

PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES LLP
Jeffrey N. Pomerantz (CA Bar No.143717) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
John A. Morris (NY Bar No. 2405397) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
Gregory V. Demo (NY Bar No. 5371992) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
Hayley R. Winograd (NY Bar No. 5612569) (*admitted pro hac vice*)
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 277-6910
Facsimile: (310) 201-0760

HAYWARD PLLC
Melissa S. Hayward
Texas Bar No. 24044908
MHayward@HaywardFirm.com
Zachery Z. Annable
Texas Bar No. 24053075
ZAnnable@HaywardFirm.com
10501 N. Central Expy, Ste. 106
Dallas, Texas 75231
Tel: (972) 755-7100
Fax: (972) 755-7110

Counsel for Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery, Jr., solely in his capacities as Chief Executive Officer of Highland Capital Management, L.P. and Trustee of the Highland Claimant Trust

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

In re
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,
Reorganized Debtor

Bankr. Case No. 19-34054-sgj11

HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,
Appellant,

Case No. 3:23-cv-00737-N

v.
MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC; JESSUP HOLDINGS, LLC;
FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC;
STONEHILL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC;
HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT L.P.;
JAMES P. SEERY, JR.; and THE HIGHLAND
CLAIMANT TRUST,
Appellees.



**DECLARATION OF JOHN A. MORRIS
IN SUPPORT OF THE HIGHLAND PARTIES' OBJECTION TO HUNTER
MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S OPPOSED MOTION FOR EXPEDITED
BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**

I, John A. Morris, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, under penalty of perjury, declare as follows:

1. I am a partner in the law firm of Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl & Jones LLP (the "Firm"), counsel to Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("HCMLP"), the reorganized debtor in the above-referenced bankruptcy case, the Highland Claimant Trust (the "Trust"), and James P. Seery, Jr., solely in his capacities as Chief Executive Officer of HCMLP and Claimant Trustee ("Mr. Seery"), and together with HCMLP and the Trust, the "Highland Parties"),¹ and I submit this declaration (the "Declaration") in support of the Highland Parties' objection (the "Objection") to *Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Opposed Motion for Expedited Briefing Schedule on Motion for Interlocutory Appeal* [Document No. 4] (the "Motion to Expedite") being filed simultaneously with this Declaration. This Declaration is based on my personal knowledge and review of the documents listed below.

2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the *Verified Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit and Seek Documents* filed by James Dondero in Cause No. DC-21-09534 on July 22, 2021.

¹ HMIT recently expressed concerns that the interests of HCMLP and the Trust may conflict with those of Mr. Seery. Based on our review of relevant information, my Firm has no reason to believe an actual conflict exists. Nevertheless, to address HMIT's professed concerns, Mr. Seery is in the process of retaining personal counsel. We expect Mr. Seery's attorney to file a Notice of Appearance early this week but are filing the Objection—with the consent of Mr. Seery and his prospective counsel and without waiting for an order of the Court—in order to move this matter forward expeditiously.

3. Attached as **Exhibit B** is a true and correct copy of the *Verified Amended Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit and Seek Documents* filed by James Dondero in Cause No. DC-21-09534 on May 2, 2022 (the “First 202 Petition”).

4. Attached as **Exhibit C** is a true and correct copy of an *Order* dated June 1, 2022 entered in Cause No. DC-21-09534 denying the First 202 Petition and dismissing the case.

5. Attached as **Exhibit D** is a true and correct copy of a letter (excluding attachments) from Douglas S. Draper to Nan R. Eitel of the Office of General Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, dated October 5, 2021.

6. Attached as **Exhibit E** is a true and correct copy of a letter (excluding attachments) from Davor Rukavina to Nan R. Eitel of the Office of General Counsel, Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, dated November 3, 2021.

7. Attached as **Exhibit F** is a true and correct copy of *Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust’s Verified Rule 202 Petition* filed by Hunter Mountain Investment Trust in Cause No. DC-23-01004 on January 20, 2023 (the “Second 202 Petition”).

8. Attached as **Exhibit G** is a true and correct copy of the *Declaration of James Dondero* (with Exhibit 1) dated January 15, 2023, filed in Cause No. DC-23-01004.

9. Attached as **Exhibit H** is a true and correct copy of an *Order* dated March 8, 2023 entered in Cause No. DC-23-01004 denying the Second 202 Petition and dismissing the case.

Dated: April 10, 2023

/s/ John A. Morris
John A. Morris

EXHIBIT A

DC-21-09534

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE JAMES DONDERO,

Petitioner.

§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
 § 95th
 § _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 §
 § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

**VERIFIED PETITION TO TAKE DEPOSITION BEFORE SUIT
 AND SEEK DOCUMENTS**

Petitioner James Dondero respectfully requests that this Court order, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202, the deposition of the corporate representatives of Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC, and of Farallon Capital Management, LLC. Petitioner further requests that the Court order certain limited, yet relevant documents to be provided under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2 as set forth below.

Petitioner would respectfully show the Court that:

I.

PARTIES

1. Petitioner James Dondero ("Petitioner") is an individual resident in Dallas County, Texas and is impacted by the potential acts and omissions alleged herein.
2. Respondent Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("A&M") is a Delaware limited liability company serving as an investment adviser, with offices in Dallas County, Texas, at 2100 Ross Ave., 21st Floor, Dallas, Texas 75201.
3. Respondent Farallon Capital Management LLC is a limited liability company with its primary place of business in California ("Farallon" and together with A&M, the "Respondents") which is an investment fund located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. The anticipated lawsuit would include common law claims.

5. The Court has personal jurisdiction over A&M because it maintains a regular place of business in Dallas County. Personal jurisdiction is also proper under TEX. CIR. PRAC. REM. CODE § 17.003, and under § 17.042(1)-(3) because its acts on behalf of the Crusader Funds (as defined below), would constitute a tort in this state. Furthermore, it participated in substantial acts in this state which are the subject of the investigation. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction over any potential claims because the action concerns the sale of personal property that was located in Dallas County, and in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Farallon because it, acting on behalf of itself or one of its subsidiaries/affiliates, communicated with representatives of Highland Capital Management, LP which is located in Dallas County, and with representatives of Acis and Josh Terry (both of whom are residents in Dallas County), to purchase claims in the Highland Capital Management, LP (“Highland”) Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the “Highland Bankruptcy Case”). Such acts, if shown to have occurred could constitute a tort in this state. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction over any potential claims because the action concerns the sale of personal property that was located in Dallas County, and in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

7. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, where venue of the anticipated lawsuit may lie and where the property at issue exists, and where a substantial amount of the acts and omissions underlying the potential suit occurred.

8. Removal is not proper because there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because a Rule 202 petition, as a pre-suit mechanism, does not meet Article III of the United States Constitution's standing requirement of an actual, live case or controversy.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9. This matter arises out of Farallon's purchase of certain bankruptcy claims in the Highland Bankruptcy Case, pending in the Northern District of Texas bankruptcy court, from three sources: HarbourVest, Acis Capital Management, LP, and the Crusader Funds (as defined below).

10. Petitioner is the founder and former CEO of Highland and is an adviser and/or manager of several trusts who own the equity in Highland. In addition, Petitioner is an investor in Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd. and several of its companion and affiliated funds (the "Crusader Funds").

11. Until recently, the Crusader Funds were managed by Highland, but are now managed and advised by A&M.

12. Shortly after the commencement of the Highland Bankruptcy Case, the Office of the United States Trustee solicited Highland's twenty largest unsecured creditors to serve on the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the Highland Bankruptcy Case (the "UCC").

13. As set forth below, the Information Sheet attached to such solicitation provided, *inter alia*,

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any

other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. (Emphasis in Original)

14. The UCC was originally populated by four members, (i) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (the “Redeemer Committee”), (ii) Acis Capital Management, L.P. (iii) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (together, “UBS”) and (iv) Meta-E Discovery LLC.

