc.
The SLHC Trust
Thread 55, LLC
Tranquility Lake Apartments Investors, L.P.
Trey Parker
Tricor Business Outsourcing
Turtle Bay Holdings, LLC
Tuscany Acquisition, LLC
United States Army Air Force Exchange Services
Uptown at Cityplace Condominium Association, Inc.
US Gaming OpCo, LLC
Valhalla CLO, Ltd.
VB GP LLC
VB Holding, LLC
VB One, LLC
VB OP Holdings LLC
VBAnnex C GP, LLC
VBAnnex C Ohio, LLC
VBAnnex C, LP
VineBrook Annex B, L.P.
VineBrook Annex I, L.P.
VineBrook Homes Merger Sub II LLC
VineBrook Homes Merger Sub LLC

VineBrook Homes OP GP, LLC
VineBrook Homes Operating Partnership, L.P.
VineBrook Homes Trust, Inc.
VineBrook Partners I, L.P.
VineBrook Partners II, L.P.
VineBrook Properties, LLC
Wake LV Holdings II, Ltd.
Wake LV Holdings, Ltd.
Walter Holdco GP, LLC
Walter Holdco I, Ltd.
Walter Holdco, L.P.
Westchester CLO, Ltd.
Yellow Metal Merchants, Inc.

7. Taxing and Other Significant Governmental Authorities

California Franchise Tax Board
Internal Revenue Service
Los Angeles County Tax Collector
Delaware Division of Revenue

8. Banks and Secured Parties

BBVA
KeyBank National Association
Jeffries, LLC Prime Brokerage Services
Frontier State Bank

9. United States Bankruptcy Judges in the District of Delaware

The Honorable Brendan L. Shannon
The Honorable Christopher S. Sontchi, Chief Judge
The Honorable John T. Dorsey
The Honorable Karen B. Owens
The Honorable Kevin Gross
The Honorable Laurie Selber Silverstein
The Honorable Mary F. Walrath

10. United States Trustee for the District of Delaware (and Key Staff Members)

Andrew Vara, Acting US Trustee
Benjamin Hackman, Trial Attorney
Christine Green, Paralegal Specialist
David Buchbinder, Trial Attorney
Diane Giordano, Bankruptcy Analyst
Dion Wynn, Paralegal Specialist
Edith A. Serrano, Paralegal Specialist
Hannah M. McCollum, Trial Attorney
Holly Dice, Auditor (Bankruptcy)
James R. O'Malley, Bankruptcy Analyst
Jane Leamy, Trial Attorney
Jeffrey Heck, Bankruptcy Analyst
Juliet Sarkessian, Trial Attorney
Karen Starr, Bankruptcy Analyst
Linda Casey, Trial Attorney
Linda Richenderfer, Trial Attorney
Lauren Attix, OA Assistant
Michael Panacio, Bankruptcy Analyst
Michael West, Bankruptcy Analyst

Ramona Vinson, Paralegal Specialist
Richard Schepacarter, Trial Attorney
Shakima L. Dortch, Paralegal Specialist
T. Patrick Tinker, Assistant U.S. Trustee
Timothy J. Fox, Jr., Trial Attorney

11. Clerk of Court and Deputy for the District of Delaware

Stephen Grant, Chief Deputy Clerk
Una O'Boyle, Clerk of Court

12. Notice Parties

Alvarez & Marshal CF Management, LLC
Coleman County TAD
Fannin CAD
Allen ISD
Rockwall CAD
Kaufman County
Tarrant County
Dallas County
Upshur County
Grayson County
Irving ISD
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Patrick Daugherty
Hunter Mountain Trust
Integrated Financial Associates
BET Investments, II, L.P.
Crescent TC Investors, L.P.
Intertrust Entities
CLO Entities

EXHIBIT Z

FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED

AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

OF

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

(A Delaware Limited Partnership)

[_____], 2021

This FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (this "***Agreement***") of Highland Capital Management, L.P., (the "***Partnership***"), dated as of [_____], 2021 and entered into by and among the [*New GP Entity*] as general partner of the Partnership (the "***General Partner***") and the limited partner of the Partnership as set forth on Schedule A hereto (the "***Limited Partner***"), amends and restates in its entirety the Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of the Partnership dated as of December 24, 2015 (as amended to date, the "***Prior Agreement***"), by and among Strand Advisors, Inc. (the "***Prior General Partner***") and the former limited partners of the Partnership who were limited partners of the Partnership (the "***Prior Limited Partners***"). The General Partner and Limited Partners are collectively referred to as the "***Partners***."

WHEREAS, the Prior Agreement, as amended pursuant to that certain amendment dated [_____], 2021, provides for the reconstitution and continuation of the Partnership if new limited partners are admitted to the partnership within 90 days after dissolution thereof and such new limited partners consent to the continuation of the Partnership.

WHEREAS, the Partnership was reorganized pursuant to the Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P., that was approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on [_____] (the "***Plan***").

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan the limited partnership interests of the Prior Limited Partners and the Prior General Partner were canceled on [_____] and new limited partnership interests were issued to the Limited Partner and the General Partner under the Prior Agreement.

WHEREAS, the General Partner and the Limited Partner wish to ratify the admission to the Partnership of the General Partner and the Limited Partner and to amend and restate the terms of the Partnership as set forth in this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements and obligations set forth herein, the undersigned hereby agree as follows:

1. Continuation.

(a) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Partners hereby continue the Partnership as a limited partnership pursuant to the provisions of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (6 *Del.C.* §17-101, *et seq.)*, as amended from time to time (the "***Act***"). This Agreement amends, restates, and supersedes the Prior Agreement and all other prior agreements or understandings with respect to the matters covered herein.

(b) The Limited Partner, being the sole limited partner of the Partnership, hereby (i) consents to the continuation of the Partnership and (ii) ratifies and approves the appointment of the General Partner as general partner of the Partnership.

2. Organizational Matters.

(a) *Name; Certificate*. The name of the Partnership is Highland Capital Management, L.P. The Partnership was organized as a limited partnership pursuant to the Act and

filed a Certificate of Limited Partnership (the "***Certificate***") with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. Any person authorized to act on behalf of the General Partner or the Partnership may, subject to Section 19 below, cause the Partnership to file such other certificates and documents as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with the Act and any other applicable requirements for the operation of a limited partnership in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware and any other jurisdictions in which the Partnership shall conduct business, and to maintain such filings for so long as the Partnership conducts business therein.

(b) *Offices*. The name of the resident agent for service of process for the Partnership and the address of the registered office of the Partnership in the State of Delaware is Corporation Services Company, 2023 Centre Road, Wilmington Delaware 19805-1297. The General Partner may establish places of business of the Partnership within and without the State of Delaware, as and when required by the Partnership's business and in furtherance of its purposes set forth herein, and may appoint (or cause the appointment of) agents for service of process in all jurisdictions in which the Partnership shall conduct business. The General Partner may from time to time in its sole discretion change the Partnership's places of business, resident agent for service of process, and/or the location of its registered office in Delaware.

3. Purpose; Powers. The Partnership is formed for the purpose of engaging in any lawful act or activity for which limited partnerships may be formed under the Act. Without limiting the foregoing, the general character and purposes of the business of the Partnership are to (a) engage in the business, directly and/or through one or more subsidiaries, of liquidating assets of, and performing investment management and advisory services for, pooled investment vehicles, funds, investment holdings, accounts, and interests therein; and (b) engage in any lawful activities (including, subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, the borrowing of money and the issuance of guarantees of indebtedness of others) directly or indirectly related or incidental thereto and in which a Delaware limited partnership may lawfully engage. The Partnership shall have and exercise all of the powers and rights conferred upon limited partnerships formed pursuant to the Act.

4. Management.

(a) *Authority of the General Partner*. The business and affairs of the Partnership shall be managed exclusively by and under the direction of the General Partner, which shall have the right, power and authority to exercise all of the powers of the Partnership except as otherwise provided by law or this Agreement. Decisions or actions made or approved by the General Partner in accordance with this Agreement shall constitute decisions or actions by the Partnership and shall be binding upon the Partnership and each Limited Partner of the Partnership. The General Partner may not be removed or replaced by the Limited Partners. In the event of the withdrawal, resignation or dissolution of the General Partner, a new General Partner shall be designated in writing by a majority in interest of the Limited Partners, who shall provide written notice to the remaining Limited Partners of such designation.

(b) *Delegation of Powers; Officers*. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the General Partner may delegate any or all or any portion of its rights, powers, authority, duties and responsibilities with respect to the management of the Partnership to such officers of the Partnership with such titles as the General Partner may determine ("***Officers***"). The General Partner

may authorize any such Officers to sign agreements, contracts, instruments, or other documents in the name of and on behalf of the Partnership, and such authority may be general or limited to specific instances. The power and authority of any Officer appointed by the General Partner under this Section 4(b) shall not exceed the power and authority possessed by the General Partner under this Agreement. The Officers shall hold office until their successors are duly appointed or their earlier death, resignation, or removal. Any Officer so appointed may be removed at any time, with or without cause, by the written consent of the General Partner. Any Officer may resign from his or her office upon prior written notice to the Partnership. If any office shall become vacant, a replacement Officer may be appointed by the written consent of the General Partner. Two or more offices may be held by the same person. The initial Officers of the Partnership are set forth on Schedule B.

(c) *Limited Partners*. No Limited Partner shall have any right to participate in the management of the Partnership as a Limited Partner. Moreover, no Limited Partner shall have any voting rights except with respect to consent to amendments as set forth in Section 19 below, or as otherwise required by the Act.

(d) *Transactions with Affiliates*. The General Partner or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the General Partner (an "***Affiliate***") may engage in transactions with the Partnership from time to time, including without limitation for lending to or borrowing from the Partnership, engaging in the provision of services to the Partnership, or otherwise engaging in business transactions with the Partnership, provided that such transactions are entered into in good faith. Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement or any other agreement contemplated herein, whenever a conflict of interest exists or arises between the General Partner or any of its Affiliates, on the one hand, and the Partnership or any Limited Partner, on the other hand, any action taken by the General Partner, in the absence of bad faith by the General Partner, shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement or any other agreement contemplated herein or a breach of any standard of care or duty imposed herein or therein or under the Act or any other applicable law, rule, or regulation.

5. Partners.

(a) *General*. The name, address, and percentage interest ownership interest of the General Partner and each Limited Partner in the Partnership (the "***Percentage Interest***") are set forth on Schedule A hereto. Additional Limited Partners may be admitted to the Partnership, and Schedule A may be amended, only with the written consent of the General Partner (provided, that failure to update Schedule A shall not itself be conclusive of whether consent of the General Partner has been obtained). No Limited Partner shall have the right or power to resign, withdraw or retire from the Partnership, except upon (i) the occurrence of any event described in Section 17-801 of the Act (in which case the Limited Partner(s) with respect to which such event has occurred shall, automatically and with no further action necessary by any person, cease to be a Limited Partner, and shall be deemed to have solely the interest of an assignee (within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act) with respect to such Limited Partner's Limited Partnership Interest), or (ii) with the consent of the General Partner. For the avoidance of doubt, no action may be taken to reduce, directly or indirectly, the Percentage Interest of any Partner without the written consent of such Partner.

(b) *Capital Contributions*. The Partners may, in their sole discretion, make additional capital contribution to the Partnership if requested by the General Partner. All capital, whenever contributed, shall be subject in all respects to the risks of the business and subordinate in right of payment to the claims of present or future creditors of the Partnership in accordance with this Agreement.

(c) *Capital Accounts*. The Partnership shall maintain a capital account for each Partner in accordance with Section 704(b) and 704(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "***Code***"), and the principles of the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.

(d) *Tax Representative*. The General Partner shall serve as the "tax representative" to be the Partnership's designated representative within the meaning of Section 6223 of the Code with sole authority to act on behalf of the Partnership for purposes of subchapter C of Chapter 63 of the Code and any comparable provisions of state or local income tax laws (the "***Tax Representative***"). The Tax Representative is specifically directed and authorized to take whatever steps it deems necessary or desirable to perfect such designation, including, without limitation, filing any forms or documents with the Internal Revenue Service, properly designating a particular individual to act on its behalf of the Tax Representative and taking such other action as may from time to time be required under Treasury Regulations. The Tax Representative is hereby authorized to and shall perform all duties of a "tax representative" and shall serve as Tax Representative until its resignation or until the designation of its successor, whichever occurs sooner.

6. Allocation of Income and Losses.

(a) *Definitions*. For purposes of this Agreement, "***Income***" and "***Loss***" of the Partnership shall mean the taxable income and loss, respectively, of the Partnership computed with the adjustments set forth in Treasury Regulation under Code Section 704(b) including (A) adjustments pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g), (B) the inclusion of the amount of any tax-exempt income as an item of income, (C) the inclusion of the amount of any nondeductible, noncapitalizable expense as an item of deduction and (D) the inclusion of the amount of unrealized gain or unrealized loss with respect to an asset of the Partnership as an item of income or gain (as applicable) upon distribution of such asset in kind or as required by Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).

(b) *Allocations Generally*. The Income and Loss of the Partnership for each fiscal year or other applicable period shall be allocated to and among the Partners in proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.

(c) *Adjustments*. Notwithstanding Section 6(b) (but subject to Section 6(c)),

(i) Items of income or gain for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partner in the manner and to the extent required by the "qualified income offset" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d); and

(ii) In no event shall any Loss or item of deduction be allocated to a Partner if such allocation would cause or increase a negative balance

in such Partner's capital account determined by increasing the Partner's capital account balance by any amount the Partner may be obligated to restore to the Partnership pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c) and by decreasing such capital account balance by the amounts specified in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), (5) and (6)).

(d) *Nonrecourse Debt*. If at any time the Partnership incurs any "nonrecourse debt" (*i.e.,* debt that is treated as nonrecourse for purposes of Treasury Regulation Section 1.1001-2), the following provisions will apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary expressed elsewhere in this Agreement:

(i) "Nonrecourse deductions" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(b) and (c)) shall be allocated to the Partners in proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.

(ii) All other allocations relating to such nonrecourse debt shall be allocated in accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2; and

(iii) For purposes of Sections 6(b) and 6(c), each Partner's capital account balance shall be increased by the Partner's share of minimum gain and of partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain (as determined pursuant to Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(g) and 1.704-2(i)(5), respectively).

(e) *Deductions, Credits*. Except as otherwise provided herein or as required by Code Section 704, for federal income tax purposes, all items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit shall be allocated to the Partners in the same manner as are Income and Loss.

(f) *Regulatory Allocations*. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 6(a)-(e) above, allocations of Income and Loss shall be made in the order of priority set forth in Exhibit I to this Agreement.

(g) *Withholding*. To the extent that the Partnership is required to withhold and pay over any amounts to any Governmental Authority with respect to Distributions or allocations to any Limited Partner, the amount withheld shall be treated as a Distribution to that Limited Partner pursuant to Sections 4.02, 4.03 or 4.05, as applicable. In the event of any claimed over-withholding, Limited Partners shall be limited to an action against the applicable jurisdiction and not against the Partnership (unless the Partnership has not yet paid such amounts over to such jurisdiction). If any amount required to be withheld was not, in fact, actually withheld from one or more Distributions and the Partnership shall have been required to pay such amount to such Governmental Entity, the Partnership may, at its option, (i) require the affected Limited Partner to reimburse the Partnership for such withholding or (ii) reduce any subsequent Distributions to such Limited Partner by the amount of such withholding, in each case plus interest. Each Limited Partner agrees to furnish the Partnership with such documentation as shall reasonably be requested by the Partnership to assist it in determining the extent of, and in fulfilling, its withholding

obligations. Each Limited Partner will indemnify the General Partner and the Partnership against any losses and liabilities (including interest and penalties) related to any withholding obligations with respect to allocations or Distributions made to such Limited Partner by the Partnership.

(h) *Consistent Tax Reporting*. Except as otherwise unanimously agreed to in writing by the Limited Partners, for U.S. federal, state and local income tax purposes, the Limited Partners agree, as a condition to their admission to the Partnership, to report all taxable income, loss and items thereof (including the character and timing of such items) in a manner consistent with the manner in which such taxable income, loss or item thereof is reported by the Partnership on its tax returns and the Schedules K-1 (or any successor form) furnished by the Partnership to the Limited Partners.

7. Distributions. Distributions shall be made from the undistributed profit and loss account to the Partners at the times and in the aggregate amounts determined by the General Partner in its sole discretion; provided, that distributions shall be made to the Partners in accordance with their Percentage Interests. Distributions may be in cash or in kind as determined by the General Partner in its sole discretion. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the Partnership shall not make a distribution to the Limited Partners on account of its interest in the Partnership if such distribution would violate Section 17-607 of the Act or other applicable law.

8. Other Business. The Partners and their affiliates may engage in or possess an interest in other business ventures (unconnected with the Partnership) of every kind and description, independently or with others. The Partnership shall not have any rights in or to such independent ventures or the income or profits therefrom by virtue of this Agreement.

9. Limited Liability. The debts, obligations, and liabilities of the Partnership, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the Partnership and the General Partner. No Limited Partner shall have any liability (personal or otherwise) for any such debt, obligation, or liability of the Partnership solely by reason of acting in such capacity. For the avoidance of doubt, to the extent a Limited Partner is an Officer of the Partnership (regardless of title) and/or has authority to act on behalf of the General Partner of the Partnership, such Limited Partner shall remain a Limited Partner of the Partnership and shall not be subject to any liability (personal or otherwise) for any debt, obligation or liability of the Partnership.

10. Exculpation; Indemnification.

(a) *Exculpation*. Neither the General Partner nor any Covered Person (as defined below) shall be liable to the Partnership or any Limited Partner for errors in judgment or for any acts of omissions that do not constitute gross negligence, fraud, or willful misconduct. The General Partner may exercise any of the powers granted to it by this Agreement and perform any of the duties imposed upon it hereunder either directly or by or through its officers, directors, agents, trustees, or representatives, and the General Partner shall not be responsible for any misconduct or negligence on the part of any agent or representative appointed by the General Partner.

(b) *Indemnification*. To the fullest extent permitted by law, subject to Section 10(d) below, the Partnership shall indemnify each Covered Person for any and all losses, claims,

demands, costs, damages, liabilities (joint and several), expenses of any nature (including attorneys' fees and disbursements), judgments, fines, settlements and other amounts arising from any and all claims, demands, actions, suits or proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, in which such Covered Person may be involved or threatened to be involved, as a party or otherwise, by reason of any act or omission performed or omitted by such Covered Person in good faith on behalf of the Partnership and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of the authority conferred on such Covered Person by this Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the indemnification under this Section 10(b) shall apply even though at the time of such claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding such person is no longer a Covered Person (except as set forth in Section 10(c)(iii) below). Any indemnity under this Section 10(b) shall be provided out of and only to the extent of the Partnership's assets, and no Limited Partner shall have personal liability on account thereof. For the avoidance of doubt, any indemnification obligations of the Partnership under the Prior Agreement are null and void and are superseded in their entirety by this Section 10.

(c) *Covered Persons*. "***Covered Person***" means each of the following:

(i) the General Partner, and each member, partner, director, officer, and agent thereof,

(ii) each person who is or becomes an Officer of the Partnership on or after the date of this Agreement, and

(iii) each person who is or becomes an employee or agent of the Partnership on or after the date of this Agreement if the General Partner determines in its sole discretion that such employee or agent should be a Covered Person.

"Covered Person" shall *not* include any former officer, former partner, former director, former employee, or former agent of the Partnership or the General Partner (unless such Person is a "Covered Person" as defined in clause (i) or (ii) above on or after the date of this Agreement), *unless* the General Partner in its sole discretion determines that such Person should be a Covered Person.

(d) *Limitations on Indemnification*. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, no indemnification shall be provided for any Covered Person (i) with respect to any action brought by such Covered Person as a plaintiff against the Partnership or another Covered Person, or (ii) for any loss, damage or claim arising from such Covered Person's fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct (in each case as determined by a final and binding judgment of a court or arbitrator).

(e) *Advancement of Expenses*. Expenses reasonably incurred in defending any claim, action, suit or proceeding of the character described in Section 10(b), to the extent available, shall be advanced by the Partnership prior to the final disposition of such claim, action, suit or proceeding upon receipt of a written undertaking by or on behalf of the recipient to repay all such advances if it is ultimately determined by the General Partner that such Covered Person is not entitled to indemnification pursuant to Section 10(d).

(f) *Third Party Beneficiaries*. Covered Persons shall be deemed to be third-party beneficiaries solely for purposes of this Section 10. All rights of any Covered Person under this Section shall inure to the benefit of such Covered Person's heirs and assigns. Except as expressly provided in this Section 10(f), this Agreement is intended solely for the benefit of the parties hereto and, to the extent allowed by this Agreement, their respective permitted successors and assigns, and this Agreement is not for the benefit of, nor may any provision hereof be enforced by, any other person.

11. Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Partnership shall end on December 31st of each year.

12. Transfers of Limited Partner Interests. No Limited Partner may transfer, in whole or in part, whether by sale, exchange, lease, license, assignment, distribution, gift, transfer or other disposition or alienation in any way, its interest in the Partnership, without the prior consent of the General Partner, which consent may be given or withheld in the sole discretion of the General Partner and may include such terms and conditions as the General Partner shall deem appropriate in its sole discretion. In addition, it shall be a condition precedent to every transfer of all or any portion of a Limited Partner's interest permitted hereunder, the transferring Limited Partner shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the General Partner that (i) the proposed transfer will not cause or result in a breach of any violation of law, including U.S. federal or state securities laws, and (ii) that the transfer would not adversely affect the classification of the Partnership as a partnership for U.S. federal tax purposes (including by causing the Partnership to be treated as a "publicly traded partnership" under Section 7704 of the Code), terminate it as a partnership under Code Section 708, or have a substantial adverse effect with respect to U.S. federal income taxes payable by the Partnership.

13. Dissolution. The Partnership shall dissolve, and its affairs shall be wound up upon the first to occur of the following: (i) the consent of the General Partner; (ii) at any time there are no Limited Partners of the Partnership, unless the business of the Partnership is continued in a manner permitted by the Act; or (iii) the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under Section 17-802 of the Act. Following the foregoing event, the General Partner shall proceed diligently to liquidate the assets of the Partnership in a manner consistent with commercially reasonable business practices. In the event of dissolution, the Partnership shall conduct only such activities as are necessary to wind up its affairs (including the sale of the assets of the Partnership in an orderly manner), and the assets of the Partnership shall be applied in the manner, and in the order of priority, set forth in Section 17-804 of the Act. Liquidating distributions to the Partners shall be made in in accordance with their Percentage Interests.

14. Severability of Provisions. Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered separable and if for any reason any provision or provisions herein are determined to be invalid, unenforceable or illegal under any existing or future law, such invalidity, unenforceability or illegality shall not impair the operation of or affect those portions of this Agreement which are valid, enforceable and legal.

15. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts and as so executed shall constitute one agreement binding on all parties hereto, notwithstanding that all of the parties have not signed the same counterpart.

16. Facsimile Signature Page. This Agreement may be executed and delivered by the parties hereto by an executed signature page transmitted by facsimile, and any failure to deliver the originally executed signature page shall not affect the validity, legality or enforceability of this Agreement.

17. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and understanding among the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings relating to such subject matter.

18. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware (without regard to the conflicts of law principles), all rights and remedies being governed by said laws.

19. Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement.

20. Amendments. No amendment of this Agreement shall be valid or binding unless such amendment is made with the written consent of the General Partner. Further, any amendment of this Agreement that reduces the Percentage Interest or economic rights of any Limited Partner in a manner that is disproportionate to other Limited Partners shall require the written consent of the affected Limited Partner. For the avoidance of doubt, amendment includes any merger, combination or other reorganization or any amendment of the Certificate that has the effect of changing or superseding the terms of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, intending to be legally bound hereby, has duly executed this Agreement as of the date first set forth above.

GENERAL PARTNER:

[*NEW GP ENTITY*]

_____

By:
Its:

LIMITED PARTNER:

[CLAIMANT TRUST]

_____

By:
Its: Trustee

[Signature Page to Fifth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P.]

Schedule A

SCHEDULE OF PARTNERS

[Date], 2021

General Partner

Name	Address	Percentage Interest
[New GP Entity]	*[Insert Address]*	[1.00]%

Limited Partners

Name	Address	Percentage Interest
[Claimant Trust]	*[Insert Address]*	[99.00]%

Schedule B

SCHEDULE OF OFFICERS

[Date], 2021

Name	Officer Title
James P. Seery, Jr.	Chief Executive Officer
[Name]	*[Title]*
[Name]	*[Title]*

Exhibit I

REGULATORY ALLOCATIONS

(i) Items of income or gain (computed in accordance with Section 6(a), including the adjustments therein) for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partners in the manner and to the minimum extent required by the "minimum gain chargeback" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(f) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(i)(4).

(ii) All "nonrecourse deductions" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(b)(1)) of the Partnership for any year shall be allocated to the Partners in accordance with their respective Percentage Interests; provided, however, that nonrecourse deductions attributable to "partner nonrecourse debt" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(b)(4)) shall be allocated to the Partners in accordance with the provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(i)(1).

(iii) Items of income or gain (computed in accordance with Section 6(a), including the adjustments therein) for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partners in the manner and to the extent required by the "qualified income offset" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*d*).

(iv) In no event shall Loss of the Partnership be allocated to a Partner if such allocation would cause or increase a negative balance in such Partner's Adjusted Capital Account (determined for purposes of this Exhibit I only, by increasing the Partner's Adjusted Capital Account balance by the amount the Partner is obligated to restore to the Partnership pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*c*) and decreasing it by the amounts specified in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*d*)(*4*), (*5*) and (*6*)).

(v) For tax purposes, except as otherwise provided herein or as required by Code Section 704, all items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit shall be allocated to the Partners in the same manner as are Income and Loss; provided, however, that if the Book Value of any property of the Partnership differs from its adjusted basis for tax purposes, then items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit related to such property for tax purposes shall be allocated among the Partners so as to take account of the variation between the adjusted basis of the property for tax purposes and its Book Value in the manner provided for under Code Section 704(c).

(vi) For purposes hereof, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

"***Adjusted Capital Account***" means, for each Partner, such Partner's capital account balance increased by such Partner's share of "minimum gain" and of "partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain" (as determined pursuant to Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(g) and 1.704-2(i)(5), respectively).

"***Book Value***" means, with respect to any asset, the asset's adjusted basis for U.S. federal income tax purposes; provided, however, that (i) the initial Book Value of any asset contributed to the Partnership shall be adjusted to equal its fair market value as determined by the General Partner at the time of its contribution, and (ii) the Book Values of all assets held by the Partnership shall be

adjusted to equal their respective fair market values as determined by the General Partner (taking Code Section 7701(g) into account) upon an election by the Partnership to revalue its property in accordance with Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(*f*) and upon liquidation of the Partnership. The Book Value of any asset whose Book Value was adjusted pursuant to the preceding sentence shall thereafter be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(*g*).

EXHIBIT AA

FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED

AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

OF

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

(A Delaware Limited Partnership)

[_____], ~~2020~~2021

This FIFTH AMENDED AND RESTATED AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (this "***Agreement***") of Highland Capital Management, L.P., (the "***Partnership***"), dated as of [_____], ~~2020~~2021 and entered into by and among the [*New GP Entity*] as general partner of the Partnership (the "***General Partner***") and the limited partner of the Partnership as set forth on Schedule A hereto (the "***Limited Partner***"), amends and restates in its entirety the Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of the Partnership dated as of December 24, 2015 (as amended to date, the "***Prior Agreement***"), by and among Strand Advisors, Inc. (the "***Prior General Partner***") and the former limited partners of the Partnership who were limited partners of the Partnership (the "***Prior Limited Partners***"). The General Partner and Limited Partners are collectively referred to as the "***Partners***."

WHEREAS, the Prior Agreement, as amended pursuant to that certain amendment dated [_____], ~~2020,~~2021, provides for the reconstitution and continuation of the Partnership if new limited partners are admitted to the partnership within 90 days after dissolution thereof and such new limited partners consent to the continuation of the Partnership.

WHEREAS, the Partnership was reorganized pursuant to the Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P., that was approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on [_____] (the "***Plan***").

WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan the limited partnership interests of the Prior Limited Partners and the Prior General Partner were canceled on [_____] and new limited partnership interests were issued to the Limited Partner and the General Partner under the Prior Agreement.

WHEREAS, the General Partner and the Limited Partner wish to ratify the admission to the Partnership of the General Partner and the Limited Partner and to amend and restate the terms of the Partnership as set forth in this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements and obligations set forth herein, the undersigned hereby agree as follows:

1. Continuation.

(a) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Partners hereby continue the Partnership as a limited partnership pursuant to the provisions of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (6 *Del.C.* §17-101, *et seq.)*, as amended from time to time (the "***Act***"). This Agreement amends, restates, and supersedes the Prior Agreement and all other prior agreements or understandings with respect to the matters covered herein.

(b) The Limited Partner, being the sole limited partner of the Partnership, hereby (i) consents to the continuation of the Partnership and (ii) ratifies and approves the appointment of the General Partner as general partner of the Partnership.

2. Organizational Matters.

(a) *Name; Certificate*. The name of the Partnership is Highland Capital Management, L.P. The Partnership was organized as a limited partnership pursuant to the Act and

filed a Certificate of Limited Partnership (the "***Certificate***") with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware. Any person authorized to act on behalf of the General Partner or the Partnership may, subject to Section 19 below, cause the Partnership to file such other certificates and documents as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with the Act and any other applicable requirements for the operation of a limited partnership in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware and any other jurisdictions in which the Partnership shall conduct business, and to maintain such filings for so long as the Partnership conducts business therein.

(b) *Offices*. The name of the resident agent for service of process for the Partnership and the address of the registered office of the Partnership in the State of Delaware is Corporation Services Company, 2023 Centre Road, Wilmington Delaware 19805-1297. The General Partner may establish places of business of the Partnership within and without the State of Delaware, as and when required by the Partnership's business and in furtherance of its purposes set forth herein, and may appoint (or cause the appointment of) agents for service of process in all jurisdictions in which the Partnership shall conduct business. The General Partner may from time to time in its sole discretion change the Partnership's places of business, resident agent for service of process, and/or the location of its registered office in Delaware.

3. Purpose; Powers. The Partnership is formed for the purpose of engaging in any lawful act or activity for which limited partnerships may be formed under the Act. Without limiting the foregoing, the general character and purposes of the business of the Partnership are to (a) engage in the business, directly and/or through one or more subsidiaries, of liquidating assets of, and performing investment management and advisory services for, pooled investment vehicles, funds, investment holdings, accounts, and interests therein; and (b) engage in any lawful activities (including, subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, the borrowing of money and the issuance of guarantees of indebtedness of others) directly or indirectly related or incidental thereto and in which a Delaware limited partnership may lawfully engage. The Partnership shall have and exercise all of the powers and rights conferred upon limited partnerships formed pursuant to the Act.

4. Management.

(a) *Authority of the General Partner*. The business and affairs of the Partnership shall be managed exclusively by and under the direction of the General Partner, which shall have the right, power and authority to exercise all of the powers of the Partnership except as otherwise provided by law or this Agreement. Decisions or actions made or approved by the General Partner in accordance with this Agreement shall constitute decisions or actions by the Partnership and shall be binding upon the Partnership and each Limited Partner of the Partnership. The General Partner may not be removed or replaced by the Limited Partners. In the event of the withdrawal, resignation or dissolution of the General Partner, a new General Partner shall be designated in writing by a majority in interest of the Limited Partners, who shall provide written notice to the remaining Limited Partners of such designation.

(b) *Delegation of Powers; Officers*. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the General Partner may delegate any or all or any portion of its rights, powers, authority, duties and responsibilities with respect to the management of the Partnership to such officers of the Partnership with such titles as the General Partner may determine ("***Officers***"). The General Partner may authorize any such Officers to sign agreements, contracts, instruments, or other documents in

the name of and on behalf of the Partnership, and such authority may be general or limited to specific instances. The power and authority of any Officer appointed by the General Partner under this Section 4(b) shall not exceed the power and authority possessed by the General Partner under this Agreement. The Officers shall hold office until their successors are duly appointed or their earlier death, resignation, or removal. Any Officer so appointed may be removed at any time, with or without cause, by the written consent of the General Partner. Any Officer may resign from his or her office upon prior written notice to the Partnership. If any office shall become vacant, a replacement Officer may be appointed by the written consent of the General Partner. Two or more offices may be held by the same person. The initial Officers of the Partnership are set forth on Schedule B.

(c) *Limited Partners*. No Limited Partner shall have any right to participate in the management of the Partnership as a Limited Partner. Moreover, no Limited Partner shall have any voting rights except with respect to consent to amendments as set forth in Section 19 below, or as otherwise required by the Act.

(d) *Transactions with Affiliates*. The General Partner or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the General Partner (an "***Affiliate***") may engage in transactions with the Partnership from time to time, including without limitation for lending to or borrowing from the Partnership, engaging in the provision of services to the Partnership, or otherwise engaging in business transactions with the Partnership, provided that such transactions are entered into in good faith. Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement or any other agreement contemplated herein, whenever a conflict of interest exists or arises between the General Partner or any of its Affiliates, on the one hand, and the Partnership or any Limited Partner, on the other hand, any action taken by the General Partner, in the absence of bad faith by the General Partner, shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement or any other agreement contemplated herein or a breach of any standard of care or duty imposed herein or therein or under the Act or any other applicable law, rule, or regulation.

5. Partners.

(a) *General*. The name, address, and percentage interest ownership interest of the General Partner and each Limited Partner in the Partnership (the "***Percentage Interest***") are set forth on Schedule A hereto. Additional Limited Partners may be admitted to the Partnership, and Schedule A may be amended, only with the written consent of the General Partner (provided, that failure to update Schedule A shall not itself be conclusive of whether consent of the General Partner has been obtained). No Limited Partner shall have the right or power to resign, withdraw or retire from the Partnership, except upon (i) the occurrence of any event described in Section 17-801 of the Act (in which case the Limited Partner(s) with respect to which such event has occurred shall, automatically and with no further action necessary by any person, cease to be a Limited Partner, and shall be deemed to have solely the interest of an assignee (within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act) with respect to such Limited Partner's Limited Partnership Interest), or (ii) with the consent of the General Partner. For the avoidance of doubt, no action may be taken to reduce, directly or indirectly, the Percentage Interest of any Partner without the written consent of such Partner.

(b) *Capital Contributions*. The Partners may, in their sole discretion, make additional capital contribution to the Partnership if requested by the General Partner. All capital,

whenever contributed, shall be subject in all respects to the risks of the business and subordinate in right of payment to the claims of present or future creditors of the Partnership in accordance with this Agreement.

(c) *Capital Accounts*. The Partnership shall maintain a capital account for each Partner in accordance with Section 704(b) and 704(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "***Code***"), and the principles of the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.

(d) *Tax Representative*. The General Partner shall serve as the "tax representative" to be the Partnership's designated representative within the meaning of Section 6223 of the Code with sole authority to act on behalf of the Partnership for purposes of subchapter C of Chapter 63 of the Code and any comparable provisions of state or local income tax laws (the "***Tax Representative***"). The Tax Representative is specifically directed and authorized to take whatever steps it deems necessary or desirable to perfect such designation, including, without limitation, filing any forms or documents with the Internal Revenue Service, properly designating a particular individual to act on its behalf of the Tax Representative and taking such other action as may from time to time be required under Treasury Regulations. The Tax Representative is hereby authorized to and shall perform all duties of a "tax representative" and shall serve as Tax Representative until its resignation or until the designation of its successor, whichever occurs sooner.

6. Allocation of Income and Losses.

(a) *Definitions*. For purposes of this Agreement, "***Income***" and "***Loss***" of the Partnership shall mean the taxable income and loss, respectively, of the Partnership computed with the adjustments set forth in Treasury Regulation under Code Section 704(b) including (A) adjustments pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g), (B) the inclusion of the amount of any tax-exempt income as an item of income, (C) the inclusion of the amount of any nondeductible, noncapitalizable expense as an item of deduction and (D) the inclusion of the amount of unrealized gain or unrealized loss with respect to an asset of the Partnership as an item of income or gain (as applicable) upon distribution of such asset in kind or as required by Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).

(b) *Allocations Generally*. The Income and Loss of the Partnership for each fiscal year or other applicable period shall be allocated to and among the Partners in proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.

(c) *Adjustments*. Notwithstanding Section 6(b) (but subject to Section 6(c)),

(i) Items of income or gain for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partner in the manner and to the extent required by the "qualified income offset" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d); and

(ii) In no event shall any Loss or item of deduction be allocated to a Partner if such allocation would cause or increase a negative balance in such Partner's capital account determined by increasing the Partner's capital account balance by any amount the Partner may be

obligated to restore to the Partnership pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c) and by decreasing such capital account balance by the amounts specified in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), (5) and (6)).

(d) *Nonrecourse Debt*. If at any time the Partnership incurs any "nonrecourse debt" (*i.e.,* debt that is treated as nonrecourse for purposes of Treasury Regulation Section 1.1001-2), the following provisions will apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary expressed elsewhere in this Agreement:

(i) "Nonrecourse deductions" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(b) and (c)) shall be allocated to the Partners in proportion to their respective Percentage Interests.

(ii) All other allocations relating to such nonrecourse debt shall be allocated in accordance with Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2; and

(iii) For purposes of Sections 6(b) and 6(c), each Partner's capital account balance shall be increased by the Partner's share of minimum gain and of partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain (as determined pursuant to Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(g) and 1.704-2(i)(5), respectively).

(e) *Deductions, Credits*. Except as otherwise provided herein or as required by Code Section 704, for federal income tax purposes, all items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit shall be allocated to the Partners in the same manner as are Income and Loss.

(f) *Regulatory Allocations*. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 6(a)-(e) above, allocations of Income and Loss shall be made in the order of priority set forth in Exhibit I to this Agreement.

(g) *Withholding*. To the extent that the Partnership is required to withhold and pay over any amounts to any Governmental Authority with respect to Distributions or allocations to any Limited Partner, the amount withheld shall be treated as a Distribution to that Limited Partner pursuant to Sections 4.02, 4.03 or 4.05, as applicable. In the event of any claimed over-withholding, Limited Partners shall be limited to an action against the applicable jurisdiction and not against the Partnership (unless the Partnership has not yet paid such amounts over to such jurisdiction). If any amount required to be withheld was not, in fact, actually withheld from one or more Distributions and the Partnership shall have been required to pay such amount to such Governmental Entity, the Partnership may, at its option, (i) require the affected Limited Partner to reimburse the Partnership for such withholding or (ii) reduce any subsequent Distributions to such Limited Partner by the amount of such withholding, in each case plus interest. Each Limited Partner agrees to furnish the Partnership with such documentation as shall reasonably be requested by the Partnership to assist it in determining the extent of, and in fulfilling, its withholding obligations. Each Limited Partner will indemnify the General Partner and the Partnership against any losses and liabilities (including

interest and penalties) related to any withholding obligations with respect to allocations or Distributions made to such Limited Partner by the Partnership.

(h) *Consistent Tax Reporting*. Except as otherwise unanimously agreed to in writing by the Limited Partners, for U.S. federal, state and local income tax purposes, the Limited Partners agree, as a condition to their admission to the Partnership, to report all taxable income, loss and items thereof (including the character and timing of such items) in a manner consistent with the manner in which such taxable income, loss or item thereof is reported by the Partnership on its tax returns and the Schedules K-1 (or any successor form) furnished by the Partnership to the Limited Partners.

7. Distributions. Distributions shall be made from the undistributed profit and loss account to the Partners at the times and in the aggregate amounts determined by the General Partner in its sole discretion; provided, that distributions shall be made to the Partners in accordance with their Percentage Interests. Distributions may be in cash or in kind as determined by the General Partner in its sole discretion. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the Partnership shall not make a distribution to the Limited Partners on account of its interest in the Partnership if such distribution would violate Section 17-607 of the Act or other applicable law.

8. Other Business. The Partners and their affiliates may engage in or possess an interest in other business ventures (unconnected with the Partnership) of every kind and description, independently or with others. The Partnership shall not have any rights in or to such independent ventures or the income or profits therefrom by virtue of this Agreement.

9. Limited Liability. The debts, obligations, and liabilities of the Partnership, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the Partnership and the General Partner. No Limited Partner shall have any liability (personal or otherwise) for any such debt, obligation, or liability of the Partnership solely by reason of acting in such capacity. For the avoidance of doubt, to the extent a Limited Partner is an Officer of the Partnership (regardless of title) and/or has authority to act on behalf of the General Partner of the Partnership, such Limited Partner shall remain a Limited Partner of the Partnership and shall not be subject to any liability (personal or otherwise) for any debt, obligation or liability of the Partnership.

10. Exculpation; Indemnification.

(a) *Exculpation*. Neither the General Partner nor any Covered Person (as defined below) shall be liable to the Partnership or any Limited Partner for errors in judgment or for any acts of omissions that do not constitute gross negligence, fraud, or willful misconduct. The General Partner may exercise any of the powers granted to it by this Agreement and perform any of the duties imposed upon it hereunder either directly or by or through its officers, directors, agents, trustees, or representatives, and the General Partner shall not be responsible for any misconduct or negligence on the part of any agent or representative appointed by the General Partner.

(b) ~~(a) *General*~~*Indemnification*. To the fullest extent permitted by law, subject to Section 10(~~c~~d) below, the Partnership shall indemnify each Covered Person ~~(as defined below)~~ for any and all losses, claims, demands, costs, damages, liabilities (joint and several), expenses of any

nature (including attorneys' fees and disbursements), judgments, fines, settlements and other amounts arising from any and all claims, demands, actions, suits or proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, in which such Covered Person may be involved or threatened to be involved, as a party or otherwise, by reason of any act or omission performed or omitted by such Covered Person in good faith on behalf of the Partnership and in a manner reasonably believed to be within the scope of the authority conferred on such Covered Person by this Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, the indemnification under this Section 10(~~a~~b) shall apply even though at the time of such claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding such person is no longer a Covered Person (except as set forth in Section 10(c)(iii) below). Any indemnity under this Section 10(~~a~~b) shall be provided out of and only to the extent of the Partnership's assets, and no Limited Partner shall have personal liability on account thereof. For the avoidance of doubt, any indemnification obligations of the Partnership under the Prior Agreement are null and void and are superseded in their entirety by this Section 10.

(c) ~~(b)~~ *Covered Persons*. "***Covered Person***" means each of the following:

(i) the General Partner, and each member, partner, director, officer, and agent thereof,

(ii) each person who is or becomes an Officer of the Partnership on or after the date ~~hereof~~of this Agreement, and

(iii) each person who is or becomes an employee or agent of the Partnership on or after the date of this Agreement if the General Partner determines in its sole discretion that such employee or agent should be a Covered Person.

~~(iii)~~ "Covered Person" shall *not* include any ~~other current or~~ former officer, former partner, former director, former employee, or former agent ~~for~~of the Partnership or the General Partner~~, in each case to the extent determined by~~ (unless such Person is a "Covered Person" as defined in clause (i) or (ii) above on or after the date of this Agreement), *unless* the General Partner in its sole discretion determines that such Person should be a Covered Person.

(d) ~~(c)~~ *Limitations on Indemnification*. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, no indemnification shall be provided for any Covered Person (i) with respect to any action brought by such Covered Person as a plaintiff against the Partnership or another Covered Person, or (ii) for any loss, damage or claim arising from such Covered Person's fraud, gross negligence or willful misconduct (in each case as determined by a final and binding judgment of a court or arbitrator).

(e) ~~(d)~~ *Advancement of Expenses*. Expenses reasonably incurred in defending any claim, action, suit or proceeding of the character described in Section 10(~~a~~b), to the extent available, shall be advanced by the Partnership prior to the final disposition of such claim, action, suit or proceeding upon receipt of a written undertaking by or on behalf of the recipient to repay all such advances if it is ultimately determined by the General Partner that such Covered Person is not entitled to indemnification pursuant to Section 10(~~c~~d).

(f) ~~(e)~~ *Third Party Beneficiaries*. Covered Persons shall be deemed to be third-party beneficiaries solely for purposes of this Section 10. All rights of any Covered Person under this Section shall inure to the benefit of such Covered Person's heirs and assigns. Except as expressly provided in this Section 10(f), this Agreement is intended solely for the benefit of the parties hereto and, to the extent allowed by this Agreement, their respective permitted successors and assigns, and this Agreement is not for the benefit of, nor may any provision hereof be enforced by, any other person.

11. Fiscal Year. The fiscal year of the Partnership shall end on December 31st of each year.

12. Transfers of Limited Partner Interests. No Limited Partner may transfer, in whole or in part, whether by sale, exchange, lease, license, assignment, distribution, gift, transfer or other disposition or alienation in any way, its interest in the Partnership, without the prior consent of the General Partner, which consent may be given or withheld in the sole discretion of the General Partner and may include such terms and conditions as the General Partner shall deem appropriate in its sole discretion. In addition, it shall be a condition precedent to every transfer of all or any portion of a Limited Partner's interest permitted hereunder, the transferring Limited Partner shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the General Partner that (i) the proposed transfer will not cause or result in a breach of any violation of law, including U.S. federal or state securities laws, and (ii) that the transfer would not adversely affect the classification of the Partnership as a partnership for U.S. federal tax purposes (including by causing the Partnership to be treated as a "publicly traded partnership" under Section 7704 of the Code), terminate it as a partnership under Code Section 708, or have a substantial adverse effect with respect to U.S. federal income taxes payable by the Partnership.

13. Dissolution. The Partnership shall dissolve, and its affairs shall be wound up upon the first to occur of the following: (i) the consent of the General Partner; (ii) at any time there are no Limited Partners of the Partnership, unless the business of the Partnership is continued in a manner permitted by the Act; or (iii) the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under Section 17-802 of the Act. Following the foregoing event, the General Partner shall proceed diligently to liquidate the assets of the Partnership in a manner consistent with commercially reasonable business practices. In the event of dissolution, the Partnership shall conduct only such activities as are necessary to wind up its affairs (including the sale of the assets of the Partnership in an orderly manner), and the assets of the Partnership shall be applied in the manner, and in the order of priority, set forth in Section 17-804 of the Act. Liquidating distributions to the Partners shall be made in in accordance with their Percentage Interests.

14. Severability of Provisions. Each provision of this Agreement shall be considered separable and if for any reason any provision or provisions herein are determined to be invalid, unenforceable or illegal under any existing or future law, such invalidity, unenforceability or illegality shall not impair the operation of or affect those portions of this Agreement which are valid, enforceable and legal.

15. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts and as so executed shall constitute one agreement binding on all parties hereto, notwithstanding that all of the parties have not signed the same counterpart.

16. Facsimile Signature Page. This Agreement may be executed and delivered by the parties hereto by an executed signature page transmitted by facsimile, and any failure to deliver the originally executed signature page shall not affect the validity, legality or enforceability of this Agreement.

17. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and understanding among the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings relating to such subject matter.

18. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware (without regard to the conflicts of law principles), all rights and remedies being governed by said laws.

19. Consent to Jurisdiction. Each of the parties hereto consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, for any action or proceeding instituted for the enforcement and construction of any right, remedy, obligation, or liability arising under or by reason of this Agreement.

20. ~~19.~~ Amendments. No amendment of this Agreement shall be valid or binding unless such amendment is made with the written consent of the General Partner. Further, any amendment of this Agreement that reduces the Percentage Interest or economic rights of any Limited Partner in a manner that is disproportionate to other Limited Partners shall require the written consent of the affected Limited Partner. For the avoidance of doubt, amendment includes any merger, combination or other reorganization or any amendment of the Certificate that has the effect of changing or superseding the terms of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, intending to be legally bound hereby, has duly executed this Agreement as of the date first set forth above.

GENERAL PARTNER:

[NEW GP ENTITY]

_____

By:
Its:

LIMITED PARTNER:

[CLAIMANT TRUST]

_____

By:
Its: Trustee

[Signature Page to Fifth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P.]

Schedule A

SCHEDULE OF PARTNERS

[Date], ~~2020~~2021

General Partner

Name	Address	Percentage Interest
[New GP Entity]	*[Insert Address]*	[1.00]%

Limited Partners

Name	Address	Percentage Interest
[Claimant Trust]	*[Insert Address]*	[99.00]%

Schedule B

SCHEDULE OF OFFICERS

[Date], ~~2020~~2021

Name	Officer Title
~~[~~James P. Seery~~]~~, Jr.	~~[~~Chief Executive Officer~~]~~
[Name]	*[Title]*
[Name]	*[Title]*

Exhibit I

REGULATORY ALLOCATIONS

(i) Items of income or gain (computed in accordance with Section 6(a), including the adjustments therein) for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partners in the manner and to the minimum extent required by the "minimum gain chargeback" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(f) and Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(i)(4).

(ii) All "nonrecourse deductions" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(b)(1)) of the Partnership for any year shall be allocated to the Partners in accordance with their respective Percentage Interests; provided, however, that nonrecourse deductions attributable to "partner nonrecourse debt" (as defined in Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(b)(4)) shall be allocated to the Partners in accordance with the provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-2(i)(1).

(iii) Items of income or gain (computed in accordance with Section 6(a), including the adjustments therein) for any taxable period shall be allocated to the Partners in the manner and to the extent required by the "qualified income offset" provisions of Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*d*).

(iv) In no event shall Loss of the Partnership be allocated to a Partner if such allocation would cause or increase a negative balance in such Partner's Adjusted Capital Account (determined for purposes of this Exhibit I only, by increasing the Partner's Adjusted Capital Account balance by the amount the Partner is obligated to restore to the Partnership pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*c*) and decreasing it by the amounts specified in Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(*d*)(*4*), (*5*) and (*6*)).

(v) For tax purposes, except as otherwise provided herein or as required by Code Section 704, all items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit shall be allocated to the Partners in the same manner as are Income and Loss; provided, however, that if the Book Value of any property of the Partnership differs from its adjusted basis for tax purposes, then items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit related to such property for tax purposes shall be allocated among the Partners so as to take account of the variation between the adjusted basis of the property for tax purposes and its Book Value in the manner provided for under Code Section 704(c).

(vi) For purposes hereof, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

"***Adjusted Capital Account***" means, for each Partner, such Partner's capital account balance increased by such Partner's share of "minimum gain" and of "partner nonrecourse debt minimum gain" (as determined pursuant to Treasury Regulation Sections 1.704-2(g) and 1.704-2(i)(5), respectively).

"***Book Value***" means, with respect to any asset, the asset's adjusted basis for U.S. federal income tax purposes; provided, however, that (i) the initial Book Value of any asset contributed to the Partnership shall be adjusted to equal its fair market value as determined by the General Partner

at the time of its contribution, and (ii) the Book Values of all assets held by the Partnership shall be adjusted to equal their respective fair market values as determined by the General Partner (taking Code Section 7701(g) into account) upon an election by the Partnership to revalue its property in accordance with Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(*f*) and upon liquidation of the Partnership. The Book Value of any asset whose Book Value was adjusted pursuant to the preceding sentence shall thereafter be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of Regulation Section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(*g*).

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Padding cell	

Statistics:	
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Insertions	38
Deletions	26
Moved from	0
Moved to	0
Style change	0
Format changed	0
Total changes	64

EXHIBIT BB

SENIOR EMPLOYEE STIPULATION AND TOLLING AGREEMENT EXTENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION

This stipulation (the "Stipulation") is entered into as of January 20, 2021, by and between Thomas Surgent (the "Senior Employee") and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"). The Debtor and the Senior Employee are individually referred to as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties".

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case"):

WHEREAS, on October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee appointed the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") in the Chapter 11 Case;

WHEREAS, On November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* (as may be further amended or supplemented, the "Plan")[1] [Docket No. 1472]. A hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan is currently scheduled for January 26, 2021.

WHEREAS, prior to and during the course of the Chapter 11 Case, the Senior Employee was employed by the Debtor as its Chief Compliance Officer and in such role provided services to the Debtor;

WHEREAS, (i) certain amounts that were allegedly due to be paid to the Senior Employee for the partial year of 2018 in installments due on February 28, 2020 and August 31, 2020; and (ii) certain amounts that were due to the Senior Employee in respect of the 2017 Deferred Award that vested after three years on May 31, 2020 ((i) and (ii), collectively, the "Bonus Amount") were not paid because of objections raised by the Committee;

WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the total Bonus Amount through and including the date hereof is $[redacted]

WHEREAS, on May 26, 2020, the Senior Employee filed a proof of claim [Claim No. 183] (the "Proof of Claim"), which included a claim for the Bonus Amount;

WHEREAS, as set forth in the Proof of Claim, the Senior Employee may have other Claims against the Debtor in addition to the Bonus Amount (the "Other Employee

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

Claims" and together with the Bonus Amount, the "Senior Employee Claims")[2]:

WHEREAS, the Committee has alleged that certain causes of action against the Senior Employee may exist, which causes of action have been or will be retained pursuant to the Plan (the "Causes of Action"):

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the release of certain of the Causes of Action (the "Released Causes of Action") against the Senior Employee as set forth in therein (the "Employee Release"):

WHEREAS, both the Employee Release and the payment of the Bonus Amount (as reduced pursuant to this Agreement) are conditioned on the Senior Employee executing this Stipulation on or prior to the Confirmation Date;

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the creation of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub- Trust and the appointment of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (the "CTOC") to oversee such entities;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, each of the Parties stipulates and agrees as follows:

1. Covenant Not to Sue. In consideration of the Senior Employee's agreement to toll the statutes of limitation with respect to any Causes of Action that can be asserted against him and to waive a portion of the Bonus Amount which would otherwise be part of the Senior Employee Claim, the Debtor and any of its successors or assigns, including the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust (collectively, the "HCMLP Parties"), agree not to initiate or commence any lawsuit, action or proceeding for the purpose of prosecuting any Released Causes of Action against the Senior Employee from the date of this Stipulation until the earlier of (a) thirty calendar days after the Notice Date and (b) the Dissolution Date (each as defined below) (such date, the "Termination Date"). This Stipulation shall expire upon the Termination Date and shall thereafter be of no further force and effect; *provided, however,* that the termination of this Stipulation shall not affect the treatment of the Bonus Amount set forth in Section 5 hereof or in the Plan.

2. Non-Compliance: Vesting.

a. As set forth in the Plan, the Senior Employee acknowledges and agrees that the Employee Release will be deemed null and void and of no force and effect (1) if there is more than one member of the CTOC who does not represent entities holding a Disputed or Allowed Claim (the "Independent Members"), the Claimant Trustee and the Independent Members by majority vote determine or (2) if there is only one Independent Member, the Independent Member after discussion with the Claimant

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, the "Other Employee Claims" shall include all prepetition and postpetition Claims of the Senior Employee, including paid time off claims, claims (if applicable) for severance amounts under applicable employment agreements, and administrative claims (if applicable), but shall not include the Bonus Amount.

Trustee, determines (in each case after discussing with the full CTOC) that such Employee (regardless of whether the Employee is then currently employed by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee):

(1) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust, or any of their respective employees or agents, or any Released Party on or in connection with any claim or cause of action arising prior to the Effective Date,

(2) has taken any action that, impairs or harms the value of the Claimant Trust Assets or the Reorganized Debtor Assets,

(3) has violated the confidentiality provisions of Section 4 below, or

(4) (x) upon the request of the Claimant Trustee, has failed to provide reasonable assistance in good faith to the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets or Reorganized Debtor Assets, as applicable, or (ii) the resolution of Claims, or (y) has taken any action that impedes or frustrates the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to any of the foregoing. If such determination under this Section 2a is made, the Claimant Trustee will deliver a notice of non-compliance with the Plan (the "Notice") to the Senior Employee. Such Notice will be effective when deemed delivered pursuant to Section 8.h hereof (the "Notice Date").

b. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Employee Release will vest and all Released Causes of Action that may or could be brought against the Senior Employee will be indefeasibly released solely to the extent set forth in Article IX.D of the Plan so long as the Notice Date does not occur on or before the date that the Claimant Trust is dissolved (such date, the "Dissolution Date").

c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Stipulation or any other document, Senior Employee expressly reserves the right to take all actions necessary to pursue enforcement and payment of the Other Employee Claims, and such actions shall not violate the terms of this Stipulation; provided, that, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Stipulation shall prejudice the rights of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to object to or otherwise challenge any Other Employee Claims or limit the Senior Employee's obligations under Section 8 hereof. Additionally, this Agreement does not affect or impair Senior Employee's rights, if any, to seek indemnification from any party, including, without limitation, the Debtor, any HCMLP Parties, or any other affiliates thereof nor does it affect or impair the right of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to challenge such request.

3. Tolling of Statutes of Limitation. In consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that the statute of limitations applicable to any Cause of Action is hereby tolled as of, and

extended from, the date of this Stipulation through and including the Termination Date (the "Tolling Period"). The Tolling Period shall be excluded from any calculation of any statute of limitations period applicable to any Cause of Action that may be brought by the HCMLP Parties against the Senior Employee. The Senior Employee acknowledges that he will be estopped from arguing that this Stipulation is ineffective to extend the time within which the HCMLP Parties must commence an action to pursue any Cause of Action.

4. Confidentiality. In further consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that, in addition to existing obligations to maintain all business sensitive information concerning the HCMLP Parties in strictest confidence, each Senior Employee further agrees to keep all discussions, information and observations including, but not limited to, attorney-client privileged or work product information (collectively "Confidential Information") relating to the activities or planned activities of the HCMLP Parties strictly confidential. Each Senior Employee covenants and represents that it will not discuss such Confidential Information with anyone, other than the Senior Employee's personal attorney, the Claimant Trustee, or its respective representatives.

5. Bonus Amount.

a. The Senior Employee has agreed to forfeit a percentage of his Bonus Amount in consideration for the Employee Release and acknowledges that such agreement is an integral part of this Stipulation. The Senior Employee hereby agrees that (i) the Bonus Amount will be treated as an Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claim) under the Plan and, to the extent required, will reduce his Bonus Amount as required to qualify for such treatment, (ii) the Senior Employee will receive the treatment provided to other Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claims), (iii) the Allowed Class 7 distribution on the Bonus Amount will be further reduced by 5% (the "Reduced Amount"), and (iv) the Reduced Amount will be forever waived and released. Except as set forth herein, nothing herein will prejudice or otherwise impact any Other Employee Claim, or prevent the Senior Employee from prosecuting, pursuing, or enforcing any Other Employee Claim.

b. For the avoidance of doubt, although the Employee Release can be nullified as set forth in Section 2, any such nullification will have no effect on the treatment of the Senior Employee's Bonus Amount pursuant to this Section 5.

6. Other Employee Claims. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the Senior Employee is not entitled to make the Convenience Class Election with respect to the Other Employee Claims.

7. Effective Date. The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court and the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan. If, for any reason, the Plan is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or the Effective Date does not occur, this Stipulation will be null and void and of no force and effect.

8. Plan Support. The Senior Employee agrees that he will use commercially reasonable efforts to assist the Debtor in confirmation of the Plan, including, without limitation, filing a notice of such Senior Employee's withdrawal from the *Senior Employees' Limited Objection to Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization* [Docket No. 1669], and vote, if applicable, the Bonus Amount, the Other Employee Claims, and any other Claims in favor of the Plan.

9. Miscellaneous.

a. Counterparts. This Stipulation may be signed in counterparts and such signatures may be delivered by facsimile or other electronic means.

b. Binding Effect. This Stipulation shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any and all successors-in-interests, assigns, and legal representatives, of any Party.

c. Authority. Each Party to this Stipulation and each person executing this document on behalf of any Party to this Stipulation warrants and represents that he, she, or it has the power and authority to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this Stipulation.

d. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation sets forth the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements and discussions. This Stipulation may only be amended by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.

e. No Waiver and Reservation of Rights. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Stipulation shall be, or deemed to be, a waiver of any rights, remedies, or privileges of any of the Parties. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Stipulation is without prejudice to any Party's rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law, whether at law or in equity, and each Party hereby reserves all of such rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law.

f. No Admission of Liability. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Causes of Action. Nothing in this Agreement will imply an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Senior Employee and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Senior Employee.

g. No Waiver If Breach. The Parties agree that no breach of any provision hereof can be waived except in writing. The waiver of a breach of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach of any provision hereof.

h. Notice. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered by email, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address

as may be subsequently specified in writing by any Party and delivered to all other Parties pursuant to this Section:

Senior Employee

Thomas Surgent
[redacted]

With a copy to:
Attorneys for Senior Employee

M. Michelle Hartmann
Baker McKenzie
1900 N. Pearl Street
Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Email: michelle.hartmann@bakermckenzie.com

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: (631) 804-2049
Email: jpseeryjr@gmail.com

With a copy to:

Attorneys for HCMLP

John A. Morris
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
780 Third Avenue
34th Floor
New York, New York 10017-2024
Telephone No.: (212) 561-7760
Email: jmorris@pszjlaw.com

i. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Stipulation; (b) executed this Stipulation upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Stipulation, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Stipulation and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered

any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

j. Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

k. Governing Law: Venue. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

SENIOR EMPLOYEE

By: _____
Name: Thomas Surgent
Its: CCO

EXHIBIT CC

SENIOR EMPLOYEE STIPULATION AND TOLLING AGREEMENT EXTENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATION

This stipulation (the "Stipulation") is entered into as of January 20, 2021, by and between Frank Waterhouse (the "Senior Employee") and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"). The Debtor and the Senior Employee are individually referred to as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties".

RECITALS

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, the Debtor filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which case was subsequently transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court") and captioned *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (the "Chapter 11 Case"):

WHEREAS, on October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee appointed the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") in the Chapter 11 Case;

WHEREAS, On November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.* (as may be further amended or supplemented, the "Plan")[1] [Docket No. 1472]. A hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan is currently scheduled for January 26, 2021.

WHEREAS, prior to and during the course of the Chapter 11 Case, the Senior Employee was employed by the Debtor as its Chief Financial Officer and in such role provided services to the Debtor;

WHEREAS, (i) certain amounts that were allegedly due to be paid to the Senior Employee for the partial year of 2018 in installments due on February 28, 2020 and August 31, 2020; and (ii) certain amounts that were due to the Senior Employee in respect of the 2017 Deferred Award that vested after three years on May 31, 2020 ((i) and (ii), collectively, the "Bonus Amount") were not paid because of objections raised by the Committee;

WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the total Bonus Amount through and including the date hereof is [redacted]

WHEREAS, on May 26, 2020, the Senior Employee filed a proof of claim [Claim No. 182] (the "Proof of Claim"), which included a claim for the Bonus Amount;

WHEREAS, as set forth in the Proof of Claim, the Senior Employee may have other Claims against the Debtor in addition to the Bonus Amount (the "Other Employee Claims" and together

[1] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Plan.

with the Bonus Amount, the "Senior Employee Claims")[2]:

WHEREAS, the Committee has alleged that certain causes of action against the Senior Employee may exist, which causes of action have been or will be retained pursuant to the Plan (the "Causes of Action"):

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the release of certain of the Causes of Action (the "Released Causes of Action") against the Senior Employee as set forth in therein (the "Employee Release"):

WHEREAS, both the Employee Release and the payment of the Bonus Amount (as reduced pursuant to this Agreement) are conditioned on the Senior Employee executing this Stipulation on or prior to the Confirmation Date:

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the creation of the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust and the appointment of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee (the "CTOC") to oversee such entities:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, each of the Parties stipulates and agrees as follows:

1. Covenant Not to Sue. In consideration of the Senior Employee's agreement to toll the statutes of limitation with respect to any Causes of Action that can be asserted against him and to waive a portion of the Bonus Amount which would otherwise be part of the Senior Employee Claim, the Debtor and any of its successors or assigns, including the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust (collectively, the "HCMLP Parties"), agree not to initiate or commence any lawsuit, action or proceeding for the purpose of prosecuting any Released Causes of Action against the Senior Employee from the date of this Stipulation until the earlier of (a) thirty calendar days after the Notice Date and (b) the Dissolution Date (each as defined below) (such date, the "Termination Date"). This Stipulation shall expire upon the Termination Date and shall thereafter be of no further force and effect; *provided, however*, that the termination of this Stipulation shall not affect the treatment of the Bonus Amount set forth in Section 5 hereof or in the Plan.

2. Non-Compliance: Vesting.

a. As set forth in the Plan, the Senior Employee acknowledges and agrees that the Employee Release will be deemed null and void and of no force and effect (1) if there is more than one member of the CTOC who does not represent entities holding a Disputed or Allowed Claim (the "Independent Members"), the Claimant Trustee and the Independent Members by majority vote determine or (2) if there is only one Independent Member, the Independent Member after discussion with the Claimant Trustee, determines (in each case after discussing with the full CTOC) that such Employee (regardless of whether the Employee is then

[2] For the avoidance of doubt, the "Other Employee Claims" shall include all prepetition and postpetition Claims of the Senior Employee, including paid time off claims, claims (if applicable) for severance amounts under applicable employment agreements, and administrative claims (if applicable), but shall not include the Bonus Amount.

currently employed by the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or the Claimant Trustee):

(1) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trust, or any of their respective employees or agents, or any Released Party on or in connection with any claim or cause of action arising prior to the Effective Date,

(2) has taken any action that, impairs or harms the value of the Claimant Trust Assets or the Reorganized Debtor Assets,

(3) has violated the confidentiality provisions of Section 4 below, or

(4) (x) upon the request of the Claimant Trustee, has failed to provide reasonable assistance in good faith to the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to (i) the monetization of the Claimant Trust Assets or Reorganized Debtor Assets, as applicable, or (ii) the resolution of Claims, or (y) has taken any action that impedes or frustrates the Claimant Trustee or the Reorganized Debtor with respect to any of the foregoing. If such determination under this Section 2a is made, the Claimant Trustee will deliver a notice of non-compliance with the Plan (the "Notice") to the Senior Employee. Such Notice will be effective when deemed delivered pursuant to Section 8.h hereof (the "Notice Date").

b. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Employee Release will vest and all Released Causes of Action that may or could be brought against the Senior Employee will be indefeasibly released solely to the extent set forth in Article IX.D of the Plan so long as the Notice Date does not occur on or before the date that the Claimant Trust is dissolved (such date, the "Dissolution Date").

c. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Stipulation or any other document, Senior Employee expressly reserves the right to take all actions necessary to pursue enforcement and payment of the Other Employee Claims, and such actions shall not violate the terms of this Stipulation; provided, that, for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Stipulation shall prejudice the rights of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to object to or otherwise challenge any Other Employee Claims or limit the Senior Employee's obligations under Section 8 hereof. Additionally, this Agreement does not affect or impair Senior Employee's rights, if any, to seek indemnification from any party, including, without limitation, the Debtor, any HCMLP Parties, or any other affiliates thereof nor does it affect or impair the right of the Debtor, or any of the Debtor's successor in interests under the Plan, to challenge such request.

3. Tolling of Statutes of Limitation. In consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that the statute of limitations applicable to any Cause of Action is hereby tolled as of, and extended from, the date of this Stipulation through and including the Termination Date (the "Tolling Period"). The Tolling Period shall be excluded from any calculation of any statute of limitations period applicable to any Cause of Action that may be brought by the HCMLP Parties against the Senior Employee. The Senior Employee acknowledges that he will be estopped from arguing that this Stipulation is

ineffective to extend the time within which the HCMLP Parties must commence an action to pursue any Cause of Action.

4. Confidentiality. In further consideration of the HCMLP Parties' "Covenant Not to Sue" (set forth in Section 1 hereof), the Senior Employee agrees that, in addition to existing obligations to maintain all business sensitive information concerning the HCMLP Parties in strictest confidence, each Senior Employee further agrees to keep all discussions, information and observations including, but not limited to, attorney-client privileged or work product information (collectively "Confidential Information") relating to the activities or planned activities of the HCMLP Parties strictly confidential. Each Senior Employee covenants and represents that it will not discuss such Confidential Information with anyone, other than the Senior Employee's personal attorney, the Claimant Trustee, or its respective representatives.

5. Bonus Amount.

a. The Senior Employee has agreed to forfeit a percentage of his Bonus Amount in consideration for the Employee Release and acknowledges that such agreement is an integral part of this Stipulation. The Senior Employee hereby agrees that (i) the Bonus Amount will be treated as an Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claim) under the Plan and, to the extent required, will reduce his Bonus Amount as required to qualify for such treatment, (ii) the Senior Employee will receive the treatment provided to other Allowed Class 7 (Convenience Claims), (iii) the Allowed Class 7 distribution on the Bonus Amount will be further reduced by 5% (the "Reduced Amount"), and (iv) the Reduced Amount will be forever waived and released. Except as set forth herein, nothing herein will prejudice or otherwise impact any Other Employee Claim, or prevent the Senior Employee from prosecuting, pursuing, or enforcing any Other Employee Claim ~~as a Class 8 Claim in accordance with the Plan.~~

b. For the avoidance of doubt, although the Employee Release can be nullified as set forth in Section 2, any such nullification will have no effect on the treatment of the Senior Employee's Bonus Amount pursuant to this Section 5.

6. Other Employee Claims. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the Senior Employee is not entitled to make the Convenience Class Election with respect to the Other Employee Claims.

7. Effective Date. The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of the Plan by the Bankruptcy Court and the occurrence of the Effective Date of the Plan. If, for any reason, the Plan is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or the Effective Date does not occur, this Stipulation will be null and void and of no force and effect.

8. Plan Support. The Senior Employee agrees that he will use commercially reasonable efforts to assist the Debtor in confirmation of the Plan, including, without limitation, filing a notice of such Senior Employee's withdrawal from the *Senior Employees' Limited Objection to Debtor's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization* [Docket No. 1669], and vote, if applicable, the Bonus Amount, the Other Employee Claims, and any other Claims in favor of the Plan.

9. Miscellaneous.

a. Counterparts. This Stipulation may be signed in counterparts and such signatures may be delivered by facsimile or other electronic means.

b. Binding Effect. This Stipulation shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, any and all successors-in-interests, assigns, and legal representatives, of any Party.

c. Authority. Each Party to this Stipulation and each person executing this document on behalf of any Party to this Stipulation warrants and represents that he, she, or it has the power and authority to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this Stipulation.

d. Entire Agreement. This Stipulation sets forth the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements and discussions. This Stipulation may only be amended by an agreement in writing signed by the Parties.

e. No Waiver and Reservation of Rights. Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Stipulation shall be, or deemed to be, a waiver of any rights, remedies, or privileges of any of the Parties. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Stipulation is without prejudice to any Party's rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law, whether at law or in equity, and each Party hereby reserves all of such rights, privileges and remedies under applicable law.

f. No Admission of Liability. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Causes of Action. Nothing in this Agreement will imply an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Senior Employee and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Senior Employee.

g. No Waiver If Breach. The Parties agree that no breach of any provision hereof can be waived except in writing. The waiver of a breach of any provision hereof shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach of any provision hereof.

h. Notice. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered by email, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be subsequently specified in writing by any Party and delivered to all other Parties pursuant to this Section:

Senior Employee

Frank Waterhouse

[redacted]

With a copy to:

Attorneys for Senior Employee

M. Michelle Hartmann
Baker McKenzie
1900 N. Pearl Street
Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Email: michelle.hartmann@bakermckenzie.com

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: (631) 804-2049
Email: jpseeryjr@gmail.com

With a copy to:

Attorneys for HCMLP

John A. Morris
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
780 Third Avenue
34th Floor
New York, New York 10017-2024
Telephone No.: (212) 561-7760
Email: jmorris@pszjlaw.com

i. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Stipulation; (b) executed this Stipulation upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Stipulation, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Stipulation and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

j. Severability. Any provision hereof which is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions hereof, and any such prohibition or unenforceability in any jurisdiction shall not invalidate or render unenforceable such provisions in another jurisdiction.

k. Governing Law: Venue. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement.

[Remainder of Page Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: CEO/CRO

SENIOR EMPLOYEE

By: _____
Name: FRANK WATERHOUSE
Its: _____

EXHIBIT DD

Released Employees

Name
Abayarathna, Sahan
Bannon, Lucy
Baynard, Paul C.
Beispiel, Michael
Brewer, Brigid
Broaddus, Paul
Burns, Nathan
Carter, Jerome
Chisum, Naomi
Clark, Stetson
Collins, Brian
Cotton, Austin
Cournoyer, Timothy
Covitz, Hunter
Diorio, Matthew
Eftekhari, Cyrus
Eliason, Hayley
Flaherty, Brendan
Fox, Sean
Goldsmith, Sarah B.
Gosserand, William
Gray, Matthew
Groff, Scott
Haltom, Steven
Hendrix, Kristin
Hoedebeck, Charlie
Irving, Mary K.
Jain, Bhawika
Jeong, Sang K.
Jimenez, Sarah
Kim, Helen
Klos, David
Kovelan, Kari J.
Leuthner, Andrew
Loiben, Tara J.
Luu, Joye
Mabry, William
Mckay, Bradley
Mills Iv, James
Nikolayev, Yegor

Owens, David
Park, Jun
Parker, Trey
Patel, Vishal
Patrick, Mark
Poglitsch, Jon
Post, Jason
Rice, Christopher
Richardson, Kellie
Rios, Heriberto
Roeber, Blair A.
Rothstein, Jason
Sachdev, Kunal
Schroth, Melissa
Sevilla, Jean-Paul
Short, Lauren
Staltari, Mauro
Stevens, Kellie
Stewart, Phoebe L.
Stoops, Clifford
Surgent, Thomas *
Swadley, Rick
Thedford, Lauren E.
Thomas, Kristen
Thottichira, Christina
Throckmorton, Michael
Vitiello, Stephanie
Waterhouse, Frank *
Yoo, Han Us

* Senior Employee - Required to execute Senior Employee Stipulation.

STINSON LLP
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Facsimile: (214) 560-2203
Email: deborah.deitschperez@stinson.com
Email: michael.aigen@stinson.com

Counsel for The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING

Exhibit
R 5

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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING

Movants The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, "Movants") file this Motion for Leave to File Proceeding.

SUMMARY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS[1]

1. Movants file this Motion for Leave to File Proceeding (the "Motion for Leave") out of an abundance of caution in light of the gatekeeper injunction (the "Gatekeeper Provision") contained in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) ("Plan") confirmed by order of this Court on February 22, 2021, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F [Dkt. No.1950]. Specifically, Movants seek an order from the Court finding that the Gatekeeper Provision is inapplicable to the proposed proceeding (the "Valuation Proceeding") to be commenced by Movants in this Court, or that the requisite standard is met.

2. The Valuation Proceeding largely seeks the same relief previously sought by Movants through motion practice. In particular, the Valuation Proceeding seeks information regarding the value of the estate, including the assets and liabilities of the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust") and related determinations by the Court. On December 6, 2022, the Court ordered Movants to seek the relief previously sought by motion practice through an adversary proceeding [Dkt. No. 3645]. As a result, Movants are required to name Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust") as defendants in the Valuation Proceeding, notwithstanding that what Movants are really

[1] Movants incorporate the facts alleged in their proposed Complaint To (I) Compel Disclosures About The Assets Of The Highland Claimant Trust And (II) Determine (A) Relative Value Of Those Assets, And (B) Nature Of Plaintiffs' Interests In The Claimant Tru[st ("Proposed Complaint" or "Valuation Complaint"), annexed hereto as Exhibit A.

seeking is information from HCMLP and the Claimant Trust. Under the circumstances, Movants believe their Valuation Proceeding should fall outside of the Gatekeeper Provision.

3. However, if the Court determines that the Gatekeeper Provision applies to the Valuation Proceeding, Movants seek an order determining that the Valuation Proceeding presents a "colorable claim" within the meaning of the Gatekeeper Provision and should be allowed.

4. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[2] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Movants need to file the Valuation Proceeding in an effort to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust established to liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

5. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that, even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is likely more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors 100 cents on the dollar. Accordingly, Movants and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or nothing for the owners that built the company.

6. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this

[2] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Dkt. No. 1808].

Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here, a prompt valuation of the estate would serve the same purpose and is needed.

7. As set forth in greater detail in the annexed complaint ("Valuation Complaint"), upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Movants. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery who would then be inclined to approve inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets was realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

8. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless Movants are allowed to proceed, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

9. On the petition date, the estate had over $550 million in assets, with far less in in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

10. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[3]

11. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of June 1, 2022, was as follows:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[4]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[3] Additional detail in the Valuation Complaint and its exhibits.
[4] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

12. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

13. On information and belied, Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded with a reorganization plan to the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

14. Instead, it appears that Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Making the transactions particularly suspect is the fact that the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years' hence. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

15. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided such information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

16. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a line of credit for $59 million, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post effective date litigation now pursued by Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying in the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

17. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Movants believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest, now.

18. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Movants and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Movants in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity of any meaningful recovery.

19. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Movants including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Movants have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Movants become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Movants are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

20. Movants are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

ARGUMENT

A. The Gatekeeper Provision.

21. The Debtor's Plan includes a Gatekeeper Provision, limiting how claims can be asserted against Protected Parties (Plan, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F), such as the reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust. Plan Ex. A, Article I.B, ¶ 105.

22. Under the Debtor's Plan confirmed by this Court, an "Enjoined Party" may not:

> [C]ommence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Protected Party that arises from or is related to the Chapter 11 Case, the negotiation of the Plan, the administration of the Plan or property to be distributed under the Plan, the wind down of the business of the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the administration of the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust, or the transactions in furtherance of the foregoing without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining, after notice and a hearing, that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of any kind . . . against a Protected Party and (ii) specifically authorizing such Enjoined Party to bring such claim or cause of action against any such Protected Party.

Plan, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F.