15. Upon information and belief, two of Highland’s creditors – the Redeemer Committee (a member of the UCC) and the Crusader Funds, who between them held approximately \$191 million in claims in the Highland Bankruptcy Case (the “Crusader Claims”)—sold their claims to Jessup Holdings LLC (“Jessup”), a newly established limited liability company established by Farallon right before the sale. It was formed for the purpose of holding claims Farallon purchased in the Highland Bankruptcy Case.

16. Upon information and belief, two other Highland creditors—Joshua Terry and Acis Capital Management (another member of the UCC), who between them held approximately \$25 million in claims (the “Acis Claims”)—sold their claims to Muck Holdings LLC (“Muck”), a newly established limited liability company set up by Farallon solely for the purpose of holding the Acis Claims that Farallon purchased.

17. Finally, another group of affiliated creditors, HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund, L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment, L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners, L.P. (collectively, “HarbourVest”) also sold \$80 million worth of their claims (the “HarbourVest Claims”, together with the Crusader Claims and Acis Claims, the “Claims”) to Muck.

18. Notwithstanding the instructions issued by the Office of the United States Trustee, no one—not Farallon, nor the Redeemer Committee, HarbourVest or Acis Capital Management—ever sought, much less obtained Court approval to sell their respective claims.

19. Upon information and belief, a substantial amount of time passed between the agreement to sell the Claims and the consummation of such sales. Notwithstanding their agreement to sell their respective claims, neither the Redeemer Committee nor Acis Capital Management resigned from the UCC.

20. The current CEO of Highland, James Seery, has an age-old connection to Farallon and, upon information and belief, advised Farallon to purchase the claims.

21. On a telephone call between Petitioner and a representative of Farallon, Michael Lin, Mr. Lin informed Petitioner that Farallon had purchased the claims sight unseen—relying entirely on Mr. Seery’s advice solely because of their prior dealings.

22. Mr. Seery had much to gain by brokering a sale of the Claims to Jessup and Muck—namely, his knowledge that Farallon—as a friendly investor—would allow him to remain as Highland’s CEO with virtually unfettered discretion to administer Highland. In addition, Mr. Seery’s rich compensation package incentivized him to continue the bankruptcy for as long as possible.

23. As Highland’s current CEO, Mr. Seery had non-public, material information concerning Highland. Upon information and belief, such non-public, material information was the basis for instructing Farallon to purchase the Claims, in violation the Registered Investment Advisor Act 15 U.S.C § 80b-1 et seq., among other things.

24. Additionally, A&M, upon information and belief, did not put the Crusader Claims on the open market prior to selling them to Farallon. The sale of the Crusader Claims by A&M

was not pursuant to normal means and there is reason to doubt that A&M sought or obtained the highest price for the assets that it sold. This would have injured Petitioner as an investor in the Crusader Funds.

IV.

RELIEF SOUGHT

1. Petitioner asks this Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take a pre-suit deposition of a designated representative, or representatives, of A&M, and to depose Michael Lin, on the following topics, to investigate any potential claims by Petitioner arising out of the highly irregular manner in which the Claim were marketed (if at all) and sold, within ten days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties:

- a. A&M's agreements with the Crusader Funds, and the agreement(s) of those funds with their respective investors;
- b. The valuation, marketing and sale of the Claims to Farallon (or its subsidiaries/ affiliates);
- c. The negotiations and communications leading up to the purchase or sale of the Claims;
- d. Any discussions with James Seery regarding the Claims;
- e. Any prior relationship with James Seery.

2. As part of the Court's Order, Petitioner requests this Court to require Respondents to produce the following documents at their respective depositions:

- a. All agreements, contracts, or other documents (including any e-mails, correspondence, texts, drafts, term sheets, or communications related to same) related to or concerning the valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims (or any subset of the Claims);
- b. All communications with James Seery regarding the Claims;
- c. All communications with, between or among A&M, Seery, HarbourVest, Joshua Terry, Acis, or Highland Capital Management ,LP (or any agent or

representative thereof), regarding or related to the Claims (or any subset or portion thereof);

- d. All communications regarding filing any notice with the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the Highland Bankruptcy Case or seeking such Court's approval for the sale or purchase of the Claims;
- e. All offers to sell or purchase the Claims and/or all correspondence regarding same;

V.

HEARING

21. After service of this Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on the Petition.

22. FOR THESE REASONS, Petitioner asks the Court to set a date for hearing on this Petition, and after the hearing, to find that the likely benefit of allowing Petitioner to take the requested depositions outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure. Petitioner further asks the Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take the oral depositions of Michael Lin and a designated representative or representatives of A&M after proper notice and service at the offices of Sbaiti & Company PLLC, 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 4900W, Dallas, Texas 75201, within ten (10) days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties, and to produce the requested documents at said deposition. Petitioner also seeks any further relief to which he may be justly entitled.

Dated: July 22, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti

Texas Bar No. 24058096

Brad J. Robinson

Texas Bar No. 24058076

J.P. Morgan Chase Tower

2200 Ross Avenue Suite 4900W

Dallas, Texas 75205

T: (214) 432-2899

F: (214) 853-4367

E: mas@sbautilaw.com


bjr@sbautilaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

VERIFICATION

I, the undersigned, have reviewed attached *Verified Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit and Seek Documents* and verify, pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 132.001 under penalty of perjury, that the factual statements therein, as stated, are true and correct, and are within the best of my personal knowledge as stated therein. The date of my birth is June 29, 1962, and my address is 2515 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1100, Dallas, Texas 75201.

Verified this 22nd Day of July, 2021.



James Dondero

EXHIBIT B

CAUSE NO. DC-21-09534

IN RE JAMES DONDERO,

Petitioner.

§ **IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
§
§ **95th JUDICIAL DISTRICT**
§
§ **DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS**

**VERIFIED AMENDED PETITION TO TAKE DEPOSITION BEFORE SUIT
AND SEEK DOCUMENTS**

Petitioner James Dondero respectfully requests that this Court order, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202, the deposition of the corporate representatives and/or employees of Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC, and of Farallon Capital Management, LLC. Petitioner further requests that the Court order certain limited, yet relevant, documents to be provided under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 199.2 as set forth in below.

Petitioner would respectfully show the Court that:

I.

PARTIES

1. Petitioner James Dondero ("Petitioner") is an individual resident in Dallas County, Texas, and is impacted by the potential acts and omissions.
2. Respondent Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("A&M") is a Delaware limited liability company serving as an investment adviser, with offices in Dallas County, Texas, at 2100 Ross Ave., 21st Floor, Dallas, Texas 75201.
3. Respondent Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") is an investment fund located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111, and Respondent Michael Lin is a principal at Farallon.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202. The anticipated lawsuit would include common law claims.

5. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Respondent Alvarez & Marsal because it maintains a regular place of business in Dallas County. Personal jurisdiction is also proper under Tex. Cir. Prac. Rem. Code § 17.003, and under §17.042(1)-(3) because A&M contracted with counterparties, Joshua Terry and Acis Capital Management, L.P., both of whom at the time had their principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas, and because its acts on behalf of the Crusader Funds (as defined below), if they occurred as believed they did, will have been tortious as to Petitioner. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction because the action concerns the sale of personal property located in Dallas County in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

6. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Farallon because it contracted with A&M to purchase claims in the Highland Capital Management, L.P. Chapter 11 bankruptcy (“Highland bankruptcy”) upon the recommendation of James Seery, Highland’s CEO. Such acts, if shown to have occurred as believed and under the alleged circumstances, will have been tortious as to the Petitioner. Moreover, this Court has quasi *in rem* jurisdiction because the action concerns the sale of personal property located in Dallas County in which Plaintiff claims an interest.

7. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, where venue of the anticipated lawsuit may lie and where the property at issue exists, and where a substantial amount of the acts and omissions underlying the potential suit occurred.

8. Removal is not proper because there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because a Rule 202 petition does not meet Article III of the United States Constitution's standing requirement.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9. This matter arises out of purchase of certain bankruptcy claims in the Highland Bankruptcy.

10. Petitioner is the founder and former CEO of Highland Capital Management, L.P., currently a bankrupt debtor. He is also an investor in Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd. and several of its companion and affiliated funds (the "Crusader Funds"). Therefore, Petitioner has an interest in seeing to it that A&M properly marketed the claims for proper purposes and for the right price.

11. Until recently, the Crusader Funds were managed by Highland, and then by A&M when those funds went into liquidation.

12. Petitioner has an interest in the bankruptcy estate by virtue of his affiliation, and the fact that he is an adviser and/or manager of several trusts who own the equity of the debtor and therefore has an interest in seeing the equity properly protected in bankruptcy.

13. Shortly after the Highland bankruptcy was filed, the Chapter 11 Trustee issued an invitation to creditors to serve on the unsecured creditors committee (the "UCC").

14. The Trustee's invitation included a condition: namely, that anyone who served on the committee would have to agree that they would not sell their claims or in any way alienate them (including allowing them to be used as security) without leave of Court. Specifically, the United Trustee's instruction sheet stated:

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer

claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed questionnaire and accepting membership on official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from the committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violation, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

15. Upon information and belief, two of the Highland creditors – the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund, who between them owned approximately \$191 million in claims in the bankruptcy as well as other assets (the “Crusader Claims”) – sold their Claims and assets to Jessup Holdings LLC, a subsidiary of Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Alvarez and Marsal made this sale, which was in violation of the foregoing order.

16. Alvarez and Marsal arguably owe fiduciary duties to the funds and funds investors, and may have violated those duties by failing to conduct a sale for proper value, and/or by engaging in other acts that resulted in a sale of assets that was not authorized and/or not allowed by the terms of the funds or by law.

17. Around the same time, another Highland creditor—Joshua Terry and Acis Capital Management, who have approximately \$25 million in claims—also sold their claims to Muck Holdings, LLC, set up by Farallon Capital Management (the “Acis Claims”).

18. And a third creditor, HarbourVest, sold its \$80 million worth of claims (the “HarbourVest Claims”) to Muck Holding as well.

19. The above interests are generally referred to hereinafter as the “Claims”.

20. The sales of the Claims were not reported contemporaneously as they were supposed to have been, nor was leave of the bankruptcy court ever sought, much less obtained, for the sales.

21. However, Acis/Terry, and Crusader continued to serve on the UCC for a substantial period of time as if they hadn't sold their claims at all.

22. As was discovered by the Petitioner, the current CEO of Highland, James Seery, has an age-old connection to Farallon and to Stonehill and, upon information and belief, advised Farallon and Stonehill to purchase the Claims.

23. On a telephone call between Petitioner and Michael Lin, a representative of Farallon, Mr. Lin informed Petitioner that Farallon had purchased the claims sight unseen and with no due diligence—100% relying on Mr. Seery's say-so because they had made so much money in the past when Mr. Seery told them to purchase claims.

24. In other words, Mr. Seery had inside information on the price and value of the claims that he shared with no one but Farallon for their benefit.

25. Mr. Seery's management duties come with a federally-imposed fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act of 1940.

26. Mr. Seery had much to gain by Farallon holding the claims—namely, his knowledge that Farallon—as a friendly investor—would allow him to remain as CEO while Highland remains bankrupt and get paid (whereas plainly, the selling members of the UCC were ready to move on, thus truncating Seery's supposed gravy train). Mr. Seery's rich compensation package incentivized him to continue the bankruptcy for as long as possible.

27. However, Mr. Seery is privy to material non-public information (i.e., "Inside Information") of many of the securities that Highland deals in, as well as in the funds that Mr. Seery manages through Highland. One of the assets was a publicly traded security that Highland was an insider of, and therefore, should not have traded (whether directly or indirectly), given its possession of insider information.

28. Thus, his confidential tip to Farallon to purchase the claims may have violated certain of his duties as a Registered Investment Adviser, federal Securities laws, and his duties to the bankruptcy estate.

29. Mr. Seery's duties also involve duties to manage the bankruptcy estate in a manner that would expeditiously resolve the bankruptcy. If the Unsecured Creditor Committee members (Acis, HarbourVest, and Redeemer) were indeed interested in selling their claims for less than the notional amount, then that would have been publicized in the required court filing. By failing to file them publicly and seeking court approval, the bankruptcy has been prolonged whilst Farallon seeks to reap a massive windfall return on its investment—a return that Seery apparently promised.

30. The sale of assets authorized by A&M was not pursuant to normal means, and there is reason to doubt that A&M sought or obtained the highest price for the assets that it sold.

IV.

RELIEF SOUGHT FROM ALVAREZ AND MARSAL

31. Petitioner asks this Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take a pre-suit deposition of a designated representative, or representatives, of A&M, on the following topics, and to investigate any potential lawsuits arising out of the highly irregular manner in which the assets were marketed and sold, within ten days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties:

- a. A&M's rights and responsibilities and duties, including, but not limited to, under A&M's agreement(s) with the Crusader Funds and the Agreement(s) of those funds governing Petitioner's rights and duties as an investor (whether directly or indirectly);
- b. The solicitation, offer, valuation, marketing, negotiation, and sale of the Highland bankruptcy claims or other assets by A&M on behalf of the Crusader Funds (and/or the Redeemer Committee) to any or all of Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Muck Holdings, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC, or any third party;

- c. A&M's valuation, and negotiation of the price, of the Claims, its bases therefor, and what it communicated to potential purchasers about the value of the Claims, if anything;
- d. The negotiations and communications leading up to the purchase or sale of the Claims, including, but not limited to:
 - i. Any discussions with James Seery or anyone at or on behalf of Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Creditors Committee, Sidley Austin, LLP, and/or F.T.I. Consulting, regarding the Claims, any plans with regards to Highland Capital Management, L.P., the liquidation or the value of the Claims, the likelihood of and quantum of payout of the Claims, the pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation;
 - ii. Any discussions with the purchasers of the Claims or other assets to, including, but not limited to, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC or Muck Holdings, LLC, regarding the Claims or other assets, Highland Capital Management, L.P., the value of the Claims, the likely payout of the Claims, the pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation.

32. As part of the Court's Order, Petitioner requests this Court to require A&M to produce the following documents at their respective depositions:

- a. All offers to sell or purchase the Claims and/or all correspondence regarding same;
- b. A&M's agreement(s) with the Crusader Funds and the Agreement(s) of those funds governing Petitioner's rights and duties as an investor (whether directly or indirectly);
- c. Any document reflecting the purported assets of, or valuation of, Highland Capital Management, L.P. at the time of the sale or marketing of the Claims;
- d. Marketing materials, presentations, decks, information sheets, spreadsheets, or other documents sent to or provided to any purchaser, whether in a data room or as part of any marketing pitch, or during any due diligence process, relating to or concerning the liquidation value, potential or likely return on investment, asset valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims;
- e. All documents, agreements, contracts (including any drafts, letters of intent, confidentiality agreements, term sheets) or communications related to same,

relating to or concerning the valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims (or any subset of the Claims);

- f. Communications with James Seery or any other person on behalf of the Debtor, the U.S. Trustee's office, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, Joshua Terry, Acis Capital Management, LLC, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, or Muck Holdings, LLC (or anyone representing or signing on behalf of the foregoing) regarding the sale of the Claims or other assets, the value thereof, the expected amount or percentage of the Claims that would be paid and when such payment was expected to occur, the liquidation value of Highland Capital Management, L.P., potential sources of other cash to pay the claims, the liquidation of the Claims, the likely return from purchasing the Claims, the underlying assets securing the Claims.
- g. Proofs of purchase of the Claims and other assets of the Crusader entities.