23. The Plan defines the term "Enjoined Party" to include "all Entities who have held, hold, or may hold Claims against or Equity Interests in the Debtor", "any Entity that has appeared and/or filed any motion, objection, or other pleading in this Chapter 11 Case regardless of the capacity in which such Entity appeared", and any "Related Entity." Plan Ex. A, Article I.B, ¶ 56. The Plan expressly defines "Related Entity" to include Dugaboy and Hunter Mountain. *Id.*, § B, ¶ 110. Accordingly, each of Movants is an "Enjoined Party." The question thus arises whether Movants must seek Court permission prior to instituting the annexed Valuation Proceeding.

B. The Gatekeeper Provision Is Satisfied Because Movants Were Directed to Raise Valuation Issues through an Adversary Proceeding

24. Movants previously sought by way of contested matter to obtain the relief sought in the Valuation Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3382, 3467, and 3533]. Debtor objected, asserting both that that the relief asserted was unwarranted and that it could only be obtained in an adversary proceeding [Dkt No. 3465]. The Court ruled that Movants must pursue an adversary proceeding.

Given that the Court has already ordered Movants to proceed in this fashion, the Court has already served its gatekeeper function and this motion is unnecessary [Dkt. No. 3645].

25. However, Movants conferenced the issue with Debtor, and Debtor was only willing to stipulate that no gatekeeper motion was needed if Movants sought exactly the same relief as had been sought in the motion. Because the relief sought is better defined now, and to avoid further delay, in an excess of caution, Movants bring this motion. After filing, Movants will attempt to negotiate a resolution of this motion so that the Court can proceed directly to the merits.

C. The Valuation Proceeding Sets Forth a Colorable Claim.

26. Movants present colorable claims that should be authorized to proceed.

27. The Plan does not define what constitutes a "colorable claim of any kind." Nor does the Bankruptcy Code define the term. The case law construing the requirement for "colorable" claims clearly provides that the requisite showing is a relatively low threshold to satisfy, requiring Movants to prove "there is a possibility of success." *See Spring Svc. Tex., Inc. v. McConnell (In re McConnell)*, 122 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).

28. The Fifth Circuit has stated that "the colorable claim standard is met if the [movant] has asserted claims for relief that on appropriate proof would allow a recovery. Courts have determined that a court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing, but must ensure that the claims do not lack any merit whatsoever." *Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 858 F.2d 233, 248 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court therefore need not be satisfied that there is an evidentiary basis for the claims to be asserted but instead should allow the claims if they appear to have some merit.

29. Other federal circuit courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the standard to be applied. For example, the Eighth Circuit held that "creditors' claims are colorable if they would survive a motion to dismiss." *In re Racing Services, Inc.*, 540 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2008); *accord In Re Foster*, 516 B.R. 537, 542 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2014), *aff'd* 602 Fed. Appx. 356 (8th Cir.

2015) (per curiam). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar test requiring that the court look only to the face of the complaint to determine if claims are colorable. *In re The Gibson Group, Inc.*, 66 F.3d 1436, 1446 (6th Cir. 1995).

30. Other federal courts have adopted roughly the same standard—*i.e.*, a claim is colorable if it is merely "plausible" and thus could survive a motion to dismiss. *See In re America's Hobby Center, Inc.*, 223 B.R. 275, 282 (S.D.N.Y 1998); *see also, e.g., In re GI Holdings*, 313 B.R. at 631 (court must decide whether the committee has asserted "claims for relief that on appropriate proof would support a recovery"); *Official Comm. v. Austin Fin. Serv. (In re KDI Holdings)*, 277 B.R. 493, 508 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing that the inquiry into whether a claim is colorable is similar to that undertaken on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); *In re iPCS, Inc.*, 297 B.R. 283, 291-92 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003) (same).

31. In addition, in the non-bankruptcy context, the District Court for this district has explained that "[t]he requirement of a 'colorable claim' means only that the plaintiff must have an 'arguable claim' and not that the plaintiff must be able to succeed on that claim." *Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.*, 207 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002).

32. This Court's analysis of whether the Valuation Proceeding sets forth a colorable claim is not a determination of whether the Court finds there is enough evidence presented. Rather, if on the face of the Valuation Complaint, there appears a plausible claim, then the Valuation Proceeding presents a colorable claim, and this Motion must be granted to allow Movants to file their Valuation Complaint.

33. In the First Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint, Movants seek disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and request an accounting. An equitable accounting is proper "when the facts and accounts presented are so complex that adequate relief may not be obtained at law."

Gooden v. Mackie, No. 4:19-CV-02948, 2020 WL 714291 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23 2020) (quoting *McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. 4:12-CV-02658, 2013 WL 5231486, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2013); *Bates Energy Oil & Gas v. Complete Oilfeld Servs.*, 361 F. Supp. 3d 633, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding an equitable accounting claim was sufficiently stated when was a party was less than forthcoming in providing information and the available information was insufficient to determine what was done with a party's money); *Phillips v. Estate of Poulin*, No. 03-05-00099-CV, 2007 WL 2980179, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin, Oct. 12, 2007, no pet.) (finding that an accounting order was appropriate where the facts are complex and when the plaintiff could not obtain adequate relief through standard discovery); *Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Dooley*, 884 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (finding that an accounting was necessary in order to determine the identity of the property or the amount of money owed to a party).

34. The requested disclosures and accounting are necessary due to the lack of transparency surrounding the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust. The Court has retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI. As set forth above and in the Valuation Complaint, Movants have concerns that those provisions are not being appropriately followed, and efforts to obtain the information necessary to confirm otherwise has been unavailable through discovery. As a result of the restrictions imposed on Movants, including Movants' inability, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Movants have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Movants become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Movants are in the dark regarding

the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought. Movants are unable to protect their own interests without an equitable accounting. Therefore, the First Claim for Relief sets forth a colorable claim.

35. The Second Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint sets forth Movants' request for a declaratory judgment regarding the value of Claimant Trust Assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations. When considering whether a valid declaratory judgment claim exists, a court must engage in a three-step inquiry. *Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe*, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000). The court must ask (1) whether an actual controversy exists between the parties, (2) whether the court has the authority to grant such declaratory relief; and (3) whether the court should exercise its "discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action." *Id*; *see also In re Fieldwood Energy LLC,* No. 20-33948, 2021 WL 4839321, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 15 2021) (seeking declaratory judgment regarding interpretation of a Plan and whether certain claims were discharged); *In re Think3, Inc.,* 529 B.R. 147, 206-07 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015) (sufficient actual controversy to bring a declaratory judgment action to assist with an early and prompt adjudication of claims and to promote judicial and party economy).

36. In this case, there can be no serious doubt that an actual controversy exists between the parties with respect to the relief sought, as the Debtor has already opposed the relief sought in the Valuation Complaint. Additionally, there is no dispute that the Court has the inherent power to grant the relief sought in the Proposed Complaint. Further, the third element is satisfied because this determination is important to the implementation of the Plan and distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims and Allowed Equity Interests. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at

recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close. In addition, such a determination by the Court could allow for a settlement that would cover the spread between current assets and obligations before that gap is further widened by the professional fees incurred by the Claimant Trust. Therefore, the Second Claim for Relief pleads a colorable claim.

37. Finally, in the Third Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint, Movants request a declaratory judgment and determination regarding the nature of their interests. As with the Second Claim for Relief, there is no serious dispute that an actual controversy exists between the parties and that the Court has the power to grant the relief requested. Additionally, the third element is satisfied because, in particular, in the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient to pay all Allowable Claims indefeasibly, Movants seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement. However, the requested determination would further assist parties in interest, such as Movants, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement. Therefore, the Third Claim for Relief pleads a colorable claim.

38. The equitable relief sought in the Valuation Proceeding certainly meets any iteration of the standard for what constitutes "a colorable claim of any kind." Instead of using the

information governing provisions of the Claimant Trust as a shield, HCMLP and the Claimant Trust are using them as a sword to enable continued litigation that ultimately provides no benefit to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or Movants as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests.

39. As set forth above, the Valuation Complaint seeks disclosure of information and an accounting that are related to the administration of the Plan and property to be distributed under the Plan, but not otherwise available to Movants. The Valuation Complaint also requests declaratory judgments within the Court's jurisdiction and relevant to the furtherance of the Bankruptcy Case. These claims are colorable, and this Motion for Leave should be granted.

WHEREFORE, Movants request the entry of an order i) granting this Motion for Leave; ii) determining that the Gatekeeping Provision is satisfied as applied to the Valuation Proceeding; and iii) authorizing Movants to file the Valuation Complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 5, 2023, Louis M. Phillips conferenced with counsel for Defendants, John Morris, regarding this motion. Counsel for Defendants was willing to stipulate that no gatekeeper motion was needed if Movants sought exactly the same relief as had been sought in their prior motion addressing these issues. Because the relief sought is better defined now, and to avoid further delay, in an excess of caution, Movants bring this motion. After filing, Movants will attempt to negotiate a resolution of this motion so that the Court can proceed directly to the merits.

/s/Deborah Deitsch-Perez
Deborah Deitsch-Perez

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 6, 2023, a true and correct copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/Deborah Deitsch-Perez
Deborah Deitsch-Perez

EXHIBIT A

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	Adversary Proceeding No. _____
vs.	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§	
Defendants.	§	

COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND (II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND (B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, the "Plaintiffs") file this adversary complaint (the "Complaint") against defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust," and collectively with HCMLP, the "Defendants"), seeking: (1) disclosures about and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of those assets; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs' interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[1] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

2. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or

[1] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Docket No. 1808].

nothing for the owners that built the company. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

3. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery, who he knew would approve his inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

4. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

5. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice. The estate had over $550 million in assets on the petition date, with far less in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

6. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[2]

7. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of 6/1/22 was:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[3]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[2] Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022, annexed hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, as is further detail about claims buyers.
[3] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

8. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

9. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the over the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

10. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." These transactions are particularly suspect because the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

11. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided that information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

12. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a $59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation now pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

13. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation, would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

14. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery.

15. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

16. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the "Bankruptcy Case") pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court").

18. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

19. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

20. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

21. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

22. Hunter Mountain is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

23. HCMLP is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

24. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

25. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), HCMLP, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

26. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCMLP had approximately $550 million in assets and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCMLP's reason for seeking

bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately $190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about $110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about $65 million, well below the expected $110 million,[4] and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

27. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "Committee"), and over the objection of HCMLP and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCMLP and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.[5] Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCMLP management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor's apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

28. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCMLP's general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage HCMLP during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

[4] Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid $78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about $13 million.

[5] For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, "The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what's going on with this debtor, with this debtor's management, this debtor's post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little do with this debtor." [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), Docket No. 181]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but "transparently vexatious," for allegedly having sued Moody's for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, Docket No. 1186].

a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

29. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately let the Debtor's professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management's spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally "Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board… But I'm concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they're smart, they're persuasive… they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it's really all about . . . Mr. Dondero." [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

30. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was "surprised that Judge Jones' or Judge Isgur's staff expressed that they had availability." Debtor's counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, "I'll take it from here." Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, "my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don't have meaningful time." [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals

who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

31. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

32. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the de facto leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCMLP's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

33. Indeed, Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, initially Mr. Seery reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

34. Yet despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the

plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

35. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as "vexatious litigants," emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a "transparently" vexatious litigant based pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled "vexatious" by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented in proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

36. In addition to the Debtor's mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions to hide the real value of the estate.

37. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HabourVest (which claims had initially been valued at $0) for $80 million, in order to acquire HarborVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), gain HarborVest's vote in favor of its Plan, and hide

the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at $22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth $40 million at the time and over $60 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

38. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCMLP's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

39. Worse still, while knowing that HCMLP had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCMLP's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

40. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCMLP, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to be willing to sell. Had the Debtor instead

fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

41. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

42. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately $200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

43. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, $250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and $90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this "success" to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of $30 million.

44. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs, appears to have exceeded $140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* Docket No. 3410-1.

45. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members' fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

46. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less that Mr. Dondero's written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court's indifference to the Debtor's complete failure to abide its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

47. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to

manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that could have been resolved with money left over for equity but for that manipulation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

48. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [Docket No. 1473], ¶ F(4).

49. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCMLP's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id.*

50. In the aggregate, HCMLP's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

51. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order") [Docket No. 1808] (the "Plan").

52. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

53. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy's Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

54. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

55. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

56. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

57. Based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

58. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCMLP became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

59. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed

> Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

60. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

61. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

62. In its Post Confirmation Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 2022 [Docket No. 3582], Debtor stated that it distributed $255,201,228 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 64% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of $387,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

63. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate as held in the Claimant Trust has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

64. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with $125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over $416 million, building a cash war chest of over $541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over $688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was $365 million, those claims were sold for about $150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero*, *et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, Docket No. 1 (as amended by Docket No. 158).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from $460 an hour for associates to $1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from $830 an hour for first year associate to over $2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.[6]

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

[6] To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February __, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

STINSON LLP

Draft

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EXHIBIT A-1

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EDWARD M. HELLER
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October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee") in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Debtor"). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors' Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee's Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over $550 million in assets and net $110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland's decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net $110 million arbitration award in favor of the "Redeemer Committee."[1] After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor's counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland's best interest.

[1] The "Redeemer Committee" was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the "Crusader Fund" that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[2] It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise . . . ." *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

[2] *See* Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[3] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors' committee to share information it receives with those who "hold claims of the kind represented by the committee" but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors' committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland's structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[4] This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor's counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[5] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

[3] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

[4] *See* Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[5] During a deposition, the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").[6] The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[6] Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at $22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of $40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.[7] Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),[8] nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.[9] That representation is untrue;

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and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating $300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be $0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to $80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

[7] Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

[8] *See* Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

[9] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.[10] If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[11] It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[12] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[13] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims[14]:

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[10] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

[11] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

[12] *See id.* at 22.

[13] *See* Appendix, p. A-25.

[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.[15] In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[16]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0[17]

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a $200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of $556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to $328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021.[18]

[15] A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

[16] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

[17] Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid $50 million for claims worth only $46.4 million. *See* Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between $472-600 million as opposed to $364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

[18] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by $100 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[19]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.[20] Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

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monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

19 *See* Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

20 *See* Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[21] We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

[21] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

> **In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.**

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;

d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement[22];

e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2

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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express
Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[1]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

[1] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).[2] At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[3]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[4]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

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[2] Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

[3] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[4] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[5] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[6]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[7] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[8] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

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[5] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

[6] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

[7] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

[8] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[9] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[10] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

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[9] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[10] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty $750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a "settlement" to obtain Mr. Daugherty's withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor's plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[11]

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately $75 billion under management. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining □2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

[11] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs.[12]

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[13] Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to $45 million in Class 8 claims and $35 million in Class 9 claims.[14] At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a $31.5 million return.[15]

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least $44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.[16] This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

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[12] Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than $7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the $15 million in legal fees).
[13] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[15] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $28 million.
[16] Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." *See* Ex. B.

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"[17] Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "'actual and necessary cost'" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."[18] It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[19] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[17] *See* Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
[18] *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).
[19] *See* Ex. C.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $600 million,[20] which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[21]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0

[20] *See* Ex. D.
[21] *See* Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16, 2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021).[22]
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of $236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[23]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than $100 million in claims on those trades.

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[22] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

[23] *See* Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The aggregate $150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[24] In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

[24] *See* Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange.The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[25] When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of $150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."[26] Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

[25] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[26] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[27] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between $472-$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between $150 and $232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least $460 million, including $105 million in cash and a $50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

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[27] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.[28]

- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.[29] The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.[30]

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

[28] Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.
[29] Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.
[30] Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.[31]

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.[32] Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[33] In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.[34] Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[35] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

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[31] 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
[32] The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.
[33] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.
[34] *Id.* at 26-28.
[35] *See id.* at 22.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a $6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.[36] In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.[37] If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. *See* 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

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[36] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[37] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;

- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay $18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and

- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP,	Case No. 19-34054-SGJ 11
Debtor	

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

PAGE	LINE
85	20

COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Each of the businesses will be a

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on when it is going to happen and what the restrictions either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the value of certain of the assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?

Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?

A. No.

Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?

A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

Q. Excuse me?

A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?

A. There is a semipublic market; yes.

Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?

A. It's available.

Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are not readily available

J. SEERY

markets; correct?

A. No.

Q. Those are operating businesses?

A. Correct.

Q. Who provided the valuation for the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for mark purposes and then we adjust it for plan purposes.

Q. And the adjustment was up or down?

A. When?

Q. For both November and January. You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I believe that for November we adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the top of my head but I believe both of them were adjusted down.

J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. That is the HarbourVest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP

Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No. 143717)
Ira D. Kharasch (CA Bar No. 109084)
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-and-

HAYWARD & ASSOCIATES PLLC

/s/ Zachery Z. Annable

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

UBS Settlement [Doc. 2200-1]

Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

R E C I T A L S

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**


SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia


Robert Holmgren


no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

GCM GROSVENOR

Grosvenor Capital Management

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS 32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.
John G. Hutchinson
John J. Lavelle
Martin B. Jackson
Sidley Austin LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019
(212) 839-5300 (tel)
(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!



https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More | Message

General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr

Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area

Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos

Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois

General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois

Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

EXHIBIT A-3

MUNSCH HARDT

DALLAS / HOUSTON / AUSTIN

Ross Tower
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
munsch.com
Direct Dial 214.855.7587
Direct Fax 214.978.5359
drukavina@munsch.com

May 11, 2022

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Eitel:

By way of follow-up to the letter Douglas Draper sent to your offices on October 4, 2021 and my letter dated November 3, 2021, I write to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor"). Those abuses, as detailed in our prior letters, include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to line the pockets of Debtor management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of stakeholders and third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds and in violation of investors' due process rights and various fiduciary duties and duties of candor to the Bankruptcy Court and all constituents. In particular, I write this letter to further detail:

1. Actions and omissions by the Debtor that have but a single apparent purpose: to spend the assets of the Highland estate to enrich those currently managing the estate at the expense of the business owners (the equity). Currently, the Highland estate has more than enough assets to pay 100% of the allowed creditors' claims. But doing so would deprive the current steward, Jim Seery, as well as his professional cohorts, the opportunity to reap tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in fees. This motivation explains the acts and omissions described below—all designed to prop up a façade that the post-confirmation bankruptcy machinations are necessary, and to avoid any scrutiny of that façade, and to foreclose any investigation into a contrary thesis.

2. The Debtor's intentional understatement of the value of the estate for personal gain, the gain of professionals, and the gain of affiliated or related secondary claims-buyers.

3. The failure to adhere to fiduciary duties to maximize the value of estate assets and failure to contest baseless proofs of claim to enable Highland to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern and to preserve value for all stakeholders.

4. The gross misuse of estate assets by the Debtor and Debtor professionals in pursuing baseless and stale claims against former insiders of the Debtor when the current value of the estate (over

$650 million with the recent completion of the MGM sale, which includes over $200 million in cash) greatly exceeds the estate's general unsecured claims ($410 million).

5. The failure of the Debtor's CRO and CEO, Jim Seery, to adhere to his fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate. As evidenced by the chart below, all general unsecured claims could have been resolved using $163 million of debtor cash and other liquidity. Instead, proofs of claim were inflated and sold to Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), which are both affiliates of Grosvenor (the largest investor in the Crusader Funds, which became the largest creditor in the bankruptcy). Mr. Seery has a long-standing relationship with Grosvenor and was appointed to the Independent Board (the board charged with managing the Debtor's estate) by the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, on which Grosvenor held five of nine seats.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0 ($65.0 net of other assets)
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 to $163.0**

As highlighted in the prior letters to your office and as further detailed herein, this is the type of systemic abuse of process that is something lawmakers and the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "EOUST") should be concerned about. Accordingly, we urge the EOUST to exercise its "broad administrative, regulatory, and litigation/enforcement authorities . . . to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders–debtors, creditors, and the public."[1] Specifically, we believe it would be appropriate for the EOUST to undertake an investigation to confirm the current value of the estate and to ensure that the claims currently being pursued by the Debtor are intended to benefit creditors of the estate, and not just to further enrich Debtor professionals and Debtor management.

BACKGROUND

The Players

James Dondero – co-founder of Highland in 1993. Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/ust.

Highland – Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Debtor. Highland is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as adviser to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

Strand – Strand Advisors, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The general partner of Highland.

The Independent Board – the managing board installed after Highland's bankruptcy filing. To avoid a protracted dispute, and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors of Strand, who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Pursuant to an agreement with the Creditors' Committee that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Dondero, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee each were permitted to choose one director. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James P. Seery, Jr.[2]

Creditors' Committee – On October 29, 2019, the bankruptcy court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which consisted of: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).

James P. Seery, Jr. – a member of the Independent Board, and the Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor. Beginning in March 2020, Mr. Seery ran day-to-day operations and negotiations with the Creditors' Committee, investors, and employees in return for compensation of $150,000 per month and generous incentives and stands to earn millions more for administering the Debtor's post-confirmation liquidation. Judge Nelms and John Dubel remained on the Independent Board, receiving weekly updates and modest compensation.

Acis – Acis Capital Management, L.P., a former affiliate of Highland. Acis is currently owned and controlled by Josh Terry, a former employee of Highland. Acis (Joshua Terry) was a member of Highland's Creditors' Committee.

UBS – UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively. UBS asserted claims against Highland arising out of a default on a 2008 warehouse lending facility (to which Highland was neither a party nor a guarantor). Highland had paid UBS twice for full releases of claims UBS asserted against Highland – approximately $110 million in 2008 and an additional $70.5 million via settlement with Barclays, the Crusader Funds, and Credit Strategies in June 2015. UBS was a member of the Creditors' Committee and appointed John Dubel to the Independent Board.

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[2] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

HarbourVest – HarbourVest Partners, LLC. HarbourVest is a private equity fund of funds and one of the largest private equity investment managers globally. HarbourVest has approximately $75 billion in assets under management. HabourVest has deep ties with Grosvenor and has jointly with Grosvenor sponsored 59 LBO transactions in the last two years.

The Crusader Funds – a group of Highland-managed funds formed between 2000 and 2002. During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their full investment plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been paid when made. Subsequently, when disputes regarding management of the Crusader Funds' liquidation arose, the Redeemer Committee instituted an arbitration against Highland, resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of approximately $190 million. Nonetheless, due to offsets and double-counting, the Debtor initially estimated the value of the Redeemer arbitration award at $105 million to $110 million. In a 9019 settlement with the Debtor, the Crusader Funds ultimately received allowed claims of $137 million, plus $17 million of sundry claims and retention of an interest in Cornerstone Healthcare Group, Inc., an acute-health-care company, valued at over $50 million. Notably, UBS objected to the Crusader Funds' 9019 settlement, arguing that the Redeemer arbitration award was actually worth much less—between $74 and $128 million. The Crusader Funds sold their allowed claims to Stonehill, in which Grosvenor is the largest investor. This sale to an affiliated fund without approval of other investors in the fund is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The Redeemer Committee – The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds was a group of investors in the Crusader Funds that oversaw the liquidation of the funds. The Redeemer Committee was comprised of nine members. Grosvenor held five seats. Concord held one seat.

Grosvenor – GCM Grosvenor is a global alternative asset management firm with over $59 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor has one of the largest operations in the Cayman Islands, with more than half of their assets under management originating through its Cayman operations. Unlike most firms operating in the Cayman Islands, Grosvenor has its own corporate and fiduciary services firm. This structure provides an additional layer of opacity to anonymous corporations from the British Virgin Islands (which includes significant Russian assets), Hong Kong (which includes significant Chinese assets), and Panama (which includes significant South American assets). As a registered investment adviser, Grosvenor must adhere to know-your-customer regulations, must report suspicious activities, and must not facilitate non-compliance or opacity. In 2020, Michael Saks and other insiders distributed all of Grosvenor's assets to shareholders and sold the firm to a SPAC originated by Cantor Fitzgerald.[3] In 2020, the equity market valued asset managers and financial-services firms at decade-high valuations. It makes little sense that Grosvenor would use the highly dilutive SPAC process (as opposed to engaging

[3] *See* https://www.wsj.com/articles/gcm-grosvenor-to-merge-with-cantor-fitzgerald-spac-11596456900. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently released a rule proposal that is focused on enhancing disclosure requirements around special purpose acquisition companies, including additional disclosures about SPAC sponsors, conflicts of interest and sources of dilution, business combination transactions between SPACs and private operating companies, and fairness of these transactions. *See* https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-proposes-enhanced-spac-disclosure-rule.

in a traditional IPO or other strategic-sale alternatives) unless such a structure was employed to avoid the diligence and management-liability tail inherent in more traditional processes.

Farallon – Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is a hedge fund that manages capital on behalf of institutions and individuals and was previously the largest hedge fund in the world. Farallon has approximately $27 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor is a significant investor in Farallon. Grosvenor and Farallon are further linked by Hellman & Friedman, LLC, an American private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman owned a stake in Grosvenor from 2007 until it went public in 2020 and seeded Farallon's initial capital.

Muck – Muck Holdings, LLC. Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon. Together with Jessup Holdings, LLC (described below)), Muck acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Stonehill – Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Stonehill provides portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles. It has approximately $3 billion in assets under management, which we have reason to believe includes approximately $1 billion from Grosvenor.

Jessup – Jessup Holdings, LLC. Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill. Together with Muck (Farallon), Stonehill acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Marc Kirschner/Teneo - The Debtor retained Marc Kirschner to pursue over $1 billion in claims against former insiders and affiliates of the Debtor despite the significant solvency of the estate ($650 million in assets versus $410 million in claims). Kirschner's bankruptcy restructuring firm was purchased by Teneo (which also purchased the restructuring practice of KPMG). Teneo is sponsored by LetterOne, a London-based private equity firm owned by Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. Fridman is also the primary investor in Concord Management, LLC ("Concord"), which held a position on the Redeemer Committee. During the resolution of a 2018 arbitration involving a Debtor-managed fund, the Highland Credit Strategies Fund, evidence emerged demonstrating that Concord was operating as an unregistered investment adviser of Russian money from Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest privately held bank and a key part of Fridman's Alfa Group Consortium. –That money that was funneled into BVI-domiciled shell companies into the Cayman Islands, then into various hedge funds and private equity funds in the U.S. Evidence of these activities was presented by the Debtor to Grosvenor, and the Debtor asked to have Concord removed from the Redeemer Committee. Concord was never removed. Concord is a large investor in Grosvenor. Grosvenor, in turn, is a large investor in Stonehill and Farallon.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved investors in the Crusader Funds. As explained above, a group of Crusader Funds investors sued after the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions during the financial crisis. That dispute resolved with the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors'

receiving a return of their investments plus a profit, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite the successful liquidation of the Crusader Funds, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

In view of the expected arbitration award and believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[4]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Creditors' Committee. At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[5]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of Strand. To avoid a protracted dispute and to

[4] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.
[5] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by the Independent Board.[6]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the independent directors, Mr. Seery. Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[7] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[8]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[9] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of

[6] Frank Waterhouse and Scott Ellington, Highland employees, remained as officers of Strand, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel, respectively.
[7] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.
[8] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.
[9] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[10] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate. This becomes all the more important when a debtor or an estate holds substantial assets through non-debtor subsidiaries or vehicles, as is the case here; hence, the purpose of Rule 2015.3.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee's Office did anything to ensure compliance. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below. Additionally, the lack of proper and accurate information and intentional hiding of material information led creditors to vote for the Debtor's plan and the Bankruptcy Court to confirm that plan which, we believe, would not have happened had the Debtor complied with its fiduciary and reporting duties.

As Mr. Draper and I have already highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[11] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-

[10] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).
[11] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

value determinations.[12] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

Despite these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[13]

Because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the Debtor to Quietly Sell Assets Without Observing Best Practices

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of Portola Pharma shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year).

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to the debtor (20% less than Mr. Dondero received in funds he managed).

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or

[12] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[13] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

outside stakeholders, resulting in a loss to the estate of over $10 million versus cost and $20 million versus fair market value.

- The Debtor "sold" interests in certain investments commonly referred to as PetroCap without engaging in a public sale process and without exploring any other method of liquidating the asset.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors. Equally as troubling, for certain similar sale transactions the Debtor *did* seek Bankruptcy Court approval, thus acknowledging that such approval was necessary or, at a minimum, that disclosures regarding non-estate asset sales are required.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the "Inner Circle" to Manipulate the Estate for Personal Gain

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic because the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months in the wake of the global pandemic. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 million impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). A Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-Debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. The Debtor's "inner circle" – the Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) – had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

Mr. Seery's compensation package encouraged, and the lack of transparency permitted, manipulation of the estate and settlement of creditors' claims at inflated amounts.

Upon his initial appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[14]

When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he his compensation package was handsomely improved. His base salary, which was on the verge of dropping to $30,000 per month, was increased ***retroactively*** back to March 15, 2020, to $150,000 per month. Additionally, his employment agreement contemplated a discretionary "Restructuring Fee"[15] that would be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a "Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and was intended to provide a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to steer Highland through the Chapter 11 case and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern.

Despite the structure of his compensation package, Mr. Seery saw greater value in aligning himself with creditors and the Creditors' Committee. To that end, he publicly alienated and maligned Mr. Dondero, and he found willing allies in the Creditors' Committee. The posturing also paved the way for Mr. Seery to bestow upon the hold-out creditors exorbitant settlements at the expense of equity and earn his Restructuring Fee. In fact, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee (both members of the Creditors' Committee),[16] leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS (also a member of the Creditors' Committee) claims to resolve. In other words, Mr. Seery had curried favor with two of the four members of the Creditors' Committee who would ultimately approve his Restructuring Fee and future compensation following plan consummation.

Ultimately, the confirmed Plan appointed Mr. Seery as the Claimant Trustee, which continued his compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary") and provided that the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery would negotiate additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[17] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably is (or will be) based on whether his liquidation of

[14] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[15] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.
[16] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 8, l. 24 – p. 9, l. 8.
[17] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

the estate outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee" and severance payment. In fact, during a deposition taken on October 21, 2021, Mr. Seery testified that he expected to make "a few million dollars a year" for each year during the years that he will take to liquidate the Debtor, although we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $650 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

Mr. Seery Enters into Inflated Settlements

Even before his appointment as CEO and CRO of the Debtor, Mr. Seery had effectively seized control of the Debtor as its *de facto* chief executive officer.[18] Thus, while he was in the process of negotiating his compensation agreement, he was simultaneously negotiating settlements with the remaining creditors to ensure he earned his Restructuring Fee, even if he did so at inflated amounts. One transaction that highlights this is the settlement with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee.

In connection with Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and CRO, the Debtor announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee. Even ***UBS***, one of the members of the Creditors' Committee, thought the settlement was inflated. In its objection to the Debtor's 9019 motion, UBS stated:[19]

> The Redeemer Claim is based on an Arbitration Award that required the Debtor, inter alia, to pay $118,929,666 (including prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees) in damages and to pay Redeemer $71,894,891 (including prejudgment interest) in exchange for all of Crusader's shares in Cornerstone. Pursuant to that same Arbitration Award, the Debtor also retained the right to receive $32,313,000 in Deferred Fees upon Crusader's liquidation. As shown below, after accounting for those reciprocal obligations to the Debtor and depending on the true value of the Cornerstone shares to be tendered (which is disputed), the actual value of the Arbitration Award to Redeemer is between $74,911,557 and $128,011,557.[3]
>
> Under the Proposed Settlement, however, Redeemer stands to gain far more because the Debtor has inexplicably agreed to release its rights to Crusader's Cornerstone shares and the Deferred Fees (with a combined value that could be as much as $115,913,000)—providing a substantial windfall to Redeemer. The Debtor has failed to provide sufficient information to permit this Court to meaningfully evaluate the true value of the Proposed Settlement, including the fair value of the Cornerstone shares, which it must do in order for this Court to have the information it needs to approve the Proposed Settlement. Depending on the valuation of the Cornerstone shares, the value of the Proposed Settlement to Redeemer may be as much as $253,609,610—which substantially exceeds the face amount of the Redeemer Claim.

[18] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 6, l. 18 – 22.
[19] *See* Dkt. 1190, p. 6 – 7.

In the meantime, other general unsecured creditors of the Debtor will receive a much lower percentage recovery than they would if those assets were instead transferred to the Debtor's estate, as required by the Arbitration Award, and evenly distributed among the Debtor's creditors. The Proposed Settlement is only in the best interests of Redeemer and, as such, it should be rejected.

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[3] The potential range of value attributable to the Cornerstone shares is significant because, according to the Debtor's liquidation analysis, the Debtor expects to have only $195 million total in value to distribute, and only $161 million to distribute to general unsecured creditors under its proposed plan. See Liquidation Analysis [Dkt. No. 1173-1]; First Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Dkt. No. 1079].

UBS was right. Mr. Seery agreed to a settlement that substantially overpaid the Redeemer Committee, and UBS only agreed to withdraw its objection and appeal of the Redeemer Committee's settlement when the Debtor bestowed upon UBS its own lavish settlement.[20]

It is worth noting that the Redeemer Committee ultimately sold its bankruptcy claim for $78 million in cash, but the sale excluded, and the Crusader Funds retained, its investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and certain non-cash consideration.[21] At the end of the day, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee cashed out of their bankruptcy claims for total consideration at the very least of $135 million, meaning they received 105% of the highest estimate (according to UBS) of the net amount of their arbitration award.[22]

The Inner Circle Doesn't Object to Inflated Settlements

Following the Bankruptcy Court's approval of settlements with Acis/Josh Terry and the Crusader Funds/the Redeemer Committee, Mr. Seery turned his attention to the two remaining critical holdouts: HarbourVest and UBS. HarbourVest, a private equity fund-of-funds with approximately $75 billion under management, had invested pre-bankruptcy $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO

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[20] *See* Dkt 2199. Under the terms of the UBS Settlement, UBS received a Class 8 claim in the amount of $65 million, a Class 9 claim in the amount of $60 million, a payment in cash of $18.5 million from a non-Debtor fund managed by the Debtor, and the Debtor's agreement to assist UBS in pursuing other claims against former Debtor affiliates related to a default on a credit facility during the Global Financial Crisis. Importantly, over the course of the preceding 11 years, UBS had already received payments totaling $180 million in connection with this dispute, and just prior to bankruptcy, UBS and the Debtor had reached a settlement in principle in which the Debtor would pay UBS just $7 million and $10 million in future business.

[21] *See* Exh. B.

[22] The estimation of a total recovery of $135 million includes attributing $48 million to the retained Cornerstone investment. The $48 million valuation equated to a ~45% interest in Cornerstone, which was valued pre-pandemic at approximately $107 million. Following COVID, Cornerstone's long-term acute care facilities flourished. Additionally, Cornerstone held a direct investment of over 800,000 shares in MGM, which was held on its books at approximately $72 per share. The per-share closing price on the sale of MGM to Amazon exceeded $164, which would have increased the company's valuation (irrespective of the post-COVID growth) by more than $70 million, bring Crusader Funds' windfall to more than $205 million.

Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called the Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining ~2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees.

Before Highland filed bankruptcy, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment into HCLOF because Highland allegedly failed to disclose facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry, which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs. In Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that the Debtor and Debtor's counsel initially argued was absurd. Indeed, Debtor management valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, which was consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[23] Nevertheless, as one of the final creditor claims to be resolved, Mr. Seery ultimately agreed to give HabourVest a $45 million Class 8 claim and a $35 million Class 9 claim.[24] At that time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive 71.32% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. Thus, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would result in HarbourVest receiving $32 million in cash.[25] The cash consideration was offset by HarbourVest's agreement to convey its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor (or its designee) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. In other words, from the outside looking in, the Debtor agreed to pay $9.5 million for a spurious claim.

Oddly enough, no creditors (other than former insiders) objected. What the inner circle presumably knew was that the settlement was actually a windfall for the Debtor. As we have previously detailed, the $22.5 million valuation of HCLOF that the Debtor utilized in seeking approval of the settlement was based upon September 2020 figures when the economy was still reeling from the pandemic. The value of that investment rebounded rapidly, particularly because of the pending MGM sale to Amazon that was disclosed to the Debtor but not the public (i.e., material non-public information). We have subsequently learned that the actual value of the HCLOF at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the HarbourVest settlement was at least $44 million—a value that Mr. Seery would have known but that was not disclosed to the Court or the public.

Likewise, there were no objections to the UBS settlement, which is puzzling. As detailed in the Debtor's 64-page objection to the UBS proof of claim and the Redeemer Committee's 431-page objection to the UBS proof of claim, UBS's claims against the Debtor were razor thin and largely foreclosed by res judicata and a settlement and release executed in connection with the June 2015 settlement. Moreover, the publicly available information indicated that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16,

[23] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[24] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[25] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $27 million.

2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021);[26]

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million from December 2020 to January 2021, with Class 8 claims ballooning $74 million in December to $267 million in January;

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for Class 8 Claims decreased from 87.44% to 71.32% in just a matter of months.

The Liquidation Analysis estimated total assets remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims to be $195 million, with general unsecured claims totaling $273 million. By the time the UBS settlement was presented to the court for approval, the allowed Class 8 Claims had increased to $309,345,000, reducing the distribution to Class 8 creditors to 62.99%. Surely significant creditors like the Redeemer Committee—whose projected distribution dropped from $119,527,515 when it voted for the Plan to $86,105,194 with the HarbourVest and UBS claims included—should have taken notice.

Mr. Seery Stacks the Oversight Board

As previously disclosed, we believe Mr. Seery facilitated the sale of the four largest claims in the estate to Farallon and Stonehill. Based upon conversations with representatives of Farallon, Mr. Seery contacted them directly to encourage their acquisition of claims in the bankruptcy estate.[27] We believe Mr. Seery did so by disclosing the true value of the estate versus what was publicly disclosed in court filings, demonstrating that there was substantial upside to the claims as compared to what was included in the Plan Analysis. For example, publicly available information at the time Farallon and Stonehill acquired the UBS claim indicated the purchase would have made no economic sense: the publicly disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Farallon and Stonehill would have lost money on the claim acquisition. We can only conclude Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), which based upon accurately disclosed financial statements would indicate they were likely to recover close to 100% on both Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

As set forth in the previous letters, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers Farallon, through Muck, and Stonehill, through Jessup. The four claims purchased by Farallon and Stonehill comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin, collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[26] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473].

[27] We believe Mr. Seery made similar calls to representatives of Stonehill. We are informed and believe that Mr. Seery has long-standing relationships with both Farallon and Stonehill.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,696,610**	**$95,000,000**	

From the information we have been able to gather, it appears that Stonehill and Farallon purchased these claims for the following amounts:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[28]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	$270.0	$95.0		$150.0 - $165.0

As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) are overseeing the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth below, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $650 million and has approximately $200 million in cash, which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million. Thus, it is a warranted and logical deduction that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. As set forth in previous letters, there are three primary reasons to believe this:

- The scant publicly available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that was actually publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims; and
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

For example, consider the sale of the Crusader Funds' claims, which we *know* was sold for $78 million. Based upon the publicly available information at the time of the acquisition, the expected distribution would have been $86 million. Surely a sophisticated hedge fund would not invest $78 million in a particularly contentious bankruptcy if it believed its maximum return was $86 million years later.

[28] Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

Ultimately, the Plan, Mr. Seery's compensation package, and the lack of transparency to everyone other than the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee permitted Debtor management and the Creditors' Committee to support grossly inflated claims (at the expense of residual stakeholders) in a grossly understated estate, which facilitated the sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In doing so, Mr. Seery installed on the Reorganized Debtor's Oversight Board friendly faces who stand to make $370 million on ~$150 million investment. And Mr. Seery's plan has already worked. Notably, while the confirmed Plan was characterized by the Debtor as a monetization plan,[29] the newly installed Oversight Board supported, and the Court approved, paying Mr. Seery the much more lucrative Case Resolution Fee, netting Mr. Seery $1.5 million more than he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.

In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

	Value as of Aug. 2021		**March 2022 High Estimate updated for MGM closing**
Asset	**Low**	**High**	
Cash as of 4/25/22	$17.9	$17.9	
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0	
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0	
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0	
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2	
Park West Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
HCLOF trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0	
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**	**$200**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0	$25.0
HCLOF	$40.0	$40.0	$20.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0	$30.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0	$0.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0	$30.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0	$20.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0	$10.0

[29] See Dkt. 194., p.5.

Highland Restoration Capital Partners			
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**	**$645.0**

The Bankruptcy Professionals are Draining the Estate

Yet another troubling aspect of the Highland bankruptcy has been the rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the Estate, largely through invented, unnecessary, and greatly overstaffed and overworked offensive litigation. The sums expended between case filing and the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") are staggering:

Professional	**Fees**	**Expenses**
Hunton Andrews Kurth	$1,147,059.42	$2,747.84
FTI Consulting, Inc.	$6,176,551.20	$39,122.91
Teneo Capital, LLC	$1,221,468.75	$6,257.07
Marc Kirschner	$137,096.77	
Sidley Austin LLP	$13,134,805.20	$211,841.25
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	$23,978,627.25	$334,232.95
Mercer (US) Inc.	$202,317.65	$2,449.37
Deloitte Tax LLP	$553,412.60	
Development Specialists, Inc.	$5,562,531.12	$206,609.54
James Seery[30]	$5,100,000.00	
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP		
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP	$2,645,729.72	$5,207.53
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC	$2,054,716.00	
Foley & Lardner LLP	$629,088.00	
Casey Olsen Cayman Limited	$280,264.00	
ASW Law Limited	$4,976.00	
Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc.	$766,397.00	
Berger Harris, LLP		
Hayward PLLC	$825,629.50	$46,482.92
	$64,420,670.18	**$854,951.38**
Total Fees and Expenses		**$65,275,621.56**

"The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees sought." *In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co.*, 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).

[30] This amount includes Mr. Seery's success fee, which was paid a month following the Effective Date.

The rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the estate is in stark contrast to the treatment of the employees who stayed with the Debtor (without a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive program) on the promise they would be made whole for prepetition deferred compensation that had not yet vested, only to be stiffed and summarily terminated. Even worse, some of these employees have been targeted by the litigation sub-trust for acts they took in the course and scope of their employment.

Following the Effective Date, siphoning of estate assets continues. Mr. Seery still receives base compensation of $150,000 per month, and he expects to receive compensation of at least "a few million dollars a year" according to his own deposition testimony. In addition, his retention was conditioned upon receiving a to-be-negotiated success fee and severance payment (notably, none of which is disclosed publicly).

Likewise, Teneo Capital, LLC was retained as the litigation adviser. For its services post-Effective Date, it is compensated $20,000 per month for Mr. Kirschner as trustee for the Litigation Subtrust, plus the regularly hourly fees of any additional Teneo personnel, plus a "Litigation Recovery Fee." The Litigation Recovery Fee is equal to 1.5% of Net Litigation Proceeds up to $100 million and 2.0% of Net Litigation Proceeds above. Interestingly, although "Net Litigation Proceeds" is defined as gross litigation proceeds less certain fees incurred in pursing the litigation, net proceeds are not reduced by Mr. Kirschner's monthly fee, contingency fees charged by any other professionals, or litigation funding financing. Moreover, Teneo is given credit for any litigation recoveries regardless of whether those recoveries stem from actions commenced by the litigation trustee. The Debtor has not disclosed, and is not required to disclose, the terms upon which any professionals have been engaged following the Effective Date, including Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for the Litigation Subtrust. Based upon pre-Effective Date monthly expenses, the number of lawyers that attend various matters on behalf of the Debtor,[31] and the addition of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Teneo, we believe the Debtor could be spending as much as $5-$7 million per month.

The Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust recently filed heavily redacted, quarterly post-confirmation reports.[32] Of note, the Reorganized Debtor disclosed that it has disbursed $81,983,611 since the Effective Date but disclosed that it has only paid $47,793 in priority claims and $6,918,473 in general unsecured claims, while still estimating a total recovery to general unsecured claims of $205,144,544. The Highland Claimant Trust disclosed that it has disbursed an additional $7,152,331 since the Effective Date.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an extreme example of the abuses that can occur if the federal bench, federal government appointees, and federal lawmakers do not police federal bankruptcy proceedings by

[31] In connection with a recent two-day trial on an administrative claim, the Debtor was represented by John Morris ($1,245.00 per hour), Greg Demo ($950 per hour), and Hayley Winograd ($695 per hour), and was assisted by paralegal La Asia Canty ($460 per hour). The Debtor's local counsel, Zachery Annable ($300 per hour), was also present, and Jeffrey Pomerantz ($1,295 per hour) observed the trial via WebEx. Despite the army of lawyers, Mr. Morris handled virtually the entire proceeding, with Ms. Winograd examining only two small witnesses. Messrs. Pomerantz, Demo, and Annable played no active role in the proceedings.

[32] Dkt 3325 and 3326.

permitting debtors-in-possession to hide material information, violate duties of transparency and candor, and manipulate information and transactions to benefit disclosed and undisclosed insiders or "friends" of insiders. Bankruptcy should not be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. We therefore encourage your office to investigate the problems inherent in the Highland bankruptcy. At a minimum, we ask that the EOUST seek orders from the Bankruptcy Court compelling the Debtor to undertake the following actions:

1. turn over all financial reports that should have been disclosed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, including 2015.3 reports;

2. provide a detailed disclosure of the assets Reorganized Debtor;

3. provide a copy of the executed Claimant Trust Agreement, which should already have been disclosed;

4. disclose all solvency analyses prepared by the Debtor; and

5. provide copies of all agreements for the engagement of Debtor professionals post-confirmation, including the terms of Mr. Seery's success fee and severance agreement, compensation agreements for personnel of the Reorganized Debtor, and the fee arrangement with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

Sincerely,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:

EXHIBIT A

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Counsel for Plaintiffs the Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	Adversary Proceeding No. _____
vs.	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§	
Defendants.	§	

COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND (II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND (B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, the "Plaintiffs") file this adversary complaint (the "Complaint") against defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust," and collectively with HCMLP, the "Defendants"), seeking: (1) disclosures about and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of those assets; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs' interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[1] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

2. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or

[1] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Docket No. 1808].

nothing for the owners that built the company. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

3. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery, who he knew would approve his inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

4. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

5. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice. The estate had over $550 million in assets on the petition date, with far less in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

6. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[2]

7. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of 6/1/22 was:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[3]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[2] Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022, annexed hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, as is further detail about claims buyers.
[3] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

8. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

9. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the over the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

10. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." These transactions are particularly suspect because the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

11. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided that information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

12. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a $59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation now pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

13. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation, would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

14. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery.

15. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

16. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the "Bankruptcy Case") pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court").

18. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

19. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

20. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

21. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

22. Hunter Mountain is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

23. HCMLP is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

24. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

25. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), HCMLP, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

26. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCMLP had approximately $550 million in assets and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCMLP's reason for seeking

bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately $190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about $110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about $65 million, well below the expected $110 million,[4] and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

27. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "Committee"), and over the objection of HCMLP and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCMLP and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.[5] Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCMLP management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor's apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

28. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCMLP's general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage HCMLP during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

[4] Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid $78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about $13 million.

[5] For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, "The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what's going on with this debtor, with this debtor's management, this debtor's post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little do with this debtor." [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), Docket No. 181]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but "transparently vexatious," for allegedly having sued Moody's for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, Docket No. 1186].

a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

29. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately let the Debtor's professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management's spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally "Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board… But I'm concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they're smart, they're persuasive… they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it's really all about . . . Mr. Dondero." [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

30. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was "surprised that Judge Jones' or Judge Isgur's staff expressed that they had availability." Debtor's counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, "I'll take it from here." Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, "my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don't have meaningful time." [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals

who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

31. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

32. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the de facto leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCMLP's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

33. Indeed, Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, initially Mr. Seery reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

34. Yet despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the

plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

35. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as "vexatious litigants," emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a "transparently" vexatious litigant based pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled "vexatious" by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented in proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

36. In addition to the Debtor's mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions to hide the real value of the estate.

37. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HabourVest (which claims had initially been valued at $0) for $80 million, in order to acquire HarborVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), gain HarborVest's vote in favor of its Plan, and hide

the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at $22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth $40 million at the time and over $60 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

38. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCMLP's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

39. Worse still, while knowing that HCMLP had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCMLP's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

40. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCMLP, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to be willing to sell. Had the Debtor instead

fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

41. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

42. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately $200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

43. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, $250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and $90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this "success" to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of $30 million.

44. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs, appears to have exceeded $140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* Docket No. 3410-1.

45. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members' fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

46. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less that Mr. Dondero's written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court's indifference to the Debtor's complete failure to abide its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

47. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to

manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that could have been resolved with money left over for equity but for that manipulation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

48. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [Docket No. 1473], ¶ F(4).

49. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCMLP's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id.*

50. In the aggregate, HCMLP's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

51. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order") [Docket No. 1808] (the "Plan").

52. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

53. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy's Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

54. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

55. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

56. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

57. Based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

58. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCMLP became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

59. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed

> Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

60. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

61. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

62. In its Post Confirmation Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 2022 [Docket No. 3582], Debtor stated that it distributed $255,201,228 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 64% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of $387,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

63. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate as held in the Claimant Trust has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

64. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with $125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over $416 million, building a cash war chest of over $541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over $688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was $365 million, those claims were sold for about $150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero*, *et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, Docket No. 1 (as amended by Docket No. 158).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from $460 an hour for associates to $1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from $830 an hour for first year associate to over $2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.[6]

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

[6] To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February __, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

STINSON LLP

Draft

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EXHIBIT A-1

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EDWARD M. HELLER
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October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee") in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Debtor"). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors' Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee's Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over $550 million in assets and net $110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland's decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net $110 million arbitration award in favor of the "Redeemer Committee."[1] After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor's counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland's best interest.

[1] The "Redeemer Committee" was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the "Crusader Fund" that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[2] It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise . . . ." *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

[2] *See* Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[3] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors' committee to share information it receives with those who "hold claims of the kind represented by the committee" but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors' committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland's structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[4] This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor's counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[5] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

[3] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

[4] *See* Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[5] During a deposition, the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").[6] The Debtor's motion to settle the

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below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[6] Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at $22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of $40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.[7] Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),[8] nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.[9] That representation is untrue;

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and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating $300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be $0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to $80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

[7] Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

[8] *See* Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

[9] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.[10] If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[11] It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[12] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[13] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims[14]:

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[10] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

[11] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

[12] *See id.* at 22.

[13] *See* Appendix, p. A-25.

[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.[15] In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[16]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0[17]

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a $200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of $556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to $328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021.[18]

[15] A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

[16] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

[17] Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid $50 million for claims worth only $46.4 million. *See* Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between $472-600 million as opposed to $364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

[18] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by $100 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[19]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.[20] Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

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monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

19 *See* Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

20 *See* Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[21] We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

[21] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

> **In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.**

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;

d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement[22];

e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2

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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express
Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
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Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[1]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

[1] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).[2] At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[3]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[4]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

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[2] Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

[3] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[4] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[5] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[6]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[7] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[8] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

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[5] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

[6] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

[7] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

[8] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[9] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[10] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

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[9] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[10] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty $750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a "settlement" to obtain Mr. Daugherty's withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor's plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[11]

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately $75 billion under management. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining □2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

[11] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs.[12]

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[13] Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to $45 million in Class 8 claims and $35 million in Class 9 claims.[14] At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a $31.5 million return.[15]

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least $44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.[16] This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

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[12] Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than $7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the $15 million in legal fees).
[13] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[15] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $28 million.
[16] Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." *See* Ex. B.

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"[17] Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "'actual and necessary cost'" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."[18] It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[19] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[17] *See* Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
[18] *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).
[19] *See* Ex. C.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $600 million,[20] which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[21]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0

[20] *See* Ex. D.
[21] *See* Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16, 2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021).[22]
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of $236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[23]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than $100 million in claims on those trades.

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[22] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

[23] *See* Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The aggregate $150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[24] In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

[24] *See* Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange.The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[25] When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of $150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."[26] Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

[25] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[26] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[27] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between $472-$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between $150 and $232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least $460 million, including $105 million in cash and a $50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

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[27] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.[28]

- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.[29] The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.[30]

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

[28] Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.
[29] Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.
[30] Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.[31]

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.[32] Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[33] In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.[34] Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[35] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

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[31] 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
[32] The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.
[33] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.
[34] *Id.* at 26-28.
[35] *See id.* at 22.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a $6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.[36] In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.[37] If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. *See* 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

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[36] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[37] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;

- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay $18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and

- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

In Re: Chapter 11

HIGHLAND CAPITAL Case No.

MANAGEMENT, LP, 19-34054-SGJ 11

Debtor

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

PAGE	LINE
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COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

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J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

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J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

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J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

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J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Each of the businesses will be a

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on when it is going to happen and what the restrictions either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the value of certain of the assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

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J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?
Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?
A. No.
Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?
A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --
Q. Excuse me?
A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.
Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?
A. There is a semipublic market; yes.
Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?
A. It's available.
Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Those are not readily available

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J. SEERY

markets; correct?
A. No.
Q. Those are operating businesses?
A. Correct.
Q. Who provided the valuation for the November 2020 liquidation analysis?
A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for mark purposes and then we adjust it for plan purposes.
Q. And the adjustment was up or down?
A. When?
Q. For both November and January. You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.
A. I believe that for November we adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the top of my head but I believe both of them were adjusted down.

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J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.
A. I didn't say that.
Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?
A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.
Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

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J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.
A. Correct.
Q. That is the HarbourVest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.
Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?
A. A change in the plan value of the assets.
Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.
A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

UBS Settlement [Doc. 2200-1]

Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**

SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia

Robert Holmgren

no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

GCM GROSVENOR

Grosvenor Capital Management

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS 32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.
John G. Hutchinson
John J. Lavelle
Martin B. Jackson
Sidley Austin LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019
(212) 839-5300 (tel)
(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!

Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More | Message

Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him) · 3rd

General Counsel

Winnetka, Illinois, United States · Contact info

500+ connections

Message | More

Yale Law School

Open to work
Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel roles
See all details

About

I have over 38 years of experience representing participants in the investment management industry with respect to a wide range of legal and regulatory matters, including SEC, DOL, FINRA, and NFA regulations and examinations. ... see more

Activity

522 followers

Posts Joseph H. created, shared, or commented on in the last 90 days are displayed here.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/


Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel
More
Message
General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr
Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area
Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos
Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos
Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois
General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois
Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

EXHIBIT A-3

MUNSCH HARDT

DALLAS / HOUSTON / AUSTIN

Ross Tower
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
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drukavina@munsch.com

May 11, 2022

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Eitel:

By way of follow-up to the letter Douglas Draper sent to your offices on October 4, 2021 and my letter dated November 3, 2021, I write to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor"). Those abuses, as detailed in our prior letters, include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to line the pockets of Debtor management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of stakeholders and third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds and in violation of investors' due process rights and various fiduciary duties and duties of candor to the Bankruptcy Court and all constituents. In particular, I write this letter to further detail:

1. Actions and omissions by the Debtor that have but a single apparent purpose: to spend the assets of the Highland estate to enrich those currently managing the estate at the expense of the business owners (the equity). Currently, the Highland estate has more than enough assets to pay 100% of the allowed creditors' claims. But doing so would deprive the current steward, Jim Seery, as well as his professional cohorts, the opportunity to reap tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in fees. This motivation explains the acts and omissions described below—all designed to prop up a façade that the post-confirmation bankruptcy machinations are necessary, and to avoid any scrutiny of that façade, and to foreclose any investigation into a contrary thesis.

2. The Debtor's intentional understatement of the value of the estate for personal gain, the gain of professionals, and the gain of affiliated or related secondary claims-buyers.

3. The failure to adhere to fiduciary duties to maximize the value of estate assets and failure to contest baseless proofs of claim to enable Highland to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern and to preserve value for all stakeholders.

4. The gross misuse of estate assets by the Debtor and Debtor professionals in pursuing baseless and stale claims against former insiders of the Debtor when the current value of the estate (over

$650 million with the recent completion of the MGM sale, which includes over $200 million in cash) greatly exceeds the estate's general unsecured claims ($410 million).

5. The failure of the Debtor's CRO and CEO, Jim Seery, to adhere to his fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate. As evidenced by the chart below, all general unsecured claims could have been resolved using $163 million of debtor cash and other liquidity. Instead, proofs of claim were inflated and sold to Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), which are both affiliates of Grosvenor (the largest investor in the Crusader Funds, which became the largest creditor in the bankruptcy). Mr. Seery has a long-standing relationship with Grosvenor and was appointed to the Independent Board (the board charged with managing the Debtor's estate) by the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, on which Grosvenor held five of nine seats.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0 ($65.0 net of other assets)
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 to $163.0**

As highlighted in the prior letters to your office and as further detailed herein, this is the type of systemic abuse of process that is something lawmakers and the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "EOUST") should be concerned about. Accordingly, we urge the EOUST to exercise its "broad administrative, regulatory, and litigation/enforcement authorities . . . to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders–debtors, creditors, and the public."[1] Specifically, we believe it would be appropriate for the EOUST to undertake an investigation to confirm the current value of the estate and to ensure that the claims currently being pursued by the Debtor are intended to benefit creditors of the estate, and not just to further enrich Debtor professionals and Debtor management.

BACKGROUND

The Players

James Dondero – co-founder of Highland in 1993. Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/ust.

Highland – Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Debtor. Highland is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as adviser to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

Strand – Strand Advisors, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The general partner of Highland.

The Independent Board – the managing board installed after Highland's bankruptcy filing. To avoid a protracted dispute, and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors of Strand, who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Pursuant to an agreement with the Creditors' Committee that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Dondero, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee each were permitted to choose one director. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James P. Seery, Jr.[2]

Creditors' Committee – On October 29, 2019, the bankruptcy court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which consisted of: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).

James P. Seery, Jr. – a member of the Independent Board, and the Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor. Beginning in March 2020, Mr. Seery ran day-to-day operations and negotiations with the Creditors' Committee, investors, and employees in return for compensation of $150,000 per month and generous incentives and stands to earn millions more for administering the Debtor's post-confirmation liquidation. Judge Nelms and John Dubel remained on the Independent Board, receiving weekly updates and modest compensation.

Acis – Acis Capital Management, L.P., a former affiliate of Highland. Acis is currently owned and controlled by Josh Terry, a former employee of Highland. Acis (Joshua Terry) was a member of Highland's Creditors' Committee.

UBS – UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively. UBS asserted claims against Highland arising out of a default on a 2008 warehouse lending facility (to which Highland was neither a party nor a guarantor). Highland had paid UBS twice for full releases of claims UBS asserted against Highland – approximately $110 million in 2008 and an additional $70.5 million via settlement with Barclays, the Crusader Funds, and Credit Strategies in June 2015. UBS was a member of the Creditors' Committee and appointed John Dubel to the Independent Board.

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[2] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

HarbourVest – HarbourVest Partners, LLC. HarbourVest is a private equity fund of funds and one of the largest private equity investment managers globally. HarbourVest has approximately $75 billion in assets under management. HabourVest has deep ties with Grosvenor and has jointly with Grosvenor sponsored 59 LBO transactions in the last two years.

The Crusader Funds – a group of Highland-managed funds formed between 2000 and 2002. During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their full investment plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been paid when made. Subsequently, when disputes regarding management of the Crusader Funds' liquidation arose, the Redeemer Committee instituted an arbitration against Highland, resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of approximately $190 million. Nonetheless, due to offsets and double-counting, the Debtor initially estimated the value of the Redeemer arbitration award at $105 million to $110 million. In a 9019 settlement with the Debtor, the Crusader Funds ultimately received allowed claims of $137 million, plus $17 million of sundry claims and retention of an interest in Cornerstone Healthcare Group, Inc., an acute-health-care company, valued at over $50 million. Notably, UBS objected to the Crusader Funds' 9019 settlement, arguing that the Redeemer arbitration award was actually worth much less—between $74 and $128 million. The Crusader Funds sold their allowed claims to Stonehill, in which Grosvenor is the largest investor. This sale to an affiliated fund without approval of other investors in the fund is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The Redeemer Committee – The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds was a group of investors in the Crusader Funds that oversaw the liquidation of the funds. The Redeemer Committee was comprised of nine members. Grosvenor held five seats. Concord held one seat.

Grosvenor – GCM Grosvenor is a global alternative asset management firm with over $59 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor has one of the largest operations in the Cayman Islands, with more than half of their assets under management originating through its Cayman operations. Unlike most firms operating in the Cayman Islands, Grosvenor has its own corporate and fiduciary services firm. This structure provides an additional layer of opacity to anonymous corporations from the British Virgin Islands (which includes significant Russian assets), Hong Kong (which includes significant Chinese assets), and Panama (which includes significant South American assets). As a registered investment adviser, Grosvenor must adhere to know-your-customer regulations, must report suspicious activities, and must not facilitate non-compliance or opacity. In 2020, Michael Saks and other insiders distributed all of Grosvenor's assets to shareholders and sold the firm to a SPAC originated by Cantor Fitzgerald.[3] In 2020, the equity market valued asset managers and financial-services firms at decade-high valuations. It makes little sense that Grosvenor would use the highly dilutive SPAC process (as opposed to engaging

[3] *See* https://www.wsj.com/articles/gcm-grosvenor-to-merge-with-cantor-fitzgerald-spac-11596456900. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently released a rule proposal that is focused on enhancing disclosure requirements around special purpose acquisition companies, including additional disclosures about SPAC sponsors, conflicts of interest and sources of dilution, business combination transactions between SPACs and private operating companies, and fairness of these transactions. *See* https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-proposes-enhanced-spac-disclosure-rule.

in a traditional IPO or other strategic-sale alternatives) unless such a structure was employed to avoid the diligence and management-liability tail inherent in more traditional processes.

Farallon – Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is a hedge fund that manages capital on behalf of institutions and individuals and was previously the largest hedge fund in the world. Farallon has approximately $27 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor is a significant investor in Farallon. Grosvenor and Farallon are further linked by Hellman & Friedman, LLC, an American private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman owned a stake in Grosvenor from 2007 until it went public in 2020 and seeded Farallon's initial capital.

Muck – Muck Holdings, LLC. Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon. Together with Jessup Holdings, LLC (described below)), Muck acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Stonehill – Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Stonehill provides portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles. It has approximately $3 billion in assets under management, which we have reason to believe includes approximately $1 billion from Grosvenor.

Jessup – Jessup Holdings, LLC. Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill. Together with Muck (Farallon), Stonehill acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Marc Kirschner/Teneo - The Debtor retained Marc Kirschner to pursue over $1 billion in claims against former insiders and affiliates of the Debtor despite the significant solvency of the estate ($650 million in assets versus $410 million in claims). Kirschner's bankruptcy restructuring firm was purchased by Teneo (which also purchased the restructuring practice of KPMG). Teneo is sponsored by LetterOne, a London-based private equity firm owned by Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. Fridman is also the primary investor in Concord Management, LLC ("Concord"), which held a position on the Redeemer Committee. During the resolution of a 2018 arbitration involving a Debtor-managed fund, the Highland Credit Strategies Fund, evidence emerged demonstrating that Concord was operating as an unregistered investment adviser of Russian money from Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest privately held bank and a key part of Fridman's Alfa Group Consortium. –That money that was funneled into BVI-domiciled shell companies into the Cayman Islands, then into various hedge funds and private equity funds in the U.S. Evidence of these activities was presented by the Debtor to Grosvenor, and the Debtor asked to have Concord removed from the Redeemer Committee. Concord was never removed. Concord is a large investor in Grosvenor. Grosvenor, in turn, is a large investor in Stonehill and Farallon.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved investors in the Crusader Funds. As explained above, a group of Crusader Funds investors sued after the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions during the financial crisis. That dispute resolved with the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors'

receiving a return of their investments plus a profit, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite the successful liquidation of the Crusader Funds, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

In view of the expected arbitration award and believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[4]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Creditors' Committee. At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[5]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of Strand. To avoid a protracted dispute and to

[4] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.
[5] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by the Independent Board.[6]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the independent directors, Mr. Seery. Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[7] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[8]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[9] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of

[6] Frank Waterhouse and Scott Ellington, Highland employees, remained as officers of Strand, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel, respectively.
[7] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.
[8] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.
[9] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[10] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate. This becomes all the more important when a debtor or an estate holds substantial assets through non-debtor subsidiaries or vehicles, as is the case here; hence, the purpose of Rule 2015.3.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee's Office did anything to ensure compliance. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below. Additionally, the lack of proper and accurate information and intentional hiding of material information led creditors to vote for the Debtor's plan and the Bankruptcy Court to confirm that plan which, we believe, would not have happened had the Debtor complied with its fiduciary and reporting duties.

As Mr. Draper and I have already highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[11] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-

[10] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).
[11] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

value determinations.[12] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

Despite these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[13]

Because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the Debtor to Quietly Sell Assets Without Observing Best Practices

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of Portola Pharma shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year).

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to the debtor (20% less than Mr. Dondero received in funds he managed).

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or

[12] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[13] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

outside stakeholders, resulting in a loss to the estate of over $10 million versus cost and $20 million versus fair market value.

- The Debtor "sold" interests in certain investments commonly referred to as PetroCap without engaging in a public sale process and without exploring any other method of liquidating the asset.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors. Equally as troubling, for certain similar sale transactions the Debtor *did* seek Bankruptcy Court approval, thus acknowledging that such approval was necessary or, at a minimum, that disclosures regarding non-estate asset sales are required.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the "Inner Circle" to Manipulate the Estate for Personal Gain

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic because the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months in the wake of the global pandemic. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 million impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). A Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-Debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. The Debtor's "inner circle" – the Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) – had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

Mr. Seery's compensation package encouraged, and the lack of transparency permitted, manipulation of the estate and settlement of creditors' claims at inflated amounts.

Upon his initial appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[14]

When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he his compensation package was handsomely improved. His base salary, which was on the verge of dropping to $30,000 per month, was increased ***retroactively*** back to March 15, 2020, to $150,000 per month. Additionally, his employment agreement contemplated a discretionary "Restructuring Fee"[15] that would be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a "Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and was intended to provide a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to steer Highland through the Chapter 11 case and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern.

Despite the structure of his compensation package, Mr. Seery saw greater value in aligning himself with creditors and the Creditors' Committee. To that end, he publicly alienated and maligned Mr. Dondero, and he found willing allies in the Creditors' Committee. The posturing also paved the way for Mr. Seery to bestow upon the hold-out creditors exorbitant settlements at the expense of equity and earn his Restructuring Fee. In fact, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee (both members of the Creditors' Committee),[16] leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS (also a member of the Creditors' Committee) claims to resolve. In other words, Mr. Seery had curried favor with two of the four members of the Creditors' Committee who would ultimately approve his Restructuring Fee and future compensation following plan consummation.

Ultimately, the confirmed Plan appointed Mr. Seery as the Claimant Trustee, which continued his compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary") and provided that the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery would negotiate additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[17] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably is (or will be) based on whether his liquidation of

[14] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[15] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.
[16] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 8, l. 24 – p. 9, l. 8.
[17] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

the estate outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee" and severance payment. In fact, during a deposition taken on October 21, 2021, Mr. Seery testified that he expected to make "a few million dollars a year" for each year during the years that he will take to liquidate the Debtor, although we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $650 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

Mr. Seery Enters into Inflated Settlements

Even before his appointment as CEO and CRO of the Debtor, Mr. Seery had effectively seized control of the Debtor as its *de facto* chief executive officer.[18] Thus, while he was in the process of negotiating his compensation agreement, he was simultaneously negotiating settlements with the remaining creditors to ensure he earned his Restructuring Fee, even if he did so at inflated amounts. One transaction that highlights this is the settlement with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee.

In connection with Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and CRO, the Debtor announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee. Even ***UBS***, one of the members of the Creditors' Committee, thought the settlement was inflated. In its objection to the Debtor's 9019 motion, UBS stated:[19]

> The Redeemer Claim is based on an Arbitration Award that required the Debtor, inter alia, to pay $118,929,666 (including prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees) in damages and to pay Redeemer $71,894,891 (including prejudgment interest) in exchange for all of Crusader's shares in Cornerstone. Pursuant to that same Arbitration Award, the Debtor also retained the right to receive $32,313,000 in Deferred Fees upon Crusader's liquidation. As shown below, after accounting for those reciprocal obligations to the Debtor and depending on the true value of the Cornerstone shares to be tendered (which is disputed), the actual value of the Arbitration Award to Redeemer is between $74,911,557 and $128,011,557.[3]
>
> Under the Proposed Settlement, however, Redeemer stands to gain far more because the Debtor has inexplicably agreed to release its rights to Crusader's Cornerstone shares and the Deferred Fees (with a combined value that could be as much as $115,913,000)—providing a substantial windfall to Redeemer. The Debtor has failed to provide sufficient information to permit this Court to meaningfully evaluate the true value of the Proposed Settlement, including the fair value of the Cornerstone shares, which it must do in order for this Court to have the information it needs to approve the Proposed Settlement. Depending on the valuation of the Cornerstone shares, the value of the Proposed Settlement to Redeemer may be as much as $253,609,610—which substantially exceeds the face amount of the Redeemer Claim.

[18] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 6, l. 18 – 22.
[19] *See* Dkt. 1190, p. 6 – 7.

In the meantime, other general unsecured creditors of the Debtor will receive a much lower percentage recovery than they would if those assets were instead transferred to the Debtor's estate, as required by the Arbitration Award, and evenly distributed among the Debtor's creditors. The Proposed Settlement is only in the best interests of Redeemer and, as such, it should be rejected.

******

[3] The potential range of value attributable to the Cornerstone shares is significant because, according to the Debtor's liquidation analysis, the Debtor expects to have only $195 million total in value to distribute, and only $161 million to distribute to general unsecured creditors under its proposed plan. See Liquidation Analysis [Dkt. No. 1173-1]; First Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Dkt. No. 1079].

UBS was right. Mr. Seery agreed to a settlement that substantially overpaid the Redeemer Committee, and UBS only agreed to withdraw its objection and appeal of the Redeemer Committee's settlement when the Debtor bestowed upon UBS its own lavish settlement.[20]

It is worth noting that the Redeemer Committee ultimately sold its bankruptcy claim for $78 million in cash, but the sale excluded, and the Crusader Funds retained, its investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and certain non-cash consideration.[21] At the end of the day, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee cashed out of their bankruptcy claims for total consideration at the very least of $135 million, meaning they received 105% of the highest estimate (according to UBS) of the net amount of their arbitration award.[22]

The Inner Circle Doesn't Object to Inflated Settlements

Following the Bankruptcy Court's approval of settlements with Acis/Josh Terry and the Crusader Funds/the Redeemer Committee, Mr. Seery turned his attention to the two remaining critical holdouts: HarbourVest and UBS. HarbourVest, a private equity fund-of-funds with approximately $75 billion under management, had invested pre-bankruptcy $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO

[20] *See* Dkt 2199. Under the terms of the UBS Settlement, UBS received a Class 8 claim in the amount of $65 million, a Class 9 claim in the amount of $60 million, a payment in cash of $18.5 million from a non-Debtor fund managed by the Debtor, and the Debtor's agreement to assist UBS in pursuing other claims against former Debtor affiliates related to a default on a credit facility during the Global Financial Crisis. Importantly, over the course of the preceding 11 years, UBS had already received payments totaling $180 million in connection with this dispute, and just prior to bankruptcy, UBS and the Debtor had reached a settlement in principle in which the Debtor would pay UBS just $7 million and $10 million in future business.

[21] *See* Exh. B.

[22] The estimation of a total recovery of $135 million includes attributing $48 million to the retained Cornerstone investment. The $48 million valuation equated to a ~45% interest in Cornerstone, which was valued pre-pandemic at approximately $107 million. Following COVID, Cornerstone's long-term acute care facilities flourished. Additionally, Cornerstone held a direct investment of over 800,000 shares in MGM, which was held on its books at approximately $72 per share. The per-share closing price on the sale of MGM to Amazon exceeded $164, which would have increased the company's valuation (irrespective of the post-COVID growth) by more than $70 million, bring Crusader Funds' windfall to more than $205 million.

Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called the Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining ~2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees.

Before Highland filed bankruptcy, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment into HCLOF because Highland allegedly failed to disclose facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry, which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs. In Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that the Debtor and Debtor's counsel initially argued was absurd. Indeed, Debtor management valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, which was consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[23] Nevertheless, as one of the final creditor claims to be resolved, Mr. Seery ultimately agreed to give HabourVest a $45 million Class 8 claim and a $35 million Class 9 claim.[24] At that time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive 71.32% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. Thus, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would result in HarbourVest receiving $32 million in cash.[25] The cash consideration was offset by HarbourVest's agreement to convey its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor (or its designee) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. In other words, from the outside looking in, the Debtor agreed to pay $9.5 million for a spurious claim.

Oddly enough, no creditors (other than former insiders) objected. What the inner circle presumably knew was that the settlement was actually a windfall for the Debtor. As we have previously detailed, the $22.5 million valuation of HCLOF that the Debtor utilized in seeking approval of the settlement was based upon September 2020 figures when the economy was still reeling from the pandemic. The value of that investment rebounded rapidly, particularly because of the pending MGM sale to Amazon that was disclosed to the Debtor but not the public (i.e., material non-public information). We have subsequently learned that the actual value of the HCLOF at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the HarbourVest settlement was at least $44 million—a value that Mr. Seery would have known but that was not disclosed to the Court or the public.

Likewise, there were no objections to the UBS settlement, which is puzzling. As detailed in the Debtor's 64-page objection to the UBS proof of claim and the Redeemer Committee's 431-page objection to the UBS proof of claim, UBS's claims against the Debtor were razor thin and largely foreclosed by res judicata and a settlement and release executed in connection with the June 2015 settlement. Moreover, the publicly available information indicated that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16,

[23] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[24] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[25] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $27 million.

2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021);[26]

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million from December 2020 to January 2021, with Class 8 claims ballooning $74 million in December to $267 million in January;

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for Class 8 Claims decreased from 87.44% to 71.32% in just a matter of months.

The Liquidation Analysis estimated total assets remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims to be $195 million, with general unsecured claims totaling $273 million. By the time the UBS settlement was presented to the court for approval, the allowed Class 8 Claims had increased to $309,345,000, reducing the distribution to Class 8 creditors to 62.99%. Surely significant creditors like the Redeemer Committee—whose projected distribution dropped from $119,527,515 when it voted for the Plan to $86,105,194 with the HarbourVest and UBS claims included—should have taken notice.

Mr. Seery Stacks the Oversight Board

As previously disclosed, we believe Mr. Seery facilitated the sale of the four largest claims in the estate to Farallon and Stonehill. Based upon conversations with representatives of Farallon, Mr. Seery contacted them directly to encourage their acquisition of claims in the bankruptcy estate.[27] We believe Mr. Seery did so by disclosing the true value of the estate versus what was publicly disclosed in court filings, demonstrating that there was substantial upside to the claims as compared to what was included in the Plan Analysis. For example, publicly available information at the time Farallon and Stonehill acquired the UBS claim indicated the purchase would have made no economic sense: the publicly disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Farallon and Stonehill would have lost money on the claim acquisition. We can only conclude Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), which based upon accurately disclosed financial statements would indicate they were likely to recover close to 100% on both Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

As set forth in the previous letters, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers Farallon, through Muck, and Stonehill, through Jessup. The four claims purchased by Farallon and Stonehill comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin, collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[26] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473].

[27] We believe Mr. Seery made similar calls to representatives of Stonehill. We are informed and believe that Mr. Seery has long-standing relationships with both Farallon and Stonehill.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,696,610**	**$95,000,000**	

From the information we have been able to gather, it appears that Stonehill and Farallon purchased these claims for the following amounts:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[28]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	$270.0	$95.0		$150.0 - $165.0

As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) are overseeing the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth below, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $650 million and has approximately $200 million in cash, which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million. Thus, it is a warranted and logical deduction that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. As set forth in previous letters, there are three primary reasons to believe this:

- The scant publicly available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that was actually publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims; and
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

For example, consider the sale of the Crusader Funds' claims, which we *know* was sold for $78 million. Based upon the publicly available information at the time of the acquisition, the expected distribution would have been $86 million. Surely a sophisticated hedge fund would not invest $78 million in a particularly contentious bankruptcy if it believed its maximum return was $86 million years later.

[28] Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

Ultimately, the Plan, Mr. Seery's compensation package, and the lack of transparency to everyone other than the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee permitted Debtor management and the Creditors' Committee to support grossly inflated claims (at the expense of residual stakeholders) in a grossly understated estate, which facilitated the sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In doing so, Mr. Seery installed on the Reorganized Debtor's Oversight Board friendly faces who stand to make $370 million on ~$150 million investment. And Mr. Seery's plan has already worked. Notably, while the confirmed Plan was characterized by the Debtor as a monetization plan,[29] the newly installed Oversight Board supported, and the Court approved, paying Mr. Seery the much more lucrative Case Resolution Fee, netting Mr. Seery $1.5 million more than he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.

In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

	Value as of Aug. 2021		**March 2022 High Estimate updated for MGM closing**
Asset	**Low**	**High**	
Cash as of 4/25/22	$17.9	$17.9	
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0	
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0	
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0	
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2	
Park West Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
HCLOF trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0	
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**	**$200**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0	$25.0
HCLOF	$40.0	$40.0	$20.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0	$30.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0	$0.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0	$30.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0	$20.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0	$10.0

[29] See Dkt. 194., p.5.