V.

**RELIEF SOUGHT FROM FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.,
MUCK HOLDINGS, LLC AND MICHAEL LIN**

33. Petitioner asks this Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take a pre-suit deposition of a designated representative, or representatives, of Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. or Muck Holdings, LLC, and to depose Michael Lin, on the following topics, to investigate any potential lawsuits arising out of the highly irregular manner in which the assets were marketed and sold, within ten days of the Court's Order, or as agreed by the parties:

- a. Farallon, Muck Holdings, LLC, and/or Lin's understanding of the value of the Claims, the assets held or controlled by or to be acquired by Highland Capital Management, L.P., the liquidation value of the Estate of Highland Capital Management, L.P., and/or Claims, how and when the claims were expected to be paid and what the expected percentage payoff was going to be, and the bases for such understanding or belief, and what was communicated to them about the value of the Claims;
- b. The negotiations and communications leading up to the purchase or sale of the Claims, including, but not limited to, any discussions with sellers of any of the Claims regarding the Claims and the sale/purchase of the Claims, discussions with James Seery or anyone at or on behalf of Highland Capital Management, L.P. regarding the Claims and his plans with regards to Highland, the value of the Claims, the likely payout of the Claims, the

pricing of the Claims, and/or the assets that would secure the Claims or be liquidated to fund the Claims' liquidation, or any disclosures by James Seery or Highland Capital Management, L.P. regarding how the Claims were going to be paid;

- c. Farallon and Michael Lin's awareness of material non-public information regarding Highland Capital Management, L.P. or securities held by Highland Capital Management, L.P.;
- d. Farallon and Michael Lin's relationship with James Seery or Highland Capital Management, L.P. and their knowledge of his role and their ongoing relationship with him.

34. As part of the Court's Order, Petitioner requests this Court to require Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C., Muck Holdings LLC, and Michael Lin to produce the following documents at their respective depositions:

- a. All offers to sell or purchase the Claims and/or all correspondence regarding same;
- b. Any document reflecting the purported assets of, or valuation of, Highland Capital Management, L.P. at the time of the sale or marketing of the Claims;
- c. Marketing materials, presentations, decks, information sheets, spreadsheets, or other documents sent to or provided to any purchaser, whether in a data room or as part of any marketing pitch, or during any due diligence process, relating to or concerning the liquidation value, potential or likely return on investment, asset valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims.
- d. All agreements, contracts, or other documents (including any drafts, letters of intent, confidentiality agreements, term sheets, or communications related to same) relating to or concerning the valuation, purchase, marketing or sale of the Claims (or any subset of the Claims);
- e. All communications with James Seery or any other person on behalf of the Debtor, the U.S. Trustee's office, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, Joshua Terry, Acis Capital Management, LLC, Farallon, Stonehill Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings, LLC or Muck Holdings, LLC (or anyone representing or signing on behalf of the foregoing) regarding the sale of the Claims or other assets, the value thereof, the expected amount or percentage of the Claims that would be paid and when such payment was expected to occur, the liquidation value of Highland Capital Management, L.P., potential sources of other cash to pay the Claims, the liquidation of the

Claims, the likely return from purchasing the Claims, the underlying assets securing the Claims.

- f. Proofs of purchase of the Claims and other assets of the Crusader entities.

VI.

REQUEST FOR HEARING & ORDERS

35. After service of this Amended Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on the Petition and order the requested relief.

36. Document discovery is permitted by Rule 199.2. Rule 202.5 states that “depositions authorized by this Rule are governed by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. The scope of discovery in depositions authorized by this rule is the same as if the anticipated suit or potential claim had been filed....” Rule 199.2 governs such actions and “expressly allows a party noticing a deposition to include a request for production of documents or tangible things within the scope of discovery and within the witness's possession, custody, or control.” *In re City of Tatum*, 567 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2018) (holding that district court properly ordered document discovery in Rule 202 action). *See also* Tex. R. Civ. P. 205.1(c) (authorizing party to compel discovery from a nonparty by court order or subpoena, including a request for production served with a deposition notice). *See also City of Dall. v. City of Corsicana*, Nos. 10-14-00090-CV, 10-14-00171-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8753, at *15-16 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 20, 2015) (“Under rule 202, documents can be requested in connection with a deposition.... Accordingly, the trial court’s order is not an abuse of discretion to the extent that it allows Navarro to obtain documents in an oral deposition under rule 199 or a deposition on written questions under rule 200.”); *In re Anand*, No. 01-12-01106-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 4157, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2013) (“the language of these rules when read together

permits a petition seeking a pre-suit deposition under Rule 202 to also request the production of documents”).

37. **FOR THESE REASONS**, Petitioner asks the Court to set a date for hearing on this Amended Petition, and after the hearing, to find that the likely benefit of allowing Petitioner to take the requested depositions outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure. Petitioner further asks the Court to issue an Order authorizing Petitioner to take the oral depositions of the Respondents after proper notice and service at the offices of Sbaiti & Company PLLC, 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 4900W, Dallas, Texas 75201, within ten (10) days of the Court’s Order, or as otherwise agreed to by the parties, and to produce the requested documents prior to said deposition. Petitioner also seeks any further relief to which he may be justly entitled.

Dated: May 2, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

SBAITI & COMPANY PLLC

/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti

Texas Bar No. 24058096

Brad J. Robinson

Texas Bar No. 24058076

2200 Ross Avenue – Suite 4900W

Dallas, TX 75201

T: (214) 432-2899

F: (214) 853-4367

E: mas@sbaitilaw.com

bjr@sbaitilaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of May, 2022.


/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti

Mazin A. Sbaiti

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
DALLAS COUNTY §

Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared James Dondero (hereinafter "Affiant"), who is over the age of 21 and of sound mind and body, who being by me duly sworn, on his oath deposed and said that he has read the foregoing Amended Verified Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit, and that the statements of fact therein are within his personal knowledge and are true and correct as stated, Further, Affiant stated that the Affiant has personal knowledge because of Affiant's relationships and interactions as described therein.


James Dondero

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this 04th day of April, 2022, to certify which witness my hand and official seal.

My commission expires on 12.9.2025.


Notary Public of the State of Texas

seal



Automated Certificate of eService

This automated certificate of service was created by the eFiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the eFiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Kim James on behalf of Mazin Sbaiti
 Bar No. 24058096
 krj@sbautilaw.com
 Envelope ID: 64114982
 Status as of 5/3/2022 2:58 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
Mazin Sbaiti		MAS@SbaitiLaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Andrew Bean		ABean@gibsondunn.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
John T.Cox		TCox@gibsondunn.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Wendy Cassidy		WCassidy@gibsondunn.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Kim James		krj@sbautilaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Jonathan Bridges		jeb@sbautilaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Brad Robinson		bjr@sbautilaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT
Charlotte Casso		bcc@sbautilaw.com	5/2/2022 9:27:04 PM	SENT

EXHIBIT C

CAUSE NO. DC-21-09534

IN RE:

JAMES DONDERO,

Petitioner.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

95TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER

Came on for consideration the *Verified Amended Petition to Take Deposition Before Suit and Seek Documents* ("Petition") filed by petitioner James Dondero ("Dondero"). The Court, having considered the Petition, the responses filed by respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC ("A&M"), the record, and applicable authorities, and having conducted a hearing on the Petition on June 1, 2022, concludes that Dondero's Petition should be denied and that this case should be dismissed. Therefore,

The Court ORDERS that Dondero's Petition be, and is hereby, DENIED, and that this case be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

THE COURT SO ORDERS.

Signed this 1st day of June, 2022.



HONORABLE MONICA PURDY

EXHIBIT D

HELLER, DRAPER & HORN, L.L.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

650 POYDRAS STREET, SUITE 2500
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70130-6103
TELEPHONE: (504) 299-3300 FAX: (504) 299-3399

Douglas S. Draper
Direct Dial: (504) 299-3333
E-mail: ddraper@hellerdraper.com

EDWARD M. HELLER
(1926-2013)

October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530


Re: *Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11*

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“Creditors’ Committee”) in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland” or “Debtor”). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors’ Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee’s Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over \$550 million in assets and net \$110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland’s decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net \$110 million arbitration award in favor of the “Redeemer Committee.”¹ After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor’s counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland’s best interest.

¹ The “Redeemer Committee” was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the “Crusader Fund” that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the “Redeemer Committee” and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.



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I became involved in Highland’s bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust (“Dugaboy”), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court’s rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors’ Committee and the U.S. Trustee’s Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors’ Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor’s general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland’s business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.² It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland’s business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland’s Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the “Plan”). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor’s Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the “EOUST”) has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled “*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*” (the “Periodic Reporting Requirements”). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST’s commitment to maintaining “uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor’s financial condition and business activities” and “to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor’s financial affairs.” 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to “assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise” *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that “Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate’s administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor’s business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

² See Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

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information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires.” See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that “the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest.” This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.³ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors’ committee to share information it receives with those who “hold claims of the kind represented by the committee” but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors’ committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland’s structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee’s Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor’s failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee’s Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task “fell through the cracks.”⁴ This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor’s counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show “cause” to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor’s failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors’ Committee often refer to the Debtor’s structure as a “byzantine empire,” the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.⁵ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

³ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement “for cause,” including that “the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available.” Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

⁴ See Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 49:5-21).

⁵ During a deposition, the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor’s assets “[o]ff the top of [his] head” and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

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available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").⁶ The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

⁶ Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

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HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at \$22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of \$40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.⁷ Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),⁸ nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.⁹ That representation is untrue;

and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating \$300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be \$0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to \$80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

⁷ Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

⁸ See Doc. 1894 (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

⁹ See Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

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MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.¹⁰ If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.¹¹ It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.¹² This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹³ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims¹⁴:

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

¹⁰ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

¹¹ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

¹² See *id.* at 22.

¹³ See Appendix, p. A-25.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

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and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.¹⁵ In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor’s estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors’ claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ¹⁶
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0 ¹⁷

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a \$200 million dissipation in the estate’s asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of \$556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021.¹⁸

¹⁵ A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

¹⁶ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included “the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds,” the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

¹⁷ Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid \$50 million for claims worth only \$46.4 million. See Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between \$472-600 million as opposed to \$364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

¹⁸ Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor’s settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

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- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by \$236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by \$100 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.¹⁹

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.²⁰ Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.
- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

¹⁹ See Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

²⁰ See Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

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committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²¹ We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

²¹ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

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In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;
- d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement²²;
- e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

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members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT E



Ross Tower
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
munsch.com
Direct Dial 214.855.7587
Direct Fax 214.978.5359
drukavina@munsch.com

November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov


Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned



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about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of \$189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of \$110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.¹

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

¹ *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

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Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).² At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.³

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.⁴

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

² Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

³ See *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

⁴ See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

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independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.⁵ Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.⁶

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").⁷ There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.⁸ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

⁵ See Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

⁶ See Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

⁷ See Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

⁸ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

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management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."⁹ Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.¹⁰ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

⁹ See Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

¹⁰ During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. See Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

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they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty \$750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a “settlement” to obtain Mr. Daugherty’s withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor’s plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor’s confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor’s failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court’s order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.¹¹

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors’ Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor’s failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor’s affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate’s asset value decreased by approximately \$200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the \$200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately \$75 billion under management. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (“HCLOF”). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (“DAF”) held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining 2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

¹¹ See “*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*” (the “Periodic Reporting Requirements”). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST’s commitment to maintaining “uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor’s financial condition and business activities” and “to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor’s financial affairs.” 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

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which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately \$15 million in legal fees and costs.¹²

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over \$300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at \$0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.¹³ Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to \$45 million in Class 8 claims and \$35 million in Class 9 claims.¹⁴ At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total \$80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a \$31.5 million return.¹⁵

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was \$22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least \$44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.¹⁶ This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

¹² Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than \$7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the \$15 million in legal fees).

¹³ See Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

¹⁵ We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately \$28 million.

¹⁶ Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." See Ex. B.

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- The Debtor sold approximately \$25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over \$70 million; the Debtor likewise sold \$6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for \$18 million.
- The Debtor divested interests worth \$145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for \$35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);
- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;
- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth \$50 million) and Targa (worth \$37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

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operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*¹⁷ Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "actual and necessary cost" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."¹⁸ It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹⁹ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims:

¹⁷ See Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

¹⁸ *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).

¹⁹ See Ex. C.

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<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management (“Farallon”), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management (“Stonehill”). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly \$600 million,²⁰ which could result in Mr. Seery’s receipt of a performance bonus approximating \$50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor’s estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors’ claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ²¹
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0

²⁰ See Ex. D.

²¹ See Ex. E. Because the transaction included “the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds,” the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

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An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by \$200 million, from \$556 million on October 16, 2019, to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021).²²
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of \$236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.²³

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than \$100 million in claims on those trades.

²² Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLDF, which in reality was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

²³ See Ex. F.

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- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The aggregate \$150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²⁴ In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

²⁴ See Ex. E.

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The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of \$60,000 per month for the first three months, \$50,000 per month for the following three months, and \$30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.²⁵ When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of \$150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."²⁶ Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

- (1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to \$1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

²⁵ See Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.

²⁶ See Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

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“Case Resolution Plan,” \$500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and \$750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

- (2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a “Monetization Vehicle Plan,” he would be entitled to \$500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, \$250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined “contingent restructuring fee” based on “performance under the plan after all material distributions” were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery’s formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan’s effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of \$150,000 per month (termed his “Base Salary”), subject to the negotiation of additional “go-forward” compensation, including a “success fee” and severance pay.²⁷ Mr. Seery’s success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large “success fee.” Again, we estimate that, based on the estate’s nearly \$600 million value today, Mr. Seery’s success fee could approximate \$50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS’s claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between \$472-\$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor’s management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor’s repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors’ Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate’s recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between \$150 and \$232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor’s estate had an actual value of at least \$460 million, including \$105 million in cash and a \$50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero’s offer, the Debtor’s cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

²⁷ See Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

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Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.²⁸
- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.²⁹ The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.³⁰

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

²⁸ Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.

²⁹ Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.

³⁰ Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

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of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.³¹

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.³² Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.³³ In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.³⁴ Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.³⁵ This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

³¹ 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).

³² The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.

³³ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

³⁴ *Id.* at 26-28.

³⁵ See *id.* at 22.

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As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a \$6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.³⁶ In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.³⁷ If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. See 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

³⁶ See Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

³⁷ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

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- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;
- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay \$18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and
- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: 

Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm

EXHIBIT F

DC-23-01004

CAUSE NO. _____

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	§	191st
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	____th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
	§	
<i>Petitioner,</i>	§	
	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

**PETITIONER HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST’S
VERIFIED RULE 202 PETITION**

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Petitioner, Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (“HMIT”), files this Verified Petition (“Petition”) pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking pre-suit discovery from Respondent Farallon Capital Management, LLC (“Farallon”) and Respondent Stonehill Capital Management, LLC (“Stonehill”) (collectively “Respondents”), to allow HMIT to investigate potential claims against Respondents and other potentially adverse entities, and would respectfully show:

PARTIES

1. HMIT is a Delaware statutory trust that was the largest equity holder in Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“HCM”), holding a 99.5% limited partnership interest. HCM filed chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in 2019 and, as a result of these

proceedings,¹ HMIT held a Class 10 claim which, post-confirmation, was converted to a Contingent Trust Interest in HCM's post-reorganization sole limited partner.