Highland Restoration Capital Partners			
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**	**$645.0**

The Bankruptcy Professionals are Draining the Estate

Yet another troubling aspect of the Highland bankruptcy has been the rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the Estate, largely through invented, unnecessary, and greatly overstaffed and overworked offensive litigation. The sums expended between case filing and the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") are staggering:

Professional	**Fees**	**Expenses**
Hunton Andrews Kurth	$1,147,059.42	$2,747.84
FTI Consulting, Inc.	$6,176,551.20	$39,122.91
Teneo Capital, LLC	$1,221,468.75	$6,257.07
Marc Kirschner	$137,096.77	
Sidley Austin LLP	$13,134,805.20	$211,841.25
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	$23,978,627.25	$334,232.95
Mercer (US) Inc.	$202,317.65	$2,449.37
Deloitte Tax LLP	$553,412.60	
Development Specialists, Inc.	$5,562,531.12	$206,609.54
James Seery[30]	$5,100,000.00	
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP		
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP	$2,645,729.72	$5,207.53
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC	$2,054,716.00	
Foley & Lardner LLP	$629,088.00	
Casey Olsen Cayman Limited	$280,264.00	
ASW Law Limited	$4,976.00	
Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc.	$766,397.00	
Berger Harris, LLP		
Hayward PLLC	$825,629.50	$46,482.92
	$64,420,670.18	**$854,951.38**
Total Fees and Expenses		**$65,275,621.56**

"The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees sought." *In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co.*, 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).

[30] This amount includes Mr. Seery's success fee, which was paid a month following the Effective Date.

The rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the estate is in stark contrast to the treatment of the employees who stayed with the Debtor (without a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive program) on the promise they would be made whole for prepetition deferred compensation that had not yet vested, only to be stiffed and summarily terminated. Even worse, some of these employees have been targeted by the litigation sub-trust for acts they took in the course and scope of their employment.

Following the Effective Date, siphoning of estate assets continues. Mr. Seery still receives base compensation of $150,000 per month, and he expects to receive compensation of at least "a few million dollars a year" according to his own deposition testimony. In addition, his retention was conditioned upon receiving a to-be-negotiated success fee and severance payment (notably, none of which is disclosed publicly).

Likewise, Teneo Capital, LLC was retained as the litigation adviser. For its services post-Effective Date, it is compensated $20,000 per month for Mr. Kirschner as trustee for the Litigation Subtrust, plus the regularly hourly fees of any additional Teneo personnel, plus a "Litigation Recovery Fee." The Litigation Recovery Fee is equal to 1.5% of Net Litigation Proceeds up to $100 million and 2.0% of Net Litigation Proceeds above. Interestingly, although "Net Litigation Proceeds" is defined as gross litigation proceeds less certain fees incurred in pursing the litigation, net proceeds are not reduced by Mr. Kirschner's monthly fee, contingency fees charged by any other professionals, or litigation funding financing. Moreover, Teneo is given credit for any litigation recoveries regardless of whether those recoveries stem from actions commenced by the litigation trustee. The Debtor has not disclosed, and is not required to disclose, the terms upon which any professionals have been engaged following the Effective Date, including Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for the Litigation Subtrust. Based upon pre-Effective Date monthly expenses, the number of lawyers that attend various matters on behalf of the Debtor,[31] and the addition of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Teneo, we believe the Debtor could be spending as much as $5-$7 million per month.

The Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust recently filed heavily redacted, quarterly post-confirmation reports.[32] Of note, the Reorganized Debtor disclosed that it has disbursed $81,983,611 since the Effective Date but disclosed that it has only paid $47,793 in priority claims and $6,918,473 in general unsecured claims, while still estimating a total recovery to general unsecured claims of $205,144,544. The Highland Claimant Trust disclosed that it has disbursed an additional $7,152,331 since the Effective Date.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an extreme example of the abuses that can occur if the federal bench, federal government appointees, and federal lawmakers do not police federal bankruptcy proceedings by

[31] In connection with a recent two-day trial on an administrative claim, the Debtor was represented by John Morris ($1,245.00 per hour), Greg Demo ($950 per hour), and Hayley Winograd ($695 per hour), and was assisted by paralegal La Asia Canty ($460 per hour). The Debtor's local counsel, Zachery Annable ($300 per hour), was also present, and Jeffrey Pomerantz ($1,295 per hour) observed the trial via WebEx. Despite the army of lawyers, Mr. Morris handled virtually the entire proceeding, with Ms. Winograd examining only two small witnesses. Messrs. Pomerantz, Demo, and Annable played no active role in the proceedings.

[32] Dkt 3325 and 3326.

permitting debtors-in-possession to hide material information, violate duties of transparency and candor, and manipulate information and transactions to benefit disclosed and undisclosed insiders or "friends" of insiders. Bankruptcy should not be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. We therefore encourage your office to investigate the problems inherent in the Highland bankruptcy. At a minimum, we ask that the EOUST seek orders from the Bankruptcy Court compelling the Debtor to undertake the following actions:

1. turn over all financial reports that should have been disclosed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, including 2015.3 reports;

2. provide a detailed disclosure of the assets Reorganized Debtor;

3. provide a copy of the executed Claimant Trust Agreement, which should already have been disclosed;

4. disclose all solvency analyses prepared by the Debtor; and

5. provide copies of all agreements for the engagement of Debtor professionals post-confirmation, including the terms of Mr. Seery's success fee and severance agreement, compensation agreements for personnel of the Reorganized Debtor, and the fee arrangement with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

Sincerely,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NO. 23 was filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Muck Holdings LLC

Name of Transferor:

ACMLP Claim, LLC

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Muck Holdings LLC
c/o Crowell & Moring LLP
Attn: Paul Haskel
590 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Phone: (212) 530-1823

Claim No.: 23
Amount of Claim: $23,000,000.00
Date Claim Filed: December 31, 2019

Phone: (212) 530-1823

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:

Same as above

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____
Transferee's Agent

Date: April 16, 2021

Exhibit
R 6

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, ACMLP Claim, LLC ("**Assignor**") has unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Muck Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**") all of Assignor's rights, title and interest in, to and under those claims asserted by Assignor in the proof of claim that was assigned claim number 23 ("**Claim No. 23**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**").

Assignor waives any objection to the transfer of Claim No. 23 on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waives to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignor acknowledges and understands, and hereby stipulates, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignor transferring Claim No. 23 to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of Claim No. 23. Assignor further directs the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court-appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Claim No. 23, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of Claim No. 23, shall be delivered or made to Assignee.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 16th day of April, 2021.

ACMLP Claim, LLC
By: Shorewood GP, LLC, its Manager

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Title: President

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
	§	
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NO. 72 was filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Jessup Holdings LLC

Name of Transferors:

Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Jessup Holdings LLC
c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan LLP
Attn: John Mandler
100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390
Orangeburg, NY 10962

Phone: (845) 639-7800

Claim no.: 72
Amount of Claim: $137,696,610.00
Date Claim Filed: April 3, 2020

Phone: (845) 639-7800

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:

Same as above

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____
Transferee's Agent

Date: April 30, 2021

Exhibit
R 7

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund ("**Assignor**") has unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Jessup Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**") all of Assignor's rights, title and interest in, to and under those claims asserted by Assignor in the proof of claim that was assigned claim number 72 ("**Claim No. 72**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**").

Assignor waives any objection to the transfer of Claim No. 72 on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waives to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignor acknowledges and understands, and hereby stipulates, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignor transferring Claim No. 72 to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of Claim No. 72. Assignor further directs the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court-appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Claim No. 72, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of Claim No. 72, will be delivered or made to Assignee.

[Signature Pages Follow]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 30th day of April, 2021.

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____
Name: Burke Montgomery, designated representative of Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____

Name: Brian Zambie, designated representative of Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

By: _____

Name: Tom Rowland, designated representative of Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Concord Management, LLC

By: _____

Name: Brant Behr, designated representative of Concord Management, LLC

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Baylor University

By: _____

Name: David Morehead, designated representative of Baylor University

ATTEST: _____

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Man Solutions Limited

By: _____

Name: Michael Buerer, designated representative of Man Solutions Limited

[Signature Page to Evidence of Transfer of Claim]

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Belleville Road Pty Limited

By: _____

Name: Stuart Robertson, designated representative of Seattle Fund SPC

REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND

Army and Air Force Exchange Service

By: Brad Bingham
Name: Brad Bingham, designated representative of Army and Air Force Exchange Service

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
	§	
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NO. 81 was filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Jessup Holdings LLC

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Jessup Holdings LLC
c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan LLP
Attn: John Mandler
100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390
Orangeburg, NY 10962

Phone: (845) 639-7800

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:

Same as above

Name of Transferors:

Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd. and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd.

Claim no.: 81
Amount of Claim: $50,000.00
Date Claim Filed: April 6, 2020

Phone: (845) 639-7800

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____
Transferee's Agent

Date: April 30, 2021

Exhibit
R 8

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd. and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "**Assignor**") has unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Jessup Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**") all of Assignor's rights, title and interest in, to and under those claims asserted by Assignor in the proof of claim that was assigned claim number 81 ("**Claim No. 81**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**").

Assignor waives any objection to the transfer of Claim No. 81 on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waives to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignor acknowledges and understands, and hereby stipulates, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignor transferring Claim No. 81 to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of Claim No. 81. Assignor further directs the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court-appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Claim No. 81, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of Claim No. 81, will be delivered or made to Assignee.

(remainder of page blank)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 30th day of April, 2021.

HIGHLAND CRUSADER OFFSHORE PARTNERS, L.P.

By: House Hanover, Its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Mark S. DiSalvo
Title: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND, L.P.

By: House Hanover, Its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Mark S. DiSalvo
Title: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND, LTD.

By: _____
Name: Mark S. DiSalvo
Title: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND II, LTD.

By: _____
Name: Mark S. DiSalvo
Title: Authorized Signatory

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 were filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Muck Holdings LLC

Name of Transferors:

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P.
HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P.
HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P.
HV International VIII Secondary L.P.
HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P.
HarbourVest Partners L.P.

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Muck Holdings LLC
c/o Crowell & Moring LLP
Attn: Paul Haskel
590 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Phone: (212) 530-1823

Claim Nos.: 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 and all associated claims and rights pursuant to the Court's Order at Doc. No. 1788 (Entered 1/21/21)

Amount of Claims: **$45,000,000.00 (GUC)**
$35,000,000.00 (Subor.)

Date POCs Filed: **April 8, 2020**

Phone: (617) 348-3773

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:
Same as above

[Signature page follows]

Exhibit
R 9
HMIT Appx. 02078

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____ Date: April 29, 2021
Transferee's Agent

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "**Assignors**") have unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Muck Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**") all of Assignors' rights, title and interest in, to and under those claims asserted by Assignors in the proofs of claims that were assigned claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 ("**Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**") and all associated claims and rights under that certain *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* dated January 20, 2021 [Doc No. 1788] (the "**Order**").

Assignors waive any objection to the transfer of Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 as well as the claims and rights under the Order - on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waive to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignors acknowledge and understand, and hereby stipulate, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignors transferring Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 as well as all associated claims and rights under the Order to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 as well as all associated claims and rights under the Order. Assignors further direct the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court- appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 as well as associated claims and rights under the Order, shall be delivered or made to Assignee.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 28 day of April, 2021.

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., by HarbourVest 2017 Global Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Partners L.P., on behalf of funds and accounts under management, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HV International VIII Secondary L.P., by HIPEP VIII Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: _____
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
	§	
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NOS. 190 and 191 were filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Jessup Holdings LLC

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Jessup Holdings LLC
c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan LLP
Attn: John J. Mandler
100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390
Orangeburg, NY 10962
Phone: (845) 639-7800

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:

Same as above

Name of Transferors:

UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch

Claim no.: **__190___**
Amount of Claim: **_$32,175,000.00**
Date Claim Filed: **_June 26, 2020 ____**

and

Claim No. **__191___**
Amount of Claim: **_$18,000,000.00**
Date Claim Filed: **_June 26, 2020 ____**

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____
Transferee's Agent

Date: August 9, 2021

Exhibit
R 10

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, UBS Securities LLC ("**UBS Securities**") and UBS AG London Branch ("**UBS AG**" and, together with UBS Securities, "**Assignor**") have unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Jessup Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**"), a portion of Assignor's rights, title and interest in, to and under the claims asserted by Assignor contained in the proofs of claim that was assigned claim numbers 190 and 191 (the "**Transferred Claim**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**") and allowed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's Order dated May 27, 2021 at Docket No. 2389 in the amounts consisting of: (a) a 49.5% portion of the Class 8 Claim in the amount of $32,175,000.00 (which, with respect to claim number 190, is comprised of the sum of the claim amount of $21,450,000.00 asserted and held by UBS AG and the claim amount of $10,725,000.00 asserted and held by UBS Securities) and (b) a 30% portion of the Class 9 Claim in the amount of $18,000,000.00 (which, with respect to claim number 191, is comprised of the sum of the claim amount of $12,000,000.00 asserted and held by UBS AG and the claim amount of $6,000,000.00 asserted and held by UBS Securities).

Assignor waives any objection to the transfer of the Transferred Claim on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waives to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignor acknowledges and understands, and hereby stipulates, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignor transferring the Transferred Claim to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of the Transferred Claim. Assignor further directs the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court-appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Transferred Claim, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of the Transferred Claim, will be delivered or made to Assignee.

(remainder of page blank)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 9th day of August, 2021.

ASSIGNOR:

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: William W. Chandler
Title: Managing Director

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Title: Executive Director

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: Jignesh Doshi
Title: Mananging Director

By: _____
Name: William W. Chandler
Title: Managing Director

ASSIGNEE:

JESSUP HOLDINGS LLC

By: _____
Name: John J. Mandler
Title: Authorized Signatory

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 9th day of August, 2021.

ASSIGNOR:

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name:
Title:

By: _____
Name:
Title:

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name:
Title:

By: _____
Name:
Title:

ASSIGNEE:

JESSUP HOLDINGS LLC

By:
Name: John J. Mandler
Title: Authorized Signatory

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IN RE:	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR SECURITY

CLAIM NOS. 190 and 191 were filed in this case or deemed filed under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Transferee hereby gives evidence and notice pursuant to Rule 3001(e)(2), Fed. R. Bankr. P., of the transfer, other than for security, of the claim referenced in this evidence and notice.

Name of Transferee:

Muck Holdings LLC

Name and Address where notices to Transferee should be sent:

Muck Holdings LLC
c/o Crowell & Moring LLP
Attn: Paul B. Haskel
590 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Phone: (212) 530- 1823

Name and Address where transferee payments should be sent:

Same as above

Name of Transferors:

UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch

Claim no.: **190**
Amount of Claim: **$32,175,000.00**
Date Claim Filed: **June 26, 2020**

and

Claim No. **191**
Amount of Claim: **$18,000,000.00**
Date Claim Filed: **June 26, 2020**

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this notice is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

By: _____
Transferee's Agent

Date: August 9, 2021

Exhibit

R 11

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM

TO: THE DEBTOR AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT

For value received, the adequacy and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, UBS Securities LLC ("**UBS Securities**") and UBS AG London Branch ("**UBS AG**" and, together with UBS Securities, "**Assignor**") have unconditionally and irrevocably transferred and assigned to Muck Holdings LLC ("**Assignee**"), a portion of Assignor's rights, title and interest in, to and under the claims asserted by Assignor contained in the proofs of claim that was assigned claim numbers 190 and 191 (the "**Transferred Claim**") filed against Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "**Debtor**") in Case No. 19-34054 pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "**Bankruptcy Court**") and allowed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's Order dated May 27, 2021 at Docket No. 2389 in the amounts consisting of: (a) a 49.5% portion of the Class 8 Claim in the amount of $32,175,000.00 (which, with respect to claim number 190, is comprised of the sum of the claim amount of $21,450,000.00 asserted and held by UBS AG and the claim amount of $10,725,000.00 asserted and held by UBS Securities) and (b) a 30% portion of the Class 9 Claim in the amount of $18,000,000.00 (which, with respect to claim number 191, is comprised of the sum of the claim amount of $12,000,000.00 asserted and held by UBS AG and the claim amount of $6,000,000.00 asserted and held by UBS Securities).

Assignor waives any objection to the transfer of the Transferred Claim on the books and records of the Debtor and the Bankruptcy Court, and hereby waives to the fullest extent permitted by law any notice or right to a hearing as may be imposed by Rule 3001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, applicable local bankruptcy rules or applicable law. Assignor acknowledges and understands, and hereby stipulates, that an order of the Bankruptcy Court may be entered without further notice to Assignor transferring the Transferred Claim to Assignee and recognizing Assignee as the sole owner and holder of the Transferred Claim. Assignor further directs the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC, as court-appointed claims and noticing agent, and all other interested parties that all further notices relating to Transferred Claim, and all payments or distributions of money or property in respect of the Transferred Claim, will be delivered or made to Assignee.

(remainder of page blank)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 9th day of August, 2021.

ASSIGNOR:

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: William W. Chandler
Title: Managing Director

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Title: Executive Director

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: Jignesh Doshi
Title: Mananging Director

By: _____
Name: William W. Chandler
Title: Managing Director

ASSIGNEE:

MUCK HOLDINGS LLC

By: _____
Name: Michael Linn
Title: Authorized Signatory

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER OF CLAIM is executed this 9th day of August, 2021.

ASSIGNOR:

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name:
Title:

By: _____
Name:
Title:

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name:
Title:

By: _____
Name:
Title:

ASSIGNEE:

MUCK HOLDINGS LLC

By: _____
Name: Michael Linn
Title: Authorized Signatory

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re:	)	Chapter 11
	)	
Highland Capital Management, L.P.	)	Case No. 19-12239 (CSS)
	)	
Debtor.	)	

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL AND
DEMAND FOR NOTICES AND PAPERS

Please take notice that the undersigned firm of Sullivan Hazeltine Allinson LLC hereby enters its appearance as counsel for the Hunter Mountain Trust ("Hunter") in the above-captioned case, pursuant to section 1109(b) of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"); and Rule 9010(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"); such counsel hereby requests, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 3017 and 9007 and sections 342 and 1109(b) of the bankruptcy Code, that hard copies of all notices and pleadings given or filed in the above-captioned case be given and served upon the following persons at the following addresses, telephone and telecopy numbers:

William A. Hazeltine, Esq.
SULLIVAN · HAZELTINE · ALLINSON LLC
901 North Market Street, Suite 1300
Wilmington, DE 19801
Tel: (302) 428-8191
Fax: (302) 428-8195

Please take further notice that pursuant to section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the foregoing demand includes not only the notices and papers referred to in the bankruptcy rules and sections of the Bankruptcy Code specified above, but also includes, without limitation, any notice, application, complaint, demand, motion, petition, pleading or request, whether formal or informal,

Exhibit
R 12

written or oral, and whether transmitted or conveyed by mail, delivery, telephone, telegraph, telex, or otherwise filed or made with regard to the above-captioned cases and proceedings therein.

This Notice of Appearance and Demand for Notices and Papers shall not be deemed or construed to be a waiver of (a) Hunter's rights (i) to have final orders in non-core matters and/or matters entitled to adjudication by a judge authorized under Article III of the U.S. Constitution entered only after *de novo* review by a District Court Judge, (ii) to trial by jury in any proceeding so triable in these cases or in any case, controversy, or proceeding related to these cases, and (iii) to have the District Court withdraw the reference in any matter subject to mandatory or discretionary withdrawal, or (b) any other rights, claims, actions, setoffs, or recoupments to which Hunter is or may be entitled, in law or in equity, all of which rights, claims, actions, defenses, setoffs, and recoupments Hunter expressly reserves.

Date: October 30, 2019
Wilmington, DE

SULLIVAN · HAZELTINE · ALLINSON LLC

/s/ William A. Hazeltine
William A. Hazeltine (No. 3294)
901 North Market Street, Suite 1300
Wilmington, DE 19801
Tel: (302) 428-8191
Fax: (302) 428-8195
Email: whazeltine@sha-llc.com

Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Trust

E. P. Keiffer
Rochelle McCullough, LLP
325 North St. Paul Street, Suite 4500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 580-2525
Facsimile: (214) 953-0185
Email: pkeiffer@romclaw.com

COUNSEL FOR HUNTER MOUNTAIN TRUST

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	**Chapter 11**
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Case No. 19-34054-SGJ-11**
Debtor.	§	

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AND REQUEST FOR SERVICE OF PAPERS

COMES NOW, E. P. Keiffer, of Rochelle McCullough, LLP who files this Notice of Appearance on behalf of Hunter Mountain Trust ("HMT") pursuant to Rules 2002, 3017, 9007, and 9010 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, requesting that all notices given or required to be given in these proceedings and all papers served, or required to be served, in these proceedings, be served upon the undersigned as follows:

E. P. Keiffer
Rochelle McCullough, LLP
325 North St. Paul Street, Suite 4500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 580-2525
Facsimile: (214) 953-0185
Email: pkeiffer@romclaw.com

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that this request includes notices and papers referred to in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and additionally, without limitation,

Exhibit
R 13

payments, notices of any application, complaint, demand, hearing, motion, order, pleading, or other request, formal or informal, whether transmitted or conveyed by mail, telephone or otherwise.

HMT additionally request that the Debtor and the Clerk of the Court place the foregoing name and address on any mailing matrix or list of creditors to be prepared or existing in the above-numbered case.

Respectfully submitted by:

/s/ *E. P. Keiffer*

E. P. Keiffer (TX Bar No. 11181700)
ROCHELLE MCCULLOUGH LLP
325 North St. Paul Street, Suite 4500
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 580-2525
Facsimile: (214) 953-0185
Email: pkeiffer@romclaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR HUNTER MOUNTAIN TRUST

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appearance was served via electronic means pursuant to the Court's ECF noticing system on the 2nd day of January, 2020.

/s/ E. P. Keiffer
E. P. Keiffer

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed October 22, 2020

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

Exhibit

R 14

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	Related to Docket No. 1089

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH (A) THE REDEEMER COMMITTEE OF THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUND (CLAIM NO. 72), AND (B) THE HIGHLAND CRUSADER FUNDS (CLAIM NO. 81), AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

Upon the *Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72), and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1089] (the "Motion")[2] filed by the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor"); and this

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and no other notice need be provided; and this Court having reviewed the Motion, any and all other documents filed in support of the Motion, and the UBS Objection; and this Court having held an evidentiary hearing October 20, 2020, where it assessed the credibility of the witnesses, considered the evidence admitted into the record, and determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion and at the hearing on the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon overruling any objections to the Motion; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT**:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. The Settlement, attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Morris Declaration, is approved in all respects pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019.

3. The UBS Objection is overruled in its entirety.

4. The Debtor and its agents are authorized to take any and all actions necessary or desirable to implement the Settlement without need of further Court approval or notice.

5. The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or relating to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order

END OF ORDER

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed May 27, 2021

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

Exhibit
R 15

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH UBS SECURITIES LLC AND UBS AG LONDON BRANCH AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

This matter having come before the Court on *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2199] (the "Motion"),[2] filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor") in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the "Bankruptcy Case"); and this Court having considered (a) the Motion; (b) the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Declaration of Robert J Feinstein in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith [Docket No. 2200] (the "Feinstein Declaration"), and the exhibits annexed thereto including the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement"); (c) the arguments and law cited in the Motion; (d) the *Limited Preliminary Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2268] (the "Trusts' Preliminary Objection"), filed by The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Get Good Trust (collectively the "Trusts"); (e) the *Supplemental Opposition to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2293] (the "Trusts' Supplemental Opposition"), filed by the Trusts; (f) *James Dondero's Objection Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2295] (the "Dondero Objection" and collectively, with the Trusts' Preliminary Objection and the Trusts' Supplemental Opposition, the "Objections"), filed James Dondero; (g) the *Debtor's Omnibus Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2308] (the "Debtor's Reply"), filed by the Debtor; (h) UBS's *Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 2310]; (i) the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted into evidence during the hearing held on May 21, 2021 (the "Hearing"), including assessing the credibility of the witness; and (j) the arguments made during the Hearing; and this Court having jurisdiction over

this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement fair and equitable; and this Court having analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to the Settlement Agreement, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law, (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay, and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views, and (ii) that the settlement is the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. All objections to the Motion are overruled.

3. The Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**, is approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4. The Debtor, UBS, and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

5. The Court finds that the Debtor, in its capacity as investment manager of Multi-Strat, exercised sound business judgment in causing Multi-Strat to enter into the Settlement Agreement. Pursuant to Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor, in its capacity as investment manager of Multi-Strat, is authorized to cause Multi-Strat to settle the claims UBS has asserted against Multi-Strat in the State Court and otherwise to cause Multi-Strat to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

6. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this Order.

###End of Order###

EXHIBIT 1

EXECUTION VERSION

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

R E C I T A L S

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

A G R E E M E N T

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ENTERED

THE DATE OF ENTRY IS ON
THE COURT'S DOCKET

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed October 27, 2020

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

Exhibit
R 16

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	Related to Docket Nos. 1087 & 1088

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH (A) ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. AND ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC (CLAIM NO. 23), (B) JOSHUA N. TERRY AND JENNIFER G. TERRY (CLAIM NO. 156), AND (C) ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. (CLAIM NO. 159) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

Having considered the *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (a) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (Claim No. 23), (b) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry (Claim No. 156), and (c) Acis Capital Management, L.P. (Claim No. 159) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1087] (the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

"Motion"),[2] the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement") to *Declaration of Gregory V. Demo in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with (A) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (Claim No. 23), (B) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry (Claim No. 156), and Acis Capital Management, L.P. (Claim No. 159), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1088] (the "Demo Declaration"), and the General Release attached as **Exhibit "2"** (the "Release") to the Demo Declaration filed by the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor"); and this Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement and the Release are fair and equitable; and this Court having, analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to Settlement Agreement and Release, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law; (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay; and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views; and (ii) the extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

this Court having reviewed the Motion, any and all other documents filed in support of the Motion, including the Debtor's Omnibus Reply filed by the Debtor at Docket No. 1211, and all objections thereto, including the objection filed by James Dondero at Docket No. 1121 (the "Dondero 9019 Objection");[3] and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT**:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. The Settlement and the Release, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** and **Exhibit 2** are approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

3. The Dondero 9019 Objection and all other objections to the Motion are overruled in their entirety.

4. All objections to the proofs of claim subject to the Motion[4] are overruled as moot in light of the Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release.

5. The Debtor, the Debtor's agents, the Acis Parties (as defined by the Release), and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary or desirable to implement the Settlement Agreement and the Release without need of further Court approval or notice.

---

[3] The objection to the Motion filed by Patrick Hagaman Daugherty at Docket No. 1201 was withdrawn on the record during the hearing on the Motion. The reservations of rights filed by Highland CLO Funding, Ltd., CLO Holdco, Ltd., HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P. and HarbourVest Partners L.P. filed at Docket Nos. 1177, 1191, and 1195 (collectively, the "Reservations") are resolved based on the Debtor's representations on the record, made without objection, that (a) the conditions precedent in Section 1(c) of the Settlement Agreement will not occur and therefore, the Debtor will not, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, transfer all of its direct and indirect right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. to Acis or its nominee, and that (b) none of the parties asserting any of the Reservations are bound by the Release.

[4] The objections include (a) the Debtor's *Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC* [Docket No. 771]; (b) *James Dondero's Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC; and (II) Joinder in Support of Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC* [Docket No. 827]; and (c) *UBS (I) Objection to Proof of Claim of Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC and (II) Joinder in the Debtor's Objection* [Docket No. 891].

6. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or relating to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order.

END OF ORDER

EXHIBIT 1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement, including all attachments, (the "Agreement") is entered into as of September 9, 2020, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"); (ii) Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"); (iii) Acis Capital Management GP LLC ("Acis GP" and together with Acis LP, "Acis"); (iv) Joshua N. Terry, individually and for the benefit of his individual retirement accounts, and (v) Jennifer G. Terry, individually and for the benefit of her individual retirement accounts and as trustee of the Terry Family 401-K Plan

Each of the foregoing are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

R E C I T A L S

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (together, the "Mediation Parties"), among others, were directed to mediate their disputes before Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"); and

WHEREAS, during the mediation, the Mediators made an economic proposal to resolve the Claims (the "Mediators' Economic Proposal"), and each of the Mediation Parties accepted the Mediators' Economic Proposal; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have negotiated and executed that certain General Release, dated as of even date herewith (the "Release"),[1] which, among other things, releases the Acis Released Claims and the HCMLP Released Claims; and

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement which incorporates, formalizes, and finalizes the Mediators' Economic Proposal and which, when combined with the Release, will fully and finally resolve the Claims; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement and the Release attached hereto will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019");

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

1. **Settlement of Claims.** In full and complete satisfaction of the Claims:

(a) The proof of claim filed by Acis in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case on December 31, 2019 [Claim No. 23] will be allowed in the amount of $23,000,000 as a general unsecured claim;

[1] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Release.

(b) On the effective date of a plan of reorganization and confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, HCMLP will pay in cash to:

(i) Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry $425,000, plus 10% simple interest (calculated on the basis of a 360-day year from and including June 30, 2016), in full and complete satisfaction of the proof of claim filed in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case by Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry on April 8, 2020 [Claim No. 156];

(ii) Acis LP $97,000, which amount represents the legal fees incurred by Acis LP with respect to *NWCC, LLC v. Highland CLO Management, LLC, et al.*, Index No. 654195-2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018), in full and complete satisfaction of the proof of claim filed by Acis LP in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case on April 8, 2020 [Claim No. 159];

(iii) Joshua N. Terry $355,000 in full and complete satisfaction of the legal fees assessed against Highland CLO Funding, Ltd., in *Highland CLO Funding v. Joshua Terry*, [No Case Number], pending in the Royal Court of the Island of Guernsey;

(c) On the effective date of a plan of reorganization proposed by HCMLP and confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, if HMCLP receives written advice of nationally recognized external counsel that it is legally permissible consistent with HCMLP's contractual and legal duties to transfer all of its direct and indirect right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. to Acis or its nominee and that doing so would not reasonably subject HCMLP to liability, HCMLP shall transfer all of its right, title and interest in Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., whether its ownership is direct or indirect, to Acis or its nominee, subject at all times to Acis's right to unilaterally reject the transfer in its sole and absolute discretion;

(d) Within five (5) days of the Agreement Effective Date, HCMLP shall:

(i) Move to withdraw, with prejudice, its proof of claim [Claim No. 27] filed in *In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018), and its proof of claim [Claim No. 13] filed in *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018);

(ii) Move to withdraw, with prejudice, Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Application for Administrative Expense Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) filed in the Acis Bankruptcy Case [Docket No. 772];

(e) At all times after the execution of this Agreement:

(i) Only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo in the Acis Appeals, the Parties shall cooperate in seeking to abate or otherwise stay the Acis Appeals vis-à-vis the Parties pending the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date; and

(ii) HCMLP shall cooperate in good faith to promptly return to Acis all property of Acis that is in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control, including but not limited to e-mail communications.

2. **Releases.** The Release is (a) attached to this Agreement as **Appendix A**; (b) an integral component of the Mediator's Economic Proposal and (c) incorporated by reference into this Agreement as if fully set forth herein.

3. **Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.**

(a) The effectiveness of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the Release by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement and the Release expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order. The "Agreement Effective Date" will be the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

(b) The Parties acknowledge and agree that the terms and conditions of this Agreement are conditioned, in all respects, on the execution of the Release by the Parties and the approval of the Release and this Agreement by the Bankruptcy Court. If either the Release or this Settlement Agreement are not approved by the Bankruptcy Court for any reason, this Agreement and the Release will be immediately null and void and of no further force and effect.

4. **Representations and Warranties**. Subject in all respects to Section 3, each Party represents and warrants to the other Party that such Party is fully authorized to enter into and perform the terms of this Agreement and that, as of the Agreement Effective Date, this Agreement and the Release will be fully binding upon each Party in accordance with their terms.

5. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the Claims. Nothing in this Agreement will imply, an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the Acis Parties, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the Acis Parties, or any other person.

6. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns, including but not limited to any Chapter 7 trustee appointed for HCMLP.

7. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be specified in any notice delivered or mailed as set forth below:

Acis

Acis Capital Management, LP
4514 Cole Avenue
Suite 600
Dallas, Texas 75205

Attention: Joshua N. Terry
Email: josh@aciscm.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

ROGGE DUNN GROUP, P.C.
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 1900
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Brian P. Shaw
Telephone No.: 214.239.2707
E-mail: shaw@roggedunngroup.com

Joshua N. Terry and Jennifer G. Terry

25 Highland Park Village, Suite 100-848
Dallas TX 75205
Attention: Joshua N. Terry
Email: joshuanterry@gmail.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

ROGGE DUNN GROUP, P.C.
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 1900
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Brian P. Shaw
Telephone No.: 214.239.2707
E-mail: shaw@roggedunngroup.com

HCMLP

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: Legal Department
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
Facsimile No.: 972-628-4147
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910

Facsimile No.: 310-201-0760
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

8. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

9. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

10. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

11. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

12. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

13. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this

Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: Self

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Jennifer G. Terry
Its: Self

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: 
Name: JAMES P. SEERY, JR
Its: CEO/CRO

EXHIBIT 2

GENERAL RELEASE

This GENERAL RELEASE (this "Release"), effective on the Effective Date (as defined below), is entered into by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"), (ii) Joshua N. Terry, individually and for the benefit of his individual retirement accounts, Jennifer G. Terry, individually and for the benefit of her individual retirement accounts and as trustee of the Terry Family 401-K Plan (collectively, the "Terry Parties"), (iii) Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (collectively, "Acis") (the Terry Parties and Acis, collectively, the "Acis Parties"), and (iii) those HCMLP Specified Parties (as defined below) who execute this Release (together, the "Parties").

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the Parties have asserted or may assert claims that are defined in Section 1 below as the "Acis Released Claims" and the "HCMLP Released Claims" (collectively, the "Claims"); and

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court") entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, Acis Capital Management L.P., and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC (together, the "Mediation Parties"), among others, were directed to mediate their disputes before Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"); and

WHEREAS, during the mediation, the Mediators made an economic proposal to resolve the Claims (the "Mediators' Economic Proposal"), and each of the Mediation Parties accepted the Mediators' Economic Proposal; and

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into a general release of all Claims which, when combined with the Mediators' Economic Proposal, will fully and finally resolve the Claims; and

WHEREAS, except in Section 1.c below, this is a general release, meaning the Parties intend hereby to release any and all Claims which the Parties can release, and the Parties are unaware of any Claims between them which are not being released herein; and

WHEREAS, this Release will be appended or otherwise incorporated into a written settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") that will include the terms of the Mediators' Economic Proposal and will be presented to the Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019"), and is only effective upon the Effective Date.

NOW, THEREFORE, after good-faith, arms-length negotiations, and in consideration of the promises made herein and in the Mediators' Economic Proposal, the Parties agree to release each other pursuant to and in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth below.

AGREEMENT

1. Releases.

a. Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, and except as set forth in Section 1d below, each of the Acis Parties on behalf of himself, herself, or itself and each of their respective current or former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue, (A)(i) HCMLP; (ii) Strand; (iii) any entity of which greater than fifty percent of the voting ownership is held directly or indirectly by HCMLP and any entity otherwise controlled by HCMLP; and (iv) any entity managed by either HCMLP or a direct or indirect subsidiary of HCMLP (the foregoing (A)(i) through (A)(iv) the "HCMLP Entities") and (B) with respect to each such HCMLP Entity, such HCMLP Entity's respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns, except as expressly set forth below (the "HCMLP Parties," and together with the HCMLP Entities, the "HCMLP Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Filed Cases, including the proofs of claim [Claim No. 23; 156; 159] filed by the Acis Parties in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case and any objections or potential objections to the Plan or the confirmation thereof (collectively, the "Acis Released Claims"). This release is intended to be general. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the term HCMLP Released Parties **shall not** include NexPoint Advisors (and any of its subsidiaries), the Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. (and any of its subsidiaries, including CLO Holdco, Ltd.), Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (and any of its subsidiaries), NexBank, SSB (and any of its subsidiaries), James Dondero, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), Dugaboy Investment Trust (or any trustee acting for the trust), Grant Scott, David Simek, William Scott, Heather Bestwick, Mark Okada and his family trusts (and the trustees for such trusts in their representative capacities), McKool Smith, PC, Gary Cruciani, Lackey Hershman, LLP, Jamie Welton, or Paul Lackey.

b. Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each HCMLP Released Party hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue the (A) Acis Parties, (B) Acis CLO 2013-1Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-3 Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-4 Ltd., Acis CLO 2014-5 Ltd., Acis CLO 2015-6 Ltd. (collectively, the "Acis CLOs"), and (C) with respect to each such Acis Party and Acis CLO, to the extent applicable, such Acis Party and Acis CLO, their respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents,

affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the foregoing (A), (B), and (C), the "Acis Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Filed Cases (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"). This release is intended to be general. Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, this Section 1.b will not affect any right to payment under any notes, debt, equity, or other security issued by any Acis CLO and held by any HCMLP Released Party.

c. The HCMLP Released Parties shall also hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely release, relieve, acquit, remise, and exonerate, and covenant never to sue (A) U.S. Bank National Association, Moody's Investor Services, Inc., and Brigade Capital Management, Inc. and (B) with respect to each such DAF Suit Defendant, to the extent applicable, such DAF Suit Defendant, their respective current advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, current or former employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the foregoing (A) and (B), the "DAF Suit Defendants"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the DAF Lawsuits. This release is not intended to be general.

d. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, if (A) any HCMLP Specified Party has not executed this Release on or before the Effective Date or (B) any HCMLP Released Party, including any HCMLP Specified Party, (i) sues, attempts to sue, or threatens or works with or assists any entity or person to sue, attempt to sue, or threaten any Acis Released Party on or in connection with any HCMLP Released Claim or any other claim or cause of action arising prior to the date of this Release, (ii) takes any action that, in HCMLP's reasonable judgment, impairs or harms the value of HCMLP, its estate, and its assets; or (iii) in HCMLP's reasonable judgment fails to use commercially reasonable efforts to support confirmation of the Plan and/or the monetization of HCMLP's assets at their maximum value, then (a) such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party) will be deemed to have waived (x) the release and all other protections set forth in Section 1a hereof and will have no further rights, duties, or protections under this Release and (y) any releases set forth in the Plan, (b) the Acis Released Parties, as applicable, may, in their discretion, assert any and all Acis Released Claims against such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party), and (c) any statutes of limitation or other similar defenses are tolled against such HCMLP Released Party (and only such HCMLP Released Party) from the execution of this Release until ninety (90) days after the Acis Released Parties receive actual written notice of any violation of this Section 1d. For the avoidance of doubt, by signing this Release each of the HCMLP Specified Parties is

acknowledging and agreeing, without limitation, to the terms of this Section 1.d and the tolling agreement set forth herein.

2. Withdrawal/Dismissal of Filed Cases. Within five days of the Effective Date, each Acis Released Party and HCMLP Released Party, to the extent applicable, will coordinate to cause the Filed Cases, including any appeals of any Filed Cases, to be dismissed with prejudice as to any Acis Released Party or HCMLP Released Party; *provided, however,* that there is no obligation to dismiss or withdraw the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case. For the avoidance of doubt, and consistent with this Section, (a) if HMCLP receives written advice of nationally recognized external counsel that it is legally permissible consistent with HCMLP's contractual and legal duties to direct Neutra, Ltd. to move to dismiss all of their appeals arising from the Acis Bankruptcy and that doing so would not reasonably subject HCMLP to liability, HCMLP shall direct Neutra, Ltd. to move to dismiss all of their appeals arising from the Acis Bankruptcy and (b) Acis shall move to dismiss with prejudice its claims against HCMLP asserted in any adversary proceeding in the Acis Bankruptcy Case. To the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo in the Filed Cases, including any appeals thereof, prior to the Effective Date, each Acis Released Party and HCMLP Released Party shall reasonably cooperate in seeking to abate or otherwise stay the Filed Cases vis-à-vis the Parties.

3. Representations and Warranties.

a. Each of the Acis Parties represents and warrants to each of the HCMLP Released Parties and each of the HCMLP Specified Parties who have signed this Release that (a) he, she or it has full authority to release the Acis Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Acis Released Claim to any other person or entity, and that (b) to the best of his, her or its current knowledge, no person or entity other than the Acis Parties has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Acis Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) any of the Acis Parties.

b. Each of HCMLP and each HCMLP Specified Party who has signed this Release represents and warrants to each of the Acis Parties that he, she or it has not sold, transferred, pledged, assigned or hypothecated any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity.

c. Each HCMLP Specified Party and each of HCMLP and Strand represents and warrants to each of the Acis Parties that he, she, or it has full authority to release any HCMLP Released Claims that such HCMLP Specified Party, HCMLP, or Strand personally has against any Acis Party.

d. HCMLP represents and warrants that it is releasing the HCMLP Released Claims on behalf of the HCMLP Entities to the maximum extent permitted by any contractual or other legal rights HCMLP possesses. To the extent any of the HCMLP Entities dispute HCMLP's right to release the HCMLP Released Claims on behalf of any of the HCMLP Entities, HCMLP shall use commercially reasonable efforts to support the Acis Parties' position, if any, that such claims were released herein. For the avoidance of doubt, HCMLP will have no obligations to assist the Acis Parties under this Section if HCMLP has been advised by external counsel that such assistance could subject HCMLP to liability to any third party or if such

assistance would require HCMLP to expend material amounts of time or money. HCMLP shall not argue in any forum that the non-signatory status of any of the HCMLP Entities to this Release shall in any way affect the enforceability of this Release vis-à-vis any of the HCMLP Entities. The Parties agree that all of the HCMLP Entities are intended third-party beneficiaries of this Release.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Acis Parties acknowledge and agree that their sole and exclusive remedy for the breach of the foregoing Sections 3b, 3c, and 3d will be that set forth in Section 1.d hereof.

4. Additional Definitions.

a. "Acis Bankruptcy Case" means, collectively, *In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018)

b. "DAF Lawsuits" means (a) Case No. 1:19-cv-09857-NRB; *The Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al*, formerly pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; and (b) Case No. 1:20-cv-01036-LGS; *The Charitable Donor Advised Fund, L.P. and CLO Holdco, Ltd. v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al*, formerly pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

c. "Effective Date" means the date of an order of the Court approving the Settlement Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

d. "Filed Cases" means (a) the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case, (b) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al*, Case No. 18-03078 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018); (c) *Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Allow Pursuit of Motion for Order to Show Cause for Violations of the Acis Plan Injunction*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11 [Docket No. 593] (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2020); (d) *Joshua and Jennifer Terry v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., James Dondero and Thomas Surgent*, Case No. DC-16-11396, pending in the 162nd District Court of Dallas County Texas; (e) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al v. James Dondero, et al.*, Case No. 20-0360 (Bankruptcy N.D. Tex. 2020); (f) *Acis Capital Management, L.P., et al v. Gary Cruciani, et al.*, Case No. DC-20-05534, pending in the 162nd District Court of Dallas County Texas; (g) *Highland CLO Funding v. Joshua Terry*, [No Case Number], pending in the Royal Court of the Island of Guernsey; and (h) the Acis Bankruptcy Case.

e. "HCMLP Bankruptcy Case" means *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2019).

f. "HCMLP Specified Party" means Scott Ellington, Isaac Leventon, Thomas Surgent, Frank Waterhouse, Jean Paul Sevilla, David Klos, Kristin Hendrix, Timothy Cournoyer, Stephanie Vitiello, Katie Irving, Jon Poglitsch, or Hunter Covitz. For the avoidance of doubt, each HCMLP Specified Party is a HCMLP Released Party.

g. "Plan" means the *Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, filed in the HCMLP Bankruptcy Case [Docket No. 956] as may be amended or restated.

h. "Strand" means Strand Advisors, Inc.

5. Miscellaneous.

a. For the avoidance of doubt, all rights, duties, and obligations of any HCMLP Released Party or Acis Released Party created by this Release or the Settlement Agreement shall survive its execution.

b. This Release, together with the Settlement Agreement and any exhibits thereto, contains the entire agreement between the Parties as to its subject matter and supersedes and replaces any and all prior agreements and undertakings between the Parties relating thereto.

c. This Release may not be modified other than by a signed writing executed by the Parties.

d. The effectiveness of this Release is subject in all respects to entry of an order of the Court approving this Release and the Settlement Agreement and authorizing HCMLP's execution thereof.

e. This Release may be executed in counterparts (including facsimile and electronic transmission counterparts), each of which will be deemed an original but all of which together constitute one and the same instrument, and shall be effective against a Party upon the Effective Date.

f. This Release will be exclusively governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to its conflicts of law principles, and all claims relating to or arising out of this Release, or the breach thereof, whether sounding in contract, tort, or otherwise, will likewise be governed by the laws of the State of Texas, excluding Texas's conflicts of law principles. The Court will retain exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes relating to this Release. In any action to enforce this Release, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: President

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Joshua N. Terry
Its: Self

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: Jennifer G. Terry
Its: Self

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GP LLC

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JOSHUA N. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

JENNIFER G. TERRY

By: _____
Name: _____
Its: _____

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: CEO/CRO

HCMLP SPECIFIED PARTIES

SCOTT ELLINGTON

_____

ISAAC LEVENTON

_____

THOMAS SURGENT

_____

FRANK WATERHOUSE

_____

JEAN PAUL SEVILLA

_____

DAVID KLOS

_____

KRISTIN HENDRIX

_____

TIMOTHY COURNOYER

_____

STEPHANIE VITIELLO

_____

KATIE IRVING

_____

JON POGLITSCH

_____

HUNTER COVITZ

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed January 20, 2021

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

Exhibit
R 17

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER APPROVING DEBTOR'S SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

This matter having come before the Court on *Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1625] (the "Motion"),[2] filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the debtor and debtor-in-possession (the "Debtor") in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the "Bankruptcy Case"); and this Court having considered (a) the

[1] The Debtor's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (6725). The headquarters and service address for the above-captioned Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.

Motion; (b) the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1631] (the "Morris Declaration"), and the exhibits annexed thereto, including the Settlement Agreement attached as **Exhibit "1"** (the "Settlement Agreement"); (c) the arguments and law cited in the Motion; (d) *James Dondero's Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest* [Docket No. 1697] (the "Dondero Objection"), filed by James Dondero; (e) the *Objection to Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1706] (the "Trusts' Objection"), filed by the Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Get Good Trust ("Get Good," and together with Dugaboy, the "Trusts"); (f) *CLO Holdco's Objection to HarbourVest Settlement* [Docket No. 1707] (the "CLOH Objection" and collectively, with the Dondero Objection and the Trusts' Objection, the "Objections"), filed by CLO Holdco, Ltd.; (g) the *Debtor's Omnibus Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1731] (the "Debtor's Reply"), filed by the Debtor; (h) the *HarbourVest Reply in Support of Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1734] (the "HarbourVest Reply"), filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"); (i) the testimonial and documentary evidence admitted into evidence during the hearing held on January 14, 2021 (the "Hearing"), including assessing the credibility of the witnesses; and (j) the

arguments made during the Hearing; and this Court having jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and this Court having found that this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); and this Court having found that venue of this proceeding and the Motion in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and this Court having found that the relief requested in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtor's estate, its creditors, and other parties-in-interest; and this Court having found the Settlement Agreement fair and equitable; and this Court having analyzed, for the reasons stated on the record, (1) the probability of success in litigating the claims subject to the Settlement Agreement, with due consideration for the uncertainty in fact and law, (2) the complexity and likely duration of litigation and any attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay, and (3) all other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise, including: (i) the best interests of the creditors, with proper deference to their reasonable views, and (ii) the extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion; and this Court having found that the Debtor's notice of the Motion and opportunity for a hearing on the Motion were appropriate under the circumstances and that no other notice need be provided; and this Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish good cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before this Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby **ORDERED** that:

1. The Motion is **GRANTED** as set forth herein.

2. All objections to the Motion are overruled.

3. The Settlement Agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**, is approved in all respects pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

4. All objections to the proofs of claim subject to the Motion[3] are overruled as moot in light of the Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement.

5. The Debtor, HarbourVest, and all other parties are authorized to take any and all actions necessary and desirable to implement the Settlement Agreement without need of further approval or notice.

6. Pursuant to the express terms of the *Members Agreement Relating to the Company*, dated November 15, 2017, HarbourVest is authorized to transfer its interests in HCLOF to a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary of the Debtor pursuant to the terms of the *Transfer Agreement for Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.* without the need to obtain the consent of any party or to offer such interests first to any other investor in HCLOF.

7. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation of this Order.

###End of Order###

[3] This includes the *Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 906].

EXHIBIT 1

EXECUTION VERSION

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of December 23, 2020, between Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor"), on the one hand, and HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (each, a "HarbourVest Party," and collectively, "HarbourVest"), on the other hand. Each of the foregoing are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

R E C I T A L S

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Case") in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Bankruptcy Court");

WHEREAS, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, Case No. 19-34054-sgj (the "Bankruptcy Court");

WHEREAS, prior to the Petition Date, HarbourVest invested in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF") and acquired an a 49.98% ownership interest in HCLOF (the "HarbourVest Interests");

WHEREAS, the portfolio manager for HCLOF is Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Debtor;

WHEREAS, on April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim in the Bankruptcy Case, which are listed on the Debtor's claims register as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154 (the "HarbourVest Claims"), asserting claims against the Debtor relating to its investment in HCLOF;

WHEREAS, on July 30, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (a) Duplicate Claims; (b) Overstated Claims; (c) Late-Filed Claims; (d) Satisfied Claims; (e) No Liability Claims; and (f) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 906], in which the Debtor objected to the HarbourVest Claims;

WHEREAS, on September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Creation (a) Duplicate Claims; (b) Overstated Claims; (c) Late-Filed Claims; (d) Satisfied Claims; (e) No Liability Claims; and (f) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "HarbourVest Response");

WHEREAS, on October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed the *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion" and together with the HarbourVest Response, the "HarbourVest Pleadings");

WHEREAS, in the HarbourVest Pleadings, HarbourVest asserted, among other things, that the HarbourVest Claims included claims against the Debtor arising from fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of securities laws, and misuse of assets and sought damages in excess of $300,000,000;

WHEREAS, the Debtor disputes the HarbourVest Claims;

WHEREAS, on November 24, 2020, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P.* [Docket No. 1472] (as amended, the "Plan").[1]

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Agreement which incorporates, formalizes, and finalizes the full and final resolution of the HarbourVest Claims and HarbourVest Pleadings; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019").

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

1. **Settlement of Claims.**

(a) In full and complete satisfaction of the HarbourVest Claims, HarbourVest will receive:

(i) an allowed, nonpriority general unsecured claim in the aggregate amount of $45,000,000 (the "Allowed GUC Claim"); and

(ii) an allowed subordinated claim in the aggregate amount of $35,000,000 (the "Allowed Subordinated Claim" and together with the Allowed GUC Claim, the "Allowed Claims").

(b) On the Effective Date, HarbourVest will transfer all of its rights, title, and interest in the HarbourVest Interests to the Debtor or its nominee pursuant to the terms of the *Transfer Agreement for Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.*, attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Transfer Agreements") and the Debtor or its nominee will become a shareholder of HCLOF with respect to the HarbourVest Interests. The terms of the Transfer Agreements are incorporated into this Agreement by reference.

2. **Releases.**

(a) Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each HarbourVest Party on behalf of itself and each of its current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents,

[1] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Plan.

participants, subsidiaries, parents, successors, designees, and assigns hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue, the Debtor, HCLOF, HCLOF's current and former directors, and the Debtor's current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns, except as expressly set forth below (the "Debtor Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HarbourVest Released Claims").

(b) Upon the Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, the Debtor hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, and exonerates, and covenants never to sue (i) each HarbourVest Party and (ii) each HarbourVest Party's current and former advisors, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (the "HarbourVest Released Parties"), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorney's fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, which were or could have been asserted in, in connection with, or with respect to the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Debtor Released Claims"); *provided, however,* that notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the release contained in this Section 2(b) will apply to the HarbourVest Released Parties set forth in subsection (b)(ii) only with respect to Debtor Released Claims arising from or relating to HarbourVest's ownership of the HarbourVest Interests.

(c) Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the releases set forth herein will not apply with respect to (i) the Allowed Claims, (ii) the claims of Charlotte Investor IV, L.P., or (iii) the duties, rights, or obligations of any Party under this Agreement or the Transfer Agreements.

3. **Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.** The effectiveness of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to cooperate and use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The "Effective Date" will be the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019.

4. **Representations and Warranties**. Subject in all respects to Section 3 hereof:

(a) each HarbourVest Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HarbourVest Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HarbourVest Released Claim to any other person or entity, (ii) no person or entity other than such HarbourVest Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HarbourVest Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) of such HarbourVest Party; and (iii) HarbourVest owns all of the HCLOF Interests free and clear of any claims or interests; and

(b) the Debtor represents and warrants to HarbourVest that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Debtor Released Claims and (ii) no person or entity other than the Debtor has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Debtor Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) of the Debtor Party.

5. **Plan Support.**

(a) Each HarbourVest Party hereby agrees that it will (a) vote all HarbourVest Claims held by such HarbourVest Party to accept the Plan, by delivering its duly executed and completed ballots accepting the Plan on a timely basis; and (b) not (i) change, withdraw, or revoke such vote (or cause or direct such vote to be changed withdrawn or revoked); (ii) exercise any right or remedy for the enforcement, collection, or recovery of any claim against the Debtor except in a manner consistent with this Agreement or the Plan, (iii) object to, impede, or take any action other action to interfere with, delay or postpone acceptance or confirmation of the Plan; (iv) directly or indirectly solicit, propose, file, support, participate in the formulation of or vote for, any restructuring, sale of assets (including pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363), merger, workout, or plan of reorganization of the Debtor other than the Plan; or (v) otherwise take any action that would in any material respect interfere with, delay, or postpone the consummation of the Plan; provided, however, that such vote may be revoked (and, upon such revocation, deemed void ab initio) by such HarbourVest Party at any time following the termination of this agreement or the occurrence of a Support Termination Event (it being understood that any termination of this agreement shall entitle each HarbourVest Party to change its vote in accordance with section 1127(d) of the Bankruptcy Code), notwithstanding any voting deadline established by the Bankruptcy Court including without limitation the January 5, 2021, 5:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time) deadline established by the *Order Approving Form of Ballots, Voting Deadline and Solicitation Procedures* [Docket No. 1476].

(b) In full resolution of the 3018 Motion, HarbourVest will have a general unsecured claim for voting purposes only in the amount of $45,000,000.

(c) The obligations of the HarbourVest Parties under this Section 5 shall automatically terminate upon the occurrence of any of the following (each a "Support Termination Event"): (i) the effective date of the Plan, (ii) the withdrawal of the Plan, (iii) the entry of an order by the Bankruptcy Court (A) converting the Bankruptcy Case to a case under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or (B) appointing an examiner with expanded powers beyond those set forth in sections 1106(a)(3) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code or a trustee in Bankruptcy

Case, or (iv) the failure of the Court to enter an order approving the terms of this Agreement and the settlement described herein pursuant to Rule 9019 prior to confirmation of the Plan.

6. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the HarbourVest Claims. Nothing in this Agreement will imply, an admission of liability, fault or wrongdoing by the Debtor, HarbourVest, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of the Debtor, HarbourVest, or any other person.

7. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their successors, and assigns.

8. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder will be in writing and will be sent by email and delivered or mailed by registered mail, receipt requested, and will be deemed to have been given on the date of its delivery, if delivered, and on the fifth full business day following the date of the mailing, if mailed to each of the Parties thereto at the following respective addresses or such other address as may be specified in any notice delivered or mailed as set forth below:

HARBOURVEST

HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Attention: Michael J. Pugatch
One Financial Center
Boston, MA 02111
Telephone No. 617-348-3712
E-mail: mpugatch@harbourvest.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
Attention: M. Natasha Labovitz, Esq.
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone No. 212-909-6649
E-mail: nlabovitz@debevoise.com

THE DEBTOR

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: James P. Seery, Jr.
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
Facsimile No.: 972-628-4147
E-mail: jpseeryjr@gmail.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
Facsimile No.: 310-201-0760
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

9. **Advice of Counsel**. Each Party represents that it has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

10. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement and the Transfer Agreement contain the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersede and replace all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

11. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

12. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

13. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

14. **Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs**. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of Texas without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

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EXECUTION VERSION

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: /s/ James P. Seery, Jr.
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: CEO/CRO

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., by HarbourVest 2017 Global Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HarbourVest Partners L.P., on behalf of funds and accounts under management, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

EXECUTION VERSION

HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., by HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited, its Alternative Investment Fund Manager, by HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its General Partner

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

HV International VIII Secondary L.P., by HIPEP VIII Associates L.P., its General Partner, by HarbourVest GP LLC, its General Partner, by HarbourVest Partners, LLC, its Managing Member

By: /s/ Michael Pugatch
Name: Michael Pugatch
Its: Managing Director

Exhibit A

TRANSFER AGREEMENT
FOR ORDINARY SHARES OF
HIGHLAND CLO FUNDING, LTD.

This Transfer Agreement, dated as of January ____, 2021 (this "**Transfer Agreement**"), is entered into by and among Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (the "**Fund**"), Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. (the "**Portfolio Manager**"), HCMLP Investments, LLC (the "**Transferee**") and each of the following: HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., and HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P. (collectively, the "**Transferors**").

WHEREAS, each Transferor is the record, legal and beneficial owner of the number of ordinary shares ("**Shares**") of the Fund set forth opposite such Transferor's name on Exhibit A hereto (with respect to each Transferor, the "**Transferred Shares**").

WHEREAS the Transferee is an affiliate and wholly owned subsidiary of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("**HCMLP**") which is one of the initial members of the Fund.

WHEREAS, each Transferor wishes to transfer and assign 100% of its rights, title and interest as a shareholder in the Fund, including the Transferred Shares (the "**Interest**") on the terms set forth in this Transfer Agreement.

WHEREAS, subject to and in connection with the approval of that certain Settlement Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof, by and among HCMLP and the Transferors (the "**Settlement Agreement**"), the Transferee desires that the Interest be transferred to Transferee and that thereafter the Transferee will become a Shareholder and the Transferors will no longer be Shareholders.

WHEREAS, the Portfolio Manager desires to consent to such transfers and to the admission of Transferee as a Shareholder on the terms set forth herein, and the Transferors and Transferee agree to such terms.

WHEREAS, the Fund desires to amend its records to reflect the foregoing transfers.

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1. Transfer of Shares and Advisory Board

   a. Each Transferor hereby transfers and assigns all of its rights, title, and interest in its Interest to the Transferee, and the Transferee wishes to be admitted to the Fund as a Shareholder.

   b. In connection with the transfer of the Interest as contemplated herein, the Transferee shall be granted the right to appoint a representative to the Fund's advisory board (the "**Advisory Board**") to replace the Transferors' appointed representative to the Advisory Board.

c. Transferee hereby assumes all of Transferor's rights and obligations in respect of the Interest effective as of the Effective Date (as defined below) and acknowledge that thereafter Transferee shall be subject to the applicable terms and provisions of the Members' Agreement dated as of November 15, 2017 (the "**Members' Agreement**"), the Articles of Incorporation adopted November 15, 2017 (the "**Articles**") and the Subscription and transfer Agreement, dated as of November 15, 2017 among each Transferor, the Fund and the Portfolio Manager (the "**Subscription Agreement**", and together with the Members' Agreement and the Articles, the "**Fund Agreements**") with respect to the Interest. Transferee does not assume any liability or responsibility for any obligations or liabilities incurred by any Transferor prior to the Effective Date of the transfer.

d. Following the transfer, each Transferor shall have no further rights or obligations to any party hereunder in respect of the Interest under the Fund Agreements.

e. This Transfer Agreement, and the parties' obligations hereunder, are conditioned in all respects on the approval by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 of (*i*) this Transfer Agreement and (*ii*) the Settlement Agreement, and each of the parties agree that no further action shall be required from any party for the transfer of the Interest to be effective except as described herein.

2. Transferee's Representations and Warranties. The Transferee represents and warrants to the Transferors, the Portfolio Manager, and the Fund as follows:

a. This Transfer Agreement constitutes a valid and binding obligation of the Transferee, enforceable against it in accordance with its terms;

b. This Transfer Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by or on behalf of the Transferee and such execution and delivery have been duly authorized by all necessary trust action of the Transferee;

c. The Transferee acknowledges receipt of, has read, and is familiar with, the Fund's Offering Memorandum for Placing Shares dated November 15, 2017 (the "**Offering Memorandum**") and the Fund Agreements;

d. The Transferee hereby accepts and receives the Interest from the Transferors for investment, and not with a view to the sale or distribution of any part thereof, and the Transferee has no present intention of selling, granting participations in, or otherwise distributing the same, but subject nevertheless to any requirement of law that the disposition of the Transferee's property shall at all times be within such Transferee's control; and

e. The Transferee is an "Eligible U.S. Investor" as defined in the Offering Memorandum.

3. Transferors' Representations and Warranties. Each Transferor represents and warrants to the Transferee, the Portfolio Manager, and the Fund as follows:

   a. This Transfer Agreement constitutes a valid and binding obligation of the Transferor, enforceable against it in accordance with its terms;

   b. This Transfer Agreement has been duly authorized, and duly and validly executed and delivered by the Transferor and such execution and delivery have been duly authorized by all necessary action of the Transferor; and

   c. As of the date hereof, the Transferor has good and valid title to the Transferor's Interest, free and clear of any liens, vesting requirements or claims by others.

4. Consent to Transfer. Based in part on the representations and warranties of the Transferors and the Transferee which are included herein, and on the terms contained herein, the Portfolio Manager and the Fund hereby consent to the transfers of the Interest, the admission of the Transferee as a Shareholder and the Transferee's appointment of a representative to the Advisory Board, the Portfolio Manager's execution of this Transfer Agreement constituting its prior written consent to the transfers of the Interest for the purposes of article 18.1 of the Articles and this Transfer Agreement constituting express notice in writing to the Fund of the assignment set out at clause 1(c) above for the purposes of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Guernsey) Law, 1979 (as amended).

5. Completion: As of the date of approval by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 of (*i*) this Transfer Agreement and (*ii*) the Settlement Agreement (the "**Effective Date**"):

   a. each Transferor shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Transferee a transfer instrument relating to the Transferred Shares duly executed and completed by that Transferor in favor of the Transferee; and

   b. the Transferee shall deliver to the Transferors and the Fund a duly executed and dated Adherence Agreement (as defined in the Members' Agreement).

   Prior to the Effective Date the Transferee shall procure that:

   c. the board of directors of the Fund shall hold a meeting at which the transfer of the Shares to the Transferee shall be approved and registration in the register of members of the Fund shall be effected on the Effective Date.

6. Miscellaneous.

   a. Each of the parties hereto agree to execute any further instruments and perform any further acts which are or may become reasonably necessary to carry out the intent of this Transfer Agreement or are reasonably requested by the Portfolio Manager, the Fund or a Transferor to complete the transfer of the Interest.

b. The parties to this Transfer Agreement acknowledge that the terms of this Transfer Agreement are the result of arms'-length negotiations between the parties and their respective counsel. Each party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Transfer Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Transfer Agreement, the language or drafting of this Transfer Agreement will not be construed against any party.

c. This Transfer Agreement shall be governed by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the internal substantive laws of the state of Delaware, without giving effect to conflicts of law principles.

d. The representations, warranties and covenants of the Transferors and the Transferee shall remain in full force and effect following the transfer of the Interest, and the Fund and the Portfolio Manager thereafter may rely on all such representations, warranties and covenants.

e. This Transfer Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Transfer Agreement for any purpose.

f. Captions of sections have been added only for convenience and shall not be deemed to be a part of this Transfer Agreement.

g. This Transfer Agreement is among the parties hereto. No Person that is not a party hereto shall have any right herein as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise except as expressly contemplated hereby.

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Transfer Agreement as of the date first above written.

TRANSFEREE:

HCMLP Investments, LLC

By: Highland Capital Management, L.P.

Its: Member

By: _____

Name: James P. Seery, Jr.

Title: Chief Executive Officer

PORTFOLIO MANAGER:

Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd.

By: _____

Name: James P. Seery, Jr.

Title: President

FUND:
Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.

By: _____

Name:

Title:

[Additional Signatures on Following Page]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Transfer Agreement as of the date first above written.

TRANSFERORS:

HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P., its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HV International VIII Secondary L.P.

By: HIPEP VIII Associates L.P.
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest GP LLC
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its Managing Member

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited
Its Alternative Investment Fund Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its General Partner

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P.

By: HarbourVest Partners (Ireland) Limited
Its Alternative Investment Fund Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners L.P.
Its Duly Appointed Investment Manager

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its General Partner

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P.

By: HarbourVest 2017 Global Associates L.P.
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest GP LLC
Its General Partner

By: HarbourVest Partners, LLC
Its Managing Member

By: _____

Name: Michael Pugatch

Title: Managing Director

[Signature Page to Transfer of Ordinary Shares of Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.]

Exhibit A

Transferee Name	**Number of Shares**	**Percentage**
HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P.	54,355,482.14	71.0096%
HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P.	7,426,940.38	9.7025%
HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P.	3,713,508.46	4.8513%
HV International VIII Secondary L.P.	9,946,780.11	12.9944%
HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P.	1,103,956.03	1.4422%

HMIT Exhibit 12

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Petitioner.	§	191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER

Came on for consideration *Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Verified Rule 202 Petition* ("Petition") filed by petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"). The Court, having considered the Petition, the joint verified response in opposition filed by respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill"), HMIT's reply, the evidence admitted during the hearing conducted on February 22, 2023, the argument of counsel during that hearing, Farallon's and Stonehill's post-hearing brief, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes that HMIT's Petition should be denied and that this case should be dismissed. Therefore,

The Court ORDERS that HMIT's Petition be, and is hereby, DENIED, and that this case be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

THE COURT SO ORDERS.

Signed this 16th day of March, 2023.

HONORABLE GENA SLAUGHTER

HMIT Exhibit 13

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	Case N. 19-34054 (SGJ)
Debtor.	

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THE ESTATE AND ASSETS HELD BY THE CLAIMANT TRUST

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By this Motion, the Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") respectfully seeks a determination by this Court of the current value of the estate and an accounting of the assets currently held the Claimant Trust and available for distribution to creditors, as contemplated by the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization, as Amended (the "Plan") of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (the "Debtor" or "HCMLP"). Notably, although the latest quarterly operating report filed by the Reorganized Debtor projects a distribution to creditors totaling $205 million (a scant $11 million more than what the Debtor projected in its Plan Disclosure), Dugaboy has reason to believe that the mix of assets held by the Claimant Trust has changed dramatically since this Court confirmed the Plan and that the estate presently has sufficient cash and other assets with which to pay creditors in full plus interest. At the same time, the Reorganized Debtor has reported that it has paid to professionals nearly $70 million since the Effective Date of the Plan—an enormous burn for an estate that projects payment of fractionally more to creditors. And extrapolating from the Reorganized Debtor's most recent financial

reporting, it appears that the estate has reserved or accrued for tens of millions of dollars of additional professional fees.

2. Notably, the Court previously described Dugaboy's interest in the estate as "extremely remote," a finding based solely on a projection as of February 2021. *See* Order dated February 22, 2021, Dkt. 1943 ("Plan Confirmation Order") at ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 18. That projection was made at an arbitrary point in time (now 16 months ago) and was based on the value of assets then held by the estate, which necessarily fluctuates. But the value of the assets available for distribution to creditors is vastly different today than it was in February of 2021. We know this because certain assets have been liquidated, transforming what were once projections into finite values, and other assets have increased in value. Dugaboy believes that the combination of assets and cash held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries—if liquidated—would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full with interest or, at the very least, come very close. In other words, based upon reality as opposed to the Debtor's projections 16 months ago, the nature of Dugaboy's interest in the estate—and its standing to seek redress in the bankruptcy proceedings—cannot now be classified as remote.

3. By way of example only, at the time of the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, it reported the value of HarbourVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF") as $22 million. *See* Dkt 1625, p.9 at fn. 5. But based on the research Dugaboy has done, HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was worth closer to $45 million at the time the Debtor acquired that interest and is worth approximately $75 million today, with the majority of the value held in cash.[1]

[1] We know, for example, that HCLOF's interest in the Acis CLOs is worth at least $53 million, of which the Debtor

4. Dugaboy's interest in the estate is very much real and realizable because there is a potential for significant payment to residual equity holders, and the way in which the estate is managed (including its expenses for such management) could detrimentally affect Dugaboy's financial interests. Indeed, Dugaboy believes that the estate has ample cash and other assets with which to pay all creditors in full, with interest, and to pay a return to residual equity holders like Dugaboy. In particular, Dugaboy believes that the Claimant Trustee has sold all but four major assets of the estate, bringing the value of the Claimant Trust to approximately $685 million, including almost $300 million in cash. In other words, the funds available to pay creditors and equity holders has grown tremendously since Plan confirmation. This difference in value is important—and underscores the need for this Motion—because, if accurate, it means that professionals representing the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Dugaboy, Hunter Mountain, and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation will be Dugaboy and Hunter Mountain. In other words, Dugaboy and Hunter Mountain are essentially footing the bill for huge legal fees so that the Claimant Trust and Litigation Sub-Trust can sue them only to return any recoveries back to them. Dugaboy has a very significant interest in a determination as to whether sufficient funds currently exist or will exist to pay all creditors in full such that the estate and its professionals can stop incurring professional fees to pursue unnecessary litigation.

5. Even if the estate does not have sufficient assets at present to pay all allowed claims in full with interest, a determination of the current value of the estate would still benefit all creditors, residual equity holders, and parties-in-interest because such a determination would reveal the spread between the estate's asset value (exclusive of various adversary proceedings,

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is entitled to 50.62% as a result of the acquisition of the HarbourVest interest, or $26.8 million. HCLOF also had significant holdings in the Highland CLOs, which held, among other assets, MGM stock. *See* Dkt. 1235 at ¶¶ 1-2.

including the notes lawsuits and the Kirschner litigation) and the estate's net liabilities to creditors. If all interested parties were able to understand that spread, it could facilitate a settlement that would achieve payment of creditors in full and resolution of all outstanding litigation while preventing the further enormous burn occasioned by legal fees and other costs currently borne by the estate (nearly $70 million since the Effective Date and accruing at a rate of what Dugaboy estimates to be approximately $5-$7 million/month).[2]

6. Accordingly, this Motion seeks an evidentiary hearing so that the Court may determine the current amount of cash and other assets currently held by the Claimant Trust for distribution to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries (as that term is defined in the Plan). At the very least, disclosure of the assets held by the Claimant Trust may facilitate a meaningful settlement discussion and potentially end the litigation and appellate proceedings currently burdening the estate and resulting in very high legal fees, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

II. BACKGROUND

A. HCMLP Files A Chapter 11 Petition Anticipating A Quick Restructuring And Exit From Bankruptcy

7. HCMLP filed its chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019. Dkt. 3.[3] The case was transferred over HCMLP's objection to this Court on December 4, 2019. Dkt. 1. As the Court has since acknowledged, at the time HCMLP filed its chapter 11 petition, the company had "relatively insignificant secured indebtedness," "did not have problems with its trade vendors or landlords," and "did not suffer any type of catastrophic business calamity." Order (I)

[2] *See* Dkt. 3325, indicating that the Reorganized Debtor has disbursed $76,788,959 since the Effective Date, of which only $6,966,266 has been paid to administrative, secured, priority, and general unsecured claims.
[3] All references to the docket are to the docket entries in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief ("Plan Confirmation Order"), Dkt. 1943, ¶ 8. Indeed, at the time of its filing, HCMLP had over $550 million in assets and no outstanding judgment liabilities against it other than the award issued by the American Arbitration Association in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds.[4] As a result, there was every reason to believe that HCMLP could achieve a quick and orderly restructuring of its judgment debt and emerge from bankruptcy a going concern.

B. The Debtor and its Management Were Not Required To Disclose Assets and Transactions During Bankruptcy Proceedings

8. As the Court is aware, a quick exit from bankruptcy did not transpire as anticipated. During the 16 months between the time of HCMLP's bankruptcy filing and the Court's approval of the Plan, the estate's value did not remain static. Nonetheless, the Debtor—with the Court's approval—only provided the public with limited information regarding the mix of assets held by the estate (including at the subsidiary level). The Court likewise granted the Debtor's request to shield from public scrutiny asset sales conducted by the Debtor's management during bankruptcy. For example, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that were acquired as part of the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest into a non-debtor special purpose entity. *See* Dkt. 1788. That placement meant that the true value of the asset, the asset's appreciated value, and its ultimate liquidation were not reported or disclosed to creditors or other interested parties.

9. The Court also did not require the Debtor to file any Rule 2015.3 reports during the bankruptcy proceedings, notwithstanding that the Debtor did not seek relief from the

[4] HCMLP expected to pay the Redeemer Committee approximately $110 million on that award, after offsets and other adjustments.

requirement.[5] Such reports were especially important here, where the Debtor held most of its assets in subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required reports is difficult to understand. Indeed, despite this Court's characterization of HCMLP as a "byzantine complex" (*see* Plan Confirmation Order, ¶ 6), the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments (less than ten line items), most of which have audited financials and/or were required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[6] Further, the Debtor provided information regarding these assets' value to the Official Committee for Unsecured Creditors ("UCC") on a weekly basis during the bankruptcy proceedings, and the UCC was able to summarize the so-called "byzantine complex" in two short pages attached to the Debtor's Amended Operating Protocols. *See* Dkt. 466-1. Because the same information was not provided in Rule 2015.3 reports, there was no publicly available information regarding the composition of assets and the corresponding liabilities held by the Debtor at the subsidiary level, making it impossible for outside stakeholders and interested parties to fairly evaluate the Debtor's estate.

10. Following an extended period of non-transparency and vague quarterly reporting in which the Debtor represented that the estate had suffered a loss in value of more than $230 million (*see* Disclosure Statement, Dkt. 1473), Dugaboy filed a motion seeking appointment of an examiner to independently examine the estate, the reasons for its apparent losses, and other

[5] As the Court is aware, there is a mechanism for seeking such relief under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Specifically, the Court could have granted the Debtor relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(d). But HCMLP did not seek relief from the requirements under Rule 2015.3(a), nor did it make any "good faith effort" to comply with the Rule. To the contrary, Mr. Seery publicly represented that the task of filing the required reports simply "fell through the cracks." *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[6] Indeed, during one deposition, Mr. Seery was able to identify most of HCMLP's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by the Debtor's subsidiaries. *See* Deposition of James P. Seery, Jr. ("Seery Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 22:4-10, 23:1-29:10.

issues relating to estate value. *See generally* Dkt. 1752. Although Dugaboy filed the motion well before the Plan confirmation hearing, the Court set the motion six weeks out on a date well after the confirmation hearing. *See* Dkt. 1832. Thereafter, the Court denied the motion as moot in light of the Plan Confirmation Order, which the Court held stripped it of authority to appoint an examiner. Dkt. 1960.

11. In connection with the hearing in the Confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, the Debtor offered up a chart (entitled "Plan Analysis v. Liquidation Analysis"), which attempted to reflect both what creditors could receive in a liquidation and that which Creditors could receive under the Plan. But the analysis reflected in that document is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the document was a summary based upon projections.[7] Second, the Debtor refused to disclose subsidiary ledgers that comprised a significant amount of the Debtor's monetization value. But based on that analysis, and the testimony of Mr. Seery at the Plan confirmation hearing—which the Court accepted—the Debtor projected at confirmation that it would realize only $257 million dollars from the "monetization" of its assets by December 31, 2022. Dkt. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr.) at 120:10-121:3, 122:13-123:2.

12. It is now close to a year and a half after the Debtor's Plan projections were provided to the Court, and Dugaboy is merely asking for the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing so that the projections can be judged by the realities of the ongoing liquidation of estate assets and the known increases in asset value. Based on known settlements and other filings reflecting allowed claims, Dugaboy believes that allowed claims to be paid now total at least $400 million. But nobody has disclosed the total other liabilities of the Claimant Trust. Nor do interested stakeholders know how much was drawn on the exit loan approved by this Court,

[7] What is more, Seery admitted under oath that, in putting together the projections, the Debtor's management arbitrarily adjusted downward third-party valuations of certain Debtor assets. Seery Dep., Ex. A, at 48:1-50:6.

how much is outstanding on that loan today, and what other payables and contractual liabilities are owed on account of the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Sub-Trust. All of this information is critical to ascertaining what the estate is capable of paying to creditors now or in the near-term and whether a remainder will be left for the residual equity holders.

13. After confirmation of the Debtor's Plan but before the Plan Effective Date, in light of evolving information relating to the value of the estate, Dugaboy moved to compel the Debtor's compliance with Rule 2015.3. Dkt. 2256. In response, the Debtor argued that compliance with the Rule was too cumbersome, which again, strains credulity for several reasons. First, the Debtor's management, including Mr. Seery, are experienced estate professionals who are accustomed to dealing with complex financial structures. Second, the Debtor, as a registered investment advisor, was required by law to know precisely what assets it had under management. And third the financial information that HCMLP should have disclosed pursuant to Rule 2015.3 was at management's fingertips and indeed was information that management was required to disclose to the UCC on a *weekly basis* pursuant to its Amended Operating Protocols. *See supra* at ¶ 11 & n. 3; Dkt. 466 at p. 3.

14. The Court set an initial hearing on Dugaboy's Rule 2015.3 motion for June 20, 2021, but thereafter continued the hearing until September 2021 to ensure the hearing occurred after the Effective Date. The Court then denied the motion as moot in light of the intervening effective date of the Plan in August 2021. *See* Dkt. 2812.

C. The Bankruptcy Court Approves A Liquidation Plan

15. The Court ultimately approved a Plan that contemplates the liquidation of HCMLP and an orderly wind-down of operations. *See* Plan Confirmation Order, ¶ 2. In reaching its conclusion that the Plan was in the "best interest" of creditors and other

stakeholders, the Court expressly relied upon the Amended Liquidation Analysis/Financial Projections filed by the Debtor that projected a recovery by Class 7 General Unsecured Creditors of 85% and Class 8 General Unsecured Creditors of 71%. *Id.*, ¶ 52; *see also* Dkt. 1875 at p. 4.