2. Farallon is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in California, which is located at One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111.

3. Stonehill is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal office in New York, which is located at 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

4. Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, because all or substantially all of the events or omissions giving rise to HMIT's potential common law claims occurred in Dallas County, Texas. In the event HMIT elects to proceed with a lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill, venue of such proceedings will be proper in Dallas County, Texas.

5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Petition pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.² The amount in controversy of any potential claims against Farallon or Stonehill far exceeds this Court's minimum jurisdictional requirements. Without limitation, HMIT specifically seeks to investigate potentially actionable claims for unjust enrichment, imposition of a constructive trust with

¹ These proceedings were initially filed in Delaware but were ultimately transferred to and with venue in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

² The discovery relief requested in this Petition does not implicate the HCM bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, this Rule 202 Petition is not subject to removal because there is no amount in actual controversy and there is no cause of action currently asserted.

disgorgement, knowing participation in breaches of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with business expectancies.

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Respondents from which discovery is sought because both Farallon and Stonehill are doing business in Texas under Texas law including, without limitation, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §17.042. Consistent with due process, Respondents have established minimum contacts with Texas, and the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Respondents complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. HMIT's potential claims against Respondents arise from and/or relate to Farallon's and Stonehill's contacts in Texas. Respondents also purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities within Texas, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Texas law.

SUMMARY

7. HMIT seeks to investigate potential claims relating to the sale and transfer of large, unsecured creditors' claims in HCM's bankruptcy to special purpose entities affiliated with and/or controlled by Farallon and Stonehill (the "Claims"). Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill historically had and benefited from close relationships with James Seery ("Seery"), who was serving as HCM's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") at the time of the Claims purchases. Furthermore, still upon information and belief, because Farallon and Stonehill acquired or controlled the acquisition of the Claims under highly questionable

circumstances. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Respondents received material non-public information and were involved in insider trading in connection with the acquisition of the Claims.

8. The pre-suit discovery which HMIT seeks is directly relevant to potential claims, and it is clearly appropriate under Rule 202.1(b). HMIT anticipates the institution of a future lawsuit in which it may be a party due to its status as a stakeholder as former equity in HCM or in its current capacity as a Contingent Trust Interest holder, as well as under applicable statutory and common law principles relating to the rights of trust beneficiaries. In this context, HMIT may seek damages on behalf of itself or, alternatively, in a derivative capacity and without limitation, for damages or disgorgement of monies for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.

9. HMIT currently anticipates a potential lawsuit against Farallon and Stonehill as defendants and, as such, Farallon and Stonehill have adverse interests to HMIT in connection with the anticipated lawsuit. The addresses and telephone numbers are as follows: **Farallon Capital Management LLC**, One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94111, Telephone: 415-421-2132; **Stonehill Capital Management, LLC**, 320 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022, 212-739-7474 . Additionally, the following parties also may be parties with adverse interests in any potential lawsuit: **Muck Holdings LLC**, c/o Crowell & Moring LLP, Attn: Paul B. Haskel, 590 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022, 212-530-1823; **Jessup Holdings LLC**, c/o Mandel, Katz and Brosnan

LLP, Attn: John J. Mandler, 100 Dutch Hill Road, Suite 390, Orangeburg, NY 10962, 845-6339-7800.

BACKGROUND³

A. *Procedural Background*

10. On or about October 16, 2019, HCM filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which was later transferred to the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, Dallas Division, on December 4, 2019.

11. On October 29, 2019, the U.S. Trustee's office appointed a four-member Unsecured Creditors Committee ("UCC") consisting of three judgment creditors—the Redeemer Committee, which is a committee of investors in an HCM-affiliated fund known as the Crusader Fund that obtained an arbitration award against HCM in the hundreds of millions of dollars; Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP LLC (collectively "Acis"); and UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively "UBS") - and an unpaid vendor, Meta-E Discovery.

12. Following the venue transfer to Texas on December 27, 2019, HCM filed its *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary*

³ All footnote references to evidence involve documents filed in the HCM bankruptcy proceedings and are cited by "Dkt." reference. HMIT asks the Court to take judicial notice of the documents identified by these docket entries.

Course (“HCM’s Governance Motion”).⁴ On January 9, 2020, the Court signed an order approving HCM’s Settlement Motion (the “Governance Order”).⁵

13. As part of the Governance Order, an independent board of directors—which included Seery as one of the UCC’s selections—was appointed to the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Strand Advisors, Inc., (“Strand Advisors”) HCM’s general partner. Following the approval of the Governance Order, the Board then appointed Seery as HCM’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Restructuring Officer (“CRO”) in place of the previous CEO.⁶ Seery currently serves as Trustee of the Claimant Trust (HCM’s sole post-reorganization limited partner) and, upon information and belief, continues to serve as CEO of HCM following the effective date of the HCM bankruptcy reorganization plan (“Plan”).⁷

B. Seery’s Relationships with Stonehill and Farallon

14. Farallon and Stonehill are two capital management firms (similar to HCM) that, upon information belief, have long-standing relationships with Seery. Upon information and belief, they eventually participated in, directed and/or controlled the acquisition of hundreds of millions of dollars of unsecured Claims in HCM’s bankruptcy on behalf of funds which they manage. It appears they did so without any meaningful

⁴ Dkt. 281.

⁵ Dkt. 339.

⁶ Dkt. 854, Order Approving Retention of Seery as CEO/CRO.

⁷ See Dkt. 1943, Order Approving Plan, p. 34.

due diligence, much less reasonable due diligence, and *ostensibly* based their investment decisions only on Seery's input.

15. Upon information and belief, Seery historically has had a substantial business relationship with Farallon and he previously served as legal counsel to Farallon in other matters. Upon information and belief, Seery also has had a long-standing relationship with Stonehill. GCM Grosvenor, a global asset management firm, held four seats on the Redeemer Committee⁸ (an original member of the Unsecured Creditors Committee in HCM's bankruptcy). Upon information and belief, GCM Grosvenor is a significant investor in Stonehill and Farallon. Grosvenor, through Redeemer, also played a large part in appointing Seery as a director of Strand Advisors and approved his appointment as HCM's CEO and CRO.

C. *Claims Trading*

16. Imbued with his powers as CEO and CRO, Seery negotiated and obtained bankruptcy court approval of settlements with Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and another major creditor, HarbourVest⁹ (the "Settlements") (Redeemer, Acis, UBS, and HarbourVest are collectively the "Settling Parties"), resulting in the following allowed claims:¹⁰

⁸ Declaration of John A. Morris [Dkt. 1090], Ex. 1, pp. 15.

⁹ "HarbourVest" collectively refers to HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P.

¹⁰ Orders Approving Settlements [Dkt. 1273, Dkt. 1302, Dkt. 1788, Dkt. 2389].

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9
Redeemer	\$137 mm	\$0 mm
Acis	\$23 mm	\$0 mm
HarbourVest	\$45 mm	\$35 mm
UBS	\$65 mm	\$60 mm

17. Although these Settlements were achieved after years of hard-fought litigation,¹¹ each of the Settling Parties *curiously* sold their claims to Farallon or Stonehill (or affiliated special purpose entities) shortly after they obtained court approval of their Settlements. One of these “trades” occurred within just a few weeks before the Plan’s Effective Date.¹² Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill coordinated and controlled the purchase of these Claims through special purpose entities, Muck Holdings, LLC (“Muck”) and Jessup Holdings, LLC (“Jessup”) (collectively “SPEs”).¹³ Upon information and belief, both of these SPEs were created on the eve of the Claims purchases for the ostensible purpose of taking and holding title to the Claims.