16. Further, the Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Plan Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18. But based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

D. The Plan Grants Dugaboy A Springing Interest In The Claimant Trust

17. Notably, the Plan expressly contemplates potential payment to Dugaboy and other residual equity holders. Rather than leaving Dugaboy and residual equity holder Hunter Mountain Investment Trust with no interest in the Claimant Trust, the Plan expressly includes residual equity holders in the definition of "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries" as follows:

> "*Claimant Trust Beneficiaries*" means the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full, post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, **Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests**.

Plan, § B, ¶ 27 (emphasis added). The Plan, in turn, makes clear that Dugaboy is a holder of

Class A Limited Partnership Interests. *Id.*, ¶ 33; *see also id.*, ¶¶ 24-26, 29-31 (describing the assets to be held by the Claimant Trust for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the manner in which the Claimant Trust is to be operated).

18. In other words, under the Plan, after all allowed claims are paid in full plus interest, the assets of the trust and any payment from the operation of the Claimant Trust goes to Dugaboy (and Hunter Mountain, as a holder of Class B/C Partnership Interests). *Id.*, ¶¶ 33-36.

E. There Is Credible Evidence Demonstrating That The Estate's Value Has Changed

19. Since the entry of the Court's Plan Confirmation Order, the Debtor's financial outlook has changed, making the Amended Liquidation Analysis/Financial Projections on which the Court based its Plan Confirmation Order inapplicable. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the value of the estate has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only do many of the assets held by the estate fluctuate in value based on market conditions, but Dugaboy is aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, resulting in increased value to the estate.

20. Specifically, Dugaboy's information relating to estate value as of June 1, 2022 is as follows:

Asset Values as of June 1, 2022 (in millions)

Cash as of February 1, 2022			125.0
Proceeds from MGM Sale			25.0
Proceeds from CLO Distributions			37.5
Proceeds from Restoration Liquidation[8]			
MGM Sale		139.0	
CCS medical Sale		21.0	
Cornerstone (business sale)		100.0	
Cornerstone (MGM shares)		48.0	
Total:		308.0	
HCMLP Interest	16.7%		51.4
Proceeds from Multi-Strat Liquidation			55.0
Total Cash as of June 1, 2022			**293.9**
To be Monetized:			
Trussway			230.0
Remaining Harbourvest CLOs			37.5
Korea Fund			18.0
Celtic Litigation*			25.0
SE Multifamily*			20.0
Affiliate Notes*			50.0
Other			10.0
Total to be Monetized			**390.5**
Total Cash and Assets			**684.4**

*Subject to dispute

21. Likewise, the total value of allowed claims has changed since Plan confirmation. The Debtor and Reorganized Debtor have settled some creditor claims and seen others dismissed, making estimates given during the Plan confirmation hearing obsolete.

22. Despite this evidence, the Debtor's most recent sworn financial statement dated March 31, 2022, contains materially unchanged projections. *See* Dkt. 3325. This should raise

[8] Restoration documents provide for manager incentive fees, which could increase realizations to the estate.

alarm bells for the Court, particularly because the Debtor's underlying assets naturally fluctuate in value and because the Debtor has engaged in the sale of virtually all major assets since confirmation.

23. Further, the post-confirmation reports filed by the Debtor do not provide any information to creditors regarding the prospect of payment and the expectation of future payment. Specifically, the report for the quarter ending March 31, 2022, reflects that only approximately $6.9 million dollars has been paid to creditors, notwithstanding that the Reorganized Debtor and/or Claimant Trust are holding huge amounts of cash as a result of the asset sales reported above.

E. Dugaboy's Appellate Rights Are Compromised By Outdated Projections

24. The Court's repeated description of Dugaboy's interest in the estate as "remote" is problematic for other reasons as well. As this Court is aware, Dugaboy has appealed several orders issued by the Court in HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, both to the District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. *See, e.g.*, Case No. 22-10189 (5th Cir.); Case No. 21-90011 (5th Cir.); Case No. 21-cv-01295 (N.D. Tex.); Case No. 21-00546 (N.D. Tex.).

25. At least one of those appeals has been dismissed because the appellate court determined that Dugaboy lacked standing to pursue it. *See, e.g.*, *Highland Capital Mgmt. Fund Advisors, L.P., et al. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., LP*, Case No. 3:21-cv-01895-D (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 44, at 4. This Court's prior finding that Dugaboy's interest in the bankruptcy proceedings is "remote" and "contingent" no doubt played a role in these dismissals. In particular, the appellate courts have relied upon a Fifth Circuit decision—*In re Coho Energy*—which stands for the proposition that an appellant must possess an economic interest in the outcome of an

appeal that is not remote or contingent at the time the appeal is heard. Under *Coho*, a party that may have had standing at the time of filing its appeal under 11 U.S.C. § 1109 may be subjected to a higher and stricter standard for standing later in the appellate process.

26. Dugaboy has appealed the dismissal of one of its appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and has raised in its appellate briefing the wisdom and statutory basis for the Court's opinion in *Coho.* In particular, Dugaboy has argued that *Coho's* iteration of standing cannot be correct because the value of estate assets fluctuates during and after bankruptcy, such that the value of interests held by creditors and residual equity holders likewise fluctuates over time. Standing thus cannot be captured at a single point in time but must account for these potential fluctuations and acknowledge that fluctuations can place a particular party "in the money" such that decisions issued in bankruptcy can cause that party harm.

III. DUGABOY HAS STANDING IN THESE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

27. The Plan, on its face, gives Dugaboy an interest in the estate. Accordingly, and as this Court has acknowledged (*see* Plan Confirmation Order, ¶ 17), Dugaboy has standing to raise issues affecting the estate and Dugaboy's interest in it, including by filing the present motion seeking disclosure of the current value of assets held by the Claimant Trust. No other Court can hold the valuation hearing requested by Dugaboy.

28. First, Dugaboy has statutory standing to be heard and to object to actions taken by the Debtor and the Claimant Trustee in these bankruptcy proceedings. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code gives any "party in interest" the right to participate in a debtor's chapter 11 proceedings. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). While neither 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) nor any other section in the Bankruptcy Code specifically defines the term "party in interest," section 1109(b) provides a non-exclusive list of entities that fall within the meaning of "party in interest" for the

purposes of a chapter 11 proceeding. *See Kipp Flores Architects, L.L.C. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.*, 852 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2017). This non-exclusive list "broadly includes debtors, creditors, trustees, indenture trustees, and equity security holders." *Id.* Other courts and authorities have similarly concluded that parties in interest "include not only the debtor, but anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding." *Adair v. Sherman*, 230 F.3d 890, 894 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000); *see also* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.02 (16th ed. 2020) ("In the context of a chapter 11 case in particular, the term 'party in interest' expressly includes the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.").

29. Further, any party in interest may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under [Chapter 11]." 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Indeed, Section 1109(b) "has been construed to create a broad right of participation in Chapter 11 cases." *In re Global Indus. Technologies, Inc.*, 645 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting *In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc.*, 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.21 (3d Cir. 2004)).

30. Second, Dugaboy also has Article III standing to be heard in these bankruptcy proceedings. As the Supreme Court of the United States recently observed and held, Congress long ago abolished the requirement of a minimum amount in controversy for purposes of establishing related federal question jurisdiction. *See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski*, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 792, 802 (2021) ("But Congress abolished the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction in 1980…And we have never held that one applies as a matter of constitutional law.") (internal citation omitted). The absence of a minimum amount in controversy requirement under Section 1334 indicates that it should receive a parallel

construction. Indeed, in *Uzuegbunam*, the majority held that nominal damages or compensatory damages of one dollar ($1.00) are sufficient to establish the redressability requirement under Article III.

31. As the court is aware, there is more than $1 in controversy here. Indeed, depending upon how the estate is managed post-confirmation, Dugaboy stands to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars as a residual equity holder. And regardless of the amount of that recovery, Dugaboy has a very real interest in how the estate is managed by the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee because that management will dictate whether and how much Dugaboy receives after payment of all creditors of the estate.

32. So, whether as a party in interest under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) or for purposes of Article III, Dugaboy has the requisite standing.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING THE VALUE OF THE ESTATE AND THE ASSETS HELD BY THE CLAIMANT TRUST

33. In addition to issuing a finding that Dugaboy has standing to appear, be heard, and object in these bankruptcy proceedings, the Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing and require disclosure by the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trustee of the value of the estate and all assets held by the Claimant Trust that are available for distribution to creditors and residual equity holders. At a minimum, the hearing would provide valuable information regarding:

- The cash held by the Reorganized Debtor and various entities controlled by the Reorganized Debtor;
- How the cash was acquired and, more specifically, what assets were sold or liquidated;
- How the amounts received for assets sold or liquidated compares to the projections made by the Debtor at the time of Plan confirmation;

- The value of estate assets still held for the benefit of the estate and its creditors, whether held by the Reorganized Debtor or the Claimant Trust;
- The post-confirmation expenses incurred or to be incurred pursuant to contractual obligations by the estate and its professionals;[9]
- The claims that must be paid prior to the interests of Dugaboy and Hunter Mountain springing into existence;
- Expected professional fees, based at a minimum on the post-confirmation engagement letter with Mr. Seery and/or the agreement entered into between the Debtor and Mr. Seery regarding post-confirmation management of the Debtor and Mr. Seery's compensation package to be paid by the estate.

34. Such a hearing would benefit not only Dugaboy in ascertaining the value of its current interest in the estate but also stands to benefit the estate and its creditors in two core ways. First, there are currently pending adversary proceedings seeking to recover value for HCMLP's estate, when no such additional value is necessary to pay creditors in full and which could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid. Second, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Marc Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or can be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. If at the hearing the Court finds that the estate is solvent or the spread is minimal, it can order mediation to settle the estate. Again, a quick resolution of all outstanding proceedings can only benefit the estate and its creditors.

35. The idea that the estate will incur an additional $20+ million in legal fees and success bonuses when the estate can be finally resolved now should be of concern to the Court.

[9] The Debtor's Post-Confirmation Report for the quarter ending March 31, 2022, shows total post-Effective Date disbursements by the estate of approximately $81.9 million. *See* Dkt. 3325 at p. 2. The same Report projects additional expenditures of approximately $211 million.

The Court should not encourage a repeat of the WRT case (which incidentally was managed by Golden & Associates and David Pauker, who is a member of the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust).

36. Dugaboy is likewise concerned that very few distributions have been made thus far to creditors. Dugaboy recognizes that the various trust agreements provide great latitude to the Claimant Trustee, but the fact that allowed claims are incurring interest, and it is unknown whether the Claimant Trust is earning a return equal to that being incurred on creditor claims, is another cause for concern and a reason to require the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust to provide this information at an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Dugaboy respectfully requests that the Court enter an order: (i) finding that Dugaboy has standing in these bankruptcy proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) and Article III of the United States Constitution; and (ii) setting an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the assets currently available for distribution to allowed claimants, to determine the current value of those assets, and to determine whether there is a potential for settling the estate now, without further pursuing continued expensive and protracted litigation and without incurring additional enormous professional fees.

Dated: June 30, 2022

Respectfully Submitted,

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Counsel for The Dugaboy Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Douglas S. Draper, the undersigned, hereby certify that on June 30th, 2022, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing was served via the Court's ECF system on counsel for the Debtor and on all other parties requesting or consenting to such service in this case as follows:

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/s/ Douglas S. Draper
Douglas S. Draper

EXHIBIT A

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION.

In Re: Chapter 11

HIGHLAND CAPITAL Case No.

MANAGEMENT, LP, 19-34054-SGJ 11

Debtor

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

J. SEERY

Q. Excuse me?

A. I believe it does.

Q. Is there a subsidiary ledger that would tell me what is the note component versus what is the hard asset component?

A. Yes.

Q. Who has that?

A. I do.

MR. DRAPER: Mr. Morris, can I get that document?

MR. MORRIS: I will take it under advisement.

Q. There is also a Dugaboy note in your notes that is to be sold. Is that Dugaboy note in the $40 million, or is it in the hard asset monetization?

A. I believe it is in the -- it is to be sold, so it is not collected in full. If they default, then we would accelerate that and collect that in full as well.

Q. That doesn't answer my question unfortunately. What I am asking you, is

J. SEERY

it in the $40 million calculation, or in the $200 million number?

A. It doesn't answer your question because you didn't listen to my prior answer. I said that the 40 million calculation was for stuff that had been demanded. I think you represent -- do you represent Dugaboy? I don't think we demanded --

Q. I do. Excuse me?

A. So if it wasn't demanded, it is not in the hard asset calculation; it's in the discounted amount.

Q. Let me try to understand your answer. What you are telling me, just so we are both clear, is that that Dugaboy note is not in the $40 million; it is in the balance of the 257? That is a yes or no answer.

A. I didn't take it as a question. It sounded like a statement. I agree with your statement.

Q. Thank you. So the answer is yes?

J. SEERY

A. It wasn't a question. I agree with your statement; yes.

Q. Thank you.

Now, let's go to the November 2020 schedule that we had. If you see in the line "Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets," you had $190 million under the plan analysis?

A. Yes.

Q. What percentage of that are notes versus hard assets?

A. The demand notes only were included in the proceeds in terms of recovery in full. I don't quite understand your distinction between hard assets. There is a lot of intangibles as well as tangibles in the total.

But if we are distinguishing between notes and other assets, the demand notes are included in the 190. The longer dated notes are assumed to be sold. So, they are included but they are included at a much lower amount.

Q. Okay. Now how much of the

J. SEERY

demand notes in the 190, Mr. Seery?

A. Off the top of my head I don't recall. It is the Dondero demand notes as well as the HCFMA demand notes, so it should be about 15 to $20 million. Somewhere in that realm. The same as the other demand notes.

Q. Were the other notes, the $40 million of notes that you referenced in the January document, were they carried at face or at discounted amount in the 190?

A. In the 190, the ones that were demand were carried at face. The ones that were long dated, which really at that point I believe -- the only difference is the $24-and-change-million NexPoint Advisors note was at a discounted amount. The others were at face.

Q. What was the discount that was applied to that note?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head. It is pretty significant because of the long dated nature of the notes. They

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. That is the HarbourVest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original thereof now in my office this the 15th day of February 2023 at Dallas, Texas
Clerk, U. S. Bankruptcy Court
Northern District of Texas
By Sue Duggan Deputy

HMIT Exhibit 14

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	**Case No. 19-34054-sgj11**
	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	**Chapter 11**
	§	
	§	**Relates to Dkt. No. 3382**
Debtor	§	

LIMITED RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF CERTAIN REQUESTED RELIEF

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain") files this *Limited Response in Support of Certain Requested Relief* (the "Response") in connection with the *Motion For Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust* [**Dkt. No. 3382**] (the "Motion for Valuation") filed by the Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and supports Dugaboy's request for information from the reorganized debtor ("HCMLP") and the Claimant Trust, as defined in the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management,*

L.P. (as modified) [**Dkt. No. 1943**] (the "Plan"),[1] regarding the value of the Reorganized Debtor Assets and Claimant Trust Assets, as well as the outstanding Class 8 and 9 Claims.

SUMMARY

1. Hunter Mountain believes that no Professional, Claimant Trust Beneficiary, nor this Court would support the idea that the Plan provides that the Litigation Sub-Trust should pursue litigation against Holders of Equity Interest to generate a recovery with which to pay distributions to those same Holders of Equity Interest, less the costs of that litigation. Yet, given the allegations in the Motion for Valuation and general lack of transparency into the Reorganized Debtor Assets, Claimant Trust Assets, and outstanding obligations that must be resolved, including the Class 8 and 9 Claims, Hunter Mountain—as both a Holder of Class 10 - Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests and a defendant in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding[2]—is concerned that this could occur in this case. Therefore, Hunter Mountain submits that to best effectuate the Plan, HCMLP and the Claimant Trust should work with Holders of Equity Interests, like Hunter Mountain, to provide transparency into the value of the Reorganized Debtor Assets and Claimant Trust Assets and outstanding Class 8 and 9 Claims.

BACKGROUND

A. Hunter Mountain holds a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest

2. HCMLP is a Delaware limited partnership. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interest (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure

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[1] Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein take their meaning from the Plan.

[2] *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. Dondero et al* [Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj]

Statement [**Dkt. No. 1473**], ¶F(4). The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCMLP's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id*. In the aggregate, HCMLP's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand. *Id*.

3. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests which are Class 11. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶H(10) and (11). According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are be subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

4. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those Equity Interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain *Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended* (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

5. The Plan created the Claimant Trust which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full,

> post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27. Therefore, Hunter Mountain holds a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

6. Therefore, depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Hunter Mountain may become a Claimant Trust Beneficiary.

7. In other words, the status of the Bankruptcy Case is a liquidation, and there are assets including (this is a generalization) cash, ownership interests in entities, investments into entities and funds, perhaps real estate, and litigation claims ("Assets"). There are obligations, including the Exit Facility, Allowed Claims, obligations to Indemnified Parties, etc. Further, there are ongoing (and we assume material) administrative and litigation costs, and obligations arising under the Plan for payment of various success fees, etc., to various persons in connection with the liquidation (collectively, the "Obligations").

8. Hunter Mountain is "in the money" if the Assets are greater than the Obligations.

9. Further, Hunter Mountain and perhaps other persons and entities could have incentive to discuss with HCMLP and the Claimant Trust the prospect of an overall resolution if it could obtain some level of clarity as to the value of the assets and the amount of the Obligations. Information could facilitate discussion. For example, Hunter Mountain assumes that while the Exit Facility has repayment obligations that must be made on an ongoing basis, the obligations to Indemnified Parties and the necessity of payment of ongoing administrative and litigations costs may cause a postponement of distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims, creating a circle whereby Allowed Claims are not paid, the value of current assets is being used, so that the Asset

over Obligations ratio is currently decreasing. So as time passes, the value of Assets is decreasing, which requires reliance upon litigation claims to replace such diminution.

10. So, even if there is a deficit of Assets over Obligations, knowledge of the amount of such a deficit, with information about assets remaining, could generate a picture of a current deficit, and better the possibility of a resolution that could create a maximization of the Asset value and a capping of the Obligations (for example, in a resolution situation there would be no obligations to Indemnified Parties so any reserve could be utilized free of such obligations; and no further need for projection and payment of administrative and litigation costs so no growing deficit).

B. Holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests have no insight into the value of the Assets or amount of Obligations.

11. While whether Hunter Mountain's Contingent Claimant Trust Interest will vest into a Claimant Trust Interest is dependent upon the Asset value over Obligations amount, Hunter Mountain has little to no insight into what these values may be and no method to independently ascertain them.

12. HCMLP and the Claimant Trust file quarterly post-confirmation reports, but these reports do not provide the relevant information related to the true Asset value versus the Obligations. These reports state that all Claims in Classes 6 and 7 were paid in full and that Classes 8 and 9 have received non-cash distributions in to and form of Claimant Trust Interests and therefore any distributions to holders of Class 8 and Class 9 claims will be made by the Claimant Trust. *See* Dkt. No. 3409-1. But the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Dkt. No. 3410-1. Further Hunter Mountain has no independent knowledge of the amount of Class 8 and 9 Allowed Claims.

13. Further, the quarterly post-confirmation reports only reflect assets directly held HCMLP which are only a fraction of the Assets.

14. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and notify the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9). But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests.

C. Hunter Mountain is also a defendant in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding

15. While normally this lack of transparency into whether the Contingent Claimant Trust Interest will vest would not require valuation information to be provided at this intermediate juncture, here Hunter Mountain's status as a defendant in the Kirschner Adversary necessitates greater transparency.

16. On October 15, 2021, Marc C. Kirschner as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants including Hunter Mountain (a Holder of Class 10 Equity Interests) for various causes of action. *See* Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, Dkt. No. 1 (as amended by Dkt. No. 158).

17. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned-subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV,¶ (B)(4).

18. Therefore, any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

19. So, if Hunter Mountain could be a Claimant Trust Beneficiary, the Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Hunter Mountain, which, if it becomes a Claimant Trust Beneficiary, would be the recipient of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). This last part is the most troubling and catalyst for requiring a valuation at this juncture. The costs of litigation are only increasing and are likely to be great. Therefore, the costs to litigate against Hunter Mountain will be borne by Hunter Mountain by virtue of its status as a Holder of a Contingent Claimant Trust Interest, and every dollar incurred litigating against Hunter Mountain decreases the likelihood that Hunter Mountain's Contingent Claimant Trust Interest will vest.

20. And if whether Hunter Mountain will be a Claimant Trust Beneficiary is a close call [*i.e.* because the difference between Assets and Obligations is "small" (a relative term given the hundreds of millions of dollars at stake)], then this will greatly inform Hunter Mountain's litigation decisions and could affect materially the prospects of overall resolution.

21. Information concerning the amount of cash Assets, together with the remaining non-cash Assets (without regard to the litigation of Estate Claims), together with the current Obligations, could well generate fruitful settlement discussions because it is reasonable to believe that Hunter Mountain could decide that it can utilize non-cash assets in such a way as to maximize their value in a way that HCMLP and the Claimant Trust cannot, after resolution of the Obligations.

RELIEF REQUESTED

22. Simply put, Hunter Mountain seeks information, which is readily available to HCMLP and the Claimant Trust (and for which Hunter Mountain is willing to bear the cost of collating) that will inform whether Hunter Mountain will be a Claimant Trust Beneficiary so that:

(i) all parties can avoid the facially unpalatable circumstance of the Litigation Sub-Trust seeking recovery from Hunter Mountain which could be raised to go to pay Hunter Mountain, less the Litigation Sub-Trust's attorney's fees, and (ii) Hunter Mountain can make informed litigation decisions, including possibly seeking to assemble sufficient resources with which to resolve the Obligations, thereby negating the basis of any further litigation and resulting in an expeditious closing of the Bankruptcy Case. Hunter Mountain is situated in priority to Dugaboy, so it has a firmer basis for entitlement.

23. Hunter Mountain does not seek to interfere with or be part of the liquidation process, does not seek to examine negotiations, does not seek the identity of persons or entities with whom HCMLP or the Claimant Trust is dealing, does not seek to substitute its judgment for that of person and parties authorized under the Plan. But as a Holder of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, it is entitled to information as to the value of Assets and amount of Obligations.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

24. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

25. The relief requested by Hunter Mountain is limited to the likelihood that the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests will vest. This information will help ensure distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests as well as possibly lead to a resolution of overall the Bankruptcy Case.

CONCLUSION

26. For the reasons set forth herein, Hunter Mountain supports the request of Dugaboy to compel information regarding the value of the Assets and Obligations and the outstanding claims in Classes 8 and 9.

Respectfully submitted:

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, undersigned counsel, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document and all attachments thereto were sent via electronic mail via the Court's ECF system to all parties authorized to receive electronic notice in this case on this August 24, 2022.

/s/ Louis M. Phillips
Louis M. Phillips

HMIT Exhibit 15

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re: HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1] Reorganized Debtor.	Chapter 11 Case No. 19-34054-sgj11

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.'S BRIEF ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING TO OBTAIN THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN VALUATION MOTION[2]

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the reorganized debtor in this Chapter 11 case ("**Highland**"), respectfully submits the following arguments establishing that the relief sought by

[1] Highland's last four digits of its taxpayer identification number are (8357). The headquarters and service address for Highland is 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, TX 75201.

[2] This brief responds to the Court's request for further briefing regarding the "sole issue [of] whether the relief sought in the motion for a valuation requires an adversary proceeding." Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022, 29:9–10.

The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("**Dugaboy**") in the *Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust* [Docket No. 3382] (the "**Initial Mtn.**") and the *Supplemental and Amended Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust* [Docket No. 3533] (the "**Supp. Mtn.**" and, together with the Initial Mtn., the "**Valuation Motion**") and supported by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("**HMIT**") must be sought, if at all, by filing an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001.

Introduction

1. Dugaboy is clear about what it seeks in the Valuation Motion: an accounting of the assets held in, and the liabilities of, the Highland Claimant Trust (the "**Claimant Trust**") on a consolidated basis (*i.e.,* including the assets of Reorganized Highland, the Highland Litigation SubTrust, and the Indemnity SubTrust) so that Dugaboy may ascertain what, if any, interest it may arguably have in the Claimant Trust. But the Valuation Motion is procedurally improper because the relief sought may only be obtained in a proceeding for: (1) equitable relief; (2) declaratory relief; or (3) a determination of the extent of an interest in property.

2. Each one of these types of proceedings must be commenced by the filing of an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001. A "proceeding to obtain … equitable relief" requires an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7). A "proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment" requires an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9). And a "proceeding to determine the … extent of … [an] interest in property" requires an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2). When Bankruptcy Rule 7001 says "The following are adversary proceedings," a proceeding appearing in the rule's list of ten proceeding types *must* be brought as an adversary proceeding.[3]

[3] *See, e.g., Haber Oil Co. v. Swinehart (In re Haber Oil Co.),* 12 F.3d 426, 437–40 (5th Cir. 1994).

3. If this Court agrees that the relief sought in the Valuation Motion falls within one or more of these three categories, the Court should require Dugaboy to seek that relief by filing and prosecuting an adversary proceeding under Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules.

The Valuation Motion Seeks Equitable Relief

4. Dugaboy acknowledges that the Valuation Motion, at its core, is about obtaining information pertaining to the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust—an **accounting**. "By this Motion, … [Dugaboy] respectfully seeks … an **accounting** of the assets currently held [*sic*] the Claimant Trust …."[4] Dugaboy further characterizes the relief it seeks as an invocation of alleged "**accounting rights** of contingent [trust] beneficiaries …."[5]

5. At the initial status conference in this matter, counsel for both Dugaboy and HMIT stated repeatedly that they want an accounting (while carefully avoiding using that magic word), referring to what they want as "information" about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust:

- MR. DRAPER: … The first issue is … am I entitled to the information that I seek? … If in fact I'm entitled to the information and I'm entitled to the hearing, then we should go forward … I'm entitled to the information. And … I believe we're entitled to the information …[6]

- MR. DRAPER: … This is merely seeking information … It's seeking information as to the value of an estate … We're really asking to find out what the—what the estate is entitled—has and whether I'm entitled to a report.[7]

- MR. PHILLIPS: … If, if we could get information … We just don't know what money is there … as a practical matter, if we can get information about the assets, not only at Highland but at the subsidiaries, what's left to be done, and we could see what's reserved, then maybe everybody could stop, everybody could stop and take a look … if we knew what the assets were or we knew what the claims were, then maybe everybody could take a step back and take a look at it.[8]

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[4] Supp. Mtn. at 1 (emphasis added).

[5] *Id*. at 15 (emphasis added).

[6] Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022, at 6:5–8:17.

[7] *Id.* at 12:2–22.

[8] *Id.* at 15:24–17:18.

6. Whether it's called "information about the assets," or "information about the reserves and claims," or "information about what the estate has," or "what money is there," it remains clear that what Dugaboy and HMIT seek is an **accounting** of the Claimant Trust. An accounting is an equitable remedy that must be sought by adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7),[9] which provides that an adversary proceeding includes "a proceeding to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, except when a … plan provides for the relief."[10] For reasons extensively discussed in Highland's *Reply in Further Opposition to Valuation Motion* [Docket No. 3614], nothing in the confirmed Plan or in the Claimant Trust Agreement entitles contingent beneficiaries of the Claimant Trust to *any* information regarding trust assets, much less an accounting of the sort Dugaboy now seeks. Thus, Dugaboy seeks an equitable remedy from this Court—an accounting. That remedy must be sought by adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7). Seeking an accounting by motion as Dugaboy has done in the Valuation Motion, is improper.

7. That Dugaboy and HMIT are both seeking equitable relief is highlighted by their reliance on Bankruptcy Code § 105(a)—equitable relief—to support their request for an

[9] *See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,* 560 F. App'x 233, 243 (5th Cir. 2014) ("A suit for accounting is generally founded in equity"); *Animale Group v. Sunny's Perfume, Inc.,* 256 F. App'x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Plaintiffs seek an accounting … which is 'subject to the principles of equity,'" citing *Maltina Corp. V. Cawy Bottling Co.,* 613 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1980)); *In re Higgins,* 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3672 at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2009) ("Determination of this amount … requires an adversary proceeding for an accounting pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7001(7)/(9)"); *In re Mitchell,* 44 B.R. 485, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) ("A proceeding to obtain an accounting is generally an equitable proceeding"); *In re Turner,* 2010 Bankr LEXIS 300 at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Feb. 9, 2010) ("the debtors' request falls within the provisions of Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7001(7)—'a proceeding to obtain … other equitable relief', i.e., an accounting"); *Campbell v. Cathcart (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),* 380 B.R. 429, 443 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) ("These facts, if true, would allow the Court in its equitable jurisdiction to order Veristeel to provide an accounting of all assets of Debtor transferred," citing Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7)); 10 *Collier on Bankruptcy* ¶ 7001.08 (16th ed. 2022) ("'Other equitable relief' as used in Rule 7001(7) should include relief other than injunctions traditionally granted only by courts of equity. Accountings … immediately come to mind ….").

[10] Highland does not concede anything in respect of whether Dugaboy is entitled to the accounting it seeks. But at this point in these proceedings, the Court need not determine Dugaboy's entitlement to an accounting as a substantive matter and need only determine that the information Dugaboy seeks—which amounts to an accounting—must be sought through an adversary proceeding.

accounting.[11] The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have long recognized that bankruptcy litigants such as Dugaboy misinterpret Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) as a broad grant of authority allowing bankruptcy courts to "do equity."[12] *Collier* explains the limits on bankruptcy courts' equitable powers: "The *equitable origins* of the bankruptcy power suggest substantial leeway to tailor solutions to meet the diverse problems facing bankruptcy courts. Section 105 gives the bankruptcy court the power to *fill in gaps and further the statutory mandates of Congress* in an efficient manner."[13]

8. Insofar as the Valuation Motion seeks relief that, Dugaboy and HMIT argue, may only be granted under Bankruptcy Code § 105(a), that relief is equitable relief. Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7) requires equitable relief to be sought only through an adversary proceeding.

The Valuation Motion Seeks a Determination of the Extent of Dugaboy's Contingent Interest in Property

9. Dugaboy argues that the Plan establishes an interest in property by granting Dugaboy a contingent beneficial interest in the Claimant Trust. True enough, but Dugaboy ignores a critical word—in this context, *the* critical word—in Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2): **extent**. The Valuation Motion is about nothing if not an accounting of Claimant Trust assets and superior beneficial interests in those assets so that Dugaboy may assess the *extent* of its interest in the Claimant Trust (although neither Dugaboy nor HMIT will have any interest until their respective contingent interests vest). That Dugaboy has some sort of unvested interest in the Claimant Trust

[11] *Reply in Support,* Docket No. 3606, at 3. "MR. DRAPER: … It's really a 105 argument, Your Honor." Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022, at 11:13–14. "MR. PHILLIPS: … We think that the Court retained authority under 1142(b) and 105 to implement—determine, classify equity interests …" Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022, at 13:6–8.

[12] "We have long held that 'whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of' the Bankruptcy Code." *Law v. Siegel,* 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (referring to Bankruptcy Code § 105(a) and quoting *Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,* 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)). *See also United States v. Sutton*, 785 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Section 105] does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity").

[13] 2 *Collier on Bankruptcy* ¶ 105.01 (16th ed. 2022) (emphasis added).

(and, therefore, its property) is not in dispute—Highland and Dugaboy agree that the Plan grants Dugaboy a contingent, as-yet unvested interest in the Claimant Trust. That undisputed fact certainly cannot be the reason for bringing the Valuation Motion. It is the **extent of that interest** that is the subject of the Valuation Motion. Assessing the extent of Dugaboy's contingent interest in Claimant Trust property is the purpose of the Valuation Motion, Dugaboy's request for an evidentiary hearing, and Dugaboy's demand for an accounting (which is itself, as noted above, a demand for equitable relief requiring an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7)).

10. HMIT's counsel didn't equivocate about this when he argued at the status conference that, "We think that the Court retained authority under 1142(b) and 105 to … determine, classify equity interests …"[14] The Plan already "classifies" equity interests, so what HMIT seeks here is a "determination" of the *extent* of the equity interest. That oral argument is consistent with what HMIT said in its reply in support of the Valuation Motion: "In the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court ***expressly*** retained jurisdiction, citing sections 105 and 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code, to determine or classify any Equity Interest …."[15] "Determining" an equity interest—particularly in the context in which the Plan already classifies equity interests and establishes that Dugaboy and HMIT possess an unvested, contingent equity interest in Highland—can only mean assessing the *extent* of that equity interest, the *extent* of Dugaboy's and HMIT's entitlement to a distribution from the Claimant Trust.

11. A proceeding to "determine" an equity interest, to ascertain the value of Claimant Trust assets via an accounting, is an indispensable part of mathematically assessing the *extent of Dugaboy's interest in property*. Dugaboy concedes as much:

[14] Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022 at 13:6.

[15] *Reply in Support,* Docket No. 3606, at 3 (emphasis in original).

- An evidentiary "hearing would benefit not only Dugaboy in **ascertaining the value of its current interest in the estate** …"[16]
- "the nature of Dugaboy's interest in the estate … cannot now be classified as remote."[17]
- "Dugaboy's interest in the estate is very much real and realizable …."[18]
- "MR. DRAPER: … "there is no recourse for me to attack, or just not even attack, to have the standing that I have on an appellate issue raised at a various point in time … the February 2021 matters were based on a projection …. I should have the ability to have my standing determined at that point in time, not based upon the set of facts that existed at the confirmation hearing."[19]

12. A request to determine the extent of Dugaboy's potential future interest in the Claimant Trust must be brought as an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2): "a proceeding to determine the … extent of [an] … interest in property …"[20] Whether the proceeding seeks to determine the extent of a movant's ownership in stock or to determine the extent of an entity's limited partnership interest or the extent of a contingent beneficial interest in a creditor trust created by a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, it is a proceeding required to be commenced by the filing of an adversary complaint under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2).

13. This is why HMIT's reliance on *Pearl Resources* in its *Reply in Support* is misplaced.[21] The court there, *in an adversary proceeding to invalidate an asserted lien,* was

[16] Supp. Mtn. at 17. Of course, Dugaboy misspeaks when it refers to "its current interest in the estate." There is no estate insofar as the Plan became effective well over a year ago and vested all estate assets in the Claimant Trust. Surely, Dugaboy means "its current interest in the Claimant Trust."

[17] Supp. Mtn. at 2.

[18] Supp. Mtn. at 3.

[19] Hearing Transcript Nov. 15, 2022, at 8:23–9:8. Stated simply, Dugaboy wants to assess the **extent** of its interest in property by getting an accounting that may demonstrate that the February 2021 projections are now outdated.

[20] *See, e.g., In re Cadiz Properties,* 278 B.R. 744, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002), in which a dispute arose between a movant and a debtor regarding the extent to which the movant owned stock in the debtor; this Court (Judge Felsenthal) held that the "determination of the ownership of the stock must be resolved in an adversary proceeding," citing Bankruptcy Rules 7001(2) and (9). *See also In re Corky Foods Corp.,* 85 B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (movant sought court's determination of a specific value of a limited partnership interest; "In denying this motion, I do not pretermit [fail to mention] movant's contention that the debtor's partnership interest has a present negative value.… [T]his issue may only be presented by an adversary complaint. B.R. 7001(2) or (9)").

[21] *Reply in Support,* Docket No. 3606, at 7.

concerned with the **validity** of a lien for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 502 and the allowance of a proof of claim relating to a purported lien on mineral property: "The **validity** of Maverick's Lien Claim under Chapter 56 of the Texas Property Code is at the heart of this proceeding."[22] That court was assessing the validity of a creditor's claim against the estate under § 502 that had been made the subject of an objection because it had not been asserted as an adversary proceeding. In overruling the objection on that basis, the court—in the context of a pre-confirmation claim objection under Bankruptcy Code § 502 where "valuation" was incidental to whether the creditor had a claim at all—was addressing whether a proof of claim had to be brought as an adversary proceeding. (In this way, *Pearl Resources* stands for the unremarkable proposition that a would-be secured creditor does not have to commence an adversary proceeding to seek allowance of its proof of claim under Bankruptcy Code § 502.) That court was *not* addressing an effort to assess the **extent** of an equity holder's contingent interest in property (already established and allowed under a confirmed and effective Plan and an effective Claimant Trust Agreement) nearly two years post-confirmation. Dugaboy seeks something entirely different from what the court in *Pearl Resources* was addressing (in the context of pre-confirmation claim allowance)—an accounting of a post-effective date Claimant Trust's assets and liabilities to enable Dugaboy to measure the **extent** of its contingent interest in the Claimant Trust.

14. All the relief Dugaboy seeks in the Valuation Motion is intended to allow Dugaboy to ascertain the *extent* of its interest in the Claimant Trust (although Dugaboy will never have an interest in the Claimant Trust until its contingent interest has vested). Thus, all the relief Dugaboy seeks in the Valuation Motion must be sought in an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2).

[22] *Pearl Res. LLC v. Allied OFS LLC (In re Pearl Res. LLC),* 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 2675 at *22 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2022) (emphasis added).

The Valuation Motion Seeks a Declaratory Judgment

15. The Valuation Motion does not only seek information—an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust on a consolidated basis. The Valuation Motion goes further, seeking a determination from this Court that the value of the Claimant Trust's assets exceeds the Claimant Trust's liabilities and that, therefore, Dugaboy's tiny equity interest in Highland (as a member of Class 10 under the Plan) is "in the money," and entitled to a vested beneficial interest in the Claimant Trust and a distribution from the Claimant Trust on account of its equity interests (after all creditor beneficiaries are paid in full). Leaving aside Dugaboy's mischaracterization of its interest in the Claimant Trust, Dugaboy itself characterizes the relief it seeks in the Valuation Motion as declaratory relief: "Accordingly, this Motion seeks an evidentiary hearing so that the Court may determine the current amount of cash and other assets currently held by the Claimant Trust for distribution to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries …."[23]

16. Dugaboy is asking this Court for an accounting so that the Court can *declare* Dugaboy to be "in the money." Dugaboy is asking this Court to *declare* that its contingent, inchoate, and unvested interest in the Claimant Trust somehow has positive value today—to *declare* the extent of its interest in property. Dugaboy is asking this Court to *declare* that it possesses "person aggrieved" appellate standing under applicable Fifth Circuit precedent because its contingent equity interests may someday have positive value and that, therefore, the outcome of its many appeals to the District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals will affect Dugaboy pecuniarily.[24] Dugaboy is asking this Court to *declare* that it is unreasonable for the Litigation

[23] Supp. Mtn. at 4–5.

[24] "Dugaboy's Appellate Rights Are Compromised … Dugaboy has argued [to appellate courts] that *Coho's* iteration of standing [that an appellant lacks appellate standing because it is not a "person aggrieved" and not pecuniarily affected by the outcome of the appeal] cannot be correct because the value of estate assets fluctuates during and after bankruptcy, such that the value of interests held by creditors and residual equity holders likewise fluctuates over time." Initial Mtn. at 13.

SubTrust to pursue causes of action against Dugaboy and HMIT because only Dugaboy and HMIT "stand to profit" from those proceedings.[25]

17. These requests all constitute a multi-faceted prayer for declaratory relief. By filing the Valuation Motion, Dugaboy has asked this Court for a declaratory judgment, something that Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9) requires to be sought only through an adversary proceeding: "The following are adversary proceedings: … (9) a proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment relating to any of the foregoing [types of relief] …." Dugaboy seeks equitable relief that must be sought, if at all, by an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7). It also seeks a determination of the extent of its interest in Claimant Trust assets, which must be sought, if at all, by an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2). But Dugaboy also seeks declaratory relief relating to the equitable relief it seeks and the requested determination of the extent of its interest in Claimant Trust property.[26] Seeking declaratory relief relating to each of these matters—any of these matters—requires Dugaboy to file and prosecute an adversary proceeding to obtain that declaratory relief under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9), a third basis for this Court to compel Dugaboy to commence an adversary proceeding if it wants the relief it seeks in the Valuation Motion.

Conclusion

18. Irrespective of whether the Court deems the relief sought in the Valuation Motion as equitable relief or declaratory relief or relief to determine the extent of Dugaboy's interest in property, or some combination of two or all three of those categories, that relief must be sought

[25] *[Dugaboy's] Reply in Support of Its Motion for Determination of Value* [Docket No. 3603] at 9.

[26] *See, e.g., In re Eastman Kodak Co.,* 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2746 at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (a party's request for a declaratory judgment pertaining to a determination of the extent of an interest in property requires an adversary proceeding); *In re Ortiz,* 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2148 at *6–*8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 15, 2012) (creditor sought a "declaratory judgment 'determining that [his] claim cannot be barred for lack of notice … and deeming such Proof of Claim timely filed,'" but court did "not reach [his] request for a declaratory judgment, for the reason that the seeking of a declaratory judgment requires the filing of an adversary proceeding").

within the confines of an adversary proceeding. Dugaboy (and, ostensibly, HMIT) must be required to commence an adversary proceeding.

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Dated: November 29, 2022

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HMIT Exhibit 16

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed December 6, 2022

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	
	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	
	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
	§	

ORDER DENYING MOTION [DE # 3382] AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION [DE # 3533] OF DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST DUE TO PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY: ADVERSARY PROCEEDING IS REQUIRED

I. Introduction: Context in Which Underlying Motion and Supplemental Motion Arise.

By way of background, the above-referenced bankruptcy case of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland") is in a post-confirmation stage. Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization, as Amended (the "Plan"), was confirmed on February 22, 2021 and went effective on August 11, 2021 (the "Effective Date"). Highland will be referred to sometimes as the "Reorganized Debtor," when discussing Highland during the post-Effective Date time period.

On the Effective Date of the Plan, a "Claimant Trust" was created pursuant thereto, and is governed by that certain Claimant Trust Agreement, effective as of August 11, 2021 (the "CTA"). The CTA was expressly incorporated into and is a part of the Plan. Highland's assets were either transferred to the Claimant Trust or remained at Highland for monetization. All prepetition equity interests in Highland were canceled pursuant to the Plan. New limited partnership interests in the Reorganized Debtor were issued to the Claimant Trust. Beneficial interests in the Claimant Trust were created in favor of Highland's prepetition general unsecured creditors in Class 8 (General Unsecured Claims) and Class 9 (Subordinated Claims). Former equity interests in Highland are treated under the Plan and CTA as having "Contingent Trust Interests" in the Claimant Trust, and such interests will vest into "Claimant Trust Beneficiaries" upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that holders of Allowed Claims against Highland have been paid indefeasibly in full, plus post-petition interest at the federal judgment rate.

II. Pending Motion and Supplemental Motion.

On June 30, 2022, the Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") filed a "*Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust*" [DE # 3382] (the "Value Motion"). Notably, prior to the Effective Date of the Plan, Dugaboy owned 0.1866% of Highland's total equity. By its Value Motion, Dugaboy sought "a determination by this Court of the current value of the estate and an accounting of the assets currently held the [sic] Claimant Trust and available for distribution to creditors."

Dugaboy thereafter, on September 21, 2022, filed a *"Supplemental and Amended Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust"* [DE# 3533] (the "Supp. Value Motion" and, together with the Value Motion, the "Dugaboy Value Motions"). The Supp. Value Motion further stated that "the Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing and

require disclosure by the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trustee of the value of the estate and all assets held by Claimant Trust that are available for distribution to creditors and residual equity holders." The Dugaboy Value Motions collectively express a belief that the Claimant Trust may have sufficient assets with which to pay creditors in full, with interest. The prayer for relief in the Supp. Value Motion requests "an order: (i) finding that Dugaboy has standing in these bankruptcy proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), Delaware trust law, and Article III of the United States Constitution; and (ii) setting an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the assets currently available for distribution to allowed claimants, to determine the current value of those assets, and to determine whether there is a potential for settling the estate now . . .."

The Dugaboy Value Motions were supported by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT") in a *"Limited Response in Support of Certain Requested Relief"* [DE # 3467] filed on August 24, 2022 ("HMIT Response"). Prior to the Effective Date, HMIT owned 99.5% of Highland's equity.

The Dugaboy Value Motions were opposed by the Reorganized Debtor in a "*Reorganized Debtor's Objection to Motion for Determination of Value*" [DE # 3465] filed August 24, 2022 ("Reorganized Debtor's Objection").

These various pleadings were pending for a while before the parties requested court time. At the parties' request, the court held a non-evidentiary status conference on these pleadings on November 15, 2022.

At the status conference, the court expressed concerns whether the Dugaboy Value Motions required the procedural mechanism (i.e., the due process and protections) of an adversary proceeding, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001. The court gave the parties until November 29,

2022, to submit briefs solely dealing with the issue of whether an adversary proceeding is required for the relief sought in the Dugaboy Value Motions. The court indicated it would rule on this procedural issue based on these subsequent briefs. Dugaboy, HMIT, and the Reorganized Debtor each filed briefs on November 29, 2022 [DE ## 3637, 3638, and 3639 respectively].

III. Ruling.

Based on the court's review of the briefs and deliberations, the court determines that an adversary proceeding is necessary with regard to the relief sought in the Dugaboy Value Motions.

First, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2) states that a "proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property" should be brought as an adversary. The Dugaboy Value Motions seek for the court to ***determine*** the ***extent*** of Dugaboy's ***interest*** in the ***property*** in the Creditor's Trust. Specifically, is Dugaboy "in the money" or not? Will its status as a holder of a "Contingent Trust Interest" soon spring into the status of a "Claimant Trust Beneficiary" or not? Same, obviously, for HMIT.

Additionally, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(7) states that the following should be brought as an adversary proceeding: a "proceeding to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief, except when a chapter 9, chapter 11, chapter 12 or chapter 13 plan provides for the relief." The Dugaboy Value Motions seek equitable relief that does not appear to be provided for in the confirmed chapter 11 plan. Specifically, the essence of the Dugaboy Value Motions is a request for an accounting (Dugaboy sought "a determination by this Court of the current value of the estate and an accounting of the assets currently held the [sic] Claimant Trust and available for distribution to creditors"). Dugaboy and HMIT have not pointed to any provision of the CTA that establishes a right to an accounting. The court notes anecdotally that section 3.12(a) of the CTA states that "Except as

otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Agreement requires the Claimant Trustee to file any accounting or seek approval of any court with respect to the administration of the Claimant Trust, or as a condition for managing any payment or distribution out of the Claimant Trust Assets." But to be clear, it is not as though the Claimant Trustee is operating "under the radar." Section 3.12(b) of the CTA states that:

> "The Claimant Trustee shall provide quarterly reporting to the Oversight Board[1] and Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of (i) the status of the Claimant Trust Assets, (ii) the balance of Cash held by the Claimant Trust (including in each of the Claimant Trust Expense Reserve and Disputed Claim Reserve), (iii) the determination and any re-determination, as applicable, of the total amount allocated to the Disputed Claim Reserve, (iv) the status of Disputed Claims and any resolutions thereof, (v) the status of any litigation, including the pursuit of the Causes of Action, (vi) the Reorganized Debtor's performance, and (vii) operating expenses; provided, however, that the Claimant Trustee may, with respect to any Member of the Oversight Board or Claimant Trust Beneficiary, redact any portion of such reports that relate to such Entity's Claim or Equity Interest, as applicable and any reporting provided to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries may be subject to such Claimant Trust Beneficiary's agreement to maintain confidentiality with respect to any non-public information."

It would appear that Dugaboy and HMIT may be frustrated that they did not negotiate or obtain the same oversight rights as the actual Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in the Plan and CTA.[2]

---

[1] "Oversight Board" was defined in the CTA as "the board comprised of five (5) Members established pursuant to the Plan and Article III of this Agreement to oversee the Claimant Trustee's performance of his duties and otherwise serve the functions set forth in this Agreement and those of the "Claimant Trust Oversight Committee" described in the Plan. Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the initial Members of the Oversight Board shall be: (i) Eric Felton, as representative of the Redeemer Committee; (ii) Josh Terry, as representative of Acis; (iii) Elizabeth Kozlowski, as representative of UBS; (iv) Paul McVoy, as representative of Meta-e Discovery; and (v) David Pauker."

[2] The court notes that Dugaboy seems to argue that it has been deprived of information throughout the Highland bankruptcy case, and that there was a lack of overall transparency. This rings hollow since: (a) this bankruptcy case had a very aggressive, proactive, and sophisticated Official Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") with extensive monitoring rights to information throughout the case; (b) a Board of Independent Directors was appointed post-petition due to concerns about having management free of conflicts—which Board (one of whose members was a retired bankruptcy judge) operated quite transparently; (c) there has been an active, vigilant United States Trustee during the case; and (d) Dugaboy is the family trust of James Dondero, a founder and the former CEO of Highland who had reason to be extremely familiar with everything associated with Highland. While a late-in-the-bankruptcy-case argument was lodged by Dugaboy that Rule 2015.3 statements had not been filed by Highland and that an Examiner should be appointed to look into Highland's non-debtor subsidiary value and activity because of this, such argument was made just prior to Plan confirmation and seemed more like a litigation tactic than an honest desire for information.

Finally, Rule 7001(9) states that the following should be brought as an adversary proceeding: a "proceeding to obtain declaratory judgment relating to any of the foregoing." While Dugaboy seems to urge that it is, at bottom, simply seeking ***information*** and not a determination or declaration of any kind, this contradicted by both the title of the Dugaboy Value Motions (both containing the word "Determination" therein) the prayers therein, seeking that the court find "that Dugaboy has standing in these bankruptcy proceedings" and for an order "determine[ing] the current value of those assets (i.e., assets of the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust"). These are clearly requests for declaratory judgment as to value of assets, the extent of Dugaboy's and HMIT's interests in assets, and ultimately a declaration as to Dugaboy's standing.

Accordingly, the Dugaboy Valuation Motions (and HMIT's joinder therein) will not be considered at this juncture and are hereby **DENIED** for procedural deficiency. This is without prejudice to the filing of an adversary proceeding.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 # # # # END OF ORDER # # # #

Moreover, the Rule 2015.3 filing requirement can be modified by a court for cause—something that would be reasonable in a case such as this where there was extensive oversight by a UCC and Independent Board.

HMIT Exhibit 17

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING

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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING

Movants The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, "Movants") file this Motion for Leave to File Proceeding.

SUMMARY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS[1]

1. Movants file this Motion for Leave to File Proceeding (the "Motion for Leave") out of an abundance of caution in light of the gatekeeper injunction (the "Gatekeeper Provision") contained in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) ("Plan") confirmed by order of this Court on February 22, 2021, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F [Dkt. No.1950]. Specifically, Movants seek an order from the Court finding that the Gatekeeper Provision is inapplicable to the proposed proceeding (the "Valuation Proceeding") to be commenced by Movants in this Court, or that the requisite standard is met.

2. The Valuation Proceeding largely seeks the same relief previously sought by Movants through motion practice. In particular, the Valuation Proceeding seeks information regarding the value of the estate, including the assets and liabilities of the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust") and related determinations by the Court. On December 6, 2022, the Court ordered Movants to seek the relief previously sought by motion practice through an adversary proceeding [Dkt. No. 3645]. As a result, Movants are required to name Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust") as defendants in the Valuation Proceeding, notwithstanding that what Movants are really

[1] Movants incorporate the facts alleged in their proposed Complaint To (I) Compel Disclosures About The Assets Of The Highland Claimant Trust And (II) Determine (A) Relative Value Of Those Assets, And (B) Nature Of Plaintiffs' Interests In The Claimant Tru[st ("Proposed Complaint" or "Valuation Complaint"), annexed hereto as Exhibit A.

seeking is information from HCMLP and the Claimant Trust. Under the circumstances, Movants believe their Valuation Proceeding should fall outside of the Gatekeeper Provision.

3. However, if the Court determines that the Gatekeeper Provision applies to the Valuation Proceeding, Movants seek an order determining that the Valuation Proceeding presents a "colorable claim" within the meaning of the Gatekeeper Provision and should be allowed.

4. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[2] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Movants need to file the Valuation Proceeding in an effort to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust established to liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

5. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that, even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is likely more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors 100 cents on the dollar. Accordingly, Movants and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or nothing for the owners that built the company.

6. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this

[2] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Dkt. No. 1808].

Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here, a prompt valuation of the estate would serve the same purpose and is needed.

7. As set forth in greater detail in the annexed complaint ("Valuation Complaint"), upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Movants. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery who would then be inclined to approve inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets was realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

8. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless Movants are allowed to proceed, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

9. On the petition date, the estate had over $550 million in assets, with far less in in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

10. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[3]

11. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of June 1, 2022, was as follows:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[4]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[3] Additional detail in the Valuation Complaint and its exhibits.
[4] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

12. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

13. On information and belied, Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded with a reorganization plan to the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

14. Instead, it appears that Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Making the transactions particularly suspect is the fact that the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years' hence. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

15. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided such information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

16. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a line of credit for $59 million, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post effective date litigation now pursued by Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying in the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

17. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Movants believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest, now.

18. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Movants and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Movants in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity of any meaningful recovery.

19. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Movants including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Movants have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Movants become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Movants are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

20. Movants are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

ARGUMENT

A. The Gatekeeper Provision.

21. The Debtor's Plan includes a Gatekeeper Provision, limiting how claims can be asserted against Protected Parties (Plan, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F), such as the reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust. Plan Ex. A, Article I.B, ¶ 105.

22. Under the Debtor's Plan confirmed by this Court, an "Enjoined Party" may not:

> [C]ommence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Protected Party that arises from or is related to the Chapter 11 Case, the negotiation of the Plan, the administration of the Plan or property to be distributed under the Plan, the wind down of the business of the Debtor or Reorganized Debtor, the administration of the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust, or the transactions in furtherance of the foregoing without the Bankruptcy Court (i) first determining, after notice and a hearing, that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of any kind . . . against a Protected Party and (ii) specifically authorizing such Enjoined Party to bring such claim or cause of action against any such Protected Party.

Plan, § AA & Ex. A, Article IX.F.

23. The Plan defines the term "Enjoined Party" to include "all Entities who have held, hold, or may hold Claims against or Equity Interests in the Debtor", "any Entity that has appeared and/or filed any motion, objection, or other pleading in this Chapter 11 Case regardless of the capacity in which such Entity appeared", and any "Related Entity." Plan Ex. A, Article I.B, ¶ 56. The Plan expressly defines "Related Entity" to include Dugaboy and Hunter Mountain. *Id.*, § B, ¶ 110. Accordingly, each of Movants is an "Enjoined Party." The question thus arises whether Movants must seek Court permission prior to instituting the annexed Valuation Proceeding.

B. The Gatekeeper Provision Is Satisfied Because Movants Were Directed to Raise Valuation Issues through an Adversary Proceeding

24. Movants previously sought by way of contested matter to obtain the relief sought in the Valuation Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3382, 3467, and 3533]. Debtor objected, asserting both that that the relief asserted was unwarranted and that it could only be obtained in an adversary proceeding [Dkt No. 3465]. The Court ruled that Movants must pursue an adversary proceeding.

Given that the Court has already ordered Movants to proceed in this fashion, the Court has already served its gatekeeper function and this motion is unnecessary [Dkt. No. 3645].

25. However, Movants conferenced the issue with Debtor, and Debtor was only willing to stipulate that no gatekeeper motion was needed if Movants sought exactly the same relief as had been sought in the motion. Because the relief sought is better defined now, and to avoid further delay, in an excess of caution, Movants bring this motion. After filing, Movants will attempt to negotiate a resolution of this motion so that the Court can proceed directly to the merits.

C. The Valuation Proceeding Sets Forth a Colorable Claim.

26. Movants present colorable claims that should be authorized to proceed.

27. The Plan does not define what constitutes a "colorable claim of any kind." Nor does the Bankruptcy Code define the term. The case law construing the requirement for "colorable" claims clearly provides that the requisite showing is a relatively low threshold to satisfy, requiring Movants to prove "there is a possibility of success." *See Spring Svc. Tex., Inc. v. McConnell (In re McConnell)*, 122 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).

28. The Fifth Circuit has stated that "the colorable claim standard is met if the [movant] has asserted claims for relief that on appropriate proof would allow a recovery. Courts have determined that a court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing, but must ensure that the claims do not lack any merit whatsoever." *Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co.*, 858 F.2d 233, 248 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court therefore need not be satisfied that there is an evidentiary basis for the claims to be asserted but instead should allow the claims if they appear to have some merit.

29. Other federal circuit courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the standard to be applied. For example, the Eighth Circuit held that "creditors' claims are colorable if they would survive a motion to dismiss." *In re Racing Services, Inc.*, 540 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2008); *accord In Re Foster*, 516 B.R. 537, 542 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2014), *aff'd* 602 Fed. Appx. 356 (8th Cir.

2015) (per curiam). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar test requiring that the court look only to the face of the complaint to determine if claims are colorable. *In re The Gibson Group, Inc.*, 66 F.3d 1436, 1446 (6th Cir. 1995).

30. Other federal courts have adopted roughly the same standard—*i.e.*, a claim is colorable if it is merely "plausible" and thus could survive a motion to dismiss. *See In re America's Hobby Center, Inc.*, 223 B.R. 275, 282 (S.D.N.Y 1998); *see also, e.g., In re GI Holdings*, 313 B.R. at 631 (court must decide whether the committee has asserted "claims for relief that on appropriate proof would support a recovery"); *Official Comm. v. Austin Fin. Serv. (In re KDI Holdings)*, 277 B.R. 493, 508 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing that the inquiry into whether a claim is colorable is similar to that undertaken on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); *In re iPCS, Inc.*, 297 B.R. 283, 291-92 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2003) (same).

31. In addition, in the non-bankruptcy context, the District Court for this district has explained that "[t]he requirement of a 'colorable claim' means only that the plaintiff must have an 'arguable claim' and not that the plaintiff must be able to succeed on that claim." *Gonzales v. Columbia Hosp. at Med. City Dallas Subsidiary, L.P.*, 207 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (N.D. Tex. 2002).

32. This Court's analysis of whether the Valuation Proceeding sets forth a colorable claim is not a determination of whether the Court finds there is enough evidence presented. Rather, if on the face of the Valuation Complaint, there appears a plausible claim, then the Valuation Proceeding presents a colorable claim, and this Motion must be granted to allow Movants to file their Valuation Complaint.

33. In the First Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint, Movants seek disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and request an accounting. An equitable accounting is proper "when the facts and accounts presented are so complex that adequate relief may not be obtained at law."

Gooden v. Mackie, No. 4:19-CV-02948, 2020 WL 714291 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23 2020) (quoting *McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. 4:12-CV-02658, 2013 WL 5231486, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2013); *Bates Energy Oil & Gas v. Complete Oilfeld Servs.*, 361 F. Supp. 3d 633, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding an equitable accounting claim was sufficiently stated when was a party was less than forthcoming in providing information and the available information was insufficient to determine what was done with a party's money); *Phillips v. Estate of Poulin*, No. 03-05-00099-CV, 2007 WL 2980179, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin, Oct. 12, 2007, no pet.) (finding that an accounting order was appropriate where the facts are complex and when the plaintiff could not obtain adequate relief through standard discovery); *Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Dooley*, 884 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (finding that an accounting was necessary in order to determine the identity of the property or the amount of money owed to a party).

34. The requested disclosures and accounting are necessary due to the lack of transparency surrounding the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust. The Court has retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI. As set forth above and in the Valuation Complaint, Movants have concerns that those provisions are not being appropriately followed, and efforts to obtain the information necessary to confirm otherwise has been unavailable through discovery. As a result of the restrictions imposed on Movants, including Movants' inability, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Movants have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Movants become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Movants are in the dark regarding

the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought. Movants are unable to protect their own interests without an equitable accounting. Therefore, the First Claim for Relief sets forth a colorable claim.

35. The Second Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint sets forth Movants' request for a declaratory judgment regarding the value of Claimant Trust Assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations. When considering whether a valid declaratory judgment claim exists, a court must engage in a three-step inquiry. *Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe*, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000). The court must ask (1) whether an actual controversy exists between the parties, (2) whether the court has the authority to grant such declaratory relief; and (3) whether the court should exercise its "discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action." *Id*; *see also In re Fieldwood Energy LLC,* No. 20-33948, 2021 WL 4839321, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 15 2021) (seeking declaratory judgment regarding interpretation of a Plan and whether certain claims were discharged); *In re Think3, Inc.,* 529 B.R. 147, 206-07 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015) (sufficient actual controversy to bring a declaratory judgment action to assist with an early and prompt adjudication of claims and to promote judicial and party economy).

36. In this case, there can be no serious doubt that an actual controversy exists between the parties with respect to the relief sought, as the Debtor has already opposed the relief sought in the Valuation Complaint. Additionally, there is no dispute that the Court has the inherent power to grant the relief sought in the Proposed Complaint. Further, the third element is satisfied because this determination is important to the implementation of the Plan and distributions to Holders of Allowed Claims and Allowed Equity Interests. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at

recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close. In addition, such a determination by the Court could allow for a settlement that would cover the spread between current assets and obligations before that gap is further widened by the professional fees incurred by the Claimant Trust. Therefore, the Second Claim for Relief pleads a colorable claim.

37. Finally, in the Third Claim for Relief of the Valuation Complaint, Movants request a declaratory judgment and determination regarding the nature of their interests. As with the Second Claim for Relief, there is no serious dispute that an actual controversy exists between the parties and that the Court has the power to grant the relief requested. Additionally, the third element is satisfied because, in particular, in the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient to pay all Allowable Claims indefeasibly, Movants seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement. However, the requested determination would further assist parties in interest, such as Movants, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement. Therefore, the Third Claim for Relief pleads a colorable claim.

38. The equitable relief sought in the Valuation Proceeding certainly meets any iteration of the standard for what constitutes "a colorable claim of any kind." Instead of using the

information governing provisions of the Claimant Trust as a shield, HCMLP and the Claimant Trust are using them as a sword to enable continued litigation that ultimately provides no benefit to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or Movants as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests.

39. As set forth above, the Valuation Complaint seeks disclosure of information and an accounting that are related to the administration of the Plan and property to be distributed under the Plan, but not otherwise available to Movants. The Valuation Complaint also requests declaratory judgments within the Court's jurisdiction and relevant to the furtherance of the Bankruptcy Case. These claims are colorable, and this Motion for Leave should be granted.

WHEREFORE, Movants request the entry of an order i) granting this Motion for Leave; ii) determining that the Gatekeeping Provision is satisfied as applied to the Valuation Proceeding; and iii) authorizing Movants to file the Valuation Complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 5, 2023, Louis M. Phillips conferenced with counsel for Defendants, John Morris, regarding this motion. Counsel for Defendants was willing to stipulate that no gatekeeper motion was needed if Movants sought exactly the same relief as had been sought in their prior motion addressing these issues. Because the relief sought is better defined now, and to avoid further delay, in an excess of caution, Movants bring this motion. After filing, Movants will attempt to negotiate a resolution of this motion so that the Court can proceed directly to the merits.

/s/Deborah Deitsch-Perez
Deborah Deitsch-Perez

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on February 6, 2023, a true and correct copy of this document was served electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system to the parties registered or otherwise entitled to receive electronic notices in this case.

/s/Deborah Deitsch-Perez
Deborah Deitsch-Perez

EXHIBIT A

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Counsel for Plaintiffs the Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	Adversary Proceeding No. _____
vs.	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§	
Defendants.	§	

COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND (II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND (B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, the "Plaintiffs") file this adversary complaint (the "Complaint") against defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust," and collectively with HCMLP, the "Defendants"), seeking: (1) disclosures about and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of those assets; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs' interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[1] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

2. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or

[1] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Docket No. 1808].

nothing for the owners that built the company. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

3. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery, who he knew would approve his inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

4. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

5. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice. The estate had over $550 million in assets on the petition date, with far less in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

6. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[2]

7. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of 6/1/22 was:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[3]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[2] Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022, annexed hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, as is further detail about claims buyers.
[3] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

8. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

9. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the over the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

10. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." These transactions are particularly suspect because the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

11. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided that information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

12. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a $59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation now pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

13. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation, would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

14. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery.

15. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

16. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the "Bankruptcy Case") pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court").

18. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

19. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

20. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

21. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

22. Hunter Mountain is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

23. HCMLP is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

24. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

25. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), HCMLP, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

26. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCMLP had approximately $550 million in assets and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCMLP's reason for seeking

bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately $190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about $110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about $65 million, well below the expected $110 million,[4] and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

27. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "Committee"), and over the objection of HCMLP and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCMLP and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.[5] Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCMLP management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor's apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

28. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCMLP's general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage HCMLP during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

[4] Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid $78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about $13 million.

[5] For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, "The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what's going on with this debtor, with this debtor's management, this debtor's post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little do with this debtor." [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), Docket No. 181]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but "transparently vexatious," for allegedly having sued Moody's for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, Docket No. 1186].

a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

29. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately let the Debtor's professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management's spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally "Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board… But I'm concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they're smart, they're persuasive… they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it's really all about . . . Mr. Dondero." [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

30. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was "surprised that Judge Jones' or Judge Isgur's staff expressed that they had availability." Debtor's counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, "I'll take it from here." Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, "my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don't have meaningful time." [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals

who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

31. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

32. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the de facto leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCMLP's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

33. Indeed, Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, initially Mr. Seery reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

34. Yet despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the

plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

35. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as "vexatious litigants," emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a "transparently" vexatious litigant based pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled "vexatious" by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented in proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

36. In addition to the Debtor's mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions to hide the real value of the estate.

37. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HabourVest (which claims had initially been valued at $0) for $80 million, in order to acquire HarborVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), gain HarborVest's vote in favor of its Plan, and hide

the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at $22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth $40 million at the time and over $60 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

38. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCMLP's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

39. Worse still, while knowing that HCMLP had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCMLP's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

40. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCMLP, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to be willing to sell. Had the Debtor instead

fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

41. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

42. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately $200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

43. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, $250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and $90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this "success" to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of $30 million.

44. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs, appears to have exceeded $140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* Docket No. 3410-1.

45. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members' fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

46. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less that Mr. Dondero's written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court's indifference to the Debtor's complete failure to abide its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

47. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to

manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that could have been resolved with money left over for equity but for that manipulation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

48. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [Docket No. 1473], ¶ F(4).

49. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCMLP's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id.*

50. In the aggregate, HCMLP's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

51. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order") [Docket No. 1808] (the "Plan").

52. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

53. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy's Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

54. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

55. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

56. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

57. Based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

58. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCMLP became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

59. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed

> Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

60. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

61. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

62. In its Post Confirmation Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 2022 [Docket No. 3582], Debtor stated that it distributed $255,201,228 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 64% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of $387,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

63. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate as held in the Claimant Trust has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

64. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with $125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over $416 million, building a cash war chest of over $541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over $688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was $365 million, those claims were sold for about $150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero, et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, Docket No. 1 (as amended by Docket No. 158).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from $460 an hour for associates to $1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from $830 an hour for first year associate to over $2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.[6]

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

[6] To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February __, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

STINSON LLP

Draft

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EXHIBIT A-1

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EDWARD M. HELLER
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October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee") in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Debtor"). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors' Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee's Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over $550 million in assets and net $110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland's decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net $110 million arbitration award in favor of the "Redeemer Committee."[1] After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor's counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland's best interest.

[1] The "Redeemer Committee" was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the "Crusader Fund" that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[2] It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise . . . ." *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

[2] *See* Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[3] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors' committee to share information it receives with those who "hold claims of the kind represented by the committee" but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors' committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland's structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[4] This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor's counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[5] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

[3] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

[4] *See* Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[5] During a deposition, the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").[6] The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[6] Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at $22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of $40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.[7] Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),[8] nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.[9] That representation is untrue;

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and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating $300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be $0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to $80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

[7] Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

[8] *See* Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

[9] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.[10] If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[11] It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[12] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[13] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims[14]:

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[10] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

[11] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

[12] *See id.* at 22.

[13] *See* Appendix, p. A-25.

[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.[15] In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[16]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0[17]

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a $200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of $556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to $328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021.[18]

[15] A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

[16] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

[17] Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid $50 million for claims worth only $46.4 million. *See* Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between $472-600 million as opposed to $364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

[18] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by $100 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[19]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.[20] Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

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monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

19 *See* Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

20 *See* Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[21] We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

[21] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

> **In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.**

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;

d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement[22];

e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2

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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express
Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[1]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

[1] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).[2] At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[3]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[4]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

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[2] Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

[3] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[4] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[5] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[6]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[7] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[8] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

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[5] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

[6] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

[7] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

[8] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[9] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[10] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

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[9] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[10] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty $750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a "settlement" to obtain Mr. Daugherty's withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor's plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[11]

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately $75 billion under management. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining □2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

[11] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs.[12]

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[13] Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to $45 million in Class 8 claims and $35 million in Class 9 claims.[14] At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a $31.5 million return.[15]

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least $44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.[16] This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

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[12] Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than $7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the $15 million in legal fees).
[13] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[15] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $28 million.
[16] Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." *See* Ex. B.

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"[17] Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "'actual and necessary cost'" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."[18] It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[19] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[17] *See* Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
[18] *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).
[19] *See* Ex. C.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $600 million,[20] which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[21]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0

[20] *See* Ex. D.
[21] *See* Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16, 2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021).[22]
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of $236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[23]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than $100 million in claims on those trades.

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[22] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

[23] *See* Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The aggregate $150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[24] In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

[24] *See* Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange.The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[25] When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of $150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."[26] Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

[25] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[26] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[27] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between $472-$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between $150 and $232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least $460 million, including $105 million in cash and a $50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

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[27] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.[28]

- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.[29] The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.[30]

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

[28] Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.
[29] Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.
[30] Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.[31]

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.[32] Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[33] In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.[34] Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[35] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

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[31] 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
[32] The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.
[33] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.
[34] *Id.* at 26-28.
[35] *See id.* at 22.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a $6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.[36] In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.[37] If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. *See* 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

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[36] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[37] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;

- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay $18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and

- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP,	Case No. 19-34054-SGJ 11
Debtor	

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Each of the businesses will be a

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on when it is going to happen and what the restrictions either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the value of certain of the assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?

Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?

A. No.

Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?

A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

Q. Excuse me?

A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?

A. There is a semipublic market; yes.

Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?

A. It's available.

Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are not readily available

J. SEERY

markets; correct?

A. No.

Q. Those are operating businesses?

A. Correct.

Q. Who provided the valuation for the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for mark purposes and then we adjust it for plan purposes.

Q. And the adjustment was up or down?

A. When?

Q. For both November and January. You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I believe that for November we adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the top of my head but I believe both of them were adjusted down.

J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. That is the HarbourVest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

R E C I T A L S

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**


SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia


Robert Holmgren


no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

GCM GROSVENOR

Grosvenor Capital Management

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS 32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.
John G. Hutchinson
John J. Lavelle
Martin B. Jackson
Sidley Austin LLP
787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10019
(212) 839-5300 (tel)
(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!


Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel
More
Message
#OPENTOWORK
Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him) ·
3rd
General Counsel
Winnetka, Illinois, United States ·
Contact info
500+ connections
Yale Law School
Message
More
Open to work
Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel roles
See all details
About
I have over 38 years of experience representing participants in the investment management industry with respect to a wide range of legal and regulatory matters, including SEC, DOL, FINRA, and NFA regulations and examinations. ... see more
Activity
522 followers
Posts Joseph H. created, shared, or commented on in the last 90 days are displayed here.
https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More | Message

General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr

Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area

Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos

Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos

Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois

General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois

Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

EXHIBIT A-3

MUNSCH HARDT

DALLAS / HOUSTON / AUSTIN

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May 11, 2022

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Eitel:

By way of follow-up to the letter Douglas Draper sent to your offices on October 4, 2021 and my letter dated November 3, 2021, I write to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor"). Those abuses, as detailed in our prior letters, include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to line the pockets of Debtor management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of stakeholders and third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds and in violation of investors' due process rights and various fiduciary duties and duties of candor to the Bankruptcy Court and all constituents. In particular, I write this letter to further detail:

1. Actions and omissions by the Debtor that have but a single apparent purpose: to spend the assets of the Highland estate to enrich those currently managing the estate at the expense of the business owners (the equity). Currently, the Highland estate has more than enough assets to pay 100% of the allowed creditors' claims. But doing so would deprive the current steward, Jim Seery, as well as his professional cohorts, the opportunity to reap tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in fees. This motivation explains the acts and omissions described below—all designed to prop up a façade that the post-confirmation bankruptcy machinations are necessary, and to avoid any scrutiny of that façade, and to foreclose any investigation into a contrary thesis.

2. The Debtor's intentional understatement of the value of the estate for personal gain, the gain of professionals, and the gain of affiliated or related secondary claims-buyers.

3. The failure to adhere to fiduciary duties to maximize the value of estate assets and failure to contest baseless proofs of claim to enable Highland to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern and to preserve value for all stakeholders.

4. The gross misuse of estate assets by the Debtor and Debtor professionals in pursuing baseless and stale claims against former insiders of the Debtor when the current value of the estate (over

$650 million with the recent completion of the MGM sale, which includes over $200 million in cash) greatly exceeds the estate's general unsecured claims ($410 million).

5. The failure of the Debtor's CRO and CEO, Jim Seery, to adhere to his fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate. As evidenced by the chart below, all general unsecured claims could have been resolved using $163 million of debtor cash and other liquidity. Instead, proofs of claim were inflated and sold to Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), which are both affiliates of Grosvenor (the largest investor in the Crusader Funds, which became the largest creditor in the bankruptcy). Mr. Seery has a long-standing relationship with Grosvenor and was appointed to the Independent Board (the board charged with managing the Debtor's estate) by the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, on which Grosvenor held five of nine seats.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0 ($65.0 net of other assets)
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 to $163.0**

As highlighted in the prior letters to your office and as further detailed herein, this is the type of systemic abuse of process that is something lawmakers and the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "EOUST") should be concerned about. Accordingly, we urge the EOUST to exercise its "broad administrative, regulatory, and litigation/enforcement authorities . . . to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders–debtors, creditors, and the public."[1] Specifically, we believe it would be appropriate for the EOUST to undertake an investigation to confirm the current value of the estate and to ensure that the claims currently being pursued by the Debtor are intended to benefit creditors of the estate, and not just to further enrich Debtor professionals and Debtor management.

BACKGROUND

The Players

James Dondero – co-founder of Highland in 1993. Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/ust.

Highland – Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Debtor. Highland is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as adviser to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

Strand – Strand Advisors, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The general partner of Highland.

The Independent Board – the managing board installed after Highland's bankruptcy filing. To avoid a protracted dispute, and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors of Strand, who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Pursuant to an agreement with the Creditors' Committee that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Dondero, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee each were permitted to choose one director. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James P. Seery, Jr.[2]

Creditors' Committee – On October 29, 2019, the bankruptcy court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which consisted of: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).

James P. Seery, Jr. – a member of the Independent Board, and the Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor. Beginning in March 2020, Mr. Seery ran day-to-day operations and negotiations with the Creditors' Committee, investors, and employees in return for compensation of $150,000 per month and generous incentives and stands to earn millions more for administering the Debtor's post-confirmation liquidation. Judge Nelms and John Dubel remained on the Independent Board, receiving weekly updates and modest compensation.

Acis – Acis Capital Management, L.P., a former affiliate of Highland. Acis is currently owned and controlled by Josh Terry, a former employee of Highland. Acis (Joshua Terry) was a member of Highland's Creditors' Committee.

UBS – UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively. UBS asserted claims against Highland arising out of a default on a 2008 warehouse lending facility (to which Highland was neither a party nor a guarantor). Highland had paid UBS twice for full releases of claims UBS asserted against Highland – approximately $110 million in 2008 and an additional $70.5 million via settlement with Barclays, the Crusader Funds, and Credit Strategies in June 2015. UBS was a member of the Creditors' Committee and appointed John Dubel to the Independent Board.

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[2] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

HarbourVest – HarbourVest Partners, LLC. HarbourVest is a private equity fund of funds and one of the largest private equity investment managers globally. HarbourVest has approximately $75 billion in assets under management. HabourVest has deep ties with Grosvenor and has jointly with Grosvenor sponsored 59 LBO transactions in the last two years.

The Crusader Funds – a group of Highland-managed funds formed between 2000 and 2002. During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their full investment plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been paid when made. Subsequently, when disputes regarding management of the Crusader Funds' liquidation arose, the Redeemer Committee instituted an arbitration against Highland, resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of approximately $190 million. Nonetheless, due to offsets and double-counting, the Debtor initially estimated the value of the Redeemer arbitration award at $105 million to $110 million. In a 9019 settlement with the Debtor, the Crusader Funds ultimately received allowed claims of $137 million, plus $17 million of sundry claims and retention of an interest in Cornerstone Healthcare Group, Inc., an acute-health-care company, valued at over $50 million. Notably, UBS objected to the Crusader Funds' 9019 settlement, arguing that the Redeemer arbitration award was actually worth much less—between $74 and $128 million. The Crusader Funds sold their allowed claims to Stonehill, in which Grosvenor is the largest investor. This sale to an affiliated fund without approval of other investors in the fund is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The Redeemer Committee – The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds was a group of investors in the Crusader Funds that oversaw the liquidation of the funds. The Redeemer Committee was comprised of nine members. Grosvenor held five seats. Concord held one seat.