18. Upon information and belief, Farallon and Stonehill directed and controlled the investment of over \$160 million dollars to acquire the Claims in the absence of any publicly available information that could rationally justify this substantial investment. These “trades” are even more surprising because, at the time of the confirmation of HCM’s Plan, the Plan provided only pessimistic estimates that these Claims would ever receive full satisfaction:

¹¹ Order Confirming Plan, pp. 9-11.

¹² Dkt. 2697, 2698.

¹³ See Notice of Removal [Dkt 2696], ¶ 4.

- a. HCM's Disclosure Statement projected payment of 71.32% of Class 8 claims, and 0% of claims in Classes 9-11;¹⁴
 - i. This meant that Farallon and Stonehill invested more than \$163 million in Claims *when the publicly available information indicated they would receive \$0 in return on their investment as Class 9 creditors and substantially less than par on their Class 8 Claims.*
- b. In HCM's Q3 2021 Post-Confirmation Report, HCM reported that the amount of Class 8 claims expected to be paid dropped even further from 71% to 54% (down approximately \$328.3 million);¹⁵
- c. From October 2019, when the original Chapter 11 Petition was filed, to January 2021, just before the Plan was confirmed, the valuation of HCM's assets dropped over \$200 million from \$566 million to \$328.3 million;¹⁶
- d. Despite the stark decline in the valuation of the HCM bankruptcy estate and reduction in percentage of Class 8 Claims expected to be satisfied, Stonehill, through Jessup, and Farallon, through Muck, nevertheless purchased the four largest bankruptcy claims from the Redeemer Committee/Crusader Fund, Acis, HarbourVest, and UBS (collectively the "Claims") in April and August of 2021¹⁷ in the combined amount of approximately \$163 million; and
- e. Upon information and belief:
 - i. Stonehill, through an SPE, Jessup, acquired the Redeemer Committee's claim for approximately \$78 million;¹⁸

¹⁴ Dkt. 1875-1, Plan Supplement, Exh. A, p. 4.

¹⁵ Dkt. 2949.

¹⁶ Dkt 1473, Disclosure Statement, p. 18.

¹⁷ Notices of Transfers [Dkt. 2211, 2212, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2215, 2697, 2698].

¹⁸ July 6, 2021 Letter from Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.

- ii. The \$23 million Acis claim¹⁹ was sold to Farallon/Muck for approximately \$8 million;
- iii. HarbourVest sold its combined approximately \$80 million in claims to Farallon/Muck for approximately \$27 million; and
- iv. UBS sold its combined approximately \$125 million in claims for approximately \$50 million to both Stonehill/Jessup and Farallon/Muck *at a time when the total projected payout was only approximately \$35 million.*

19. In Q3 2021, just over \$6 million of the projected \$205 million available to satisfy general unsecured claims was disbursed.²⁰ No additional distributions were made to general unsecured claimholders until, suddenly, in Q3 2022 almost \$250 million was paid toward Class 8 general unsecured claims—\$45 million more than was *ever* projected.²¹ According to HCM’s Motion for Exit Financing,²² and a recent motion filed by Dugaboy Investment Trust,²³ there remain *substantial* assets to be monetized for the benefit of HCM’s creditors. Thus, upon information and belief, the funds managed by Stonehill and Farallon stand to realize significant profits on their Claims purchases. In turn, upon information and belief, Stonehill and Farallon will garner (or already have garnered) substantial fees – both base fees and performance fees – as the result of their acquiring and/or managing the purchase of the Claims.

¹⁹ Seery/HCM have argued that \$10 million of the Acis claim is self-funding. Dkt. 1271, Transcript of Hearing on Motions to Compromise Controversy with Acis Capital Management [1087] and the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund [1089], p. 197.

²⁰ Dkt. 3200.

²¹ Dkt. 3582.

²² Dkt. 2229.

²³ Dkt. 3382.

D. *Material Information is Not Disclosed*

20. Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3 requires debtors to “file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest.” No public reports required by Rule 2015.3 were filed. Seery testified they simply “fell through the cracks.”²⁴

21. As part of the HarbourVest Settlement, Seery negotiated the purchase of HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF for approximately \$22.5 million as part of the transaction.²⁵ Approximately 19.1% of HCLOF’s assets were comprised of debt and equity in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (“MGM”). The HCLOF interest was not to be transferred to HCM for distribution as part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to “to an entity to be designated by the Debtor”—*i.e.*, one that was not subject to typical bankruptcy reporting requirements.²⁶

22. Six days prior to the filing of the motion seeking approval of the HarbourVest Settlement, upon information and belief, it appears that Seery may have acquired material non-public information regarding Amazon’s now-consummated interest in acquiring MGM,²⁷ yet there is no record of Seery’s disclosure of such

²⁴ Dkt. 1905, February 3, 2021 Hearing Transcript, 49:5-21.

²⁵ Dkt. 1625, p. 9, n. 5.

²⁶ Dkt. 1625.

²⁷ Dkt. 150-1.

information to the Court, HCM's creditors, or otherwise. Upon the receipt of this material non-public information, HMIT understands, upon information and belief, that MGM was supposed to be placed on HCM's "restricted list," but Seery nonetheless continued to move forward with deals that involved MGM assets.²⁸

23. As HCM additionally held its own direct interest in MGM,²⁹ the value of MGM was of paramount importance to the value of HCM's bankruptcy estate. HMIT believes, upon information and belief, that Seery conveyed material non-public information regarding MGM to Stonehill and Farallon as inducement to purchase the Claims.

E. *Seery's Compensation*

24. Upon information and belief, a component of Seery's compensation is a "success fee" that depends on the actual liquidation of HCM's bankruptcy estate assets versus the Plan projections. As current holders of the largest claims against the HCM estate, Muck and Jessup, the SPEs apparently created and controlled by Stonehill and Farallon, were installed as two of the three members of an Oversight Board in charge of monitoring the activities of HCM, as the Reorganized Debtor, and the Claimant Trust.³⁰ Thus, along with a single independent restructuring professional, Farallon and

²⁸ See Dkt. 1625, Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith, filed December 23, 2020

²⁹ Motion for Exit Financing.[Dkt.2229]

³⁰ Dkt. 2801.

Stonehill's affiliates oversee Seery's go-forward compensation, including any "success" fee.³¹

DISCOVERY REQUESTED

25. HMIT seeks to investigate whether Farallon and Stonehill received material non-public information in connection with, and as inducement for, the negotiation and sale of the claims to Farallon and Stonehill or its affiliated SPEs. Discovery is necessary to confirm or deny these allegations and expose potential abuses and unjust enrichment.

26. The requested discovery from Farallon is attached as Exhibit "A", and includes the deposition of one or more of its corporate representatives and the production of documents. The requested discovery from Stonehill is attached as Exhibit "B", and includes the deposition of Stonehill's corporate representative(s) and the production of documents.

27. Pursuant to Rule 202.2(g), the requested discovery will include matters that will allow HMIT to evaluate and determine, among other things:

- a. The substance and types of information upon which Stonehill and Farallon relied in making their respective decisions to invest in or acquire the Claims;
- b. Whether Farallon and Stonehill conducted due diligence, and the substance of any due diligence when evaluating the Claims;

³¹ Claimant Trust Agreement [Dkt. 1656-2].

- c. The extent to which Farallon and Stonehill controlled the SPEs, Muck and Jessup, in connection with the acquisition of the Claims;
- d. The creation and organizational structure of Farallon, Stonehill, Muck, and Jessup, as well as the purpose of creating Muck and Jessup as SPEs to hold the Claims;
- e. Any internal valuations of Muck or Jessup's net asset value (NAV);
- f. Any external valuation or audits of the NAV attributable to the Claims;
- g. Any documents reflecting expected profits from the purchase of the Claims;
- h. All communications between Farallon and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;
- i. All communications between Stonehill and Seery concerning the value and purchase of the Claims;
- j. All documents reflecting the expected payout on the Claims;
- k. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and HarbourVest concerning the purchase of the Claims;
- l. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and Acis regarding the purchase of the Claims;
- m. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and UBS regarding the purchase of the Claims;
- n. All communications between Farallon or Stonehill and The Redeemer Committee regarding the purchase of the Claims;
- o. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill regarding the purchase of the Claims;

- p. All communications between Farallon and Stonehill and investors in their respective funds regarding purchase of the Claims or valuation of the Claims;
- q. All communications between Seery and Stonehill or Farallon regarding Seery's compensation as the Trustee of the Claimant Trust;
- r. All documents relating to, regarding, or reflecting any agreements between Seery and the Oversight Committee regarding compensation;
- s. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Stonehill has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;
- t. All documents reflecting the base fees and performance fees which Farallon has received or may receive in connection with management of the Claims;
- u. All monies received by and distributed by Muck in connection with the Claims;
- v. All monies received by and distributed by Jessup in connection with the Claims;
- w. All documents reflecting whether Farallon is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Muck; and
- x. All documents reflecting whether Stonehill is a co-investor in any fund which holds an interest in Jessup.

BENEFIT OUTWEIGHS THE BURDEN

28. The beneficial value of the requested discovery greatly outweighs any conceivable burden that could be placed on the Respondents. The requested information

also should be readily available because the Respondents have been engaged in the bankruptcy proceedings relating to the matters at issue for several years.

29. The important benefit associated with this requested discovery is also clear – it is reasonably calculated to determine whether the Respondents have unjustly garnered tens of millions of dollars of benefit based upon insider information. If this occurred, the monies received as a result of such conduct are properly subject to a constructive trust and disgorged. This would result in substantial funds available for other creditors, including those creditors in Class 10, which includes HMIT as a beneficiary. This significant benefit, in addition to the value of bringing proper light to the activities of Farallon and Stonehill as discussed in this petition, far outweighs any purported burden associated with requiring Respondents to sit for focused depositions concerning the topics and documents identified in Exhibits A and B.

REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORDER

30. After service of this Petition and notice, Rule 202.3(a) requires the Court to hold a hearing on this Petition.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

31. Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust respectfully requests that the Court issue an order pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 authorizing HMIT to take a deposition of designated representatives of Farallon Capital Management, LLC and Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. HMIT additionally requests authorization to

issue subpoenas duces tecum compelling the production of documents in connection with the depositions in compliance with Tex. R. Civ. P. 205, and asks that the Court grant HMIT all such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

**PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY
PLLC**

By: /s/ Sawnie A. McEntire

Sawnie A. McEntire
State Bar No. 13590100
smcentire@pmmlaw.com
Ian B. Salzer
State Bar No. 24110325
isalzer@pmmlaw.com
1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 4400
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 237-4300
Facsimile: (214) 237-4340

Roger L. McCleary
State Bar No. 13393700
rmccleary@pmmlaw.com
One Riverway, Suite 1800
Houston, Texas 77056
Telephone: (713) 960-7315
Facsimile: (713) 960-7347


*Attorneys for Petitioner Hunter
Mountain Investment Trust*

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TEXAS §
 §
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

Before me, the undersigned notary, on this day personally appeared Mark Patrick, the affiant, whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath, affiant testified as follows:

“My name is Mark Patrick. I am the Administrator of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, and I am authorized and capable of making this verification. I have read Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust’s Verified Rule 202 Petition (“Petition”). The facts as stated in the Petition are true and correct based on my personal knowledge and review of relevant documents in the proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054, in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division .”




Mark Patrick

Sworn to and subscribed before me by Mark Patrick on January 20, 2023.



Notary Public in and for
the State of Texas



3116424.1

EXHIBIT G

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT
	§	
HUNTER MOUNTAIN	§	
INVESTMENT TRUST	§	191 ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
	§	
<i>Petitioner,</i>	§	
	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

DECLARATION OF JAMES DONDERO

STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS §


The undersigned provides this Declaration pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 132.001 and declares as follows:

1. My name is James Dondero. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age. I am of sound mind and body, and I am competent to make this declaration. The facts stated within this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
2. I previously served as the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“HCM”). Jim Seery succeeded me in this capacity following the entry of various orders in the bankruptcy proceedings styled *In re Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (“HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings”).
3. On December 17, 2020, I sent an email to employees at HCM, including the then Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer Jim Seery, containing non-public information regarding Amazon and Apple’s interest in acquiring MGM. I became aware of this information due to my involvement as a member of the board of MGM. My purpose was to alert Mr. Seery and others that MGM stock, which was owned either directly or indirectly by HCM, should be on a restricted list and not be involved in any trades. A true and correct copy of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit “1”.

4. In late Spring of 2021, I had phone calls with two principals at Farallon Capital Management, LLC (“Farallon”), Raj Patel and Michael Linn. During these phone calls, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn informed me that Farallon had a deal in place to purchase the Acis and HarbourVest claims, which I understood to refer to claims that were a part of settlements in the HCM Bankruptcy Proceedings. Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn stated that Farallon agreed to purchase these claims based solely on conversations with Mr. Seery because they had made significant profits when Mr. Seery told them to purchase other claims in the past. They also stated they were particularly optimistic because of the expected sale of MGM.
5. During one of these calls involving Mr. Linn, I asked whether they would sell the claims for 30% more than they had paid. Mr. Linn said no because Mr. Seery said they were worth a lot more. I asked Mr. Linn if he would sell at any price and he said that he was unwilling to do so. I believe these conversations with Farallon were taped by Farallon.
6. My name is James Dondero, my date of birth is June 29, 1962, and my address is 3807 Miramar Ave., Dallas, Texas 75205, United States of America. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

FURTHER DECLARANT SAYETH NOT.

Executed in Dallas County, State of Texas, on the 15th day of February 2023.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James Dondero", written over a horizontal line.

JAMES DONDERO

Exhibit 1

From: Jim Dondero <JDondero@highlandcapital.com>

To: Thomas Surgent <TSurgent@HighlandCapital.com>, Jim Seery <jpseeryjr@gmail.com>, Scott Ellington <SELLington@HighlandCapital.com>, "Joe Sowin" <JSowin@HighlandCapital.com>, Jason Post <JPost@NexpointAdvisors.com>

Cc: "D. Lynn (\\"Judge Lynn\\")" <michael.lynn@bondsellis.com>, Bryan Assink <bryan.assink@bondsellis.com>

Subject: Trading restriction re MGM - material non public information

Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:14:39 -0600

Importance: Normal

Just got off a pre board call, board call at 3:00. Update is as follows: Amazon and Apple actively diligencing in Data Room. Both continue to express material interest.

Probably first quarter event, will update as facts change. Note also any sales are subject to a shareholder agreement.

Sent from my iPhone

EXHIBIT H

CAUSE NO. DC-23-01004

IN RE:

HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,

Petitioner.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS


191ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT


ORDER

Came on for consideration *Petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Verified Rule 202 Petition* ("Petition") filed by petitioner Hunter Mountain Investment Trust ("HMIT"). The Court, having considered the Petition, the joint verified response in opposition filed by respondents Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. ("Farallon") and Stonehill Capital Management LLC ("Stonehill"), HMIT's reply, the evidence admitted during the hearing conducted on February 22, 2023, the argument of counsel during that hearing, Farallon's and Stonehill's post-hearing brief, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes that HMIT's Petition should be denied and that this case should be dismissed. Therefore,

The Court ORDERS that HMIT's Petition be, and is hereby, DENIED, and that this case be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.

THE COURT SO ORDERS.

Signed this  day of March, 2023.



HONORABLE GENA SLAUGHTER