Grosvenor – GCM Grosvenor is a global alternative asset management firm with over $59 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor has one of the largest operations in the Cayman Islands, with more than half of their assets under management originating through its Cayman operations. Unlike most firms operating in the Cayman Islands, Grosvenor has its own corporate and fiduciary services firm. This structure provides an additional layer of opacity to anonymous corporations from the British Virgin Islands (which includes significant Russian assets), Hong Kong (which includes significant Chinese assets), and Panama (which includes significant South American assets). As a registered investment adviser, Grosvenor must adhere to know-your-customer regulations, must report suspicious activities, and must not facilitate non-compliance or opacity. In 2020, Michael Saks and other insiders distributed all of Grosvenor's assets to shareholders and sold the firm to a SPAC originated by Cantor Fitzgerald.[3] In 2020, the equity market valued asset managers and financial-services firms at decade-high valuations. It makes little sense that Grosvenor would use the highly dilutive SPAC process (as opposed to engaging

[3] *See* https://www.wsj.com/articles/gcm-grosvenor-to-merge-with-cantor-fitzgerald-spac-11596456900. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently released a rule proposal that is focused on enhancing disclosure requirements around special purpose acquisition companies, including additional disclosures about SPAC sponsors, conflicts of interest and sources of dilution, business combination transactions between SPACs and private operating companies, and fairness of these transactions. *See* https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-proposes-enhanced-spac-disclosure-rule.

in a traditional IPO or other strategic-sale alternatives) unless such a structure was employed to avoid the diligence and management-liability tail inherent in more traditional processes.

Farallon – Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is a hedge fund that manages capital on behalf of institutions and individuals and was previously the largest hedge fund in the world. Farallon has approximately $27 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor is a significant investor in Farallon. Grosvenor and Farallon are further linked by Hellman & Friedman, LLC, an American private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman owned a stake in Grosvenor from 2007 until it went public in 2020 and seeded Farallon's initial capital.

Muck – Muck Holdings, LLC. Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon. Together with Jessup Holdings, LLC (described below)), Muck acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Stonehill – Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Stonehill provides portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles. It has approximately $3 billion in assets under management, which we have reason to believe includes approximately $1 billion from Grosvenor.

Jessup – Jessup Holdings, LLC. Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill. Together with Muck (Farallon), Stonehill acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Marc Kirschner/Teneo - The Debtor retained Marc Kirschner to pursue over $1 billion in claims against former insiders and affiliates of the Debtor despite the significant solvency of the estate ($650 million in assets versus $410 million in claims). Kirschner's bankruptcy restructuring firm was purchased by Teneo (which also purchased the restructuring practice of KPMG). Teneo is sponsored by LetterOne, a London-based private equity firm owned by Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. Fridman is also the primary investor in Concord Management, LLC ("Concord"), which held a position on the Redeemer Committee. During the resolution of a 2018 arbitration involving a Debtor-managed fund, the Highland Credit Strategies Fund, evidence emerged demonstrating that Concord was operating as an unregistered investment adviser of Russian money from Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest privately held bank and a key part of Fridman's Alfa Group Consortium. –That money that was funneled into BVI-domiciled shell companies into the Cayman Islands, then into various hedge funds and private equity funds in the U.S. Evidence of these activities was presented by the Debtor to Grosvenor, and the Debtor asked to have Concord removed from the Redeemer Committee. Concord was never removed. Concord is a large investor in Grosvenor. Grosvenor, in turn, is a large investor in Stonehill and Farallon.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved investors in the Crusader Funds. As explained above, a group of Crusader Funds investors sued after the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions during the financial crisis. That dispute resolved with the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors'

receiving a return of their investments plus a profit, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite the successful liquidation of the Crusader Funds, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

In view of the expected arbitration award and believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[4]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Creditors' Committee. At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[5]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of Strand. To avoid a protracted dispute and to

[4] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.
[5] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by the Independent Board.[6]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the independent directors, Mr. Seery. Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[7] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[8]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[9] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of

[6] Frank Waterhouse and Scott Ellington, Highland employees, remained as officers of Strand, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel, respectively.
[7] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.
[8] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.
[9] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[10] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate. This becomes all the more important when a debtor or an estate holds substantial assets through non-debtor subsidiaries or vehicles, as is the case here; hence, the purpose of Rule 2015.3.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee's Office did anything to ensure compliance. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below. Additionally, the lack of proper and accurate information and intentional hiding of material information led creditors to vote for the Debtor's plan and the Bankruptcy Court to confirm that plan which, we believe, would not have happened had the Debtor complied with its fiduciary and reporting duties.

As Mr. Draper and I have already highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[11] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-

[10] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).
[11] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

value determinations.[12] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

Despite these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[13]

Because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the Debtor to Quietly Sell Assets Without Observing Best Practices

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of Portola Pharma shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year).

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to the debtor (20% less than Mr. Dondero received in funds he managed).

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or

[12] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[13] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

outside stakeholders, resulting in a loss to the estate of over $10 million versus cost and $20 million versus fair market value.

- The Debtor "sold" interests in certain investments commonly referred to as PetroCap without engaging in a public sale process and without exploring any other method of liquidating the asset.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors. Equally as troubling, for certain similar sale transactions the Debtor *did* seek Bankruptcy Court approval, thus acknowledging that such approval was necessary or, at a minimum, that disclosures regarding non-estate asset sales are required.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the "Inner Circle" to Manipulate the Estate for Personal Gain

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic because the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months in the wake of the global pandemic. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 million impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). A Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-Debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. The Debtor's "inner circle" – the Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) – had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

Mr. Seery's compensation package encouraged, and the lack of transparency permitted, manipulation of the estate and settlement of creditors' claims at inflated amounts.

Upon his initial appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[14]

When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he his compensation package was handsomely improved. His base salary, which was on the verge of dropping to $30,000 per month, was increased ***retroactively*** back to March 15, 2020, to $150,000 per month. Additionally, his employment agreement contemplated a discretionary "Restructuring Fee"[15] that would be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a "Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and was intended to provide a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to steer Highland through the Chapter 11 case and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern.

Despite the structure of his compensation package, Mr. Seery saw greater value in aligning himself with creditors and the Creditors' Committee. To that end, he publicly alienated and maligned Mr. Dondero, and he found willing allies in the Creditors' Committee. The posturing also paved the way for Mr. Seery to bestow upon the hold-out creditors exorbitant settlements at the expense of equity and earn his Restructuring Fee. In fact, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee (both members of the Creditors' Committee),[16] leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS (also a member of the Creditors' Committee) claims to resolve. In other words, Mr. Seery had curried favor with two of the four members of the Creditors' Committee who would ultimately approve his Restructuring Fee and future compensation following plan consummation.

Ultimately, the confirmed Plan appointed Mr. Seery as the Claimant Trustee, which continued his compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary") and provided that the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery would negotiate additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[17] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably is (or will be) based on whether his liquidation of

[14] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[15] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.
[16] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 8, l. 24 – p. 9, l. 8.
[17] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

the estate outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee" and severance payment. In fact, during a deposition taken on October 21, 2021, Mr. Seery testified that he expected to make "a few million dollars a year" for each year during the years that he will take to liquidate the Debtor, although we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $650 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

Mr. Seery Enters into Inflated Settlements

Even before his appointment as CEO and CRO of the Debtor, Mr. Seery had effectively seized control of the Debtor as its *de facto* chief executive officer.[18] Thus, while he was in the process of negotiating his compensation agreement, he was simultaneously negotiating settlements with the remaining creditors to ensure he earned his Restructuring Fee, even if he did so at inflated amounts. One transaction that highlights this is the settlement with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee.

In connection with Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and CRO, the Debtor announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee. Even ***UBS***, one of the members of the Creditors' Committee, thought the settlement was inflated. In its objection to the Debtor's 9019 motion, UBS stated:[19]

> The Redeemer Claim is based on an Arbitration Award that required the Debtor, inter alia, to pay $118,929,666 (including prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees) in damages and to pay Redeemer $71,894,891 (including prejudgment interest) in exchange for all of Crusader's shares in Cornerstone. Pursuant to that same Arbitration Award, the Debtor also retained the right to receive $32,313,000 in Deferred Fees upon Crusader's liquidation. As shown below, after accounting for those reciprocal obligations to the Debtor and depending on the true value of the Cornerstone shares to be tendered (which is disputed), the actual value of the Arbitration Award to Redeemer is between $74,911,557 and $128,011,557.[3]
>
> Under the Proposed Settlement, however, Redeemer stands to gain far more because the Debtor has inexplicably agreed to release its rights to Crusader's Cornerstone shares and the Deferred Fees (with a combined value that could be as much as $115,913,000)—providing a substantial windfall to Redeemer. The Debtor has failed to provide sufficient information to permit this Court to meaningfully evaluate the true value of the Proposed Settlement, including the fair value of the Cornerstone shares, which it must do in order for this Court to have the information it needs to approve the Proposed Settlement. Depending on the valuation of the Cornerstone shares, the value of the Proposed Settlement to Redeemer may be as much as $253,609,610—which substantially exceeds the face amount of the Redeemer Claim.

[18] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 6, l. 18 – 22.
[19] *See* Dkt. 1190, p. 6 – 7.

In the meantime, other general unsecured creditors of the Debtor will receive a much lower percentage recovery than they would if those assets were instead transferred to the Debtor's estate, as required by the Arbitration Award, and evenly distributed among the Debtor's creditors. The Proposed Settlement is only in the best interests of Redeemer and, as such, it should be rejected.

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[3] The potential range of value attributable to the Cornerstone shares is significant because, according to the Debtor's liquidation analysis, the Debtor expects to have only $195 million total in value to distribute, and only $161 million to distribute to general unsecured creditors under its proposed plan. See Liquidation Analysis [Dkt. No. 1173-1]; First Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Dkt. No. 1079].

UBS was right. Mr. Seery agreed to a settlement that substantially overpaid the Redeemer Committee, and UBS only agreed to withdraw its objection and appeal of the Redeemer Committee's settlement when the Debtor bestowed upon UBS its own lavish settlement.[20]

It is worth noting that the Redeemer Committee ultimately sold its bankruptcy claim for $78 million in cash, but the sale excluded, and the Crusader Funds retained, its investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and certain non-cash consideration.[21] At the end of the day, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee cashed out of their bankruptcy claims for total consideration at the very least of $135 million, meaning they received 105% of the highest estimate (according to UBS) of the net amount of their arbitration award.[22]

The Inner Circle Doesn't Object to Inflated Settlements

Following the Bankruptcy Court's approval of settlements with Acis/Josh Terry and the Crusader Funds/the Redeemer Committee, Mr. Seery turned his attention to the two remaining critical holdouts: HarbourVest and UBS. HarbourVest, a private equity fund-of-funds with approximately $75 billion under management, had invested pre-bankruptcy $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO

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[20] *See* Dkt 2199. Under the terms of the UBS Settlement, UBS received a Class 8 claim in the amount of $65 million, a Class 9 claim in the amount of $60 million, a payment in cash of $18.5 million from a non-Debtor fund managed by the Debtor, and the Debtor's agreement to assist UBS in pursuing other claims against former Debtor affiliates related to a default on a credit facility during the Global Financial Crisis. Importantly, over the course of the preceding 11 years, UBS had already received payments totaling $180 million in connection with this dispute, and just prior to bankruptcy, UBS and the Debtor had reached a settlement in principle in which the Debtor would pay UBS just $7 million and $10 million in future business.

[21] *See* Exh. B.

[22] The estimation of a total recovery of $135 million includes attributing $48 million to the retained Cornerstone investment. The $48 million valuation equated to a ~45% interest in Cornerstone, which was valued pre-pandemic at approximately $107 million. Following COVID, Cornerstone's long-term acute care facilities flourished. Additionally, Cornerstone held a direct investment of over 800,000 shares in MGM, which was held on its books at approximately $72 per share. The per-share closing price on the sale of MGM to Amazon exceeded $164, which would have increased the company's valuation (irrespective of the post-COVID growth) by more than $70 million, bring Crusader Funds' windfall to more than $205 million.

Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called the Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining ~2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees.

Before Highland filed bankruptcy, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment into HCLOF because Highland allegedly failed to disclose facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry, which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs. In Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that the Debtor and Debtor's counsel initially argued was absurd. Indeed, Debtor management valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, which was consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[23] Nevertheless, as one of the final creditor claims to be resolved, Mr. Seery ultimately agreed to give HabourVest a $45 million Class 8 claim and a $35 million Class 9 claim.[24] At that time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive 71.32% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. Thus, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would result in HarbourVest receiving $32 million in cash.[25] The cash consideration was offset by HarbourVest's agreement to convey its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor (or its designee) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. In other words, from the outside looking in, the Debtor agreed to pay $9.5 million for a spurious claim.

Oddly enough, no creditors (other than former insiders) objected. What the inner circle presumably knew was that the settlement was actually a windfall for the Debtor. As we have previously detailed, the $22.5 million valuation of HCLOF that the Debtor utilized in seeking approval of the settlement was based upon September 2020 figures when the economy was still reeling from the pandemic. The value of that investment rebounded rapidly, particularly because of the pending MGM sale to Amazon that was disclosed to the Debtor but not the public (i.e., material non-public information). We have subsequently learned that the actual value of the HCLOF at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the HarbourVest settlement was at least $44 million—a value that Mr. Seery would have known but that was not disclosed to the Court or the public.

Likewise, there were no objections to the UBS settlement, which is puzzling. As detailed in the Debtor's 64-page objection to the UBS proof of claim and the Redeemer Committee's 431-page objection to the UBS proof of claim, UBS's claims against the Debtor were razor thin and largely foreclosed by res judicata and a settlement and release executed in connection with the June 2015 settlement. Moreover, the publicly available information indicated that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16,

[23] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[24] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[25] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $27 million.

2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021);[26]

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million from December 2020 to January 2021, with Class 8 claims ballooning $74 million in December to $267 million in January;

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for Class 8 Claims decreased from 87.44% to 71.32% in just a matter of months.

The Liquidation Analysis estimated total assets remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims to be $195 million, with general unsecured claims totaling $273 million. By the time the UBS settlement was presented to the court for approval, the allowed Class 8 Claims had increased to $309,345,000, reducing the distribution to Class 8 creditors to 62.99%. Surely significant creditors like the Redeemer Committee—whose projected distribution dropped from $119,527,515 when it voted for the Plan to $86,105,194 with the HarbourVest and UBS claims included—should have taken notice.

Mr. Seery Stacks the Oversight Board

As previously disclosed, we believe Mr. Seery facilitated the sale of the four largest claims in the estate to Farallon and Stonehill. Based upon conversations with representatives of Farallon, Mr. Seery contacted them directly to encourage their acquisition of claims in the bankruptcy estate.[27] We believe Mr. Seery did so by disclosing the true value of the estate versus what was publicly disclosed in court filings, demonstrating that there was substantial upside to the claims as compared to what was included in the Plan Analysis. For example, publicly available information at the time Farallon and Stonehill acquired the UBS claim indicated the purchase would have made no economic sense: the publicly disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Farallon and Stonehill would have lost money on the claim acquisition. We can only conclude Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), which based upon accurately disclosed financial statements would indicate they were likely to recover close to 100% on both Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

As set forth in the previous letters, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers Farallon, through Muck, and Stonehill, through Jessup. The four claims purchased by Farallon and Stonehill comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin, collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[26] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473].

[27] We believe Mr. Seery made similar calls to representatives of Stonehill. We are informed and believe that Mr. Seery has long-standing relationships with both Farallon and Stonehill.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,696,610**	**$95,000,000**	

From the information we have been able to gather, it appears that Stonehill and Farallon purchased these claims for the following amounts:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[28]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	$270.0	$95.0		$150.0 - $165.0

As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) are overseeing the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth below, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $650 million and has approximately $200 million in cash, which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million. Thus, it is a warranted and logical deduction that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. As set forth in previous letters, there are three primary reasons to believe this:

- The scant publicly available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that was actually publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims; and
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

For example, consider the sale of the Crusader Funds' claims, which we *know* was sold for $78 million. Based upon the publicly available information at the time of the acquisition, the expected distribution would have been $86 million. Surely a sophisticated hedge fund would not invest $78 million in a particularly contentious bankruptcy if it believed its maximum return was $86 million years later.

[28] Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

Ultimately, the Plan, Mr. Seery's compensation package, and the lack of transparency to everyone other than the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee permitted Debtor management and the Creditors' Committee to support grossly inflated claims (at the expense of residual stakeholders) in a grossly understated estate, which facilitated the sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In doing so, Mr. Seery installed on the Reorganized Debtor's Oversight Board friendly faces who stand to make $370 million on ~$150 million investment. And Mr. Seery's plan has already worked. Notably, while the confirmed Plan was characterized by the Debtor as a monetization plan,[29] the newly installed Oversight Board supported, and the Court approved, paying Mr. Seery the much more lucrative Case Resolution Fee, netting Mr. Seery $1.5 million more than he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.

In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

	Value as of Aug. 2021		**March 2022 High Estimate updated for MGM closing**
Asset	**Low**	**High**	
Cash as of 4/25/22	$17.9	$17.9	
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0	
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0	
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0	
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2	
Park West Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
HCLOF trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0	
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**	**$200**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0	$25.0
HCLOF	$40.0	$40.0	$20.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0	$30.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0	$0.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0	$30.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0	$20.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0	$10.0

[29] See Dkt. 194., p.5.

Highland Restoration Capital Partners			
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**	**$645.0**

The Bankruptcy Professionals are Draining the Estate

Yet another troubling aspect of the Highland bankruptcy has been the rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the Estate, largely through invented, unnecessary, and greatly overstaffed and overworked offensive litigation. The sums expended between case filing and the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") are staggering:

Professional	**Fees**	**Expenses**
Hunton Andrews Kurth	$1,147,059.42	$2,747.84
FTI Consulting, Inc.	$6,176,551.20	$39,122.91
Teneo Capital, LLC	$1,221,468.75	$6,257.07
Marc Kirschner	$137,096.77	
Sidley Austin LLP	$13,134,805.20	$211,841.25
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	$23,978,627.25	$334,232.95
Mercer (US) Inc.	$202,317.65	$2,449.37
Deloitte Tax LLP	$553,412.60	
Development Specialists, Inc.	$5,562,531.12	$206,609.54
James Seery[30]	$5,100,000.00	
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP		
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP	$2,645,729.72	$5,207.53
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC	$2,054,716.00	
Foley & Lardner LLP	$629,088.00	
Casey Olsen Cayman Limited	$280,264.00	
ASW Law Limited	$4,976.00	
Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc.	$766,397.00	
Berger Harris, LLP		
Hayward PLLC	$825,629.50	$46,482.92
	$64,420,670.18	**$854,951.38**
Total Fees and Expenses		**$65,275,621.56**

"The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees sought." *In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co.*, 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).

[30] This amount includes Mr. Seery's success fee, which was paid a month following the Effective Date.

The rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the estate is in stark contrast to the treatment of the employees who stayed with the Debtor (without a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive program) on the promise they would be made whole for prepetition deferred compensation that had not yet vested, only to be stiffed and summarily terminated. Even worse, some of these employees have been targeted by the litigation sub-trust for acts they took in the course and scope of their employment.

Following the Effective Date, siphoning of estate assets continues. Mr. Seery still receives base compensation of $150,000 per month, and he expects to receive compensation of at least "a few million dollars a year" according to his own deposition testimony. In addition, his retention was conditioned upon receiving a to-be-negotiated success fee and severance payment (notably, none of which is disclosed publicly).

Likewise, Teneo Capital, LLC was retained as the litigation adviser. For its services post-Effective Date, it is compensated $20,000 per month for Mr. Kirschner as trustee for the Litigation Subtrust, plus the regularly hourly fees of any additional Teneo personnel, plus a "Litigation Recovery Fee." The Litigation Recovery Fee is equal to 1.5% of Net Litigation Proceeds up to $100 million and 2.0% of Net Litigation Proceeds above. Interestingly, although "Net Litigation Proceeds" is defined as gross litigation proceeds less certain fees incurred in pursing the litigation, net proceeds are not reduced by Mr. Kirschner's monthly fee, contingency fees charged by any other professionals, or litigation funding financing. Moreover, Teneo is given credit for any litigation recoveries regardless of whether those recoveries stem from actions commenced by the litigation trustee. The Debtor has not disclosed, and is not required to disclose, the terms upon which any professionals have been engaged following the Effective Date, including Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for the Litigation Subtrust. Based upon pre-Effective Date monthly expenses, the number of lawyers that attend various matters on behalf of the Debtor,[31] and the addition of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Teneo, we believe the Debtor could be spending as much as $5-$7 million per month.

The Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust recently filed heavily redacted, quarterly post-confirmation reports.[32] Of note, the Reorganized Debtor disclosed that it has disbursed $81,983,611 since the Effective Date but disclosed that it has only paid $47,793 in priority claims and $6,918,473 in general unsecured claims, while still estimating a total recovery to general unsecured claims of $205,144,544. The Highland Claimant Trust disclosed that it has disbursed an additional $7,152,331 since the Effective Date.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an extreme example of the abuses that can occur if the federal bench, federal government appointees, and federal lawmakers do not police federal bankruptcy proceedings by

[31] In connection with a recent two-day trial on an administrative claim, the Debtor was represented by John Morris ($1,245.00 per hour), Greg Demo ($950 per hour), and Hayley Winograd ($695 per hour), and was assisted by paralegal La Asia Canty ($460 per hour). The Debtor's local counsel, Zachery Annable ($300 per hour), was also present, and Jeffrey Pomerantz ($1,295 per hour) observed the trial via WebEx. Despite the army of lawyers, Mr. Morris handled virtually the entire proceeding, with Ms. Winograd examining only two small witnesses. Messrs. Pomerantz, Demo, and Annable played no active role in the proceedings.

[32] Dkt 3325 and 3326.

permitting debtors-in-possession to hide material information, violate duties of transparency and candor, and manipulate information and transactions to benefit disclosed and undisclosed insiders or "friends" of insiders. Bankruptcy should not be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. We therefore encourage your office to investigate the problems inherent in the Highland bankruptcy. At a minimum, we ask that the EOUST seek orders from the Bankruptcy Court compelling the Debtor to undertake the following actions:

1. turn over all financial reports that should have been disclosed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, including 2015.3 reports;

2. provide a detailed disclosure of the assets Reorganized Debtor;

3. provide a copy of the executed Claimant Trust Agreement, which should already have been disclosed;

4. disclose all solvency analyses prepared by the Debtor; and

5. provide copies of all agreements for the engagement of Debtor professionals post-confirmation, including the terms of Mr. Seery's success fee and severance agreement, compensation agreements for personnel of the Reorganized Debtor, and the fee arrangement with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

Sincerely,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

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EXHIBIT A

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Counsel for Plaintiffs the Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	Adversary Proceeding No. _____
vs.	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§	
Defendants.	§	

COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND (II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND (B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain" and collectively with Dugaboy, the "Plaintiffs") file this adversary complaint (the "Complaint") against defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust," and collectively with HCMLP, the "Defendants"), seeking: (1) disclosures about and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of those assets; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs' interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[1] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

2. HCMLP's October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or

[1] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Docket No. 1808].

nothing for the owners that built the company. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

3. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery, who he knew would approve his inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

4. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

5. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice. The estate had over $550 million in assets on the petition date, with far less in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

6. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least $75 million below market price.[2]

7. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of 6/1/22 was:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10
Affiliate Notes[3]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

[2] Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022, annexed hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, as is further detail about claims buyers.
[3] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

8. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

9. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the over the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

10. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." These transactions are particularly suspect because the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

11. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided that information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

12. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a $59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation now pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

13. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation, would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

14. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery.

15. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

16. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the "Bankruptcy Case") pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court").

18. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

19. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

20. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

21. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

22. Hunter Mountain is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

23. HCMLP is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

24. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

25. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), HCMLP, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

26. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCMLP had approximately $550 million in assets and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCMLP's reason for seeking

bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately $190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about $110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about $65 million, well below the expected $110 million,[4] and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

27. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "Committee"), and over the objection of HCMLP and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCMLP and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.[5] Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCMLP management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor's apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

28. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCMLP's general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage HCMLP during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

[4] Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid $78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about $13 million.

[5] For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, "The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what's going on with this debtor, with this debtor's management, this debtor's post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little do with this debtor." [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), Docket No. 181]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but "transparently vexatious," for allegedly having sued Moody's for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, Docket No. 1186].

a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

29. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately let the Debtor's professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management's spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally "Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board… But I'm concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they're smart, they're persuasive… they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it's really all about . . . Mr. Dondero." [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

30. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was "surprised that Judge Jones' or Judge Isgur's staff expressed that they had availability." Debtor's counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, "I'll take it from here." Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, "my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don't have meaningful time." [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals

who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

31. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

32. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the de facto leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCMLP's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

33. Indeed, Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, initially Mr. Seery reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

34. Yet despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the

plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

35. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as "vexatious litigants," emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a "transparently" vexatious litigant based pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled "vexatious" by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented in proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

36. In addition to the Debtor's mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions to hide the real value of the estate.

37. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HabourVest (which claims had initially been valued at $0) for $80 million, in order to acquire HarborVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), gain HarborVest's vote in favor of its Plan, and hide

the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at $22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth $40 million at the time and over $60 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

38. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCMLP's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

39. Worse still, while knowing that HCMLP had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCMLP's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

40. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCMLP, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to be willing to sell. Had the Debtor instead

fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

41. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

42. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately $200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

43. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, $250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and $90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this "success" to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of $30 million.

44. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs, appears to have exceeded $140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* Docket No. 3410-1.

45. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members' fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

46. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less that Mr. Dondero's written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court's indifference to the Debtor's complete failure to abide its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

47. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to

manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that could have been resolved with money left over for equity but for that manipulation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

48. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [Docket No. 1473], ¶ F(4).

49. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCMLP's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id.*

50. In the aggregate, HCMLP's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

51. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order") [Docket No. 1808] (the "Plan").

52. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

53. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy's Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

54. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

55. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

56. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

57. Based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

58. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCMLP became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

59. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed

> Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

60. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

61. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

62. In its Post Confirmation Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 2022 [Docket No. 3582], Debtor stated that it distributed $255,201,228 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 64% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of $387,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

63. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate as held in the Claimant Trust has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

64. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with $125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over $416 million, building a cash war chest of over $541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over $688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was $365 million, those claims were sold for about $150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero, et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, Docket No. 1 (as amended by Docket No. 158).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from $460 an hour for associates to $1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from $830 an hour for first year associate to over $2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.[6]

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

[6] To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February __, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

STINSON LLP

Draft

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EXHIBIT A-1

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EDWARD M. HELLER
(1926-2013)

October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee") in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or "Debtor"). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors' Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee's Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over $550 million in assets and net $110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland's decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net $110 million arbitration award in favor of the "Redeemer Committee."[1] After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor's counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland's best interest.

[1] The "Redeemer Committee" was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the "Crusader Fund" that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[2] It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise . . . ." *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

[2] *See* Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[3] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors' committee to share information it receives with those who "hold claims of the kind represented by the committee" but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors' committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland's structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[4] This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor's counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[5] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

[3] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

[4] *See* Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[5] During a deposition, the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").[6] The Debtor's motion to settle the

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below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[6] Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at $22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of $40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.[7] Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),[8] nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.[9] That representation is untrue;

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and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating $300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be $0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to $80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

[7] Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

[8] *See* Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

[9] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.[10] If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[11] It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[12] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[13] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims[14]:

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[10] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

[11] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

[12] *See id.* at 22.

[13] *See* Appendix, p. A-25.

[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.[15] In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[16]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0[17]

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a $200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of $556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to $328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021.[18]

[15] A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

[16] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

[17] Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid $50 million for claims worth only $46.4 million. *See* Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between $472-600 million as opposed to $364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

[18] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by $100 million.

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[19]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.[20] Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.

- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.

- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

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monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

19 *See* Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

20 *See* Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[21] We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

[21] *See* Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

> **In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.**

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;

d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement[22];

e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2

MUNSCH HARDT
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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express
Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[1]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

[1] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).[2] At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[3]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.[4]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

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[2] Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

[3] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

[4] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[5] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[6]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[7] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[8] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

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[5] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

[6] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

[7] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

[8] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[9] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.[10] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

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[9] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

[10] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty $750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a "settlement" to obtain Mr. Daugherty's withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor's plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[11]

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately $75 billion under management. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining □2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

[11] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs.[12]

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[13] Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to $45 million in Class 8 claims and $35 million in Class 9 claims.[14] At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a $31.5 million return.[15]

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least $44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.[16] This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

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[12] Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than $7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the $15 million in legal fees).
[13] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[14] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[15] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $28 million.
[16] Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." *See* Ex. B.

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"[17] Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "'actual and necessary cost'" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."[18] It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,[19] collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[17] *See* Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
[18] *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).
[19] *See* Ex. C.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,6969,610**	**$95,000,000**	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $600 million,[20] which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[21]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0

[20] *See* Ex. D.
[21] *See* Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16, 2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021).[22]
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of $236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.[23]

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than $100 million in claims on those trades.

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[22] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of $45 million and a Class 9 Claim of $35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately $44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. *See* Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at $267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of $74 million in December 2020.

[23] *See* Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.

- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased $365 million in claims. The aggregate $150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with $3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."[24] In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

[24] *See* Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;

b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;

c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and

d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange.The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[25] When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of $150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."[26] Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

[25] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[26] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[27] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between $472-$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between $150 and $232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least $460 million, including $105 million in cash and a $50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

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[27] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.[28]

- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.[29] The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.[30]

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

[28] Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.
[29] Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.
[30] Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.[31]

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.[32] Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.[33] In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.[34] Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.[35] This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

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[31] 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
[32] The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.
[33] *See* Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.
[34] *Id.* at 26-28.
[35] *See id.* at 22.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS $18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a $6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.[36] In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.[37] If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. *See* 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

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[36] *See* Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; *see* Appendix, p. A-57.

[37] The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;

- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay $18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and

- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers

*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

A. "Court" means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

B. "NAV" means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity's assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO's gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.

C. "Non-Discretionary Account" means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.

D. "Related Entity" means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any "non-statutory" insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the "Related Entities Listing"); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor's cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).

E. "Stage 1" means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the ("Term Sheet") by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.

F. "Stage 2" means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.

G. "Stage 3" means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.

H. "Transaction" means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.

K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities**: N/A (See entities above).

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).[1]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

[1] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) Stage 3:

(1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

(2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities**: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[2]

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.

   b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.

2. Related Entity Transactions

   a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

   b) Stage 3:

      (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

      (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than $2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):

   a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) $3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

[2] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

C. **Weekly Reporting**: The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.[3]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

[3] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.[4]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

A. Covered Entities: See **Schedule A** hereto. **Schedule A** includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.[5]

B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A

C. Operating Requirements: N/A

D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.

B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.

B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

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[4] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

[5] The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.

C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A[6]

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
   a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
   b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
   c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
   d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
   e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
   f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
   g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
   h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
   i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
   j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
   k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
   l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
   m) Red River CLO Ltd.
   n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
   o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
   p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
   q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
   r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
   s) Pam Capital
   t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

[6] NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In Re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LP,	Case No. 19-34054-SGJ 11
Debtor	

REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

January 29, 2021

10:11 a.m. EST

Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

January 29, 2021
9:00 a.m. EST

Remote Deposition of JAMES P. SEERY, JR., held via Zoom conference, before Debra Stevens, RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the State of New York.

REMOTE APPEARANCES:

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EXAMINATIONS

EXHIBITS

SEERY DYD

INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS

MARKED FOR RULING

PAGE	LINE
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COURT REPORTER: My name is Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG Reporting and notary public of the State of New York. Due to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and following the practice of social distancing, I will not be in the same room with the witness but will report this deposition remotely and will swear the witness in remotely. If any party has any objection, please so state before we proceed.

Whereupon,

JAMES SEERY,

having been first duly sworn/affirmed, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY
MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I have series of questions today in connection with the 30(b) Notice that we filed. The first question I have for you, have you seen the Notice of Deposition

J. SEERY

the screen, please?
A. Page what?
Q. I think it is page 174.
A. Of the PDF or of the document?
Q. Of the disclosure statement that was filed. It is up on the screen right now.
COURT REPORTER: Do you intend this as another exhibit for today's deposition?
MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this Exhibit 2.
(So marked for identification as Seery Exhibit 2.)
Q. If you look to the recovery to Class 8 creditors in the November 2020 disclosure statement was a recovery of 87.44 percent?
A. That actually says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
Q. And in the new document that was filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery is 62.5 percent?

J. SEERY

A. It says the percent distribution to general unsecured creditors is 62.14 percent.
Q. Have you communicated the reduced recovery to anybody prior to the date -- to yesterday?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I believe generally, yes. I don't know if we have a specific number, but generally yes.
Q. And would that be members of the Creditors' Committee who you gave that information to?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you give it to anybody other than members of the Creditors' Committee?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. HarbourVest.
Q. And when was that?
A. Within the last two months.
Q. You did not feel the need to communicate the change in recovery to

J. SEERY

anybody else?
A. I said Mr. Doherty.
Q. In looking at the two elements, and what I have asked you to look at is the claims pool. If you look at the November disclosure statement, if you look down Class 8, unsecured claims?
A. Yes.
Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
A. Million.
Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And the number in the new document is 313 million?
A. Correct.
Q. What accounts for the difference?
A. An increase in claims.
Q. When did those increases occur? Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two months ago?
A. Over the last couple months.
Q. So in fact over the last couple months you knew in fact that the recovery in the November disclosure statement was

J. SEERY

not accurate?
A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it to the Bankruptcy Court in open court hearings.
Q. But you never did bother to calculate the reduced recovery; you just increased --
(Reporter interruption.)
Q. You just advised as to the increased claims pool. Correct?
MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. What I am trying to get at is, as you increase the claims pool, the recovery reduces. Correct?
A. No. That is not how a fraction works.
Q. Well, if the denominator increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately decrease if --
A. No.
Q. -- if the numerator stays the

J. SEERY

were amended without consideration a few years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't make the assumption, which I am sure will happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance action would be brought. We just assumed that we'd have to discount the notes heavily to sell them because nobody would respect the ability of the counterparties to fairly pay.

Q. And the same discount was applied in the liquidation analysis to those notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Now --

A. The difference -- there would be a difference, though, because they would pay for a while because they wouldn't want to accelerate them. So there would be some collections on the notes for P and I.

Q. But in fact as of January you have accelerated those notes?

A. Just one of them, I believe.

Q. Which note was that?

J. SEERY

A. NexPoint, I said. They defaulted on the note and we accelerated it.

Q. So there is no need to file a fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Disagree. Since it was likely intentional fraud, there may be other recoveries on it. But to collect on the note, no.

Q. My question was with respect to that note. Since you have accelerated it, you don't need to deal with the issue of when it's due?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. That wasn't your question. But to that question, yes, I don't need to deal with when it's due.

Q. Let me go over certain assets. I am not going to ask you for the valuation of them but I am going to ask

J. SEERY

you whether they are included in the asset portion of your $257 million number, all right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go into specific asset value, and I don't intend to do that.

The first question I have for you is, the equity in Trustway Highland Holdings, is that included in the $257 million number?

A. There is no such entity.

Q. Then I will do it in a different way. In connection with the sale of the hard assets, what assets are included in there specifically?

A. Off the top of my head -- it is all of the assets, but it includes Trustway Holdings and all the value that flows up from Trustway Holdings. It includes Targa and all the value that flows up from Targa. It includes CCS Medical and all the value that would flow to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It includes Cornerstone and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It

J. SEERY

includes any other securities and all the value that would flow from Cornerstone. It includes HCLOF and all the value that would flow up from HCLOF. It includes Korea and all the value that would flow up from Korea.

There may be others off the top of my head. I don't recall them. I don't have a list in front of me.

Q. Now, with respect to those assets, have you started the sale process of those assets?

A. No. Well, each asset is different. So, the answer is, with respect to any securities, we do seek to sell those regularly and we do seek to monetize those assets where we can depending on whether there is a restriction or not and whether there is liquidity in the market.

With respect to the PE assets or the companies I described -- Targa, CCS, Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not -- Trustway. We have not sought to sell

J. SEERY

A. I don't recall the specific limitation on the trust. But if there was a reason to hold on to the asset, if there is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

Q. Let me ask a question. With respect to these businesses, the Debtor merely owns an equity interest in them. Correct?

A. Which business?

Q. The ones you have identified as operating businesses earlier?

A. It depends on the business.

Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try to be specific. With respect to SSP, it was your position that you did not need to get court approval for the sale. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Which one of the operating businesses that are here, that you have identified, do you need court authority for a sale?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Each of the businesses will be a

J. SEERY

different analysis that we'll undertake with bankruptcy counsel to determine what we would need depending on when it is going to happen and what the restrictions either under the code are or under the plan.

Q. Is there anything that would stop you from selling these businesses if the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two years?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. Is there anything that would stop me? We'd have to follow the strictures of the code and the protocols, but there would be no prohibition -- let me finish, please.

There would be no prohibition that I am aware of.

Q. Now, in connection with your differential between the liquidation of what I will call the operating businesses under the liquidation analysis and the plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

J. SEERY

or determined the discount that has been placed between the two, plan analysis versus liquidation analysis?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. To which document are you referring?

Q. Both the June -- the January and the November analysis has a different estimated proceeds for monetization for the plan analysis versus the liquidation analysis. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is a note under there. "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be able to achieve the same sales proceeds as Claimant trustee."

A. I see that, yes.

Q. Do you see that note?

A. Yes.

Q. Who arrived at that discount?

A. I did.

Q. What percentage did you use?

A. Depended on the asset. Each one

J. SEERY

is different.

Q. Is the discount a function of capability of a trustee versus your capability, or is the discount a function of timing?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. It could be a combination.

Q. So, let's -- let me walk through this. Your plan analysis has an assumption that everything is sold by December 2022. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And the valuations that you have used here for the monetization assume a sale between -- a sale prior to December of 2022. Correct?

A. Sorry. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. The 257 number, and then let's take out the notes. Let's use the 210 number.

MR. MORRIS: Can we put the document back on the screen, please? Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

J. SEERY

would be helpful.

MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.

(Pause.)

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much.

Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?

A. In the one from yesterday?

Q. Yes.

A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.

Q. That assumes a monetization of all assets by December of 2022?

A. Correct.

Q. And so everything has been sold by that time; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So, what I am trying to get at is, there is both the capability between you and a trustee, and then the second issue is timing. So, what discount was put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when a trustee would sell it versus when you would sell it?

MR. MORRIS: Objection.

Q. What is the percentage you

J. SEERY

applied?

A. Each of the assets is different.

Q. Is there a general discount that you used?

A. Not a general discount, no. We looked at each individual asset and went through and made an assessment.

Q. Did you apply a discount for your capability versus the capability of a trustee?

A. No.

Q. So a trustee would be as capable as you are in monetizing these assets?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

Q. Excuse me? The answer is?

A. The answer is maybe.

Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Perhaps.

Q. Sir, that is a yes or no question. Could the trustee hire somebody

J. SEERY

as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. I don't know.

Q. Is there anybody as capable as you are?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.

A. Certainly.

Q. And they could be hired. Correct?

A. Perhaps. I don't know.

Q. And if you go back to the November 2020 liquidation analysis versus plan analysis, it is also the same note about that a trustee would bring less, and there is the same sort of discount between the estimated proceeds under the plan and under the liquidation analysis.

MR. MORRIS: If that is a question, I object.

Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery, looking at the document?

A. There are discounts, yes.

J. SEERY

Q. Again, the discounts are applied for timing and capability?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, in looking at the November plan analysis number of $190 million and the January number of $257 million, what accounts for the increase between the two dates? What assets specifically?

A. There are a number of assets. Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.

Q. How much are those?

A. Approximately 22 and a half million dollars.

Q. Okay.

A. Secondly, there is a significant increase in the value of certain of the assets over this time period.

Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?

A. There are a number. They include MGM stock, they include Trustway, they include Targa.

Q. And what is the percentage increase from November to January, November of 2020 to January of 2021?

J. SEERY

A. Do you mean what is the percentage increase from 190 to 257?

Q. No. You just identified three assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the exchange and figure out what the price increase is; correct?

A. No.

Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock publicly traded?

A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

Q. Excuse me?

A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

Q. Is there a public market for the MGM stock that we could calculate the increase?

A. There is a semipublic market; yes.

Q. So it is a number that is readily available between the two dates?

A. It's available.

Q. Now, you identified Targa and Trustway. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Those are not readily available

J. SEERY

markets; correct?

A. No.

Q. Those are operating businesses?

A. Correct.

Q. Who provided the valuation for the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

A. We use a combination of the value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for mark purposes and then we adjust it for plan purposes.

Q. And the adjustment was up or down?

A. When?

Q. For both November and January. You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did you adjust it down?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I believe that for November we adjusted it down, and for January we adjusted it down. I don't recall off the top of my head but I believe both of them were adjusted down.

J. SEERY

Q. And if I understand what you just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey valuation for those two businesses showed a significant increase between November of 2020 and January of 2021?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I didn't say that.

Q. I am trying to account for the increase between the two dates, and you identified three assets. You identified MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you have said, a readily ascertainable value. Then you identified two others that the valuation is based upon something Houlihan Lokey provided you. Correct?

A. I gave you three examples. I never said "readily." That is your word, not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan had a significant change in their valuation.

Q. So let's now go back to the question. There is an increase in value from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

J. SEERY

of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60 some odd million dollars. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We can account for $22 million of it easily, right?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

A. Correct.

Q. That is the HarbourVest settlement, so that leaves roughly $40 million unaccounted for?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question if that is a question. It is accounted for.

Q. What makes up that difference, Mr. Seery?

A. A change in the plan value of the assets.

Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort of go back to where we were.

A. There are numerous assets in the plan formulation. I gave you three examples of the operating businesses. The securities, I believe, have increased in value since the plan, so those would go up

J. SEERY

for one. On the operating businesses, we looked at each of them and made an assessment based upon where the market is and what we believe the values are, and we have moved those valuations.

Q. Let me look at some numbers again. In the liquidation analysis in November of 2020, the liquidation value is $149 million. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the liquidation analysis in January of 2021, you have $191 million?

A. Yes.

Q. You see that number. So there is $51 million there, right?

A. No.

Q. What is the difference between 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little off. What is the difference between the two numbers, Mr. Seery?

A. Your math is off.

Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?

A. Correct.

Q. $22 million of that is the

J. SEERY

HarbourVest settlement, right?

A. I believe that's correct.

Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. And part of that differential are publicly traded or ascertainable securities. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And basically you can get, or under the plan analysis or trustee analysis, if it is a marketable security or where there is a market, the liquidation number should be the same for both. Is that fair?

A. No.

Q. And why not?

A. We might have a different price target for a particular security than the current trading value.

Q. I understand that, but I mean that is based upon the capability of the person making the decision as to when to sell. Correct?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

J. SEERY

of the question.

Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?

A. I said no.

Q. What is that based on, then?

A. The person's ability to assess the market and timing.

Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a trustee hire somebody as capable as you to both, A, assess the market and, B, make a determination as to when to sell?

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

A. I suppose a trustee could.

Q. And there are better people or people equally or better than you at assessing a market. Correct?

A. Yes.

MR. MORRIS: Objection to form of the question.

Q. So, again, let's go back to that. We have accounted for, out of $41 million where the liquidation analysis increases between the two dates, $22 million of it. That leaves

J. SEERY

$18 million. How much of that is publicly traded or ascertainable assets versus operating businesses?

A. I don't know off the top of my head the percentages.

Q. All right. The same question for the plan analysis where you have the differential between the November number and the January number. How much of it is marketable securities versus an operating business?

A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

MR. DRAPER: Let me take a few-minute break. Can we take a ten-minute break here?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

(Recess.)

BY MR. DRAPER:

Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to show you and what I would ask you to look at is in the note E, in the statement of assumptions for the November 2020 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	$50 million
Life Settlements	$35 million
OmniMax	$50 million
Targa	$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted[1] that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a $9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a $3 million asset]).

[1] *See* Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	$65,000,000.00	$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	$45,000,000.00	$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	$8,250,000.00	$2,750,000 (+$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	**$309,345,631.74**	**$95,000,000**

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at $22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of $364 million, liabilities of $335 million (**inclusive of $267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims**), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included $18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	$26,496		$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662		154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)		(33,804)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**195,294**		**147,309**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)		(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)		(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)		(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)		(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)		-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)		-
Subtotal	(33,756)		(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538		129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-		17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-		3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609		174,609
Subtotal	174,609		196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%		66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using $0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded $105 million of general unsecured claims and $95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)[2]

	Plan Analysis		**Liquidation Analysis**
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	$24,290		$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941		191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)		(41,488)
Total estimated $ available for distribution	**222,658**		**174,178**
Less: Claims paid in full			
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)		(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)		(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-		-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)		(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)		(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)		(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-		-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-		-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)		-
Subtotal	**(27,793)**		**(17,514)**
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865		157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%		0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219		286,100
Subtotal	273,219		286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%		54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-		-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	*no distribution*		*no distribution*

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume $0 for IFA and HM, $50.0 million for UBS and $45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

[2] Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report[3]

	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	$2,529,000	$12,651,000	$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	$232,620,000	$109,211,000	$142,976,000
Equity method investees	$161,819,000	$103,174,000	$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	$2,579,000	$2,461,000	$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	$3,754,000	$2,594,000	$2,518,000
due from affiliates	$151,901,000	$152,449,000	$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		($61,039,000)	($61,167,000)
other assets	$11,311,000	$8,258,000	$8,651,000
Total Assets	**$566,513,000**	**$329,759,000**	**$364,317,000**
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	$1,176,000	$1,077,000	$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		$900,000	$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	$5,195,000	$5,195,000	$5,195,000
Jefferies	$30,328,000	$0	$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	$59,203,000	$60,446,000	$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		$5,795,000	$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	$73,997,000	$73,997,000	$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	$396,614,000	$182,347,000	$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	**$566,513,000**	**$329,757,000**	**$364,317,000**

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled $267 million, a jump from $74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing $267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly $310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.

[3] [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim





Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)[4]

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	$17.9	$17.9
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	$40.0	$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**



[4] Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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Counsel for the Debtor and Debtor-in-Possession

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,[1]	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Debtor.	§	

DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

[1] The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession ("Highland" or the "Debtor"), files this motion (the "Motion") for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"), approving a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"),[2] a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion ("Morris Dec."), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, "HarbourVest"). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

[2] All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the "Delaware Court").

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor's case to this Court [Docket No. 186].[3]

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the "Settlement Motion"). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the "Settlement Order").

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor's chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

[3] All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its $80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of $300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.[4]

[4] Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately $8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the "Transfers"), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the "Acis Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor's objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the "Acis Trustee"). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest's claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").

- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.

- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."

- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.

- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to" the Operative Documents "and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest's Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the "Claim Objection").

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the "Fraud Claims"), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the "Securities Claims"), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the "HarbourVest Claims").

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the "3018 Motion"). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than $300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;[5]
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of $35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of $45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

[5] The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately $22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

> On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. *See Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. *See In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, "approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court." *See United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, "with a focus on comparing 'the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.'" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: "(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise." *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider "the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views." *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the "extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion." *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court's TRO that restricted HCLOF's ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor's estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's $300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

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Exhibit 1

Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP" or the "Debtor"), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) ("Multi-Strat," and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the "MSCF Parties"), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, "UBS").

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and individually as a "Party."

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC," and together with CDO Fund, the "Funds") related to a securitization transaction (the "Knox Agreement");

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the "State Court") against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2009 Action");

WHEREAS, UBS's lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP"), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. ("Credit-Strat"), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. ("Crusader"), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the "2010 Action");

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the "State Court Action"), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of $105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over $300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a $25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to $100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately $32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of $1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for $1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of $94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of $65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;[1] and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of $60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

[1] Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of $18,500,000 (the "Multi-Strat Payment") as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the "HCMLP Excluded Employees"); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities' holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of $3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) "Agreement Effective Date" shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) "HCMLP Parties" shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) "Order Date" shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) "UBS Parties" shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) UBS Releases. Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "UBS Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities' past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the "UBS Unrelated Investments"); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. UBS Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

8. **No Admission of Liability**. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. **Successors-in-Interest.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. **Notice**. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. **Advice of Counsel**. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. **Entire Agreement**. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. **No Party Deemed Drafter**. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. **Future Cooperation**. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. **Counterparts**. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).

[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank]

IT IS HEREBY AGREED.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P.)

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO, Ltd.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized Signatory

HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr
Its: Authorized signatory

STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: _____
Name: James P. Seery, Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: _____
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: _____
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: _____
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled "Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets" (the "Tax Memo"), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the $105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero's relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor's settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

RETURN TO ABOUT (/ABOUT/)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and co-founded Hellman & Friedman, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, Farallon Capital Management and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren. (https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf)**

SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia

Robert Holmgren

no caption

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020

GCM GROSVENOR

Grosvenor Capital Management

In 2007, H&F invested in Grosvenor, one of the world's largest and most diversified independent alternative asset management firms. The Company offers comprehensive public and private markets solutions and a broad suite of investment and advisory choices that span hedge funds, private equity, and various credit and specialty strategies. Grosvenor specializes in developing customized investment programs tailored to each client's specific investment goals.

SECTOR

Financial Services

STATUS

Past

www.gcmlp.com (http://www.gcmlp.com)

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

Julie Segal

The $57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020

Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at $2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has $57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007
Asset Class	Retail
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management
Transaction Type	Refinance
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: $121 million JP Morgan: $200 million

Transaction Overview

- In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of $321 million (Lehman portion: $121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc ("Simon") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon") secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the "Property") located in Gurnee, IL .
- The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a $5 million interior renovation in addition to a $71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.

Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for $25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately $1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately $7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated $321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

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Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:	:	Chapter 11
BLOCKBUSTER INC., *et al.*,	:	Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
Debtors.	:	(Jointly Administered)

THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates

Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!



https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/


Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel
More
Message
General Counsel
Dalpha Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr
Of Counsel
Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area
Principal
The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos
Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
11 yrs 9 mos
Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management, L.P.
May 2015 – Dec 2015 · 8 mos
Chicago, Illinois
General Counsel
Apr 2004 – Apr 2015 · 11 yrs 1 mo
Chicago, Illinois
Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Alvarez & Marsal
Management, LLC 2029 Ce
Park East Suite 2060
Angeles, CA 9

July 6, 2021

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

Dear Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholder,

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of $137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of $50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

A timely appeal of the settlement was taken by UBS (the "UBS Appeal) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. However, the Bankruptcy Court subsequently approved a settlement between HCM and UBS, resulting in dismissal of the UBS Appeal with prejudice on June 14, 2021.

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup") for $78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds' investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the "Settlement Agreement"), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

The sale to Jessup resulted from a solicitation of offers to purchase the Claims commenced by Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management LLC ("A&M CRF"), as Investment Manager of the Crusader Funds, in consultation with the Redeemer Committee. Ultimately, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee entered exclusive negotiations with Jessup, culminating in the sale to Jessup.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction ($78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately $9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of $87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: _____
Steven Varner
Managing Director

EXHIBIT A-3

MUNSCH HARDT

DALLAS / HOUSTON / AUSTIN

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500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
munsch.com
Direct Dial 214.855.7587
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drukavina@munsch.com

May 11, 2022

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Eitel:

By way of follow-up to the letter Douglas Draper sent to your offices on October 4, 2021 and my letter dated November 3, 2021, I write to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor"). Those abuses, as detailed in our prior letters, include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to line the pockets of Debtor management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of stakeholders and third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds and in violation of investors' due process rights and various fiduciary duties and duties of candor to the Bankruptcy Court and all constituents. In particular, I write this letter to further detail:

1. Actions and omissions by the Debtor that have but a single apparent purpose: to spend the assets of the Highland estate to enrich those currently managing the estate at the expense of the business owners (the equity). Currently, the Highland estate has more than enough assets to pay 100% of the allowed creditors' claims. But doing so would deprive the current steward, Jim Seery, as well as his professional cohorts, the opportunity to reap tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in fees. This motivation explains the acts and omissions described below—all designed to prop up a façade that the post-confirmation bankruptcy machinations are necessary, and to avoid any scrutiny of that façade, and to foreclose any investigation into a contrary thesis.

2. The Debtor's intentional understatement of the value of the estate for personal gain, the gain of professionals, and the gain of affiliated or related secondary claims-buyers.

3. The failure to adhere to fiduciary duties to maximize the value of estate assets and failure to contest baseless proofs of claim to enable Highland to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern and to preserve value for all stakeholders.

4. The gross misuse of estate assets by the Debtor and Debtor professionals in pursuing baseless and stale claims against former insiders of the Debtor when the current value of the estate (over

$650 million with the recent completion of the MGM sale, which includes over $200 million in cash) greatly exceeds the estate's general unsecured claims ($410 million).

5. The failure of the Debtor's CRO and CEO, Jim Seery, to adhere to his fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate. As evidenced by the chart below, all general unsecured claims could have been resolved using $163 million of debtor cash and other liquidity. Instead, proofs of claim were inflated and sold to Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), which are both affiliates of Grosvenor (the largest investor in the Crusader Funds, which became the largest creditor in the bankruptcy). Mr. Seery has a long-standing relationship with Grosvenor and was appointed to the Independent Board (the board charged with managing the Debtor's estate) by the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, on which Grosvenor held five of nine seats.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0 ($65.0 net of other assets)
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 to $163.0**

As highlighted in the prior letters to your office and as further detailed herein, this is the type of systemic abuse of process that is something lawmakers and the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "EOUST") should be concerned about. Accordingly, we urge the EOUST to exercise its "broad administrative, regulatory, and litigation/enforcement authorities . . . to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders–debtors, creditors, and the public."[1] Specifically, we believe it would be appropriate for the EOUST to undertake an investigation to confirm the current value of the estate and to ensure that the claims currently being pursued by the Debtor are intended to benefit creditors of the estate, and not just to further enrich Debtor professionals and Debtor management.

BACKGROUND

The Players

James Dondero – co-founder of Highland in 1993. Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

[1] https://www.justice.gov/ust.

Highland – Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Debtor. Highland is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as adviser to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

Strand – Strand Advisors, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The general partner of Highland.

The Independent Board – the managing board installed after Highland's bankruptcy filing. To avoid a protracted dispute, and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors of Strand, who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Pursuant to an agreement with the Creditors' Committee that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Dondero, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee each were permitted to choose one director. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James P. Seery, Jr.[2]

Creditors' Committee – On October 29, 2019, the bankruptcy court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which consisted of: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).

James P. Seery, Jr. – a member of the Independent Board, and the Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor. Beginning in March 2020, Mr. Seery ran day-to-day operations and negotiations with the Creditors' Committee, investors, and employees in return for compensation of $150,000 per month and generous incentives and stands to earn millions more for administering the Debtor's post-confirmation liquidation. Judge Nelms and John Dubel remained on the Independent Board, receiving weekly updates and modest compensation.

Acis – Acis Capital Management, L.P., a former affiliate of Highland. Acis is currently owned and controlled by Josh Terry, a former employee of Highland. Acis (Joshua Terry) was a member of Highland's Creditors' Committee.

UBS – UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively. UBS asserted claims against Highland arising out of a default on a 2008 warehouse lending facility (to which Highland was neither a party nor a guarantor). Highland had paid UBS twice for full releases of claims UBS asserted against Highland – approximately $110 million in 2008 and an additional $70.5 million via settlement with Barclays, the Crusader Funds, and Credit Strategies in June 2015. UBS was a member of the Creditors' Committee and appointed John Dubel to the Independent Board.

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[2] *See* Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

HarbourVest – HarbourVest Partners, LLC. HarbourVest is a private equity fund of funds and one of the largest private equity investment managers globally. HarbourVest has approximately $75 billion in assets under management. HabourVest has deep ties with Grosvenor and has jointly with Grosvenor sponsored 59 LBO transactions in the last two years.

The Crusader Funds – a group of Highland-managed funds formed between 2000 and 2002. During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their full investment plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been paid when made. Subsequently, when disputes regarding management of the Crusader Funds' liquidation arose, the Redeemer Committee instituted an arbitration against Highland, resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of approximately $190 million. Nonetheless, due to offsets and double-counting, the Debtor initially estimated the value of the Redeemer arbitration award at $105 million to $110 million. In a 9019 settlement with the Debtor, the Crusader Funds ultimately received allowed claims of $137 million, plus $17 million of sundry claims and retention of an interest in Cornerstone Healthcare Group, Inc., an acute-health-care company, valued at over $50 million. Notably, UBS objected to the Crusader Funds' 9019 settlement, arguing that the Redeemer arbitration award was actually worth much less—between $74 and $128 million. The Crusader Funds sold their allowed claims to Stonehill, in which Grosvenor is the largest investor. This sale to an affiliated fund without approval of other investors in the fund is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The Redeemer Committee – The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds was a group of investors in the Crusader Funds that oversaw the liquidation of the funds. The Redeemer Committee was comprised of nine members. Grosvenor held five seats. Concord held one seat.

Grosvenor – GCM Grosvenor is a global alternative asset management firm with over $59 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor has one of the largest operations in the Cayman Islands, with more than half of their assets under management originating through its Cayman operations. Unlike most firms operating in the Cayman Islands, Grosvenor has its own corporate and fiduciary services firm. This structure provides an additional layer of opacity to anonymous corporations from the British Virgin Islands (which includes significant Russian assets), Hong Kong (which includes significant Chinese assets), and Panama (which includes significant South American assets). As a registered investment adviser, Grosvenor must adhere to know-your-customer regulations, must report suspicious activities, and must not facilitate non-compliance or opacity. In 2020, Michael Saks and other insiders distributed all of Grosvenor's assets to shareholders and sold the firm to a SPAC originated by Cantor Fitzgerald.[3] In 2020, the equity market valued asset managers and financial-services firms at decade-high valuations. It makes little sense that Grosvenor would use the highly dilutive SPAC process (as opposed to engaging

[3] *See* https://www.wsj.com/articles/gcm-grosvenor-to-merge-with-cantor-fitzgerald-spac-11596456900. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently released a rule proposal that is focused on enhancing disclosure requirements around special purpose acquisition companies, including additional disclosures about SPAC sponsors, conflicts of interest and sources of dilution, business combination transactions between SPACs and private operating companies, and fairness of these transactions. *See* https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-proposes-enhanced-spac-disclosure-rule.

in a traditional IPO or other strategic-sale alternatives) unless such a structure was employed to avoid the diligence and management-liability tail inherent in more traditional processes.

Farallon – Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is a hedge fund that manages capital on behalf of institutions and individuals and was previously the largest hedge fund in the world. Farallon has approximately $27 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor is a significant investor in Farallon. Grosvenor and Farallon are further linked by Hellman & Friedman, LLC, an American private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman owned a stake in Grosvenor from 2007 until it went public in 2020 and seeded Farallon's initial capital.

Muck – Muck Holdings, LLC. Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon. Together with Jessup Holdings, LLC (described below)), Muck acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Stonehill – Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Stonehill provides portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles. It has approximately $3 billion in assets under management, which we have reason to believe includes approximately $1 billion from Grosvenor.

Jessup – Jessup Holdings, LLC. Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill. Together with Muck (Farallon), Stonehill acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Marc Kirschner/Teneo - The Debtor retained Marc Kirschner to pursue over $1 billion in claims against former insiders and affiliates of the Debtor despite the significant solvency of the estate ($650 million in assets versus $410 million in claims). Kirschner's bankruptcy restructuring firm was purchased by Teneo (which also purchased the restructuring practice of KPMG). Teneo is sponsored by LetterOne, a London-based private equity firm owned by Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. Fridman is also the primary investor in Concord Management, LLC ("Concord"), which held a position on the Redeemer Committee. During the resolution of a 2018 arbitration involving a Debtor-managed fund, the Highland Credit Strategies Fund, evidence emerged demonstrating that Concord was operating as an unregistered investment adviser of Russian money from Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest privately held bank and a key part of Fridman's Alfa Group Consortium. –That money that was funneled into BVI-domiciled shell companies into the Cayman Islands, then into various hedge funds and private equity funds in the U.S. Evidence of these activities was presented by the Debtor to Grosvenor, and the Debtor asked to have Concord removed from the Redeemer Committee. Concord was never removed. Concord is a large investor in Grosvenor. Grosvenor, in turn, is a large investor in Stonehill and Farallon.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved investors in the Crusader Funds. As explained above, a group of Crusader Funds investors sued after the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions during the financial crisis. That dispute resolved with the formation of the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors'

receiving a return of their investments plus a profit, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite the successful liquidation of the Crusader Funds, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of $189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of $110 million once the award was confirmed).

In view of the expected arbitration award and believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.[4]

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Creditors' Committee. At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

> **Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.**

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.[5]

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of Strand. To avoid a protracted dispute and to

[4] *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.
[5] *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by the Independent Board.[6]

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the independent directors, Mr. Seery. Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.[7] Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.[8]

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").[9] There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." *See* http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of

[6] Frank Waterhouse and Scott Ellington, Highland employees, remained as officers of Strand, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel, respectively.
[7] *See* Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.
[8] *See* Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.
[9] *See* Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.[10] Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate. This becomes all the more important when a debtor or an estate holds substantial assets through non-debtor subsidiaries or vehicles, as is the case here; hence, the purpose of Rule 2015.3.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee's Office did anything to ensure compliance. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below. Additionally, the lack of proper and accurate information and intentional hiding of material information led creditors to vote for the Debtor's plan and the Bankruptcy Court to confirm that plan which, we believe, would not have happened had the Debtor complied with its fiduciary and reporting duties.

As Mr. Draper and I have already highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."[11] Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-

[10] After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).
[11] *See* Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

value determinations.[12] Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

Despite these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.[13]

Because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the Debtor to Quietly Sell Assets Without Observing Best Practices

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

- The Debtor sold approximately $25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over $70 million; the Debtor likewise sold $6 million of Portola Pharma shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for $18 million.

- The Debtor divested interests worth $145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for $35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year).

- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to the debtor (20% less than Mr. Dondero received in funds he managed).

- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth $50 million) and Targa (worth $37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or

[12] During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. *See* Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

[13] *See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11"* (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

outside stakeholders, resulting in a loss to the estate of over $10 million versus cost and $20 million versus fair market value.

- The Debtor "sold" interests in certain investments commonly referred to as PetroCap without engaging in a public sale process and without exploring any other method of liquidating the asset.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors. Equally as troubling, for certain similar sale transactions the Debtor *did* seek Bankruptcy Court approval, thus acknowledging that such approval was necessary or, at a minimum, that disclosures regarding non-estate asset sales are required.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the "Inner Circle" to Manipulate the Estate for Personal Gain

Largely because of the Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic because the Debtor sold $172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate's asset value decreased by approximately $200 million in a matter of months in the wake of the global pandemic. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the $200 million impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). A Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-Debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. The Debtor's "inner circle" – the Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) – had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

Mr. Seery's compensation package encouraged, and the lack of transparency permitted, manipulation of the estate and settlement of creditors' claims at inflated amounts.

Upon his initial appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of $60,000 per month for the first three months, $50,000 per month for the following three months, and $30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.[14]

When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he his compensation package was handsomely improved. His base salary, which was on the verge of dropping to $30,000 per month, was increased ***retroactively*** back to March 15, 2020, to $150,000 per month. Additionally, his employment agreement contemplated a discretionary "Restructuring Fee"[15] that would be calculated in one of two ways:

(1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to $1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a "Case Resolution Plan," $500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and $750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

(2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to $500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, $250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and was intended to provide a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to steer Highland through the Chapter 11 case and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern.

Despite the structure of his compensation package, Mr. Seery saw greater value in aligning himself with creditors and the Creditors' Committee. To that end, he publicly alienated and maligned Mr. Dondero, and he found willing allies in the Creditors' Committee. The posturing also paved the way for Mr. Seery to bestow upon the hold-out creditors exorbitant settlements at the expense of equity and earn his Restructuring Fee. In fact, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee (both members of the Creditors' Committee),[16] leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS (also a member of the Creditors' Committee) claims to resolve. In other words, Mr. Seery had curried favor with two of the four members of the Creditors' Committee who would ultimately approve his Restructuring Fee and future compensation following plan consummation.

Ultimately, the confirmed Plan appointed Mr. Seery as the Claimant Trustee, which continued his compensation of $150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary") and provided that the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery would negotiate additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.[17] Mr. Seery's success fee presumably is (or will be) based on whether his liquidation of

[14] *See* Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.
[15] *See* Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.
[16] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 8, l. 24 – p. 9, l. 8.
[17] *See* Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

the estate outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee" and severance payment. In fact, during a deposition taken on October 21, 2021, Mr. Seery testified that he expected to make "a few million dollars a year" for each year during the years that he will take to liquidate the Debtor, although we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly $650 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate $50 million.

Mr. Seery Enters into Inflated Settlements

Even before his appointment as CEO and CRO of the Debtor, Mr. Seery had effectively seized control of the Debtor as its *de facto* chief executive officer.[18] Thus, while he was in the process of negotiating his compensation agreement, he was simultaneously negotiating settlements with the remaining creditors to ensure he earned his Restructuring Fee, even if he did so at inflated amounts. One transaction that highlights this is the settlement with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee.

In connection with Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and CRO, the Debtor announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee. Even ***UBS***, one of the members of the Creditors' Committee, thought the settlement was inflated. In its objection to the Debtor's 9019 motion, UBS stated:[19]

> The Redeemer Claim is based on an Arbitration Award that required the Debtor, inter alia, to pay $118,929,666 (including prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees) in damages and to pay Redeemer $71,894,891 (including prejudgment interest) in exchange for all of Crusader's shares in Cornerstone. Pursuant to that same Arbitration Award, the Debtor also retained the right to receive $32,313,000 in Deferred Fees upon Crusader's liquidation. As shown below, after accounting for those reciprocal obligations to the Debtor and depending on the true value of the Cornerstone shares to be tendered (which is disputed), the actual value of the Arbitration Award to Redeemer is between $74,911,557 and $128,011,557.[3]
>
> Under the Proposed Settlement, however, Redeemer stands to gain far more because the Debtor has inexplicably agreed to release its rights to Crusader's Cornerstone shares and the Deferred Fees (with a combined value that could be as much as $115,913,000)—providing a substantial windfall to Redeemer. The Debtor has failed to provide sufficient information to permit this Court to meaningfully evaluate the true value of the Proposed Settlement, including the fair value of the Cornerstone shares, which it must do in order for this Court to have the information it needs to approve the Proposed Settlement. Depending on the valuation of the Cornerstone shares, the value of the Proposed Settlement to Redeemer may be as much as $253,609,610—which substantially exceeds the face amount of the Redeemer Claim.

[18] *See* Dkt. 864, p. 6, l. 18 – 22.
[19] *See* Dkt. 1190, p. 6 – 7.

In the meantime, other general unsecured creditors of the Debtor will receive a much lower percentage recovery than they would if those assets were instead transferred to the Debtor's estate, as required by the Arbitration Award, and evenly distributed among the Debtor's creditors. The Proposed Settlement is only in the best interests of Redeemer and, as such, it should be rejected.

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[3] The potential range of value attributable to the Cornerstone shares is significant because, according to the Debtor's liquidation analysis, the Debtor expects to have only $195 million total in value to distribute, and only $161 million to distribute to general unsecured creditors under its proposed plan. See Liquidation Analysis [Dkt. No. 1173-1]; First Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Dkt. No. 1079].

UBS was right. Mr. Seery agreed to a settlement that substantially overpaid the Redeemer Committee, and UBS only agreed to withdraw its objection and appeal of the Redeemer Committee's settlement when the Debtor bestowed upon UBS its own lavish settlement.[20]

It is worth noting that the Redeemer Committee ultimately sold its bankruptcy claim for $78 million in cash, but the sale excluded, and the Crusader Funds retained, its investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and certain non-cash consideration.[21] At the end of the day, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee cashed out of their bankruptcy claims for total consideration at the very least of $135 million, meaning they received 105% of the highest estimate (according to UBS) of the net amount of their arbitration award.[22]

The Inner Circle Doesn't Object to Inflated Settlements

Following the Bankruptcy Court's approval of settlements with Acis/Josh Terry and the Crusader Funds/the Redeemer Committee, Mr. Seery turned his attention to the two remaining critical holdouts: HarbourVest and UBS. HarbourVest, a private equity fund-of-funds with approximately $75 billion under management, had invested pre-bankruptcy $80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO

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[20] *See* Dkt 2199. Under the terms of the UBS Settlement, UBS received a Class 8 claim in the amount of $65 million, a Class 9 claim in the amount of $60 million, a payment in cash of $18.5 million from a non-Debtor fund managed by the Debtor, and the Debtor's agreement to assist UBS in pursuing other claims against former Debtor affiliates related to a default on a credit facility during the Global Financial Crisis. Importantly, over the course of the preceding 11 years, UBS had already received payments totaling $180 million in connection with this dispute, and just prior to bankruptcy, UBS and the Debtor had reached a settlement in principle in which the Debtor would pay UBS just $7 million and $10 million in future business.

[21] *See* Exh. B.

[22] The estimation of a total recovery of $135 million includes attributing $48 million to the retained Cornerstone investment. The $48 million valuation equated to a ~45% interest in Cornerstone, which was valued pre-pandemic at approximately $107 million. Following COVID, Cornerstone's long-term acute care facilities flourished. Additionally, Cornerstone held a direct investment of over 800,000 shares in MGM, which was held on its books at approximately $72 per share. The per-share closing price on the sale of MGM to Amazon exceeded $164, which would have increased the company's valuation (irrespective of the post-COVID growth) by more than $70 million, bring Crusader Funds' windfall to more than $205 million.

Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called the Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining ~2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees.

Before Highland filed bankruptcy, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment into HCLOF because Highland allegedly failed to disclose facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry, which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately $15 million in legal fees and costs. In Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over $300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that the Debtor and Debtor's counsel initially argued was absurd. Indeed, Debtor management valued HarbourVest's claims at $0, which was consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.[23] Nevertheless, as one of the final creditor claims to be resolved, Mr. Seery ultimately agreed to give HabourVest a $45 million Class 8 claim and a $35 million Class 9 claim.[24] At that time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive 71.32% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. Thus, HarbourVest's total $80 million in allowed claims would result in HarbourVest receiving $32 million in cash.[25] The cash consideration was offset by HarbourVest's agreement to convey its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor (or its designee) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was $22.5 million. In other words, from the outside looking in, the Debtor agreed to pay $9.5 million for a spurious claim.

Oddly enough, no creditors (other than former insiders) objected. What the inner circle presumably knew was that the settlement was actually a windfall for the Debtor. As we have previously detailed, the $22.5 million valuation of HCLOF that the Debtor utilized in seeking approval of the settlement was based upon September 2020 figures when the economy was still reeling from the pandemic. The value of that investment rebounded rapidly, particularly because of the pending MGM sale to Amazon that was disclosed to the Debtor but not the public (i.e., material non-public information). We have subsequently learned that the actual value of the HCLOF at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the HarbourVest settlement was at least $44 million—a value that Mr. Seery would have known but that was not disclosed to the Court or the public.

Likewise, there were no objections to the UBS settlement, which is puzzling. As detailed in the Debtor's 64-page objection to the UBS proof of claim and the Redeemer Committee's 431-page objection to the UBS proof of claim, UBS's claims against the Debtor were razor thin and largely foreclosed by res judicata and a settlement and release executed in connection with the June 2015 settlement. Moreover, the publicly available information indicated that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by $200 million, from $556 million on October 16,

[23] *See* Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.
[24] Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.
[25] We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately $27 million.

2019, to $328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to $364 million as of January 31, 2021);[26]

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by $236 million from December 2020 to January 2021, with Class 8 claims ballooning $74 million in December to $267 million in January;

- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for Class 8 Claims decreased from 87.44% to 71.32% in just a matter of months.

The Liquidation Analysis estimated total assets remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims to be $195 million, with general unsecured claims totaling $273 million. By the time the UBS settlement was presented to the court for approval, the allowed Class 8 Claims had increased to $309,345,000, reducing the distribution to Class 8 creditors to 62.99%. Surely significant creditors like the Redeemer Committee—whose projected distribution dropped from $119,527,515 when it voted for the Plan to $86,105,194 with the HarbourVest and UBS claims included—should have taken notice.

Mr. Seery Stacks the Oversight Board

As previously disclosed, we believe Mr. Seery facilitated the sale of the four largest claims in the estate to Farallon and Stonehill. Based upon conversations with representatives of Farallon, Mr. Seery contacted them directly to encourage their acquisition of claims in the bankruptcy estate.[27] We believe Mr. Seery did so by disclosing the true value of the estate versus what was publicly disclosed in court filings, demonstrating that there was substantial upside to the claims as compared to what was included in the Plan Analysis. For example, publicly available information at the time Farallon and Stonehill acquired the UBS claim indicated the purchase would have made no economic sense: the publicly disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Farallon and Stonehill would have lost money on the claim acquisition. We can only conclude Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), which based upon accurately disclosed financial statements would indicate they were likely to recover close to 100% on both Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

As set forth in the previous letters, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers Farallon, through Muck, and Stonehill, through Jessup. The four claims purchased by Farallon and Stonehill comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin, collectively totaling almost $270 million in Class 8 claims and $95 million in Class 9 claims:

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[26] *Compare* Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], *with* Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473].

[27] We believe Mr. Seery made similar calls to representatives of Stonehill. We are informed and believe that Mr. Seery has long-standing relationships with both Farallon and Stonehill.

Claimant	Class 8 Claim	Class 9 Claims	Date Claim Settled
Redeemer Committee	$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	$45,000,000	$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	$65,000,000	$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	**$269,696,610**	**$95,000,000**	

From the information we have been able to gather, it appears that Stonehill and Farallon purchased these claims for the following amounts:

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Purchaser	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Stonehill	$78.0[28]
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Farallon	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Farallon	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	$50.0
TOTAL	$270.0	$95.0		$150.0 - $165.0

As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) are overseeing the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth below, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly $650 million and has approximately $200 million in cash, which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating $50 million. Thus, it is a warranted and logical deduction that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. As set forth in previous letters, there are three primary reasons to believe this:

- The scant publicly available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that was actually publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims; and
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of $100 million (and likely closer to $150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

For example, consider the sale of the Crusader Funds' claims, which we *know* was sold for $78 million. Based upon the publicly available information at the time of the acquisition, the expected distribution would have been $86 million. Surely a sophisticated hedge fund would not invest $78 million in a particularly contentious bankruptcy if it believed its maximum return was $86 million years later.

[28] Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately $65 million.

Ultimately, the Plan, Mr. Seery's compensation package, and the lack of transparency to everyone other than the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee permitted Debtor management and the Creditors' Committee to support grossly inflated claims (at the expense of residual stakeholders) in a grossly understated estate, which facilitated the sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In doing so, Mr. Seery installed on the Reorganized Debtor's Oversight Board friendly faces who stand to make $370 million on ~$150 million investment. And Mr. Seery's plan has already worked. Notably, while the confirmed Plan was characterized by the Debtor as a monetization plan,[29] the newly installed Oversight Board supported, and the Court approved, paying Mr. Seery the much more lucrative Case Resolution Fee, netting Mr. Seery $1.5 million more than he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.

In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

	Value as of Aug. 2021		**March 2022 High Estimate updated for MGM closing**
Asset	**Low**	**High**	
Cash as of 4/25/22	$17.9	$17.9	
Targa Sale	$37.0	$37.0	
8/1 CLO Flows	$10.0	$10.0	
Uchi Bldg. Sale	$9.0	$9.0	
Siepe Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
PetroCap Sale	$3.2	$3.2	
Park West Sale	$3.5	$3.5	
HCLOF trapped cash	$25.0	$25.0	
Total Cash	**$105.6**	**$105.6**	**$200**
Trussway	$180.0	$180.0	$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	$18.0	$18.0	$25.0
HCLOF	$40.0	$40.0	$20.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	$20.0	$20.0	$30.0
MGM (direct ownership)	$32.0	$32.0	$0.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	$45.0	$45.0	$30.0
Korea Fund	$18.0	$18.0	$20.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	$12.0	$40.0	$40.0
SE Multifamily	$0.0	$20.0	$20.0
Affiliate Notes	$0.0	$70.0	$70.0
Other	$2.0	$10.0	$10.0

[29] See Dkt. 194., p.5.

Highland Restoration Capital Partners			
TOTAL	**$472.6**	**$598.6**	**$645.0**

The Bankruptcy Professionals are Draining the Estate

Yet another troubling aspect of the Highland bankruptcy has been the rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the Estate, largely through invented, unnecessary, and greatly overstaffed and overworked offensive litigation. The sums expended between case filing and the effective date of the Plan (the "Effective Date") are staggering:

Professional	**Fees**	**Expenses**
Hunton Andrews Kurth	$1,147,059.42	$2,747.84
FTI Consulting, Inc.	$6,176,551.20	$39,122.91
Teneo Capital, LLC	$1,221,468.75	$6,257.07
Marc Kirschner	$137,096.77	
Sidley Austin LLP	$13,134,805.20	$211,841.25
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	$23,978,627.25	$334,232.95
Mercer (US) Inc.	$202,317.65	$2,449.37
Deloitte Tax LLP	$553,412.60	
Development Specialists, Inc.	$5,562,531.12	$206,609.54
James Seery[30]	$5,100,000.00	
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP		
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP	$2,645,729.72	$5,207.53
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC	$2,054,716.00	
Foley & Lardner LLP	$629,088.00	
Casey Olsen Cayman Limited	$280,264.00	
ASW Law Limited	$4,976.00	
Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc.	$766,397.00	
Berger Harris, LLP		
Hayward PLLC	$825,629.50	$46,482.92
	$64,420,670.18	**$854,951.38**
Total Fees and Expenses		**$65,275,621.56**

"The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees sought." *In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co.*, 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).

[30] This amount includes Mr. Seery's success fee, which was paid a month following the Effective Date.

The rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the estate is in stark contrast to the treatment of the employees who stayed with the Debtor (without a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive program) on the promise they would be made whole for prepetition deferred compensation that had not yet vested, only to be stiffed and summarily terminated. Even worse, some of these employees have been targeted by the litigation sub-trust for acts they took in the course and scope of their employment.

Following the Effective Date, siphoning of estate assets continues. Mr. Seery still receives base compensation of $150,000 per month, and he expects to receive compensation of at least "a few million dollars a year" according to his own deposition testimony. In addition, his retention was conditioned upon receiving a to-be-negotiated success fee and severance payment (notably, none of which is disclosed publicly).

Likewise, Teneo Capital, LLC was retained as the litigation adviser. For its services post-Effective Date, it is compensated $20,000 per month for Mr. Kirschner as trustee for the Litigation Subtrust, plus the regularly hourly fees of any additional Teneo personnel, plus a "Litigation Recovery Fee." The Litigation Recovery Fee is equal to 1.5% of Net Litigation Proceeds up to $100 million and 2.0% of Net Litigation Proceeds above. Interestingly, although "Net Litigation Proceeds" is defined as gross litigation proceeds less certain fees incurred in pursing the litigation, net proceeds are not reduced by Mr. Kirschner's monthly fee, contingency fees charged by any other professionals, or litigation funding financing. Moreover, Teneo is given credit for any litigation recoveries regardless of whether those recoveries stem from actions commenced by the litigation trustee. The Debtor has not disclosed, and is not required to disclose, the terms upon which any professionals have been engaged following the Effective Date, including Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for the Litigation Subtrust. Based upon pre-Effective Date monthly expenses, the number of lawyers that attend various matters on behalf of the Debtor,[31] and the addition of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Teneo, we believe the Debtor could be spending as much as $5-$7 million per month.

The Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust recently filed heavily redacted, quarterly post-confirmation reports.[32] Of note, the Reorganized Debtor disclosed that it has disbursed $81,983,611 since the Effective Date but disclosed that it has only paid $47,793 in priority claims and $6,918,473 in general unsecured claims, while still estimating a total recovery to general unsecured claims of $205,144,544. The Highland Claimant Trust disclosed that it has disbursed an additional $7,152,331 since the Effective Date.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an extreme example of the abuses that can occur if the federal bench, federal government appointees, and federal lawmakers do not police federal bankruptcy proceedings by

[31] In connection with a recent two-day trial on an administrative claim, the Debtor was represented by John Morris ($1,245.00 per hour), Greg Demo ($950 per hour), and Hayley Winograd ($695 per hour), and was assisted by paralegal La Asia Canty ($460 per hour). The Debtor's local counsel, Zachery Annable ($300 per hour), was also present, and Jeffrey Pomerantz ($1,295 per hour) observed the trial via WebEx. Despite the army of lawyers, Mr. Morris handled virtually the entire proceeding, with Ms. Winograd examining only two small witnesses. Messrs. Pomerantz, Demo, and Annable played no active role in the proceedings.

[32] Dkt 3325 and 3326.

permitting debtors-in-possession to hide material information, violate duties of transparency and candor, and manipulate information and transactions to benefit disclosed and undisclosed insiders or "friends" of insiders. Bankruptcy should not be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. We therefore encourage your office to investigate the problems inherent in the Highland bankruptcy. At a minimum, we ask that the EOUST seek orders from the Bankruptcy Court compelling the Debtor to undertake the following actions:

1. turn over all financial reports that should have been disclosed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, including 2015.3 reports;

2. provide a detailed disclosure of the assets Reorganized Debtor;

3. provide a copy of the executed Claimant Trust Agreement, which should already have been disclosed;

4. disclose all solvency analyses prepared by the Debtor; and

5. provide copies of all agreements for the engagement of Debtor professionals post-confirmation, including the terms of Mr. Seery's success fee and severance agreement, compensation agreements for personnel of the Reorganized Debtor, and the fee arrangement with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

Sincerely,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: _____
Davor Rukavina, Esq.

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HMIT Exhibit 18

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	Case No. 19-34054-sgj
Reorganized Debtor.	

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING

Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"), the reorganized debtor in the above-referenced bankruptcy case, and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Trust", and together with HCMLP, "Highland"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit this response (the "Response") to the *Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* [Docket No. 3662] (the "Motion") filed

by The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT", and together with Dugaboy, the "Movants"). In support of its Response, Highland represents as follows:

RESPONSE

1. On June 30, 2022, Dugaboy filed its *Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust* [Docket No. 3382] (the "Initial Valuation Motion") in which Dugaboy sought a determination of the value of the estate and an accounting of Highland's assets. HMIT joined Dugaboy's Initial Valuation Motion [Docket No. 3467], which Dugaboy subsequently amended to, among other things, request an evidentiary hearing and the disclosure of certain information. *See Supplemental and Amended Motion for Determination of the Value of the Estate and Assets Held by the Claimant Trust* [Docket No. 3533] (together with the Initial Valuation Motion, the "Valuation Motion").

2. In their Valuation Motion, the Movants generally alleged that the information sought would support their allegation that the value of the Claimant Trust's assets exceeds the amount of the Class 8 and Class 9 claims such that—as Contingent Claimant Trust Beneficiaries—they will become "in the money." After briefing and argument, the Court denied the Valuation Motion as procedurally improper, finding, among other things, that the Movants' request for equitable relief could only be obtained in an adversary proceeding. *Order Denying Motion [DE # 3382] and Supplemental Motion [DE #3533] of Dugaboy Investment Trust Due to Procedural Deficiency: Adversary Proceeding Required* [Docket No. 3645] (the "Order").

3. Two months after the Order was entered, with new counsel,[1] the Movants filed the Motion. However, unlike the Valuation Motion, the Motion and the proposed Complaint do not

[1] Douglas Draper has represented Dugaboy throughout Highland's bankruptcy case, including in connection with the Valuation Motion. Louis Phillips has represented HMIT since the spring of 2021, including in connection with the

simply seek a determination that Movants are entitled to information from the Claimant Trust under the Claimant Trust Agreement or applicable law. If that is what the Movants actually wanted, the Complaint would be no more than a handful of pages. Instead, in lengthy, rambling pleadings, Movants attempt to portray Dondero as a helpless and tragic victim, betrayed by the bankruptcy process, the judiciary, and a bunch of conniving thieves, led—of course—by the antagonist-in-chief, management of the Claimant Trust and reorganized HCMLP.

4. Naturally, the Movants ignore that fact that Dondero and those acting in concert with him are serial litigators[2] who have left a trail of destruction in their wake.[3] But more importantly, the Movants' litany of baseless conspiracy theories are irrelevant to the Motion.

5. The Movants have no legal right to the "valuation" information they purportedly seek; that is exactly why they must seek equitable relief. Stymied by the law, the Movants apparently intend to use their Complaint as a vehicle to spew venom, engage in groundless character assassination, re-litigate matters decided years ago, and seek information that they surely will try to use to commence further litigation that will be subject to the Gatekeeper in the Plan.[4] Accordingly, if Movants want to continue to pursue their request for information, the Court should

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Valuation Motion. However, neither lawyer represents the Movants in connection with the Motion. Instead, the Stinson firm—James Dondero's long-time, personal counsel—has taken the reins and filed the Motion on behalf of the Movants, thereby re-affirming Dondero's ultimate control of the Movants.

[2] *See generally Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Deem the Dondero Entities Vexatious Litigants*, a copy of which was attached as Exhibit A to *Highland Capital Management, L.P.'s Opposed Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit*, Case No. 3:21-cv-00881-X (N.D. Tex.) (the "Vexatious Litigant Motion"). A copy of the Vexatious Litigant Motion is annexed as **Exhibit 1**.

[3] *See, e.g., Special Turnover Petition* filed in *UBS Securities LLC v. Dondero*, Index No. 650744/2023, NYSCEF No. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 8, 2023) (the "UBS Special Petition"). A copy of the UBS Special Petition is annexed as **Exhibit 2**.

[4] In fact, Dondero's vexatiousness is continuing even before the Motion is adjudicated. On Friday afternoon, March 24, Highland was advised that—notwithstanding the dismissal of ***two*** separate section 202 proceedings in Texas state court—HMIT will file (through yet another lawyer) another baseless Gatekeeper motion in this Court in an attempt to attack management of the Claimant Trust and HCMLP and certain stakeholders.

require the Movants to modify the Complaint to eliminate the *ad hominem* attacks and efforts to re-litigate all that has transpired since the Independent Board's appointment in January 2020. Otherwise, the Complaint will lead to a full-fledged circus.[5]

6. The proposed Complaint seeks equitable relief in the form of information disclosures, an accounting, and judicial declarations concerning the value of the Claimant Trust and the Movants' interests therein. Movants seek no damages of any kind, nor do they seek to hold any Protected Party liable for anything. Accordingly, to the limited extent that litigation of the Complaint will concern Movants' entitlement (or lack thereof) to information, Highland does not object to Movants seeking the relief requested in the Motion from this Court on the ground that the Gatekeeper was not intended to apply to equitable requests of this type. And while the Claimant Trust certainly disputes Movants' claims to the equitable relief sought, the Claimant Trust does not believe the Court needs to make a colorability determination in connection therewith. The merits of Movants' equitable claims will be determined in due course in the adversary proceeding.

7. In sum, while Highland does not object to the Movants commencing an action in this Court seeking the equitable relief set forth in the draft Complaint attached to the Motion, if the Complaint is not modified as set forth above prior to filing, Highland reserves the right to seek sanctions under Rule 11 (because a substantial number of the allegations will never have any evidentiary support) and to strike under Rule 12(f) (because a substantial number of the allegations are immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous).

[5] Dondero's never-disputed threat to "burn the place down" if he did not get his way, and his later, written message to "[be] careful what you do – last warning" hang like pall over this bankruptcy case and serve as a clear warning for more to come, unless appropriately restrained by the courts, regulators, or the Department of Justice.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Highland does not object to the filing of a complaint in this Court requesting the equitable relief described in the draft Complaint (and only such relief), but Highland specifically reserves the right to seek sanctions under Rule 11 and to strike under Rule 12 if Movants file their Complaint in its current form.

Dated: March 27, 2023

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., Plaintiff, vs. HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT FUND ADVISORS, L.P., et al., Defendants.	§	Case No. 3:21-cv-00881-X (Consolidated with 3:21-cv-00880-X, 3:21-cv-01010-X, 3:21-cv-01378-X, 3:21-cv-01379-X)

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DEEM THE DONDERO ENTITIES VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS AND FOR RELATED RELIEF

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CASES

STATUTES

Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland"), by and through its undersigned counsel, submits this *Memorandum of Law*[1] in support of its motion (the "Motion") to deem the above-captioned defendants, their affiliated entities, and any person or entity controlled by or acting in concert with James Dondero (collectively, the "Dondero Entities")[2] vexatious litigants and to require them to file a copy of this Court's order in any pending or future litigation or proceeding. In support of the Motion, Highland states as follows:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT[3]

1. The Dondero Entities—all of which are dominated and controlled by or acting in concert with Mr. Dondero, Highland's co-founder and ousted Chief Executive Officer—are engaged in a coordinated litigation strategy spanning more than two years to wear down Highland and its management and thwart Highland's confirmed Plan. The Dondero Entities have clogged the dockets of this Court, the Bankruptcy Court, and the Fifth Circuit and have wasted untold judicial and estate resources. While the Bankruptcy Court approved a Gatekeeper provision as part of Highland's confirmed Plan, it has proved inadequate to curtail the Dondero Entities' harassing and abusive litigation. Accordingly, Highland requests that this Court declare the Dondero Entities vexatious litigants and require them to file a copy of this Court's order finding them vexatious in any pending or future litigation or proceeding.

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[1] Highland is concurrently filing its *Appendix in Support of Motion to Deem the Dondero Entities Vexatious Litigants and for Related Relief* (the "Appendix"). Citations to the Appendix are notated as "Ex. #, Appx. #."

[2] "Dondero Entities" refers, collectively, to (a) Mr. Dondero, (b) NexPoint Advisors, L.P. ("NPA"), (c) Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., n/k/a NexPoint Asset Management, L.P. ("HCMFA"), (d) HCRE Partners LLC n/k/a NexPoint Real Estate Partners LLC ("HCRE"), (e) Highland Capital Management Services, Inc., (f) Nancy Dondero, and (g) any entity directly or indirectly controlled by, or acting in concert with, Mr. Dondero, including, without limitation, (i) The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF"), (ii) CLO HoldCo, Ltd. ("CLOH"), (iii) The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), (iv) Get Good Investment Trust ("Get Good"), (v) Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, (vi) Strand Advisors, Inc., (vii) The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust 1; (viii) The Get Good Non-Exempt Trust 2; and (ix) PCMG Trading Partners XXIII, L.P. ("PCMG").

[3] Capitalized terms in this Preliminary Statement have the meanings given to them below.

2. Mr. Dondero's "strategy" is not new; he has used litigation as a weapon to harass and exact revenge against his perceived enemies for years.[4] Prior to its 2019 bankruptcy, Mr. Dondero fostered a culture of scorched-earth, vindictive litigation at Highland suing anyone who challenged him or refused to cave to his demands. That culture spawned litigation lasting more than a decade in courts and arbitration panels in Texas, Delaware, New York, and foreign jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and Guernsey.

3. But Mr. Dondero's litigation "strategy" caught up with him, and Highland was forced to seek bankruptcy protection in October 2019. Highland's unsecured creditors Committee was comprised largely of litigation claimants who were intimately familiar with Mr. Dondero's tactics. The Committee immediately focused on removing Mr. Dondero from control of Highland. To avoid appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, Highland, Mr. Dondero, and the Committee entered into a settlement in January 2020, which removed Mr. Dondero and appointed an Independent Board to manage and oversee Highland's bankruptcy.

4. In late 2020, after the Committee rejected Mr. Dondero's global settlement offers as inadequate—thus blocking Mr. Dondero's efforts to regain control of Highland—he vowed to "burn down the place" unless they capitulated to his demands. Thereafter, directly and through the Dondero Entities, Mr. Dondero began interfering with the management of the estate, threatening Highland employees, challenging actions taken to further Highland's reorganization, commencing new (and frivolous) litigation against Highland and its management both inside and outside of the

[4] Mr. Dondero's proclivity for frivolous litigation is so well known that Highland was unable to obtain cost-effective insurance because insurance companies refused to insure the risk of Mr. Dondero's vexatiousness, calling it the "Dondero Exclusion." *See* ¶ 24 *infra*.

Bankruptcy Court, violating Bankruptcy Court orders, filing multiple motions to recuse, and appealing nearly everything resulting in 26 total appeals.[5]

5. Despite the Dondero Entities' roadblocks, in February 2021, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Plan, which included a Gatekeeper provision preventing, in relevant part, the Dondero Entities from suing Highland, its employees, and its management without leave of the Bankruptcy Court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Confirmation Order, including the Gatekeeper, in all material respects but remanded solely to limit the parties exculpated by the Plan. On remand, the Dondero Entities blatantly mischaracterized the Fifth Circuit's ruling, wrongly asserting the Fifth Circuit had severely limited the Gatekeeper. The Bankruptcy Court disagreed, but the Dondero Entities are certain to appeal any final order conforming the Plan.

6. In the meantime, the Dondero Entities continue to harass Highland and hinder performance of the Plan. For example, they have commenced actions in Texas state courts against members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Board seeking information to use to manufacture more spurious claims and have filed letters and complaints with the U.S. Trustee launching broad and baseless attacks against Highland and its management.

7. Thus, even with the Gatekeeper firmly in place, the Dondero Entities continue to seek ways to avoid its protections and mire the estate in even more litigation. To protect its estate, the bankruptcy process, and the judicial system, Highland asks this Court to enter an order in the form annexed to the Motion as **Exhibit A** complementing the Gatekeeper by declaring the Dondero Entities vexatious litigants and requiring them to file a copy of such order with any court or agency in which an action is currently pending or is subsequently filed.

[5] With a few narrow exceptions, these appeals have been rejected and reviewing courts have sometimes been blunt in their characterization. For example, this Court expressed its belief that Mr. Dondero's arguments were intended to "bamboozle" (*see* ¶ 26 *infra*) and the Fifth Circuit described the Dondero Entities' collective objections to confirmation as "blunderbuss" (*see* ¶ 17 *infra*).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Highland's Prepetition Culture of Litigation

8. Highland was founded in 1993 by Mr. Dondero and Mark Okada (who resigned pre-bankruptcy) and was controlled by Mr. Dondero as the owner and sole director of its general partner. At its peak, Highland was a global investment adviser managing nearly $40 billion, and, for most of its history, it was successful. Its bankruptcy was not caused by a business calamity. "Rather, [Highland] filed for Chapter 11 protection due to a myriad of massive, unrelated, business litigation claims that it faced—many of which had finally become liquidated (or were about to become liquidated) after a decade or more of contentious litigation in multiple forums all over the world."[6] For example:

- UBS: UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG, London Branch (collectively, "UBS"), sued two funds controlled by Highland in 2009 in New York state court for breach of contract when they failed to honor margin calls. After discovering Highland—through Mr. Dondero—had orchestrated a series of frauds that rendered the funds judgment-proof, UBS named Highland and others as defendants. In February 2020, a $1 billion-plus judgment was entered against the two Highland funds,[7] which UBS sought to recover from Highland alleging, among other things, alter ego liability.[8] UBS continues to litigate with Mr. Dondero and his proxies.
- Patrick Daugherty: Mr. Daugherty was a Highland employee and limited partner who resigned in 2011. Thereafter, Mr. Dondero, directly and by proxy, began a litigation campaign to deprive Mr. Daugherty of income earned while at Highland. After Mr. Daugherty prevailed against certain affiliated entities, Mr. Dondero again orchestrated a series of fraudulent transfers that

[6] *See Order Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief*, Bankr. Docket No. 1943 ("Confirmation Order") ¶ 8.

[7] Ex. 2, Appx. [__]; Ex. 3, Appx. [__].

[8] Ex. 4, Appx. [__]; Ex. 5, Appx. [__].

left those entities judgment-proof. Mr. Dondero's actions led the Delaware Chancery Court to find "a reasonable basis to believe that a fraud has been perpetrated" and to apply the "crime-fraud exception" to Dondero confederates' assertions of attorney-client privilege.[9] This litigation continues.

- Redeemer Committee: In 2011, a Redeemer Committee was appointed by a Bermudian court to oversee the wind-down of the Highland Crusader Fund because of concerns with Mr. Dondero's management. Disputes arose, and, in 2016, the Redeemer Committee terminated Highland as investment manager and commenced binding arbitration alleging, among other things, that Highland had converted over $30 million, breached its fiduciary duties, and engaged in other misconduct. In March 2019, the arbitration panel (a) rejected Highland's arguments; (b) made highly critical assessments of the credibility of Highland's witnesses; (c) found Highland breached its fiduciary duties and certain agreements and engaged in other wrongful conduct; and (d) awarded the Redeemer Committee more than $190 million.[10]
- Acis: Joshua Terry was a Highland employee and limited partner of a former Highland affiliate, Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis") who was terminated in June 2016. Mr. Terry subsequently obtained an $8 million arbitration award against Acis. Rather than satisfying the award, Mr. Dondero followed his playbook by stripping Acis of assets and taking other vindictive actions against Mr. Terry, including converting Mr. Terry and his wife's retirement account. Unable to collect, Mr. Terry filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Acis in the Bankruptcy Court in 2018, resulting in the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee. The bankruptcy was marked by extraordinarily acrimonious litigation,[11] but, ultimately, Acis's

[9] Ex. 6, Appx. [__].
[10] Ex. 7, Appx. [__]; Ex. 8, Appx. [__].
[11] *See, e.g., In re Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 584 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018).

confirmed plan transferred ownership of Acis to Mr. Terry.[12] Mr. Dondero's war against Mr. Terry and Acis continues.[13]

Highland's culture of litigation—of which the foregoing are only examples—ultimately forced Highland to seek bankruptcy protection.[14]

B. Highland Files Bankruptcy; the Independent Board Is Appointed; Negotiations Commence

9. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), Mr. Dondero caused Highland to file a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"), and Highland's statutory committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee") was appointed. Three of the four members of the Committee—Acis, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee—held claims arising from Highland's culture of litigation (the last member was an e-discovery vendor).[15]

10. The Committee immediately moved to transfer the Bankruptcy Case to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division (the "Bankruptcy Court")—

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[12] *Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Final Approval of Disclosure Statement and Confirming the Third Amended Joint Plan for Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, as Modified*, Case No. 18-30264-sgj11, Docket No. 829 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2019). The Dondero Entities, of course, appealed the Acis confirmation order; their appeals were denied. *See* Case No. 3:19-cv-00291-D, Docket No. 75 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019); Case No. 19-10847 (5th Cir. June 17, 2021).

[13] Immediately after the expiration of the injunction in Acis's plan, Mr. Dondero—through NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund ("NSOF")—filed suit against Acis, Mr. Terry, and others in the Southern District of New York alleging they violated their fiduciary obligations to NSOF as an investor in a CLO managed by Acis (and which had been managed by Mr. Dondero prior to the Acis bankruptcy). Civ. Case No. 1:21-cv-04384 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). Mr. Dondero's litigation caused Acis to halt distributions from its managed CLOs thus depriving Highland of approximately $20 million in proceeds. The Southern District of New York dismissed Mr. Dondero's litigation. Undeterred, Mr. Dondero appealed to the Second Circuit (USCA Case No. 22-1912 (2d Cir. 2022)) and re-filed his breach of fiduciary duty claims in New York state court (Index No. 653654/2022 (N.Y. Sup. 2022)).

[14] The direct catalyst for Highland's bankruptcy was the Redeemer Committee's arbitration award. Highland lacked the liquidity to pay the award and was desperate to avoid its public disclosure, which was averted by Highland's filing.

[15] The culture of litigation ran so deep at Highland that Highland's twenty largest unsecured, non-insider creditors included *nineteen* litigation claimants, law firms, and other professionals related to litigation. Bankr. Docket No. 1.

where Acis's bankruptcy was pending—and, on December 2, 2019, Highland's case was transferred.[16]

11. Soon thereafter, the Committee, with the support of the U.S. Trustee, told Highland it intended to seek appointment of a chapter 11 trustee because it did not believe Mr. Dondero could act as an estate fiduciary based on his history of self-dealing, asset stripping, and other breaches of fiduciary duty. To avoid a trustee, Mr. Dondero and Highland entered into a settlement with the Committee—approved by the Bankruptcy Court in January 2020[17]—that: (a) removed Mr. Dondero from all control positions at Highland; (b) appointed an independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage the bankruptcy; and (c) implemented operating protocols (the "Protocols") that, among other things, (i) generally required Committee approval before most asset sales or transfers, and (ii) prohibited Mr. Dondero and his controlled affiliates from terminating contracts with Highland. Mr. Dondero remained at Highland as an unpaid portfolio manager. The Bankruptcy Court subsequently appointed one of the Independent Board members, James P. Seery, Jr., as Highland's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer.[18]

12. The January and July Orders appointing the Independent Board and Mr. Seery, respectively, included gatekeeper provisions intended to protect Highland's fiduciaries from harassing litigation.[19]

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[16] The Delaware court transferred venue to the Bankruptcy Court because of, among other reasons, its knowledge of and experience with Mr. Dondero and his use of surrogates and proxies to litigate his positions.

[17] Bankr. Docket No. 339 (the "January Order"). "Bankr. Docket" refers to the docket maintained in Case No. 19-34054-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.).

[18] Bankr. Docket No. 854 (the "July Order").

[19] *See* January Order ¶ 10 ("No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director … without the Bankruptcy Court … specifically authorizing such entity to bring a claim."); July Order ¶ 5 ("No entity may commence or pursue a claim or cause of action of any kind against Mr. Seery … without the Bankruptcy Court … specifically authorizing such entity to bring a claim.").

13. In August 2020, at the urging of the Bankruptcy Court, Highland, Mr. Dondero, the Committee, Acis, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee entered mediation with retired bankruptcy judge Allan Gropper and attorney Sylvia Mayer as mediators in the hope of reaching a global settlement.[20] The mediation resulted in settlements with the Redeemer Committee, Acis, and, ultimately, UBS[21] but not a global settlement with Mr. Dondero. Thereafter, Highland and the Committee began negotiating a plan of reorganization that would monetize Highland's assets and distribute proceeds to creditors.

C. Mr. Dondero Interferes with the Estate and Vows to "Burn [Highland] Down"

14. With the Committee refusing to capitulate, and frustrated by his inability to regain control of Highland, Mr. Dondero told Mr. Seery that he would "burn down the place."[22] True to his word, Mr. Dondero became an implacable opponent of Highland and the Committee's efforts to confirm a plan and settle claims, resulting in the Independent Board demanding his resignation. Mr. Dondero and the Dondero Entities then embarked on a coordinated campaign of destruction: (a) objecting to virtually every settlement; (b) commencing actions that were either frivolous or withdrawn on the eve of trial; (c) forcing Highland to sue to collect on over $60 million of simple, two-page demand and term loans and then asserting fabricated and frivolous defenses to repayment; (d) interfering with Highland's management of its estate; (e) threatening Highland

[20] Bankr. Docket No. 912.

[21] The settlement with UBS was subsequently renegotiated after Highland—then independently managed—uncovered and disclosed a massive fraud in which Mr. Dondero surreptitiously caused two entities against which UBS ultimately procured a billion-dollar judgment to transfer $300 million in face amount of cash and securities to an offshore entity owned and controlled by Mr. Dondero and his general counsel, Scott Ellington, in August 2017. Ex. 8, Appx. [ ]. After the details of this transfer were presented to the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy Court indicated it would review the facts, which it called "damning," and, if warranted, make a criminal referral pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a). *Id.*, Appx. [ ].

[22] Confirmation Order ¶ 78.

employees and management; and (f) appealing virtually every order. The Bankruptcy Court found the Dondero Entities' litigation was intended to harass.[23]

D. Confirmation of Highland's Plan; Approval of the Gatekeeper and Fifth Circuit Affirmance; and Subsequent Litigation

15. On February 22, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court overruled the Dondero Entities' objections and, with the support of 99.8% of creditors in amount,[24] entered the Confirmation Order, which confirmed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified)*.[25] In the Confirmation Order, the Bankruptcy Court found Mr. Dondero controlled the Dondero Entities and that they were "marching" to his orders.[26]

16. The confirmed Plan included a "gatekeeper" provision (the "Gatekeeper") prohibiting the Dondero Entities, among others, from bringing claims against Highland, any of the entities created under the Plan, and Highland's management, among others, unless the Bankruptcy Court found the claims "colorable."[27] The Bankruptcy Court found the Gatekeeper was:

> necessary and appropriate in light of the history of the continued litigiousness of Mr. Dondero and his related entities in this Chapter 11 Case and necessary to the effective and efficient administration, implementation and consummation of the Plan …. Approval of the Gatekeeper Provision will prevent baseless litigation designed merely to harass the post-confirmation entities charged with monetizing the Debtor's assets for the benefit of its economic constituents, will avoid abuse of

[23] Confirmation Order ¶ 77 ("During the last several months, Mr. Dondero and the Dondero Related Entities have harassed [Highland], which has resulted in further substantial, costly, and time-consuming litigation for [Highland].")

[24] Confirmation Order ¶ 3.

[25] Bankr. Docket No. 1808 (the "Plan").

[26] Confirmation Order ¶¶ 16, 19.

[27] Plan, Art. IX.F. The Plan also provided for the creation of the Highland Litigation Sub-Trust and the appointment of Marc Kirschner as litigation trustee. *See generally* Plan, Art. IV.B. Mr. Kirschner, as litigation trustee, subsequently filed suit against Mr. Dondero and a number of Dondero Entities in the Bankruptcy Court. Adv. Proc. No. 21-03051-sgj (Bankr. N.D. Tex.). In response to that suit, the Dondero Entities and the other defendants have given new meaning to the phrase 'scorched earth' by serving over 40 third-party subpoenas on Highland's employees, law firms (including its lead bankruptcy counsel), and financial advisors; claimholders and their individual counsel (both law firms and individual lawyers); the Creditors Committee and its counsel; Oversight Committee Members; vendors; and contract counter-parties (collectively, the "Subpoenas"). The Subpoenas generally seek every document and communication concerning Highland since the beginning of time, are facially improper, and represent a further abuse of the judicial process. See Adv. Proc. No. 21-03051-sgj (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Docket Nos. 233-307 (except 237) (73 docket entries showing the filing of the Subpoenas, as amended, and service-related documents).

the court system and preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants.[28]

17. The Dondero Entities appealed the Confirmation Order arguing, among other things, the protections in the Plan, including the Gatekeeper, were overbroad and illegal. On direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Dondero Entities' arguments calling their scatter-shot strategy a "bankruptcy-law blunderbuss" [29] and affirmed the Confirmation Order in material part, including the Gatekeeper[30] and the factual findings regarding Mr. Dondero's control of the Dondero Entities.[31] The Fifth Circuit, however, limited the Plan's exculpation provision and remanded "for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion"[32] and encouraged the courts to find the Dondero Entities vexatious if their harassment continued.[33]

18. The Dondero Entities immediately petitioned for rehearing effectively requesting that the Fifth Circuit amend its opinion and limit the parties protected by the Gatekeeper so the Dondero Entities could expand their harassment of the estate.[34] The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing (without even waiting for Highland to respond), but rejected the request for a substantive amendment to the opinion. Instead, the Fifth Circuit simply deleted one sentence leaving the substance of its opinion—and its affirmation of the Gatekeeper—intact.[35]

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[28] Confirmation Order ¶ 79.

[29] *NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 48 F.4th 419, 432 (5th Cir. 2022).

[30] *Id.* at 435 ("the injunction and gatekeeper are sound"); *see also id.*, at 439 ("We otherwise affirm the inclusion of the injunction and the gatekeeper provision in the Plan.")

[31] *Id.*. at 434-35. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed that the January and July Orders were *res judicata*. *Id.* at 438, n.15.

[32] *Id.* at 439-40.

[33] *Id.* at 439, n.19 ("Nothing in this opinion should be construed to hinder the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin and impose sanctions on Dondero and other entities by following the procedures to designate them vexatious litigants.").

[34] Case No. 21-10449, Document 516458961 (Sept. 2, 2022).

[35] *Cf.* Case No. 21-10449, Document 516439341 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2022), *with* Case No. 21-10449, Document 516462923 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022). The Fifth Circuit subsequently confirmed it had limited only the exculpation provision. *Highland Cap. Mgmt. Fund Advisors, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 57 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir.2023) ("In September 2022, we affirmed the Plan in all respects except one, concluding that the Plan exculpated certain non-debtors beyond the bankruptcy court's authority").

19. Following remand, Highland filed a motion to conform the Plan to the Fifth Circuit's opinion by limiting the parties receiving exculpation.[36] The Dondero Entities objected, baselessly arguing that the Fifth Circuit had limited the Gatekeeper the same way it limited exculpation.[37] From the bench, the Bankruptcy Court overruled the Dondero Entities' objections, granted Highland's motion, and took the matter under advisement to issue a written opinion.[38] Highland expects the Dondero Entities to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's order when entered and—once again—seek to challenge the Gatekeeper in the Fifth Circuit. Highland believes any appeal will fail; however, the Gatekeeper has not fully stopped the Dondero Entities.[39] Instead, they have tried to evade it in order to further abuse Highland, anyone supporting Highland, and the judicial system.[40] Declaring the Dondero Entities vexatious and requiring them to file a copy of the order approving the Motion is necessary to protect all parties connected to Highland from continued harassment.

E. The Dondero Entities' Vexatiousness Impeded Highland's Bankruptcy and Continues to This Day

20. The Dondero Entities' relentless litigation and related actions during Highland's Bankruptcy Case have created substantial and unnecessary burdens for the estate and the judiciary.

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[36] Bankr. Docket No. 3503.

[37] Bankr. Docket Nos. 3539, 3551.

[38] Ex. 10, Appx. [__].

[39] The Dondero Entities are currently mischaracterizing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in a disingenuous attempt to limit the gatekeeper provision in the July Order appointing Mr. Seery. *See Brief for Appellants The Charitable DAF Fund L.P.; CLO HoldCo, Ltd.; Mark Patrick; Sbaiti & Company PLLC; Mazin A. Sbaiti; Jonathan Bridges*, Case No. 22-11036, Document 66 at 53 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2023) ("[The Fifth Circuit] refus[ed] to extend … gatekeeping protections to non-debtors including Seery as CEO, even while acknowledging and permitting the *Barton* doctrine and related protections to apply to debtors in possession who stand in the shoes of trustee …. The bankruptcy court, by contrast, did precisely what the Supreme Court now rejects—it expanded a judicially-invented doctrine [*i.e.*, the *Barton* Doctrine] beyond its precedential scope based on its own policy views [by approving the gatekeeper in the July Order].") This statement is plainly wrong. The Fifth Circuit's opinion did not limit the Gatekeeper and expressly declared that the January and July Orders were *res judicata* and not subject to collateral attack. Consistent with their goal to strip away all protections against harassing litigation, the Dondero Entities also, via separate motion, moved to modify the July Order. Bankr. Docket No. 2242.

[40] *See* ¶¶ 27-29 *infra*.

The Dondero Entities (a) filed in the Bankruptcy Court (i) 52 pre-petition claims against the estate; (ii) 80 motions; and (iii) 71 objections, including objections to the UBS, Acis, and Redeemer Committee settlements; (b) forced Highland to commence nine adversary proceedings against the Dondero Entities in order to protect, or collect property of, the estate; (c) appealed 18 Bankruptcy Court orders to this Court and eight orders to the Fifth Circuit; and (d) took other actions to impede Highland's reorganization, including filing fabricated stories with the U.S. Trustee. A more detailed summary of the Dondero Entities' actions is included in the Appendix as **Exhibit 1, Appendix [_]**. Certain of the Dondero Entities' most egregious conduct is summarized below.

21. The Dondero Entities are the *only* parties currently litigating with Highland. All other parties resolved their claims and causes of action long ago and are awaiting their Plan distributions.

i **The Dondero Entities File Meritless Claims Against Highland's Estate**

22. During the Bankruptcy Case, the Dondero Entities filed dozens of claims against the estate every one of which was either withdrawn—after Highland was forced to defend them—or overruled by the Bankruptcy Court (and then, of course, appealed).

- The Dondero Entities' Prepetition Claims: The Dondero Entities filed 52 proofs of claim and then withdrew (or attempted to withdraw) them after Highland was forced to incur the cost of objecting.[41] CLOH publicly and voluntarily reduced its meritless claim to $0.00. Over a year later, Mr. Dondero replaced CLOH's trustee and—with a new titular head—CLOH now seeks

[41] Exs. 1-62, Appx. [__]. If former employee claims are counted, 92 proofs of claim were filed. NPA subsequently acquired five additional prepetition claims in early 2021 filed by former Highland employees all of which were subsequently withdrawn. Bankr. Docket Nos. 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2266. In January 2022, NPA acquired a disputed employee claim (Bankr. Docket No. 3146), which was expunged (Bankr. Docket No. 3180). NPA has appealed.

to amend its $0.00 claim to over $2 million.[42] ***As of today, none of the Dondero Entities hold a single allowed claim against the estate.***

- NPA's and HCMFA's Administrative Expense Claim: NPA and HCMFA filed an administrative expense claim seeking $14 million for alleged overpayments to Highland under certain shared service and employee-reimbursement agreements during the Bankruptcy Case.[43] After a two-day evidentiary hearing,[44] the Bankruptcy Court found there were no overpayments but that NPA and HCMFA had breached the foregoing agreements at Mr. Dondero's direction and awarded Highland $2.596 million in contract damages.[45] The Dondero Entities appealed.
- CPCM, LLC, Employee Claims: During the bankruptcy, Highland disclosed it was terminating nearly all employees upon Plan confirmation. Because Highland's bonus program did not allow terminated employees to receive bonuses, Highland received approval for a retention plan intended to make employees largely whole.[46] Mr. Dondero, however, as conditions to future employment, demanded former Highland's employees reject Highland's offer and assign their claims to CPCM, LLC—a newly-created entity owned by Highland's former general counsel. After Highland incurred significant costs objecting, CPCM withdrew its' approximately $5.25 million in face amount of (baseless) claims for a nuisance settlement of $100,000, which CPCM was subsequently forced to forfeit in order to settle yet another frivolous claim against the estate.[47]

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[42] Bankr. Docket Nos. 3177, 3178, 3220, 3223. CLOH's request to amend was denied by the Bankruptcy Court. Bankr. Docket No. 3457. CLOH has appealed.

[43] Ex. 63, Appx. [__].

[44] While testifying, Mr. Dondero made a series of vague threats about future allegations the Dondero Entities were going to bring to the U.S. Trustee. Ex. 64, Appx. [__]. Mr. Dondero's threats at the hearing were consistent with baseless allegations actually made to the U.S. Trustee by two Dondero Entities. *See* ¶ 27 *infra*.

[45] Adv. Proc. No. 21-03010, Docket No. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2022).

[46] Bankr. Docket No. 1849

[47] Bankr. Docket Nos. 3244; 3328 ¶ 5.

- HCRE Proof of Claim: HCRE filed a proof of claim alleging all or part of Highland's interest in SE Multifamily LLC (a Dondero-controlled entity) did not belong to Highland but instead belonged to Dondero-controlled HCRE.[48] After Highland learned HCRE's counsel had jointly represented HCRE and Highland in the underlying transactions, Highland was forced to seek disqualification over HCRE's objection.[49] After a six-month delay and the deposition of Highland's witnesses, HCRE abruptly canceled the depositions of Mr. Dondero and Matthew McGraner (a Dondero loyalist and joint-owner of HCRE) and moved to withdraw its claim.[50] At the subsequent hearing, it became clear HCRE's goal was to preserve its claim for future litigation outside of the Bankruptcy Court. The motion to withdraw was denied. During a hearing on the merits, significant evidence was adduced indicating that Mr. Dondero and HCRE lacked a good faith basis for filing the HCRE proof of claim.[51] This matter is *sub judice*.[52]

ii The Dondero Entities File Meritless Motions in the Bankruptcy Case

23. The Dondero Entities also filed numerous motions attempting to re-assert control over Highland or, failing that, to overwhelm the estate with litigation. The following are illustrative:

- Motion Requiring Notice and Hearing of Asset Sales: Mr. Dondero alleged Highland violated 11 U.S.C. § 363 by selling assets without Bankruptcy Court approval *and* without giving him a

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[48] Ex. 53, Appx. [__].

[49] Bankr. Docket No. 3106.

[50] Bankr. Docket Nos. 3443, 3487, 3505.

[51] Ex. 65, Appx. [__].

[52] Pursuant to its rights as a member of HCRE, Highland requested copies of SE Multifamily's and records. Mr. Dondero has thus far refused to provide that information. Regrettably, Mr. Dondero's indefensible refusal to comply with his unambiguous contractual obligations will likely necessitate litigation to obtain this basic information.

chance to purchase those assets. Mr. Dondero withdrew his baseless motion after Highland and the Committee incurred significant costs responding and preparing for trial.[53]

- Motion for Temporary Restriction on CLO Sales: After withdrawing the motion to restrict asset sales, five Dondero Entities moved to prevent Highland from causing its managed CLOs to sell assets without the Dondero Entities' approval (the "Restriction Motion").[54] The movants cited no authority and relied solely on Mr. Dondero's disagreement with Highland's business decisions. After an evidentiary hearing, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion as "almost Rule 11 frivolous."[55]
- Motion to Appoint Examiner: Fifteen months after the Petition Date, and just days before confirmation, Mr. Dondero's family "trusts," Dugaboy and Get Good, moved for the appointment of an examiner,[56] purportedly to assess the claims against the estate (most of which had already settled) and the Dondero Entities' Plan objections.[57]
- Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3: Two months post-confirmation and eighteen months after the Petition Date, Dugaboy and Get Good sought to compel Highland to file reports required by Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3.[58] Highland and the Committee objected, arguing the request was untimely, unduly burdensome, and was an attempt to obtain information for the

[53] Bankr. Docket No. 1349, 1546, 1551, 1622

[54] Bankr. Docket No. 1522

[55] Ex. 66, Appx. [___].

[56] Bankr. Docket No. 1752.

[57] The Dondero Entities subsequently admitted the motion was filed to delay confirmation, re-litigate settlements, and adjudicate the Dondero Entities' Plan objections in a different forum—completely improper purposes. Bankr. Docket No. 2061 ¶ 37 ("[W]hen the Trusts made the Examiner Motion, they believed that the motion would cause delay or a continuance of the confirmation hearing on the Plan …."); Bankr. Docket No. 3542 at 11 ("The Trustees sought the appointment of an examiner to address … (i) the issues raised … in the Restriction Motion [*i.e.*, a motion denied a month earlier], [and] (ii) various objections to the proposed [Plan] ….")

[58] Bankr. Docket No. 2256.

purpose of manufacturing more litigation claims. The motion was denied as moot. On appeal, the Dondero Entities admitted their goal was to create additional litigation.[59]

- Motions to Recuse: Seventeen months post-petition, the Dondero Entities sought to recuse the Bankruptcy Court. After their motion was denied, they appealed, but this Court held the order was interlocutory. In July 2022, the Dondero Entities defiantly moved the Bankruptcy Court to rule its order was "final" so it could be appealed to this Court and asserted additional allegations of bias. The motion was denied.[60] In September 2022, the Dondero Entities filed their third motion to recuse; that motion was fully briefed and is *sub judice*.[61]

iii The Dondero Entities File Meritless Objections in the Bankruptcy Case

24. In addition to their meritless claims and motions, the Dondero Entities objected to nearly every motion Highland filed in the Bankruptcy Court. The following are some of the more egregious examples:

- Objections to Settlements: In late 2020 and early 2021, Highland settled with holders of the largest litigation claims against the estate—something the Bankruptcy Court called "nothing short of a miracle"—and sought court approval. The Dondero Entities objected to most of the settlements, including those with Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest.[62] Mr. Ellington—Mr. Dondero's long-time general counsel—objected to the settlement with Mr. Daugherty.[63]

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[59] *See* ¶ 26 *infra*.

[60] At the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court observed that the Dondero Entities were "carpet-bombing us with paper and causing us to expend resources" and asked the Dondero Entities' counsel to "help me to understand why this is not wasting resources in your view and why this isn't just some strategy." Ex. 67, Appx. [___].

[61] Bankr. Docket Nos. 2061, 2601, 2062, 3470, 3542.

[62] Bankr. Docket Nos. 1177, 1121, 1706, 1697, 1707, 2268, 2268, 2293. HarbourVest refers to a series of affiliated funds that invested in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), a Guernsey-based investment vehicle. HarbourVest asserted a $300 million-plus claim against Highland, alleging Mr. Dondero and certain former Highland employees fraudulently induced it to invest in HCLOF.

[63] Bankr. Docket No. 3242.

- Objections to Confirmation: Twenty-one of the Dondero Entities filed five separate objections to confirmation. Fifteen funds managed by NPA and HCMFA joined the objections. Certain former Highland employees (most of whom were then working for Mr. Dondero) and Mr. Dondero's Dallas-based bank, NexBank, also separately objected.[64] The Dondero Entities were the only parties pressing objections at confirmation. Their objections were overruled and a number found borderline frivolous.[65] The Dondero Entities appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the Confirmation Order in all material respects.
- NPA Fee Objections: NPA objected to the final fee applications of nearly every professional in the Bankruptcy Case and asked the Bankruptcy Court to delay allowing fees and to allow NPA to retain a fee examiner. NPA's motion was denied. NPA appealed to this Court, and, after this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of prudential standing, to the Fifth Circuit.
- Objection to Indemnity Trust Motion: After Highland was unable to procure cost-effective insurance necessary for its reorganization because of Mr. Dondero's reputation in the insurance community—colloquially known as the "Dondero Exclusion"[66]—Highland and the Committee created an indemnity trust effectively to self-insure its indemnification obligations.[67] The Dondero Entities were the only objectors,[68] claiming the trust was somehow a plan modification. The Bankruptcy Court overruled their objections,[69] and the Dondero Entities appealed to this Court and the Fifth Circuit. Neither appeal was successful.[70]

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[64] Bankr. Docket Nos. 1661, 1667, 1669, 1670, 1673, 1675, 1676.

[65] Confirmation Order ¶ C; Ex. 68, Appx. [___] ("The Court considered [certain of the Dondero Entities' plan objections] to wholly lack merit, and are borderline frivolous, frankly. They do not raise a serious legal question.")

[66] Ex. 69, Appx. [___].

[67] Bankr. Docket No. 2491, 2576, 2577.

[68] Bankr. Docket No. 2563.

[69] Bankr. Docket No. 2599.

[70] *Highland Cap. Mgmt. Fund Advisors v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15648 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2022); *Highland Cap. Mgmt. Fund Advisors*, 574 F.4th at 496.

iv Highland Litigates to Protect Its Rights and the Bankruptcy Process

25. In addition to the foregoing, Highland was forced to file affirmative litigation to protect itself and to compel the Dondero Entities to comply with Bankruptcy Court orders and simple obligations:

- First TRO and Subsequent Contempt Order: In December 2020, after Mr. Dondero interfered with Highland's exclusive management of the CLOs and threatened Mr. Seery in writing—"Be careful what you do, last warning"—Highland sought and obtained a temporary restraining order ("TRO") preventing Mr. Dondero from, *inter alia*, (a) threatening Highland and its employees and agents; (b) communicating with Highland's employees (with one specified exception); and (c) interfering with Highland's business. Mr. Dondero violated the TRO immediately and was later held in contempt and sanctioned $450,000.[71] The Dondero Entities subsequently appealed.[72]
- Second TRO: Days after the Restriction Motion was dismissed as "frivolous,"[73] certain Dondero Entities sent letters (a) demanding Highland refrain from causing the CLOs to sell assets and (b) threatening to terminate Highland's management agreements with the CLOs (an action prohibited by the Protocols).[74] The Dondero Entities' actions forced Highland to seek and obtain another temporary restraining order to prevent further interference with the estate.[75]

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[71] *Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Dondero (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1533 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 7, 2021). Mr. Dondero's wrongful (but not contemptuous) conduct included destroying his Highland-issued cell phone resulting in the spoliation of his text messages. *Id.*, at *29-40.

[72] *See* ¶ 26 *infra*.

[73] *See* ¶ 27 *supra*.

[74] Adv. Proc. No. 21-03000-sgj, Docket Nos. 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11. The Dondero Entities subsequently admitted their letters were sent to procure denied relief. Bankr. Docket No. 2061 ¶ 27 ("In December of 2020, due to the Court's denial of the Restriction Motion, … [the Dondero Entities sent] correspondence … to reiterate [their] … request, again, that Debtor not liquidate the CLOs; to reserve any rights that the Advisors and the Retail Funds might have against Debtor for failure to maximize the value of the investment as required under the [CLO] Portfolio Management Agreements; and to notify Debtor that the Retail Funds … intended to initiate the procedure to remove Debtor as fund manager of the CLOs.").

[75] Adv. Proc. No. 21-03000-sgj11, Docket Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 20, 64, 76 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.).

- Mandatory Injunction: Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland had arrangements to provide middle- and back-office services to certain Dondero Entities. In late 2020, Highland exercised its right and gave notice of its intent to terminate the applicable agreements due to the expected downsizing of its workforce. Before and after formal notice was given, Highland tried to negotiate in good faith a transition plan with the Dondero Entities to prevent their retail funds from going into freefall, which could have negatively impacted Highland. Although all material terms were agreed upon after extensive negotiation, the Dondero Entities refused to sign unless Mr. Dondero regained access to Highland's offices—he had previously been evicted. With a substantial reduction-in-workforce days away, Highland sought an injunction compelling the Dondero Entities to create a transition plan.[76] At the hearing, and presumably to avoid SEC scrutiny, the Dondero Entities disclosed for the first time that they had cobbled together their own transition plan, thus mooting Highland's motion.[77]
- Actions to Collect Demand/Term Notes: Highland loaned certain Dondero Entities more than $60 million in aggregate pursuant to a series of simple, unambiguous two-page demand and term notes. In late 2020, Highland called the demand notes and, in January 2021, following defaults, accelerated the term notes. The Dondero Entities refused to satisfy their obligations and fabricated multiple (and ever-shifting) defenses, including that the notes were (a) compensation structured as a non-repayable note for tax purposes, (b) subject to an undisclosed oral agreement between Mr. Dondero and his sister to forgive the notes under certain conditions, (c) void due to mutual mistake, and (d) executed without proper authority. After discovery, the Bankruptcy Court recommended summary judgment be granted to Highland, finding the

[76] Adv. Proc. No. 21-03010-sgj11, Docket No. 2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2021).
[77] Adv. Proc. No. 21-03010-sgj11, Docket No. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2021); Ex. 70, Appx. [ ].

Dondero Entities' defenses "farfetched," based on a "complete lack of evidence," and unable to pass the "Straight-Face Test."[78] The Bankruptcy Court assessed Highland's costs against the Dondero Entities as required under the notes. The Dondero Entities objected to each report and recommendation.[79]

- Second Contempt Order: The DAF and CLOH (baselessly) pursued claims against Mr. Seery in this Court (not the Bankruptcy Court)[80] in violation of the "gatekeeper" provisions in the January and July Orders. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Bankruptcy Court held Mr. Dondero, DAF, CLOH, their trustee, and their counsel in contempt.[81] The Dondero Entities subsequently appealed.[82]

v The Dondero Entities Appeal Nearly Every Order

26. Not content to abuse the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, the Dondero Entities have appealed nearly every Bankruptcy Court order to this Court, and, when unsuccessful here, to the Fifth Circuit. Certain examples of the abusive appeals are as follows:

- Appeal of Confirmation Order: The Dondero Entities' appeal of their Plan objections was certified to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit (a) affirmed the Gatekeeper and the factual findings concerning Mr. Dondero's control over the Dondero Entities, but (b) limited the parties exculpated by the Plan. The Fifth Circuit also implied that the Dondero Entities should be

[78] *Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt. Fund Advisors, L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1989 at * 40-41, 46-47, 59-60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jul. 19, 2022); Highland filed a separate suit to collect on two other notes issued by HCMFA. The Bankruptcy Court also recommended summary judgment in favor of Highland in that action. Adv. Proc. No. 21-03082-sgj, Docket No. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2022).

[79] Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00881-X, Docket Nos. 27-1, 27-4, 27-5, 34, 62, 78, 87, 98, 204, 210 (N.D. Tex.).

[80] *See* ¶ 27 *infra*.

[81] *In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 2074 at *28-29, 40-41 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2021), aff'd 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175778 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2022) ("The totality of the evidence was clear that Mr. Dondero sparked this fire … Mr. Dondero encouraged [plaintiffs] to do something wrong, and [plaintiffs] basically abdicated responsibility to Mr. Dondero with regard to … executing the litigation strategy.").

[82] *See* ¶ 26 *infra*.

deemed vexatious.[83] The Fifth Circuit remanded to the Bankruptcy Court to conform the Plan. On remand, Highland moved to conform the Plan to limit the exculpated parties as directed by the Fifth Circuit; the Dondero Entities objected.[84] Highland expects the Dondero Entities to appeal any order conforming the Plan and attempt, again, to overturn the Gatekeeper.

- Appeal of TRO and First Contempt Order: Mr. Dondero appealed the TRO prohibiting him from interfering with the estate or colluding with Highland employees, but this Court denied his request for an interlocutory appeal.[85] Mr. Dondero appealed the order holding him in contempt. This Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court in all respects but one.[86] Mr. Dondero has appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
- Appeal of Settlement Orders: The Dondero Entities appealed the orders approving the settlements with Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest. The appeals of the Acis and HarbourVest settlements were dismissed for lack of prudential standing. The appeal of the UBS settlement was dismissed on the merits, with this Court finding aspects of the appeal were intended to "bamboozle" the Court.[87] The Dondero Entities appealed the HarbourVest and UBS settlements to the Fifth Circuit.
- Appeal of Second Contempt Order: The Dondero Entities appealed the order holding them in contempt for pursuing claims against Mr. Seery in violation of the January and July Orders. This Court (a) found the gatekeeper provisions in the January and July Orders "failed to deter"

[83] *See* ¶ 17 *supra*.

[84] *See* ¶ 19 *supra*.

[85] Case No. 3:21-CV-0132-E, Docket No. 9 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2021). Mr. Dondero also sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit, which was dismissed after the matter was consensually resolved. Case No. 21-10219, Document 515867137 (5th Cir. May 18, 2021)

[86] Civ. Action No. 3:21-CV-1590-N, Docket No. 42 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2022). The parties agreed the Bankruptcy Court's monetary sanction assessing a penalty of $100,000 for each unsuccessful appeal exceeded its authority. The order was otherwise affirmed.

[87] *Dugaboy Inv. Tr. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172351, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2022).

the Dondero Entities and the contempt finding was based on "clear and convincing evidence" and (b) affirmed the finding regarding Mr. Dondero's control of DAF and CLOH.[88] The Dondero Entities appealed this Court's order to the Fifth Circuit.

- Appeal of Rule 2015.3 Order: Dugaboy appealed the order denying its motion to compel compliance with Rule 2015.3, admitting it had been filed to gain information for the purpose of manufacturing new litigation claims.[89] This Court dismissed Dugaboy's appeal for lack of prudential standing. Dugaboy appealed to the Fifth Circuit.[90]
- Appeal of Orders on Lack of Standing: The Dondero Entities appealed this Court's orders dismissing their appeals for lack of prudential standing, arguing the "person aggrieved" standard (applied in this Circuit and all other Circuits for decades) must be overturned.[91]

vi The Dondero Entities' Attempt to Evade the Bankruptcy Court

27. Trying to evade the Bankruptcy Court, the Dondero Entities filed four complaints *in this Court* asserting administrative expense claims against Highland arising from its alleged breach of fiduciary duties to the Dondero Entities during the Bankruptcy Case. The Dondero

[88] *Charitable DAF Fund L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175778, at *3, 5-11, 18-21 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2022).

[89] Case No. 3:21-cv-02268-S, Docket No. 15, pg. 2-3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 1, 2022) ("That is the point of this appeal [of the order on the 2015.3 reports]: to determine what claims against the estate exist which arose from transactions with non-debtor affiliates—a determination that was foreclosed because of the Bankruptcy Court's Order rendering production of the 2015.3 Reports moot"); *see also* Case No. 3:22-CV-2268-S, Docket No. 21, pg. 5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022) ("Dugaboy's primary contention is that, but for the bankruptcy court's failure to compel Debtor to file retroactive reports regarding its ownership interests in non-debtor subsidiaries as of the bankruptcy petition date, Dugaboy might have used the information in those reports to investigate whether any post-petition claims exist against Debtor's estate by any non-debtor affiliate") (citations omitted).

[90] In its reply to the Fifth Circuit, Dugaboy alleged, without factual support, that Highland's failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 meant Highland's bankruptcy case was a "black box allowing Highland and its professionals to pilfer the estate for tens of million dollars" with the complicity of "the courts." Case No. 22-10831, Document 516578672, at 5 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2022). Highland moved to strike Dugaboy's unsupported statements. Although the Fifth Circuit denied the motion, it directed Highland to file a sur-reply, which it did. Case No. 22-10831, Document 39-1 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2023); *see also* Case No. 22-10831, Document 40 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2023). The matter is *sub judice*.

[91] Case No. 22-10960 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2022); Case No. 22-10575 (5th Cir. Jun. 10, 2022); Case No. 22-10831 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2022).

Entities also baselessly tried to bring indirect actions against the estate in Texas state court and through the U.S. Trustee, which violate the spirit—if not the letter—of the Gatekeeper.

- *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P., et al v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al*: The DAF and its subsidiary, CLOH, filed suit in this Court,[92] alleging Highland breached its purported duties by entering into the Bankruptcy Court-approved HarbourVest settlement—notwithstanding that CLOH had objected to the settlement and then, after conducting research and reviewing the arguments, publicly withdrew its objection, stating the objection had no merit.[93] Shortly thereafter, DAF and CLOH sought to add Mr. Seery as a defendant in violation of the January and July Orders.[94] The complaint was referred to the Bankruptcy Court in September 2021 and dismissed based on collateral and judicial estoppel grounds.[95] This Court reversed, in part, and remanded for additional findings.[96] Highland filed its renewed motion to dismiss in October 2022, and, in November 2022 (over a year after the matter was referred to the Bankruptcy Court and litigated), plaintiffs moved to withdraw the reference. The Bankruptcy Court recommended this Court *not* withdraw the reference, finding the motion was untimely and "appears to be forum shopping and an attempt to delay adjudication."[97] The motion to dismiss is under advisement.

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[92] 3:21-cv-00842-B (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2021).

[93] Ex. 71, Appx. [_]; Ex. 72, Appx. [_].

[94] *See* ¶ 25 *supra*.

[95] *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 659 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2022). .

[96] *Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P. (In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.)*, 643 B.R. 162 (N.D. Tex. 2022). Although this Court reversed, it did not, in any way, find the Dondero Entities' complaint had merit. Instead, it found the Bankruptcy Court appropriately applied collateral estoppel *sua sponte* and that all elements of collateral estoppel were met except one—"actually litigated"—because a settlement under Rule 9019 has a different legal standard. *Id.*, 643 B.R. at 173. This Court also found the first two elements of judicial estoppel—"inconsistency" and "court's acceptance"—were met but the third element—"inadvertence"—was not assessed and remanded to determine if CLOH's withdrawal of its objection was "inadvertent."

[97] Civ. Act. No. 3:21-0842-B, Docket No. 162 at 14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2023); Civ. Act. No. 3:22-02802-S, Docket No. 2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2023). The Dondero Entities objected to the Bankruptcy Court's report and recommendation. Civ. Act. No. 3:22-02802-S, Docket No. 3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2023).

- *PCMG Trading Partners XXIII, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*: PCMG, an entity controlled by Mr. Dondero, filed suit in this Court,[98] alleging Highland mismanaged an investment fund during the Bankruptcy Case. PCMG never served its complaint and moved for an *ex parte* stay pending appeal of the Confirmation Order, which was granted. After Highland re-opened the case, this Court referred the complaint to the Bankruptcy Court, and Highland moved to dismiss. PCMG withdrew its complaint shortly before the hearing without explanation.[99]
- *The Dugaboy Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*: Dugaboy filed suit in this Court,[100] alleging Highland mismanaged the Highland Multi-Strategy Credit Fund, L.P. ("MSCF") by causing it to sell assets during the Bankruptcy Case. Dugaboy did not serve its complaint but withdrew it after Highland discovered it and disclosed that it was duplicative of Dugaboy's proof of claim,[101] which itself was subsequently withdrawn after Highland incurred the cost of objecting.[102]
- *The Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*: After Dugaboy withdrew its complaint, the DAF filed virtually the same complaint in this Court[103] alleging, again, mismanagement of MSCF. The DAF never served its complaint and moved for an *ex parte* stay, which was granted. After Highland re-opened the case, this Court referred the

[98] 3:21-cv-01169-N (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2021).
[99] Adv. Proc. No. 22-03068-sgj, Docket No. 27 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2022).
[100] 3:21-cv-01479-S (N.D. Tex. Jun. 23, 2021).
[101] Ex. 58, Appx. [ ].
[102] Bankr. Docket No. 2965.
[103] 3:21-cv01710-N (N.D. Tex. Jul. 22, 2021).

complaint to the Bankruptcy Court. In August 2022, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the complaint as a late-filed administrative expense claim.[104] The DAF has appealed.[105]

- Mr. Dondero Seeks Discovery in Texas State Court: In July 2021, Mr. Dondero filed a petition in Texas state court seeking pre-suit discovery from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("Alvarez"), and Farallon Capital Management, LLC ("Farallon"), alleging that Mr. Seery provided "inside information" to Farallon to assist in the purchase of claims from the Redeemer Committee (represented by Alvarez). Mr. Dondero also sought discovery (again) on the previously adjudicated HarbourVest settlement.[106] The petition clearly targeted Mr. Seery. The petition was removed to the Bankruptcy Court but remanded back to state court.[107] The state court held a hearing on Mr. Dondero's petition and dismissed it the same day.[108]

  On January 20, 2023, another Dondero Entity filed another petition in Texas state court for pre-suit discovery against Farallon and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC ("Stonehill"), again baselessly alleging Farallon and Stonehill purchased claims with "inside information" from Mr. Seery, including information related to the HarbourVest settlement, so Mr. Seery, in conspiracy with them, could somehow loot the estate.[109] Again, Mr. Seery was not named but is clearly the target of the pre-suit discovery

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[104] Adv. Proc. No. 22-03052, Docket No. 42, 43 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2022).

[105] The DAF subsequently dismissed its appeal without explanation. Civ. Action No. 3:22-cv-02280-S, Docket No. 9 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2023).

[106] Ex. 73, Appx. [_]; Ex. 74, Appx. [_].

[107] Despite remanding the action to state court, the Bankruptcy Court noted that Mr. Dondero's petition focused primarily on Mr. Seery despite not naming him directly. Adv. Proc. No. 21-03054-sgj, Docket No. 23 at 6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022) ("It appears that Dondero may be seeking discovery as a means to craft a lawsuit against Seery … despite being previously sanctioned, along with related parties, by this court when he attempted to add Seery to a lawsuit … in violation of this court's prior gatekeeping orders …. Disturbingly, Seery again appears to be at the center of Dondero's allegations of wrongful acts, as his name appears nine times in the petition that commenced the Rule 202 Proceeding").

[108] Ex. 75, Appx. [_].

[109] Ex. 76, Appx. [_].

- Mr. Dondero Tenders Meritless Complaints to the U.S. Trustee: In late 2021, and again in May 2022, Dugaboy, NPA, and HCMFA sent letters to the Office of U.S. Trustee[110] falsely, baselessly, and maliciously alleging, among other things, that: (a) the Bankruptcy Court ruled for Highland because Highland knowingly misrepresented facts; (b) the Bankruptcy Case lacked transparency because Highland did not file its Rule 2015.3 reports; (c) Highland's settlement with HarbourVest was fraudulent; (d) Highland engaged in asset sales without Bankruptcy Court approval and without offering investors (*i.e.*, Mr. Dondero) the opportunity to purchase the assets; (e) Mr. Seery violated employee rights by not paying the employee claims transferred to CPCM; (f) the Plan impermissibly sought to liquidate a solvent estate against creditor wishes; (g) Mr. Seery engaged in insider trading and used his authority to dominate Highland for his own self-interest; and (h) Mr. Seery conspired with Stonehill and Farallon on the purchase of claims. The U.S. Trustee has not contacted Highland concerning Mr. Dondero's libelous letters.

vii The Dondero Entities' Newest Action Restating Their Spurious Claims About Highland

28. On February 6, 2023, the Dondero Entities filed a motion for leave to file a complaint against Highland seeking information about Highland's current assets, the results of its asset sales, and the amounts distributed to creditors.[111] Highland believes the Dondero Entities' complaint will ultimately be dismissed. The motion, however, is emblematic of the Dondero Entities' unceasing litigation—restating the litany of false statements in their letters to the U.S. Trustee and seeking to re-litigate a multitude of settled issues (*e.g.*, the HarbourVest settlement,

[110] Dugaboy sent its letter to the U.S. Trustee on October 5, 2021. NPA and HCMFA sent letters on November 3, 2021, and May 11, 2022. The letters can be found at Bankr. Docket No. 3662-1.

[111] Bankr. Docket No. 3662.

Highland's ability to sell assets without obtaining Mr. Dondero's consent, and Mr. Seery's supposed malfeasance).

29. The Dondero Entities' conduct—a little over two weeks ago—belies any belief that their litigation crusade is at an end. Instead, it is clear their goal is to file new and ever more frivolous motions and regulatory actions, like the Texas state court actions and letters to the U.S. Trustee, to gin up additional (and baseless) claims against Highland and its management.

III. RELIEF REQUESTED

30. Highland requests an order in the form annexed to the Motion as **Exhibit A** (the "Order") complementing the Gatekeeper by deeming the Dondero Entities "vexatious litigants" and requiring them to file a copy of the Order in any court or tribunal (whether foreign or domestic) or governmental, administrative, or regulatory agency in which (a) a claim, cause of action or complaint of any kind (including, without limitation, appeals and regulatory and administrative actions) (collectively, an "Action") instituted, commenced, or pursued by any Dondero Entity is currently pending (including, for the avoidance of doubt, any Action in the U.S. District Courts and Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern District of Texas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Office of the U.S. Trustee, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Texas State Securities Board) against (i) Highland, the Highland Claimant Trust, the Highland Litigation Sub-Trust, and HCMLP GP LLC (collectively, the "Highland Entities"), (ii) any entity directly or indirectly majority-owned and/or controlled by any Highland Entity, (iii) any entity managed directly or indirectly by any of the Highland Entities, including, without limitation, HCLOF, (iv) each of the Highland Entities' trustees, officers, executives, agents, employees, and professionals, (v) the current and former members of the Oversight Board of the Highland Claimant Trust and their affiliates, including, without limitation, Farallon, Stonehill, Muck Holdings LLC, and Jessup Holdings LLC, (vi) the Independent Board and each of its members (in

their official capacities), (vii) the Committee and each of its members (in their official capacities), (viii) the professionals (and their respective firms) retained by Highland or the Committee during the Bankruptcy Case, and (ix) any person or entity indemnified by any Highland Entity ((i)-(ix), collectively the "Covered Parties") arising from or related to (1) the Bankruptcy Case, (2) the negotiation of the Plan, (3) the wind down of the Highland Entities' business, (4) the administration of the Plan or property to be distributed under the Plan, (5) the management of the Highland Entities, (6) property owned directly or indirectly by any Highland Entity, or (7), as applicable, the transactions in furtherance of the foregoing ((1)-(7), collectively, the "Estate Administration") or (b) any Dondero Entity institutes, commences, or pursues an Action against any Covered Party arising from or related to the Estate Administration.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Courts in the Fifth Circuit Have the Authority to Deem Litigants "Vexatious" and Issue Pre-Filing Injunctions

31. The Fifth Circuit has on many occasions affirmed lower court orders declaring litigants "vexatious" and imposing pre-filing injunctions and other sanctions to prevent abusive and harassing litigation.[112] In doing so, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that federal courts (a) have the inherent power to "sanction a party or attorney when necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of [their] docket[s]"[113] and (b) may exercise their power, and the authority provided by the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)), to deem a litigant "vexatious" and to impose a pre-filing injunction and any other remedy necessary to stop the vexatious conduct if they find

[112] *See, e.g., Bowling v. Willis*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168602 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2019), *aff'd* 853 F. App'x. 983 (5th Cir. 2021); *Staten v. Harrison Cnty.*, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 35747 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021); *Schum v. Fortress Value Recovery Fund I LLC*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226679 at *14-15 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2019), *aff'd* 805 F. App'x. 319 (5th Cir. 2020); *Caroll v. Abide (In re Carroll)*, 850 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2017); *Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC*, 513 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2008); *Clark v. Mortenson*, 93 F. App'x. 643, 645-46 (5th Cir. 2004); *Newby v. Enron Corp.*, 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002).

[113] *Caroll*, 850 F.3d at 815.

that the litigant acted in "bad faith."[114] The Fifth Circuit effectively affirmed its prior holdings in September 2022 when it all but encouraged Highland to have the Dondero Entities deemed vexatious.[115]

32. In the Fifth Circuit, the "traditional standards for injunctive relief, *i.e.* irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law, do not apply to the issuance of a pre-filing injunction against a vexatious litigant."[116] Instead, courts apply a four-part test to determine whether to impose a pre-filing injunction, analyzing: (a) the party's history of litigation, in particular whether s/he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (b) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (c) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party's filings; and (d) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.[117]

33. In assessing these factors, courts consider affirmative litigation as well as objections, appeals, attempts to re-litigate settled issues, and other actions, including regulatory and defensive actions taken by the vexatious litigant.[118] If relevant, courts may also consider

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[114] *Id.*; *see also Staten*, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 35747 at *7 ("District court have authority to enjoin vexatious litigants under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. They also have inherent power to impose pre-filing injunctions to deter vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation, and they have a constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that impairs their ability to carry out their Article III functions.")

[115] *NexPoint*, 48 F.4th at 369, n.19 ("Nothing in this opinion should be construed to hinder the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin and impose sanctions on Dondero and other entities by following the procedures to designate them vexatious litigants.").

[116] *Baum*, 513 F.3d at 189 (citations omitted).

[117] *Id.*

[118] *Caroll*, 850 F.3d at 815-16 ("Appellants' suggestion that their conduct was not done in bad faith is belied by their repeated attempts to litigate issues that have been conclusively resolved against them or that they had no standing to assert and by their unsupported and multiple attempts to remove … the trustee."); *Clark*, 93 F. App'x. at 645-46 (finding multiple lawsuits against receiver for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, embezzlement, mail fraud, and RICO violations vexatious); *Caroll*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100930 at *32-33 (M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2016), *aff'd* 850 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding appeal of bankruptcy court orders and standing that was "entirely 'uncertain'" evidence of vexatiousness); *Schum*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226679 at *14-15 (finding objections and motions, including motion to recuse, and appeal of nearly every order vexatious); *Alliance Riggers & Constructors, Ltd. v. Restrepo*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29346 at *14-15 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015) (holding litigant can be vexatious if a defendant or plaintiff if "seeks to halt the judicial process with identical meritless filings").

actions in other courts or outside of court if they threaten the court's jurisdiction or assist in determining bad faith.[119]

34. The conduct in *Caroll v. Abide* is instructive (and, as discussed herein, less egregious than that of the Dondero Entities). In *Carroll*, after a trustee was appointed to manage the bankruptcy estate, the Carolls immediately began objecting and filing a "legion" of motions to undermine her mandate. The court found the Carolls vexatious, highlighting the following, among others, as examples of vexatious conduct: (a) challenges to, and appeals of, orders authorizing the sale of debtor property, (b) challenging the estate's ownership of property, resulting in findings of contempt, orders to compel, and denial of efforts to stay the proceedings, (c) two motions to remove the trustee, and (d) the filing of a complaint with the U.S. Trustee, not coincidentally, at the same time the Carolls were seeking to thwart bankruptcy sales.[120] Based on the foregoing, the bankruptcy court found the Carolls and their daughters (non-debtors who filed actions at the direction of their parents) "vexatious litigants" and issued a pre-filing injunction.[121]

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[119] *Bowling*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168602 at *10-14 (upholding pre-filing injunction based on the "totality of the record" where movant filed three federal cases seeking to re-litigate or interfere with her state court divorce proceeding); *Baum*, 513 F.3d at 191 ("The district court could consider Baum's conduct in the state court proceedings in determining whether his conduct before the bankruptcy court was undertaken in bad faith or for an improper motive"); *Nix v. Major League Baseball*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104770 at *15-16, 62 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2022) (taking judicial notice of actions filed in other courts and an attempt to strong arm a party with threats of litigation); *Schum*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226679 at *15 (considering appeal of FCC approval of bankruptcy sale as evidence of vexatious litigation).

[120] *In re Caroll*, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 937 at *5-27 (Bankr. M.D. La. Mar. 16, 2016) *aff'd* 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100930 (M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2016), *aff'd* 850 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2017).

[121] *Id.* at *34; *see also Caroll v. Abide*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100930, at *32 (M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2016) ("For years, then, Appellants have appealed well-founded orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court and thusly delayed (or attempted to hinder) specific actions by court or trustee which were authorized by either Code or jurisprudence."); *Caroll*, 850 F.3d at 815-16 ("As both the bankruptcy court and the district court meticulously explained, Appellants have engaged in conduct intended to harass and delay. Appellants' suggestion that their conduct was not done in bad faith is belied by their repeated attempts to litigate issues that have been conclusively resolved against them or that they had no standing to assert and by their unsupported and multiple attempts to remove Abide as the trustee."). The conduct in *Caroll* is consistent with conduct other courts have found to be vexatious. *See, e.g. Clark*, 93 F. App'x. at 645-46; *Schum*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226679, at *14-15.

35. Finally, and as was done in *Caroll* (and other cases), a court may enjoin or sanction parties in front of the court and those under such parties' control or that act in concert with them[122] and may require that the vexatious litigants file the order deeming them vexatious in any pending or future proceeding.[123]

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Deem the Dondero Entities Vexatious and Prohibit Filings in Both This Court and the Bankruptcy Court

36. As discussed in *Schum*, district courts, which sit as courts of review over bankruptcy courts, have the inherent authority to enjoin filings in both the district court *and in the bankruptcy courts*. Orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court are appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Similarly, this Court—as it is currently doing—is required by 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) to review the Bankruptcy Court's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to "non-core" matters and any objections thereto. Accordingly, events in the Bankruptcy Court directly affect this Court's jurisdiction, and this Court may sanction vexatious conduct in the Bankruptcy Court to protect the jurisdiction of both the Bankruptcy Court and this Court.[124]

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[122] *Caroll*, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 937, at *34 (prohibiting litigation filed by the vexatious litigants and "anyone acting on their behalf"); *Clark v. Mortenson*, 93 F. App'x. at 654 (prohibiting suits brought "directly and indirectly" by the vexatious litigants); *see also Staten*, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 35747, at *6-7 (extending pre-filing injunction to protect certain named parties "and those in privity with them"); *see also Restrepo*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29346 at *15 ("[O]rders made pursuant to the All Writs Act may be directed not only to the immediate parties to a proceeding, but also 'to person who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice.'") (citing *Williams v. McKeithen*, 939 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir. 1991).

[123] *Baum*, 513 F.3d at 191 ("[T]he Second Circuit … upheld those provisions of the injunction requiring Martin-Trigona to alert state courts of his history of vexatious filings in federal courts."); *Nix*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104770 at *70 ("The court also orders Nix to file a copy of this opinion with any filing that he makes in any other court"); *see also Silver v. City of San Antonio*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118643, at *31-32 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2020) (requiring vexatious litigant file in any court a notice listing every sanction imposed or sanction warning issued and each order imposing sanctions or issuing a sanctions warning and alert state courts of history of vexatious federal filings); *Marinez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208591, at *14 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2013) ("[P]laintiff will disclose the contents of this order and the outcome of every previously filed suit related to the subject property that was previously filed by her.")

[124] *Schum*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226679 at *12-13 ("[A] court may issue injunctive relief … in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over the bankruptcy court … Appellees seek injunctive relief prohibiting Appellant from making future filings related to [two bankruptcy court proceedings]. Those filings, when decided and if appealed, will affect the Court's future appellate jurisdiction over those bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has the jurisdiction to order the requested relief.").

C. Highland Satisfies the Four-Part Test for Obtaining a Pre-Filing Injunction

37. Based on the Dondero Entities' actions, Highland has established each element of the Fifth Circuit's four-part test for obtaining a pre-filing injunction and related relief.

i The Dondero Entities Have a History of Vexatious Litigation

38. Highland easily meets the first prong—history of litigation. As set forth above, the Dondero Entities' vindictive litigation crusade against Highland has continued unchecked for over two years. The Dondero Entities have objected to everything, filed (and then generally abandoned) baseless claims, pursued claims (including duplicative claims) in other forums to evade the Bankruptcy Court, and appealed every adverse ruling regardless of the merits, the evidence, the standard on appeal, whether they have standing, or whether the appeal is economically rational. The Dondero Entities' conduct—as recently as two weeks ago—shows they have no intent to stop their harassment and remain intent on being "disruptors."[125]

39. Nor is the Dondero Entities' strategy new; they are still locked in vociferous, decade-long litigation with UBS, Mr. Daugherty, and Mr. Terry and Acis notwithstanding the adverse rulings—and harsh criticisms—issued against them. The Dondero Entities have a long and storied history of vexatious litigation—a history so infamous the insurance industry generally refuses to insure against it.[126]

ii The Dondero Entities' Litigation Lacks a Good-Faith Basis

40. Highland also satisfies the second prong—lack of good faith. The Dondero Entities' relentless litigation is simply the execution of Mr. Dondero's stated plan to "burn down the place"

[125] Confirmation Order, ¶ 17 ("[T]he remoteness of [Mr. Dondero and the Dondero Related Entities'] economic interests is noteworthy, and the Bankruptcy Court questions the good faith of Mr. Dondero's and the Dondero Related Entities' objections. In fact, the Bankruptcy Court has good reason to believe that these parties are not objecting to protect economic interests they have in the Debtor but to be disruptors").

[126] *See* ¶ 24 *supra*.

after he failed to impose his will and re-take control of Highland and his personal threat against Mr. Seery—"Be careful what you do, last warning." The Dondero Entities' actions led the Bankruptcy Court to find their litigation was "designed merely to harass," resulted in two contempt orders and two restraining orders, multiple admonishments (including from this Court), and caused the Fifth Circuit to *sua sponte* suggest deeming the Dondero Entities vexatious. Unrepentant and unrestrained, the Dondero Entities continue to appeal nearly every adverse ruling (including multiple appeals of this Circuit's long-standing precedent on prudential standing), seek information to manufacture more baseless claims, and attempt to re-litigate settled issues in other forums.[127]

41. The Dondero Entities are the *only* parties litigating with Highland. Every other party has resolved its claims and awaits distributions under the Plan—confirmed with the approval of 99.8% of creditors in amount. The Dondero Entities' conduct in this case (and prior cases) evinces their lack of good faith.

iii **The Dondero Entities' Litigation Has Created an Enormous Burden on the Court System and Highland**

42. The third prong of the test—burden on the courts and Highland—is easily met. In the Bankruptcy Court, the Dondero Entities filed 52 prepetition claims (not one of which was ultimately allowed), 80 motions, 71 objections, and forced Highland to file nine adversary proceedings against them. The Dondero Entities appealed nearly every adverse ruling from the Bankruptcy Court to this Court and, when unsuccessful, to the Fifth Circuit, resulting in a total of 26 appeals. The burden created on the court system is enormous. So is the burden on Highland.

[127] By way of example, the Dondero Entities challenged the HarbourVest settlement in the Bankruptcy Court and then in this Court. When those efforts proved unsuccessful (and led to a finding of contempt), the Dondero Entities sent letters to the U.S. Trustee and filed pre-suit discovery requests in Texas state courts to challenge the HarbourVest settlement yet again.

Highland has been forced to spend substantial sums litigating with the Dondero Entities and, in fact, had to procure exit financing, in large part, to fund its defense of the Dondero Entities' litigation.[128]

iv Alternative Sanctions Are Inadequate to Deter the Conduct

43. Finally, the Dondero Entities have shown that previous sanctions are inadequate to deter their conduct. The Dondero Entities have been enjoined twice; their violations of Bankruptcy Court orders have led to two contempt findings and monetary sanctions.

44. In order to protect Highland and its court-appointed management, the Bankruptcy Court issued the January and July Orders and approved the Gatekeeper. The Dondero Entities violated the July Order, and, notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the Gatekeeper and its finding that the January and July Orders were *res judicata*, the Dondero Entities still seek to evade these protections—objecting to the motion to conform filed in the Bankruptcy Court with the presumed goal of appealing such order to the Fifth Circuit. They even contend the Fifth Circuit *actually limited the Gatekeeper* in an effort to overturn the July Order.[129] The Dondero Entities then sought to enlist the U.S. Trustee and the Texas state courts in their attempts to circumvent the Gatekeeper and attack Mr. Seery and Highland.

45. The Dondero Entities' motives are painfully clear—find a way to avoid the Gatekeeper in the hope of flooding the courts with additional litigation. Unfortunately, the current sanctions are inadequate to protect the estate.

[128] Bankr. Docket Nos. 2229, 2503. The Dondero Entities objected to the exit financing. Bankr. Docket No. 2403, 2467.

[129] *See* n.39 *supra*.

V. CONCLUSION

46. WHEREFORE, Highland respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion, enter the Order consistent with paragraph 30 *supra*, and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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Dated: [_____], 2023

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

UBS SECURITIES LLC and UBS AG LONDON BRANCH,

Petitioners,

- against -

JAMES DONDERO, SCOTT ELLINGTON, HIGHLAND CDO HOLDING COMPANY, HIGHLAND CDO OPPORTUNITY MASTER FUND, L.P., HIGHLAND FINANCIAL PARTNERS, L.P., HIGHLAND SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES HOLDING COMPANY, CLO HOLDCO, LTD., MAINSPRING, LTD., and MONTAGE HOLDINGS, LTD.,

Respondents.

Index No. _____

SPECIAL TURNOVER PETITION

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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* Motion for admission *pro hac vice* forthcoming.

Exhibit 2

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INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioners UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (together, "UBS") bring this proceeding under CPLR Article 52 to enforce more than a billion dollars in related judgments that UBS obtained after a decade of hard-fought litigation against Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM") and its affiliates. *See UBS Secs. LLC v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the "Underlying Action"). The court bifurcated the Underlying Action into two phases ("Phase I" and "Phase II") and entered judgment for UBS in each phase ("Phase I Judgment," "Phase II Judgment," and collectively, the "Judgment").

2. In the Phase I Judgment, the court awarded UBS $1,042,391,031.79 against Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company ("SOHC") and CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. ("CDO Fund") collectively,[1] including prejudgment interest and another $257,027.92 accruing daily in post-judgment interest. *See* Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 2-3 (Feb. 10, 2020). In the Phase II Judgment, the court awarded UBS $67,222.00 against CDO Fund; adjudged defendant Highland Financial Partners, L.P. ("HFP" and with CDO Fund and SOHC, the "Judgment Debtors") the alter ego of SOHC and liable for SOHC's portion of the Judgment; and awarded UBS $16,283,331.00 in attorney's fees. *See* Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 9-10 (Nov. 21, 2022).

3. After UBS obtained the Phase I Judgment, it discovered that HCM's two former principals—James Dondero (former President and Chief Executive Officer) and Scott Ellington (former Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel)—conspired for over a decade to frustrate UBS's ultimate recovery by systematically draining the Judgment Debtors' assets. Dondero and Ellington exercised unfettered control over HCM and numerous other entities—including the Judgment

[1] The Phase I Judgment ordered CDO Fund to pay $531,619,426.24 and SOHC to pay $510,771,605.55. Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 2-3.

Debtors—to fraudulently transfer assets away from the Judgment Debtors and other potentially liable entities to enrich themselves at UBS's expense. UBS brings this petition (the "Turnover Petition" or "Petition") to collect on its Judgment and hold accountable Dondero, Ellington, and certain entities they controlled and used as part of their scheme to defraud UBS.

THE PARTIES

4. Petitioner UBS Securities LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its headquarters and principal place of business at 1285 Avenue of the Americas in New York, New York 10019.

5. Petitioner UBS AG London Branch is a Swiss banking corporation with its principal place of business at 5 Broadgate, London EC2M 2QS, United Kingdom.

6. Respondent Dondero is an individual who resides at 3807 Miramar Ave, Dallas, TX 75205. Dondero co-founded HCM in 1993 and served as its President and Chief Executive Officer until his removal in 2020.

7. Respondent Ellington is an individual who resides at 3825 Potomac Ave, Dallas, TX 75205. Ellington was HCM's Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel until his removal in 2021.

8. Respondent SOHC is a Cayman Islands corporation with its principal office at Walker House, 87 Mary Street, George Town, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands. UBS has a Judgment against SOHC in the amount of $527,054,936.55, on which $137,839,662.28 of gross post-judgment interest has accrued and $33,366,517.87 of post-judgment interest only has been satisfied. *See* Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 3; Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 9.

9. Respondent HFP is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal office at 100 Crescent Street, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201. The Supreme Court of New York has declared HFP to be an alter ego of SOHC and adjudged HFP liable for UBS's judgment against SOHC,

presently totaling $631,528,081.35, including post-judgment interest. Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 9.

10. Respondent CDO Fund is a Bermuda limited partnership with its principal office at 52 Reid Street, Hamilton, Bermuda. UBS has a Judgment against CDO Fund in the amount of $547,969,979.24, on which $143,454,428.88 of gross post-judgment interest has accrued and $52,420,980.58 of post-judgment interest only has been satisfied. Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 2; Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 9. Although an independently managed HCM now controls CDO Fund, Dondero and Ellington controlled CDO Fund at all times relevant to allegations involving CDO Fund in this Turnover Petition.[2]

11. Respondent Highland CDO Holding Company ("CDO Holding") is a Cayman Islands company with its registered office at Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited, One Nexus Way, Camana Bay, Grand Cayman, KY1-9005, Cayman Islands. CDO Holding is a wholly owned subsidiary of HFP.

12. Respondent CLO HoldCo, Ltd. ("CLO HoldCo"), is a Cayman Islands company with its registered office at Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited, One Nexus Way, Camana Bay, Grand Cayman, KY1-9005, Cayman Islands. CLO HoldCo is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (the "DAF"), which Dondero indirectly controls and has funded from his personal assets, his family trusts, and HCM.

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[2] This Turnover Petition names the Judgment Debtors from the Underlying Action as Respondents because it seeks to pierce the corporate veil against the Judgment Debtors' alter egos. In an action to impose alter ego liability, each alter ego is a necessary party. *Intelligent Prod. Sols., Inc. v. Morstan Gen. Agency, Inc.*, 45 Misc.3d 1225(A), 2014 WL 6883125, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. Dec. 4, 2014) (citing *Mannucci v. Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart of Jesus*, 94 A.D.3d 471 (1st Dep't 2012)).

13. Respondent Mainspring, Ltd. ("Mainspring"), is a Cayman Islands company with a registered office at P.O. Box 10008 (c/o Services Cayman Limited), Willow House, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman KY1-1001, Cayman Islands. Dondero is the ultimate beneficial owner of Mainspring.

14. Respondent Montage Holdings, Ltd. ("Montage"), is a Cayman Islands company which shares Mainspring's registered office address: P.O. Box 10008 (c/o Services Cayman Limited), Willow House, Cricket Square, Grand Cayman KY1-1001, Cayman Islands. Ellington is the ultimate beneficial owner of Montage.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. As a court of general jurisdiction, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. *See* N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7; Judiciary Law § 140-b.

16. Venue is proper under CPLR 5221(a)(4) because this is a special proceeding to enforce a judgment entered by the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, and there is no county in this state in which any respondent "resides or is regularly employed or has a place for the regular transaction of business in person." *See* Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment. CPLR 5221(a)(4) instructs that "if there is no such county," a judgment creditor may bring a judgment-enforcement proceeding in the supreme court in "the county in which the judgment was entered." That makes this Court the proper forum.

17. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over all Respondents.

18. The Court has personal jurisdiction over CDO Fund and SOHC under General Obligations Law § 5-1402 based on the forum-selection clauses in the agreements underpinning the claims in the Underlying Action. *See* Ex. 92, Cash Warehouse Agreement ¶ 15 (Mar. 14, 2008) (UBS, CDO Fund, and SOHC agreeing to "submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and New York state courts located in the county of New York, New York in connection with any

dispute related to this Agreement or any of the matters contemplated hereby"); Ex. 93, Synthetic Warehouse Agreement ¶ 15 (Mar. 14, 2008) (same); Ex. 11, Phase I Decision and Order, at 39 (Nov. 14, 2019) (finding CDO Fund and SOHC liable for breaching these two agreements as part of UBS's Judgment). These clauses "obviat[e] the need for a separate analysis of the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction," *Oak Rock Fin., LLC v. Rodriguez*, 148 A.D.3d 1036, 1038 (2d Dep't 2017) and remain enforceable and provide personal jurisdiction for "judgment enforcement claims" even after Judgment on the claims, *Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Bonderman*, 73 Misc. 3d 1217(A), 2021 WL 5272497, at *7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2021), *reargument denied*, 75 Misc. 3d 469, 476-78 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2022).

19. For similar reasons, the Court has personal jurisdiction over HFP. Although not a signatory to the agreements involved in the Underlying Action, HFP is "bound" by the agreements' forum-selection clause as "an alter ego of a signatory," SOHC, as the court found in Phase II. *Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. Targeted Delivery Techs. Holdings, Ltd.*, 184 A.D.3d 116, 122 (1st Dep't 2020); Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 5-6.

20. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Dondero and Ellington because, as explained below, they are alter egos of the Judgment Debtors. The Court has personal jurisdiction over CDO Holding because, as also explained below, it is the alter ego of Judgment Debtor HFP.

21. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over all Respondents under CPLR 302(a)(2) and (a)(3) as participants in a conspiracy involving tortious acts in New York to frustrate the judgment of a New York court, which resulted in injury in New York. As demonstrated below, all Respondents participated in a scheme to funnel away assets to frustrate UBS's efforts to collect on a judgment from a New York action. *See, e.g.*, *Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Bergstein*, 2016 WL 4410881, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 19, 2016) (citing cases) (holding that

conspiracy to frustrate New York judgment established personal jurisdiction over participants), *aff'd*, 147 A.D.3d 644, 645 (1st Dep't 2017).

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF

22. UBS brings this special turnover proceeding under CPLR 5225(b) to enforce the Judgment in its favor. *See* Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 2-3; Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment at 10-11. To date, the total amount owed on the Judgment, including statutory post-judgment interest, is $1,253,939,017.66.

23. A judgment creditor can bring a special proceeding under CPLR 5225(b) against any person or entity that (1) possesses or has custody over assets in which the judgment debtor has an interest; (2) unlawfully received assets from the judgment debtor, or received judgment debtor assets in which the judgment creditor has a superior interest, or (3) owes or will owe a debt to the judgment debtor.

24. The same standards "governing a motion for summary judgment, 'requiring the court to decide the matter upon the pleadings, papers[,] and admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised'" govern a special proceeding. *Triadou SPV S.A. v. Chetrit*, 2021 WL 3290834, at *9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 2, 2021) (quoting *Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York*, 127 A.D.3d 632, 633 (1st Dep't 2015)).

25. Although a special proceeding, this action remains a plenary action and allows this Court to adjudicate all disputes between the parties. *See, e.g.*, *Cardinal Health 414 LLC v. U.S. Heartcare Mgmt., Inc.*, 2013 WL 563288, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. Feb. 13, 2013) ("Although originally a creditor was required to commence a plenary action to achieve this goal, now it can be accomplished through a special proceeding under CPLR 5225 or 5227." (citing *Siemens & Halske GmbH v. Gres*, 32 A.D.2d 624, 624 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam))); *Matter of WBP Cent. Assocs., LLC v. DeCola*, 50 A.D.3d 693, 694 (2d Dep't 2008) ("[A] claim to set aside an allegedly

fraudulent conveyance of money, assets, or property may be asserted in a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5225(b), without first commencing a plenary action . . . .").

FACTS

I. DONDERO, ELLINGTON, AND THE BYZANTINE STRUCTURE OF THE HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT "COMPLEX"

26. Before its bankruptcy, HCM was an investment management firm that managed billions of dollars of assets "through its organizational structure of approximately 2,000 separate business entities." *In re Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2019 WL 417149, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2019), *aff'd*, 604 B.R. 484 (N.D. Tex. 2019), *aff'd sub nom. In re Acis Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 850 F. App'x 302 (5th Cir. 2021).

27. Dondero co-founded HCM in 1993 and was its majority owner, President, and Chief Executive Officer until his removal in 2020.[3] *See* Ex. 36, Email from L. Thedford, at HCMUBS000050 (Mar. 1, 2017) (attaching Highland Affiliate Ownership Chart); *see also In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.*, 2021 WL 2326350, at *1, *21 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 7, 2021). Ellington served as HCM's Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel from 2010 until his removal in January 2021. *See In re Highland*, 2021 WL 2326350, at *17; Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 55:4-13 (July 29, 2021). At all times relevant to this Turnover Petition, Ellington operated as one of Dondero's top lieutenants and confidants, often handing many aspects of the business himself.

[3] Dondero resigned from director positions at the Judgment Debtors in 2021. *See* Ex. 129, Letter from Clay Taylor, at HCMUBS005324 (Apr. 28, 2021) ("[T]his letter shall serve as Mr. Dondero's immediate resignation of the alleged director position(s) at HFP and SOHC and/or any officer positions at those entities."); *see also* Ex. 130, Letter from J. Pomerantz, at HCMUBS005322 (May 7, 2021) (requesting that Dondero also confirm his resignation from Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd. ("CDO Opportunity Fund"), and its subsidiaries, including CDO Fund).

28. Dondero, with Ellington at his side, for years controlled HCM and its vast web of funds and other entities under its management and control with unilateral and unfettered discretion. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 97, HFP 2010 Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD2415709; Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 48:8-13 (May 10, 2021) (Dondero was the "decision maker" for HFP and its subsidiaries); Ex. 114, Dondero Dep. at 319:20-325:14 (May 12, 2021) (Dondero had the authority to authorize the sale and assignment of the assets of SOHC, CDO Fund, and related entities); *see also* Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 40-41 (Apr. 18, 2013) (expert report from the Underlying Action that concludes "HCM and its President and majority owner, Mr. Dondero, sit at the top of [the HCM] organization chart," and "[f]rom this position, Mr. Dondero controlled" HCM and many related entities—including SOHC, CDO Fund, Highland Financial Corp. ("HFC"), HFP, and CDO Holding); Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 5 ("Mr. Dondero also served as the sole Director of SOHC and as President of the ultimate general partner of CDO Fund."); *In re Acis Cap. Mgmt.*, 2019 WL 417149, at *5 (holding that Dondero controlled his many related entities through friends, family members, and directors-for-hire that the Court described as "nominal figureheads who are paid to act like they are in charge, while they are not.").

29. Dondero exercised his control in part through his status as the sole stockholder and director of Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCM's general partner. *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 12:4-13:17 (Oct. 19, 2022); Ex. 105, HCM Organizational Chart; *see also generally* Ex. 5, Bk. Dkt. No. 281-1 (Dec. 12, 2019). Dondero unilaterally made decisions for HCM, and "through his controlling stake in HCM, and/or his positions within SOHC, CDO Fund and HFP, Mr. Dondero was able to control these entities," Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 41-42, as demonstrated in part by the below (attached in larger format as Ex. 100, HCM Affiliates Organizational Chart (July 2019)):



30. Dondero's dominion over HCM and the related web of entities was so extensive that the bankruptcy court overseeing HCM's reorganization proceeding (the "Bankruptcy Court") labeled this web the "Non-Debtor Dondero-Related Entities" as "[m]any of these non-Debtor entities appear to be under the *de facto* control of Mr. Dondero—as he is the president and portfolio manager for many or most of them." *In re Highland*, 2021 WL 2326350, at *3.

31. Ellington, as an officer of Strand and the Chief Legal Officer of HCM, also exercised control over the HCM complex. *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 21:2-23:16 [redacted]. Dondero "delegated and entrusted" many decisions related to SOHC, CDO Fund, and related entities to Ellington, *see* Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 215:19-216:11, including signatory authority and [redacted], *see* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 194:22-196:12; *see also* Ex. 50, Email from S. Goldsmith, at UBSPROD2630461, -463 (Aug. 31, 2017) (Ellington signs on behalf of CDO Fund

to transfer assets); Ex. 53, Email from J. Sevilla, at BC SEN0000767181 (Nov. 20, 2017) (Ellington signs on behalf of CDO Fund appointing Beecher as representative).[4]

32. Among their vast web of HCM-linked entities, Dondero and Ellington directed six to initiate the fraudulent activities at issue in this proceeding (the "Transferors"):

- **CDO Fund**, a Judgment Debtor to UBS and an indirect subsidiary of HCM (and, with SOHC, the "Funds").
- **SOHC**, a Judgment Debtor to UBS and wholly owned subsidiary and alter ego of HFP.
- **HFP**, a Judgment Debtor to UBS as alter ego of SOHC and an indirect subsidiary of HCM.
- **HFC**, a subsidiary of HFP. *See* Ex. 97, HFP 2010 Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD2415709 (reflecting entity organization); *see also* Ex. 26, Email from J. Blumer, at UBSHCDO-160165 (row 665) (attaching Highland Entity Excel Chart and reflecting Dondero as the sole Director/Manager/Trustee of HFC).
- **CDO Holding**, a wholly owned subsidiary of HFP. *See* Ex. 97, HFP 2010 Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD2415709 (reflecting entity organization).[5]
- **CDO Opportunity Fund**, which is also an indirect subsidiary of HCM and serves as the "offshore feeder" fund to CDO Fund. *See* Ex. 104, CDO Opportunity Fund Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD5113036.

33. A testifying expert in the Underlying Action applied New York principles of alter ego relationships and concluded that "HCM and its President and majority owner, Mr. Dondero,

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[4] [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 119:10-120:15, 140:25-141:12, 192:6-11, 369:8-11.

[5] Although HFC was listed in the organizational chart as an intermediate parent of CDO Holding just below HFP, *see* Ex. 97, HFP 2010 Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD2415709, Dondero and Ellington similarly ignored this corporate form as evidenced by their own documented plan to directly strip CDO Holding of its assets in 2010 and again in the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances defined and described *infra* Section III. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 40, Email from I. Leventon, at HCMUBS005260 (Apr. 19, 2017) (internal document ignoring HFC's intermediate ownership of CDO Holding).

sit at the top of [the HCM] organization chart," and "[f]rom this position, Mr. Dondero controlled" several HCM-related entities—including the Funds, HFC, HFP, and CDO Holding. Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 40. In support, the expert relied upon the following facts and findings:

- Dondero "unilaterally ma[d]e decisions on behalf of HCM," and "through his controlling stake in HCM, and/or his positions within SOHC, CDO Fund and HFP, Mr. Dondero was able to control these entities." Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 41-42.

- In 2009, Dondero eliminated the requirement that HFP have independent directors and made himself the sole director of HFP and direct decision maker for HFP and its subsidiaries. Ex. 88, Email from H. Kim, at UBSPROD1854773 (Sept. 11, 2020) (attaching HFP board minutes). HFP and its subsidiaries were financially dependent on HCM for their capital needs; indeed, at one point Dondero committed that HCM "would cover up to $12 million of margin calls" for HFP. Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 49. In general, there was a "lack of separateness between HFP and its subsidiaries and HCM." Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 49. This alter ego relationship encompassed CDO Holding, which HFP dominated for the benefit of itself and other HCM subsidiaries. Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 44, 49.

- "Dondero exercised his ability to dominate and control HCM, SOHC, CDO Fund and HFP, amongst other [HCM] [e]ntities," to his own benefit, including to "authorize loans to himself" and facilitate transfers among these entities—"which were not at arm's length or executed in accordance with corporate formalities." Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 54-56.

34. The expert's findings track the conduct animating this special proceeding. Dondero and Ellington ensured the entities they controlled routinely failed to observe corporate formalities with respect to their personnel, internal systems, and considerable assets. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 113:5-9 [redacted]

see also Ex. 26, Email from J. Blumer, at UBSHCDO-160165 (rows 536, 666) (attaching Highland Entity Excel Chart and reflecting Dondero as CEO and "sole member of 'Monitoring Committee'"

of HFP).[6] At all times material to UBS's claims in this Petition, these entities functioned as extensions of one another and ultimately extensions of Dondero and Ellington.

35. [redacted], the Judgment Debtors, [redacted] often utilized the same offices, employees, and internal counsel. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 27:25-28:15, 31:6-19 (Oct. 10, 2022) [redacted]; *id.* at 28:21-29:3, 31:20-25 [redacted]; *see also* Ex. 92, Cash Warehouse Agreement ¶ 9 (Mar. 14, 2008) (listing the same address for all Judgment Debtors: Two Galleria Tower 13455 Noel Road, Suite 800 Dallas, Texas 75240). [redacted] *See* Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 22:10-23:5.

36. [redacted]

See, e.g., Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 18:3-21:1 [redacted] Ex. 119, Irving Dep. at 18:11-15 (Sept. 20, 2022) [redacted]; Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 26:22-29:9 [redacted]; Ex. 121, Leventon Dep.

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[6] *See also, e.g.*, Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 61:16-23 (HCM compensated Ellington for his work on behalf of HCM's affiliates and managed funds); *id.* at 63:20-64:4 (Ellington used an HCM email address in connection with his work on behalf of HCM's affiliates); Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 20:22-22:9 (Oct. 3, 2022) [redacted]

at 183:8-18 [redacted] Ex. 125, Sevilla Dep. at 37:15-23 (Oct. 11, 2022) [redacted]

37. HCM employees even performed work for Dondero and Ellington personally as part of their HCM employment, all without separate compensation. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 17:23-18:15 (emphasis added); Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 21:25-22:9 ([redacted] Below are a few examples:

- [redacted] Ex. 125, Sevilla Dep. at 30:19-31:10, 31:18-25; Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 43:25-44:12.
- [redacted] Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 44:13-25.
- [redacted] *See* Ex. 128, Vitiello Dep. at 39:7-21 (Sept. 19, 2022).

38. [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 51:2-8 [redacted]; *see also* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 115:23-116:2 [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 113:13-16 [redacted]

39. [redacted] Ex. 125, Sevilla Dep. at 35:22-36:25; Ex. 119, Irving Dep. at 18:11-22 [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 15:9-16:8, 18:3-21:1. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 15:5-8, 17:4-18:2. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 18:3-19:16, 52:24-53:7.

40. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 90:22-91:1. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 89:25-92:1. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 89:25-90:6, 95:18-96:24. Indeed, after getting fired from HCM, Ellington hired DiOrio to work at Skyview. Ex. 110, DiOrio Dep. at 12:11-12.

II. THE UNDERLYING ACTION

41. UBS became entangled in Dondero and Ellington's web back in 2007. In 2007 and 2008, UBS agreed to pursue a complex securitization transaction involving collateralized debt

obligations and collateralized loan obligations with HCM, CDO Fund, and SOHC (the "Knox Transaction").[7]

42. The Funds stood to earn significant fees in connection with this transaction and in exchange agreed to bear 100% of the risk of loss associated with the transaction. *See* Ex. 11, Phase I Decision and Order, at 12, 17.

43. In late 2008, amid the global economic recession, the assets suffered steep losses and the Funds breached their contractual obligations to bear 100% of those losses. *See* Ex. 11, Phase I Judgment, at 2. UBS thus terminated the agreements in December 2008, at which point the losses on the diminished assets had grown to $519,374,149. Ex. 11, Phase I Decision and Order, at 26-27.

44. UBS sued HCM, the Funds, and several other affiliated entities (including HFP) in the New York Supreme Court for breach of contract from the Funds and indemnification from HCM. *See* Ex. 11, Decision and Order, at 1.

45. Prior to the court's entry of the Phase I Judgment and the Phase II trial on UBS's remaining claims, HCM filed for bankruptcy, staying the Phase II trial.[8] In January 2020, an independent board of directors (the "Independent Board") of Strand took over sole authority to oversee HCM's operations, management of its assets, and its bankruptcy proceeding. *See* Ex. 6, Bk. Dkt. No. 339 (Jan. 9, 2020).

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[7] A collateralized loan obligation ("CLO") is a financial structure that acquires and manages a pool of loans or other debt. The CLO raises money by issuing its own debt tranches, as well as equity, and uses the proceeds of those issuances to obtain loans. As the borrowers of the underlying loans make payments, the CLO distributes the money to its investors.

[8] HCM's bankruptcy case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas under case number 19-bk-34054.

46. In late 2020, HCM and several of its largest creditors, including UBS, participated in a Bankruptcy Court-ordered mediation. *See* Ex. 10, Bk. Dkt. No. 912, at 2 (Aug. 3, 2020). During this time, Ellington repeated several misrepresentations to UBS that he had made over the years, including that the Funds were "ghost funds." *See* Ex. 87, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1738891 (Aug. 21, 2020) (Ellington misrepresenting that (1) "[m]ost of the employees and custodians" of documents related to the Funds' assets "have not worked for the debtor or related entities in 10+ years," (2) the Funds are "ghost funds" and noting that "UBS is aware of this situation . . . because I have personally discussed it with [Andy Clubok, UBS's counsel] several dozen times," and (3) Ellington and Leventon spent 100+ hours "trying to piece together everything we can" and "all that is available" about the Funds).

47. Despite long discussions with mediators and months of settlement discussions between the parties, it was only after Dondero and Ellington were removed that HCM and UBS were able to reach an agreement in principle to settle UBS's claims in the bankruptcy. Then, on or about February 10, 2021, on the eve of the parties signing a settlement agreement, HCM disclosed several fraudulent conveyances that HCM entities (at the direction of Dondero and Ellington) had conducted in concert with Sentinel, a Dondero- and Ellington-affiliated insurance entity based in the Cayman Islands. *See* Ex. 90, HCM and UBS Settlement Agreement, at 2 (Mar. 30, 2021) (acknowledging disclosure of ATE Policy); Ex. 16, Bk. Dkt. No. 2389, at Exhibit 1, at 2 (May 27, 2021) (order approving settlement). UBS and HCM renegotiated their settlement, including settlement of UBS's Phase II claims against HCM and certain related entities.

48. On July 27, 2022, the court issued a Decision and Order on the remaining, unsettled Phase II claims, finding HFP to be an alter ego of SOHC and liable for satisfying the $510,771,605.55 Phase I Judgment against SOHC, plus all statutory interest. Ex. 23, Phase II

Decision and Order (July 29, 2022). On November 21, 2022, the court issued the Phase II Judgment. Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment.

III. ANTICIPATING LIABILITY, DONDERO AND ELLINGTON SHUFFLE ASSETS TO PUT THEM BEYOND UBS'S REACH

A. The 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance From CDO Holding To CLO HoldCo

49. In late October 2010, the parties to the Underlying Action had fully briefed, and the presiding court held a hearing on, HFP's and the Funds' motion to dismiss UBS's claim against HFP as alter ego of SOHC. *See* Ex. 12, Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript, 650097/2009 (Oct. 19, 2011). UBS highlighted the many facts animating UBS's allegations that HFP exercised unfettered control over SOHC and used that control to defraud UBS, all facts the court later determined to be true. Ex. 12, Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript at 29:24-30:14 (citing the allegations in UBS's complaint that explained the alter ego relationship between HFP and SOHC). Dondero and Ellington saw the writing on the wall and correctly predicted that the court would hold that HFP is the alter ego of SOHC and thus liable for claims under which UBS would seek hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. *See* Ex. 1, Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, 650097/2009, at 10 (Nov. 3, 2011) (holding that UBS sufficiently pled an alter ego relationship between SOHC and HFP and denying motion to dismiss); *see also* Ex. 23, Phase II Decision and Order, at 9 (holding that HFP is the alter ego of SOHC and liable for the Judgment).

50. The following figure (attached in larger format as Ex. 97, HFP 2010 Organizational Chart, at UBSPROD2415709), shows the way HCM controlled HFP as the 100% owner of its general partner. It also shows the way HCM was thus able to control HFP's subsidiaries:



51. Shortly after the hearing, Dondero acted to move HFP's assets out of its structure and therefore ostensibly out of the reach of any future UBS judgment. On December 23, 2010, CDO Holding transferred substantially *all* of its assets in exchange for cash and a promissory note to CLO HoldCo, an entity created just weeks before (the "2010 Fraudulent Conveyance"). *See* Ex. 96, CDO Holding Balance Sheet, at UBSPROD4957189, tab "200.3 CDO BS."

52. CDO Holding was [redacted] Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 32:5-15. HFP used CDO Holding's assets for whatever HFP and HFP's subsidiaries needed. Indeed, HFP's former President and Chief Executive Officer (an HCM employee), Todd Travers, admitted that HFP and its subsidiaries did not employ any specific limitations or procedures that governed when one HFP subsidiary could cover the debt of HFP or another subsidiary. *See* Ex. 127, Travers Dep. at 192:14-193:8 (Apr. 3, 2012) (decisions to cover debts for HFP or its subsidiaries were "all just sort of done on an ad hoc basis as Mr. Dondero

directed"). Dondero—who controlled HFP and therefore CDO Holding—could not even recall if HFP had any policies or procedures in place to determine whether HFP or its subsidiaries would pay its debts. *See* Ex. 112, Dondero Dep. at 431:2-12 (June 11, 2012). HFP's former Chief Operating Officer, Philip Braner, similarly testified that transfers between HFP and its subsidiaries were rarely formally documented as HFP did not have any policies requiring documentation of such transfers. *See* Ex. 108, Braner Dep. at 804:3-20 (Dec. 7, 2011).

53. For instance, to cover certain SOHC losses in 2008, HFP withdrew about $15 million from CDO Holding. *See* Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 19; *see also* Ex. 107, Braner Dep. at 323:19-326:11 (Dec. 6, 2011) (Braner approved both the $15 million transfer from CDO Holding to HFP and the later transfer from HFP to SOHC with a one-word email reading "approved").

[redacted] *See* Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 32:5-33:7. [redacted]

[redacted] Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 32:5-33:7.

54. Assets moved in the other direction as well. CDO Holding routinely "required cash contributions from HFP in order to make various disbursements." Ex. 2, Dudney Report, at 47. In June 2008, SOHC recorded a dividend of $10.5 million to HFP, which HFP in turn moved to CDO Holding. *Id.* In reality, the cash transfer went directly from SOHC to CDO Holding (and not through HFP). *See id.* at 43. That month, HFP also raised $40 million from other HCM entities and transferred the money to CDO Holding to distribute it. *See id.* at 48. In December 2008, "as part of a single set of instructions to Bank of New York Mellon, SOHC transferred $3.7 million to

HFP, which was then transferred to CDO Hold[ing] and ultimately to James Dondero." *See id.* at 48.

55. CLO HoldCo, on the other hand, was set up specifically to carry out the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance. CLO HoldCo was incorporated on December 13, 2010, ***ten days*** before the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance, "to hold certain CLO assets" and to "enter[] into an investment transaction [the] next week." *See* Ex. 28, Email from H. Kim, at UBSHCDO-015354 (Dec. 14, 2010) (attaching CLO HoldCo's Certificate of Incorporation at UBSHCDO-015356); Ex. 29, Email from A. Alvarez, at UBSHCDO-135396, -98 (Dec. 16, 2010). CDO Holding recorded no sales to any other entity in 2010. *See* Ex. 96, CDO Holding Balance Sheet, at UBSPROD4957189, tab "200.3 CDO BS."

56. Dondero controlled CLO HoldCo through its parent, Highland Capital Management Partners Charitable Trust #2, and later, the DAF, which Dondero funded with his own assets and assets from HCM and other sources. *See* Ex. 71, Email from H. Kim, at UBSPROD2389234, tab "Dissolved Entities," row 429; tab "DAF," row 11 (Sept. 23, 2019) (attaching Legal Entities List); Ex. 18, Bk. Dkt. No. 2660, at 2-3 (Aug. 4, 2021) (CLO HoldCo Contempt Order)]; Ex. 32, Email from M. Okolita, at UBSHCDO-125280 (Dec. 21, 2010) ("Jim [Dondero] will be contributing ~16% of the value [of] the assets . . . .").

57. To solidify his control, Dondero put an empty suit in charge of CLO HoldCo. On paper, Grant Scott was CLO HoldCo's director and sole manager. Ex. 28, Email from H. Kim, at UBSHCDO-015354, -55. However, as the Bankruptcy Court recently explained when holding CLO HoldCo in contempt for violating court orders, Grant is "a patent lawyer with no experience in finance or running charitable organizations, who was Mr. Dondero's long-time friend, college housemate, and best man at his wedding." *See* Ex. 18, Bk. Dkt. No. 2660, at 2. The documentation

underlying the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance further underscores Dondero's control, as Dondero signed as the "[g]atekeeper" for both CDO Holding and CLO HoldCo on an internal compliance report for the transfer. *See* Ex. 35, Email from C. Chism, at UBSHCDO-212473 (Jan. 5, 2011) (attaching Dec. 21, 2010 Compliance Report).

58. The 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance was far from an arm's-length transaction, with contemporaneous internal HCM documentation evidencing concern over the lack of independent review and evaluation of the terms of the underlying note.[9]

59. The justification for the transfer was similarly suspect. One rushed valuation determined the assets to be worth at least $39,638,160.00. *See* Ex. 30, Email from M. Khankin, at UBSHCDO-117919 (Dec. 16, 2010) (attaching Dec. 8, 2010 Highland Valuation Results Letter).[10] Dondero justified transferring the asset portfolio to provide "[l]iquidity" to CDO Holding. Ex. 35, Email from C. Chism, at UBSHCDO-212473 (attaching Dec. 21, 2010 Compliance Report). But CDO Holding received just $6,597,862.00 in cash from the transfer, along with a promissory note for $32,801,593.00 plus interest that would not be payable for *fifteen* years. *See* Ex. 96, CDO Holding Balance Sheet, at UBSPROD4957189, tab "200.3 CDO BS," row 19 (reflecting that

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[9] "It appears that the note from the trust to the CDO Holdi[ng] is **not being** independently valued. I expressed sever [sic] concerns about this being at arms length and told him I had spoken to Clint and Frank AND JIM [Dondero] about this and that it was a requirement and I don't know how you deem a transaction at arms length when you control the terms of the note and no one has reviewed them!???! He expressed concerns that no one had told him this before to which I reiterated I had told everyone about this, including him and Jim [Dondero] and playing ignorant is not helpful and that I had serious doubts as to how this transaction was fair." Ex. 32, Email from M. Okolita, at UBSHCDO-125280 (emphasis in original).

[10] A subsequent version of this document indicates that the two largest CLOs in the portfolio made returns in Euros. *See* Ex. 34, Email from M. Khankin, at UBSHCDO-056482 (Jan. 3, 2011) (attaching Dec. 8, 2010 Revised Highland Valuation Results Letter). The dollar figure in this petition calculates the value based on the Euro-to-Dollar spot exchange rate from the valuation date, Dec. 8, 2010. *See* European Central Bank, Euro Foreign Exchange Rates (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/shared/pdf/2010/12/20101208.pdf (last accessed Feb. 5, 2023).

between December 31, 2009, and December 31, 2010, CDO Holding added a new intercompany receivable from CLO HoldCo in the amount of $32,801,593.00); *id.* at tab "200.5 CDO CF," row 1478 (showing that on December 23, 2010, CDO Holding recorded a "sale" of "CDO Holding Assets" to CLO HoldCo in exchange for $6,597,862.00).

60. UBS did not discover the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance until well after Dondero's and Ellington's removal from HCM. On February 10, 2021, HCM's bankruptcy counsel sent UBS a copy of the ATE Policy, which included a schedule listing a promissory note from CLO HoldCo to CDO Holding. And only after that initial disclosure did UBS receive a copy of the actual promissory note and details surrounding the fraudulent nature of the conveyance.

B. The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances To Sentinel

61. As the Underlying Action progressed, the defendants' (and, by extension, Dondero's and Ellington's) litigation setbacks continued to mount. And after summary judgment losses in March 2017, Dondero and Ellington knew an adverse judgment was inevitable. *See* Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 115:13-116:13 (Ellington believed Judgment Debtors would lose, was not surprised by the size of the damages verdict, and had warned Dondero that UBS would likely prevail); Ex. 120, Leventon Dep. at 87:22-88:4 (July 22, 2021) (Leventon advised Dondero and Ellington that Judgment Debtors were likely to be found liable).

62. Dondero and Ellington also knew that the Transferors held substantial assets—all of which were ultimately under HCM's (and therefore Dondero's and Ellington's) control, and all of which could be used to satisfy an award to UBS. And as early as April 2017, HCM's Legal Department, at Ellington's direction, prepared an internal document that specifically contemplated the financial and legal risks to HCM, its related entities, and Dondero himself, pending the outcome of the Underlying Action. *See* Ex. 38, Email from I. Leventon, at HCMUBS005289 (Apr. 12, 2017) (attaching an HCM "Settlement Analysis" which identified risks to Dondero and the HCM-

related entities associated with the Underlying Action, including a $1.2 billion judgment, and analyzed how transferring assets away from the Transferors could obviate these risks).

63. And so Dondero and Ellington devised and implemented a scheme to move *all* the Judgment Debtors' remaining assets (as well as assets of the other Transferors) that could be subject to the impending judgment to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel"), a Cayman Islands-based reinsurance company that Dondero and Ellington ultimately owned (the "2017 Fraudulent Conveyances"). *See* Ex. 68, Email from C. Price, at DISCEN0008408, -8410 (June 20, 2019) (attaching Sentinel Structure Ownership Chart).

1. Dondero And Ellington Manufacture The ATE Policy As A Way To Transfer Assets

64. As guise for the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances, Ellington devised that the Funds and the other Transferors would transfer substantially all their assets (the "2017 Transferred Assets") to Sentinel as "premium" on a so-called "After-The-Event" insurance policy (the "ATE Policy") to the Funds and CDO Holding (together, the "Insureds") for liability in the Underlying Action, under an attendant Asset Purchase Agreement (the "APA"). *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 119:10-11; *see also* Ex. 37, Email from S. Vitiello, at UBSPROD4837429 (Apr. 11, 2017) (email between Stephanie Vitiello and Leventon attaching draft ATE Policy presentation "[b]ased on our discussion with Scott [Ellington]"); Ex. 38, Email from I. Leventon, at HCMUBS005295 (attached revised ATE Policy presentation including purchase of "$100m ATE policy from Sentinel" with "ATE premium = all assets in HFP/CDO Fund"). By moving all the 2017 Transferred Assets, Dondero and Ellington could avoid loss of the assets, HCM facing "years of fraudulent transfer claims throughout Highland structure," and "liability to backstop HFP/CDO Fund for up to $1.2b" if UBS won. Ex. 40, Email from I. Leventon, at HCMUBS005253-54 (Apr.

19, 2017). The moves also avoided $257 million tax liabilities for HCM, including $50 million for Dondero personally, if HCM happened to win the case. *Id.*

65. [redacted][11] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 327:2-14, 328:9-329:1; *id.* at 119:10-11 [redacted]; *see also* Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 132:3-18 [redacted]; *see also, e.g.*, Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 145:11-19 (Apr. 12, 2022) (that the policy premium would "be satisfied by the transfer of the entire investment portfolios of the [F]unds" was Sevilla's idea).

66. Sentinel's prior business and financial status at the time of the ATE Policy further evidences the ATE Policy's fraudulent nature. Sentinel had never issued an after-the-event legal liability policy before it issued one to the Insureds, nor has it issued one since. *See* Ex. 124, Sevilla Dep. at 138:23-25 (July 21, 2021); Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 124:20-125:4. Before the ATE Policy, Sentinel exclusively wrote director and officer liability policies for Dondero- and Ellington-related entities worth fractions of that of the ATE Policy. Ex. 124, Sevilla Dep. at 95:9-23; Ex. 49, Email from K. Irving, at HCMUBS001079 (Aug. 16, 2017). Without the 2017 Transferred Assets, Sentinel would have been unable to pay the full $100 million coverage of the ATE Policy: as of December 2016, Sentinel had only $19,193,823.23 in total assets, $5,886,746.39 of which were cash. *See* Ex. 49, Email from K. Irving, at HCMUBS001079.

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[11] Beecher "specialized in setting up and helping to manage captive[]" insurers. Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 19:6-11. Beecher "helped set up [Sentinel]" and then provided services "consisting of financial statements, preparation, coordination of board meetings, corresponding with the regulators . . . [and] [i]nteracting with the various service providers that Sentinel would engage for audit [and] actuarial" work. *Id.* at 16:1-18.

2. Dondero And Ellington Set And Carry Out The Terms Of The ATE Policy

67. Dondero, Ellington, and their lieutenants unilaterally dictated the substantive terms of the ATE Policy and associated APA, reinforcing the transfers' fraudulent nature and Dondero and Ellington's control over the Judgment Debtors.

68. *First*, Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants revised the ATE Policy to allow reimbursement of expenses even if the Insureds could not afford to litigate the Underlying Action—a near certainty given that the Insureds transferred substantially all of their assets to purchase the ATE Policy. *See* Ex. 42, Email from P. Kranz, at BC SEN0000745902 (Aug. 8, 2017) (responding to an email chain in which Sevilla directs Solomon Harris to remove an exclusion that would permit Sentinel to deny coverage to an insured that lacked the funds to litigate its case).

69. *Second*, Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants carefully tailored the terms of the ATE Policy to enable the Insureds and other related entities to drain the policy limit through reimbursements unrelated to the Underlying Action. *See* Ex. 42, Email from P. Kranz, at BC SEN0000745902-03 (Sevilla directing Solomon Harris to extend coverage under the Policy to the Insureds' "own costs and expenses," and later broadening that language to the "costs and expenses of the Representative *and other service providers in the normal course*, including related tax, which are incurred during the conduct of the legal action on behalf of the insured" (emphasis added)).

70. *Third*, when Sentinel's actuary analyzed the ATE under the terms Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants provided, including the coverage limit and premium, the actuary noted that "[e]ven under reasonably optimistic assumptions," Sentinel would lose money on the ATE Policy. Ex. 41, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN0000745987 (June 28, 2017). But this did not deter Dondero, Ellington, or their lieutenants.

71. *Finally*, to ensure that they would have the authority to push the transaction through on Sentinel's behalf, Dondero and Ellington arranged for their own appointment as sole members of the Sentinel Advisory Board of ITA Trust, the entity with ultimate voting control over Sentinel. Although Sentinel had been operating for five years, Dondero and Ellington's tenure on the Sentinel Advisory Board commenced at the same time Sentinel and the Transferors executed the ATE Policy and APA. *See* Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 93:9-10 (Ellington testifying that Sentinel was formed in 2012); Ex. 66, Email from C. Price, at BC SEN0000076075 (Mar. 5, 2019) (attaching Sentinel Board Minutes). As the sole members of the Advisory Board, Dondero and Ellington would "guide the decision making of the Trustee of the ITA Trust in its role as an indirect shareholder in [Sentinel]." *Id.*

72. While developing the ATE Policy and APA, Sentinel's outside counsel at Solomon Harris questioned the "legal validity" of the contemplated transfer, ***articulating the exact theory of fraud animating UBS's claims here***: that the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances put the assets "beyond the reach of the plaintiffs in the [Underlying Action] against the [F]unds" and a court could determine "that the 'premium' has to be returned or . . . set aside as some unlawful preference or similar." Ex. 42, Email from P. Kranz, at BC SEN0000745905. This did not dissuade Dondero or Ellington. In August 2017, Dondero executed the ATE Policy and corresponding APA, transferring the 2017 Transferred Assets valued at over $105,647,679.00 to satisfy a $25,000,000 "premium." *See* Ex. 51, Email from I. Leventon (Oct. 26, 2017); Ex. 98, Asset Purchase Agreement (Aug. 7, 2017).[12]

[12] The final APA largely mirrors Appendix 1 that was attached to the settlement analysis presentation prepared by Ellington and his team in April 2017 and presented to Dondero. *See* Ex. 39, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD4837680 (Apr. 13, 2022) (attaching Settlement Analysis presentation).

73. The face value of the transferred cash and promissory notes sent as part of the 2017 Transferred Assets alone were worth nearly twice the ATE Policy premium. *See* Ex. 98, Email from I. Leventon, at BC SEN0000089127-28 (Schedule A to APA).[13]

74. In its time managing "[t]housands" of insurance policies, Beecher had never before seen a premium paid in this fashion. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 180:18-181:5. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 304:16-305:1.

75. Under the final ATE Policy, Sentinel agreed to indemnify CDO Holding—a non-party to the Underlying Action but alter ego to parties HFP and SOHC—and the Funds for up to a $100 million limit for any adverse judgment or settlement with UBS. *See* Ex. 51, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1973056, -70. [redacted] *see* Ex. 125, Sevilla Dep. at 118:18-120:4, [redacted]. Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 32:5-15.

76. The other three Transferors that contributed their assets—CDO Opportunity Fund, HFC, and HFP—were not insured under the ATE Policy and, as for CDO Opportunity Fund and HFC, were not even party to the Underlying Action. *Compare* Ex. 98, Asset Purchase Agreement,

[13] The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances included the assignment of three promissory notes. *See* Ex. 98, Asset Purchase Agreement, at BC SEN000089127-28. This included the $32,801,593 CLO HoldCo promissory note, originally issued for the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance. Ex. 54, Email from L. Thompson (April 6, 2018) (attaching Assignment Agreement Ex. A (CLO HoldCo Promissory Note)). It also included the assignment of a promissory note from the Dugaboy Investment Trust for $2,399,996, signed by Dondero's sister, Nancy, and a promissory note from Governance Re Ltd. for $2,155,144, signed by Dondero, both originally issued to CDO Fund on August 7, 2017, just days before the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances. *See* Ex. 63, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD2309345-47, 43-44 (Nov. 14, 2018) (attaching Dugaboy and Governance Re promissory notes).

at BC SEN000089127-28, *with* Ex. 51, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1983071. These three had nothing to gain from the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances except to safeguard their assets (ultimately under the control of Dondero and Ellington) from an adverse judgment and alter ego liability in the Underlying Action. *See generally* Ex. 122, Raver Dep. at 111:20-112:7 (May 6, 2021) (the Transferors *lost* money in these transfers).

77. Dondero, Ellington, and their lieutenants were intimately involved in effecting the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances from both sides. Ellington got the transaction approved and completed, *see* Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 74:9-17, and Dondero signed the ATE Policy on behalf of all the Insureds and the APA on behalf of all Transferors, *see* Ex. 51, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1983071; Ex. 98, Asset Purchase Agreement, at BC SEN0000089124-25. Dondero even tried to sign a corollary to the APA on behalf of the Transferors *and* Sentinel. *See* Ex. 48, Email from T. Loiben, at HCMUBS000863 (Aug. 14, 2017); Ex. 47, Email from T. Loiben, at HCMUBS000947, (Aug. 14, 2017) (attaching Assignment Agreement signed by Dondero as assignor and assignee). Even when they were not acting directly, Dondero and Ellington directed others at HCM to carry out their plans. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 43, Email from J. Sevilla, at UBSPROD2566503 (Aug. 10, 2017) (replying to an email from H. Kim noting that she had to track down Dondero's signature on behalf of the Judgment Debtors); Ex. 46, Email from D. Willmore, at HCMUBS000563 (Aug. 11, 2017) (confirming to Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants that wires had been initiated "to move all of CDO Fund's cash to Sentinel."). [redacted] Ex. 121, Leventon Dep. at 157:14-158:6, and Irving was instrumental in ensuring that Sentinel received all the assets in satisfaction of the premium payment under the APA, *see* Ex. 118, Irving Dep. at 87:13-18 (Nov. 15, 2021).

78. When asked, Dondero could not be sure who he or Ellington represented in the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances: Sentinel, the Transferors, or both. *See* Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 143:21-144:14 ("And although Scott Ellington coordinated the overall transaction, I don't know if there was somebody separate representing one side or the other or if he represented both [Sentinel and the Insureds].").

3. At All Times, Dondero And Ellington Controlled Sentinel

79. Dondero and Ellington happily moved assets out of the various HCM-entities because they fully controlled Sentinel and would still have control over and access to the 2017 Transferred Assets.

80. As noted above, Dondero and Ellington are and have always been the ultimate beneficial owners of Sentinel. [redacted] *See* Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 18:25-22:19 (Oct. 18, 2022); *see also* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 50:1-16 [redacted]. As a reward, even though Ellington did not contribute any capital, [redacted] Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 22:2-12; Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 155:17-156:6. Dondero and Ellington "call[ed] the shots" as the ultimate beneficial owners of Sentinel. Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 34:16-19.

81. Ellington was "responsible for managing . . . and monitoring [Sentinel]," Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 134:1-4, [redacted] *See* Ex. 125, Sevilla Dep. at 41:22-25 [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 33:4-24 [redacted] Ex. 119, Irving Dep. at 238:14-23 [redacted] Ex.

121, Leventon Dep. at 91:13-92:7 [redacted]. Sentinel had no separate employees and instead was, until 2021, run exclusively by HCM employees at Dondero and Ellington's direction. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 18:10-25; *id.* at 16:22-17:23 (Sevilla, Irving, DiOrio, and Leventon worked on behalf of Sentinel); *see also* Ex. 110, DiOrio Dep. at 88:25-89:23 (July 23, 2021) (same); Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 32:9-22 ("[a]nything pertaining to the entities within the Sentinel structure . . . would either be communicated by" Sevilla or select other HCM employees, including DiOrio); Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 115:10-12 [redacted] *See* Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 212:13-19 [redacted].[14]

4. Dondero And Ellington Try To Conceal The 2017 Sentinel Transfers

82. Dondero and Ellington went to great lengths to cover up the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances to Sentinel.

83. To start, Dondero and Ellington concealed their ownership of Sentinel and the true purpose of the ATE Policy from everyone except their trusted lieutenants. *See* Ex. 113, Dondero Dep. at 167:20-25 (Dondero did not "remember" or "recall" telling anyone at HCM that he was the majority beneficial holder of Sentinel); Ex. 123, Ringheimer Dep. at 29:14-18 (Apr. 30, 2021) (HCM employee who helped push through the transfers was aware they were urgent but could not

[14] DiOrio removed the director and pushed forward the dividend in the same breath: "[p]lease see the attached shareholder resolution removing Dilip Massand from the Sentinel board. I think we should be good to get the dividend paid out now." *See* Ex. 83, Email from J. Neveril, at BC SEN0000770886 (Apr. 24, 2020).

recall an explanation for the urgency); Ex. 126, Stoops Dep. at 16:3-20:16 (Apr. 27, 2021) (HCM employee who helped push through the transfers had "very, very limited knowledge" of the ATE Policy but knew that there was urgency to execute the associated transfers); *see also* Ex. 126, Stoops Dep. at 14:5-17:9 (Sevilla told HCM employee who helped push through the transfers that the transfers were necessary because UBS and HCM were in settlement negotiations and UBS required HCM to remit settlement in cash).

84. Later on in 2018, Sentinel (on behalf of Dondero and Ellington) tried to hide the fraudulent nature of the transfers by ascribing only $68 million in value to the 2017 Transferred Assets, *assets which HCM confirmed were worth $105,647,679.00 less than one year after the transfers.* *See* Ex. 69, Email from K. Irving, at UBSPROD2572277 (Aug. 6, 2019) (attaching Sentinel Presentation to CIMA); Ex. 61, Email from R. Swadley, at HCMUBS003792 (Sept. 12, 2018) (attaching Tax Memorandum). But an auditor for Sentinel noted that even under this value, "Sentinel [w]as . . . overpaid by approximately $15m" for the premium with "no return of overpayment." Ex. 55, Email from J. Sevilla, at BC SEN0000707457 (June 6, 2018). This raised "the question 'is this an arms-length transaction'" and would require "a ton of additional disclosures in the audit report." *Id.* Dondero, Ellington, and their lieutenants tried to conceal this disparity through retroactive "adjustments" to the ATE Policy terms, all of which underscore the illicit nature of the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances.

85. Around June 2018, Sentinel executed the first of two undated endorsements (or amendments) to the ATE Policy, which "adjusted" the premium from $25,000,000 to Sentinel's $68,362,333.62 valuation of the assets. *See* Ex. 69, Email from K. Irving, at UBSPROD2572277 (attaching Sentinel Presentation to CIMA); Ex. 52, Limited Liability Insurance Policy and Endorsements, at DISCEN0007913 (June 2018). The post-hoc increase in the ATE Policy

premium did not increase the policy limit or period of coverage—every other aspect of the ATE Policy remained the same. *See* Ex. 52, Limited Liability Insurance Policy and Endorsements.

86. Later that same month, Sentinel executed a second endorsement to the ATE Policy, reducing the premium and coverage by $9 million for monies that the Insureds supposedly "prepaid" to "cover risk mitigation costs, which include but are not limited to, legal defense costs." *See* Ex. 69, Email from K. Irving, at UBSPROD2572277 (attaching Sentinel Presentation to CIMA); Ex. 52, Limited Liability Insurance Policy and Endorsements, at DISCEN0007913.

87. Despite the substantive changes to the ATE Policy resulting from the endorsements, no representative of the Insureds signed either endorsement, and Beecher could not recall whether the Insureds had representation in connection with these amendments. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 236:7-13.

88. The fraudulent nature of the ATE Policy and related transfers came to light in March 2019 when the Cayman Island Monetary Authority ("CIMA") conducted onsite inspections of Sentinel.[15] Because Sentinel's only active policy at the time was the ATE Policy, CIMA focused its assessment on the ATE Policy, the APA, and associated transfers. CIMA was concerned that "[t]hose charged with . . . governance could not explain the basis upon which the [2017 Transferred Assets] had been valued on or about August 1, 2017 for the purpose of premium settlement," and "they could not explain the reason why the information that was relied on to value the [2017 Transferred Assets] could not be readily provided to the auditors upon request." Ex. 67, Email from S. Dube, at BC SEN0000078819, -22 (May 6, 2019) (attaching CIMA Sentinel Final

[15] "[CIMA's] Insurance Supervision Division is responsible for the supervision, regulation, and licensing of all insurance companies and insurance brokers, managers and agents through an integrated risk-based supervisory approach while ensuring compliance with regulatory legislation." Cayman Islands Monetary Auth., "Divisions," https://www.cima.ky/about-division (last accessed Feb. 6, 2023).

Inspection Reports). CIMA similarly found the post hac endorsements troubling, as "[t]hose charged with governance could not explain why the premium was adjusted from US$25 million to US$68.3 million without a commensurate adjustment to the indemnity limit provided or why the initial pricing for the policy was subsequently deemed not sufficient." *Id.* These facts, coupled with the realization that the 2017 Transferred Assets led to a near seven-fold increase in Sentinel's investment portfolio between December 2016 and December 2017, "cast significant doubt on the economic substance and business purpose of the transactions relating to the ATE coverage" that were "at the very least questionable." *Id*.

89. Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants sought to legitimize the ATE Policy by lying to CIMA in claiming that Sentinel's actuary independently determined the ATE Policy's terms — which the actuary denied and the documentary evidence shows is false. *See* Ex. 67, Email from S. Dube, at BC SEN0000078822 (attaching CIMA Sentinel Final Inspection Reports). In reality, the actuary flagged a "huge down-side risk" with "not much to gain" and warned Sentinel that "[e]ven under reasonably optimistic assumptions, Highlands' loss would exceed the projected premium." Ex. 41, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN0000745985-987, -993 (June 28, 2017).[16] CIMA determined as much through its inspection, finding that Sentinel's actuary "was not involved in the determination of premium pricing . . . to any extent at all" and that the actuary's "involvement arose after premium decisions had been finalized by [Sentinel]." Ex. 67, Email from S. Dube, at BC SEN0000078822. CIMA expressed "concern that the management's assertion that the ATE [P]olicy premium of US$25 million was established based on a pricing study conducted by [Sentinel's] actuary contradicts the actuary's position." *Id*. However, nothing came of these

[16] This analysis assumed a premium of $20 million and coverage of $80 million—the final ATE Policy maintained the same losing ratio, with a $25 million premium for $100 million in coverage. Ex. 41, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN0000745985-987.

inspections and the fraudulent nature of the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances and ATE Policy remained hidden.

90. After the court entered the Phase I Judgment, Dondero and Ellington continued to make every effort to obscure from UBS the existence of the ATE Policy and the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances.[17]

91. During years of settlement negotiations with UBS, UBS made requests for documentation relating to the Funds' assets as of February 2009 and any subsequent transfer or dissipation. *See* Ex. 13, Bk. Dkt. No. 1345, at 10 (Nov. 6, 2020). In response, Dondero, Ellington, and their lieutenants repeatedly lied to UBS, stating such documentation was limited or did not exist, that CDO Fund and SOHC were "ghost funds," that "had no assets left, but if there was a settlement, that Mr. Dondero could come up with funds from some other source to satisfy a relatively small settlement on behalf of those funds." *See, e.g.*, Ex. 87, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1738891 ("I know that UBS is aware of this situation and I know Andy Clubok knows of this situation because ***I have personally discussed it with him several dozen times***. Including as recently as this year.") (emphasis added); Ex. 103, Ellington Subpoena (Mar. 1, 2022); Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 83:15-84:24 (Ellington did not disclose the ATE Policy to UBS's counsel or the Bankruptcy Court); Ex. 120, Leventon Dep. at 150:25-152:4, 268:4-20 (Leventon did not disclose the ATE Policy to UBS, the Independent Board, or HCM's bankruptcy counsel).[18]

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[17] Indeed, Dondero and Ellington's lieutenants even went as far as to disclaim any knowledge of Sentinel's relationship with HCM. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 89, Email from G. Demo, at UBSPROD3603372 (Feb. 9, 2021) (DiOrio, a director of Sentinel at the time, lies in response to a question from Demo requesting visibility into Sentinel's ownership and purpose, "It is a non-debtor, non-affiliate reinsurance company and I do not know who or how it is owned.").

[18] Neither did Dondero, [redacted], and their lieutenants disclose to the Independent Board that HFP, SOHC, and CDO Fund were insured for up to $100 million under the ATE Policy when representing that they were insolvent. *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 133:3-10, 137:15-138:11 [redacted] Ex. 124, Sevilla Dep. at

92. It was only on or about February 10, 2021, after Dondero's and Ellington's removal, that the Independent Board first shared with UBS the existence of the ATE Policy and APA, revealing for the first time the clandestine scheme to frustrate the Judgment and defraud UBS. *See* Ex. 90, HCM and UBS Settlement Agreement, at 2 (acknowledging disclosure of ATE Policy).

C. The 2019 Fraudulent Conveyance To Sebastian Clarke

93. Just a month after the court found the Funds liable in the Underlying Action, Dondero and Ellington, through their lieutenants, sought to drain Sentinel of the remaining 2017 Transferred Assets.

94. In a single day on December 31, 2019, DiOrio and Sevilla forced through the transfer of $35,201,589 of the 2017 Transferred Assets to Sebastian Clarke—yet another Cayman Island entity Dondero and Ellington owned and controlled.[19] *See* Ex. 82, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000638651 (Mar. 19, 2020) (Sevilla requests that the directors of Sebastian Clarke, John Cullinane and David Egglishaw, "review a matter for approval today" involving a transfer of assets "Sentinel currently marks at zero and which Sentinel would propose to transfer to Sebastian Clarke for minimal consideration"); *id*. at BC SEN0000638650 (DiOrio notes that "[a]ll we need is an email consent to the transfer and we will have it documented later this week"); Ex. 60, Email from J. Venza, at HCMUBS003785 (Sept, 5, 2018) (attaching Offshore Fund Structure Chart) (reflecting Dondero and Ellington's ownership interests in various entities, including Sebastian

278:20-279:3 (Sevilla did not disclose the ATE Policy to the Independent Board); Ex. 86, Email from I. Leventon, at UBSPROD1706963 (Aug. 5, 2020) (Leventon did not disclose the ATE Policy when representing that "HFP (the parent of SOHC) and CDO Fund both informed their investors in 2009 that they had zero net asset value," and that, after personally tracking down SOHC's and CDO Fund's assets, "both portfolio assets are illiquid unless the underlying PE positions are sold").

[19] Sentinel later told UBS that Sebastian Clarke returned the assets.

Clarke); Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 109:22-110:21 [redacted]

95. In exchange for the assets it sent Sebastian Clarke, Sentinel received just ***$3***, even though the assets included two promissory notes from the 2017 Transferred Assets with a face value of over $35 million—notes from entities Dondero confirmed had the ability to pay.[20] *See* Ex. 99, Asset Transfer Agreement, at UBSPROD020571 (Dec. 31, 2019); Ex. 114, Dondero Dep. at 333:5-16 (confirming that Dugaboy has the solvency to pay off the Dugaboy promissory note); Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 190:1-6 [redacted]

96. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 293:1-16. But, on the face of the $32,800,000 promissory note from CLO HoldCo, no interest is due until maturity in 2025. Ex. 54, Email from L. Thompson, at Ex. A (attaching Assignment Agreement). [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 295:14-296:21.

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[20] Though within his power, Dondero has done nothing to cause these two promissory notes to be paid to Sentinel. Dondero is the sole beneficiary of the Dugaboy Investment Trust, and he has admitted that his sister, the trustee, [redacted] Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 62:19-63:16; *see also* Ex. 114, Dondero Dep. at 280:7-21. [redacted] Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 245:21-246:8, 248:15-21. [redacted] *Id.* at 240:22-25.

97. [redacted] Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 109:22-110:13. But only DiOrio deemed these assets "worthless;" Sentinel did not have the assets independently valued. Ex. 82, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000638649, -51 (DiOrio characterizing the assets transferred to Sebastian Clarke as "worthless" but admitting that Sentinel did not have the assets formally valued). And Beecher had "no way of confirming" the value of the assets because "Sentinel had no documents" on the assets' value. Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 281:17-282:2. In fact, DiOrio only advised Beecher of the transfer months after the agreement's execution. *See* Ex. 82, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000638649 (DiOrio forwarding the agreement to Beecher on March 19, 2020, "Not sure if I ever sent this to you guys. Sale of worthless assets agreement").

IV. DONDERO AND ELLINGTON USE THE 2017 TRANSFERRED ASSETS AS A PIGGY BANK

98. Dondero and Ellington exercised their control over Sentinel to enrich themselves using cash at Sentinel that was originally transferred with, or generated by, the 2017 Transferred Assets. This diminished the fraudulently transferred assets at Sentinel, all of which should have been available to UBS to satisfy the judgment.[21]

A. The 2019-2021 Voidable Transfers To Dondero And Ellington

99. In the months after the November 2019 Phase I Decision and Order, Dondero and Ellington spent, transferred, and otherwise dissipated the 2017 Transferred Assets. They did this in two main ways.

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[21] On September 1, 2022, UBS entered into a final settlement agreement with Sentinel, whereby, among other terms, Sentinel agreed to transfer to UBS what remained at Sentinel of the 2017 Transferred Assets, and UBS agreed to count those assets toward satisfaction of the Judgment. *See* Ex. 25, Partial Satisfaction-Piece for Post-Judgment Interest (Feb. 1, 2023).

100. *First*, Ellington charged the ATE Policy for ludicrous personal expenses, unrelated "business development" expenses meant to develop business for other Dondero- and Ellington-entities, and unrelated litigation funding expenses (collectively, and as set forth *infra* ¶¶ 103-112, the "Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements").

101. *Second*, Dondero, Ellington, and their lieutenants arranged for "dividend" transfers from Sentinel to Dondero and Ellington's holding companies, Mainspring and Montage. *See infra* ¶¶ 113-119.

102. Each of these transfers was made for no consideration and was purely to transfer the 2017 Transferred Assets parked at Sentinel to Dondero and Ellington and away from UBS.

1. The 2019-2020 Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements

103. Ellington received several direct cash transfers that funded his high-flying party lifestyle and supposed attempts to drum up non-Sentinel business—expenses unrelated to the ATE Policy or to Sentinel at all.

104. On December 16, 2019, Ellington submitted for reimbursement $21,557.04 in expenses for travel to Los Angeles, New York City, and Chicago. *See* Ex. 74, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000712799 (Dec. 17, 2019). DiOrio forwarded the expense to Beecher Carlson with instructions to reimburse pursuant to the ATE Policy with no further explanation to justify why they qualified as "risk mitigation" expenses under the ATE Policy. *Id.* Beecher made the reimbursement without question. Ex. 76, Email from CIBC Bank, at BC SEN0000004342-43 (Dec. 20, 2019).

105. On December 19, 2019, Ellington submitted for reimbursement $318,934.88 in expenses for a single day in Austin and seven days in Las Vegas during December 11-17, 2019, all of which Sentinel reimbursed as "business development." *See* Ex. 75, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN0000663342 (Dec. 20, 2019) (attaching Ellington Dec. 19 Expense Report).

Among the expenses were $42,324 in charges from a *single night* at Sapphire, a Las Vegas strip club,[22] $97,706.19 at nightclub OMNIA, and $157,855.47 at the Wynn casino and hotel in Las Vegas. Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 368:16-373:2; Ex. 75, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN00000663344 (attaching Ellington Dec. 19 Expense Report).

106. Ellington [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 369:6-18. [redacted] *See id.* at 370:15-371:10.

107. The $150,000+ Ellington spent at the Wynn Hotel was purportedly related to a trial in Lake Las Vegas. Ellington explained [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 373:10-374:15. But according to public court records, Ellington and Sevilla's trial in Lake Las Vegas was in ***August and September*** 2019 for ***HCM***-affiliated entity "LLV Holdco." *See* Ex. 70, Email from J. Sevilla, at UBSPROD2708622 (Sept. 13, 2019) (reflecting Sevilla and Ellington stayed at the Wynn Hotel during a seven-week trial on behalf of LLV Holdco); *see generally* Ex. 3, Docket Excerpts, *LLV Holdco LLC v. James Coyne*, No. A-17-749387 (Jan. 8, 2023) (case docket does not reflect any trial dates during December 2019).

108. On January 30, 2020, Ellington instructed DiOrio to submit reimbursement requests totaling $78,841.93 for Ellington's personal trips to London and Paris with his girlfriend Stephanie Archer as "Risk Mitigation" expenses under the ATE Policy. Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins (Feb. 6, 2020) (attaching Ellington January Expense Report). For instance, in a December 12, 2019

[22] When Beecher asked questions about the Sapphire expenses, DiOrio simply stated that "this is how [HCM] do[es] business." *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 101:7-102:2.

email exchange planning for the trip, Archer wrote to Ellington, "I would love to do Christmas Eve Dinner at Claridge's." Ex. 72, Email from S. Ellington, at UBSPROD460936 (Dec. 12, 2019). Sure enough, on December 24, 2019, Ellington recorded a $2,629.26 charge to the ATE Policy for "Risk Mitigation" at Claridge's. Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000727324 (attaching Ellington January 30 Expense Report). Ellington and Archer similarly enjoyed visits to the Park Chinois ($4,155.66) and Sexy Fish restaurants ($716.75), as well as a jaunt to the Four Seasons in Paris ($8,089.44). *Id*. Each of these were billed as "Risk Mitigation" expenses. *Id*. When faced with this damning documentary evidence, Ellington admitted [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 365:6-10.

109. Also in January 2020, Ellington instructed DiOrio to submit reimbursement requests totaling more than $140,000 for a trip to Toronto that lasted less than a week. Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000727325; Ex. 77, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000713384-87 (Jan. 2, 2020). But Ellington could not keep his story straight as to why Sentinel should pay the bill. Although Ellington directed DiOrio to expense the $43,353.54 for his private jet travel to Toronto as purely for "work . . . on settlement for the ATE matter," Ex. 77, Email from M. DiOrio, at BC SEN0000713384-87, he also submitted the $97,492.82 he spent while in Toronto for a mix of "risk mitigation" and "business development" expenses. Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000727324, -26 (attaching Ellington January Expense Report).[23] Despite the conflicting justifications, [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 366:19-368:11.

[23] Like his other trips, while in Toronto, Ellington spent more than $20,000 at the Shangri-La Hotel and $18,292.60 at Goldie, a nightclub. *See* Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000727325, (attaching Ellington January Expense Report).

110. Next, on March 12, 2020, Ellington's secretary Sarah Goldsmith submitted a reimbursement request for another London trip costing $273,662.82 for around six days of purported "travel & business meetings related to Sentinel." *See* Ex. 81, Email from A. Damien, at BC SEN0000777547 (Mar. 16, 2020) (attaching Ellington March Expense Report). Those expenses included three $6,000+ airfares for Kristen Leonardelli, Sara Leonardelli, and Julia Masiello—three people who appear to be unaffiliated with Sentinel. *Id.* at BC SEN0000777513-15. And again, on one day in London, Ellington spent $75,914.86 at two restaurants and a night club. *Id.* at BC SEN0000777506.

111. Sentinel reimbursed every single Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursement that Ellington submitted. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 65:19-24. [redacted] *See* Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 264:5-265:1 [redacted] *Id.* at 19:9-16. And as long as Dondero and Ellington said the expenses were appropriate, Sentinel reimbursed them. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 104:22-105:2 (Q . . . [The expense] is . . . appropriate because the UBOs said it was appropriate? . . . A To my knowledge, yes.").

112. Beecher also "had no choice other than to follow the direction of the directors" no matter the expense. *See id.* at 85:11-86:8; *see also* Ex. 80, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000727319 (processing fraudulent Ellington expenses). Beecher understood that even if it had pushed back, it "would have had no choice other" than to follow the instructions of DiOrio and other individuals controlled by Dondero and Ellington. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 85:22-86:5. In the end, Beecher understood Dondero and Ellington "called the shots," and it never pushed back on any Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursement requests even when Beecher internally

questioned their legitimacy. *Id.* at 24:13-25:13; Ex. 75, Email from T. Adamczak, at BC SEN0000663342 (confirming that Beecher pushed through an expense despite "question[ing] how much 'business development' is actually being done"); Ex. 79, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000713829 (June 1, 2020) (expensing private jet as a risk mitigation expense but noting internally, "I think it's a little excessive, but who am I to say. . .").

2. The 2020-2021 Fraudulent "Dividends" To Mainspring And Montage

113. From 2020-2021, Dondero and Ellington extracted millions from Sentinel that should have been payable to UBS to satisfy the Phase I Judgment through "dividends" to Mainspring and Montage. At the time, Dondero owned 99.5% of Mainspring and Ellington owned 99% of Montage, *see* Ex. 68, Email from C. Price, at DISCEN0008408, -8410 (attaching Sentinel Structure Ownership Chart). They only revealed their near-complete ownership of Mainspring and Montage—and thus Sentinel—after CIMA regulators warned that the complexity of Sentinel's prior ownership structure "could impede effective regulatory judgment," Ex. 45, Email from A. Devins, at BC SEN0000133653 (Mar. 22, 2018).

114. On April 24, 2020, Sentinel transferred a total of $6.4 million to Mainspring and Montage, $4,480,000.00 to Mainspring as payment of Dondero's 70% share of the dividend and $1,920,000.00 to Montage as Ellington's 30% share of the dividend. *See* Ex. 101, CIBC Bank Statement, at BC SEN0000598154 (Apr. 30, 2020); Ex. 84, Email from CIBC, at BC SEN0000004334 (Apr. 24, 2020) (attaching wire transfer to Mainspring); Ex. 85, Email from CIBC, at BC SEN0000004242-43 (Apr. 24, 2020) (attaching wire transfer to Montage).

115. Despite DiOrio's commitment that Sentinel would "not be entertaining any dividend issuance while the ATE policy is active," Ex. 62, Email from J. Arbeit, at DISCSEN0006464-65 (Oct. 3, 2018) (Beecher advising that issuance of dividends to Dondero and Ellington "would decrease the cash position below the amount of the loss reserves"), this dividend

payment occurred ***after*** the court entered the Phase I Judgment. Sentinel's own manager could not explain the basis for this dividend distribution. *See* Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 210:3-211:10.

116. [redacted] *See* Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 196:8-197:3. [redacted] *Id.* at 195:12-25. [redacted] *Id.* at 196:8-21, 238:25-239:12; *see also id.* at 224:20-225:12 [redacted]

117. On January 12, 2021, a year after the Phase I Judgment, Dondero and Ellington repeated the same play: they moved another $2.5 million to themselves by sending $1,750,000.00 to Mainspring and $750,000.00 to Montage. *See* Ex. 102, CIBC Bank Statement, at BC SEN0000610180 (Jan. 29, 2021). This violated not only Sentinel's commitment against dividend issuance while the ATE Policy was in effect, but also CIMA's policy requiring that it receive notice before a dividend was issued. Ex. 95, CIMA Statement of Guidance, at 4.2.1 (Jan. 2014). When Sentinel finally provided notice of the dividend issuance to CIMA three months later, it obscured the retroactive nature of the request by noticing a future "dividend ***to be declared and paid***." Ex. 91, Email from G. Pereira, at BC SEN0000083961 (Apr. 27, 2021).

118. [redacted] *See* Ex. 111, DiOrio Dep. at 196:22-197:1. Ultimately, Dondero and Ellington had "the ultimate responsibility of [Sentinel] meeting capital and solvency requirements." Ex. 106, Beecher Dep. at 21:2-22:9, 23:25-24:25.

119. [redacted].[24] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 126:12-21. [redacted] *See id.*

B. The 2020 Voidable Transfer To Pay Bonuses In Violation Of The Bankruptcy Court Order

1. Dondero And Ellington Make Bonus Payments Blocked By The Bankruptcy Court

120. During its bankruptcy, HCM requested that the Bankruptcy Court allow it to pay all employee bonuses. Ex. 4, Bk. Dkt. No. 177, at 1 (Dec. 4, 2019). The Bankruptcy Court rejected bonus payments to four "statutory insiders": Ellington; Leventon; Frank Waterhouse, former HCM CFO; and Thomas Surgent, former HCM Chief of Compliance, *see* Ex. 7, Bk. Dkt. No. 380, at 2-3 (Jan. 22, 2020) (order approving payment only for "Covered employees"); *see also* Ex. 17, Bk. Dkt. No. 2423, at 118-19 (June 8, 2021) (transcript of Jan. 21, 2020 hearing excluding four "statutory insiders" from the "Covered employees").

121. [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 60:22-61:8 [redacted]; *id.* at 216:7-217:11 [redacted]; *id.* at 126:12-21 [redacted]; *id.* at 129:5-24 [redacted]

[24] Ellington disputed [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 125:3-17. At the time of the payments to Dondero and Ellington, Sentinel called them "dividends" and this Petition adopts that term.

[redacted] Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 126:7-25, 127:9-18, 128:19-129:15 [redacted]

122. [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 56:21-24, 59:7-60:7, 60:22-61:8, 217:12-24; *see also* Ex. 120, Leventon Dep. at 29:3-31:11 (conceding Leventon received some of the blocked bonus payments from NexPoint).[30]

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[25] ***NexBank Capital, Inc.*** ("NexBank") is majority owned by Dondero. *See* Ex. 100, HCM Affiliate Organizational Chart. [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 56:21-24, 217:12-217:23.

[26] ***NexPoint Advisors, L.P.*** ("NexPoint"), with general partner NexPoint Advisors GP, LLC, is 100% owned by Dondero. *See* Ex. 100, HCM Affiliate Organizational Chart. [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 217:12-24; *id.* at 56:19-24.

[27] ***Highland Funds Asset Management, L.P.***, with general partner Strand Advisors XVI, Inc., is 100% owned by James Dondero. *See* Ex. 100, HCM Affiliate Organizational Chart (July 2019); *see also* Ex. 94 Highland Funds Asset Management Relationship, at UBSPROD1824596 (Feb. 18, 2011) (clarifying that Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P. was formerly known as Highland Funds Asset Management, L.P.).

[28] [redacted] *See* Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 215:2-9.

[29] The ***Charitable DAF Fund, L.P.***, is indirectly controlled by Dondero, as described *supra* ¶¶ 12, 56, and was funded with his own assets, his family trusts, and HCM. *See* Ex. 18, Bk. Dkt. No. 2660, at 2 (Aug. 4, 2021) (CLO HoldCo Contempt Order).

[30] At times, the contributing entities, such as Mainspring and NexPoint, made these payments to or created these consulting agreements directly with entities owned by or affiliated with Surgent, Waterhouse, and Leventon. *See* Ex. 19, Bk. Dkt. No. 2856 ¶ 32 (Sept. 21, 2021) (stipulation that Surgent received $750,906.13 from Tall Pine, $1,887,929.00 from Mainspring, and $135,437.00 from NexPoint).

123. [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 214:7-18. [redacted] *See id.* [redacted] *See id.* at 59:12-60:2. [redacted] *id.* at 60:10-16, Ellington kept the amounts that remained after it paid out the other claims.

124. The objective was to create the appearance of legitimate business dealings to conceal Dondero and Ellington's true purpose of funneling cash to senior leaders to thwart the Bankruptcy Court's freeze on bonus payments. But such "consulting agreements" were fraudulent because the "consultants" performed no other work on top of the services already being performed by those individuals as employees of HCM, and in certain instances some of the employees did no work for certain contributing entities. For example, Ellington used distributions from Sentinel to Mainspring to pay Waterhouse's HCM bonus—[redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 226:1-13.

125. [redacted] *Id.* at 54:11-24, 215:21-23, 216:7-15; Ex. 115, Dondero Dep. at 133:13-15. He also worked with Waterhouse, the Chief Financial Officer at HCM for more than decade, [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 213:8-215:1; Ex. 20, Bk. Dkt. No 2940 ¶ 1 (Oct. 19, 2021).

126. Under these fraudulent consulting agreements, Ellington, Surgent, Waterhouse, and Leventon received[31] roughly $8,638,536.07 in 2020, including about $5,874,203.21 from Mainspring.[32]

- Ellington received $3,074,408. *See* Ex. 15, Bk. Claim No. 244 (Mar. 23, 2021) (Ellington's amended claim for $3,074,408.16 in bonus payments).
- Surgent received $2,774,272. Ex. 19, Bk. Dkt. No. 2856 ¶ 32 (Motion for Entry of Order, reflecting Surgent's claim for $2,774,272.13 in bonus payments).
- Waterhouse received $2,102,260. Ex. 8, Bk. Claim No. 182, at 2 (May 26, 2020) (Waterhouse's claim for $2,102,260.99 in bonus payments).
- Leventon received $687,594. Ex. 14, Bk. Claim No. 216 Rider 3, at 3 (Mar. 3, 2021) (Leventon's amended claim for $687,594.79 in bonus payments).

2. Ellington And Others Defraud The Bankruptcy Court By Filing Claims Seeking Bonuses Already Procured By Fraud

127. Despite having received cash intended to replace the bonuses the Bankruptcy Court denied, Waterhouse, Leventon, Surgent, and Ellington filed proofs of claim that included the amounts already secured through these illicit payments. Ex. 8, Bk. Claim No. 182 (Waterhouse's claim for $2,102,260.99); Ex. 9, Bk. Claim No. 183 (May 26, 2020) (Surgent's claim for $3,958,628.14); Ex. 14, Bk. Claim No. 216 (Leventon's amended claim for $687,594.79); Ex. 15, Bk. Claim No. 244 (Ellington's amended claim for $3,074,408.16). After Waterhouse, Leventon,

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[31] [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 211:5-213:14.

[32] Upon HCM's discovery of some of the illicit payments, Surgent disclosed the full scheme and revealed that Mainspring had contributed 68% of his total bonus payments. Ex. 19, Bk. Dkt. No. 2856 ¶ 32. [redacted] Ex. 117, Ellington Dep. at 225:11-18. Thus, about $5,874,203.21 of these illicit bonus payments came through Mainspring from Sentinel.

and Ellington left HCM, each of them joined Skyview Group ("Skyview"),[33] an entity Ellington owns. They assigned their claims to CPCM LLC ("CPCM"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Skyview. *See* Ex. 116, Ellington Dep. at 38:23-45:21; Ex. 120, Leventon Dep. at 56:24-57:2. CPCM ultimately withdrew both Leventon's and Ellington's claims because of objections.

128. In January 2021, HCM entered into stipulations with Surgent and Waterhouse that ostensibly resolved their claims. The Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement in February 2021. But before any payment could occur, the Independent Board uncovered evidence of the above-described sizable payments from entities owned by Dondero and Ellington and filed a motion to reconsider the stipulation on account of the uncovered fraud. Ex. 19, Bk. Dkt. No. 2856 ¶¶ 26-35; Ex. 20, Bk. Dkt. No. 2940 ¶¶ 24-27. After HCM presented this evidence to the Bankruptcy Court, Surgent agreed to apply payments already received against his claim. Ex. 19, Bk. Dkt. No. 2856 ¶¶ 36-39. CPCM, however, fought the motion, and Waterhouse moved to quash a subpoena sent by HCM as imposing an undue burden on a third party. Ex. 21, Bk. Dkt. No. 3191 ¶ 5. Ultimately, CPCM and Waterhouse agreed to a settlement and withdrew the claim against HCM for bonus amounts. Ex. 22, Bk. Dkt. No. 3317 ¶ 18 (Mar. 24, 2022).

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[33] Skyview also hired DiOrio, [redacted]. *See* Ex. 110, DiOrio Dep. at 12:11-12; Ex. 119, Irving Dep. at 10:2-24; Ex. 128, Vitiello Dep. 64:6-65:4. Skyview has around 30 to 40 employees, "almost all ex-Highland Capital Management employees." Ex. 120, Leventon Dep. at 55:23-56:18. Leventon testified that, at the time, it operated out of the same offices as NexBank and NexPoint, *id.*, entities that Dondero fully controls, *see supra* ¶ 122, nn.25-26.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

I. CLAIM I: TURNOVER PREDICATED ON FRAUDULENT AND VOIDABLE CONVEYANCES AGAINST CLO HOLDCO, ELLINGTON, MAINSPRING, AND MONTAGE (CPLR 5225(B))

A. New York's Former Fraudulent Conveyance Law (Effective Through April 3, 2020)

129. The former version of New York Debtor & Creditor Law ("DCL") § 276[34] sets forth a clear standard for finding and voiding intentional fraudulent conveyances. It provides, "[e]very conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent . . . to hinder, delay, defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." DCL 276 (2019).

130. Because "fraudulent intent, by its very nature, is rarely susceptible to direct proof," it "must be established by inference from the circumstances surrounding the allegedly fraudulent act." *Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Midland Ave. Assocs., LLC*, 820 F. Supp. 2d 510, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

131. To establish fraudulent intent under the earlier DCL 276, courts look to "badges of fraud," which are "circumstances so commonly associated with fraudulent transfers 'that their presence gives rise to an inference of intent.'" *Wall St. Assocs. v. Brodsky*, 257 A.D.2d 526, 529 (1st Dep't 1999).

132. These "badges of fraud" include:

(1) a close relationship between the parties to the transaction,

(2) a secret and hasty transfer not in the usual course of business,

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[34] The former version of DCL 276, which was in effect through April 3, 2020, applies to all fraudulent conveyances that occurred through that date. James Gadsden & Alan Kolod, Supplemental Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 12, Debtor and Creditor Law Ch. 12, Art. 10 (explaining that the amended DCL "became effective on April 4, 2020, and applies to transfers and incurrences effected on or after that date").

(3) inadequacy of consideration,

(4) the transferor's knowledge of the creditor's claim and his or her inability to pay it,

(5) the use of dummies or fictitious parties, and

(6) retention of control of the property by the transferor after the conveyance.

Matter of Shelly v. Doe, 249 A.D.2d 756, 758 (3d Dep't 1998).

133. In addition, "when a transfer has been made for no consideration, the courts recognize a rebuttable presumption of insolvency and fraudulent transfer." *Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Wimbledon Fund, SPC*, 2016 WL 7440844, at *4-6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 22, 2016) (applying CPLR 5225 turnover principles to DCL 276).

B. <u>The 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance To CLO HoldCo</u>

134. Paragraphs 1-133 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated here.

135. On December 23, 2010, CDO Holding transferred its entire portfolio of assets to CLO HoldCo for only a little cash and a note with no principal or interest payments due for fifteen years. *See supra* ¶¶ 51, 59. Because CDO Holding was an alter ego of HFP, this transfer of assets was made by an entity of which UBS was a current or future creditor.

136. The circumstances surrounding the transaction, [redacted] explain the real reason for a trade that otherwise did not make sense. *See supra* ¶ 53. Indeed, the trade bore many of the quintessential "badges of fraud" that reveal it was a fraudulent conveyance.

137. ***A Close Relationship Between The Parties To The Transaction:*** CDO Holding and CLO HoldCo were each controlled by Dondero, also the ultimate controlling shareholder of

each of the Judgment Debtors. On an internal compliance report, Dondero signed as the "gatekeeper" for both entities. *See supra* ¶ 57.

138. ***A Secret And Hasty Transfer Not In The Usual Course Of Business:*** Despite Dondero justifying the transfer for "liquidity," CDO Holding transferred substantially *all* of its assets in exchange for consideration that was in large part a note that was not payable for *fifteen years*. There was also no negotiation of any kind; the rushed terms were set based on just a single valuation, prompting concern from an HCM employee. And CDO Holding recorded no sales to any other entity in 2010. *See* Ex. 96, CDO Holding Balance Sheet, at UBSPROD4957189, tab "200.3 CDO BS." This was not a transfer "in the usual course of business." *See supra* ¶¶ 58-59.

139. In addition, the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance was "hasty": it was executed just days after CLO HoldCo, the receiving entity, was created in the Cayman Islands for the purpose of receiving these assets. *See supra* ¶¶ 55, 57.

140. ***Inadequacy Of Consideration:*** The inadequacy of the consideration underscores how brazen this transfer was. Rather than receiving nearly $40 million in cash for the CLOs on the open market, CLO HoldCo sold the assets to another Dondero-controlled entity for consideration that was, in large part, a note not payable for fifteen years. *See supra* ¶ 59.

141. ***The Use Of Dummies Or Fictitious Parties:*** Although not a "fictitious" party, CLO HoldCo was set up specifically to carry out *this* fraudulent conveyance. *See supra* ¶ 55.

142. ***Retention Of The Property After The Conveyance:*** Dondero, ultimately controlled CDO Holding (through HFP) and CLO HoldCo. After Dondero personally funded a portion of the consideration for the transfer, Dondero's close ally Grant Scott oversaw the parent structure that housed CDO Holding's former assets at CLO HoldCo. *See supra* ¶¶ 56-57.

143. The Court should void the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance, enter judgment against CLO HoldCo for the value of the transferred assets, and award UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this special proceeding. *See* DCL 276-A (2019).

C. The Ellington Reimbursements Were Fraudulent Conveyances

144. Paragraphs 1-143 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated here.

145. The hundreds of thousands of dollars that Ellington spent on lavish personal vacations and questionable "business development" expenses were in fact assets to which UBS was entitled based on its status as a creditor—indeed, the largest creditor—of the Judgment Debtors.

146. The transactions that led to the "reimbursements" occurred in two steps: (i) move the assets from the Judgment Debtors to Sentinel, and then (ii) move the assets from Sentinel to Ellington.

147. New York's fraudulent conveyance law protects judgment creditors against exactly these kinds of fraudulent conveyances, which used Judgment Debtor assets to pay for the lifestyle expenses of those who controlled those Judgment Debtors. For these reasons, the badges of fraud are readily apparent from the Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements.

148. ***A Close Relationship Between The Parties To The Transaction:*** Ellington did not just have a close relationship to the other parties in the transaction, he created the transaction and controlled it from all sides. As Dondero's trusted lieutenant, Ellington is the one who proposed moving the assets away from the Transferors and sending them to Sentinel's Cayman Islands accounts—accounts over which Ellington had a 30% stake as one of the ultimate beneficial owners. *See supra* ¶¶ 78, 80. Once Dondero and Ellington had the assets tucked away offshore, Ellington was one of the two people who "called the shots" about Sentinel and the use of the assets. *See supra* ¶ 80. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] *See supra* ¶ 81.

149. ***A Secret And Hasty Transfer Not In The Usual Course Of Business:*** DiOrio unquestioningly submitted hundreds of thousands of dollars in Ellington's highly questionable charges without receiving from Ellington, or providing to Beecher, *any* legitimate business justification for the massive costs. *See supra* ¶¶ 103-112.

150. ***Inadequacy Of Consideration:*** There was no consideration provided for these expenses—Sentinel never got any benefit, a single new client, or a single new dollar, in exchange for the $833,843.05 it provided Ellington in travel, fine dining, and partying reimbursements. *See supra* ¶¶ 103-112.

151. ***The Transferor's Knowledge Of The Creditor's Claim And His Or Her Inability To Pay It:*** Ellington and DiOrio knew of UBS's Judgment and understood the 2017 Transferred Assets should go to UBS to pay that Judgment—their own legal advisors at Solomon Harris told them as much. *See supra* ¶ 72. They distributed the assets through the Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements anyway.

152. The Court should void the Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements and award UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this special proceeding. *See* DCL 276-A (2019).

D. <u>New York's Current Voidable Transactions Law (Effective April 4, 2020)</u>

153. On April 4, 2020, New York replaced its former fraudulent conveyance statute. *See* James Gadsden & Alan Kolod, Supplemental Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 12, Debtor and Creditor Law Ch. 12, Art. 10 (explaining that the amended DCL "became effective on April 4, 2020, and applies to transfers and incurrences effected on or after that date").

154. The newly enacted statute addresses "voidable transactions" instead of "fraudulent conveyances." Substantively, however, much of the voidable transactions law remains the same. For instance, DCL 273(a)(1) provides that a transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the debtor made the transfer, if made "with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor." DCL 273(a)(1) (2020).

155. The statute defines "Debtor" to include any "person that is liable on a claim." DCL 270(f). The statute provides eleven factors to weigh when determining whether a transaction is voidable (like the badges of fraud that courts consider when reviewing claims under the prior version of DCL 276). *See* DCL 273. As relevant here, these factors include, among others, whether: "the transfer or obligation was to an insider;" "the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;" "the debtor removed or concealed assets;" "the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;" and "the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred." DCL 273(b).

E. The April 2020 And January 2021 "Dividends" To Mainspring And Montage Were Voidable Conveyances

156. Paragraphs 1-155 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated here.

157. Like the Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements, the multi-million-dollar "dividends" that Dondero and Ellington sent themselves through Sentinel were the final step in the process to move Judgment Debtor assets away from UBS and to themselves. They are voidable under New York's 2020 Debtor and Creditor Law.

158. ***The Transfers Were To Insiders:*** Dondero and Ellington "called the shots" at the Judgment Debtors as well as Sentinel, and the payments to Mainspring and Montage were payments to Dondero and Ellington as Sentinel's ultimate beneficial owners. *See supra* ¶¶ 112,

114; DCL 273(b)(1); *see also* DCL 270(h)(2)(iii) (defining "Insider" to include "a person in control of the debtor"). Sentinel made the payments even after Sentinel's directors determined the insurer would not pay any dividends while the ATE Policy was active. *See supra* ¶¶ 115-116.

159. ***The Transfers Were For Insufficient Consideration:*** The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances from the Judgment Debtors were for insufficient consideration. The 2020 and 2021 transfers from Sentinel to Dondero and Ellington in their capacity as "shareholders" were for no consideration. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 116.

160. ***The April 2020 Transfer Occurred Shortly After A Substantial Debt Was Incurred:*** The court entered the Phase I Judgment shortly before the April 2020 transfers. At the time, Dondero and Ellington understood—because Solomon Harris warned them—that the court may order Sentinel to return all of the 2017 Transferred Assets to UBS in a fraudulent conveyance action like this one. *See supra* ¶ 72; *see also* DCL 273(b)(10).

161. The Court should void the dividends to Mainspring and Montage and award UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with this special proceeding. *See* DCL 276-A (2020).

II. CLAIM II: TURNOVER PREDICATED ON ALTER EGO LIABILITY AGAINST DONDERO, ELLINGTON, AND CDO HOLDING (CPLR 5225(B))

162. Paragraphs 1-161 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated here.

163. To establish an alter ego claim, a plaintiff must show (i) that the defendant exercised "complete domination of the corporation . . . in respect to the transaction attacked," and (ii) "that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff's injury." *Baby Phat Holding Co. v Kellwood Co.*, 123 A.D.3d 405, 407 (1st Dep't 2014).

164. The first element—domination or control—can involve many factors, including the disregard of corporate formalities; inadequate capitalization; intermingling of funds; overlap in ownership, officers, directors, and personnel; common office space or telephone numbers; the degree of discretion demonstrated by the allegedly dominated corporation; whether dealings between the parties involved were at arm's length; whether the dominated corporation was treated as independent profit center; and the payment or guaranty of the corporation's debts by the dominating entity. *See Fantazia Int'l Corp. v CPL Furs N.Y., Inc.*, 67 A.D.3d 511, 512 (1st Dep't 2009). No one factor is dispositive. *Id.*

165. As to the second element—using control to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff—a scheme to render an entity judgment-proof is one of the classic examples justifying alter ego liability. *See, e.g.*, *Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. 264 Water St. Assocs.*, 174 A.D.2d 504, 505 (1st Dep't 1991) (allegations that defendants "masterminded a scheme to denude the subsidiary of its assets in order to render it unable to honor its obligations resulting in a loss to plaintiff" held sufficient).

166. If a defendant or respondent qualifies as an alter ego, it becomes liable for the full amount of the outstanding judgment against its alter ego. *See* Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 5 ("alter ego liability makes HFP liable for satisfying the judgment against SOHC").

A. Dondero And Ellington Were Each Alter Egos Of The Judgment Debtors

167. Dondero and Ellington exercised complete control over the Judgment Debtors and used that control to defraud UBS. As a matter of equity, this Court should pierce the corporate veils of HFP, CDO Fund, and SOHC and hold that Dondero and Ellington—as the individuals ultimately responsible for the Judgment Debtors' harm to UBS—are their alter egos and thus personally liable for the Judgment.

1. Dondero And Ellington Dominated The Judgment Debtors

168. Applying the factors that New York courts consider when determining whether individuals exercised "complete dominion" over their alter ego to the facts in this Petition confirms that Dondero and Ellington exercised complete dominion over the Judgment Debtors.

169. ***Disregard Of Corporate Formalities:*** Dondero and Ellington disregarded the corporate formalities of HCM, SOHC, CDO Fund, and HFP to advance their own personal interests. They facilitated transfers among these entities without even trying to provide the appearance of arm's-length bargaining. *See supra* ¶¶ 52-57. During the Underlying Action, a testifying expert detailed the substantial evidence of an alter ego relationship between Dondero and HCM, SOHC, CDO Fund, and HFP since the time of the transaction underpinning the Underlying Action, specifically noting the "lack of separateness" between the entities. *See supra* ¶ 33.

170. Through 2017, Dondero and Ellington continued to operate just as they always had done, without any regard for the corporate forms of the Judgment Debtors. For instance, in the case of the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances, one of the main benefits of the asset transfers was to help Dondero avoid a potential $50 million personal tax bill. *See supra* ¶ 64. At other times, Dondero brazenly authorized loans from the entities to himself. *See supra* ¶ 33. Dondero even altered formal control structures to increase his domination: In 2009, Dondero eliminated the requirement that HFP have independent directors and made himself the sole director of HFP—and thus the direct decision maker for HFP and its subsidiaries, including SOHC and CDO Holding. *See supra* ¶ 33.

171. Dondero and Ellington also enriched themselves through improper use of HCM employees for any entity they pleased, repeatedly ignoring corporate formalities. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 35-40.

172. The Judgment Debtors were not separate bona fide entities with distinct corporate ownership and controls—they were part of an overall structure that Dondero and Ellington unilaterally directed. Dondero was the ultimate decision maker for the Judgment Debtors. *See supra* ¶¶ 27-30, 32-33. He did not consult any board before authorizing the sale and assignment of the assets of SOHC, CDO Fund, HFP, and related entities. *See supra* ¶¶ 28-29. In fact, many of these entities did not have separate boards of directors or any sort of formal corporate structure. *See supra* ¶¶ 28, 33, 35. And Ellington, as Dondero's right-hand man, also exercised unfettered authority over the Judgment Debtors, including signatory authority and [redacted] and settlement efforts. *See supra* ¶ 31, 36.

173. Dondero and Ellington repeatedly disregarded corporate formalities by shuffling assets among entities they controlled, including the Judgment Debtors, without formal documentation. Wholly owned subsidiaries of HFP would often dividend money up to HFP and [redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 52-54. At times, these transfers also were made without formal documentation. *See supra* ¶¶ 52-53. In 2008, with a single word, Dondero and Ellington directed HFP to withdraw about $15 million from CDO Holding before directing the funds to SOHC to cover SOHC's losses. *See supra* ¶ 53.

174. Whether orders came from Dondero himself, or his proxy Ellington, the result was the same: protect the collective interests of Dondero, Ellington, and their web of entities, rather than the distinct interests (and responsibilities) of any one entity. *See supra* ¶¶ 29, 31, 34, 36-40, 49-55, 61-81.

175. ***Common Office Space:*** Dondero- and Ellington-controlled entities, including the Judgment Debtors, shared common office space and operated out of the same registered addresses, with no separation of the entities. *See supra* ¶ 35. [redacted]

See supra ¶¶ 34-37.

176. ***Deliberate Undercapitalization:*** Dondero and Ellington deliberately undercapitalized the Judgment Debtors to prevent UBS from collecting on the Judgment. *See supra* ¶¶ 49, 55-78, 93-97. In the wake of the adverse summary judgment rulings, [redacted] Dondero and Ellington ensured that the Judgment Debtors would be judgment proof by effecting the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances. *See supra* ¶¶ 61-92.

177. ***Intermingling Of Funds:*** Dondero and Ellington intermingled their funds and those of the entities they controlled. In one instance, Dondero committed HCM's cash to cover HFP's shortfalls in the face of margin calls. *See supra* ¶ 33. Dondero also used his own money to partially fund the consideration CLO HoldCo sent to CDO Holding in the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance. The testifying expert in the Underlying Action noted many additional examples of "HFP's and its subsidiaries' financial dependence on HCM," which Dondero dominated, controlled, and even funded. *See supra* ¶ 33.

178. After Dondero and Ellington combined all the assets of the Judgment Debtors (and the other Transferors) in Sentinel in 2017, they later withdrew assets for themselves or entities they controlled whenever they saw fit, both as "dividends" and improper "reimbursements." *See supra* ¶¶ 98-119.

179. ***Overlap In Ownership, Officers, And Directors:*** Dondero and Ellington owned and controlled the Judgment Debtors. Dondero co-founded HCM and held the most influential roles up and down the HCM organizational chart. Dondero held many titles under the HCM umbrella and particularly among the Judgment Debtors: He was HCM's President and Chief Executive Officer from 1993 until his removal in 2020; chairman of the Board of Directors for HFP; sole Director for SOHC; and President and ultimate General Partner for CDO Fund until his resignation in 2021. *See supra* ¶¶ 6, 27 n.3, 28-29. Ellington, always at Dondero's side, implemented Dondero's directives while maintaining discretion to make his own decisions about the entities. *See supra* ¶¶ 28, 31, 36, 39-40, 77-78. The two maintained these roles and their control over the Judgment Debtors as officers of Strand, HCM's general partner. *See supra* ¶¶ 29-31. Dondero was Strand's sole stockholder. *See supra* ¶ 29.

180. ***The Degree Of Discretion Demonstrated By The Allegedly Dominated Corporation:*** Dondero and Ellington were the decision makers for all the entities. *See supra* ¶¶ 28-34, 36, 52-54, 65, 67, 71, 77. Dondero, and Ellington as his designee, unilaterally made decisions for HCM and, through his control of HCM, controlled the Judgment Debtors as well. *See supra* ¶¶ 28-34, 36, 52-54, 65, 67, 71, 77. These decisions were not for the benefit of the individual entities but were all in service of protecting Dondero and Ellington themselves.

181. ***Whether Dealings Between The Parties Involved Were At Arm's Length:*** The key dealings at issue in this Turnover Petition, the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances, were not at arm's length. Rather, the Judgment Debtors collectively transferred all of their assets, all with different valuations, for a shared (and sham) ATE Policy that did not treat them differently based on their differing contributions to the Policy. *See supra* ¶¶ 74-76. The shared contribution—including by three non-insureds, and the shared coverage (including CDO Holding, a non-party to

the Underlying Action)—evidences that these entities were merely instruments of the broader plan to move assets out of UBS's reach. Once they shuffled the 2017 Transferred Assets out of the Judgment Debtors, Dondero and Ellington appropriated the assets for their own ends, including through personal withdrawals as dividends and reimbursements for romantic getaways. *See supra* ¶¶ 98-119.

2. Dondero And Ellington Used Their Domination Over The Judgment Debtors To Defraud And Harm UBS

182. Dondero's and Ellington's control over the Judgment Debtors enabled them to orchestrate the fraudulent acts that have directly led to UBS's harm: its difficulty collecting on the Judgment.

183. ***Use Of Corporate Funds For Personal Purposes:*** Dondero and Ellington routinely directed Judgment Debtor funds and assets to Sentinel, and ultimately to Dondero and Ellington themselves. *See supra* ¶¶ 61-81, 93-128. Dondero and Ellington diverted these funds out of Judgment Debtor hands and into Sentinel's coffers to render the Judgment Debtors judgment proof and keep the assets in Dondero and Ellington's possession, using the assets for their own ends and to fund other entities they controlled. *See supra* ¶¶ 61-81, 93-128.

184. Ellington, in particular, used Judgment Debtor assets to fund his lavish lifestyle, including tens of thousands of dollars in luxurious trips to London and Paris for him and his companions, personal meals with his girlfriend, and to reimburse his outings to bars, night clubs, and a strip club. *See supra* ¶¶ 103-110. None of these reimbursements were for any plausible business purpose—much less related to the Policy insuring against the Underlying Action—and instead were strictly for Ellington's personal expenses. *See supra* ¶¶ 103-112.

185. Dondero and Ellington also used Judgment Debtors funds in issuing Mainspring and Montage millions of dollars in "dividends," which they in turn used for their own personal

purposes. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-128 (Ellington confirming he received millions in dividends; Dondero approving the use of his dividends to make fraudulent bonus payments). Like the Ellington reimbursements and original 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances, Dondero and Ellington masterminded the dividends, showing the complete control Dondero and Ellington had over the Judgment Debtors and the later transferees of the Judgment Debtors' assets.

186. Like fraud and breaches of contract the Court identified in the Underlying Action, the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances that Dondero and Ellington orchestrated from the Judgment Debtors to Sentinel were quintessential abuses of the corporate form at UBS's expense, satisfying the second required element for alter ego liability. The Court should thus pierce the corporate veil and hold Dondero and Ellington liable for the judgment against CDO Fund, SOHC, and HFP.

B. Dondero And Ellington Were The Alter Egos Of Mainspring And Montage, Respectively

187. As a matter of equity, Dondero should be liable for the debts of Mainspring and Ellington should be liable for the debts of Montage. At the time of the fraudulent conveyances from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage, Dondero had complete control of Mainspring as its ultimate beneficial owner, and Ellington had complete control of Montage as its ultimate beneficial owner. *See supra* ¶¶ 13-14. In fact, Dondero controls 99.5% of Mainspring's assets and Ellington controls 99% of Montage's assets. *See supra* ¶ 113.

1. Dondero And Ellington Dominated Mainspring And Montage, Respectively

188. Once again applying the same alter ego factors, the evidence confirms that Dondero and Ellington exercised complete dominion over Mainspring and Montage, respectively.

189. ***Intermingling Of Funds:*** Sentinel's "dividend" payments were at the sole discretion of Dondero and Ellington in their personal capacities. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. But to pay Dondero's and Ellington's respective dividends, Sentinel transferred money not to them

directly but to Mainspring and Montage. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. Even as Beecher facilitated these payments to Mainspring and Montage, it understood that it was in fact paying dividends to Dondero and Ellington. *See supra* ¶¶ 115-118.

190. ***Overlap In Ownership:*** At the time of the fraudulent conveyances from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage, Dondero had complete control and domination of Mainspring as its ultimate beneficial owner, and Ellington had complete control and domination of Montage as its ultimate beneficial owner. *See supra* ¶¶ 13-14, 116-119. Dondero and Ellington were also the ultimate controllers of the Transferors, who sent the assets to Sentinel, and of Sentinel itself.

191. ***The Degree Of Discretion Demonstrated By The Allegedly Dominated Corporation:*** Neither Mainspring nor Montage demonstrated any discretion. Rather, Dondero and Ellington took the dividend payments that Sentinel deposited and used them for personal purposes unrelated to Mainspring and Montage. They moved the money to other entities they controlled to pay court-blocked bonuses to former *HCM* employees who were never affiliated with Mainspring and even to personally enrich Ellington. *See supra* ¶¶ 120-128. There is no indication that Mainspring or Montage had any operations or purpose other than to receive money for Dondero and Ellington.

2. Dondero And Ellington Used Their Control Of Mainspring And Montage To Defraud UBS

192. Dondero and Ellington used their complete dominion over Mainspring and Montage to take for themselves funds that should have been available to satisfy the Judgment.

193. By ordering the siphoning of millions of dollars in dividends from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage, Dondero and Ellington ensured that Sentinel would have even fewer Judgment Debtor assets to return to satisfy the Judgment. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. Dondero and Ellington forced through these dividend payments over Sentinel's express commitment that it

would "not be entertaining any dividend issuance while the ATE policy is active." *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. Dondero and Ellington's clear disregard of this commitment illustrates their abuse of their complete control over the entities.

194. Dondero and Ellington abused their control over these dummy entities by secreting assets from the Judgment Debtors and to other entities that Dondero and Ellington owned and controlled all to frustrate any claim UBS had to those funds. *See supra* ¶¶ 51-81, 93-128. The Court should pierce the corporate veil and hold Dondero and Ellington liable for the judgment against CDO Fund, SOHC, and HFP.

C. CDO Holding Is An Alter Ego Of HFP

195. When it transferred substantially all of its assets to CLO HoldCo in 2010, CDO Holding was an alter ego of Judgment Debtor HFP.

196. CDO Holding's relationship to HFP is in all material respects the same as SOHC's adjudged alter ego relationship to HFP. In its alter ego default judgment in the Underlying Action, the court held that UBS's allegations sufficiently linked SOHC and HFP as alter egos because SOHC "was HFP's instrumentality, had no independence, could not exercise any business discretion, did not have its own offices, officers or employees, and that HFP completely dominated the day-to-day operations of SOHC as well as SOHC's ***sister affiliates***." Ex. 24, Phase II Judgment, at 6 (emphasis added). The evidence shows that HFP both dominated CDO Holding and abused its control over CDO Holding to defraud UBS. The Court should reverse-pierce the corporate veil and hold CDO Holding to account for its role as a controlled asset repository for HFP.

1. HFP Dominated Its "Asset Repository" CDO Holding

197. The factors that characterized the HFP and SOHC alter ego relationship also apply to HFP and CDO Holding, one of SOHC's "sister affiliates."

198. ***Disregard Of Corporate Formalities:*** CDO Holding, under the complete control and domination of HFP, [redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 52-55.

199. ***Intermingling Of Funds:*** In 2017, CDO Holding intermingled its funds and assets with several other Dondero-controlled entities, including HFP, to pay the premium on the ATE Policy. *See supra* ¶¶ 61-78. The entities that combined their funds to pay the ATE Policy did not allocate coverage amounts according to contributions; the real goal of the ATE Policy was to move money from the Judgment Debtors and their potential alter egos to Sentinel, another entity that Dondero and Ellington owned and controlled. *See supra* ¶¶ 61-76. Moreover, CDO Holding was not a named defendant in the Underlying Action but still was an Insured because it was an alter ego of defendant HFP, and Dondero and Ellington realized that a court would determine as much. *See supra* ¶¶ 64, 75.

200. ***Overlap In Ownership, Officers, And Directors:*** Dondero was ultimately in charge of HFP and CDO Holding and was the sole director of each. *See supra* ¶¶ 28-30, 32-33, 62.

201. ***The Degree Of Discretion Demonstrated By The Allegedly Dominated Corporation:*** There is no evidence that CDO Holding ever demonstrated any discretion. Just the opposite, it saw its assets stripped for the benefit of HFP and its other subsidiaries, such as SOHC. *See supra* ¶¶ 51-53. These transfers were not arm's-length transactions; [redacted] CDO Holding also lost all of its equity assets in a single 2010 transfer conducted at the direction of HFP's controller Dondero. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-51, 55-59.

202. ***The Payment Or Guaranty Of The Corporation's Debts By The Dominating Entity:*** At other times, HFP moved money into CDO Holding to enable CDO Holding to make distributions to other creditor entities or make payments for other of HFP's subsidiaries. *See supra* ¶ 54.

2. HFP Used Its Domination Over CDO Holding To Defraud UBS

203. HFP, alongside its controller Dondero, used its control of CDO Holding to defraud UBS. In 2010, Dondero ordered a transaction to fraudulently move substantially all of CDO Holding's assets to CLO HoldCo. The portfolio was worth nearly $40 million. *See supra* ¶¶ 51, 55-60. In return, CDO Holding received scant cash and a note that was not payable until 2025. *See supra* ¶ 59.

204. The 2010 asset transfer to Dondero-controlled CLO HoldCo, which left CDO Holding and HFP without assets they could have used to satisfy the Judgment, satisfies the second element of an alter ego claim. It was a fraud against UBS that sought to prevent UBS from collecting on any eventual judgment in the underlying action.

205. The Court should thus reverse-pierce the corporate veil to find that CDO Holding was the alter ego of HFP at the time of the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance and that CDO Holding was and is liable for the HFP's portion of the Judgment.

II. CLAIM III: VIOLATIONS OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT ("RICO") BY DONDERO AND ELLINGTON (18 U.S.C. § 1962(C))

206. For the reasons set forth above, Dondero and Ellington each are alter egos of the Judgment Debtors and should be personally liable for the full outstanding amount on the Judgment. If the Court finds for UBS on Claim II, it need not reach Claims III and IV.

207. In the alternative, Dondero and Ellington are liable for treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) for the reasons below.

208. A civil RICO claim is established when there is: "(1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the violation of Section 1962." *NRO Bos. LLC v. Yellowstone Cap. LLC*, 72 Misc. 3d 267, 271 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Cnty. 2021) (quoting *DeFalco v. Bernas*, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001)). A violation of § 1962(c) requires a corresponding criminal violation of the substantive RICO statute through "seven constituent elements: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a 'pattern' (4) of 'racketeering activity' (5) directly or indirectly . . . participates in (6) an 'enterprise' (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce." *Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.*, 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). A plaintiff can establish civil damages by showing "that he was 'injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.'" *Id.* (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).

209. Dondero and Ellington are each individuals able to hold a legal or beneficial interest in property and are thus "person[s]" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1962(c).

210. Dondero and Ellington each violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by leveraging a separate and distinct enterprise that engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that harmed UBS in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

211. Dondero and Ellington, acting individually and together in concert, have orchestrated and participated in a continually running scheme dating to at least 2010 and lasting to the present. They have, among other acts, fraudulently transferred assets to individuals and companies in different states and countries in anticipation and frustration of an adverse judgment in the Underlying Action. Dondero and Ellington, through the Enterprise, conducted the predicate

acts of racketeering through interstate wires or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including by sending funds to the Cayman Islands and other international destinations.

A. The RICO Enterprise

212. Dondero and Ellington conducted these misrepresentations and frauds through an association-in-fact enterprise that comprised these nine persons and nineteen entities: Dondero and Ellington, together with Leventon, Sevilla, DiOrio, Waterhouse, Irving, Vitiello, and Surgent (the "Associates"); and CDO Fund, SOHC, HFP, HFC, CDO Opportunity Fund, CDO Holding, CLO HoldCo, Sentinel, Sebastian Clarke, Mainspring, Montage, Tall Pine, Sunshine Coast, NexBank, NexPoint, Highland Funds Asset Management, the DAF, Skyview, and CPCM (collectively, "the Enterprise"). The common purpose of the Enterprise was to generate money for its members. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-97.

213. The entities that constituted the Enterprise were owned, directed, or otherwise controlled by Dondero and Ellington, as described in ¶¶ 13, 14, 32, 33, 94, 122, and 147, *supra*, and served these functions in the Enterprise:

- ***The Transferors.*** The role of CDO Fund, SOHC, HFP, HFC, CDO Opportunity Fund, and CDO Holding, as Judgment Debtors or subsidiaries of HCM and/or Judgment Debtors against whom UBS could foreseeably collect on the Judgment, was to be rendered insolvent and therefore judgment-proof.

- ***The Transferees.*** The role of CLO HoldCo, Sentinel, Sebastian Clarke, Mainspring, Montage, Tall Pine, and Sunshine Coast (together, "the Transferees") was to receive fraudulently transferred assets from the Transferors or other Transferees and shuffle assets farther away from UBS and to Dondero and Ellington.

- ***The Facilitators Of Bonus Payments.*** The role of NexBank, NexPoint, Highland Funds Asset Management, the DAF, Mainspring, Sunshine Coast, Tall Pine, Skyview, and CPCM was to make—and cover-up—fraudulent payments to associates Ellington, Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent. This scheme diverted about $5.9 million in Judgment Debtor assets.

214. The Associates were employees at HCM who reported to Dondero or Ellington and who engaged in predicate acts or received the spoils of the predicate acts at Dondero and Ellington's direction.

215. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 36. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 37. Leventon worked with Ellington closely in bringing to life Ellington's idea for the ATE Policy to drain substantially all assets from the Transferors. *See supra* ¶¶ 64-65. He also [redacted]—for which he was paid his "bonus" of roughly $687,594.00. *See supra* ¶¶ 126-127. Despite receiving these payments, and to cover his tracks, Leventon lied to the Bankruptcy Court and filed an amended claim. *See supra* ¶¶ 127. After getting fired from HCM, Leventon went to work at Ellington-owned Skyview. *See id.*

216. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 36. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 37. Sevilla oversaw the daily management of Sentinel and helped develop the idea that the ATE Policy premium would be satisfied by transferring the entire investment portfolios of the Transferors. *See supra* ¶ 65. Sevilla also facilitated the fraudulent conveyance between Sentinel and Sebastian Clarke. *See supra* ¶ 94. [redacted] *See*

supra ¶¶ 125-127. After getting fired from HCM, Ellington hired Sevilla to work at Skyview. *See supra* ¶ 127.

217. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 40. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 40. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 39. After Ellington asked DiOrio to serve as a director of Sentinel, DiOrio pushed through Ellington's requests for reimbursement of hundreds of thousands of dollars in personal expenses without question. *See supra* ¶¶ 111-112. From his position as a director of Sentinel, DiOrio also ultimately helped funnel $8,900,000.00 in "dividends" to Dondero and Ellington. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. DiOrio also facilitated the fraudulent conveyance between Sentinel and Sebastian Clarke and falsely characterized the assets transferred as "worthless." *See supra* ¶¶ 93-97. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 40.

218. ***Waterhouse*** served as the Chief Financial Officer of HCM for more than a decade. *See supra* ¶ 125. [redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 120-125. For his participation in this scheme, Waterhouse received the roughly $2,000,000.00 bonus blocked by the Bankruptcy Court. *See supra* ¶ 126. Despite receiving these payments, and to cover his tracks, Waterhouse lied to the Bankruptcy Court and filed an amended claim for his bonus payment. *See supra* ¶ 127. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 127.

219. ***Surgent*** has been a long-time employee at HCM, serving as Chief Compliance Officer for much of the relevant period. *See supra* ¶ 120. According to a stipulation he signed with the Independent Board, Surgent entered into consulting agreements with Mainspring and Tall Pine and, in March and September 2020, received payments through a pass-through entity (Prive Solutions LLC) totaling $2,774,272.13. *See supra* ¶ 126. This included $750,906.13 from Tall Pine, $1,887,929.00 from Mainspring, and $135,437.00 from NexPoint. *See supra* ¶ 122 n.30. Surgent failed to disclose these payments and instead submitted a claim to the Bankruptcy Court seeking, in part, money he had already received. *See supra* ¶¶ 126-127.

220. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 36. Irving was instrumental in ensuring that Sentinel received all the assets in satisfaction of the premium payment under the APA. *See supra* ¶ 77. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 127 n.33.

221. ***Vitiello*** worked in the legal department in HCM for seven years, at times reporting to Leventon. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 37. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 64. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 127 n.33.

B. <u>The Pattern Of Racketeering Activity</u>

222. From at least 2010 to the present, Dondero and Ellington were associated with the Enterprise and conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the management and operation of the Enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, including acts of

wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and acts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.

223. These acts were a pattern of fraudulent transactions intended to facilitate the theft of Judgment Debtor assets using the Associates, misrepresentations, and shell companies to hide their involvement in the schemes.

224. The predicate acts funneled money ever farther away from UBS. They centered on these events: (1) the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance; (2) the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances; (3) the 2018 fraudulent amendments to the ATE Policy; (4) the 2019 fraudulent conveyance to Sebastian Clarke; (5) the 2019-2020 Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements; (6) the 2020-2021 fraudulent dividends to Mainspring and Montage; (7) the 2020 fraudulent bonus payments; and (8) misrepresentations to UBS about the solvency of the Judgment Debtors.

225. ***Horizontal Relatedness.*** Dondero and Ellington conducted the related acts constituting the pattern of racketeering activity for the same purpose: making themselves rich and hiding the assets to which UBS had superior right. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-72, 82-87, 90-92, 93-97, 103-112, 113-117, 122-126. The methods of commission are also similar: Dondero and Ellington repeatedly flouted corporate formalities to use the Associates and entities under their control to hide the assets owed to UBS. For example, Dondero and Ellington failed to observe corporate formalities in moving assets from the Transferors and among the Transferees, *see supra* ¶¶ 55-63, 94, [redacted] *see supra* ¶¶ 36-40, in misrepresenting to regulators the fraudulent nature of the ATE Policy, *see supra* ¶¶ 88-89, in using Sentinel as a piggy bank to reimburse personal expenses and pay out dividends, *see supra* ¶¶ 103-119, and in fraudulently issuing bonus payments blocked by the Bankruptcy Court, *see supra* ¶¶ 120-127.

226. ***Vertical Relatedness.*** The acts constituting the pattern of racketeering activity related to the Enterprise as a whole: Dondero and Ellington were able to commit the offenses only because of their powerful positions in the Enterprise.

227. As chair and sole member of the Board of Directors for HFP, sole Director for SOHC, and President and ultimate General Partner for CDO Fund, Dondero had specific control over the Judgment Debtors. *See supra* ¶¶ 28-33. As the sole stockholder and sole director of Strand, Dondero had ultimate control over every HCM entity, affiliate, and employee. *See supra* ¶ 29. [redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 36-38. Dondero also used his position to authorize fraudulent conveyances, sometimes from all sides: he approved, for example, both the sale and purchase of assets from CDO Holding to CLO HoldCo in 2010. *See supra* ¶¶ 51-57. And he signed the ATE Policy on behalf of all Transferors at the same time [redacted] and a member of the ITA Advisory Board overseeing Sentinel. *See supra* ¶¶ 71, 77-78, 80. He also exercised his authority over Sentinel and the other funding entities to authorize their issuance of fraudulent "consulting" payments to associates who had rendered services to HCM. *See supra* ¶¶ 122-126.

228. Ellington also leveraged his position as Dondero's right-hand man in the Enterprise to commit this pattern of racketeering. Ellington's position as General Counsel at HCM, [redacted] uniquely positioned him to implement his idea to drain all Judgment Debtor assets pursuant to the ATE Policy and APA. *See supra* ¶¶ 31, 64, 80. He also used these positions to acquire fraudulent reimbursements and unwarranted dividends. *See supra* ¶¶ 103-119. [redacted]

[redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 122-127.

229. ***Continuity.*** The pattern of racketeering activity Dondero and Ellington engaged in and conducted has been continuous from at least 2010 to the present. Dondero and Ellington have completed at least ***seven*** separate schemes involving predicate acts of wire fraud and money laundering over the course of more than a decade. *See* Ex. A (table detailing selected acts of wire fraud); Ex. B (table detailing selected acts of money laundering). Such misconduct satisfies the requirements of closed-ended continuity.

230. In the alternative, the pattern of racketeering activity committed by Dondero and Ellington is open-ended in that it has no predetermined end date and is continuous, as Dondero and Ellington have shown that their scheme is the regular way of operating and conducting themselves and their ongoing business. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-72, 82-87, 90-92, 93-97, 103-112, 113-117, 122-126. Dondero and Ellington used their connections while controlling HCM to move Judgment Debtor assets not only within HCM, but to other entities outside HCM that were also in their control. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 122.

231. Dondero and Ellington retain positions of power in the Enterprise. *See supra* ¶¶ 122, 127 n.33. Ellington employs most of the Associates at Skyview, which at first shared an address with, and still preforms work for, Dondero-affiliated entities NexPoint and NexBank. *See supra* ¶ 127 n.33. Thus, there also exists the threat of continuing long-term racketeering activity.

C. The Predicate Acts

1. Wire Fraud In Violation Of 18 U.S.C. § 1343

232. Dondero and Ellington used the Enterprise to transmit communications in interstate commerce by means of wire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 in furtherance of their scheme to defraud UBS.

233. UBS incorporates by reference Exhibit A, which sets forth particular uses of wire communications in the U.S. in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, describing which RICO Defendant or individual associated with the Enterprise caused the communication to be wired, when the communication was made, and how it furthered the scheme. The wire communications described in Exhibit A were made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud UBS.

234. UBS also incorporates by reference Exhibit B, which sets forth money laundering transactions in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. Each of these wire transfers was made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud UBS and constitutes another instance of wire fraud.

a. The 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance

235. On or about December 23, 2010, Dondero, through the Enterprise, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using interstate wires to fraudulently transfer to CLO HoldCo nearly all the assets from CDO Holding, a subsidiary and alter ego of HFP. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-60.

236. This fraudulent conveyance aimed to render CDO Holding judgment-proof and to keep UBS from receiving the money the Judgment Debtors owed in the Underlying Action. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud undertaken in furtherance of this scheme.

b. The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances

237. On or about April 2017, through the Enterprise (including through associates Leventon, Sevilla, DiOrio, Irving, and Vitiello), Dondero and Ellington violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343

by using interstate wires to orchestrate the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances to render the Transferors judgment proof.

238. After summary judgment rulings in favor of UBS in the Underlying Action, Dondero and Ellington anticipated an enormous damages verdict. *See supra* ¶ 61. Despite the explicit warning by outside counsel as to the "legal validity" of sending assets "beyond the reach of the plaintiffs in the [Underlying Action] against the [F]unds," *see supra* ¶ 72, Dondero and Ellington drained the 2017 Transferred Assets, valued at over $105,647,679.00, in satisfaction of the ATE Policy's $25,000,000.00 "premium." *See supra* ¶ 72.

239. The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances included the use of interstate wires to deceive UBS, Cayman regulators, and HCM employees and other persons facilitating the transfer to believe that the ATE Policy was in good faith instead of a fraudulent sham. *See supra* ¶¶ 68-71. The objective of the transfer was to render the Transferors judgment-proof and to defraud UBS of the more than one billion dollars it was owed. *See supra* ¶ 64. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud sent in furtherance of this scheme.

c. The 2018 Fraudulent Adjustments To The ATE Policy

240. In or around June 2018, through the Enterprise (including associates DiOrio, Sevilla, and Irving), Dondero and Ellington violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using interstate wires to make fraudulent retroactive "adjustments" to ATE Policy terms and valuations of the 2017 Transferred Assets. *See supra* ¶¶ 82-87.

241. The objective of the adjustments was to keep the Transferors judgment-proof and to defraud UBS of the millions of dollars the Judgment Debtors owed. *See supra* ¶¶ 90-92. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud undertaken in furtherance of this scheme.

d. The 2019 Fraudulent Conveyance To Sebastian Clarke

242. In or around December 31, 2019, through the Enterprise (including through associates DiOrio and Sevilla), Dondero and Ellington violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using the interstate wires to transfer certain of the 2017 Transferred Assets to Sebastian Clarke for $3 to hide assets from UBS. *See supra* ¶¶ 93-97. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud sent in furtherance of this scheme.

e. The 2019-2020 Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements

243. In or around November 2019 until March 2020, through the Enterprise (including through associate DiOrio), Ellington violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using the interstate wires to defraud UBS by reimbursing his personal entertainment expenses and business expenses unrelated to the UBS litigation or the ATE Policy.

244. The objective of these reimbursements was to enrich Ellington and to hide assets from UBS that could be used as payment for the Judgment. *See supra* ¶¶ 102-112. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud sent in furtherance of this scheme.

f. The 2020-2021 Fraudulent "Dividends"

245. In or around April 2020 and January 2021, through the Enterprise (including through associate DiOrio), Dondero and Ellington violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using interstate wires to defraud UBS by causing Sentinel to issue $8,900,000.00 in dividends to entities owned and controlled by Dondero and Ellington. *See supra* ¶¶ 114, 117.

246. Sentinel fraudulently issued these distributions upon the request of Ellington, even with the knowledge that Sentinel would need to return all of the 2017 Transferred Assets to the Transferors, because the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances were fraudulent. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-117. And Sentinel issued the distributions after its directors had set a moratorium on dividend issuance while the ATE Policy was active. *See supra* ¶¶ 115, 117.

247. The objective of these dividends was to enrich Dondero and Ellington, to hide assets that could be used to pay the Judgment, and to defraud UBS of the millions of dollars owed. *See supra* ¶¶ 113-119. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud sent in furtherance of this scheme.

g. The 2020 Fraudulent Bonus Payments

248. In or around 2021, through the Enterprise (including through associates Leventon, Sevilla, Surgent, and Waterhouse), Dondero and Ellington also violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343 by using interstate wires to defraud UBS by diverting Judgment Debtor assets to Ellington, Waterhouse, Leventon, and Surgent.

249. In 2020, the Bankruptcy Court blocked HCM from making bonus payments to Waterhouse, Ellington, Leventon, and Surgent. *See supra* ¶ 120. Ellington came up with a plan (approved by Dondero) to make these bonus payments to himself and the others by transferring assets from entities in Ellington and Dondero's control. *See supra* ¶ 120.

250. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 122.

251. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 122.

252. [redacted]

[redacted] *See supra* ¶¶ 122-123. Contributions were based not on services rendered but on ability to pay and regulatory limitations. *See supra* ¶¶ 124-125.

253. As a result of this scheme, Dondero and Ellington diverted approximately $5,874,203.21 of Judgment Debtor assets from Sentinel, through Mainspring, to Ellington, Surgent, Waterhouse, and Leventon. *See supra* ¶ 126.

254. Despite having received these payments, Ellington, Surgent, Waterhouse, and Leventon filed proofs of claim seeking those same amounts in bonuses. *See supra* ¶ 127. In furtherance of the scheme, Ellington, Waterhouse, and Leventon assigned these claims to CPCM, a wholly owned subsidiary of Skyview, which pursued them on their behalf.

255. [redacted] *See supra* ¶ 121. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud in furtherance of this scheme.

h. The Misrepresentations About The Solvency Of CDO Fund And HFP

256. As part of the scheme to defraud UBS, Ellington, through his control of the Enterprise, made false representations to UBS as to the solvency of the Judgment Debtors and their ability to pay the Judgment. This scheme included the use of interstate wires to deceive UBS and to deprive it of money owed.

257. In furtherance of this scheme, Ellington repeatedly misrepresented to UBS that some of the Judgment Debtors had been "ghost funds" since 2009 without disclosing that Dondero and Ellington had made them insolvent through the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance and 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances. *See supra* ¶ 46, 91. Exhibit A lists specific instances of wire fraud sent in furtherance of this scheme.

2. Money Laundering In Violation Of 18 U.S.C. § 1956

258. Dondero and Ellington have also committed acts of money laundering to carry on and promote illegal activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. They knowingly caused the transportation, transmission, and transfer of funds to or from the United States to themselves and other Enterprise associates to promote unlawful activity, including but not limited to the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 alleged above.

259. Dondero and Ellington engaged in several financial transactions over the course of operating and managing their scheme to defraud UBS, including (i) financial transactions constituting predicate acts of wire fraud and (ii) financial transactions to funnel the proceeds of their scheme between and among themselves and other individuals associated with the Enterprise.

260. The assets sent from CLO HoldCo to CDO Holding became proceeds of wire fraud at the time of the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance, because they stemmed from a fraudulent transfer. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-60. Later, Dondero and Ellington engaged in financial transactions involving additional proceeds of wire fraud, including: (1) the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances; (2) the 2019 fraudulent conveyance to Sebastian Clarke; (3) the 2019-2020 Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements; (4) the 2020-2021 fraudulent dividends to Mainspring and Montage; and (5) the 2020 fraudulent bonus payments.[35]

[35] Even if every individual transfer did not comprise Judgment Debtor assets, all financial transactions made under the fraudulent bonus scheme in 2020 also involved the proceeds of wire fraud as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) because each transaction was part of a set of parallel or dependent transactions in this scheme, at least one of which (the payments made from Mainspring) involved the proceeds of wire fraud. In addition, all were part of a single plan or arrangement concocted by Ellington to pay himself, Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent bonuses blocked by the Bankruptcy Court. *See supra* ¶¶ 120-128.

261. Dondero and Ellington directed these transactions with knowledge that the funds at issue were actually owed to UBS (either pursuant to the contractual breach, court order, or the Judgment). The funds were therefore the proceeds of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343:

- The 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances occurred after it became clear to Dondero and Ellington that the Judgment Debtors would lose in the Underlying Action. *See supra* ¶ 72.

- The 2019 fraudulent conveyance from Sentinel to Sebastian Clarke; the 2019 and 2020 Fraudulent Ellington Reimbursements; the 2020 and 2021 fraudulent dividends from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage; and the voidable transfers from Mainspring (at times, through Tall Pine) to entities owned by Ellington, Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent all took place after the court in the Underlying Action found CDO Fund and SOHC liable to UBS. *See supra* ¶¶ 93-95, 103-112, 120-122, 113-117.

262. Dondero and Ellington conducted these financial transactions with the intent to promote and continue their unlawful activities as alleged in this Petition, and designing the financial transactions in whole or part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of their unlawful activities, and to prevent recovery of the proceeds by UBS. *See supra* ¶¶ 49, 61-63, 93, 98, 103, 113, 120-121. Had Dondero and Ellington intended to pay the Judgment, then they would have revealed the existence of the ATE Policy when the court issued the Phase I Decision and Order, rather than point to their empty pockets. *See supra* ¶¶ 46-47.

263. Exhibit B details known money laundering transactions in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The twelve money laundering violations listed in the table total more than $130 million.

D. Summary Of Allegations To Each RICO Defendant

264. Dondero and Ellington have both participated in and conducted the affairs of the Enterprise by engaging in multiple predicate acts, as alleged above and summarized immediately

below. The conduct of each constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).

265. ***Dondero*** has committed many predicate acts, including wire fraud and money laundering. Dondero, directly or indirectly, used the interstate wires in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 to:

- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to CLO HoldCo in 2010;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to Sentinel in 2017;
- fraudulently issue amendments to cover up the sham ATE Policy in 2018;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to Sebastian Clarke in 2019;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS from Mainspring to Tall Pine and ultimately to Ellington and entities owned by Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent as bonus payments from HCM in 2020; and to
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to himself and Ellington through the issuance of dividends from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage (their alter egos) in 2020-2021.

266. Dondero also engaged in financial transactions involving the known proceeds of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, including:

- the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances;
- the 2019 fraudulent conveyances to Sebastian Clarke;
- the voidable transfers of about $5.9 million from Mainspring (at times, through Tall Pine) to entities owned by Ellington, Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent in 2020; and
- the fraudulent issuance of roughly $9 million in "dividends" to himself and Ellington from Sentinel in 2020-2021.

267. ***Ellington*** has committed many predicate acts, including wire fraud and money laundering. Ellington, directly or indirectly, used the interstate wires in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 to:

- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to Sentinel in 2017;
- fraudulently issue amendments to cover up the sham ATE Policy in 2018;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to Sebastian Clarke in 2019;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to himself through personal expense reimbursements in 2019-2020;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS from Mainspring to Tall Pine and ultimately to himself and entities owned Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent as bonus payments from HCM in 2020;
- fraudulently transfer assets rightfully owed to UBS to himself and Dondero through the issuance of dividends from Sentinel to Mainspring and Montage (their alter egos) in 2020-2021; and to
- fraudulently make repeated misrepresentations to UBS as to the solvency of the Judgment Debtors and their ability to pay on the Judgment.

268. Ellington also engaged in financial transactions involving the known proceeds of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, including:

- the 2017 Fraudulent Conveyances;
- the 2019 fraudulent conveyances to Sebastian Clarke;
- the fraudulent reimbursements of $833,843.05 for his personal expenses in 2019-2020;
- the voidable transfers of about $5.9 million from Mainspring (at times, through Tall Pine) to entities owned by Ellington, Leventon, Waterhouse, and Surgent in 2020; and
- the fraudulent issuance of roughly $9 million in "dividends" to himself and Dondero from Sentinel in 2020-2021.

E. <u>The Harm To UBS</u>

269. UBS has suffered substantial injury to its business and property because of, and through, Dondero and Ellington's commission of the enumerated racketeering acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c).

270. Dondero and Ellington have frustrated UBS's ability to collect virtually any of the more than a $1 billion judgment entered against CDO Fund, SOHC, and HFP. *See supra* ¶ 98. The looting of the Judgment Debtors and subsequent shuffling of assets continued for more than a decade. *See supra* ¶¶ 49, 62, 104, 108, 113, 122-123. As a direct, proximate, and consequential damage of the result of the predicate acts described UBS has suffered: (1) lost-debt damages for the amount that UBS would have been able to collect from the Judgment Debtors but for Dondero and Ellington's wrongful conduct as set forth above; and (2) separate and independent damages in the nature of collection expense damages for the attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by UBS in connection with its enforcement of its Judgment. *See supra* ¶¶ 48, 98 n.21.

271. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), UBS has a right to recover threefold the damages it sustained, and the cost of this suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

III. CLAIM IV: CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE RICO BY ELLINGTON (18 U.S.C. § 1962(D))

272. UBS repeats and realleges each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth here.

273. UBS pleads Claim IV in addition to Ellington's direct liability for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

274. Ellington, along with Dondero, willfully conspired, and agreed to conduct and participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).

275. Dondero knew of, agreed to, and acted to further the overall objective of the conspiracy by agreeing to and conspiring to use wire communications at the times, places, and circumstances discussed above to transfer assets and valuable rights, titles, and interests from the Judgment Debtors. *See supra* ¶¶ 49-72, 82-87, 90-92, 93-97, 103-112, 113-117, 122-126.

276. Ellington knew of, agreed to, and acted to further the overall objective of the conspiracy by agreeing to and conspiring to use wire communications at the times, places, and circumstances discussed above to transfer assets and valuable rights, titles, and interests from the Judgment Debtors. *See supra* ¶¶ 31 n.4, 49-72, 82-87, 90-92, 93-97, 102-112, 113-117, 122-126.

277. Ellington committed the predicate acts of wire fraud and money laundering and thereby injured UBS in its business and property.

278. As a result of Ellington's assistance in the conspiracy, Dondero could misappropriate assets that would have otherwise been available to satisfy the Judgment.

279. As a result of Ellington's involvement in the conspiracy, UBS expended legal costs in attempts to collect its Judgment, which remains unsatisfied. In addition to its legal costs, UBS has sustained lost-debt damages for the amount that UBS would have been able to collect from the Judgment Debtors but for Ellington's involvement in the conspiracy, including the harm from the fraudulent conveyances and dissipation of assets. Dondero and Ellington's violations have thus damaged UBS.

280. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), UBS has a right to recover threefold the damages it sustained, and the cost of this suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

REQUESTS FOR RELIEF

281. Based on the facts and claims set forth above, UBS seeks the following relief:

i. Under CPLR 5225(b) and the former DCL 270 *et seq.*, to void the fraudulent conveyances of assets from CDO Holding to CLO HoldCo and from the Judgment Debtors to Ellington through Sentinel, and to enter money judgments against CLO Holdco and Ellington for the full value of the transfers;

ii. Under CPLR 5225(b) and the current DCL 270 *et seq.*, to void all voidable conveyances from the Judgment Debtors to Mainspring and Montage through Sentinel in 2020 and 2021 and to enter money judgments against Mainspring and Montage for all amounts received in said transfers;

iii. Under CPLR 5225(b), an order that: (a) CDO Holding at all relevant times was the alter ego of HFP, and is thus jointly and severally liable for the Judgment as against HFP and SOHC; (b) Dondero and Ellington at all relevant times were the alter egos of CDO Fund, SOHC, and HFP and are therefore jointly and severally liable for the Judgment; (c) Dondero at all relevant times was the alter ego of Mainspring and is liable for any turnover order and judgment against Mainspring; and (d) Ellington at all relevant times was the alter ego of Montage and is liable for any turnover order and judgment against Mainspring;

iv. Under CPLR 6201 *et seq.*, (a) an order of attachment against the Judgment Debtors' assets and/or assets to which UBS has a superior right up to the sum of $631,658,040.11, including statutory interest for the Judgment against SOHC and HFP, and $639,138,543.43, including statutory interest for the Judgment against CDO Fund; and (b) a temporary restraining order against the Respondents as to the transfer of the Judgment Debtors' assets and assets to which UBS has a superior right, including, but not limited to, (i) the assets transferred as part of the 2010 fraudulent conveyance to CLO HoldCo, and (ii) the assets transferred to Ellington, Mainspring, and Montage through Sentinel;

v. Under CPLR 6220 and 408, an order requiring Respondents to make disclosure as to any other assets that may be subject to attachment, and permitting UBS to obtain additional, related disclosure as needed;

vi. In the alternative to a finding of alter-ego liability under (iii) above and under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), an award of threefold lost-debt damages against Dondero and Ellington for the amount that UBS would have been able to collect from the Judgment Debtors but for Dondero and Ellington's wrongful conduct;

vii. Under the formerly enacted DCL 276-A, which was in effect at the time of the 2010 Fraudulent Conveyance and Ellington Fraudulent Reimbursement, an award of UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with the enforcement of the Judgment as to those transfers, to include costs and fees incurred in UBS's investigation of the facts animating the claims set forth above;

viii. Under the newly enacted DCL 276-A, which was in effect at the time of the April 2020 and January 2021 Dividends, an award of UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with the enforcement of the Judgment as to those transfers, to include costs and fees incurred in UBS's investigation of the facts animating the claims set forth above;

ix. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), an award of UBS's costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with UBS's civil RICO claims; and

x. Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February 6, 2023
New York, NY

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrew Clubok

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* Motion for admission *pro hac vice* forthcoming.

HMIT Exhibit 19

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Counsel for The Dugaboy Investment Trust and the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ)
Debtor.	**STIPULATION**

STIPULATION WITHDRAWING MOVANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING [Dkt. No. 3662]

This stipulation (the "Stipulation") is made and entered into, subject to Court approval, in the above-captioned bankruptcy by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., the reorganized debtor ("HCMLP"), and the Movants (The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain", and together with Dugaboy, "Movants")), (together, the "Parties"), by and through their respective undersigned counsel.

RECITALS

WHEREAS on February 6, 2023, Movants filed a *Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* [Dkt. No. 3662];

WHEREAS on March 27, 2023, HCMLP filed its *Response to Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* [Dkt. No. 3692];

IT IS HEREBY JOINTLY STIPULATED AND AGREED, as follows:

1. The Movants hereby withdraw their *Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* without prejudice.

[*Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank*]

Dated: May 10, 2023

HAYWARD PLLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ)
Debtor.	**ORDER**

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION WITHDRAWING MOVANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING [Dkt. No. 3662]

Upon consideration of the *Stipulation of Withdrawal of Movants' Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* [Dkt No. 3662] by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., the reorganized debtor ("HCMLP"), and the Movants (The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain", and together with Dugaboy, "Movants")), (together, the "Parties"), it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT:**

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1. The Movants will withdraw their Motion for Leave to File Proceeding without prejudice.

###END OF ORDER###

HMIT Exhibit 20

The following constitutes the ruling of the court and has the force and effect therein described.

Signed June 29, 2023

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.	Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ)
Debtor.	**ORDER**

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION WITHDRAWING MOVANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROCEEDING [Dkt. No. 3662]

Upon consideration of the *Stipulation of Withdrawal of Movants' Motion for Leave to File Proceeding* [Dkt No. 3662] by and between Highland Capital Management, L.P., the reorganized debtor ("HCMLP"), and the Movants (The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("Hunter Mountain", and together with Dugaboy, "Movants")), (together, the "Parties"), it is **HEREBY ORDERED THAT:**

1. The Movants will withdraw their Motion for Leave to File Proceeding without prejudice.

###END OF ORDER###

HMIT Exhibit 21

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:	§	Chapter 11
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	§	Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
Reorganized Debtor.	§	
DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,	§	
Plaintiffs,	§	Adversary Proceeding No. _____
vs.	§	
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,	§	
Defendants.	§	

COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND (II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND (B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy") and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT" and collectively with Dugaboy, the "Plaintiffs") file this adversary complaint (the "Complaint") against Defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCM" or the "Debtor") and the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Claimant Trust," and collectively with HCM, the "Defendants"), seeking: (1) disclosures about all distributions and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of the assets and liabilities; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs' interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests[1] that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner ("Kirschner") as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCM bankruptcy estate.

2. Defendants' October 21, 2022, January 24, 2023, and April 21, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below-market sales of assets, cash available – if not squandered in self-serving litigation – is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. With more than $100 million in assets left to monetize (not even counting related party notes), and almost $550,000 in assets already monetized, even after burning through more than $100 million in professional fees, there is and was more than enough money to pay the inflated $387 million in creditor claims the Debtor allowed. These numbers compel the question

[1] Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [Docket No. 1808].

– "What was all of this for, other than to justify outsize fees and bonuses for the professionals involved?" See paragraphs 17-18 below. And despite repeated and increasingly specific requests, the Debtor has never provided granular enough information to specifically identify all of the monies raised and where all the money has gone, including another hundred million dollars that appears to be unaccounted. *Id*.

3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books ***at those crisis period values***, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation has served to enable James P. Seery ("Mr. Seery") and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate (along with incentive fees), leaving little or nothing for the owners that built the company.

4. Significantly, Kirschner seems to concede the merits of Plaintiffs' position. After Plaintiffs began seeking the relief sought herein (originally by way of motion), Kirschner himself sought a stay of the massive litigation he instituted to evaluate whether the estate actually needed to collect additional funds. Plaintiffs and other defendants in that litigation agreed to the stay but could not convince the Debtor to provide the kind of fulsome disclosure that would allow Plaintiffs to evaluate for themselves the status of the estate, which secrecy continues to leave Plaintiffs with suspicions that prevent an overall resolution of the bankruptcy with no further need for indemnification reserves. Rather, Debtor continues to provide summary information that is not sufficient to enable Plaintiffs to determine the amounts of money being spent on administration and litigation, and not sufficient to determine whether if all litigation ceased, the estate could pay all creditors with money to spare for equity. Plaintiffs are especially concerned because the

information they have gleaned suggests inappropriate self-dealing that undermines confidence in the Debtor's financial reporting, making the relief sought herein all the more important.

5. While grave harm has already been done by the Defendants' excessive litigation and unnecessary secrecy, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in *In re ADPT DFW Holdings*, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

6. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCM's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities that had undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery; entities that Mr. Seery knew would approve inflated compensation to him when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

7. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders such as Plaintiffs by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders

have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

8. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice and at this time it appears their underhanded plan is succeeding.

9. By June 30, 2022, the estate had $550 million in cash and approximately $120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over $60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, perhaps as much as $75 million below market price.[2] As detailed below, total pre-confirmation professional fees are now over $100 million.

10. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of June 1, 2022 was:

Highland Capital Assets		**Value in Millions**	
		Low	**High**
Cash as of Feb 1. 2022		$125.00	$125.00
Recently Liquidated	$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	$51.44		
MGM Shares	$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	$416.24	$416.24	$416.24
Current Cash Balance		**$541.24**	**$541.24**
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		$37.50	$37.50
Korea Fund		$18.00	$18.00
SE Multifamily		$11.98	$12.10

[2] Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022.

Affiliate Notes[3]		$50.00	$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		$5.00	$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		**$663.72**	**$688.84**

11. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate $365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	$137.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 1	$65 million
ACIS	$23.0	$0.0	Claim buyer 2	$8.0
HarbourVest	$45.0	$35.0	Claim buyer 2	$27.0
UBS	$65.0	$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	$50.0
TOTAL	**$270.0**	**$95.0**		**$150.0 million**

12. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

13. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." These transactions are particularly suspect because, depending on the claim, the claims buyers paid amounts only fractionally higher, equivalent to, or, in some cases, less than the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated claims buyers responsible to investors of their own would

[3] Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale and/or have other defenses, but litigation continues over that also.

not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

14. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided such information to claims buyers, rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly $150 million for which they were sold. By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over $100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity that could have been used to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

15. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a $59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred because the larger amounts would not have been needed. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charged over $2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over $800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because there has been no disclosure in the HCM bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). However, buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as $30 million or more, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the

hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency. These circumstance show why Plaintiffs are right to be concerned and why it is critical that transparency be achieved.

16. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by unnecessary litigation, would still be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

17. Set forth below is Plaintiffs' best estimate of the assets of the estate. Plaintiffs have been seeking information to enable to them to confirm the accuracy of their estimates, but the Debtor has refused to provide the necessary information to do so. Indeed, after the last quarterly report, in which Debtor provided some but not all of the information Plaintiffs were seeking, Plaintiffs sent a revised list, more precisely targeting the remaining information sought. Because Debtor failed to respond, it remained necessary to file this adversary proceeding.

18. This is Plaintiffs' best estimate of the assets of the Highland estate and its cash flows. It is obvious that even if off by a significant percent, no further litigation to collect assets for the estate is needed to pay creditors. Moreover, the ample solvency of the estate was or should have been obvious to the estate professionals for quite some time, making the substantial cash burn in the estate utterly unconscionable.

	Assets		Amount	Backup
HCMLP Assets to be Monetized[1]				
As of 3/31/23 (Est.)				
	Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF")		$ 25,000,000	Debtor Pleading (re ACIS) Dkt 1235 Filed 08/18/21 p.3n.10 ($25 m); 3/31/23 DAF Multi-Strat Statement ($19.5 m est); more value in the 1.0 CLOS (Brentwood – 17%;Gleneagles – 1%;Grayson – 5%;Greenbriar-23%;Liberty-18%;Rockwall-15%)

	Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P. ("MS")		30,817,992	ADV 3/31/23 (rev 4/24/2023)
	Highland Restoration Capital Partners Master LP & Highland Restoration Capital Partners, L.P. ("RCP")		24,192,773	ADV 3/31/23 (rev 4/24/2023)
	Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korea Fund")		5,701,330	ADV 3/31/23 (rev 4/24/2023)
	SE Multifamily Holdings LLC ("SE Multifamily")		12,400,000	Communications with Debtor that apparently values it higher
	Other		5,000,000	Other investments on the post-confirmation report
	Assets as of 3/31/21 (Est.)[1]		**$ 103,112,095**	
HCMLP Monetizations & Management Fees (est.)		**Sale date if known**		
10/31/19 - 3/31/23 (Est.)				
	Targa	October ?, 2021	$ 37,500,000	Uptick from COVID; market communications
	Trussway	Sept. 1, 2022	180,000,000	90% of sales price 200MM, net of debt; need confirmation
	Cornerstone	Jan. 23, 2023	132,500,000	Assume 53% of sales price obtained because: HCM owns about 50% of RCP and 60% of Crusader (and assume increase in value of MGM within Cornerstone should have been enough to offset its debt) Sale announced May 12, 2022
	SSP	Month/date/2020	18,000,000	Market communications
	MGM Direct	Mar. 17, 2022	25,000,000	@ $145, **sale announced May 2021**
	Petrocap	Aug. 10, 2021	2,684,886	Dkt, 2537, sale motion
	Uchi	Aug. 6, 2021	9,750,000	Dkt 2687, sale order
	Jefferies Account & DRIP		60,000,000	FV form 206, net of debt, but NXRT moved from $40-$80ish; don't know when monetized, so number could be low
	Terrell (raw land)		500,000	FV Form 206
	Mgmt Fees/Dist/Fund loan repayments (est.)		30,000,000	3 years mgmt fees, misc distributions in MS/RCP/Korea, loan paybacks
	Siepe		3,500,000	Market communications
	HCLOF		35,000,000	Calculated based on DAF distributions
	Total Monetizations & Cash Flows (Est.)		**$ 534,434,886**	
	Total Assets as of 3/31/23 & Prior Monetizations & Management Fees		**$ 637,546,981**	

Cash Roll			
10/31/19 - 3/31/23 (Est.)			
Cash as of 10/31/2019		$ 2,286,000	
Monetizations & Cash Flows (10/31/19 - 3/31/23)		534,434,886	
Less: Cash on Hand as of 3/31/23		(57,000,000)	ADV 3/31/23
Fees, Distributions & Other Receipts (10/31/19 - 3/31/23)[2]		$ 479,720,886	
Administrative Fees Paid		$ 100,781,537	Dkt 3756 filed on 4/21/23 ($33,005,136 for Professional fees (bk); $7,604,472 for Professional fees (nonbk); $60,171,929 for all prof fees and exp (Debtor & UCC). Note: this appears to "Preconfirmation." What are the post confirmation amounts?)
Cumulative Payments to Creditors		276,709,651	Dkt 3756 - Unsecured, priority, secured and admin.
Other Unknown Payments or ?		102,229,698	The $102 million is calculated by subtracting cumulative payments to creditors and known pre conf prof fees and costs from the $479 million determined above. Where are these funds; what were they used for?
Fees & Distributions Paid (10/31/19 - 3/31/23)		$ 479,720,886	
[1]*Does not include approximately $70MM in affiliate notes*			
[2]*Includes $100MM of fees paid during bankruptcy*			

19. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCM, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust have been litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery. Even with the stay of

the Kirschner litigation, the Debtor continues to pursue litigation, such as its vexatious litigant motion, and presumably opposing this litigation, that unnecessarily depletes the estate.

20. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

21. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

22. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the "Bankruptcy Case") pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Court").

23. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

24. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

25. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

26. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

27. HMIT is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

28. HCM is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

29. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

30. On October 16, 2019 (the "Petition Date"), HCM, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

31. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCM had approximately $400 million in assets (ultimately monetized for much more as a result of market events, such as the sale of HCM's portfolio companies for substantial profits, as was always planned by Mr. Dondero) and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCM's reason for seeking bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately $190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about $110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about $65 million, well below the expected $110 million,[4] and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

[4] Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid $78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about $13 million.

32. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the "Committee"), and over the objection of HCM and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCM and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.[5] Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCM management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor's apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

33. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCM's general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the "Independent Board") to manage HCM during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

34. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately and then repeatedly let the Debtor's professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by

[5] For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, "The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what's going on with this debtor, with this debtor's management, this debtor's post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little do with this debtor." [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), Docket No. 181]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but "transparently vexatious," for allegedly having sued Moody's for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, Docket No. 1186].

Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management's spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally "Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board… But I'm concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they're smart, they're persuasive… they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it's really all about . . . Mr. Dondero." [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

35. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was "surprised that Judge Jones' or Judge Isgur's staff expressed that they had availability." Debtor's counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, "I'll take it from here." Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, "my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don't have meaningful time." [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121.] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

36. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only

because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

37. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the *de facto* leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCM's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

38. Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, Mr. Seery initially reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

39. Yet, despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

40. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as "vexatious litigants," emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious

litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a "transparently" vexatious litigant based on pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled "vexatious" by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented on proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

41. In addition to the Debtor's mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that are the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held, bought or sold. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions that also served to hide the real value of the estate.

42. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HarbourVest (which claims had initially been valued at $0) for $80 million, in order to acquire HarbourVest's interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), gain HarbourVest's vote in favor of its Plan, and hide the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at $22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth $34.1 million at the time, about $40 million when the settlement was consummated, and over $55 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

43. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCM's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

44. Worse still, while knowing that HCM had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCM's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

45. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCM, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to induce them to sell. Had the Debtor instead fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

46. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (a

company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

47. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately $200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Dkt. 2949. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that in some cases exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

48. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, $250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and $90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this "success" to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of $30 million or more, while engineering the estate to prevent equity holders from objecting or even knowing.

49. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs,

appears to have exceeded $140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* Docket No. 3410-1.

50. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that "Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court." Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members' fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

51. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less than Mr. Dondero's written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court's indifference to the Debtor's complete failure to abide by its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

52. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that, but for that manipulation, could have been resolved with money left over for equity.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

53. As of the Petition Date, HCM had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [Docket No. 1473], ¶ F(4).

54. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada ("Okada"), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"), HCM's general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by HMIT. *Id.*

55. In the aggregate, HCM's limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by HMIT; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

56. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [Docket No. 1943] (the "Confirmation Order") [Docket No. 1808] (the "Plan").

57. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

58. In the Plan, HCM classified HMIT's Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy's Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

59. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

60. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCM and

different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the "Limited Partnership Agreement"). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

61. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCM and therefore "technically" had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

62. Based on the Debtor's financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors' "economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote." *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 ("the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy").

63. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCM became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

64. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

> the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

65. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

66. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

67. The Post Confirmation Quarterly Reports for the First Quarter of 2023 [Docket No. 3756 and 3757], show distributions of $270,205,592 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 68% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of $397,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan. About $277 million has been distributed to creditors when secured, priority and administrative creditors are also considered.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

68. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate, as held in the Claimant Trust, has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

69. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

70. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with $125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over $416 million, building a cash war chest of over $541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over $600 million, excluding related party notes.

71. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

72. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims sold was $365 million, the sale price was about $150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

73. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

74. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to assess whether interference was necessary to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to cause the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

75. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶Art. IV(B)(9).

76. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

77. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero*, *et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, Docket No. 1 (as amended by Docket No. 158).

78. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

79. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

80. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

81. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs require the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against

them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

82. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

83. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

84. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

85. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and other proceedings is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

86. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

87. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

88. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and details of all transactions that have occurred since the wall of silence was erected, and all liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

89. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

90. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

91. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCM's estate can be justly deemed unnecessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close, ultimately stopping the bloodshed.

92. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur and receive millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from $460 an hour for associates to $1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from $830 an hour for first year associate to over $2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

93. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

94. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.[6]

95. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

(i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust, transactions completed that affect the Claimant Trust directly or indirectly, and all liabilities of the Claimant Trust;; and

(ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and

(iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with

[6] To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: May 10, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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